

FOREIGN POLICIES OF THE
UNITED STATES.

Prenatal Influencies.

'The aim of Foreign Policy may be taken, "To safeguard the life and property of the nation as a whole, and to furnish opportunities for national growth and welfare."

This is a correct statement of the later day conception. Formerly the personal whims of potentates, inextricably intermingled with dynastic ambitions, staked, oftentimes recklessly, the lives and property of peoples as a whole. Wars have been fought for the passing of the lie, for a blooded horse, for a stolen queen or even a stolen kiss. In these wars provinces have been won or lost, lives and property destroyed.

As states became consolidated and stabilized, able and farsighted rulers disregarded whims and fancies in their practise of statecraft, though dynastic considerations continued to loom large. These considerations tended to merge into and become a part of nationalistic aspirations, for wise monarchs realized that they were as great as the people over whom they ruled, no more no less. Elizabeth of England, Frederick of Prussia, and Louis the 14th were exemplars of this principle. This principle governed the relations of states during the formative days of the American colonies, somewhat lessened in the strength of its application by the inept and selfish Stuarts of England, and by the Bourbon appetite for thrones.

Five nationalities entered into the composition of the population of the thirteen colonies, viz., the Dutch of New York, the Swedes of the Delaware, the English of New

England and of the South, the French of the Carolinas, and the Jews of Spain, domiciled in New York. Under the aegis of the Union Jack these were all collected in harmony by the British Crown. The vast majority were English or of English descent, the remainder became impregnated with English thought and ideals.

It may be stated fairly that the colonies were English in tradition, ~~thought~~ and ⁱⁿ action. They were the property and appendage of England and participated in her fortunes in peace and war. They fought as Englishmen, for they fought not only in their own defense on their borders, but they fought as part of aggressive forces in Canada in Cuba and in the Carribbean. But only those Englishmen in England benefited from their warring. Their conquests were uniformly returned by the peace treaties. Massachusetts men took Louisberg and were very proud of that achievement, for the date of its cession back to France was marked on their calenders in black. Depriving the Colonias of the fruits of their bravery and enterprise, seems to have been a shortsighted and even ungracious policy. It is probable that here were planted the first seeds of difference that afterward developed into cleavage. To be English for purposes of war but not for those of peace could ~~have~~ have made no great appeal to the colonies.

The relations of the Colonias with neighboring French and Spanish colonies, being controlled by London cannot be considered as being embryo foreign policies of the colonies themselves. However, feelings were aroused and passions stirred which did effect foreign policy after independence was won.

Frequently fighting at the behests of monarchs they had never seen for reasons not clear or of no interest to themselves it is not surprising that birth should have been given to the fundamental doctrine of "No intangling alliances."

Other matters developed a consciousness of self, and an identity of interest as among the colonies themselves in opposition to the professed interests of England. The Crown imposed certain trade restrictions. Traffic in some produce was not permitted between the colonies themselves. The artificial routing of such goods was by way of the middleman in England. This was preponderately for the benefit of the British monopolists, though some compensation was granted in the way of compelling the British to buy certain commodities exclusively in the Colonies. In the early days when the settlements were separated by vast stretches of primeval forest these conditions were not found burdensome.

But the Colonies increased in wealth and population. Passable roads ran from Maine to Georgia. Intercourse by water was rapid and easy. Artificial barriers to commerce here, shocked the thrifty trading instinct of the descendants of the world's greatest traders. Taxation too became a sore subject. First imposed by edict of the Crown and later by act of Parliament in both cases without representation or even without consultation, the colonists held that their rights as Englishmen were subverted.

These engrossing questions were considered by a continental league as early as 1745. A Government for colonies much along the lines of later Dominion Governments was proposed to the Crown by this league. This idea being rejected the colonists sought to secure representation in Parliament. British statesmanship, by ordinary so farsighted and clear minded, was providentially, for this time blind and muddled.

It saw in these reasonable and fair proposals a rebellious obstinacy. The argument and logic pro and con read very much along the same lines or same general character as the briefs of present day constitutional lawyers.

It is possible that equal opportunity for trade and free goods in free ships germinated in these troubles and disputes.

It is certain that the instinct for continental solidarity found its first expression in the spontaneous thrust of the frontiersmen toward the Ohio and the Mississippi.

Early Conditions, and Fundamental National Policies.

The outbreak of the Revolution found the United States a suppliant in the Courts of Europe. No where did they find real friendship. The heads that wore crowns did not look with favor on any kind of democratic rebellion, however inspired. Instinctively they realized that an attack on one was an attack on a system, and that the militant ideas on the rampage in America might strike lightning like a-
-cross the Atlantic. But in some quarters the colonists did have the excellent luck to be held the lesser of two evils.

Europe writhed resentfully in the unrelenting grasp of English power at sea. That nation in 'splendid isolation' had checked in sequence each each bid for European hege-
-mony. She had humbled Holland, and had broken Spain, now well advanced in the long decline. France her most able and persistent rival, still outwardly strong, but inwardly drained to exhaustion, tremored to the on-coming convulsion of Revolt. And as ~~rank~~ the need of France was the most urgent, it was from France that the Americans re-
-cieved the most encouragement.

With all the resources of her ^{skilled} ~~able~~ diplomacy she in-
-ed this country to war. Her ~~words~~ promises were fair and her words were fairer, but her actions were lamentably dilatory. However, about her aims and objects she was as candid and as open as even President Wilson would have wished. It was English destruction rather than American construction that France desired; or rather, it was the mu-
-tual exhaustion of both England and England's colonies. This her ministers stated in terms. Further, while she would and did aid the colonies surreptitiously, she had no intention of giving sufficient aid to win the conflict, nor of op-

to ripe
-only enter the fighting until the time was right for her
to ~~xxx~~ gather in the spoils. The arms of the colonists and
Ben Franklin forced her hand. Franklin as an amiable, easy-
-going, and courteous character has been overdone. In Eng-
-land the high quality of his statesmanship was well known.
When Franklin gained France despite the British cruisers,
an Englishman of renown stated that it was a severer blow ~~to~~
to England than the loss of a great battle.

In was in his presence and under his auspices that the
two keenest and most resolute strokes of early American dip-
-plomacy were executed.

Deane had had little luck in securing French aid, so in
the latter part of 1776 Franklin was sent to France. It
must be admitted that he had no better results, ~~xxxxxxxxxxxx~~ ^{for a time.}
He then conceived the idea of opening negotiations with the
British. These were seemingly conducted in all seriousness,
and had not the successes of Burgoyne hardened the hearts
of the English statesmen the war may have closed in a reun-
-ion. Vergennes the French minister kept himself apprised of
~~xxxx~~ the progress of these affairs through spies. When un-
-expectedly Burgoyne surrendered, the British weakened, and
thought the Americans stiffened correspondingly, Vergennes
became frightened. He advised the King that France should ~~re~~
render assistance promptly, else the colonists would win
their independence ~~xxx~~ ~~without~~ themselves and would owe no
gratitude to France. Accordingly in December 1777 France
recognized the independence of the United States, and later
signed a treaty of alliance. Recognition by France was tan-
-amount to a declaration of war with England which promptly
ensued.

Spain was unresponsive and in fact hostile. With correct foreknowledge she was apprehensive and fearful of the spread of the American ideal throughout her own vast possessions. Florida Banca more than once advised Vergennes that France was acting against her own true interests in backing the colonies. Here again it was a case of hating America ~~ix~~ less and England more. Jay succeeded in borrowing \$170.00 through French influence, and soon Spain warred on England at the chariot wheel of France.

Prussia too, popularly supposed to have early shown her friendliness to the United States by prohibiting the passage of hireling Hessians through Prussian territory, did so in fact because Frederick was peeved at England for her alleged desertion of him ~~in~~ the Seven Years War. This also actuated Frederick when he opened his one fortified port to American vessels.

Russia's traditional friendship had the same foundation. Panin, Prime Minister of Russia, was a creature of Frederick the Great, and at that monarch's behest, France and Spain assisting Catherine of Russia was flattered into heading the league of "Armed Neutrality". This was undoubtedly to the benefit of the Americans though as before they had jealousy of Britain rather than liking for themselves to thank.

Holland is alleged to have been friendly for reasons other than self-interest. But self interest was there. She was inimical to England because of the hard usage to which her great sea-borne commerce had been subjected by those lords of the sea. True she opened her ports to Jones and lent us money. But not a guilder did those cross channel Scotchmen part with until underwritten by France.

France assisted at the death blow to Cornwallis and had to hurry lest it fall before the arrival of the French forces. This ended the actual fighting in 1781, but peace was not accomplished until 1783.

At the peace table America found France treacherous and Spain inimical. Her opponent in the field proved her best friend. The ineptness of British statesmen preceding our wars is in strange contrast with their breadth of view and sound sense in compounding peace.

Spain and France plotted together to maintain the States in their original weakness and insecurity, Spain because she feared us, France because she wished to profit by our dependence on herself. They endeavored to restrict us to the Alleghenies, to deprive us of the New Foundland fisheries, to deny us the navigation of the Mississippi, and to give back to England as an insurance for future friction Rhode Island or even New York. Sly overtures to these ends were wisely rejected by the English representatives.

Negotiations dragged. We were bound to France by a treaty to together make war and to together make peace. France and Spain were similarly bound. It soon became evident to our able commissioners that those two powers would use us as a catspaw to pull their own chestnuts out of the English fire, and that peace between the States and England was of all the last thing they wished. With bold resolution the Americans turned secretly to England in deliberate disregard of instructions. Peace with the spoils of war became a fact.

Jay got all the credit for this decisive move, and, also incidently, all the blame from aggrieved France. But Ben Franklin was their, and he was the Elder Statesman of the American group. Plainly he was willing to have it so, and contented himself with inditing to Vergennes a master-

-piece of sauvity in explanation, extenuation and reassuran-
-ance.

At conclusion of the peace, the States had England to the North, Spain to the South, across the Mississippi, and on guard at the mouth of that river and indeed of all rivers emptying into the Gulf. They themselves were a loose confederation, poverty stricken and war worn. There was no consistency, power or purpose in the Government. Foreign policies, as well as interior affairs, were of the moment and for the moment. The Congress, sole governmental agency, was rent by friction and faction, and swayed to and fro by selfish sectionalism.

England ~~maintained~~ watched from her northern forts in a cynical and somewhat bored aloofness. She awaited the execution of the terms of peace. Spain actively antagonist-ic, busied herself in the Southwest fomenting dissension and sedition. France crying greedily for gratitude endeavored to govern through her minister for the benefit of Spain or herself, but never for the benefit of the States. For many years the Minister of France was a power in politics. This led to a restrained expression from the profound wisdom of Washington to the effect that while gratitude was a gracious ^{or should} virtue, no state could be trusted beyond its own self in-terest.

What the leading men of the day held that our future encompassed is of interest. Washington great as he was saw only to the Mississippi with Jay in accord. Jefferson, with reluctance saw only to the mouth of that river, though af-terwards, after the acquisition of Louisiana, with his cus-tomary spryness he went all the way to China. Hamilton in the beginning visioned the Pacific, and there he looked eye to eye with the instinct of the nation.

-ing an adequate Navy for protection, but Washington took no steps to build a Navy. This fact is hard to explain. Had a navy been builded this country would have been saved ~~than~~ twenty years of humiliation.

~~Washington~~ England and France joined in battle in 1793.

Washington immediately issued a proclamation ~~of~~ of neutrality, an admirable document, taking it is said a new and improved ground in international relations. Except that it sounded well, it was void of effect, because it lacked support in ships and guns. Nor is this surprising in view of the greatness of the forces involved and the desperate character of the conflict.

For a little while nothing happened. France held off hoping that we would come in as her ally under ~~the~~ the terms of our treaty with her. A large pro-Gallican party supported this view both among the people and in Congress. But Washington in his wisdom held that France was the aggressor and that under the treaty we were bound to aid her only in case she was attacked. Hence Neutrality.

Neutrality meant little or nothing to the great powers at war. Rather they believed in the Mosaic dictum, 'those who are not with us are against us.' France began it by laying restriction and confiscation on our sea carrying trade. England promptly followed suit, and went one better. Our Atlantic commerce was a rich prize absolutely defenseless. Washington protested politely. But Adams began the building of a Navy. France lost in the unofficial war that followed, and when Napoleon rose to power was quite willing to come to terms.

However, that restless spirit broke ~~with~~ with England in 1803, dropped Louisiana into our lap rather than let it fall to his enemy, and commenced his decrees that, seconded by England drove our flag from the seas.

Jefferson was a man of culture, and well read. He learned less from the teachings of history than any other states-

-man of record. But he was also the most agile political gymnast in history, profiting from errors with a quick abruptness. He laid up the ships that Adams had builded, and placed into effect the negative policy of the embargo. This practically ruined the country. French naval power disappeared. Such American vessels as put to sea were subjected to insult, confiscation and impressment of seamen by the English. This led to the war of 1812, the ending of which coincident with the downfall of Bonaparte brought peace to an exhausted world.

Here or perhaps some years before the United States may be said to have attained the full majesty of a sovereign state, both as to inward grace and external impression. She appreciated her independence in thought and action and with sufficient dignity demanded a similar appreciation from the outside world. She had learned many lessons, and with emphasis that one which precluded parties pro-Gallican pro-English, or pro any other country except America, as being not conducive to comfort and well-being. The treaty of Alliance with France from which sprung the folly of Genet and the insolence of the Directory, convinced the young people's nation that intangling alliances were dangerous. The oft repeated spectacle of the quarrels of Europe crossing the Atlantic to be fought out by their nationals in this hemisphere gave birth to the idea of America for Americans, later concisely expressed by Monroe.

Neutrality, a new departure in polity, was it is stated first authentically proclaimed by Washington. This has since become a tenant in international law with nothing peculiarly American about it.

To a weak nation, with no navy, yet owning a great merchant fleet, the doctrine of 'Free ships make free goods'

later to acquire the more resounding title of Freedom of the Seas, made a profound appeal.

Some authorities accredit this country with first putting forward the principle of arbitration for the settlement of disputes between nations. But this principle is now international in character, not solely American.

The Territorial Expansion of the United States, and
the Extension of its Influence.

The continental expansion of the United States was a spontaneous movement of the people. Before the Revolution ~~was~~ was over ~~they~~ they poured through the passes of the Alleghenies as naturally, as resistlessly, and as certainly as the tides. Always until the Pacific they were forcing the Government to action. While ~~the~~ Louisiana ~~was~~ was under the hesitating and uncertain consideration of Jefferson, they had beat against and passed by the irritating but feeble barriers of Spain. While Florida was was being ceded, the frontiersmen were filling Texas. While Texas was being annexed they were streaming into ~~the~~ California and into the Oregon lands to the stirring ~~stains~~ strains of "Oh! Susanna." The statesmen never quite caught up until the western ocean was reached.

Louisiana under Spain was a constant source of irritation. Spain held both banks of the lower Mississippi. The settlers in the Ohio and Mississippi valleys had no way of getting their goods to market except down the river. They found the custom regulations and the arbitrarily imposed prices excessively tyrannical. The treaty of 1795 giving to the United States all that she could fairly ask settled affairs on paper but not in actuality for the Spanish officials continued in part their oppressive practices in disregard of the treaty and presumably of instructions from the home government. The high spirited and resourceful pioneers retaliated by smuggling, evasion and on some ~~occasions~~ occasions by force.

So when Bonaparte offered Spain an European principality for Louisiana Spain accepted gladly actuated no doubt as much by a wish to interpose a strong barrier between her

remaining possessions and the pushing aggressive Americans as by the desire for another throne in Europe.

The restless and warlike genius of Napoleon in Louisiana was in the highest degree unwelcome to America. Aroused and alarmed, Congress voted money and authorized negotiations for a settlement. They contemplated merely, however, the purchase of New Orleans or other port of deposit and the clear navigation of the Mississippi. Here the threat of the British fleet interposed powerfully in our behalf. War impended between France and England. Rather than have Louisiana fall to his deadly enemy, Bonaparte counseled the American commissioners to exceed their instructions and buy the whole of Louisiana. We were fortunate to possess that empire so cheaply, still in the end it must have become ours anyway either by purchase or by conquest.

Jefferson having tasted the sweets of imperialism turned wholeheartedly to the Floridas. Here too the rifle and axe of the frontiersman had preceded him. And they found the going hard. The Indians were savage and warlike. Run-away slaves, desperate fugitives from justice, deserters and off-scourings of the fleets and armies of a world at war nested in the Floridas and in the adjacent islands. Spain torn and desolated by the mighty forces that swirled about Bonaparte could do no effective police work. Robbers bucaniers and privateers from bases protected by the Spanish flag plied their trades and on occasion made inroads into United States territory. These furnished excuse for reprisal and occupation by our troops.

Jefferson's contention was that West Florida was within the limits of Louisiana. This does not appear to have been the view of calmer and less impulsive statesmen. But he pressed the point persistently, even asking aid of the French. The French Ambassador's comment was to the effect

That the United States would go to any depth of humiliation and or moral depravity to satisfy its sordid avarice for the Floridas.

In the War of 1812 England and America contended for Florida, their armed forces paying not the slightest attention to Spanish sovereignty. Afterwards Jackson cleaned out the outlaw strongholds. Amid threats of war and actual acts of war, crimination and recrimination, negotiations for the purchase of Floridas continued. Under duress Spain yielded and we obtained both East and West Florida for \$5,000,000 in 1821, relinquishing in addition whatever claim we may have had to Texas under the Louisiana Purchase. This latter condition was at a subsequent date regretted.

This ~~the~~ acquisition gave us a vital interest in the entire ^{was} Carribean Area, and probably the deciding motivation to the enunciation of the Monroe Doctrine which followed shortly. That bold assertion blanketed not only the Carribean, but promulgated an extension of influence over a hemisphere.

Mexico won her independence and the title to Spain's holdings in the West passed to that country. Gladly she welcomed American settlers in her vacant empire, offering them many inducements. They flooded in, but did not become Mexican citizens, and were antagonistic to every Mexican thought and mode. Mexico found them tough, unruly, distressing indigestible, Too late she closed her borders. Revolt ensued and Texas became independent in 1836. We recognized the young Republic, but though she many times knocked at our door refused her admission into the Union. This was an example of picayune party factionalism. The Anti-Slavery men of the north feared an extension of slave territory and influence.

Texas tired of begging and played poker. Then as now Texans were accomplished at that game. They feared an attempt by Mexico to reconquer them, and if the United States would not play the role of protector then perhaps France or England would. These great powers played up eagerly to this chance of weakening and restricting the United States.

To American politicians this was a horse of another color. Cheek by jowl with a nation of the same breed was one thing, side by side with an European power was decidedly another. With an anxious hurry the Act of Annexation was passed and signed. The Texan minister wore an inscrutable expression, and with but slight interest intimated that the incident was closed, until the Act was signed. Then Texas came in as quickly as the United States had opened the door.

Mexico construed this as an ~~act~~ hostile act, and the much criticized war with Mexico followed. Looking back it is difficult to see how the United States could have acted differently. Many consciences, however, would have been salved if we had not conceded to Spain our claim to Texas.

We took the northern part of Mexico as the spoils of this war, crossing the continent in a stride. With California we ~~re~~ acquired Spain's claim to the Oregon lands, which was to prove valuable in our dispute with Britain. In 1853 we rounded out our conquest of 1848 with the Gadsden purchase. There is one little noted incident about our peacemaking with Mexico. All of Polk's cabinet was unanimous for the subjugation and retention of the whole of Mexico. Polk, a severely censured man took upon himself the responsibility of vetoing this advice.

Our influence now extended to the Western Ocean, and was ~~xxxx~~ soon to be felt there as we crossed that body of water in successive steps.

Rivalry for the Oregon lands began in the early days of the Nineteenth century. Both British and American hunters and trappers were at the mouth of the Columbia and on the shores of Puget Sound as early as 1811. In that year the Americans founded Astoria.

American claims were founded on cession from Spain in the Florida treaty of 1819, discovery and exploration of the Columbia by Grey in 1788, the Lewis and Clarke Expedition, such claims as France may have had through the Louisiana Purchase, and actual occupation at Astoria and other trading points. Also, the Mexican conquests conveyed to us whatever title Mexico may have had. England countered with discoveries by Cook, explorations by Mackenzie, and actual settlements by her nationals. Russia endeavored to extend her Alaskan territory southward, but we settled with her in the Treaty of 1824, fixing 54-40 Latitude as the southern boundary of Alaska. At the time this was esteemed a victory for our diplomats, but England was to use our own arguments against us in a later dispute over the Alaskan Boundary. These lands were a matter of continuous controversy with Great Britain, with frequent compromise until 1846 when Latitude 49^r was agreed upon as the northern boundary to the Straits of Juan de Fuca. These Straits continued the boundary to the Pacific. This was the last great territorial dispute.

Seward and ardent expansionist, and a firm believer that our future lay in the Pacific was instrumental in putting through the Purchase of Alaska and the Aleutian Islands from Russia in 1867. This completed until this date our territorial expansion on the continent though it does not mean that, necessarily, our instinct for continental solidarity is as yet satisfied.

Our relations with Hawaii began in 1789. They rapidly became most friendly, and trade and social intercourse increas-

by leaps and bounds. While all of our doings in those Islands were not consistently creditable to us, yet from friendship and self interest the inhabitants thereof leaned more toward us than to other powers. More than once we warned off both England and France from interference in the affairs of the ~~ix~~ Islanders, employing language much like that used in the Monroe Doctrine.

A great factor in strengthening the ties of amity were ~~xx~~ some fourteen New England missionaries who arrived in the Islands in 1819. These and their descendants played important parts in subsequent history. Also, the effects of the seductive atmosphere of the South Seas on the cold and stern New England conscience has given birth to much entertaining literature.

commanding the Peacock
Captain ap Catesby Jones visited ~~the~~ Honolulu in 1825 on a mission to compose differences that had arisen between the natives and American citizens. This he did admirably, and exceeding his instructions, negotiated a treaty of commerce and friendship. This however was not fully ratified until over a generation later.

In 1836 apprehensive of British and French aggression, the King of Hawaii made the first proposals of annexation to this country. These were renewed from time to time but failed principally from lack of interest in the United States. True Secretary Marcy, gave the matter serious consideration and support in the middle of the century. Two treaties were drafted but as both contemplated almost immediate statehood for the islands, Marcy did not recommend approval. Besides both England and France protested in the strongest terms.

After this the subject lapsed with but sporadic revival until the Spanish American War. Urgent need of a stepping stone across the Pacific hurried through the accomplishment of annexation.

Our interests in Samoa ~~are~~ were on a scale to attract attention ~~interest~~ as early as 1850. Prior to that time wandering whalers and traders had often touched there, and ~~their~~ their tales of the beauty and amiability of the ~~isla~~ inhabitants of the islands, and of the wealth of natural produce had advertised them widely.

Many nations contended there in rivalry but ~~the~~ the three greatest, the United States, England, and Germany overshadowed all others. The conflicting ambitions of these powerful countries were to keep Samoa in tumult and uproar for an half a century. No country appears to have acquitted itself with any credit. All had rash and indiscre^t representatives, considerably below the standards of the diplomatic service of these countries.

As a matter of fact England, Germany, and the United ~~St~~ States warred against each other in the islands, using, however instead of their own armed forces, native ^{factions} soldiery of the ~~factions~~ which they had created and insitigated. True white troops did on occasion fight the native adherents of one country or the other, but white men were not pitted against white men, though this country was twice on the verge of war with Germany.

In spite of frequent conferences and one tri-party treaty matters were not improved. A government with three heads could not function, particularly when each head was suspicious and ~~envious~~ jealous and ~~envious~~ of the other two. The Islands were ~~divi~~ divided in 1899, this country receiving Tutuila, with the harbor of Pago Pago, and Germany the remainder of the Islands, England being compensated by the cession of a German island. The capture of the Philippines with its great ~~accession~~ accession to our solicitude in the Pacific, doubtless gave the impetus which carried the Samoan question to its conclusion.

Settlement of the one hundred year old account with Spain was forced in 1898. We had been constantly embroiled with that stubborn and proud but outmoded nation. The Prince of Peace Godoy and Lee as early as 1795 discussed peace or war with calm insouciance. Seemingly Godoy was cynically careless of the outcome, though in the end he did sign a treaty advantageous to this country.

Again in the early years of the next century the Floridas caused constant and dangerous friction. Spain ruined in the Napoleonic ~~xxx~~ catastrophe, could no more resent the acts of war of Jackson than she could prevent similar acts of war by the renegades ^{from} under her colors in Florida.

The imperturbability of Grant and Fish, in connection with the hasty backdown of Spain prevented war over the Virginias in 1873. This matter, however, rankled in the mind of the American public.

From this time on the press, the ~~press~~ people and the politicians progressed toward war, while conditions in Cuba became more and more of a 'public nuisance.' The cool statesmanship of Cleveland and Olney staved off the inevitable, until when with the election of McKinley Spain's hour had struck.

As the result of this war the United States gained Cuba under a virtual protectorate, and took in fee simple, Guam Puerto Rico, and the Philippines. It has already been regretted and will be more regretted in the future that we did ~~not~~ ^{ourselves of} not possess all her islands in the Pacific which have since gone via Germany to Japan. Some say the Philippines fell ~~int~~ into our hands ~~it~~ as an unexpected white elephant, from the surprising completeness of Dewey's victory. One authority has it that, McKinley with penetrating vision, struck toward China and the Orient, not toward Spain, when he ordered the American Squadron to Manilla. Those ~~they~~ may be specu-

-lations but it is a fact that our eminent peace commiss-
-ioners were of divided mind and confused counsel. Two favor-
-ed the return of the Phillipines entire, two wanted one
island or a coaling station, This last it was stated would
have been satisfactory to President McKinley.

But Whitelaw Reid was a diplomat and a statesman of ex-
-perience. He held out logically for the retention of the
entire archipelago. His argument was that we had gone to
war to bring a finish to Spanish misrule in one island, and
that it would be to the highest degree inconsistent, to
leave any of the islands we had conquered to that misgov-
-ment. This view obtained though \$20,000,000 was paid as a
sop to our sentimentalists and to Spanish pride. Strange
commentary that Phillipine independence was a major pol-
-itical issue for twelve years.

The great American merchant marine had disappeared be-
-fore confederate cruisers and steam propelled vessels.
Enterprise and adventure turned inland, away, from the sea.
Great things went on but in silence and almost in seclusion
from the outside world. For almost a half a century the
American was studiously introspective.

In 1898, figuratively speaking, with his mountains tun-
-neled, his rivers bridged, his forests cleared, and his
lands populated behind him, he aroused himself and looked
with keen inquiring eyes about the world, mostly westward.

The Phillipine foothold in the East was an additional
reason for, and was the spearhead that gave a point to, John
Hay's demand for the open door. Cuba and Porto Rico
intensified our interest and clinched our influence in the
Carribean. The magnificent cruise of the Oregon was an ad-
-vertising feat of the first magnitude and focused the
attention of the patriotism of the country on the Panama
Canal which from that time was assured.

From now on our country was in and of the world with
constantly expanding interests and influence.

The old line governments of the European mainland were outraged into savage hostility by the insolence of the ~~parve~~ parvenu Republic in daring to measure swords with an ancient Empire. Our defeat was freely predicted. The suddenness and certitude of our victory was stunning. ~~Their~~ ^{Their} sorrow over Spain was strongly tinged, with an unwilling and alarmed respect for the United States. With pronounced inhospitality they cleared room for us on the stage of the world.

Old England, in the meanwhile, chuckled ~~up~~ in her Victorian sleeve with something closely akin to pride in the ^{her} prowess of estranged offspring. She offered to do more, and in fact checked Germany's hostile move.

Panama came in 1903, an inevitable finale. The brigandage of Colombia was countered by the strong armed Mr. Roosevelt, and the United States acquired the Canal and the Zone in perpetual lease.

We purchased the Virgin Islands from the Danes in 1917, another natural step.

The Monroe Doctrine.

This famous fiat was first partially phrased by Jefferson. England threatened the Floridas, and President Jefferson instructed the American Minister to England to say to the British government that, "we should contemplate a change of neighbors with great uneasiness," and that, "a balance of power on our borders is not less desirable to us than a balance of power in Europe has always appeared to them." But the thought was in the minds of many men. There was a hint of it in the ^{words} ~~minds~~ of Hamilton and of Washington

It comes very close to being that kind of a policy, which is instinctively conceived and effected, by an unanimous feeling or reaction in ~~the~~ the people. Only the time and the opportunity was ~~awaited~~ awaited to formulate it in an expression of the national will.

The Triple or Holy Alliance furnished the occasion, England afforded the opportunity, and to a vigorous nation of ten million inhabitants conscious of their rising ~~strength~~ strength the time was already ripe.

The causes of the birth and promulgation of the Doctrine are easily analyzed. Prior to independence and for the first fifty years of our national existence the inhabitants of ~~the~~ the United States were constantly embroiled in the quarrels of Europe. For several years after we were recognized free our citizens from habit presumably developed factions for one or another of the warring powers in Europe. Our peace was ~~threatened~~ threatened by these dissensions. Even after the sense had been acquired to keep clear of Europe's troubles in a party sense, they still remained dangerous to us. For we were ringed by foreign colonies, and foreign conflict waged close about us.

Nor were ~~they~~ those great powers any too considerate of our rights. They imposed on us when ever by so doing they ~~we~~ could aid themselves or injure an enemy.

Now the United States had possessed itself of Louisiana^a-ia, and more recently of Florida. The sense of relief, not because of the accession of these lands to our area, but because potential enemies and potential trouble makers had abandoned ~~them to our neighborhood, was very great.~~ our neighborhood, was very great.

There followed an enhancement of prosperity, and the increased feeling of peace and security made a marked impression on the minds of all. An extension and a permanence of the conditions bringing this about was most urgently desired. The Colonies of Spain were gradually removing that despotism from large provinces to the south, to the gratification of American citizens, both from a natural sympathy with the revolutionists and because each deflection lessened the chances of friction with Spain.

On the reverse side ^mRussia was aiming from Alaska toward California. England had already attacked the Argentine. Her ^binterests in the unstable Carribean were many. Both England and France heavy creditors of Spain looked greedily at the rich Antilles. Then came the proposal of the Holy Alliance that precipitated the crisis.

This association of despots had banded themselves together to secure their own thrones, to uphold their idea of legitimate succession to other thrones, and to put down revolt everywhere. They had crushed self-determination in France, and had enforced their 'legitimacy' in Spain. With idle fleets and armies they turned abroad. The proposal was the reconquest of the Spanish dominions in the New World.

England cannily demurred, having no desire to lose her valuable trade with the freed colonies. The United States were alarmed feeling themselves the true target of the kings and ~~emperors.~~ emperors. The parblind Alliance determined to go ahead counting on the quiescence of Great Britain.

Here Canning, Prime Minister, of the British Empire and a great statesman initiated the Monroe Doctrine.

In brief he suggested a joint protest ~~at~~ to the proposed action of the Alliance. At first this was received with marked favor that is the joint action of this country with Great Britain. Opposition per se to the Alliance became a matter of enthusiastic patriotism. Madison and Jefferson, elder statesmen to whom ~~this~~ ~~the~~ ~~British~~ ~~proposal~~ was referred both recommended approval. However, delay ensued, argument and study. It was in the end decided that this country should alone announce determined opposition to any European conquest in this country. The liberated Colonies of Spain received ~~this~~ the Doctrine with wild acclaim. The certainty of American troop superiority at any contested point under the escort of the English Navy caused the Alliance to abandon the project. This was done with an ill grace. Metternich ~~for~~ who formed the Alliance, stated there was "a ~~xxx~~ great danger in these vast republics of the New World." Bismarck, that arrogant and ~~quite~~ ~~star~~ statesman said, "It is a piece of arrogance peculiar to Americans and inexcusable."

England backed ~~the~~ ~~proposal~~ ^{America} in the Chancelleries of Europe ^o too, but the whole of it was most ~~to~~ strong for her stomach. To this country she contented herself with Canning's somewhat non-committal remark that, "the unoccupied lands in this hemisphere were considered subject to colonization by English nationals." However it stood, while we were weak principally because of European dissensions, and when we became strong ^{then} in our own right.

It was frequently evoked in our long rivalry with Britain over Canal rights and the contiguous territory. But ~~matter~~ affairs with that country in that region though often critical were not permitted to come to a flat declaration of the Monroe Doctrine against English schemes nor did England permit herself to be drawn into a flat denouncement of the Doctrine.

Perhaps our statesmen were not so sure of our position in those long drawn out disputes. It was intended as a purely defensive measure, made no attack on existing European holding and in this hemisphere, in fact it confirmed them ~~xx~~ to an extent by inference protected the weaker nations from despoilment by the stronger. The question relative to the Carribean and Canal area hinged on what were existing English rights at the time of the publication of the Doctrine. Actual ~~xxx~~ by virtue of territory held, of great trade interests, of seapower, and potential by virtue of expanding commerce, particularly if a Canal were cut, and by a permanence of sea superiority they were of considerable extent. These considerations withheld perhaps a bold assertion ~~xx~~ of the Doctrine in the face of England. The Clayton-Bulwer Treaty just about confirmed the status quo conceding England an equal interest in Canal projects and by a secret note acknowledged her protectorate of the Mosquito Coast of Nicaragua.

Both France and England were warned away from the Antilles and later from Texas, applications of the Doctrine indisputably correct.

A mere hint, backed as it was with a veteran army ran the French out of Mexico, where they had taken advantage of our civil war preoccupation.

The Canal again came to the front. The Monroe Doctrine ran counter to France in the De Lesseps attempt and shares equally that fiasco with malaria and graft.

Dispute with England continued until after the Spanish War when in the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty she frankly acknowledged ~~xx~~ our priority in the whole Carribean region.

She had laid the ground work for this action by her ~~xx~~ acquiescence to the demand made upon her by Cleveland, in the name of the Monroe Doctrine for a settlement of the Venezuela boundaries claims.

In regard to the same country Roosevelt cited the ~~Monroe~~ Doctrine against Germany to that nation's discomfiture. However, Germany of the Empire never accepted the Monroe Doctrine.

This about finishes the uses of that national ^{policy} with respect to Europeans. It was invoked once against Japan when the Congress passed a resolution forbidding foreign colonization on any large scale in countries near to us. This had reference to an alleged Japanese establishment in Magdalena Bay, and seems an entirely logical extension of ~~the~~ the famous policy.

In regard to the countries south of us the Monroe Doctrine has become a coat of many colors, and has been tailored to a variety of fits. These applications more properly fall under other headings of the outline.

THE ISTHMIAN CANAL.

Cortez first conceived a Canal connecting the Atlantic and Pacific. Thereafter the idea was intermittently evangelized by adventurers, expansionists, and large scale gamblers. The acquisition of the Floridas in 1821 crystalized interest in the subject in the United States and gave it that vital ~~an~~ and increasing impulse which brought it to fruition in 1914.

Schemers of most nationalities were sooner or later to participate in plans to cut a canal. ~~Practically~~ All feasible routes from Mexico to New Granada were the object of negotiation or treaty over a period of three quarters of a century.

England and this country engaged in fierce rivalry for canal concessions which in the 1840s approached war. This ~~rivalry~~ rivalry though general throughout the Isthmus centered in Nicaragua then held to be the most likely canal route. England bested us there, though so intense was her concentration in that locality that she allowed to go through unprotected our Treaty with New Granada, which in 1848 gave to us exclusive canal and rail rights in the region where now lies the Canal. This treaty with New Granada now Colombia was the foundation of the existing Canal.

Because of this Treaty however ^{we} did not lessen our efforts in Nicaragua. Recurring and serious troubles with ~~Ex-~~ Britain there finally led up to the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty wherein we pooled all canal rights with England. Viewed from ~~the~~ the situation as it now exists, England's demand appear to have been presumptuous and her diplomacy highly successful. But England's holdings on the Mainland and in the islands of the Caribbean area were important, she was the greatest trading nation, and indisputably held the power at sea. Her wishes could not be ~~unreasonable~~ unreasonable from her viewpoint. She was fortunate in having to deal with Clayton who from our point of view was at worst a near traitor and at best a cheap politician.

To illustrate how strong the English position was in the public and press of this country it is only necessary to remember that granting her full equality in the Canal aroused no opposition. In fact Clayton was held somewhat of a hero because he had avoided impending war, until the discovery of his secret note betraying the Monroe Doctrine relative to the Mosquito coast discredited him. England held tenaciously to her powers under that treaty for a half a century.

Louis Napoleon dreamed of Mexico, a Canal and a French Empire in the South Seas. The ending of our Civil War shattered that dream.

De Lesseps with a reputation and millions in money started excavating on the present route in 1878. The attitude of the United States was hostile, as it could not fail to be under the Monroe Doctrine and the Treaty with New Granada. No overt act was committed; climate, the mosquito, corruption and apprehension of what action the United States would eventually take, were as effective as hostilities. The digging ended in ditch water and De Lesseps in disgrace.

There is no record of English activity while the French were at work. Her quiescence is a matter of interesting speculation.

Meanwhile opinion in the United States was steadily increasing to the effect that the Canal must be American made and American owned. Grant said it and Hayes repeated him. Cleveland in his first term had a curious lapse from this stand probably just because he was a democrat. He corrected himself in his second term and an American Canal became a fixed national policy.

Great Britain stood stolidly in the way. In the Canal region our ministers, more patriotic than practical negotiated several treaties that went full in the face of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty. Naturally, these failed of approval by our Government.

However, England's position began to show signs of gradual disintegration. She abandoned aggression in the entire Caribbean region. In 1895 absorbed in South Africa and fully comprehending the German challenge at sea, she was perhaps secretly glad, though outwardly reluctant, to concede us primacy in the Caribbean by giving way to Cleveland in the Venezuelan dispute. She herself pointed the way, which was the replacement of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty.

Our power was proved and our prestige enhanced by our victory over Spain. It was no great tax on the abilities of John Hay to substitute his own and Paunceforte's understanding for the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty. England gave up much that she had contended for. We acquired the right to own, operate and fortify. England retained equal tolls not only for herself but for all nations. A bumptious and uninformed senate threatened to deprive her of this.

England being out of the way Hay turned his attention to Colombia, with the old New Granada Treaty as a basis for negotiations. A Treaty was drafted but Colombia failed to ratify it claiming that it was contrary to her Constitution to alienate territory. The real trouble was that the United States did not offer a sufficient bribe for the Zone. It was in truth a holdup.

Panama revolted and Roosevelt recognized the new government within four days. There is somewhat more than a suspicion that we helped to foment the revolt. Certainly we prevented reconquest. Our justification was ~~that~~ a kind of right of eminent domain. And however well founded that claim may be it would have paid us in dollars and cents if we had submitted to the avarice of Colombia. Our strong arm methods earned us the distrust and fear of Latin America, and the loss of good will did hurt and will hurt our trade with the Latins. We settled with Colombia for \$25,000,000, eventually, but the incident left a lasting unfavorable impression to the South of us.

We have solidified our position in the Isthmus being possessed by treaty or by understanding with canal routes that are feasible wherever they may be. The world recognition of the Monroe Doctrine and of our paramount interest in the Canal region lends what seems to be ~~mixing~~ a lasting security.

Policies since the Spanish American War.

The Pacific American relations with the powers in the Pacific proper, had been friendly, advisory and helpful. American policy had been in marked contrast to the grab all methods of other western powers. The conquest of the Philippines changed our own attitude decidedly with respect to the Far East and ~~xxxxxxxxxxxx~~ and was the opening rift in our friendship with Japan. We had heretofore devoted ourselves to a mild attempt to secure equal trade opportunity for our merchants. We had deprecated the spheres of influence and concessions by which China was despoiled by the rival nations of Europe but had taken no decided step to check the partition .

Now with a base close to the mainland to sharpen our interest as well as to give force to our words John Hay protested in a masterly demand for the open door. England accepted gladly, for, calling home her fleets and girding herself against the German defiance, she desired to reduce her commitments about the world. France agreed unwillingly, Germany and Japan sullenly for both coveted the Philippines.

We dealt more gently with China during and after the Boxer outbreak than did the other interested powers.

Our moral and financial support to Japan during the Russian War, with Mr. Roosevelt's aid in securing to her some of the fruits of her victory mitigated her envy of the Philippines.

The English Japanese Alliance accomplished in 1905 has seemed to most to have been in bad taste. However, it has been helpful to us. Australia and New Zealand felt themselves abandoned and looked toward us as defenders of their announced policy of the Antipodes for white men. China was farther estranged from Great Britain and even the Canadian viewpoint was influenced in our favor. Of course, they were actuated solely by their own interest.

Britain's Asian fleet was freed for use in home waters, while Japan secured a closed sea in the Northwest Pacific.

At the conclusion of the Japanese Russian war the terms of the peace treaty gave helpless Korea to the tender mercies of Japan. This government did not protest though by our ancient treaty with Korea we were bound to employ our good offices in her behalf. Mr. Roosevelt carried away by his impulsive enthusiasm for the Japanese kept silent.

In 1906 California passed a school law discriminating against the Japanese. This began our racial troubles with Japan as yet unfinished. This and each succeeding ~~ix~~ like action by California was bitterly resented by Japan. We have been near to war with her on several occasions, but until 1924 our government was always able to deprecate the acts of the State of California, as against the national will, though an exercise of state right under the Constitution. California in that year excluded the Japanese. Japan in her protest resorted to a threat. Congress in a somewhat bombastic mood passed promptly the Oriental Exclusion Act.

This terminated the so called gentleman's agreement initiated by Mr. Roosevelt. Both he and succeeding Presidents one of whom employed the silver tongued Mr. Bryan, alternately railed at and pleaded with California. That state remained adamant. California is severely censured by publicists, who however live elsewhere. This is a striking example of how the most studiously correct and conventional statecraft gives way before a racial instinct.

Japan had always felt herself robbed by the great powers of her victory over China, and in some measure of her victory over Russia. The Great War as far as Europe was concerned, and the ignorant, weak, and visionary statesmanship of the Wilson regime as far as this country was concerned gave her her opportunity. She went joyously to the looting of China.

She presented her twenty one sharpened points to China in 1916. China in desperation appealed to us. But we withheld our hand until after the event and when we did protest had the

innocent nerve to protest also to China. In 1917 ourselves putting forth the most monumental war effort of history, Japan cleverly pressing the disadvantages of our position secured from Mr. Lansing a partial acquiescence to the principles of her twenty one points.

We retrieved ourselves in the Washington conference with respect to China. In accord with England we obtained considerable relief for China. The price that we paid for that, as well as for the dream of disarmament, that Republican answer to the sentimentalism of the League of Nations, was control of the sea and fortification of our Oriental possessions. That price has not yet/ but will be concretely expressed in terms of ships, money and lives.

We now stand, as we always have stood though in a vacillating manner, for an independent, integral China, open to the trade of the world. History may acclaim this as our wisest and most farsighted statesmanship.

England fortifies Singapore, a significant act.

In The Carribean.

The Panama Canal has made our interests in the Carribean paramount to all others. That statement is so because we have the power. The canal has become vital to our existence. The law of self preservation then requires, that we shall, if we may, exercise control over all areas from which the Canal may be menaced. We may.

The United States ~~has~~ forbids in terms any power fortifying or seizing territory near the Canal. This so far accord with the Monroe Doctrine. It also forbids any smaller countries in the Carribean area ~~from~~ so misbehaving as to incite foreign countries to attack and punish. This was considered a proper inference from the Monroe Doctrine, but brought that doctrine into such disrepute in Latin America that the present tendency is to permit that policy to stand on its own legs.

Germany and other European Powers threatened action against

San Domingo. Roosevelt under the broad shibbolith of the Monroe Doctrine, took over the control of police and customs in that small country. Though this was done by treaty it aroused a ~~xxx~~ storm of apprehensive disapproval in Latin America. Nor did Mr. Roosevelt's miniatory, and paternal remarks on small bad boy nations improve the situation.

Later the altruistic Wilson administration did the same in Hayti.

It is worthy of remark that San Domingo as soon as we evacuated, joined the League of Nations. If we go in there again we may run foul of the League non-aggression guarantee.

The Second Occupation of Cuba was also roundly criticised by the press to the south of us.

In Central America a part of the same area our policy has been the same. Nicaragua site of the next canal has been the recipient of frequent attentions from us. This has also been in accord with ~~xxxx~~ treaty, and while entirely natural from the viewpoint of our government is as naturally imperialistic from the viewpoint of Latin America.

Toward Mexico the United States have been curiously inconsistent. Just at the present moment relations have been better than for years, though our troubles have been recurrent since Diaz. Mr. Wilson bullied strongly but acted weakly. He demanded a salute but left Vera Cruz without it. He sent an Army after Villa but recalled it with that bandit still at liberty. ~~He~~ is the schoolmarm who scolds but lacks the courage to spank.

To the Latin mind inconsistency or ~~we~~ yielding is due to weakness, and it would be interesting to know just where that mind located the weakness. South America shrieked at our oppressing Mexico, while at the same time they scorned our indecision there.

Mr. Wilson attempted to impose his own ideas of legitimacy in succession to the government. Not only in Mexico but elsewhere he demanded that he be satisfied that any new government was constitutionally established. This bit of arrogance

must have produced good results from the viewpoint of our Government for the Republican administrations have followed the same rule.

Latin America. Our policies here have been desperately bent on securing goodwill. For every strong action in the Caribbean area we have had to endeavor to placate an hostile public opinion in South America.

Nor have we had much success.

The Pan American idea sponsored by us in the honest endeavor to promote, trade intercourse and friendship has in general worked toward those ends. Though not always. Frequently the Pan American Congress in its palatial home in Washington has been the vehicle of scarcely veiled insult and affront to the United States. Cuba and Panama because of their dependence on the United States, Peru, because Chili dislikes both Peru and this country, Brazil, a lone Portugese surrounded by Spaniards one of whom is a traditional enemy, have been our chief supporters in that Congress. Cuba and Panama have been frequently accused of subservience.

In spite of this we have rendered those countries good service. General Pershing laid the foundation for the settlement of the Tacna-Arica trouble. With other American countries we mediated with success between Bolivia and Paraguay.

Our Naval Missions to Peru and Brazil strengthened the ties between ourselves and them, but estranged Chili, to a greater extent if possible, and also the Argentine, who considered it expedient to improve her Navy.

We have had many things to contend with in South America, the natural jealousy and envy which is a price always exacted of power and wealth, the mutual irritation between Latin and Anglo-Saxon, resulting from hundreds of years of rivalry in all lines of human endeavor, fear of what they consider imperialism, whether it was flamboyantly advertised by ~~Wilson~~ Roosevelt or soft-pedaled by Wilson.

Mr. Hoover's visit was another extra-ordinary effort

to allay suspicion and to promote good feeling.

Europe. The record of our diplomacy with the countries in that geographical division is a remarkable history of advance and withdrawal. It was ignorant and visionary in the first years of Mr. Wilson's administration, and though informed later remained visionary to the end of his terms.

Both Germany and England sensed his inherent indecision and aversion to the use of force. Violence except that of the mind, was repugnant to him physically, mentally and spiritually. In his declaration against Germany, "force, force without stint and without limit," was a tortured cry.

The Allies and the Central Powers repeatedly violated our ancient doctrine of the Freedom of the Seas. Both played fast and loose with us, though England could have been easily brought to terms by action far short of war. Germany, almost convinced that we were innocuous, cynically took the hazard of war not ^{and lost it} with the American Government but ^{to} with an incensed American people.

The power of our arms rehabilitated the dignity of the country. We emerged from the world war a single tower of ~~xxxx~~ strength in a ruined world. Mr. Wilson entranced in a noble dream went to Paris and endeavored to remove a sturdy and proved corner stone of our national ~~xxx~~ existence.

He was a queer man. A pedagogue by instinct, training and profession he had the schoolmaster's dogmatism and impatient contempt for the opinions of his pupils. Also, he had in full measure the petty autocracy of that ^e ilk. The educators' idealism and ignorance of governance ^{were} ~~was~~ also his. Professors and schoolmarms read, but surely they never study history.

In Paris, he found that Kings, Presidents and Prime ministers, made cunning and refractory pupils. The boys in the Senate were equally intractable. So the Treaty of Versailles and the League of Nations failed before the time honored

principle of "No entangling alliances."

War releases the nobler emotions and these were played on by the idea of the League Of Nations. The Republicans countered the idealistic appeal of the League by one equally appealing, namely, Disarmament. True it was of Democratic birth but the Republicans kidnapped it. If Disarmament were fairly executed it would make for good and no sensible man would oppose it. ^{Limitation} ~~It~~ was not fairly or even patriotically accomplished. Prosperity is a famed breeder of magnanimity, and we were too magnanimous. We gave too much. Mr. Hughes in a confidential address to the officers of the Maryland, said, "When Ministers of State have anything to say, they say it with battleships, not with flowers." And this just at the close of the Washington Conference!

We have endeavored to get into the world court by the kitchen door as it were so far without success though a determined effort is now underway. That Court embodies some of our basic policies such as arbitration, peaceful settlement of disputes. Besides it will be a great formative force for world opinion and we can ill afford not to be represented thereon.

Estimate of Future Policies.

Some tendencies of the people should be noted as having a bearing on our future relations with other nations. Young men have once more turned seaward, or at any rate are displaying a marked inclination to do so. The manager of a large shipping firm told the writer that his firm was deluged with requests from youth of good families for vacation cruises for their boys. So much so that the Seamen's Union has filed emphatic protest, and the whole subject has become a nuisance. He states that increasing numbers of fine looking young fellows are joining the Union and cruising for the experience.

Rather fine looking models are being sailed in the stagnant back waters of the state of Mississippi. This was ascribed by one person to the widespread Constitution campaign. This may be doubted. It is more probable that both manifestations are symptoms, and that enterprise and adventure are ~~again~~ going abroad.

We now manufacture a surplus. Foreign markets are essential. Our foremost men of business are striving to hold and gain foreign markets. It is a maxim of American business that the good will of customers must be earned and kept, and that maxim as applied through statecraft may mean a profound change in our bearing toward Latin America.

If we are to take both to trade and the sea again, English power and commerce will be confronted with its most formidable challenge.

It is by no means certain that the instinct for continental solidarity is as yet satisfied. And if not confusing cross currents will beset our dealings with Mexico.

The white racial instinct has already caused friction with Japan, and is again manifesting itself with respect to other races somewhat off-colored. Of course centuries

in time considered, we have already within our social body the seeds of our racial destruction. But for several generations our immigration policies may well have international influences.

The geographic position of the United States as affecting future policies cannot be ignored. The cutting of the canal imbued us with an insular character. We are not much further removed from the vast land areas in the other hemisphere than was England from Europe in a slower age. This country may logically expect to ^{ly} great influence the histories of the nations in those land areas. The Panama canal or canals will be the cross-roads of the world. It is doubtful if history can duplicate the strategic position of the United States either for trade or for war. Even without the Philippines this would be true. Those Islands strengthen our hand immeasurably in the Far East.

The Pacific. China is the natural suzerain of the Western Pacific. Within her lands is the greatest single repository of raw materials essential for prosperity in peace and success in war. The labor in inexhaustible quantity is there to do the development. The sino is hard working, intelligent and courageous. His standard of existence is unbelievably low. His forefathers in part, the hordes of Genghis Khan, rank among the foremost fighters of the world. So the military genius is there.

China but awaits a catch-word, a rallying call, or even an effigy, embodying patriotism and nationalism to step forth a yellow giant on the stage of the world. When that time comes she will brush off foreigners like flies; Russia from Manchuria, England from Hong-kong, France from Saigon, Japan from Korea and Manchuria or even from ~~the islands~~ ^{the home} islands into the sea. Our policy of sincere friendship toward China seems a wise one.

Japan has dreamed great dreams, nor is there any assurance ~~that~~ that she does not dream them still. The stupendous achievement of this country against Germany, the money panic of 1920, and the great earthquake, shook her rudely and may have awakened her. The coincidence of her own with England's historic location off a nearby mainland could ~~not~~ ^{stir} not fail to ~~stir~~ her ambitions.

Now while Japan has a virile and brave population she lacks the two other fundamentals of England's greatness. She has no iron and her fuel is of poor quality. Except for food for powder the sinews of war must be imported. That Japan had in mind the seizure of lands producing these is self evident. Had the war gone against the Allies that seizure would have been accomplished. But England and this ~~is~~ country forced her to disgorge her Chinese aggression in 1921. That she will try it again when the time is ripe is a surety. This will make for trouble with us. Japan covets the Phillipines for three reasons, first, because she must ~~now~~ ^{now} split with us ~~the~~ the advantages of her strategic location, second for its raw materials, and third, because it seems a natural area for the expansion of her population. Further, the Japanese people writhe under the sting of racial humiliation inflicted by ourselves.

One authority states that only 146 Japanese per annum would be admitted under the national origins act. If this is true it may be that Congress in its wisdom may endeavor to placate Japan by repealing the Exclusion and Alien Acts. We may expect no change in our other policies affecting Japan, namely, the open door in the Pacific, and our continued possession of the Phillipines. Japan must be regarded as a potential enemy who bides her time, and in any subsequent embroilment we must keep one eye on Japan.

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for admission into the Union. This procedure will take many many years, and will be all the slower because of the opposition of South America.

Immigration This has been considered a purely domestic problem. But we made it international by Asiatic exclusion. This as applied to Japan will always remain a fruitful source of hurt and friction until remedied. China too when she finds herself may have something to say on the matter. Many European races are discriminated against under our present law. No trouble may be anticipated from this however, beyond that which may be kicked up their political brethren already here.

Population ~~likewise~~ abhors thin places as nature abhors a vacuum. The Japanese cannot go into Asia because they cannot successfully compete against the Chinese. We bar the ^{from} from this country, so they go in considerable numbers into Mexico and South America. It is possible that sometime in the future we may find such colonization dangerous to our peace and safety. If so we will doubtless protest as we did against an alleged colonization of Magdalena Bay. This is a natural extension of the famous doctrine.

The World Court We will eventually succeed in entering this court, and as a matter of fact will do so as soon as we have ascertained that little countries under our wing such as San Domingo may not outjudge us. The Court's object is peaceful settlements of disputes, by trial or Arbitration, methods for which this country has stood from infancy. The court should be powerful in molding public opinion and we should have representation in its deliberations.

The League of Nations. There seems to be no probability of the United States joining that League. Our future relations with the League depend ^{upon} our relations with the most powerful members thereof.

The Tariff. While nothing serious may be expected from our coming revision of the Tariff bad feeling is almost sure to result.

France has indicated an absorbing interest in certain schedules, with the intimation that she may protest or even retaliate. Cuba, Egypt and the Argentine will make representations. This is ~~an~~ evidence of the widespread interest ~~in~~ in the restrictions on trading in the world's richest market. We are not likely to arrange any schedule with regard to any foreign country.

Prohibition, becomes an international incident with the case ~~is~~ the I'm Alone. If enforcement authorities follow like methods in the future endless irritation will result. It is hoped that this case will influence and hasten the repeal of that obnoxious statute.

The Merchant Marine The United States has no intention of ever again being without a merchant marine. The brains of the country are on the job and the youth are going to sea. This means that in spite of the Seamen's Union and the ~~La Follette~~ La Follette Law ~~carrying~~ carrying that we are going to get a large proportion of the ~~carrying~~ trade of the world.

This will bear on England which country is discussed in a separate paragraph.

Limitation of Armament is a plausible phrase. If the armament allotted to each country is proportionate to the dignity, power and responsibilities of ~~that country~~ that country there can be no possible objection to the principle. Since the Washington conference, America has insisted on limitation in all classes of vessels if the principle is to be carried further. No doubt with attendant corollaries this will be our stand in the future. While Limitation was heralded as great move toward world peace, it is and was fundamentally a measure of economy. Competition will continue in quality of materiel, and in quality and quantity of personnel. If by some means competition, for some years, could be restricted to quality of personnel only, our service would greatly benefit.

Another move for a ~~conference~~ limitation conference is

now underway. From the attitude of the British press, and from the statement of Grey of Falloden published on April 11, it seems likely that Great Britain will give way in the matter of allocation of cruiser tonnage.

World Peace. This bright dream has ~~been~~ had its prophets during every great war and its heralds at the conclusions thereof. It is an historic fact that the known world has never experienced peace except under the domination of a single people. And that peace has always fallen into fratricidal war of its own weight.

The League of Nations was designed to secure world peace.

There is a smugness about that ~~document~~^{covenant} reminiscent of the Holy Alliance. It does however appear that the League has been so far administered with discretion and good judgement. If it becomes a proved, impartial power for peace, and not a vehicle for the promotion of special interests, the United States must in the end become a member. That ~~is~~ event however desirable is not likely.

Great Britain. The reciprocal relations between this country and England, will for the next few years be of transcendent interest. Traditionally she has pulled down the strongest.

A challenge for world commerce or for sea-power has been uniformly answered with destruction.

Her present seeming consent to parity on the water may be based on her conception of American bluff. There are reasons to support this view. When she realizes that we are not bluffing, and when we seriously press for the world carrying trade she may begin to plot against us. Her exploded submarine agreement with France was certainly a step in that direction.

On the other hand that agreement was almost unanimously repudiated by press and public. Also, in all our crises the people of England, regardless of the Government's stand, have ~~been~~ been consistently friendly. Another thing when England speaks now she speaks for England alone and not for the first

Class fighting men of the colonies. This may be the controlling factor.

But to go back to the other side again. So thoroughly ingrained in, all the British people is the religion of sea Supremacy that to dare it is sacrilege.

an axe
We would be a craven people if we did not accord our evident power and responsibility its fitting complement in ships and guns. Our course is set. Peace or war lies with England. A word on our fundamental policies.

The Monroe Doctrine in retirement at present, and in process of being divested of the extra habiliments pinned on by Mr. Roosevelt, is as fit and ready as ever should occasion demand.

Some day in some hard fought future war, when we are supreme on the waters, we will throw overboard our old friend Freedom of the Seas, that we raised from infancy. We will regret having reared it.

With ~~xxx~~ confidence in the keenness of our salesmen we will continue to demand the Open Door everywhere, a step just a bit inconsistent with our Tariff wall.

Pan Americanism will ~~xxx~~ receive our kindest and most solicitous attention.

We have made no 'entangling alliances' validated with our signature. But we do hold enough signed I.O.U.s from the nations of the world to make the phrase a doubtful one.

We have enthusiastically pursued our way in the matter of Arbitration and Amity treaties and now have almost as many as had the evangelistic Mr Bryan, just before the World War.