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THESIS

THE INFLUENCE OF THE NATIONAL  
POLICY ON THE STRATEGY OF A WAR

Submitted by

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THESIS

OUTLINE

Part I. The General Case

I. Introductory

1. The Nature of National Governments
2. The Functions of National Governments

II. National Governments in Foreign Affairs

1. International Law
2. Diplomacy, Treaties, etc.
3. Arbitration, Mediation
4. International Organizations

5. War

III. The Nature and Aims of National Policies

IV. Conflicts of National Policies

V. Ways and Means--the National Super-Policy

1. Origin and Purpose
2. Scope and Character
3. Japan vs Russia
4. National Variations

VI. War

1. The Causes of war
2. The Nature of War
3. The Purpose of war
4. The "Tools" of War
5. The Scope of "Ways and Means"
6. The Conduct of War--Strategy

VI. National Policies versus Strategy

1. General Relations
2. Degrees of Influence

VII. Correlation of National Policies and Strategy

VIII. Summary *page 15*

Part II The Present Case of the United States

I. Introductory

II. Geographical and Political Background

Outline (continued)

1. The Western Hemisphere
2. The Atlantic
3. The Pacific
4. The Caribbean
5. Approaches to the United States

✓ 6. Summary page 18

III. National Policies of the United States and Their Probable Conflicts with those of other Nations

1. The Western Hemisphere
  - a. Monroe Doctrine
  - b. Caribbean Protectorate
  - c. Pan-Americanism
2. The Atlantic and Europe
  - a. General
  - b. Great Britain
  - c. Other European Nations
3. The Pacific and Asia
  - a. Our Overseas Possessions
  - b. The Philippines
  - c. China (The Open Door)
  - d. Japan
4. The World in General
  - a. Economic Matters
  - b. Social Questions
  - c. Political Developments

✓ 5. Summary page 26

✓ IV. Ways and Means page 26

1. General Considerations
2. Our General Needs
3. Great Britain, Parity, the Atlantic
4. Japan, China, the Philippines

✓ V. The Influence of the U. S. National Policy on the Strategy of a War with Great Britain, or Japan

1. General Considerations

page 30

Outline (continued)

- 2. Ways and Means
- 3. Character of Strategy
  - a. Great Britain
  - b. Japan
- ✓ 4. Summary *page 33*
- ✓ VI. Conclusion *page 33*

BIBLIOGRAPHY

THE INFLUENCE OF NATIONAL POLICY  
ON THE STRATEGY OF A WAR

Part I. The General Case

I. Introductory

1. The Nature of National Governments

A nation is an aggregation of people of common descent and or of common interests living in the same area and united into a state. The common descent or the common interests may derive from race, ancestry, conquest, creed, language, or other causes, any number of which in combination may have been the original or present basis of union. The terms nation and state are used interchangeably, but nation more correctly implies the people collectively and state their oneness as a political body. State also implies the geographical area occupied by a nation.

A nation (state) uses the machinery called government to manage the common interests whether at home or abroad. The government is composed of parties, groups, or individuals who conduct the affairs of the nation; nowadays it commonly derives its powers from a constitution or from its equivalent. The personnel of a government derives from election, birth, or might, or a combination of these. The essential thing is that the government of a state rules the state at home and represents the nation abroad.

2. The Functions of National Governments

The common interests of a state (nation) divide into two broad general classifications:-- Domestic (internal) Affairs and Foreign (external) Affairs.

Domestic (internal) Affairs include:--

- (1) The organization of the government; the definition of its duties and function, including the means of changing the same.
- (2) The relations of individuals and of groups (political) to the government.

- (3) The ways and means of making the government effective
- (4) The means of creating and enforcing laws
- (5) The finances of the government
- (6) The ways and means of enabling the national government to maintain itself against armed opposition, whether at home or abroad

The foregoing items are the principal ones and, in combination, are frequently set forth in a constitution, written (United States) or implied (Great Britain).

Foreign (external) Affairs include all matters which involve relations with other nations (states).

## II. National Governments in Foreign Affairs

The relations between states are conducted by all well-defined means which have been developed in the course of time. The chief means today are:

1. International Law
  2. Diplomacy, Treaties, etc.
  3. Arbitration, Mediation
  4. International Organizations
  5. war
1. International Law

International Law is not law in the usual sense. It is a growth by accretion of customs and practices of long standing and of specific or general agreements among a majority of nations. A large part of it has come to have the same general status as common law (common sense).

There is no power to enforce such law except the disfavor of the other nations, called world opinion, and the fact that, usually, it is enlightened self-interest to observe it. It may be that one or more nations may see fit to try to punish an offender, but the offense would, in such case, be so grave as vitally to affect the interests of such nation or nations. However, as a *modus operandi* in normal and common international affairs and relations, it fills a great need and is growing in power with the increased backing of world opinion.

## 2. Diplomacy, Treaties, etc.

Relations with other states (nations) are commonly carried on through so-called diplomatic channels whereby each state sends competent and accredited representatives to manage its affairs by direct and personal contact with the governments of other states. Diplomatic matters include treaties which are almost invariably quid pro quo contracts or agreements entered into for a definite term of years. It is becoming more and more the practice for groups of states (nations) to combine together for agreement (formal or informal) as to matters of common interest; not infrequently, such agreements take the form of treaties.

## 3. Arbitration, Mediation

Where the states which are parties to disagreement can find no satisfactory solution of themselves, it is common for them to agree upon a third party to act, in effect, as umpire in the matter at issue. Where such matters are wholly to be judged by such third parties, the procedure is called arbitration; where the third party is truly an umpire, it is called mediation.

## 4. International Organizations

These organizations may be permanent or temporary in character. There is in existence at the present time an organization (the League of Nations) which aspires to permanency and has a covenant of rights, duties, and obligations which are binding upon the adhering nations. One of its instrumentalities is the International World Court. Another International organization of permanent character is the World Peace Court with headquarters at the Hague. Temporary organizations are frequently called coalitions, ententes, or alliances; they vary greatly in their purposes, extent, and power.

## 5. War

The results obtained by resort to any one of the foregoing four means or to any combination of them may well result in adjustment satisfactory to all the parties-concerned.



But, if the results are unsatisfactory, there is no way in which the dissatisfied party can be made to accept the results, except insofar as world opinion, the disfavor of other nations, or the lack of means may oblige him to acquiesce, which will usually be done in an unwilling and resentful spirit. If he has the means, and if he considers the matter at issue of sufficient vital importance to his own interests, he may be expected to resort to war to keep what he has or to get what he wants.

### III. The Nature and Aims of National Policies

The national government of a state exists to manage the common interests of the nation, both domestic and foreign. It is to the advantage of the nation that its government shall, in its management of affairs, promote and enhance the common interests. It is also to the advantage of the government itself to do this, as cause for retaining or continuing its management.

The attitude towards domestic affairs and the consequent provisions commonly result, internally, in a two-party system of government which usually takes the general form of conservative vs radical, which is largely affected by the status of "outs vs ins". Nevertheless, there are certain well-defined matters which are dealt with on the same basis and from the same viewpoint by any government or any party or of any mode of composition.

Permanent policies, with which we are here concerned, are naturally based on well-founded principles and on their effect on the national situation, life and destiny. It is to be taken for granted that the national policies will not only purpose to perpetuate the national existence but also promote national opportunities for improved welfare, both economic and social. It may well be the case that these matters are considered from the view-point of enlightened self-interest, as in the case of ideals of international peace, good-will, and co-operation--a present characteristic of the United States.

It may therefore be said that the foremost duties of a government are its attitude towards and its provisions for the security, the growth, and the welfare of the nation, which matters are likely to involve foreign (external) relations although their primary purpose is to improve domestic (internal) situations.

Security of a nation relates chiefly to territorial and political integrity, whether its own or that of allied, adjacent or vassal states, or of states whose integrity is a matter of great concern.

Growth of a nation relates chiefly to increase of trade, of industry and of agriculture, all of which are affected by questions of territory and of population, as well as matters such as the access to raw materials and the creation and development of markets.

Welfare of a nation includes such matters as tariffs for import or export, standards of living, immigration, and the observance and continuance of traditions and ideals.

There is a very considerable overlap in all of the policies thus generally classified and, in fact, they may well be said to be interwoven. Again, it may be noted that while matters of security are such as commonly to look to maintaining the status quo whereas growth and welfare are usually in a state of change and so require unremitting attention, all of them are most effective under stable circumstances.

Such stable circumstances exist in the condition called peace, so that the general aspect of all national policies is a vital concern of the government wherein it is interested in the maintenance of the status quo. So compelling is the universal pressure on all governments to avoid the condition known as war that it may be taken for granted that no government will lead its nation into war except for reasons that it, and the nation itself, considers vital to that nation's interests. What are such vital interests?

#### IV. Conflicts of National Policies

##### 1. Domestic Policies

The conflict of domestic national policies is ordinarily dealt with by the means provided in the constitution (or its equivalent) and generally takes the form of change of the personnel composing the government either by election or by appointment. However, it may be that the results are unsatisfactory to a number or to a group sufficiently large to depose the government in power even to the extent of opposition by force and with arms, called rebellion or revolution, but in any case incurring all the aspects of war and, in domestic affairs, called civil war. That it is war is the thing to be observed.

##### 2. Foreign Policies

Since all governments have similar duties with respect to their several states (nations)--to maintain and to safeguard their own national interests in regard to (1) security (2) growth (3) welfare (4) peace, it is inevitable that conflicts of these national interests shall arise.

Remembering that peace is, nowadays, an almost universal national policy and a compelling one, it is to be expected that all feasible and available means will be taken to compose the difficulties and remove the interferences which have given rise to the conflict of national policies.

The employment of any or even of all such means may fail to satisfy the one state or the other. Or one of the states concerned may decline to be governed by international law, to submit the matter to arbitration or to mediation, or to admit the jurisdiction of any international organization. In short, failing satisfactory adjustment by diplomatic or other international means, the government concerned considers the matter at issue so vital to its national interests that it prefers war to surrender of such interests.

## V. Ways and Means-- The National Super-Policy

### 1. Origin and Purpose

Such are the conditions that, in modern times, give rise to war. This being the case, it is apparent that a government is not performing its full duties with respect to national (1) security (2) growth (3) welfare or (4) peace, unless it includes among its national policies that all-important one which may be called "ways and means".

This policy requires the most careful and thorough consideration of each and every national policy which will involve probable, or even possible, conflict with the national interests of other states.

The aim must be to endeavor to discern whether a given national policy can be maintained, in case of such conflict, by any or all peaceful means of adjusting international disputes. If the expectation is that it cannot, or will not be so sustained then that national policy may require revision or even abandonment. If the national policy in question is considered to be of such vital importance to the state that abandonment is impossible and revision not admissible, then the government must see to it that adequate "ways and means" are available to enforce the vital policy by resort to war, not as a mere threat but as a determined course of action.

It is almost superfluous to note the obvious fact that the provision of ways and means adequate to uphold and enforce the national policies is, automatically, a powerful factor, if not a guarantee, of those all-important stable circumstances called peace.

### 2. Scope and Character

This national super-policy as to "ways and means" is itself subject to that careful and thorough consideration which must be given to all national policies. The application and the adequacy of this super-policy affects each and every other national policy, as shown in the following typical questions and in the answers which may result:

With what nation's national policy will the given policy conflict?

Has that nation allies, permanent or temporary?

What armed forces has that nation, existing or potential? Its allies, if any?

What are that nation's chief factors of strength or of weakness--geographic, economic, political, population, industrial, agricultural, financial, trade, and so on?

What will be the effect of the enforcement of the national policy on neutral states?

These examples do not exhaust the subject but serve clearly to indicate the scope and character of the examination.

### 3. Japan vs Russia

A striking example of such considered foresight was that of Japan before beginning the Russo-Japanese War. Japan was deprived of the foothold on the Asiatic continent won by conquest and by cession from China, only to see the same territory (Korea and the Kwantung Peninsula) taken under the domination of Russia. The resort to diplomacy (in all its aspects) was futile, as a concert of European nations was which had barred Japan from the results of her victorious war with China. The resort to "ways and means" was then (1896) impracticable, following the war just concluded, and lacking sufficient armed forces to drive Russia from the territory in question. However, Japan at once set about increasing her "ways and means" and when they were ready (1904), and not before, she re-opened the question with Russia with all the power at her command, with what result is written in history.

### 4. National Variations

There is a marked variation in the "ways and means" as to the "armed forces" provided by this national super-policy. The "armed forces" of the present day can be conveniently grouped in the three general classifications--land, sea, air--though in many nations air is a component and integral part of the land and sea forces (United States). For an island country, such as Great Britain or Japan, the corresponding dependence is natur-

ally placed on sea forces; for an inland country with borders largely land boundaries, such as Germany, the land and air forces are the primary consideration. For Great Britain, situated so close to the potential enemies of continental Europe, air forces are second in importance only to the sea forces. For Japan, although also an island nation, the remoteness of its situation as to potential enemies, the character of such potential enemies, and her interests in continental Asia, make the land forces next in importance to the sea forces. Again, France has both land and sea borders of large extent, but it is the potential enemies across the land borders that require her land and air forces to be superior to the sea forces. Theoretically, considering potential enemies, France should be as strong as possible in all three respects--land, sea, and air--but financial limitations compel a discrimination choice, which illustrates the important factor of financial ability.

## VI. War

### 1. The Causes of War

Enough has already been said to make it clear that, in modern times, the cause of a given war is the conflict of national policies in a matter so vital to at least one of the nations that war is to be preferred to giving up the vital national interests. It is to be noted that domestic (civil) war also chiefly arises from conflict of policies, even such policies as the desire or determination of the "ins" to remain in power or the resolve of the "outs" to get into power.

### 2. The Purpose of War

The aim of a given war is the upholding and enforcement of that vital national policy which was the cause of the war. Diplomatic means have presumably proved inadequate to settle the matter so that the conception is had of war as the continuance of international relations by means of hostilities--"by force and with arms". The conflict of national policies has brought about the conflict of armed forces: the outcome of the conflict of armed forces (war) will decide whose national policies will prevail and normal international relations

by diplomatic means will then be resumed in due course. The purpose of the war is to impose the will of one nation on that of another nation. How can this best be done?

5. Nature of War

Present-day war is so costly in all respects--as to human life, money, disruption of trade and of industry as examples--that a government's first care in waging war is to consider and to determine the nature of the war. It is obvious that the means should, as a matter of common sense, be adapted to the end in view, so that war is carried on only in such manner and in such degree as will procure the object for which the war was entered into.

It follows that there are two general classes of wars--limited and unlimited (von Clausewitz). Limited, where the object of the war can be gained by limited operations, as by the occupation of the territory in dispute or by the seizure of enemy territory; unlimited, where the matter at issue is so vital to one or both parties that only decisive victory over the armed forces of the other will cause the point to be yielded by the enemy nation. Even where the matter at issue has this vital character, it may be that one party to the war has such limited means that it is able only to carry on war of the limited type.

Wars may also be divided into two classes of another kind--offensive and defensive. If one of the parties is satisfied with the status quo, he may see fit to adopt the defensive and leave to the enemy to do what he will or can to change the situation, i. e., assume the offensive. Obviously, the defensive is the probable role where "means" are lacking.

It is to be noted that these classifications--limited, unlimited--offensive, defensive--are general in their nature. A given war may change from one class to the other in the course of the war; in fact, it is the usual case for the parties to change from offensive to defensive, or vice versa, according to circumstances.

#### 4. The "Tools" of war

The conduct of a war has already been shown to depend upon (1) its cause (2) its purpose and (3) its nature, all of which are clearly and surely founded upon the national policy which has given rise to a state of war.

Whether or not one or more national policies are the originating cause, set the goal to be attained, or indicate the scope of the hostilities, there is always one additional national policy that is a decisive factor. What "ways and means" has national policy provided for waging war or, in other words, where and what are the "tools" wherewith war is to be made? The consideration of adequacy of "ways and means" (tools), at hand and or in prospect, are vital to the conduct of a war. Presumably, as herein-before set forth, the realization that insistence on a given national policy was likely to lead to war has resulted (as in the case of Japan versus Russia) in an adequate national policy as to "ways and means". If not, then the nature of the war is bound to be, in every sense, limited and the outcome a matter of positive doubt, at least.

#### 5. The Scope of "Ways and Means"

The scope and character of "ways and means" has already been dealt with in the general sense. But, in a given case, these factors must be considered and evaluated in the concrete sense, so that there are clear and definite ideas of the available and potential "ways and means" of both (or of all) the nations involved. These comparisons are the only sure guide in the conduct of the war. Then only is known and appreciated at their real worth all the factors of strength and of weakness of all parties to the war. It is merely "common sense" to do this and it is merely "common sense" to employ all of the elements of strength in opposition to the enemy's elements of weakness.

When such a considered comparison of relative strengths and weaknesses has been made, not only as a matter of national policy itself, but again when taking a stand in support to



a vital national policy and yet again when war is imminent, that the nations involved can be said to be in any degree ready for the next stage, which is the conduct of war.

#### 5. Strategy--the Conduct of War

Strategy, in the general sense, is the science or art of military position and of the combination and employment of "ways and means" on a broad scale (differentiated from tactics) for gaining advantage in war. It is a science in its theory and in that it involves measurable considerations of mass, velocity, space, and time; it is an art in its practical application to a given war, to general situations in that war, and to the resulting specific situations.

It makes use of the available, and potential, "ways and means" in the manner, to the degree, and in the combination that will best insure the successful outcome of the war.

#### VI. National Policies vs Strategy

##### 1. General

The preceding presentations as to nations, governments, international relations, national policies, ways and means have not been adequate if they do not make it wholly clear that war is the outcome of the conflict of national policies and that the national policies of a given state must include "ways and means" of making war.

Since strategy is itself that essential and fundamental part of hostilities embodied in the phrase "conduct of war", it is inherent in the case, and inevitable in the premises, that the national policies affect the strategy of a war.

The national policies cause the war and so determine the opposing nation(s); they determine the purpose of the war and so define the result(s) to be attained; they determine upon and provide the "ways and means" wherewith war is to be waged and, in consequence and combination with the cause and purpose of the war, determine and define the scope and character of the war which it is the function of strategy to conduct.

It is abundantly clear, therefore, not only that the national policies do influence the strategy of a war but also that the relation of national policies and strategy is definite and unmistakable.

## 2. Degrees of Influence

The terms "influence" and "relation" are, however, general in their meaning, as there are varying degrees such as are conveyed by the words affect (minor), control (major), dominate (major plus) and command (complete).

It appears obvious that cases are hard to imagine where the connection is one to be classed as mere effect, so that the least likely degree is control. When that national super-policy regarding "ways and means" is considered, it may well dominate and, in combination with the national policy at issue, may command--the strategy of a war; e. g.--lack of means may require a defensive war, a limited war, or a combination of the two.

## 3. Correlation of National Policies and Strategy

There is a popular conception that when the politicians (diplomats) have reached an impasse from which war is the only exit, they have then nothing to do, or even that they should do nothing, but turn the situation over to the armed forces and await the outcome. Clearly, nothing could be further at variance with the facts, with the causes of the war, and with the necessities of the case.

Normally and properly the government of a state (nation) has complete control over its armed forces and is deeply concerned with the "ways and means" which they represent and which it is a function of the government to provide. The government cannot escape the responsibility for the adequacy of the "armed forces" any more than it can escape the responsibility for the national policies whose conflict with those of another nation have caused war.

Emphasis is again placed on the inescapable inter-relation of all national policies with that national super-policy

here called "ways and means". Reference is again made to the basic conception of war as a continuance of international relations by means of hostilities, and to the controlling reasons for waging war on a limited or unlimited scale and of an offensive or defensive character. Obviously, the civil government remains in full control during war.

Note: However, an exception may be noted in the existing situation in Japan if the statements (unofficial) of the civil government are to be credited, and it seems that they should be.

/// The paramount necessity is that the armed forces shall be left free to exercise their functions in the conduct of the war without interference in the military (naval) operations themselves, any more than a lawyer's client interferes with the conduct of his case in court, or a doctor's patient interferes with his conduct of the necessary treatment. But, human nature being what it is, there are all too many instances where the government and the armed forces have interfered with each other, have worked at cross-purposes and so have jeopardized the matter at stake. In the United States, the Constitution endeavors to deal with the matter by making the President (Executive head of the government) also Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy.

All this is not to say that the government, for due cause, such as a new ally (own or enemy), the attitude of a neutral nation, or domestic opposition, may not direct that a campaign be halted or even abandoned and a new one begun, that hostilities shall cease or slow up or increase, or any other general directions that, to it, appear to the advantage of the nation (state). The point is that its directions must be general as to the armed forces.

Further, the needs of efficient correlation require that the needs of the armed forces shall be kept as fully informed of the political situation as they themselves are required to keep the government informed as to the military situation. And not only must this be done in time of war

but even more, perhaps, in the time of peace when the national policies are in process of development and adoption, certainly when conflict is in prospect, and positively when war is imminent. Such are the most efficient methods to insure that correlation which is indispensable to that unity of action which leads to success in war.

✓ VIII. Summary

1. a. All governments develop national policies which promote the security, growth, welfare of the nation.  
b. Peace is a dominant factor.  
c. It is one of the essential functions of government to have a national super-policy relating to "ways and means" of enforcing its vital national interests.
2. a. Some national policies are bound to conflict.  
b. The conflicts of national policies may be adjusted by international measures with satisfactory results.  
c. If the results of international measures are unsatisfactory to a nation because of the vital character of its interest recourse may be had to war.
3. a. War is the continuation of international relations by means of armed force engaged in hostilities.  
b. The character of the war depends chiefly on the national policy at issue, upon the enemy, and upon the character of the "ways and means" provided by the national super-policy.
4. a. Strategy is, in essence, the conduct of war and so, it is influenced by the national policies to a degree where the latter may control, dominate, or even command the strategy of a war.  
b. Correlation of strategy with national policies is essential not only during a given war but in time of peace in consideration of all national policies.

## Part II. The Present Case of the United States

### I. Introductory

The foregoing general consideration and examination have led to well-defined views as to the relation between national policies and the strategy of a war, in the general sense. Since we are chiefly concerned with the interests of the United States, at home and abroad, it is well to get a perspective of our national policies as to their probable conflicts with those of other nations, to consider that national super-policy herein called "ways and means", and to note the probable trend of their resultant influence on the strategy of any war in which we are likely to engage.

### II. Geographical and Political Backgrounds

#### 1. The Western Hemisphere

The Western Hemisphere is, in effect, a smaller island land-mass separated by the oceans from that greater land-mass which comprises Europe, Asia, and Africa. It may be divided into three parts--the two continents of North and South America and Central America, the land-bridge which connects them.

This island character of the Western Hemisphere has been, and is, a determining factor in all United States political considerations which are also influenced by the fact that the nations of the Western Hemisphere are sovereign republics, patterned after our own model, with the exception of the self-governing, British, Dominion of Canada. Great Britain also possesses British Honduras in Central America, British Guiana in South America, and the islands of Jamaica, the Bahamas, and many of the Antilles--all in or near the Caribbean Sea, and Bermuda off our Atlantic Coast. France and Holland own their respective Guianas and some islands in the Antilles and elsewhere in the Caribbean Sea.

#### 2. The Atlantic

The outlook across the Atlantic is chiefly directed to Europe as the source of our people, as the most highly developed nations in political, industrial, and social matters

leading to their pre-eminence in world control of these factors and re-inforced by their strong military power. As to this last factor, we have great interest in that nation which has the greatest actual or potential power to control the Atlantic--Great Britain--which, combined with her possessions in the western Hemisphere, makes her attitude and policies of paramount concern to us both as to the Atlantic and as to the Caribbean Sea.

### 3. The Pacific

The outlook across the Pacific is chiefly affected by our overseas possessions--Alaska, Hawaii, the Canal Zone, the Philippines. The proximity of the Philippines to China and Japan, the situation of Alaska and of Hawaii as our main continental outposts, the western approaches to the Panama Canal are all of primary importance to us. Japan is the premier military (naval) and commercial nation on the Pacific shores of Asia.

### 4. The Caribbean

The Caribbean Sea, sometimes called the American Mediterranean, is peculiarly our concern not only because of British and other European mainland and island possessions but on account of our own possessions--Porto Rico, the Virgin Islands, the Canal Zone, of our responsibility for the Panama Canal and the consequent suzerainty of Panama, of our virtual protectorates of Cuba, Haiti, Santo Domingo, Nicaragua (as a potential canal route) and of any other Central American state whose political, territorial, or economic integrity is, or may become, unstable.

### 5. Approaches to the United States

The two land borders of the United States are Canada and Mexico. The approach by land from and to Canada is easy but the character of the Canadians and their relative inferiority in population and resources, at present at least, precludes the probability of Canada being anything but an avenue of approach for British military power which, in order to be effective, must first arrange to reach Canada via the sea,

and chiefly via the Atlantic.

The land approach from Mexico precludes its effective use unless another and more powerful nation tries to employ that route which it, in turn, would have to cross the sea to reach, even in the case of Central or South American nations, as the Central American terrain prohibits the movement of any considerable force by land.

✓ 6. Summary

The foregoing considerations emphasize

(1) That the island character of the Western Hemisphere affords an inherent isolation from the rest of the world and fosters a community of interests among its nations.

(2) That the strength and power of the United States make us the dominant power of the Western Hemisphere, in whose political, territorial and economic affairs we have a paramount interest.

(3) The necessity for an enemy of any considerable strength to use the sea in order to reach the continental United States.

(4) That our Atlantic interests look chiefly to Canada and other British possessions in their relation to us--and to the sea power of the British Empire in the Atlantic.

(5) That our Pacific interests look chiefly to our own overseas possessions in Alaska, Hawaii, the Panama Canal, and the Philippines--and to Japan as the principal Asiatic power in the Pacific.

(6) That our Caribbean Sea interests are of vital importance, not only because of European (chiefly British) possessions on the mainland and as to islands but also because of our own possessions, of the Panama Canal, and of our consequent necessary control over all the approaches thereto, as well as the proximity of the Antilles to our continental territory.

III. National Policies of the United States and their Probable Conflicts with Those of Other Nations

1. The Western Hemisphere

a. The Monroe Doctrine has been a fundamental factor in

our history and is now, apparently, so firmly established and so generally understood that we need not expect that any European (or other non-American) nation will try either to acquire territory in the Western Hemisphere or seek to control or disturb the existing political arrangements. It has been for us almost entirely a policy of security and has not been seriously challenged in nearly forty years (1895). In the hundred-odd years since its formal publication, it has sometimes been somewhat broadened in its scope to include political and territorial matters which were manifestly to our own advantage and incidentally to the advantage of other nations of the Western Hemisphere. The chief instances of this broadening of scope have had to do with Caribbean matters, including inter-oceanic canals between the Atlantic and the Pacific.

b. Our Caribbean policy may be considered (what, in fact, it is,) the application of a broadened Monroe Doctrine to that area (relatively local) called the Caribbean Sea. Our chief interest is the Panama Canal and the approaches thereto via the passages between the islands which enclose the Caribbean. These same islands, some of which are European (mainly British) possessions, include our own possessions--Porto Rico and the adjacent Virgin Islands, Cuba--over which we exercise a formal protectorate, Hayti--where both the republics of Haiti and Santo Domingo are under our virtual protectorate. In addition, we have a strong interest in Nicaragua as the best available route for another inter-oceanic canal. We are also interested in the proximity of the Antilles to our Gulf and Florida coasts. Hence the policy that asserts our paramount interest in the Caribbean area which, in fact, includes all political and territorial matters on the West Coast of Central America, as a corollary to our responsibility for the existing Panama Canal and for the potential Nicaragua Canal. It is primarily a policy of security.

c. Pan-Americanism is not primarily a policy of security but rather one relating to growth, welfare, and peace. Here



the island character of the Western Hemisphere and the political preponderance of republics afford an inherent differentiation from the rest of the world and so tends to pave the way for recognition and emphasis of that community of interests which it is the aim of Pan-Americanism to promote and to foster, and of which the Pan-American Union is the instrument. Its scope relates to commerce, finance, science, health, jurisprudence, and international law looking towards readable relations, scrupulous respect for the rights of small nations, the promotion of constitutional liberty, the stability of nations and the growth of mutual understanding and harmony of purpose. The chief obstacles to its development are essentially those which it is intended to overcome and can, in due course, be expected to overcome.

## 2. The Atlantic and Europe

a. Our traditional policy towards European affairs has been summed up in one word as "isolation" but it must be noted that this was in regard to political affairs. It did not, and could not, relate to economic and other interests. This policy of "isolation" was emphasized in the Monroe Doctrine and in its applications. But the Spanish-American war and the Panama Canal had already done much to increase our concern in European affairs before the development of the World War finally compelled our participation, not only in the war but in its aftermath, so that at present we are politically involved in Europe because of economic and financial interests which appear inseparable from political considerations. This is not to say that we do not endeavor, still, to keep aloof from strictly political questions but the difficulties are great. We are, of course, interested in all matters affecting trade which includes control of the sea-ways and also is concerned with access to markets and to raw materials in Europe, Asia (via Mediterranean Sea) and Africa.

It is our peace policy, however, which chiefly influences our political attitude in Europe and elsewhere, as evidenced

in our views regarding reduction of armaments, substitution of arbitration (forced, if necessary) for war and other similar measures.

b. Not only do Canada, Jamaica, and other British possessions on this side of the Atlantic enlist our attention but British sea-power (naval and merchant) and British trade in general compel us to close consideration of British views and of British policies. British trade and shipping is challenged, and has been decreased, by our expansion into markets which they dominated. As well, our financial growth and strength have virtually reduced Great Britain to second place. It is a traditional policy of Great Britain to crush, eventually, any serious challenge to their naval and commercial supremacy, as evidenced by the fate of Holland in the 17th century, of France and of Spain the 18th century and of Germany (so far as Great Britain was concerned) in the recent World War. Truly, Great Britain must be considered a potential enemy and a powerful one, not so much as to questions of security but certainly as to matters involving the growth of our foreign trade, financial supremacy and our dominant position in world affairs.

c. Among other European nations, France is important because of her military power, her commercial strength, her colonies and, also, because of her attitude of dominance in continental Europe.

Germany is subdued but resentful of her status and apparently determined to resume her pre-war standing and influence. Italy is at present aggressive towards other European nations but is not likely to cause us any serious trouble.

Russia, under its present soviet regime, is a menace in its determined and energetic endeavors to change the general political character of any and every nation. Our non-recognition is disadvantageous to our trade, but that disadvantage must be endured as a necessary result of our own position to Russian political concepts, at least as long as they are so aggressive and so unscrupulous.

### 3. The Pacific and Asia

#### a. Our Overseas Possessions

Our Pacific possessions require considerations looking to their security, which was seriously compromised at the Washington Conference (1921) when the Nine-Power Treaty imposed severe restrictions on military preparedness westward of Hawaii as the price of non-renewal of the British - Japanese alliance.

#### b. The Philippines

Our situation in regard to the Philippines is one of uncertainty with respect to their eventual independence which, if and when consummated, will not release us from at least a very strong moral obligation to guarantee that independence. Even now, the Philippines are a serious strategical liability in that Japan is likely to seize them as an opening move in case of hostilities and so place us in the situation of being obliged to regain them in spite of all the very grave difficulties.

#### c. China (The Open Door)

China and the United States have always been on friendly terms, enhanced during the past twenty years by our sympathetic encouragement of her endeavors to establish a stable republican government. But it is as a market that we are really concerned with China, as evidenced by John Hay's "Open Door" policy, re-inforced by the Nine-Power treaty which was intended to safeguard her political and territorial integrity. The chief, and perhaps the only, nation which threatens China is Japan, although Russia is active in trying to convert the Chinese to soviet doctrines. Japan, foiled as to Shantung, has recently shifted her activities to Manchuria and has invented the state of Manchukuo to screen her present actual, and future open, territorial and political control of that region. We are involved in that this Japanese action violates the Nine-Power Treaty and menaces our "Open Door" policy, as well as our general attitude of backing the efforts of the League of Nations, of which Japan is a member.

d. Japan

Not only are we concerned with Japanese policies as regards China (see above) but in their evident intention to seize and to hold a dominating position in Asia. In this concern, our Asiatic (Chinese) trade is a major consideration, as is the security (integrity) of the Philippines. Also, the Nine-Power Treaty has the effect of weakening us and of strengthening Japan in the western Pacific, which fosters and promotes Japanese ambitions. One of Japan's chief excuses for her expansion in continental Asia is her over-population which she emphasizes to the limit by way of indirect retaliation for our own exclusion policy as well as that of other nations (Australia). All these considerations point very definitely to Japan as a potential enemy, which will be satisfied to seize and hold and then to defy us to change the situation.

4. The World in General

a. Economic Matters

It is understood that our prosperity, in our normal industrial and agricultural status, is based on the export of ten to fifteen percent of our production. Other nations, as Great Britain in industry and Russia in agriculture, depend for their well-being upon their export trade and, in the nations cited, they have a reciprocal interest in Great Britain's need of food-stuffs compared with Russia's need of industrial products, which is a natural and typical basis of trade, being virtually barter.

Our difficulty is that our industrial and agricultural production are both so large that we are concerned to export, and not to import, both of them. A serious complication is that of our high protective tariff which restricts the "barter effect" of our foreign trade and, in general terms, reduces our imports to luxuries and to the relatively few raw materials which we lack and need. The nations who buy our products have, then, to make up the substantial difference (balance) in money which, in turn, must come from the profits of

their own domestic industries or their foreign trade. As a result, our foreign trade suffers with those nations who can employ (exploit) "barter effect" and so make for us very real conflicts with their trade policies. It is to be noted that they are none-the-less conflicts although they may not be the subject of formal (official) diplomatic action.

Coupled with this matter of trade and industry is the carriage of trade, especially that major part transported in shipping. Here, the "barter effect" is an important, and may be a deciding, factor in the trade relations of two nations. And certainly, as the competition in the world markets grows more intense, it cannot be expected that a nation which has a great merchant marine (as, Great Britain) will be willing to carry the trade of another nation (as, United States) into a market where they are both powerful competitors.

Such are the compelling reasons which should result in the growth of our shipping to an extent and character which will meet our needs. Here, again, it is Great Britain who is the principal rival in the Atlantic, with Japan playing a lesser but similar role in the Pacific. It is not yet the case that trade is a only and avowedly the cause of conflicts leading to wars, but it is the case that many past wars had really an economic basis which was hidden or obscured by dynastic, territorial or other excuses.

#### b. Social Questions

Linked with the question of our foreign trade and a major argument for our tariff policy is the matter of the standard of living we have attained and which we mean to maintain. An effect of this social policy is our present attitude towards immigration which restricts the flow from other countries and keeps up the barrier against Oriental peoples. As to our standard of living, it can be said that the world attitude is, if anything, one of envy. But there is strong objection to our tariff policy and, lately, retaliation has been employed to combat it, thus promoting an ill-feeling

which affects, to some degree, our international relations by decreasing mutual good-will. Conflict with our immigration policy is negligible except as to Oriental exclusion and here Japan is the chief complainant, so much so that there can be no doubt of Japan's animus against us and of her readiness to retaliate in any available way, such as in trade relations, Chinese questions, or the promotion of unrest in the Philippines.

c. Political Developments

Politically, we are committed to non-imperialism not only for ourselves but for other nations. We favor republican government and sympathize with those nations which are trying to attain to democratic institutions, but are not disposed to meddle with any nation's form of government and so are proponents of the status quo. We are also largely committed to the support of the integrity of existing territorial limits throughout the world.

It is our peace policy, based on altruism supported by sentimentalism (sometimes called polly-anna-ism) which is our chief characteristic, and has already been dealt with above. We need here, however, to repeat that, while our attitude has been a powerful influence in world affairs, it has undoubtedly been taken advantage of by other nations in a very practical manner for their own benefit. The trouble seems to be that we announce a view (whether of our own initiative or inspired) which other nations decry or cawn with faint praise with the result that we are manoeuvred into substantial concessions in support of our case. These concessions are seized upon and, if possible, exploited by other nations and finally we find ourselves committed to a stand in which those other nations agree. But an impartial examination will usually fail to reveal where any other nation has made any concessions of consequence to themselves and will commonly show that we have been in some way and to a greater or less degree, engaged in world affairs beyond our original intentions.

However, we were (and are) leaders in the application of arbitration and mediation to the solution of international

difficulties. It is our present, and probable future, policy to uphold and to guide world opinion to unity of action in opposition to any nation which acts contrary to international law, to judgement rendered by arbitration, to treaties whether general (as the Kellogg-Briand Pact) or the Pacific Nine-Power Treaty) or particular (as between individual nations) or, as well, to the dictums of the League of Nations (whether by the Council or the Assembly) or to the judgements of the International Peace Court (the Hague). Further, we are among the leaders (and perhaps the only sincere one) of the world endeavors looking towards the limitation of armaments. So powerful is this national peace policy that, coupled with the sentimental optimism which is a national characteristic, we have already gone far towards depleting and weakening our own "ways and means" of upholding and enforcing, if need be, those of our own national policies which affect our vital interests.

✓ 5. Summary

Of all the national policies which affect our foreign relations, none are likely to result in serious conflict with those of any nation except Great Britain in respect of trade and of Japan as to trade (the Open Door) and as to violation of treaties.

✓ IV. Ways and Means

1. General Considerations

While we have narrowed the scope of our considerations to the present prospective potential enemies of Great Britain (Atlantic) and Japan (Pacific), we have still a very large matter to deal with and must try to continue to deal with it only in a broad and general sense.

Historically, despite Washington's (and others') experienced and cogent advice to make due preparations for war it is traditional (and habitual) for us to be inadequately prepared. This is the combined result of a number of factors, the character of which is here only indicated: democracy, which tends to make everyone believe he knows it all; the preponderance (inherent in democracy) of people whose real

interest is in their own welfare as individuals; the glorification of our victories in war and the corresponding ignorance of our defeats (and disgraces) and of their basic causes; the inability of the average individual (the man in the street) to understand the interplay of cause and effect not only in foreign but in domestic affairs, as well as his lack of interest in such matters. Added to these elements is the manner in which our representative (republican) form of government has developed; as to put a premium on mediocrity and tend to emphasize the defects of the electorate, already mentioned. Too much, by far, do representatives have to depend for their re-election upon the real benefits procured for their districts thus leading to the scrutiny of national expenditures from the point of view not of the good of the whole, nor even of the greatest good of the greatest number, but rather of the individual, whether voter or official.

When to these attitudes are added our national altruism, our belief in our own capacity to do well at anything we undertake, together with a child-like trust and faith in our destiny, we appear unable to appreciate preparedness even when, as individuals, we carry fire insurance on our houses and collision insurance on our cars.

## 2. Our General Needs

In our previous glance at our geographical and political background we noted the island character of the Western Hemisphere, our dominant position therein and the necessity for an enemy to approach by sea to get at the continental United States. These facts, coupled with our repeated avowals of a policy of non-aggression, have sufficed for the pacifists--encouraged by our potential enemies--to make headway with the idea that we require only to stand on the defensive, with corresponding "ways and means". What they overlook (and will not see) is the location and importance of our overseas possessions and the consequent necessity to dominate the Caribbean and to be adequately prepared in the Pacific.

It must be clear that our Navy is a primary element in



our "ways and means", not only to prevent potential enemies reaching our continental United States but their reaching the Caribbean Area in such close proximity thereto. And, certainly, when our overseas possessions are considered, it is essential that our Navy be able to protect and defend all of them--of which the most difficult is the Philippines. Not only must the Navy be able to protect and defend them, in a general sense, but must be able to empower the Army to perform its part, including the shore-based air forces (whether Army or separate) by ensuring their safe passage overseas which, in turn, includes adequate and efficient shipping.

Without here attempting to set up absolute ratios of Navy and Army, it must appear clear that the relative importance of the Navy is greater than that of the Army. Shore-based air forces are here considered, and included, as in similar case to the Army.

### 3. Great Britain, Parity, the Atlantic

Turning now to possible conflicts of our national policies with those of Great Britain, it does not at present appear likely that they cannot be adjusted by measures short of war, but, in future, the questions of trade, of shipping and of naval strength may lead to war. At present, as in the past and as may be expected in the future, Great Britain is exerting all of her powerful pressure to restrict our trade, our shipping and our naval strength; this she does indirectly as well as directly and in both ways, effectively. For example, by advocating reduction of naval armaments she promotes and enhances her great advantage in the size and numbers of her merchant vessels which, in the extreme case of total disarmament, would surely keep her in the premier position on the sea.

It would appear certain that these matters of trade, shipping, and naval strength are likely to become of vital interest to us, in that we cannot yield without bringing about a decline in our usual state of prosperity. So far, we have been led to agree to parity in naval strength which sounds

well but is, in effect, non-existent not only because successive reductions have decreased our absolute naval strength but, as before mentioned, have affected our relative naval strength because of our inferior shipping. This situation of seeming parity would still exist if we had a government that would build up our naval strength to actual parity, as at present permitted.

The net result is that we may expect to be inferior to Great Britain, in case of war, in naval "ways and means".

#### 4. Japan--China, the Philippines

When we come to consider possible conflicts of our national policies with those of Japan, we have a concrete case, actually in existence, to take heed of, as evidenced by Japanese aggression in China (Manchuria) which conflicts with our policy as to the political and territorial integrity of China and may be expected to conflict with our trade policy called the Open Door.

Our participation, and Japan's, in the Nine-Power Treaty is our ostensible basis for remonstrance with Japan but, in addition, we are in our usual position of spokesman for the League of Nations, of which we are not even a member, although Japan is. The State Department is bringing pressure to bear upon Japan, even to the extent of having an American (General McCoy) a member of the Manchurian Commission which is an instrument of the League of Nations. Japan's attitude may be summed up as defiance to the world in her determination to continue her selected course in Manchuria. What will we do about it? What can we do about it?

Japan's military needs have previously been indicated as being, in order of their importance (usefulness) to Japan-- Navy, Army, Aviation. Japan has supposedly been restricted-- by the Treaty of Washington--to a 5:5:5 ratio or sixty percent of the naval strength of Great Britain or the United States.

A further restriction was that there should be no additional naval bases or development of those existing, west of Hawaii and east of Singapore. This latter restriction was proposed

and strongly supported by Japan, as it was clearly to her advantage in the Western Pacific. Not satisfied with her success in thus hampering our communications with the Philippines, she has insisted upon, and obtained an increase of her naval ratio as regards cruisers and submarines. She is surely determined on eventual parity with the United States, at least.

While we need not give too much weight to Japanese attempts against any of our possessions except the Philippines, but rather must expect to be ourselves required to operate overseas, let us not omit to realize that we will do so against a powerful and determined enemy, who has aided and abetted our other potential enemies in leading us into a naval status, at least, which is relatively inferior to Japan in the Western Pacific. The very bases required for our overseas operations are chiefly now in the islands which are a Japanese mandate.

✓ V. The Influence of U. S. National Policy on the Strategy of a war with Japan or Great Britain.

1. General Considerations

Referring back to our national policies, we find that none of our policies which relate primarily to the Western Hemisphere--the Monroe Doctrine, the Caribbean Protectorate, or Pan-Americanism--is likely to lead to war.

The relaxation of our former and traditional isolation policy may be considered necessary and inevitable but has had the unmistakable effect of bringing us into European economic and financial affairs and so, indirectly, into their political affairs.

But our altruism and our strong inclination to play "Citizen Fixit" have combined to involve us much more deeply than is necessary or desirable, even though initially not intended. In fact, these characteristics have not limited our activities to European affairs but have projected them pretty well over the whole world.

2. Ways and Means

The principal effect has been the weakening of our relative

armed strength, which includes the lack of adequate naval bases in the Pacific. It appears, to the earnest and impartial observer, that we have been cleverly and purposely maneuvered into this status of inadequate "ways and means" by skillful and effective play on our national characteristics, before-mentioned, of altruism and of acting the part of "Citizen Fixit". It also appears unlikely, now, that we shall be able to correct this situation or, as a fact, that we as a nation have sense enough to wish to correct it. The truth is that present we have confidence in the good-will of all nations and of their desire to abide by the "GoldenRule" which is to ignore the basic traits of human nature as evidenced through the ages of recorded history. So we can expect to enter any war with "ways and means" which are inadequate for the purpose of supporting and enforcing any national policy involving interests which are vital to us.

### 3. The Character of Strategy

a. If and when the time comes that measures short of war are inadequate to settle the conflicts of national policy as between us and Great Britain, we must take account of the two general situations--first, where Great Britain takes the overseas offensive against us by using her superior fleet and her possessions in the western Hemisphere in which case Canada is a likely avenue of approach; second, where Great Britain takes such measures as to require us to overthrow them, i.e.--take the overseas offensive.

It may confidently be expected that the British Dominions (except possibly the Irish Free State) and possessions will give every possible assistance, but the controlling factor none-the-less remains the British Fleet, even in the event that there are British allies other than the Dominions. Great Britain is well supplied with bases (possessions) in the vicinity of our shores whereas we would have none in European waters except in the doubtful case of our having a European ally. The strategy imposed on us in the second general situation above is so to act as to compel the first situation,

as by the invasion of Canada or by the seizure of Bermuda or of Jamaica.

The cause of the war being trade, shipping or naval strength, or a combination of them, we can expect attacks on our shipping and, as the undoubted theater of war will be the North Atlantic, the disruption of our European trade. The inferiority of our Fleet and of our shipping (lack of "ways and means" makes it all the more essential that we shall oblige Great Britain to an overseas offensive which should impose on her the handicap inherent in the necessity to establish and secure lines of overseas communication for the supply of her Fleet and the transport and supply of troops.

This, is, in effect, a limited war (as any war of overseas is likely to be) and our general course is defensive in that we take and hold an advantage which we defy the enemy to regain. This is not to say that the action of our Fleet is not to be offensive as against enemy communications or even against the enemy fleet itself, if suitable opportunity offers, or can be brought about.

#### b. Japan

We can expect that Japan will take such steps as will compel us to overseas operations by persisting in the course which caused the conflict of policies and defying us to change it and, in addition, by attacks on the Philippines or even on Hawaii as a potent handicap to our overseas operations which are of themselves of great difficulty. That is, Japan will assume the offensive initially to acquire an advantage where she can assume the defensive and defy us to alter the situation --not that her defensive attitude will be in any degree passive, it will not.

We have then to operate offensively and, initially, for a limited object, e. g.--the recapture of Hawaii and the recapture of the Philippines before we will be in a situation where we can begin to bring pressure to bear on Japan itself.

Japan is likely to be without allies except possibly impressed forces from China or considerable assistance from

Soviet Russia as to munitions and other supplies.

A chief factor of the war is here, also, the matter of "ways and means", chiefly as evidenced by Japan's determined efforts to increase her relative ratio in naval types (in which she has, so far, had marked success) and the Nine-Power Treaty (which was the price of the non-continuance of the British-Japanese alliance) and results in our inability to strengthen our existing Pacific bases westward of Hawaii, or to establish new ones.

#### ✓ 4. Summary

Geographical and political considerations combine to bring about wars of similar character in either case as to overseas operations and as to the general defensive attitude of the nation on the "receiving end" of the overseas operations. This situation appears to be true no matter what national policies have conflicted to give rise to the war so that we have, again, as the determining factor--our national policy as to "ways and means".

Adequate "ways and means" might well operate to cause Great Britain or Japan to agree to adjustment of the conflict of national policies by means other than the resort to war.

#### ✓ VI. Conclusion

It is that national altruism which leads to a U. S. national policy which may as well be called by its right name--pacifism, continuance in which promises to have the consequent effect of limiting our ability to support and enforce any national interests which may, in the future, be deemed vital to our welfare and prosperity.

In short, we can expect to become engaged in a war with the initial handicap of inadequate "ways and means", to expend much blood and treasure to overcome this handicap (if we can finally overcome it) and gain the victory. We may take great consolation we can draw from the fact that we have always done this and have, so far, been fortunate in the outcome.

The influence of the national policy of the United States as to "ways and means" is to impose upon the strategy of a war

the requirement of engaging in a limited and defensive war in the initial stages, at least.

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