DESTROYERS AT JUTLAND AND THEIR INFLUENCE ON THE BATTLE .

The destroyer is essentially a vehicle for the torpedo. It had it's inception as such in the launch which carried Lieutenant Cushing's apar torpedo against the Confederate ironclad, Albermarle, in the Civil War. The Whitehead automobile torpedo in the nineties, brought about enlargements of the vessals to carry torpedoes, but though they were still quite small, the theory was that they would swarm about an enemy in great numbers under cover of darkness. A counter to the torpedo boat had to be developed, and for this purpose was evolved the larger torpedo boat destroyer. Gradually, the craft grew in size until the torpedo boat finally disappeared and there remained the destroyer, with now the primary function of carrying torpedoes to be launched against enemy large ships. Latterly it acquired additional functions such as protection for capital ships against torpedo attacks by submarines, the hunting of submarines with depth charges, and the screening of heavy forces by smoke.

The evolution of the destroyers in design and the development of their tactics in regard to their primary function, in the German and the British Navies, was in sharp contrast. A rapid survey of the development in each Navy will assist us better to estimate the effect in battle.

The Germans had from the first held fixedly to the idea that the destroyer was the vehicle for the torpedo. As Groos says,"On our (German) torpedo boats, the lighter (gun) battery was explained by the fact that on the German side, the torpedo boat was considered first of all, the carrier of the torpedo, and that this special quality ought not to be sacrificed for a heavier battery". How this affected design we may see from their characteristics. They were, for

the most part, of less than 800 tons, and engined to attain speeds up to thirty-four knots. Few of them , however, were good for more than thirty two and a half. In one engineering feature, the fuel, they differed significantly from the British, they fired with oil and coal for safety reasons. Their very latest boats, of which they had eleven at Jutland, carried three four-inch guns, but all the others had guns of three and a half inches or less; many of them carried only two such twenty-four pounders,- some carried three. On the other hand, in torpedoes, no German boat carried less than four, and most of them had six. The Germans called their craft "super" (Grosse) torpedo boats rather than Destroyers (Zerstörer), but they referred to the corresponding British type by the word "destroyer" (Zerstörer). To the perfection of tactical employment of these super torpedo boats, the best talent of the German Navy bent all its efforts. As Von Hase says, "In the German Navy, the gun was secondary, not the main weapon and the torpedo arm had become the object of the ambition of every efficient officer". Both Admiral Scheer and Vice Admiral Hipper were eminent specialists in torpedo warfare. Admiral Scheer's last assignment with the flotillas had been that of First Leader. One of the first accomplishments of Admiral (then Captain) Von Tirpitz was the reorginization of the torpedo flotillas under a doctrine which hung to three cardinal principles, I) Instant readiness always, 2) Initial offensive, 3) Attack always in great numbers. Commander Bellairs, Royal Navy, states that,"For years the Germans had persistantly and steadily pursued a policy of offensive use of the torpedo. For years the Germans, well known to us, practised the maneuver of 'Durch bruch' which means that the destroyers break through their own lines to make a smoke screen or to attack the enemy". This was undoubtedly true; the German boats completed a regular cycle of training which advanced progressively for three years (the conscript term)

Their work with heavy ships commenced in the spring with elementary problems against the school ships and worked gradually into two further periods with the fleet in war maneuvers. It included a great deal of night work, the aim being to search for a heavy force and attack it in great numbers. No time in the year's schedule was regularly allotted to gunnery; such work was gotten in at odd times, as opportunity offered. So through thorough-going organization with painstaking attention to detail the German torpedo service became a highly-specialized branch. Emminently it was a specialty of torpedo offensive, to the exclusion of all else.

On the other hand, the British built almost exclusively to counter the torpedo boats with guns, that is, they built types which were to over-awe the small destroyers as the original destroyers had the torpedo boats. Consequently their construction ran to size and sturdiness, and in armament, to gun power. At the outset they built against the French, then as the Germans forged ahead, against them. Just before, and in the early part of the War, the gun trait was still more emphasized by the desire to embody in the destroyer, qualities for combating the submarine. So we come to the newest type of British destroyer at Jutland: a thousand-ton ship, two hundred and sixty feet in length by twenty-eight foot beam and capable of close to thirty-five knots from it's all oil-fired boilers. The armament consisted of three center line four inch semi-automatic guns which could range up to ten thousand yards. The torpedo armament was contained in only four twenty-one inch torpedoes. The class immediately preceding this one carried only two torpedoes. Like the design, the development of the destroyer tactics followed lines of defensive rather than offensive thought. We again quote Commander Bellairs who says, "The destroyer was looked upon as a defensive unit in a day battle, capable only of attacking the enemy at

night. Hence she was painted black and it was laid down

that that her duty was to repel the attack of enemy destroyers. Upon this principle destroyers were designed primarily as gun vessels; their torpedo armament was secondary." This is corroborated by the Battle Orders in effect at the time of Jutland, about which Newbolt says the following: "The second rule, equally important in the Commander- in-Chief's plan of battle, was that the destroyer flotillas were to be used defensively until the enemy was beaten by gunfire." As early as 1901, a committee appointed by the Commander- in-Chief in the Mediterranean (Admiral Fisher) to consider the question of the use of destroyers had laid down the following principles: (1) Destroyers were primarily intended to destroy torpedo boats; (2) To employ destroyers as torpedoboats for attack on ships should not be resorted to while anything remains to be done under (1), except under special conditions." This policy was, in practice, followed almost to the letter, until after Jutland. It was evidenced several times in the early brushes of the war, but most notably in the German raid on Hartlepool. A detachment of seven British destroyers found themselves in a favorable position on the bow of a German armored cruiser, three light cruisers, and a force of destroyers. All seven British destroyers opened fire with guns but only one thought to employ the torpedo, and he fired but a single shot. In commenting on British peace maneuvers prior to the war Admiral Jellicoe says, " There was a tendency to give the torpedo less than it's proper value as a fighting weapon. " He substantiates this in stating further that, " not until 1911 were destroyer attacks (with torpedoes) actually carried out in the British Navy." The advent of the submarine early in the war had, of course, contributed to confining the British destroyer to a defensive role. Destroyers were principally employed in patrol work and screeching of capital ships, in fact, screening became their chief function. Admiral Jellicoe devotes a section of ten pages

in his history of "The Grand Fleet" to gunnery training and in this, a single sentence seems to have sufficed for destroyer torpedo work. He says, "The torpedo practices at Scapa Flow, which were of a realistic character, were of the greatest possible use."

So much for the physical development of type and tactics in the two navies, but to fairly judge the authority of destroyers at Jutland, we must add a background of moral factors which had far-reaching consequences. The destroyer design and tactics of the British had practically no effect on the Germans. Quite the reverse was true of the German development on the British. In 1908, Hislam, in his "Admiralty of the Atlantic" said, "No branch of the German Navy is more formidable than the torpedo boat flotillas, and none is destined to play a more important part in any conflict which may arise in the north of Europe." Later, in in 1913, the same authority remarks, "The development of the naval situation (that is with regard to Germany) has given the destroyer an importancefar greater than that with which it is commonly regarded." Early in 1914 the Naval and Military Record said in this regard, "There is enough evidence to justify the conclusion that in the torpedo boat rests one of the leading principles of German strategy---it is the spearhead of the High Seas fleet." The German flotillas acquired reputation for unexampled efficiency and excellance; their reputation grew quickly to abnormal proportions. It's growth was no doubt augmented by false information on remarkable German torpedo performance which was circulated among the British by the Germans. Admiral Jellicoe speaks highly of the opposing flotillas. "The branch of the German navy from which I expected very good work Was the destoyer service." He refers to the German "great torpedo superiority" as a matter of "supreme importance." So, the German torpedo menace and a counter for it became a subject of constant and wide discussion among

the British leaders. "It had", says Admiral Jellicoe, "excited more attention in the two or three years before the war than any other question of tactics." This attitude carried on into the war. We find frequent references to the inability of this unit, or that, to carry out a certain exercise because the conditions had become favorable for an enemy destroyer or submarine attack; the fleet was at such and such time"in danger of attack by enemy torpedo craft." Again and again this frame of mind is reflected in the British writings. It became allied with the expected use of retiring tactics by the German battle line, and so pressing did it seem that the British Commander-in-Chief felt it necessary to place on record with the Admiralty a resumee of his intentions should he be confronted with such an eventuality. In it he said,"It is quite within the bounds of possibility that half of our battle fleet might be disabled by under water attack before the guns opened fire at all, if a false move is made, and I feel that I must constantly bear in mind the great probability of such attack." The German destroyer menace had beaome a veritable BOGEY in the minds of the British admirals. It led to thinking alone of the dangers to their own battle line, not of seeking to counter by subjecting the enemy battle line to the same dangers. They conceded in advance a superiority to the Germans in torpedo attack, and sought to evade the danger rather than neutralize it by use of British light forces in counter torpedo attack.

With the now completed background in mind, let us look at Jutland. We will sketch its high points, try to pick out those points at which destroyers had effect, and along with these, as we proceed, note the important tactical features.

Destroyers first come into the picture in the battle cruiser action at about 4:15 P.M. 31 May 1916. The battle-

cruisers had been in action on southerly courses some twenty minutes; the six British had been reduced to four , and the fifteen inch guns of the 5th Battle squadron were just commencing to tell on the five German battle-cruisers, when destroyers from both sides attacked in force on opposing vans. This is one of the two occasions of the entire Jutland operations in which the British made what may be termed a destroyer attack. It was boldly executed with an offensive spirit, led by Commander Bingham on the Nestor, and had its desired effect in causing the German battle-cruisers immediately to turn off. But this did not happen until after the two destroyer forces had been engaged in a hot gun action between the battle lines. Early in the attack, Commander Bingham, leading an irregular formation of twelve boats, was about to attain an excellent torpedo firing position when he allowed himself to be diverted by the oncoming German destroyers. He turned north to head them off. In the resultant gun action the larger and more powerfully gunned British boats had the best of it. A little later this was compensated for by the appearance of the German light-cruiser Regensburg. She furnished admirable "interference" for her destroyers to launch torpedoes, and then effectually covered their retreat. Such "interference" was notably lacking on the British side, but the excellent support of the boats following Commander Bingham enabled him to break through with two ships for a clear shot at the German battle-cruisers. Unfortunately, the torpedoes missed. By this time the German battle line appeared from the South, and both battle-cruiser forces turned North. The Germans swung just in time to have a torpedo find its mark in the Seydlitz. She was not vitally injured, however, and was able to keep her place in battle to the end of the operations. The German XI th half-flotilla of six boats then slipped out from the rear of their battle-cruisers, and completely unhampered fired seven torpedoes at the 5th Batron and battle-cruisers

as they passed each other on opposite courses. No hits were made. In the whole action the British had twelve destroyers engaged which fired a total of eleven torpedoes, and scored two hits, one on a destroyer and one on the Seydlitz. They themselves lost two boats through gunfire. They seemed to work in pairs but otherwise were un-coordinated; there was no attempt at salvo firing, no attention to spread, and the attack, an the whole, lacked volume. What the British lacked in organization, their individual captains somewhat made up in spirit and initiative. The conduct of the attack by the twenty-one German boats did not altogether live up to their high reputation for efficiency. True, they unified their efforts better; they worked in three's, usually, and illustrated one noteworthy point in the "interference" furnished by the Regensburg. Aside from the above, they used no salvo plan, had no intentional spread, and had insufficient volume. The first fifteen boats fired ten torpedoes without effect, and the XIth half flotilla fired seven with like results. They lost two boats in the gun melee. The Germans never reached a favorable firing position, probably because the British prevented them. The ultimate consequences of these destroyer attacks were not great-- the Germans only succeeded in making the 5th Batron maneuver slightly, the British caused a turn away of SD I (the German battle-cruiser force) , but both engaged major units turned north because of the arrival of the German Battle squadrons, and the operations followed their normal course as though no destroyer action had taken place.

Admiral Beatty with a badly battered Battle-cruiser force was standing north to form a junction with his own main body. The 5th Batron followed his movement rather belatedly and thus came under the combined fire of the German battle-cruisers and the van of the High Seas fleet. Destroyer units on both sides had retired to the lee of their major ships. Admiral Jellicoe, fifty miles to the north, was approaching

on course Southeast in line of division guides. He had a screenn of armored cruisers four miles ahead, and light cruisers just astern of them. His three destroyer flotillas were disposed immediately around his battle ships in an anti-submarine screen. On learning of Admiral Beatty's contact, he had detached Admiral Hood with the 3rd Battle-cruiser squadron, four destroyers, and two light cruisers as reinforcements. This group steamed ahead too far to the Southeast and was now advanced sixteen miles in that direction from the Grand fleet. By utilizing their superior speed Beatty's battle-cruisers drew out of range of the Germans. Admiral Hipper (SD I) had not suffered heavily, and was bending all efforts to reopen fire. Then Admiral Beatty inclined slightly to the East, and thus brought himself and the 5th Batron again under fire. At almost the same time the German light forces ahead of Admiral Hipper made unexpected contact with the 3rd Battle-cruiser squadron in the Northeast. Destroyers on both sides quickly entered the fray. The British division of four boats, ably led by the Shark, broke in with a gun action against the German light cruisers,; later opportunities for torpedo fire at SD I, which had come up in the wake of the light forces, were presented. There was apparently no fire doctrine or plan, ships fired single shots at either lightcruisers of large ships whenever they could. Only four torpedoes were fired and none of these hit. The four British destroyers could very easily have been supported by the light cruiser Canterbury; apparently this was not a part of the British doctrine for she (Canterbury) drew out of action to the southward. The Shark was sunk by gun and torpedo fire, and another, the Acasta, was disabled. The captain of the Shark gave ample proof of his mettle before he sank; he refused aid of the Acasta when his engines went out and instead grasped every chance of a torpedo shot. Badly wounded, he continued to direct the fire of the one gun remaining in action until a torpedo from the

other side sank his ship. As for the Germans, five boats came out to finish off the badly damaged Chester (the other British light cruiser) when they suddenly sighted the 3rd Battle-cruiser squadron. The movement on the Chester was abandoned and directed instead against the bigger target. Unfortunately, for the destroyers, the range was, right at this moment, fouled by their own light cruisers who were trying to escape from the heavy pounding of the 3rd Battle-cruiser squadron. They eventually got off five torpedoes from an unfavorable quartering position. Two other groups of destroyers joined the melee but only succeeded in adding complications; only four additional torpedoes were launched, all from unfavorable positions. The last groups of boats were again ably led and supported by the Regehsburg. The torpedo control was excellent, as all nine crossed the line; however, the torpedoes were near the end of their run and therefore easily avoided. Several of them ran on parallel courses, and two were so deep as to allow the target ships to safely pass over them. The volume was much too small and the spread inefficient. It cannot be said that this destroyer action had any important results--on the British side, although great daring and nerve was shown by individual captains, the operation was hardly worthy of the name of "destroyer attack". The German torpedoes, though they failed to hit, did make the 3rd BCS maneuver, and thus brought relief to their lightcruisers. As it was, these light cruisers left one of their number, the Wiesbaden, behind in a disabled condition.

By the vigorous blow of the 3rd BCS the Germans were placed under the impression that the British battle line was approaching from that direction, and while their destroyers were engaged as above described the other ships turned off sharply toward the support of their own battle ships in the South. As they turned off an added demonstration of the fine spirit which animated the individual British dest-

royer commanders was given by the Onslow. She, early in the game, found herself adrift, and so formed on the engaged bow of the Lion, Admiral Beatty's flagship, as she came north. THe captain took in SD I's turn off to the South, and quickly turned with the idea of firing all torpedoes. At the moment of firing a heavy shell struck the Onslow and only one torpedo was gotten out. He then, at reduced speed, pressed on and fired point blank at the Wiesbaden, striking her under the bridge. The approaching High Seas fleet now came into view; the Onslow's remaining two torpedoes were fired at it. The hit on the Wiesbaden was the only direct gain but the ship had carried her torpedoes to the field of battle and launched them against the enemy. This appreciation of their weapon and eagerness to boldly use it recurrs repeatedly whenever British boats got off on their own; unfortunately the same appreciation cannot be found in a doctrine for the combined employment of all destroyers.

Admiral Beatty had now made contact with the Grand Fleet and commenced his baffling sweep across its front. The battle area was rapidly becoming fogged up by mist, stack smoke of many ships, and gases of gunfire. Admiral Jellicoe, with allhands at battle stations, anxiously pondered his possible plans of deployment. He says in his book, "As the evidence accumulated that the enemy's battle fleet was on our starboard side, but on a bearing well before the beam of the Iron Duke, (his flag ship) the point for decision was whether to form line of battle on the starboard or port wing column. My first and natural impulse was to form on the starboard wing column in order to bring the fleet into action at the earliest possible moment (that is, close the enemy for a fight) but it became increasingly apparent, both from the sound of gunfire and the reports of the Lion and Barham, that the High Seas fleet was in close proximity and on such a bearing as to create obvious disadvantages in such a move. I assumed that the German destroyers

would be ahead of their battle fleet and it was clear that, owing to the mist, the operations of the destroyers attacking from a commanding position in the van would be much facilitated, it would be suicidal to place the battle fleet in a position where it might be open to attack by destroyers during such a deployment." Herein appears, for the first time, the BOGEY of German torpedo craft, a fact that we must carefully note, Admiral Jellicoe gave two supplementary reasons for his deployment to port. They concerned questions of gunnery and tactical concentration. The question of enemy torpedoes must have been first in his mind as he gives it as his first reason, it is very forcibly stated and we are bound to accept it as the compelling reason. The decision to deploy on the port wing column has become one of the controversial questions of the battle ; much has been said and written on both sides. In the German writings it is referred to as the first "British blunder." Admiral Scheer said, "Had Jellicoe deployed to starboard, he would have brought his fleet at once into decisive action, and the "turn together" which saved the German fleet could not have been as much as attempted." This , of course, is hind sight; we cannot in this discussion enter into the pros and cons of the case, but it must be remarked in passing, that the principle of bringing "superior forces quickly to bear on an inferior enemy" was ignored, and this, because of a preconceived notion in the British Commander-in-Chief's mind. He considered only danger to his ships and overlooked the subjection of the enemy to the same danger. Destroyers were the compelling influence in the British C-in-C's first tactical decision of the battle.

The British battle line was slow in forming on its S by E course though still in time to head off the northward rush of the High Seas fleet. Admiral Hipper, who had fallen back on the van of the German Batrons at the attack of the 3rd BCS , had now turned again, and was then leading the

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long column of German heavy ships. Admiral Beatty had formed a junction with the 3rd BCS and with it was carrying the British van. The 5th Batron, instead of following his sweep across the front of the Grand fleet, had joined the rear. These ships had been pretty roughly used in the final stages of the run North by the 3rd German Batron. The armored cruisers Defense and Warrior, here, rushed out between the lines, intent on finishing off the hapless Wiesbaden, and at once came under a blasting concentration from SD II. The Defense, almost immediately, blew up in a huge column of flame and smoke, and the Warrior limped helplessly out of action to the rear. The German van ships, SD I and Batron III, suffered under heavy fire from Northwest to Northeast and could not effectively reply because of the reduced visibility. Only the flashes of the British guns could be seen in the mist, while the German ships were evidently sharply silhouetted against the western horizon. The First Leader of destroyers realized that a destroyer attack must relieve the head, and he therefore ordered the IIIrd flotilla (seven boats) and Ist half flotilla (five boats) out. They were in company with his flagship, Rostock, on the disengaged bow of Batron III. It is pertinent to here remark on the battle stations of the destroyer flotillas on the two sides. In numerous instances we find the German flotillas just where they are needed at a crucial moment. Perhaps this resulted from their fuller organization as attack flotillas. In every contact we find the German heavy ships coming on the scene with destroyers fully concentrated for attack. The British destroyers were, on the other hand, kept in screening positions around the capital ships almost until gunfire was opened. In addition to their readiness as to position, the German flotillas usually anticipated the orders to attack, while the British were habitually tardy. This criticism cannot, however, be applied to single British destroyers, once they had been launched on an attack

or found themselves adrift and a target in sight. To continue, the attacking boats passed between the Rostock and SD I and, to the leaders surprize, the target could be made thru the mist out/only 7000 yards away; as he was not under fire he decided to approach closer. He now received radio orders to break off the attack, and in spite of his excellent position, he turned back towards the Rostock making smoke as he retired. Three of the boats on the turn fired one torpedo each, and a lone wolf, the S-32, that had just joined up, fired four. All the torpedoes ran true to the lines of the 6th Battle ship division; it is believed that one of these struck the leader of that division, the Marlborough. The firing position was ideal, 7000 yards on the bow of the 1st Batron; control was excellent as all but one of the lot passed through the target area, but we again find that there was a lack of volume, and that the torpedoes ran parallel instead of with a diverging spread. The material results were small. The ship struck was able to continue in her battle line place, the others of the same division were caused to maneuver some. It would perhaps have been a much different story had the twelve boats engaged fired twenty or thirty torpedoes from this fine position. In retiring, one of the firing boats was hit and had to be left behind to be finally sunk by major calibre fire of the whole British rear, all the others got safely back under cover of the smoke screen. This same smoke screen also covered their own battle line and enabled it to turn away unmolested to the Southwest. Therein lay the real results of the attack. When Admiral Scheer saw his van bend to the right, away from the increasingly efficient British fire, he turned his whole battle line to the reverse course. Just prior to the turn the British lost another battle-cruiser, the Invincible, from gunfire of SD I. She exploded in the same way that the Queen Mary and the Indefatigable had, in the earlier battle-cruiser action

A well bunched salvo had penetrated her magazines. Her opposite in the German line, the Lutzow, had also suffered. She was badly holed and had hardly a major gun in action. Six destroyers quickly laid a thick smoke screen around her and under it she limped after her battle line to the Southwest. Admiral Scheer's well executed turn-about immediately relieved the pressure on his van. He was left free to survey the situation and formulate a further plan; the initiative was in his hands. Twenty minutes later, with a reordered line, he again swung about and returned to reengage undepting the same unfavorable conditions. He gives as one of his reasons for such unprecedented action his desire to retain the initiative and says, " There was only one way of avoiding this (the loss of the initiative): to deal the enemy a second blow regardless of consequences, and to bring all the destroyers to attack." So the German battle line again rammed its head against the British middle. The British were fully deployed in a line of bearing of divisions from Southeast to Northwest on a southerly course directly across the path of the Germans.

Battered and burning but still afloat and occasionally getting out a shot or two, the Wiesbaden remained in her unenviable place between the lines. Admiral Scheer ordered four boats of flotilla III to rescue her crew as his battle ships returned to the fight. It was probably in his mind to bring her behind the shelter of his own battle line in the return swing but this he did not accomplish. As the four boats advanced to their task they were enveloped in a rain of heavy calibre shells from the British rear divisions. It became evident that they would never reach their objective so the leader turned off in retirement. Two of the boats were loath to let the effort go for nothing and took the opportunity to fire four torpedoes at the 5th Battle ship division. Though torpedoe control was fine, all passed through the target, the chances of hits were greatly re-

duced because of the small volume. More important was the fact, that in this attack, was contained the initial alarm for a later British maneuver that was to have a determining voice in the outcome of the battle. At the time, the British had just commenced closing the Germans on course Southwest, but at the first appearance of the destroyers and receipt of a submarine alarm, Admiral Jellicoe turned back to South. He says of this turn, "The fleet was turned back to south in order to turn on the submarine and bring the ships into line ahead, ready for any required maneuver."

Admiral Scheer was, for the second time, in the dangerous predicament of having his "T" crossed by the British. The situation was even more critical than an hour before. Advantages of light and visibility were more than ever with the British; SD I, the battering ram of the van, had next to no gunpower left, and Batron III was bunched up, lying immobile in a forest of British shell splashes. Thereupon he made the notable signal, "At the enemy!", to his crippled battle-cruisers and repeated the orders for the torpedo flotillas to attack. Three minutes later, for the third time, he turned the whole battle ship line by ships to the reverse course and withdrew from action.

The order for attack came when the second leader of destroyers in the Regensburg had just succeeded in marshalling the remnants of several flotillas on the lee side of SD I. Immediately astern he had the IXth and VIth flotillas, comprising a total of thirteen boats, further astern and abreast of Batron III, four boats of flotilla III, to the southward were the fine new boats of flotilla II. Two fresh flotillas, V and VII, were steaming up from the rear of the line. The Regensburg launched the first group of thirteen across the bows of SD I and turned to help flotilla II up. Smoke that had shielded the Lutzow still clung to this part of the battle area. Flotillas IX and VI passed rapidly through it on course SSE and found a magnificent target of twenty-four capital

ships stretched out before them. They pressed on in two groups until major and minor calibre hits made further approach impossible, and them launched thirty-one torpedoes from ten degrees forward of the target's beam at ranges of 65° to 7500 yards. Such a fine position could not have been reached without the reckless support of SD I, under whose lee the early advance was made. Each group, in retiring, laid a thick smoke screen which effectually protected them and also completely shielded their battle ships; a second demonstration of the value of efficient smoke screening. The screen of the VIth being on the right and to the south of the IXth afforded protection to the latter even during its attack. Flotilla III broke through its own battle line to the attack, and then passed through the screens laid by the returning VIth and IXth. On emerging, instead of the expected target of large ships, only light craft were sighted; thereupon course was altered back for the German battle line. The return run developed into a running fight with a flotilla of British destroyers (the 4th); when the British were seen to be supported by light cruisers, a smoke screen was let out and a safe get-a-way made under it. Although the IInd flotilla was at the start almost as well situated as the IXth and VIth, near the Regensburg, it was delayed by having to maneuver clear of the battlecruisers who turned South square across its path. The Second Leader then decided that an attack by the IInd would be too late and therefore held it in company with him. Flotilla VII remained near the German rear, while V steamed up from that position to make the final thrust. After passing the smoke screens, that by this time spread over a wide area, nothing could be seen but a few scattered groups of light ships; there was nothing to be done but return.

The attacks described above form the outstanding destroyer operations of the battle. They were the only ones which could be strictly called "attacks in force"; in them

the finely tooled German weapon achieved the purpose toward which it had, for twenty years, been sharpened. Admiral Scheer expresses his valuation of the attacks in these few words, "The purpose of the advance was gained in these destroyer attacks."; and the British Narrative of Jutland says, "Although the German flotillas did not succeed in hitting anything, they played a decisive part in this encounter." In material damage the results were nil-- the British successfully avoided all hineteen torpedoes that crossed their line. It was in the tactical movements caused, first, by the threat, and then later by the torpedoes actually crossing, that the attacks achieved their real results; perhaps, more potent ones than were caused by any other single circumstance of the Jutland operations.

As previously related, Admiral Jellicoe prepared to receive a destroyer attack when he turned his divisions back to South upon the attempted rescue of the Wiesbaden by flotilla III. A few minutes later the expected happened; flotillas VI and IX emerged from the smoke to the attack. He records his resultant action as follows: "At a sufficient interva l before it was considered that the torpedoes fired by the destroyers would cross our line a signal was made to the Battle fleet to turn two points to port by sub-divisions., Some minutes later a further turn of two points was made for a short time." The British line was already in some confusion from individual maneuvers to avoid torpedoes and imaginary submarines. The first and second divisions were blanketed by the third, but this division, and the fourth, fifth, and sixth were just commencing to achieve a destructive fire superiority over the Germans. The British Grand Fleet, after years of waiting and hoping, was at last come to grips with the Germans; from an ideal tactical position with speed still in reserve it was imposing its greater strength on the High Seas fleet. Yet, in spite of all this, the Grand Fleet not only did not close, but turned away. The Germans, thus aided, withdrew to

safety; in ten mimutes fire had practically ceased.

For the second time the British Commander had, at a "cross roads", confided his success to a movement away from the enemy---- and in this second instance the "prime movers" were again destroyers. There is no denying the prestige of this incident in a survey of the controling influences at Jutland. It has become, [illegible], the point of greatest controversy in discussions of the battle. It was strong in Admiral Jellicoe's own mind, for in his chapter,"Reflections on the Battle," he confines the discussion almost exclusively to the German destroyer attacks and his "turn-away" so that one British writer was moved to remark,"Lord Jellicoe's book contains only one arresting revelation regarding the Naval war, and that is, that on the evening of May 31st, 1916, the Germans, after long training and many rehearsals, tried to torpedo the British Empire." In September 1916 Admiral Jellicoe sent out a memorandum to his fleet,"Notes on the defense of the Battle Fleet against torpedo attack." Newbolt calls this memorandum the most important documentary record of the immediate effect of Jutland on fleet tactics. The memo states that it might be of very great advantage when the enemy employed evasive tactics under cover of torpedo attacks if the van battle squadrons followed the enemy's evasive movement closely,and kept the head of the enemy line under fire. In Newbolts words, " ------the Commander-in-Chief therefore made express provision for this independent action on the part of one or more of his squadron commanders, and this, was perhaps the <u>most significant part of the new instruction.</u>" The remedy agreed almost to the letter with the opposing Commander-in-Chief's, for Admiral Scheer says, "The enemy van did not follow our veer around----it should have held on and could have held us still further surrounded if, by a simultaneous turn to a westerly course, it had kept firmly to our line. It may be that the leader did not grasp the situation, and was afraid to come nearer for fear of torpedo attacks." Admiral von

Schoultz, probably the least partial, of the German writers, seconds Admiral Scheer in remarking, "This estimate (of German destroyer attacks) went so far as to cause the English to fail to utilize the important tactical advantages offered at various times to portions of their fleet."

It is not the writer's aim to establish a case against Admiral Jellicoe, it is, however, desired to show that, at admittedly crucial points in the battle, German torpedo-boat tactics exerted a detrimental influence on the decisions of the British Commander-in-Chief.

In so far as an action between battle lines is meant, the Battle of Jutland was definitely terminated at about 7:30 PM when the two battle lines rapidly separated because of the third German swing-around and the Torpedo-turn-away of the British. Captain Frothingham has well described the subsequent operations in the following words, "There were many encounters throughout the night between British and German war craft of various types, but these were fought on their own initiative and there was no concerted touch maintained with the German fleet--nothing that could be called a part of the battle of fleets. The Germansn simply ploughed their way home through the stragglers in the wake of the British fleet, and Lord Jellicoe frankly states that he was out of touch with his destroyers and cruisers." We left the two battle lines swiftly diverging. The German Commander now realized that to break through safely he must hold his fleet in close formation on the shortest route to Horn Reef, at the same time making every effort to drive in night destroyer attacks. Accordingly he ordered his heavy units into close single line on course South and ordered his flotillas assembled for attack. The British C-in-C commenced reforming his line on course SbyW at 7:40. So great was the confusion caused by the turn away and independent maneuvering to avoid torpedoes that it was not until twenty minutes later that he felt the formation adequately ordered for a pursuit move. He then

turned by divisions to course W by S and signalled to his light forces, "Sweep to the westward and locate the head of the enemy's line before dark." This movement brought on two short but sharp exchanges, first between opposing Battle-cruiser Forces, and then a brush between two light cruiser divisions. ~~The badly battered German battle-cruisers were relieved by their van battle squadron.~~ Nothing further having developed, the British line, a half hour later, was turned into single line on course Southwest and then to South. The situation is best described in Lord Jellicoe's own words, "At 9:00 PM the enemy was entirely out of sight, and the threat of torpedo boat attacks during the rapidly approaching darkness made it necessary for me to dispose of the fleet for the night, with a view to its safety from such attack, while providing for a renewal of action at daylight. I accordingly maneuvered to remain between the enemy and his bases, placing our flotillas in a position (five miles astern) in which they would afford protection to the fleet from destroyer attack, and at the same time, be favorably situated for attacking enemy heavy ships. -------- I rejected at once the idea of a night attack as leading to possible disaster owing, first, to the prsence of torpedo craft in such large numbers-----." We are now familiar with the night plans of both Commanders; each is of particular interest to this discussion for its prominent mention of destroyers. The Germans planned to hold steadfastly to a course to Horn Reef, at the same time, making every effort to drive in night destroyer attacks. The British plans have just been given in Admiral Jellicoe's words. We see, on his part, that a consideration of enemy destroyers first of all, led to, a refusal of night action, second, prescribed the disposition of heavy ships, and third, in a measure, determined the night employment of British destroyers. At the risk of becoming boresome we are bound to conclude that all three are but another application of the BOGEY. Whether or not the BOGEY operated detrimentally

in the first two instances is open to argument, but in the third it unquestionably led to a passive plan of destroyer employment that was faulty in concept and thereby supplied the final requirement to the safe escape of the Germans. This instance is the best illustration, by direct mention, of British destroyer employment. Admiral Jellicoe explains it at length; he says, that the destroyers in the assigned position would screen their own main body and might also be able to attack enemy battle ships. He concludes, "----finally, they would be clear of our own ships and the danger of their attacking our battle ships in error or of our battle ships firing on them would be reduced to a minimum." He admits of the possibility of attacking the enemy fleet but we search in vain in the voluminous literature on Jutland for directions or orders of any kind to the destroyers to search for and attack the enemy, to keep enemy contact during the night in order that the action may be renewed at daylight, or even to report the enemy's breaking through. It appears almost as though Admiral Jellicoe's obsession of under water damage spread to include a fear of mistaken attack from his own destroyers. He wanted his destroyers ~~xxxx~~ available near him in case of an action at daylight, yet, he did not want them tangling with his own battle line during the night, so he passively placed them five miles astern; they might do some good there against enemy destroyer attacks. "There was no concerted touch maintained with the German fleet."* That function for which destroyers are ideally suited,-- quick contact thrusts at night, was neglected.

As it turned out, by accident, and not by plan, the British flotillas had been ideally placed for attacking the enemy battle line but, from lack of orders and doctrine, their weak sallys netted only the sinking of one battle ship and a small cruiser, and not a single item of information. The flotillas were disposed in approximate line abeam astern of the fleet; from starboard to port they ran, the 11th, 4th,

13th, 9th and 10th (together), and the 12th. The Batrons were in line at one mile interval; the 6th division had, due to the reduced speed of the Marlborough, fallen behind until it was just ahead of the 13th flotilla; the 5th Batron was keeping it company here in a position abeam. Light cruisers were ahead and on the starboard flank , while the Battle cruiser force, and its attached light cruisers, was wide on the starboard bow about ten miles distant. The determination of Admiral Scheer to hold to his route soon brought action between the 11th flotilla and two of his own light cruisers. They were steaming southward on a course a little to the east of the British. Two divisions of light cruisers flanked the German battle ships to port and the two serviceable battlecruisers were feeling out on the port bow. The Castor leading eight boats of the British 11th flotilla, engaged the light cruisers Elbing and Hamburg; the German gunfire became so heavy as to cause the Castor to turn off but she, and the two destroyers immediately astern, succeeded in firing one torpedo apiece; one of these passed under the Elbing. The other destroyers witheld their fire as they thought the targets were British ships. Contact was then lost. The other light cruisers, up ahead of the Elbing and Hamburg, at about this time made contact with the 2nd Light cruiser squadron, which was flanking the British right. The range was under a thousand yards and every shot took effect. Both sides found it too hot; the Germans drew off to the shelter of their battle line, and opposite, the Southamton and Dublin, heavily damaged, did likewise. However, the Southampton was able to get off a torpedo on the turn; it struck and promptly sank the Frauenlob. Then followed, in short order, a series of contacts with each flotilla as the German battle column worked around the British rear. In the first, the eleven boats of the 4th flotilla, led by the Tipperary, were suddenly taken under fire by large ships on a parallel course less than a thousand yards off to star-

board. The British had made out shapes in this direction earlier but had held their course as enemy character had not been well enough established to warrant attack. A better position for torpedo fire could hardly have been selected; ten were gotten off under heavy fire; the leader was immediately disabled, her oil fuel, catching fire forward burned up in a huge torch of warning to the others, but HER next astern attempted to cross the German column and was rammed by the leading battle ship; she eventually got clear. The third boat became entangled with two others, in all, two destroyers were lost. Meantime the rest of the flotilla eased off and out of action to the eastward. The casualties were not all British; one of the ten torpedoes, a surface shot, exploded in a blinding flash amidships of the light cruiser Rostock. She hauled over to the other side of the battle column and was able to continue slowly to the South for a time; she finally sank. Apparently the Rostock and three other light cruisers had been screening the port flank of the German line. One of these the, Elbing, in trying to withdraw through the line was rammed, and so badly damaged that she had to be abandoned. The effect of the attack was not lasting; the German van turned off for only a few moments and then resumed its course. It then encountered the remaining six boats of flotilla 4. One, the Fortune was quickly destroyed, another disabled; the rest scattered but in so doing fired three torpedoes. No hits resulted. The Ardent was among those that got free, though not for long; she resumed a southerly course and brot herself again under a withering fire that wrecked her in five minutes. In the whole 4th flotilla thirteen torpedoes had been fired, a much too small a pattern; one hit had been made and the German battle column, for a short time, deflected from its course. The results can not be said to have been commensurate with the opportunity presented.

The Ardent was still lighting up the night when disaster befell another British ship right astern of her. The Black Prince

armored cruiser, had become separated from the fleet early in the operations and was steaming up to rejoin. Perhaps mistaking the German column for her own she approached to 1600 yards and then an overwhelming fire broke over her from two ships. In four minutes she blew up just as the Defense had, and only a glowing wreck remained above water for a brief time.

Shells from the fights of the 4th flotilla fell in NUMBERS around the adjoining 13th, and the 9th and 10th. Instead of using the sacrifices of the 4th TO COVER AN ATTACK that he might develop, the leader of the 13th, in the Champion, broke away to the southeast at such a pace that only two of his boats could follow. His leaderless flotilla then eased over and joined the formation of the 9th and 10th. The leader of this outfit stayed with his boats; but neither did he attack. He tried to slip across the bows of the Germans unobserved, his course was too close, the rear two ships of the formation had to maneuver to avoid being rammed. The rear one was lost, either in collision or by the gunfire that spattered out as she sought to maneuver clear. So passed seventeen of the British destroyers--- contact was made, not a torpedo ~~fired~~ was fired, and not a word of information sent forward.

In the 12th flotilla on the port quarter of the fleet, were thirteen fresh destroyers. They had been crowded off to the eastward by the flight of the Champion, but eventually and inevitably, because of converging courses, came into contact with the German battle line just before daylight. The leader then carried on, for a time, in correct destroyer style; he reported his contact and made a successful attack; unfortunately the report was not taken in by the C-in-C and only half of his flotilla followed him in attack. Seventeen torpedoes were fired from a fine position 3000 yards on the bow of the Germans, about ten of them passed the target line, and the old battle ship Pommern was hit; her magazines exploded and she sank with all hands. The results might have been so much more profitable if the other

ten boats had followed in the attack, or even if the attacking boats had repeated their efforts and had kept touch. The German column again eased for a brief time and then headed back on course Southeast, which course it held to the safety of the mine fields.

Let us now turn to the German night destroyer employment. We will remember that it was the express intention to drive in with attacks. The C-in-C advisedly accepted the responsibility of being without destroyers at a general daylight engagement that might follow when he detached his flotillas to search and attack. Now, though we give the German side credit for a vigorous offensive plan of destroyer employment, we are bound to conclude, from a view of the whole situation, that this plan was so weakly and poorly executed that the results were even more meagre than those of the British. True, the German flotillas had gone through severe trials during the day; a good part of their torpedoes were gone, and they had suffered casualties; also they had not had time to clean fires (most of them fired coal) and their speed was consequently greatly retarded. They were projected on their mission into sectors struck from the High Seas fleet's 8:00 PM position; some of them did not, however, get started until 9:30. These sectors reached from ENE through E and S to SW. The first sector, ENE to ESE was assigned to flotilla II. This was the newest and finest of them all; it had not been in action seriously during the day, and it was therefore unfortunate that it should have been assigned a sector that could promise the least. It is not known what system was in vogue with the Germans for searching-- whether their doctrine required them to cover the whole sector as a concentrated unit, or not, at any rate, this is what was done in most cases. The boats of Flotilla II, instead of forming some sort of a searching line, steamed out together; at 08:45 they ran squarely into the 2nd light cruiser squadron. They turned back without firing a shot and the next we hear of them, the Commander is requesting permission

to proceed home via the Skagerrack. This he did about midnight with all of his torpedoes and most of his ammunition on board. In the adjoining sector, ESE to SE, there were only three boats of the XIIth half-flotilla assigned; they together also made contact with the 2nd Light cruiser squadron and were driven back by gunfire. One of the boats was disabled and had to drop out. The others saw the later actions of the British boats and their own battle line, but they themselves never again made contact. For the next two sectors, SE to S by E, and S by E to SSW, there were available two full strength flotillas, V and VII, but they were the slowest of the lot; they could make hardly more than eighteen knots without torching badly. The VII TH had early sighted the British 4th, and split into two groups for the search (still too great a concentration). Later the Commander was about to redivide his force still further, when the action between the British flotillas and the battle line commenced. Rather than risk having his ships getting mixed up in those melees he decided to keep his force concentrated, and of course, he found no battleships; accomplished nothing. The Vth flotilla was undoubtedly the best placed; here, there was a division into four groups, but the First Leader had, contrary to his Chief's wishes, made provision for the concentration of these groups with the Batrons for daylight. Consequently they had been searching but a half hour when the greater part of them decided they must alter back to rejoin; the rest kept on for about an hour longer. In returning, some were fired on by their own battleships. The remnants of the IXth operated in the sector SSW to SW as one unit until mid-night, having sighted nothing, these boats then steered for HORN REEF. That completes the German destroyer story. With all their hard training and high reputation, they seemed to have little idea of search methods, and seemed willing "to let well enough alone." They accomplished nothing during the night except to get themselves fired on by their own forces.

There is little more to add to the narrative thread of Jütland

The Germans simply went home via Horn Reef and the Sylt. The Lutzow had to be abandoned and there was some trouble getting the Seydlitz in. Meanwhile the Grand Fleet had arrived some thirty-five miles to the SW of Horn Reef. Finding himself without the light forces (destroyers) he had so carefully provided for, Admiral Jellicoe turned North and returned to Scapa. We will allow him to complete the story, "The difficulties experienced in collecting the fleet, particularly the destroyers, rendered it undesirable to close Horn Reef at daylight, as had been my intention ------ it was obviously necessary to concentrate the battle fleet and the destroyers before renewing action. By the time this concentration was effected it had become apparent that the HighSeas Fleet had passed behind the shelter of the German mine fields."

We have tried, as we progressed through the narrative to emphasize those points at which destroyers made themselves felt, either directly through positive tactics, the lack of them ,or indirectly through their moral influence. We have also attempted to point out important tactical lessons. An effort will now be made to summarize the influences in the order of their importance. It has been seen that the losses inflicted by destroyers were minor, such losses in no way impaired the ship stregth, gun power,or mobility of either fleet; inother words,destroyers had little physical influence. But as a moral factor their prestige was of the first rank. In this particular, the influence manifested itself as a monstrous fear of German torpedo craft, that constantly stalked in the leading British minds. We place this on our list as the first and foremost destroyer influence at Jutland. This fear, which we have called a BOGEY, became so potent as to determine whether the British Battle line would, or would not, fight on four distinct occasions. It, in fact, seemed to dictate at every point in which the question to close, or not to close, arose. It was doubly unfortunate, even tragic to the British, that on these four situations turned the final indecisive outcome of

the battle. They were:

(1) The first deplôment of the British battle line to port. However, possible ill effect, here, were neutralized by the fact that the Germans later gave the same, or better, opportunities by coming head on into the middle of the fully deployed battle line.

(2) The British turn away from the German destroyer attacks between 7:00 and 7:30 PM.

(3) The British faulty disposition and plans for the night, especially in so far as they affected their destroyers

(4) The failure to reengage on the morning of 1 June. Closely linked with the bogey as a controller in all of these, but particularly in the last two, was the British defensive school of destroyer thought. It had its basis in the bogey, and, of course, was negative in its action, but because of its evident wide effect it should be listed separately. We place it as second in importance in the destroyer influences at Jutland. In it lies the astounding, but non-the-less inescapable fact, that , in spite of the size of the torpedo bugbear yet, the British failed to find its proper counter, for lack of appreciation of their own torpedo arm. Only on one occasion were British destroyers ordered to attack, and that was during the first Battle-cruiser action. Their employment, in plan, was defensive thruout. There is an old principle of war which reads, "Every arm only attains its proper efficiency in the offensive on the field of battle." How far different the outcome might have been if, to take on of the numerous offerings, the British flotillas had, during the night, driven in with utmost vigor, reporting the movements of the Germans so that the Grand Fleet might have been standing by as a daylight reception committee at Horn Reef. Third, and last, on our list we will place the positive influence on the outcome that was brot to bear by the German flotillas. Such influence was manifested twice, namely, at the two swing abouts of the German battle line while under fire., At the

first the destroyers asserted their importance through the smoke screenns, without which the successful accomplishment of the turn and withdrawal would have been doubtful. The same was even more true at the second retirement. Also in the latter case, the torpedoes launched in the attacks influenced the ultimate outcome by working such confusion in the British battle line as to delay pursuit tactics for thirty minutes.

So we see that, what th British expected, was the most potent influence; what the Germans actually delivered, was the least important.