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THESIS

The Relationship Between the
National Policy and Strategy of

GREAT BRITAIN

In the World War and its Lessons
For Us Today

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THE RELATIONSHIP
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To one who would follow British history, in an endeavor to trace national policy, it must become apparent that the close of the nineteenth century marks an end and a beginning. What had been a well-defined aim of British statesmen for eighty years or more seemed then to be found no longer adequate to the needs of the State, and was laid aside for something better fitted to its requirements. Just as in all changes of major importance, however, the transition did not take place overnight. It is impossible to point to a single date - a year, even - and say that here ended the old order and here began the new. A considerable period of gradual change took place, the actual beginning of which was doubtless unperceived at the time.

The year 1895 was marked, however, by several incidents that, to a careful observer of the day, could not fail to point the need of a new line of action for Great Britain - a line which the history of the next dozen years shows her actually taking. To enumerate some of the incidents: in the Near East there was new evidence of French dissatisfaction with British occupation of Egypt, and there was fresh antagonism with Russia in regard to Turkey; in the Far East, the combination of Russia, Germany, and

France had compelled Japan to give back to China the Liaotung Peninsula, in spite of opposition from Great Britain; in America, President Cleveland and his Secretary of State had taken so strong and uncompromising a stand with regard to the boundary dispute between Venezuela and British Guiana that, unless Great Britain acquiesced in their demands, there could be no recourse other than to arms; and in South Africa, where the dispute with the Transvaal daily became more critical, Germany was engaged openly in diplomatic interference, climaxed on 3 January, 1896, in the Kaiser's famous telegram of congratulation to President Kruger, following the so-called "Jameson Raid". These are by no means all of the "incidents" or difficulties that Great Britain had to contend with at this time. They arose almost daily, and, worst of all, they involved practically all of the first class Powers. It was evident that Great Britain needed to fortify her position with an alliance or two; otherwise she might one day find the entire world aligned against her.

And so came to an end the period when Great Britain played a lone hand, the days of non-intervention and of "splendid isolation", which had been the objective of British ministers most of the time since the close of the Napoleonic wars, but which had now become for Great Britain far more dangerous than splendid. There followed a series of agreements and "understandings" with other nations, the result of which was to strengthen considerably Great Britain's position. The first of these was concluded with Japan on 30 January, 1902. This agreement, which was really an alliance extending over a period of five years - at the end of which time it was renewed - provided that if one of the two Powers went to war with a single Power, the other was to remain neutral; but if one of the two was at war with two Powers, the other should give active support. Following the Anglo-Japanese Agreement, Great Britain in 1904 concluded an entente cordiale

with France. This latter, while it was not an alliance and did not commit the two States to support each other except by diplomatic means in case of need, resulted in an immensely improved feeling and understanding between two nations that had come to be traditional enemies. Three years later, in 1907, the Entente Cordiale was expanded to become the Triple Entente, through inclusion of Russia, which had already been allied with France under the Dual Entente of 1893. Thus was completed, with the exception of Serbia - actually a protégée of Russia - and neutralized Belgium, the alignment of Allies that faced Germany and Austria in 1914.

But reverting again to the change that took place at the turn of the century in Great Britain's attitude toward alliance with other Powers - of what did this change consist? Was it a change of policy? Many writers indeed speak of it as such; they refer, for instance, to a policy of isolation and a policy of close co-operation, but it would seem that in so doing they use the word rather loosely. The result is liable to be confusion in the mind of the reader as to what has been the guiding policy or purpose of Great Britain during her long history. Has it been something that changed with each ministry - or perhaps even oftener? Doubtless policies change; but experience teaches that any such discontinuity of policy - of basic governmental purpose - as this would indicate, could hardly be consistent with the position and the success that Great Britain has unquestionably attained in world affairs. It seems that to clarify our ideas it would be well to make a definition of terms, and, best of all, to make it on as broad a basis as practicable.

Field Marshall Sir William R. Robertson has defined Policy as the object which the Government has in view to accomplish, and Strategy as the action taken to achieve that object. The two stand in relation to each other, therefore, as Purpose or End in View, and Means to that End.

Schuman says that the "Policy of Great Britain is security for the Empire". This appears to be a statement definite enough, yet sufficiently broad in its scope, to answer our purpose. Using it as a basis, we are immediately struck with the consistency and the continuity of British policy over a period of even hundreds of years. With but slight deviation now and then, it has held true to its course. On the other hand, the means employed, i.e., the strategy, has changed from time to time as conditions changed. Not that the means employed has always been the wisest and the best: being acutely susceptible to certain defects of democratic government - as an Englishman will be the first to admit - strategy has often lagged or even gone off at a tangent. Eventually, however, it has generally assumed its proper place and direction in support of policy.

On the basis of the definitions we have selected, it is clear that Great Britain's change from isolation to close co-operation was one, not of policy, but of strategy. Under conditions as they existed in the world at the end of the nineteenth century, her basic purpose or policy, the security of the Empire, could best be attained by casting in her lot with one or more Powers whose aims were not altogether irreconcilable with her own, and whose political safety, in common with her own, was in danger of being assailed from a certain quarter. When Great Britain felt herself strong - or, conversely, when the other Powers of Europe were weak, or were divided into camps such that none was able to offer serious opposition to British plans or British security - then Great Britain could hold herself aloof. Not so, when the balance of power was broken, and States showed signs of making common cause, or taking simultaneous action, against the Island Kingdom. It was then the part of strategy to thwart such a movement by initiating combinations on her own account, taking care to direct them against the threat most dangerous to her own welfare.

At this point it seems appropriate to inquire into the reason - if there be any - why Great Britain, in seeking an alliance in Europe, placed herself with France and Russia rather than with the Triple Alliance of Germany, Austria, and Italy. During part of the decade 1894 to 1904, when the final alignment was being made, it appeared at times as if Great Britain might be thrown with the Central Powers. Between Great Britain and Italy there had long been a bond of friendship. On the other hand, Great Britain and France historically were enemies; and at this very time there was, in Madagascar, Siam, and Egypt, plenty to keep them apart. Moreover, the warm welcome, official and otherwise, that France had given President Kruger when he visited Europe was anything but pleasant to the British public. As for Russia, the other Power with which Great Britain finally became associated, there seemed to^{be}/hardly a point at which they could meet on common ground. In Turkey, in Persia, in Central Asia, and in the Far East, every move that either Power made was suspect in so far as the other was concerned. Was it then the astuteness of Delcassé, the perverseness of the Kaiser, or just downright chance that made Great Britain a member of the Triple Entente? The evidence seems definite that it was none of these. As by instinct Great Britain saw where her greatest danger lay - the rising sea-power of Germany. Thereupon her decision was made: she would throw her weight on the side opposed to Germany. As Spender says in his book, "Fifty Years of Europe" -

" . . . the rise of a new naval power across the North Sea awakened all her latent anxieties about her own safety, and the position in which she would be if a dominant European power commanding a great fleet or coalition of fleets were in a position to challenge her."

And again -

"The great contention between Germany and Britain on sea-power was . . . not a side-issue of European politics or an undesigned entanglement of Britain in the European

quarrel; it was from the beginning of the twentieth century onwards to the outbreak of the war one of the fundamental schisms between the nations."

If there is one thing that writers on war and allied subjects have stressed it is that there must be effective co-ordination between policy and strategy - that strategy, the means, must keep policy, the end, steadfastly in view. Except that each war brings the usual quota of violations of this fundamental principle, it would seem superfluous further to repeat the injunction.

As here used, both policy and strategy are intended in their widest sense, that of national policy and national, or grand, strategy, the latter of which has for its object "to co-ordinate and direct all the resources of a nation toward the attainment of the political object . . . - the goal defined by national policy". Since the resources of a nation are both material and spiritual, military and non-military, it follows that national strategy consists of a number of component, co-ordinated strategies, which have been listed by some writers as political, diplomatic, economic, military, naval, and morale. Certainly in conflicts like the World War, in which nations mobilize their entire man-power and economic resources, national strategy attains tremendous importance. Unless preparation has been guided by such strategy, and unless the State has placed in control a national strategist of the proper caliber, the result may well be disastrous.

Considering the case of Great Britain from 1900 to the beginning of the World War, it is evident that her Government sensed aright the situation, and, in the field of diplomacy, adopted the correct strategy. One cannot but remark on the timeliness of this action. The Kaiser's delight in saber-rattling, and in delivering himself of resounding speeches about "the mailed fist" and "fighting as a knight in shining armor", was well-known and

more or less discounted in Europe. But when he declared -

"Our future lies on the seas. I will never rest until I have raised my navy to a position similar to that occupied by my army. German colonial aims can be gained only when Germany becomes master of the ocean" -

that was something different; and it was particularly so, when in 1900 the Reichstag passed a Navy Act that would double the German navy by 1920. Britons did not hesitate; for now was not the time to be left isolated and alone in Europe. Almost immediately, as we have seen, they concluded an alliance with the friendly Power, Japan, thus adding greatly to the security of their position in the Far East. Then they set about to compose their differences and to form an entente with France and Russia, the German opposition in Europe. All of this was accomplished in less than seven years - leaving but a scant seven more until the storm broke.

So much for Great Britain's pre-war diplomatic strategy - how did her strategy in other fields tally with her national policy? Consider first the political aspect. Broadly speaking, this embraces the diplomatic field, since the latter has to do with foreign, as distinguished from domestic, politics. We have seen that Great Britain's action in the foreign field was well calculated to strengthen her position and further her policy. Germany saw in it a move to throttle her - to enclose her in a "ring of steel", though this was probably an exaggerated fear. Earl Grey, in fact, insists that the entente was intended only to establish better relations with France and Russia, and was not aimed at Germany at all. He says -

"There was no thought . . . of using our better relations with France or with Russia against Germany; it was hoped that relations with Germany would improve. Indeed, the experience of present years led some minds in the Foreign Office to consider that our relations with Germany would now be better than they had been, when German diplomacy had been thriving, or at

any rate looking with satisfaction, on the quarrels of Great Britain with France and Russia, and exploiting the situation caused thereby".

Earl Grey's explanation may be correct, but there was much in the entente to indicate that it definitely included Germany in its purview. Not that it sought to do her ill: its purpose was to prevent possible intentions of that nature on the part of Germany against one or more members of the entente.

In the field of domestic politics it is not apparent that strategy accomplished a great deal within the ten or fifteen years just preceding the World War. A large percentage of Britons, as usual, was thinking mainly of peace during these years, with the result that needed preparations for war were not made. Several reforms, however, were initiated and a number of acts were passed that proved beneficial; but it is probably better to mention them under the heading of certain other strategies with which they are closely related.

Looking next to the field of economic strategy - and reviewing briefly the situation of Great Britain in this respect - the following facts are noteworthy and immediately apparent:

A small island kingdom, industrialized, dependent ^{upon} the rest of the world for foodstuffs and most raw materials, and possessed of merchant shipping amounting to 21,000,000 tons, was the center of a world-wide empire. The very life of Great Britain was trade. In 1914 she had 9000 ships in her merchant fleet, almost four times the number possessed by her nearest rival, Germany. Scattered about the world, on all the trade routes and at every focal point for ocean shipping, were British bases and fueling stations, while ships under her flag carried an annual trade of five billion dollars upon the seven seas. For years London had been the financial center of the world. It little mattered that there was normally but four to eight weeks'

supply of food in the islands for the inhabitants of the United Kingdom; so long as the trade flowed in and out - supported by the mighty British navy - a food shortage for Great Britain was hardly within the realm of possibility. Altogether, the situation seemed to contain little cause for fear. That there might temporarily be abnormal risks and even losses in shipping, accompanied by a reluctance on the part of normal agencies to underwrite ships and cargoes, at least until enemy commerce destroyers were swept from the seas, was foreseen as war became imminent. It so happened that, in years past, various British shipping interests had formed emergency insurance clubs, to provide against an emergency of this nature, when the usual marine rates would become prohibitive. In 1914, these clubs immediately received the backing of the Government, and served an excellent purpose in the early days of the war, when a small number of German cruisers was still at large. But a submarine war on commerce, such as developed later on, with the serious economic threat to Great Britain that it entailed, was apparently unthought of, and certainly unprovided for.

Strategy in the economic field was of long development. Its beginnings lay far back in the sixteenth century; but through all the years, its growth followed the true line marked out by national policy. Consequently when war came, the shipping was at hand, the trade routes were established, and British bases were located at every strategical point on the ocean highways. Where economic strategy, however, had been deficient, as in the case of other Powers, was in the proper organization of industry for war. This was a new consideration; but it is one that cannot be disregarded with impunity.

Consider next the military strategy of Great Britain during pre-war times. With the exception of the Crimean campaign, which

was restricted in its objective and was conducted a long way from Western Europe, the British had not been engaged in battle on the Continent since Waterloo. In the popular belief, it had become doubtful if Great Britain would again send her land forces - at least on a large scale - to continental Europe. True, ^{she} had certain commitments, along with other Powers, under the Treaty of 1839 with regard to the neutrality of Belgium; but to the layman - the casually informed - it seems usually to have been assumed that whatever action Great Britain was called upon to take in this matter would be confined to her naval forces.

By comparison with other European countries, Great Britain's army was small. The yardstick that had been used in determining the size of her military establishment had, for some time, been the probable number of men required for the security of her overseas possessions - in particular, India and the Northwest Border. In line with the small size of her army, and in direct contrast with the conscriptive methods in vogue amongst all of the other great Powers of Europe at that time, Great Britain depended upon voluntary recruitment of her military force. This proved to be a great handicap to her when thrown suddenly into a war of such magnitude as that of 1914-1918.

In general, British military affairs are placed under the control of a Minister known as the Secretary of State for War. He is charged with administering his department of the Government; but since governmental responsibility is held jointly by all members of the Cabinet, it became customary to refer all important matters to the Cabinet, in order that the latter might consider them, if deemed necessary, or at least be cognizant of what was being done.

To aid in the consideration, planning, and handling of military matters, three bodies had been established prior to the

World War:

The Committee of Imperial Defense,

The Army Council, and

The Imperial General Staff.

The first was merely a consultative body. The second, consisting of four military and two civilian members, was the supreme military authority. The third, which had been rather recently constituted, had for its purpose the planning and co-ordinating of military operations; but, as we shall see, it failed to acquire or to assume its proper functions until months after the war began.

In a military sense, it is apparent that the national attitude of Great Britain for many years prior to 1914 had been almost wholly at variance with the line she eventually had to take. Whereas she was committed to a small army, and to little, if any, intervention on land in continental Europe, depending as she did upon her navy for her main bulwark of defense - and, if need be, of offense - she suddenly found herself obliged to raise millions of men for her armies, and to fight on the Continent for her very existence as a sovereign State. In coming thus to actual war, not only with a small army, but with no machinery set up for the prompt enrollment and efficient utilization of her man-power, it must be admitted that Great Britain's strategy in the field of the military was lacking in vision during the years preceding the World War. It was found sadly wanting also in its failure to develop and to utilize a proper General Staff for the planning of all military operations.

Still, there was one bright spot in the military picture that, small as it was, doubtless had a far-reaching effect on the outcome of the war. In the years just preceding 1914, when war with Germany began to threaten, and the joint action of a small British land force with the armies of her ally, France, came to be looked

upon as a possibility, provision was made for the organization of an expeditionary force of six divisions, for service outside of the British Isles. This force was composed of the regular troops plus the army reserve within the United Kingdom. They were not troops additional to those already raised by Great Britain; but the fact that they were organized and prepared for expeditionary service made them immediately available to be sent to France when war was declared. They proved to be insufficiently supplied with artillery and machine guns; but they were excellent troops, and the fact of their reaching Mons in the nick of time may conceivably have been the difference between complete success and final failure of von Kluck's sweep through northern France. Had the British Expeditionary Force not been in existence before August, 1914, it is hard to predict what would have been the result of those critical first few days of war.

Turning now to the naval phase, one might expect here to find in British history, and in her pre-war plans and dispositions, an excellent example of what should be the proper relation between national policy and strategy. In the main the expectation is fulfilled. Britons long ago learned the lesson of sea-power; and for more than three centuries, if there was one goal toward which they strove consistently and with singleness of purpose, it was supremacy at sea. Admiral Richmond says -

"One basis of policy is so persistently recurrent that it seems to deserve a claim to permanency: the maintenance of naval strength".

At least from the final decade of the nineteenth century, when France and Russia, the two European Powers whose political aims seemed most frequently to cross those of Great Britain, got together and formed the Dual Entente, it had become the fixed purpose of Great Britain to maintain a navy at least equal to the combination of any two other navies. By comparison with a single navy, therefore, the British at the beginning of the twentieth

century had a large preponderance of ships and tonnage. Such was the situation when Germany made her ambitious bid for the mastery of the seas. Great Britain was not slow to perceive the threat, nor to accept the challenge. As already indicated, she bound to herself an ally in the Far East, to free her own hand in that region in case of a possible conflict nearer home; she settled her differences with France and Russia, and concluded with them the Triple Entente; and she built ships. In the last instance, much discussion has been evoked as to whether her decision regarding type and design of ships to be built was as happy as her determination was firm not to be outbuilt. She produced the dreadnaught and the battlecruiser - thus rendering obsolete large classes of ships in which she had a definite preponderance, and allowing Germany, as many affirm, to enter the building race on a more or less equal footing. She permitted her construction of smaller types - particularly destroyers and submarines - to lag, while she concentrated on larger craft. And she reflected in her ship-building the Lord Fisher idea accentuating speed and offensive power to the detriment of defensive qualities.

Lloyd George makes the comment that Great Britain's naval preparation, in the years before the war, had been concentrated more upon the material than upon the personnel side. His remark was apparently directed at those in high position, though he may have included in it the general rank and file of the navy. Doubtless none would accuse Lloyd George of being unduly prejudiced in favor of any military man - his natural tendency was quite the reverse; yet an impartial judge would probably be impelled to sustain him in this observation. A War College had been established, but officers of the Royal Navy appear not to have attended it very extensively. The result shows itself in instances of indifferent planning and defective staff work. Admiral Richmond is authority for the statement that, in the case of ninety per cent

of the officers of those days, a knowledge of history never went beyond the primary stage.

"It was not necessary for anyone beyond the age of seventeen and a half to open a book again or to increase his knowledge of war by the use of the only material available in peace - History. He might become an admiral without being able to define the first principles of naval strategy, or knowing how the navy exerted its influence in war".

Returning to the material situation, we find that approximately nine tenths of the naval strength of Great Britain had, by 1914, been concentrated in home waters. As many ships as practicable were kept in full commission, while mobilization plans were in effect for rapidly placing all ships on a war footing. A study was made of operating bases suitable for a war with Germany, and a certain amount of development work had actually been done at places selected in Cromarty Firth, Scapa Flow, and Rosyth. In particular, there was built a dry-dock at the latter point - a matter of great importance in a war with Germany, since all other naval docks were in the south of England.

In expectation of the arming and dispatch to sea of a large number of fast German liners as commerce raiders at the beginning of war, plans were laid for sending out as many cruisers as could be spared from the fleet and from the North Sea area, to take station at focal points on the trade routes, for the protection of shipping.

As the result of various conferences between representatives of the British Admiralty and the French Ministry of Marine, in the years between 1905 and 1914, it was agreed in case of war in which the two countries were in alliance that the French navy would take control of the Mediterranean, while the British, in addition to being responsible for the North Sea and the Atlantic in general, were bound to protect the Channel, the northern and western coasts of France, and to insure the safe transport of

expeditionary troops from Great Britain.

British naval maneuvers for the summer of 1914 included a trial mobilization of all naval ships. Coming as it did in July, this mobilization proved to be extremely fortunate for Great Britain. By the time the maneuvers and the King's review had been completed, it was already late in the month, and, as relations with Germany had become strained, it was decided to keep the fleet mobilized. As a result, when war was declared, ships were able to proceed immediately to their assigned stations.

It appears, then, that naval strategy preceding the World War supported British policy reasonably well, enabling the country to enter the war in a fairly satisfactory position. Much of Great Britain's advantage in 1914, however, accrued from the strategy of previous years. Her preponderant fleet, her immense merchant marine, her strategic bases - all of these had their origin in the past. Fairness compels us to say that her current strategy was not altogether good in several important particulars. She failed, for instance, to perceive, and to assess at their true value, the capabilities and the limitations of the new weapons, submarines and torpedoes. And this failure alone was destined to become almost her undoing.

One other strategy remains to be considered. This has been called morale strategy, dealing with spiritual rather than material things. It is that which brings to a people firm resolve, and instills in the nation the will to win. It has, too, its uses in breaking the will and the determination of the enemy. The importance of morale has long been recognized. Napoleon, for instance, estimated that the spiritual counts as three to one in relation to the material. Never before the World War, however, had States set out on so grand a scale deliberately and scientifically to nourish and direct the play of spiritual forces - favorably among their own people,

unfavorably among the enemy. The principal means they used was propaganda, the machinery and the technique of which became so highly developed during war times - and the potency of which, for evil purposes as well as good, became so strikingly apparent - that the world may be said almost to have been cursed by it ever since.

The operation of morale strategy made itself more and more evident as the war went on. Of the period before the war, when strategy of this sort was still comparatively inactive, reference need be made to not more than two points, one of which has to do with the means Great Britain possessed for conducting propaganda, and the other with the course she took to insure among her people a united sentiment for war before the fateful declaration was made.

Side by side with her network of trade routes to all parts of the world, Great Britain had the finest system of cables and communications in existence. These enabled her not only to keep in close touch with whatever was happening throughout the world, but they provided an excellent means for disseminating to neutrals and to the world in general whatever news was favorable to the Allies and unfavorable to the Central Powers. Furthermore, they enabled Great Britain at all times to gauge the feeling and sentiment of neutrals, with the result that in her enforcement of restrictions on neutral trade she could determine accurately how far and how fast she might proceed without causing an open rupture in her relations with them.

Regarding the other point, the course adopted in declaring war, we find that the British Government resisted every pressure brought to bear on it to make the declaration until German violation of Belgian neutrality was a fact. Had Great Britain declared war simultaneously with France, her expeditionary force would probably have had two or three days to

prepare itself in its assigned position on the French flank, instead of being thrown directly into battle, as was the case when it entered the line. The final result, however, could have been little different in either event. On the other hand, the effect on the country at large of declaring war when the sentiment for such a declaration was by no means unanimous, might well have been disastrous. The Cabinet and the Parliament were themselves divided on the question; consequently it is doubtful if a declaration of war was possible until German troops crossed the Belgian frontier. By that very act, the Germans crystallized the sentiment of Great Britain, and threw her whole-heartedly into the war.

It has been argued that the British would have entered the war whether Belgian territory was or was not violated. As a matter of fact, Great Britain could hardly have remained aloof while a struggle such as later ensued was taking place almost within sight of her shores. But the evidence is that she would not have gone in immediately, had Belgian neutrality been respected. No Cabinet could have risked such a step at that time. The question arises, however, could not the British Government, in the last days of July 1914, have told Germany that any unprovoked attack on Belgium - any violation of her neutrality - would be the signal for Great Britain's immediate entry into the war? Possibly so; and to have insured that every available means was used to avert war, it is perhaps unfortunate that the warning was not given. But there is little likelihood that any attention would have been paid to it. The War Party in Germany was firmly in the saddle. It had decided that now was the time to strike, and almost certainly would have refused to alter any plans for the sake of Great Britain.

Thus far an attempt has been made to present separately the various strategies that comprised British national strategy prior to the beginning of the World War. Some of them were so closely related that it is hard to differentiate between them. The same condition existed during the war period, perhaps even to a greater degree than before. It may be impossible, therefore, to carry them along as separate threads throughout. In so far as it can be done, however, the several strategies will be treated briefly by themselves; but in order better to correlate them, and to show which actions and events were contemporaneous, the war will be divided into five periods, corresponding with the years 1914 to 1918 inclusive.

Great Britain declared war on Germany at eleven P.M. of 4 August, 1914. Preceding her into the war were Russia, Serbia, France, and Belgium - the last-named State having begun hostilities when her territory was violated by Germany. These were the original Allies, as their side came to be known in the war. On the other side, known as the Central Powers, were two members of the Triple Alliance - Germany and Austria. The third member of that alliance, Italy, declared her neutrality.

With the coming of war, activity became so great in each branch of the Government, and in each field of strategy, that it is difficult to visualize the whole picture. Attention is liable to be focussed on one phase - the politico-diplomatic or the military, for instance - while other matters of far-reaching importance pass unnoticed.

Naturally we turn first to the armed forces, and sketch briefly the situation with respect to them during the year 1914. After that, a few words will be devoted to such other phases of national strategy as appear during the same period to have been important.

With the declaration of war, British ships were on the way to their assigned stations. The Grand Fleet went north to the Orkneys, to guard the exit north-about to the Atlantic, and there Admiral Jellicoe took command. In the English Channel, which forms the other exit from the North Sea, a force composed of older battleships and cruisers of the British Navy, and designated the Channel Fleet, took station. A little further northward, at Harwich, a destroyer force directly under the orders of the British Admiralty was located. In addition to these forces, which formed the bulk of British naval strength, there were other vessels - mostly cruisers - scattered about the world where British trade routes converged. In the Far East, in the Indian Ocean, in Australasia, at the Cape, at Gibraltar, in the West Indies, and on the South American coast, these ships undertook what was, in the early days of the war, a gigantic task for so few vessels - the protection of British commerce, the stopping of German trade, and the destruction of German raiders. This phase of the sea operations of 1914 will be adverted to again; in the meantime it appears desirable to take note of a few happenings nearer home.

Admiral Jellicoe thus enumerates the objectives of the British navy:

1. To insure for British ships the unimpeded use of the sea.
2. To bring steady economic pressure to bear upon the enemy, by denying him the use of the sea.
3. To cover the passage and protect the communications of any army sent overseas.
4. To prevent invasion of the home country or the dominions.

The war was only four days old when the third of these objectives, i.e., covering the transportation of an overseas army, came very much into prominence, with the departure of the first units of

the British Expeditionary Force for France. Between 9 and 18 August a force of 100,000 men, with equipment, supplies, and ammunition, was sent across the English Channel. The passage was of only a few hours' duration, and fortunately for the British the entire operation was completed without loss. The Channel Fleet guarded the passage of the transports. At the same time, the Grand Fleet, which certainly would have been needed to hold back the High Seas Fleet had the latter decided to attack in force the stream of British transports, was far away to the north. During the greater part of the time that transportation of the British Expeditionary Force was in progress, the Grand Fleet was from two to three times as far from the transport lanes as was the German fleet in the Jade anchorage. Just why, under these conditions, the Germans did not strike at the Channel is not apparent. Perhaps they did not know how far the Grand Fleet had withdrawn to the northwestward (at one time it was considerably beyond the Orkneys). Again, in spite of their spy system, the Germans may not have been cognizant of large-scale troop movements at this early date. As a matter of fact, evidence from German sources indicates that the high command was not aware that a British force of strength anywhere near the total of 100,000 men had reached France in time to enter the line at Mons. Finally, the Germans may deliberately have left the transports unmolested - to let as many British troops as possible come and share the crushing defeat they felt sure their military machine was about to inflict on all enemy forces in France.

Whatever may have been the reason for not making an attack, the fact that Germany attempted none had far more to do with the successful transportation of the British Expeditionary Force to France without loss than did the naval measures adopted by the British to insure safety of the troop movement. The

German fleet, during these first few days, could have overpowered the British Channel force and raided the transport lanes with comparatively small loss to itself, and returned behind Heligoland before the Grand Fleet could arrive to interfere. In view of the narrow margin by which the Allies were able to stem the German onrush in France, it is worth considering what might have happened had something occurred to prevent the British force from being present before and during the Battle of the Marne. The Channel ports all the way to Brest might well have been in German hands. Whether the French army would have been able to rebuild itself and carry on the war in the face of such a reverse is open to doubt. The position of Great Britain, too, would have been critical. Looking at the matter in retrospect, with a full understanding of the significance of those fateful days, a British strategy that allowed the Grand Fleet to be so far away from the transport area at this time was only equaled in faultiness by a German strategy that made no attempt to destroy or to delay the British overseas expedition.

In so far as the British navy was concerned, the defect in its strategy is perhaps traceable to a failure to recognize the true import of the land operations in France. For the navy, it was natural to emphasize the importance of blockade, and to lose sight, perhaps, of the imperative necessity, in dealing with a continental Power, of defeating the army of that Power. As Admiral Richmond says -

" . . . outstanding above all other needs, imperative and insistent, was the military defense of France. If that failed, the whole naval and military strength of the British Empire would have been unable to retrieve the situation. The first measure, therefore, which called for the exercise of British naval force was that of securing the passage of the army to the Continent".

In general, British naval forces in home waters were occupied during the latter part of 1914 in establishing themselves in

their bases and perfecting the blockade of the North Sea. Fear of German mines and submarines led to a withdrawal of the Grand Fleet to a considerable distance from the north coast of Scotland. We have already noted this fact in connection with the discussion of troop movements across the English Channel. The fleet even spent one period of time on the north coast of Ireland, while the base at Scapa was being provided with submarine nets. That danger from mine and torpedo actually existed was shown in the sinking of three old cruisers by a submarine, followed by the sinking of another cruiser by a mine or torpedo, and the loss of the battleship Audacious, due to striking a mine. All of these losses occurred in 1914.

As the result of German mining activity on the British east coast - with evidence that a number of mines were sown outside of British territorial waters - an Order-in-Council was promulgated in November, 1914, declaring the entire North Sea a military area. Neutral shipping was warned to pass only along certain specified lanes in this area, which the British undertook to keep clear of mines. Incidentally, the restriction of shipping to certain lanes considerably simplified the task of the British navy in controlling carriage of contraband.

Late in the year 1914, Lord Fisher, who was recalled as First Sea Lord of the Admiralty, began working on a plan for joint operations in the Baltic. His idea evidently included the gaining of control of the Baltic and the landing of a Russian army on the Pomeranian coast. Contracts were actually let for a great variety of vessels - some of them being highly specialized craft for landing operations - with the result that a large part of Great Britain's ship-building facilities was tied up with orders for a project that never materialized. Russia was unable to undertake the landing. With the passing of all hope of being able to invade German territory on the

Baltic coast, there seems also to have died whatever intention existed of exercising, or attempting to exercise, sea control in the Baltic. Throughout the war it remained, to all intents and purposes, German water. Free access to the Scandinavian countries across the Baltic unquestionably provided Germany with resources greatly to prolong the war, and in the end led Great Britain to the promulgation of another drastic Order-in-Council, the rationing of neutrals to prevent the flow of foodstuffs and war materials through their territory into Germany.

It was noted in the beginning that early arrangements with France regarding the utilization of British and French fleets allocated to France the control of the Mediterranean. It was contemplated that operations there, in addition to controlling the Austrian fleet, would consist largely of securing the safety of French troop movements from Africa to France, a work that would be very suitable for French ships to perform. The beginning of August, 1914, found two German warships, however, in the Mediterranean, the battlecruiser Goeben and the light cruiser Breslau. While they remained in those waters, it was decided that British forces should stay in the Mediterranean - to shadow the German vessels until such time as the British ultimatum to Germany expired, and then to attempt to bring them to battle. Twice during the first three or four days of August, British ships located the Germans, but in each case contact was soon lost. There may have been lack of co-ordination of effort, due to uncertainty as regards supreme Allied authority in the Mediterranean. Apparently, however, the chief reason for failure to bring the Goeben and Breslau to action was a belief on the part of the British that these ships would attempt to go either to the Atlantic or to the Adriatic. Their calculation seems to have missed entirely the Turkish angle, with the result that the

German ships escaped into the Dardanelles, later to be "sold" to the Turks, and doubtless to exert considerable influence on their decision to enter the war on the side of Germany.

Returning now to British cruiser warfare, which constitutes an eventful chapter in the naval operations of 1914, we note again the strategic distribution of British forces on the trade routes of the world. These dispositions were made largely on the supposition that Germany, at the outbreak of war, would arm and send to sea a large number of fast liners to prey upon British commerce. As a matter of fact, very few German merchant ships were so converted. The commerce raiding with which the British had chiefly to deal was conducted by a few isolated cruisers of the regular German navy, operated with great skill and determination.

One notable instance occurred, that of von Spee's East Asiatic Squadron, in which five cruisers combined to form a force of considerable proportions - particularly in the South Pacific, where it was difficult on short notice to assemble an adequate opposing force. Driven from the Western Pacific by the entry of Japan into the war on the side of the Allies, and impelled to keep away from Australian waters largely because of the presence there of the battlecruiser Australia, von Spee laid his course toward the west coast of South America. Off Coronel he met and destroyed, in November 1914, a much weaker British squadron under command of Admiral Cradock. Following this success he passed around Cape Horn, only to fall in with a much superior British force at the Falkland Islands, including two battlecruisers secretly sent out by Great Britain and just arrived on the scene. The result of this battle was the complete destruction of von Spee's squadron, and the virtual end of cruiser warfare in the World War.

It is now time to glance at the military situation of 1914. The British Expeditionary Force, as we have seen, consisted of

six divisions, four of which, under the command of Sir John French, were transported to France between 9 and 18 August. A fifth division followed very shortly the first contingent, but the sixth division, although intended for France, was delayed in the United Kingdom due to fear of invasion. This spectre of invasion will be found to appear from time to time during at least the early part of the war. It resulted in the keeping of far too many men in the British Isles. About all that can be said in favor of such a concentration there, when men were so badly needed at the front, is that part of the number were usefully engaged in training. Moreover, it was possible to maintain a reservoir of troops in England, capable of being moved to a critical point in case of emergency; whereas, nearer the front, so many legitimate calls were made for men in the normal course of operations that a reserve was liable soon to be dissipated.

Of interest are the instructions issued to the Commander in chief of the British Expeditionary Force by Lord Kitchener, who had just taken over the post of Secretary of State for War. They directed the Commander in chief, Sir John French, to support and co-operate with the French armies against their common enemies, but warned him that the numerical strength of the British force and its contingent re-inforcements would be "strictly limited". It would be necessary for the Commander in chief, therefore, to use the greatest care toward minimizing loss and wastage. The instructions ended with these words:

" . I wish you distinctly to understand that your command is an entirely independent one, and that you will in no case come in any sense under the orders of any Allied general".

Evidently the idea of unified command of the Allied forces had no place in British strategy in 1914.

At this point it may be permissible to digress somewhat and devote a few words to Lord Kitchener, the man who served as War

Minister for Great Britain during the first two years of the war. In response to popular demand - and evidently against his own wishes - Kitchener, the soldier, was placed in the Cabinet, in a post traditionally held by a civilian. In many ways this was a fortunate move; in a few, it was perhaps not such a happy decision. Kitchener, alone apparently among those in high position, sensed the real magnitude of the war that broke in 1914. At a time when others thought it would be over within a few months, and when Great Britain's contribution to the Allied armies was estimated in terms more or less commensurate with the original expeditionary force that went to France, Kitchener stated his belief that the war would last three years, and in preparation for what he foresaw, he called immediately for one million men for the army. The event proved that even Kitchener fell short in his estimate, but the foresight he displayed in this instance alone was invaluable to the Government. Moreover, he had the confidence of the people, and when he called for volunteers he got them. Probably no other man at that time could have recruited voluntarily an army on such a scale as did Lord Kitchener.

Criticism has been made that Kitchener in the very beginning should have insisted on a conscription of man-power, rather than to have relied upon the old British method of voluntary recruitment. Probably Kitchener favored the volunteer system with which he was familiar; there were reasons, however, why he could not shift immediately to any other system of obtaining recruits, even had he so desired. A national service act was not in existence. A national enrollment had not been made. Certain preliminary steps had to be taken that would require precious time - when every day counted in raising the new army. That these steps should have been initiated, in order that a change could be made when all arrangements were completed, is certainly true.

A national service act, however, involves not only the armed forces but also shipping, munitions manufacture, and other vital industries. It is properly in the province of the Government as a whole, rather than of the War Minister. But Cabinets were afraid of anything that smacked of conscription. Not until the spring of 1918, when conditions regarding man-power were so desperate that previous qualms of this sort had to be ignored, did Great Britain adopt an adequate selective service system.

Another matter for which Lord Kitchener has been criticized was the shortage of munitions for the army during the first year of the war. Ammunition could not be supplied fast enough, nor could rifles be turned out in sufficient numbers for the new army. The situation assumed the proportions of a public scandal, and yet it was nothing more than could be expected when a nation came into a war of this size without the necessary preparation, and without any organization of her industries. Kitchener was simply unfortunate in being placed in the position of responsibility, when the day for preparation had already passed.

The War Minister knew where the decision in the war was to be sought; and on the evidence of one of his colleagues in the Cabinet, Sir Edward Grey, he was opposed to "side-shows" that frittered away strength. Unfortunately, however, he could not always control the course of circumstances. The Dardanelles, to anticipate the record somewhat, was a case in point. When operations at Gallipoli were being urged, Kitchener agreed to them only on the basis that they involve the navy alone, with no demands on the army for troops. Once begun, however, they developed into joint operations, and Kitchener was forced into the very position he stipulated against in the beginning.

It has been charged that Lord Kitchener was opposed to the idea of a General Staff, and was responsible for the fact that

during the first year and a half of war a properly functioning General Staff did not exist in the War Ministry. As a matter of fact, practically all of Kitchener's training and experience had been to the end that carrying on a war is a one-man job. When he came to the War Office he proceeded to take on his own shoulders all of the burden that it entailed, and probably no man ever worked harder than he. The general conception seems to have been that the Field Marshall, loyally giving way later on to the wishes of his colleagues on the question of a General Staff, felt himself supplanted by the Chief of the Imperial General Staff who came to the War Ministry, and actually welcomed the opportunity to get away from London on the mission to Russia that resulted in his death when the cruiser Hampshire sank.

In this connection it seems only fair to note what General Robertson, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff in question, has to say of the matter. He states that in all of his relations with Lord Kitchener the latter showed not the least sign of animus nor jealousy, but only a spirit of helpfulness and a desire to get on with the war. In explanation of Kitchener's apparent attitude in the beginning of the war toward a General Staff, Robertson points out that when Kitchener came to the War Office a proper staff was not functioning. Several members of the organization had just joined the British Expeditionary Force. The Chief of Staff was in poor health - he died late in 1914 - and his relief, an officer just returned from South Africa, was not in touch with the situation. Under these conditions, there was nothing for Lord Kitchener to do but to assume himself the functions of the General Staff in addition to his administrative duties as War Minister. Nor could he be accused of egotism in assuming that his own professional opinion was the equal of that of any military man that might be ordered as

Chief of the Imperial General Staff. Under the press of his other duties, however, and without an adequate staff of subordinates to do the spade work, it was physically impossible for him to make as complete a study of plans and projects as he wished, and as the importance of the matters required. Kitchener, however, made no complaints, no excuses, and shirked no responsibility. He did not always furnish his colleagues in the Cabinet with as complete explanation and detail of military plans as they wished; but he was a soldier, and firmly believed that the less general discussion - even in a Cabinet meeting - the greater the likelihood of maintaining the necessary secrecy. One cannot but admire the strength and devotion of Lord Kitchener. And the more he is studied, in the light of recent history, the larger he looms among his contemporaries.

But to return to the military operations of the first year of war - the British Expeditionary Force went into the line at Mons and immediately faced von Kluck's advance. It saw desperate fighting in the retreat from Mons and at the first Battle of Ypres. Following the Marne, when the German rush westward was checked, and the race northward to the sea was ended, both sides "dug in" and began trench warfare that was to continue for four years along a 300-mile front from the Swiss border to the North Sea.

As Sir John French had been warned by Lord Kitchener, re-inforcements for his army were "strictly limited". Not only were re-inforcements to come slowly, but the supply of ammunition was terribly deficient. A reserve of not more than 1,000,000 rounds of artillery ammunition was on hand at the beginning of the war, and munitions manufacture was not organized for extensive output. By September, 1914, receipts of 18-pounder ammunition in France averaged seven rounds per gun per day, while the situation with regard to howitzer ammunition was even worse. There came a time when 4.5 howitzers had to be placed on an allowance of two rounds per gun per day! This condition is simply appalling, in

view of what came to be considered a normal ammunition expenditure when fighting was underway. The Germans certainly were not suffering from a shortage of ammunition at this time. It all meant that British troops were not getting the artillery support to which they were entitled. In commenting on these days, Field Marshall Robertson, who served first as Quartermaster General and later as Chief of Staff of the British Expeditionary Force, says:

"When preparations for war are decried as being unnecessary, or as more likely to provoke war than to prevent it, or for any other reason, we shall do well to recollect that in the Great War thousands of lives were sacrificed and terrible hardships suffered because no suitable preparations for it were made."

It is now necessary to glance at British strategy as it revealed itself in other fields - those of economics, finance, politics, morale, and diplomacy. In the financial and economic field, the chief purpose was to avoid alarm, to maintain confidence, and to live up to the slogan of "Business as usual". As we have seen, British shipping losses due to German cruiser activities at the beginning of the war were in reality very small - inconsequential as far as the economic life of Great Britain was concerned. But they caused a flurry of excitement that could have been very serious had it been left unchecked. Bearing in mind the normal four to eight weeks' food supply in the British Isles, and the unwillingness of insurance firms to underwrite cargoes at that time, it can readily be seen that alarm, skyrocketing prices, hoarding, and actual suffering among the poor could easily have happened - and without real cause. The Government quickly lent its support, therefore, to the insurance clubs of the shipping concerns, and the danger of the first few days was safely passed.

Looking at the other side of the economic picture, Great Britain's strategy in blockading the enemy and attacking his economic life was already underway, as shown in the operations

and dispositions of the naval forces charged with blockade duty.

In the fields of politics, morale, and diplomacy, it was the duty of strategy to provide support for the Government from within, and assistance - or at least benevolent neutrality - from without. A war of such magnitude as that of 1914-1918 saw tremendous effort expended to influence neutrals favorably to the cause of this or that belligerent. In 1914 the immediate purpose of the Allies was to draw Italy away from the Triple Alliance, with the ultimate object of bringing her into the war on their side; to keep Turkey from joining the Central Powers; and to align the Balkan States on their side - or at least to keep them neutral. Some of these objectives were obviously hopeless from the start - the cards that the Allies held were not as good as those Germany could play - but several objectives they were able to attain. Italy remained neutral through 1914, and joined the Allies the following year. Turkey was too well under German control to be influenced by the other side. Actually she had a secret treaty with Germany from the very outset, but did not enter the war as an ally of the Central Powers until late in 1914.

Earl Grey, the British Foreign Minister, says that Lord Kitchener at the outbreak of war stressed the necessity of keeping Turkey neutral, at least until the troops from India were safely through the Suez Canal. Furthermore, to prevent unrest among Great Britain's Moslem subjects, he declared it very important to make clear, should Turkey join with Germany, that she did so without provocation from the Allies. The insistence of Lord Kitchener on these two points influenced British diplomacy, according to Earl Grey, in certain negotiations with Greece that have since been criticized by some of his fellow Britons.

At the outbreak of war, the Prime Minister of Greece, M. Venizelos, offered to bring Greece into the war on the side of the Allies. The offer was turned down, for fear of complications in

the Near East. Earl Grey - or Sir Edward Grey, as he was at that time - believed, rightly or wrongly, that the entrance of Greece into the war would result in an immediate declaration of war on the opposite side by Turkey - a thing that the British War Office said must not be allowed to occur until the troops from India were through the Canal. Moreover, he feared that such action by Greece would shortly bring in Bulgaria on the side of the Central Powers. As a consequence, the offer of Greece was declined in 1914. Later on, when conditions had changed and her assistance would have been welcomed by Great Britain, Greece failed to become an ally.

We now come to a consideration of 1915, the second year of war.

Taking up first the naval strategy, we find that in the sea area around the British Isles, and in the North Sea, naval activity had, by 1915, become generally systematized. As we have already seen, the Channel Fleet, the Harwich Force, and the Grand Fleet contained the German High Seas Fleet and exercised control over a considerable part of the North Sea. Fear of invasion, intensified by sporadic German cruiser raids on British east coast towns, caused a division of the Grand Fleet, and a shift of the battle-cruiser portion of it southward from Scapa to Rosyth. Periodic sweeps were made by the Grand Fleet into the North Sea, and efforts were made to cut off German raiding forces. On 24 January, 1915, acting on intelligence obtained by the Admiralty, British battlecruisers were able to engage German battlecruisers at the Dogger Bank, where the German cruiser Blucher was sunk. This action might have been decisive, except for indifferent tactics on the part of the British.

German submarine attacks on commerce first occurred near the end of 1914. In February, 1915, the British established a war zone in reprisal for such attacks, and began arming merchant

vessels for defensive purpose. Submarine attacks on merchantmen, including passenger liners, increased in number, until strong protests by the United States and other neutrals, against such flagrant outrages as the torpedoing of the Lusitania, caused a cessation, for the time being, of unrestricted submarine attacks.

Looking to the naval field outside the vicinity of the British Isles, attention is at once absorbed in the operations at the Dardanelles. Undertaken in the beginning as a purely naval affair, continued as a joint army and navy operation, it occupied the whole of 1915, and furnishes perhaps the outstanding example the war produced of how not to conduct a campaign.

Winston Churchill, First Lord of the Admiralty at the time, is generally accounted the moving spirit behind the Dardanelles campaign. Originally proposed as more or less of a "demonstration" against the forts guarding the Straits, in the rather forlorn hope of inducing the Turks to relieve pressure on the Russians in the Caucasus, it grew to the proportions of an attempt actually to force the Dardanelles, to capture Constantinople, deal a staggering blow to Turkey, and open communication with Russia.

The record of a subsequent Investigation Commission reveals the haphazard way in which affairs of this nature were transacted by the British War Council. The various members of the Council appear not to have been altogether clear as to what was agreed upon from time to time. The First Lord of the Admiralty apparently did most of the urging of the proposal. The First Sea Lord, Admiral Fisher, whose technical advice should have been utilized by the War Council before committing itself to such a scheme, was not called upon for his opinion, although he was present at the Council meetings. In his official capacity as an adviser, there seems little doubt that he should have taken it upon himself to voice before the Council his opinion - which was adverse to the proposal - even though he was not invited to speak. But Lord Fisher held the view that, while he could object to the scheme privately to Mr. Churchill,

it was not within his province to volunteer before the Council an objection to the plan put forward by his Chief. By taking this course it is evident that all members of the War Council, other than Mr. Churchill, believed that the plan as proposed had the approval of the First Sea Lord, and their acquiescence in it was doubtless influenced thereby.

The War Minister, Lord Kitchener, in the course of one of the Council discussions, expressed an opinion that the Dardanelles appeared to be a suitable military objective, but estimated roughly that it would require 150,000 men in co-operation with the fleet. He then stated definitely that there were no troops available for such an operation. Doubtless there were several objectives at that time - attractive and suitable from the military point of view - if only one had sufficient men and munitions and shipping at one's disposal.

It was decided, through lack of troops for a joint operation, to undertake the reduction of the defenses of the Dardanelles with the navy alone, on the basis that, should the operation prove successful, - all well and good; while on the other hand, it would be a simple matter, as the War Council concluded, to "discontinue the bombardment if it did not prove effective". The event showed that such an enterprise, once undertaken, was anything but simple to drop. After a short bombardment late in 1914, which served probably to put the Turks on guard against a later attack, an Allied British and French fleet bombarded the defenses of the Straits in February and again in March, 1915. The latter attack in particular resulted in severe losses to the Allied fleet, due mainly to mines planted in the narrow waters of the Straits, and finally brought home the fact that, if the Straits were ever to be forced, it must be by a joint operation.

As matters stood, the attack had gone too far, and there had been too much publicity, to give up now without further effort.

Thus the British drifted into the Dardanelles campaign, that cost 120,000 casualties, occupied at various times during the course of a year about 400,000 men, and stands, in so far as Great Britain is concerned, as the greatest failure of the war.

What makes it seem altogether inexcusable is that as far back as 1906 this very operation had been adversely reported upon in a military memorandum, which was on file in the British War Ministry and available to the War Council. Furthermore, as a purely naval undertaking, "responsible naval officers of that day were almost equally unwilling to undertake it".

Consideration of the Dardanelles campaign in the preceding paragraphs unavoidably introduced the discussion of military operations with those strictly naval. A survey of the military situation will now be continued in the other theaters of operations.

On the Western Front, British activity began in March at Neuve Chapelle. It continued through April and May in the second Battle of Ypres. Then followed a period in which the fighting slackened while preparations were made for a drive at Loos and the Champagne. September saw bitter fighting in this area, which continued until the usual slowing down of operations with the approach of winter. Two important changes in command were made about this time. Sir John French was succeeded in December by one of his corps commanders, Sir Douglas Haig, as Commander in chief of the British armies in France, and Sir William Robertson, Chief of Staff for Sir John French, was at the same time ordered to the War Office as Chief of the Imperial General Staff. Thus was begun the re-constitution of the General Staff in the War Ministry, after nearly a year and a half of war, during which a staff functioned only in part or not at all.

Throughout 1915 the British force on the Western Front was, in comparison with the French, still very small. Its situation as regards guns and ammunition had considerably improved over that of

1914, as had also, to a certain extent, the matter of re-inforcements; but both were adversely affected to a marked degree by the demands of Gallipoli and other secondary war theaters that will now be considered. One effect of the diversion of troops to these other theaters was the necessity for throwing troops partially trained into battle at Loos, with the result that they suffered excessive casualties.

The Dardanelles has already been covered in general. It will suffice now to say, regarding the military part of the operation, that the first troops were landed on 25 April, 1915, at the end of the Gallipoli Peninsula and along the western side of it. Heavy fighting with ineffective results - from the standpoint of the British and French allies - continued intermittently through the summer. By autumn it was generally conceded that the situation of the Allies at Gallipoli was hopeless, and the sooner the peninsula was evacuated the better. The difficult operation of removing the troops was skillfully conducted, and, with the help of ideal weather conditions, was accomplished with practically no loss. By December, 1915, all of the troops had been evacuated except a rather small force at Helles, which was removed in January, 1916, leaving the Turks again in complete control of Gallipoli and the Dardanelles.

The year 1915 was fruitful in the number of new "fronts" that came into being. In October, while the Dardanelles operation was still in existence, a number of French and British units was landed at Salonika, the advance guard of a large army that remained practically immobilized in that area for the rest of the war.

Of all the "side-shows" in which the Allies engaged, the expedition to Salonika, considering its size, is probably the least defensible on strategic grounds. The French, for some reason or other, were intent on maintaining it. The British were at first lukewarm to the scheme, though Mr. Lloyd George was very active in favor of it. Later, the British were decidedly against

maintaining the expedition at Salonika - at least in so large a force - but for the sake of unity of action with the French they felt constrained not to remove their troops while the French appeared so determined to remain.

In the beginning, an attempt was made by the force at Salonika to help Serbia; but by the time the Allies arrived in Thrace it was already too late to give assistance. The Serbian army had been defeated and driven from its homeland. The Allied expedition, therefore, adopted a defensive role, keeping occupied certain Bulgarian forces in front of it (Bulgaria now being an enemy) and maintaining a watchful eye on the Greeks.

Looking next to Asia Minor, we find the British with still another sizable battle front on their hands. To go back to the beginning, in 1914 the Indian Government, on its own initiative, sent an expedition to the head of the Persian Gulf to protect certain oil properties. According to British procedure, it was quite permissible for the Government of India or of the Colonies to embark on such military enterprises without reference to the War Ministry at home. The matter was handled by the Indian Office or the Colonial Office of the Home Government, and, except as assistance might be required in men or munitions, the War Office might not be informed of the matter at all. In this case, the protection of oil lines in the Persian Gulf area was doubtless a legitimate military objective. Those in command of the expedition, however, became ambitious, went far beyond the requirements of their proper objective, and badly overreached themselves. Between January and August, 1915, the British force advanced to Kut-el-Amara on the Tigris River. Attempt was then made, with the forces at hand, to capture Baghdad. General Townshend, in command of the advance force, reached Ctesiphon, only eighteen miles from Baghdad, but there he was forced to retire. In December he was back in his old position at Kut-el-Amara, where the end of the year found him besieged by the Turks.

Other military operations during 1915 included the putting down of an uprising of Senussi tribesmen on the Egyptian border, and the carrying out of various local enterprises against German colonies in East and West Africa. All of these operations, however, were conducted by local forces, and made no special demands on the central Government for men and shipping.

The preceding paragraphs regarding the military situation during 1915 indicate a rather wide dispersion of effort, not at all in keeping with the recognized principles of war. Inasmuch as the end of 1915 saw the re-organization of an Imperial General Staff, for the planning and co-ordinating of British military operations, it seems appropriate at this point to quote the words of the newly appointed Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Sir William Robertson, relative to conditions as he found they had existed during the first year and a half of war:

" . . . in addition to the ministerial heads of the two fighting services and the Secretary of State for India, there were other Ministers who considered themselves qualified and entitled, as members of the Cabinet, to have a controlling voice in the operations undertaken. It thus came about by the end of 1914 that while the Secretary of State for War was aiming at decisive results on the Western Front, the First Lord of the Admiralty was advocating the seizure of the Dardanelles and Constantinople; the Secretary of State for India and the Indian Government were conducting a campaign in Mesopotamia; the Secretary of State for the Colonies was concerned with operations in various parts of Africa; and the Chancellor of the Exchequer was impressing upon his colleagues the strategical advantages to be gained by transferring the main British military offensive from the Western Front to the Balkan Peninsula and Syria. A more deplorable state of affairs can surely never have existed in the conduct of any war."

The above comment referred to the end of the year 1914. By the end of 1915, the Dardanelles campaign advocated by Mr. Winston Churchill had already run its wretched course; and the Balkan

campaign advocated by Mr. Lloyd George, while it had not supplanted operations on the Western Front as Great Britain's major military effort, had firmly established itself as an agency for the wasteful dispersion and dissipation of forces needed in the vital war area.

It is true that plans for these various campaigns, except possibly the colonial operations and, in its early stages, the Mesopotamian campaign, were submitted to the War Council for its consideration. The trouble lay in the fact that the plans or schemes thus submitted were not drawn up by a competent General Staff, the duty of which was to study and provide suitable military plans, but were in general being proposed by amateur strategists - usually well-meaning Ministers, who lacked the professional knowledge and experience to know what could or should be done. With regard to this matter, Sir William Robertson felt impelled to say -

"There was no possibility of escape from these and similar difficulties with which the Council was rapidly becoming surrounded, except by instituting such a system of war-management as would cause Ministers to confine their activities to their own departments, and would allow the professionals to take the controlling share in the conduct of the war which, in the interests of the nation, they ought to take."

In view of his own experiences with Ministers, we may conclude that he wrote these words feelingly.

It is now time to consider British strategy for the year 1915 in fields other than military and naval. As before, it becomes rather difficult to segregate the several strategies, intimately bound together as they are: the political, the diplomatic, and the economic in external affairs, the political, the economic, and the morale in internal affairs.

Taking up first the external field, the year 1915 produced several noteworthy strategic successes for Great Britain and her Allies, though it brought probably an equal number of failures. On the credit side should be placed the entry of Italy into the

war against her former allies, Germany and Austria. To offset this, however, were diplomatic failures in the Balkans. Great Britain's objection to Greece coming in as an ally having been largely removed by the Turkish declaration of war late in 1914, it was the diplomatic objective of 1915 to induce her, as well as Rumania, to enter the war on the side of the Allies, and - failing in a similar purpose with Bulgaria - to keep the last-named Power neutral. Bulgaria, however, could be kept neutral only by the promise of concessions that, quite naturally, must come from Serbia and Greece. But Serbia was already an ally of the Great Powers opposed to Germany, and Greece was being cultivated as such. It was evident, therefore, that Great Britain and her allies could not hold out to Bulgaria such glittering inducements as could Germany. Moreover, the military situation - which, after all, exerts the greatest influence in such cases - was not at all bright for the Allies in 1915. Russian arms had suffered disaster, Serbia was overrun, and Gallipoli was doomed. It is not to be wondered at that Bulgaria climbed on what had all the appearances of being a German band wagon.

With respect to Greece and Rumania, the event did not spell diplomatic failure; but the result was disappointing, nevertheless. Rumania had intended to join the Allies simultaneously with Italy. The victorious German-Austrian sweep in the East in 1915, however, would have made such a move on her part suicidal. She had to remain neutral until a more propitious time. With regard to Greece, the hour in which she might have become an active ally passed in 1914. Pro-German tendencies of the court were, among possibly other factors, sufficient after 1914 to keep her from an actual declaration of war, though the Greeks as a nation remained friendly to the Allies until the end of the war.

In the economic-diplomatic field, Great Britain in 1915 took steps of far-reaching importance. Following upon a German

proclamation of a submarine blockade of Great Britain, the latter country, on 11 March 1915, jettisoned the whole existing classification list of absolute and conditional contraband and non-contraband articles - in the end making all goods going to or coming from the enemy, whether directly or indirectly, subject to seizure. To put teeth into this ruling, another British Order-in-Council specified that all goods in excess of normal requirements, consigned to a neutral State in communication with the enemy, would be presumed to have enemy destination, and would be subject either to requisition by Great Britain, or to return to the consignor. Normal neutral requirements were determined by Great Britain from the average peace-time imports of neutral States over a period of years preceding the war. This was the beginning of the so-called "rationing" of Scandinavian neutral countries, the purpose of which was to prevent any and all supplies from reaching Germany. To facilitate the examination of cargoes, the British at this time adopted the system of "diverting" or sending merchant vessels into port, instead of carrying out the examination at sea as contemplated by international law.

In surveying the action that Great Britain thus took, to cut off the economic support of Germany, one is struck by two things: first, the extreme and unprecedented measures to which Great Britain committed herself, and secondly, the success with which she avoided a serious clash with the neutrals over these measures. As regards the first point, Great Britain was apparently very careful not to attempt to justify her action in international law, lest at some future date, when conditions were changed, her own trade might suffer from the precedent she had established. She made no pretense that her acts were legal, but in each case specified that they were forced upon her in retaliation for unlawful acts of the enemy. Thus her hand is left free for the future; and it may be confidently expected that a belligerent

who, in the future, thinks to establish a Kirkwall, and to start a rationing system at the expense of Great Britain, will find that Power distinctly unsympathetic to the attempt. As for the second point, namely, that Great Britain avoided a serious clash with neutrals over the blockade measures she adopted during the war, it may be noted that the neutrals most seriously affected by her measures were small Powers, unable to make an effective protest. The United States, as the most powerful neutral of that time, championed the rights of all neutrals, with the result that a serious collision with Great Britain might very well have occurred over the objectionable Orders-in-Council, had Germany not resorted to even more flagrant violations of international law. British diplomacy handled the situation skillfully, making each new outburst of neutral wrath against Germany the signal for another Order-in Council, tightening the blockade with more and more drastic regulations.

Having looked at the external field, it remains now to glance at the internal affairs of Great Britain in 1915. Nothing especially noteworthy occurred in this field, though conditions as a whole changed for the better. There was considerable improvement in the organization and efficiency of vital industries, while the establishment of a Ministry of Munitions assisted greatly in increasing the output ^{of} munitions for the army. Mr. Lloyd George, as head of this ministry, performed an outstanding service for Great Britain.

Heavy casualty lists, bitter disappointment over the Dardanelles affair, and fears for the beleaguered army of General Townshend at Kut-el-Amara, these were dark clouds over Great Britain as the year came to a close. Morale of the people, however, did not falter, though there came a time later in the war when it required all of the skilled strategy that could be brought to bear to sustain the will of the Allies to win.

We come now to a consideration of 1916, the third year of war.

The Grand Fleet still occupied its place in the north, with bases at Scapa, Cromarty Firth, and Rosyth. Further south were the Harwich Force and the Channel Fleet, protecting the communications of the British army in France and guarding the southern outlet to the North Sea. A few clashes had occurred between detached naval forces, usually as the result of an attempted German raid, while periodically a sweep in force was made by one side or the other into the North Sea. But in general the breadth of that sea separated the two opposing fleets.

At the end of May 1916, however, both fleets put to sea at the same time - neither in the expectation of meeting the whole force of the enemy, but each hoping to cut off an important detachment of the opposing fleet. It thus happened that the Grand Fleet and the High Seas Fleet met each other to the westward of Jutland on 31 May, 1916, in the greatest naval battle - in so far as strength of the two forces is concerned - as well as one of the most indecisive, of all history. The actual battle is beyond the purview of a discussion of strategy; but it emphasizes a certain principle or thought that had a profound influence during the war, not only on British naval tactics but on British naval strategy as well. This thought might be expressed somewhat as follows: The Grand Fleet is of such vital importance to Great Britain and to the Allies, and the loss of it is so unthinkable, that it must not be exposed to a risk that can mean ^{its} destruction. When Admiral Jellicoe turned the fleet away from a torpedo threat at the Battle of Jutland, instead of accepting the threat and forcing a decision then and there, he simply did as in November, 1914, he told the Admiralty his judgment impelled him to do in such a situation. And the Admiralty approved the position he took at that time.

Probably it is best to let Admiral Jellicoe himself express the underlying thought that guided his action at Jutland:

"A third consideration that was present in my mind was the necessity for not leaving anything to chance in a fleet action, because our fleet was the one and only factor that was vital to the existence of the Empire, as indeed of the Allied cause."

This sounds somewhat different from Lord Nelson's famous words on the eve of Trafalgar, "Something must be left to chance".

The course adopted by Admiral Jellicoe at Jutland resulted in throwing away an opportunity for possible decisive victory, and material shortening of the war. But it was a course that was safe and conservative. It involved a minimum of risk, and in the end put both sides right back where they were in the beginning. They "lived to fight another day", but as it turned out, the other day never came. While a decision by arms was being reached on land, the British navy continued its far from spectacular task of containing the German fleet and applying the slow but deadly strangle hold on German economic life. For those who hold that Jellicoe was right in the conservative course he adopted at Jutland, the unshaken grip that Great Britain maintained on communication routes to the North Sea is a powerful argument. The British navy still served its purpose of cutting off and starving Germany. What can be said, however, for that other navy - the instrument that was built for the very purpose of disputing British supremacy on the sea? If ever there was a time for a fleet to risk all in one supreme effort, it came to the German High Seas Fleet; yet for some reason or other that fleet never came out again to fight.

But the picture we have drawn of British predominance at sea is true only in part. Germany had gone into a new field, and was waging a very serious commerce war of her own against the Allies - Great Britain in particular. German submarines, which were being turned out in as large numbers as possible, were taking a steadily

mounting toll in ship tonnage. Nor was adequate means being found for combatting the menace. Merchant ships were armed defensively; in some cases they were re-routed, to avoid well-known focal points at sea. Ship-building was speeded up in an attempt to replace losses. Depth charges were devised, and mine barrages were laid in the more restricted waters through which submarines passed. So-called "mystery ships" were sent out to decoy submarines and attack them. Destroyers, trawlers, and patrol boats hunted them; but the number of vessels available for this purpose was pitifully small, while the job resembled the proverbial hunt for a needle in a hay stack.

Submarine warfare against merchant ships appeared particularly inhumane and detestable. Bitter protests from neutral countries now and then caused a temporary decrease in attacks, but not an abandonment of the practice. The Germans asserted that they were forced to submarine warfare by stern necessity, and in retaliation for the illegal blockade by Great Britain, which was starving the civilian population of Germany. On the other hand, Great Britain justified unprecedented measures of her own as retaliatory for illegal acts of Germany. Thus illegal acts were committed in retaliation for illegal acts committed in retaliation for illegal acts - until the whole vicious circle was complete.

In looking at the British military situation during 1916, it is necessary - to get the complete picture - to glance first at the French and Russian fronts.

The German high command decided this year to devote particular attention to the French army, for the purpose of exhausting its reserves and ruining its future effectiveness. With this end in view, Verdun was chosen as the objective, in the knowledge that France would sacrifice her last man before allowing Germany to take the fortress. From February until May the slaughter at Verdun continued, as France, in the grim words of von Falkenhayn,

was literally being "bled white". The French vow, *Ils ne passeront pas*, was fulfilled; but at the same time, the German object was largely attained. France never again during the war was as strong as she had been before Verdun. Germany, of course, lost heavily also in this battle, but she was much better able to stand losses than was France.

In June, on the Eastern Front, came the brilliant campaign of the Russian General Brussiloff in Galicia. While it proved to be short-lived, it represented a remarkable come-back for the Russian armies of 1915, and helped materially the Allies on the Western Front.

British military effort in the West was centered in the Somme offensive, which occupied roughly the period from June to November, 1916. British losses were very heavy - so great, in fact, as compared with the paltry gain in ground, that British politicians fervently prayed to be spared another Somme "victory". They assailed General Haig and the rest of the military for returning again and again to the attack, heedlessly throwing away, as they asserted, the lives of thousands. General Haig knew, and German accounts have since borne him out, that his attacks hurt the enemy terribly, and had him in real straits when the coming of winter put an end to active fighting for the year.

Before taking up the secondary battle fronts, mention should be made of several changes that occurred in high places during 1916. In June, as already mentioned, Lord Kitchener was lost at sea when the cruiser Hampshire struck a mine north of Scotland and sank with practically all hands. Mr. Lloyd George replaced him as Secretary of State for War. Late in the year, General Joffre ceased to be Commander in chief of the French armies. He had been generally liked by the British, and had worked harmoniously with General Haig. Due partly to the man himself and partly to the preponderant size of the French army as compared

with the British during the first two years of war, there had been, between the two Allied commanders, a sort of unspoken agreement - which worked very well - that General Joffre would take the lead in all matters that required co-ordination or co-operation of both armies. Had Joffre continued in his high command, possibly the naming of an Allied Generalissimo would not have been delayed until 1918.

Looking now at the other British "fronts", the Dardanelles evacuation was, as we have already noted, completed in January, 1916. At Salonika, in spite of the tremendous demand for troops in France, occasioned by the Battles of Verdun and the Somme, the Allied forces increased rather than diminished in number. A conservative estimate would place the average number of Allied troops in this theater at 400,000 men, though at one time it reached the almost unbelievable total of 670,000. The strain on Allied shipping merely to maintain such a force in the eastern Mediterranean can well be imagined. Moreover, the climate and health conditions at Salonika were very unfavorable. Why, then, was the expedition retained there, accomplishing practically nothing? Certainly the British General Staff never wanted it there; nor was the British Government enthusiastic about Salonika after perhaps the first few months of the occupation. The French, as we have seen, were insistent upon it; and as the French had participated in the Dardanelles campaign, so the British felt bound to take part at Salonika. It may be that political reasons, as well as military, dictated an Allied force in the Balkans. If that force were intended, however, to "contain" several Bulgarian divisions and to keep Greece in line, then it was much too large for its purpose. On the other hand, if it were intended to protect Serbia and Rumania from being overrun by the Central Powers, it was too small. As matters stood, it simply represented a very serious dispersion of available

man-power.

Coming then to Mesopotamia, the beginning of 1916 saw General Townshend and his column besieged at Kut-el-Amara, while attempts to relieve him were of no avail. In April he was forced to surrender, with consequent great loss of prestige to the British in the Near East and India. It was now impossible for Great Britain to withdraw from that region. The situation had to be retrieved, and for this purpose the British sent out a very able officer, General Maude. By December he had sufficiently consolidated his position to begin another advance toward Baghdad.

Let us now turn to non-military fields and note the situation that developed in them during 1916.

British economic strategy continued very much as in the preceding year. It aimed at the complete isolation of Germany - both directly, by the normal sea routes, and indirectly, through neutral countries. No distinction was made as to kind of goods nor ultimate use to which they were to be put - military or non-military; so long as they were known or even presumed to be destined for enemy territory, they were not allowed to pass. At the same time, strategy attempted to fill at least the essential needs of Great Britain and her allies. In case of necessity, it applied such rationing as would insure adequate supplies for the armed forces and vital industries.

Diplomatic strategy was in a measure responsible for the entry of Rumania into the war on the side of the Allies, following the commencement of General Brussiloff's campaign in Galicia in 1916. It was further instrumental in maintaining a resolute and united front among the Allies themselves against a peace overture made by Germany late in 1916, when astute German leaders apparently sensed that they were in the most favorable position they were likely to attain for a negotiated peace.

In the political field, 1916 saw the fall of the Asquith Government. Mr. Lloyd George, who had been, in succession, Chancellor

of the Exchequer, Minister of Munitions, and finally (on the death of Lord Kitchener) War Minister in the Asquith Cabinet, was called upon to form a new Government. Shortly after becoming Prime Minister, he introduced a change in organization, whereby he set up a special War Cabinet of five members, with himself as chairman, the business of which was the carrying on of the war. The members of this body, Lords Curzon and Milner, Mr. Bonar Law, and Mr. Arthur Henderson, in addition to the Prime Minister, were without special departments or portfolios of their own in the Government, and were thus able to devote their full time to the new duty. Certain military and naval chiefs were attached to the organization - not as members, but in the capacity of technical and expert advisers. The idea of the new organization was good; certainly it was a great improvement upon the original system of using the regular Cabinet for this purpose - a considerably more unwieldy body than the new Cabinet, with pressing administrative duties to perform in the Government, some of which were little related to the carrying on of war. The new organization might still be defective, however, if its membership - all or in part - chose to ignore the expert advisers, and drew up its own strategic plans. While the War Cabinet was in no way obliged to accept military plans with which it could not agree, proper procedure in such a case should have been to remove the incumbent advisers, and to find others on whose judgment it felt it could rely. This, however, it did not do - at least not for a long time.

We now come to a consideration of the year 1917.

At sea, strategy continued along much the same course as before. Early in the year, however, the fact was finally borne into the minds of the British that they were rapidly losing the war to the German submarine. So great had been the losses in shipping during the previous two years, and so rapidly were they now rising, that it was a matter of simple arithmetic to calculate how many more months - and they were very few indeed - the process could

continue before Great Britain must sue for peace.

On 31 January, 1917, the Germans declared their intention of sinking at sight any ship, of whatever nationality, encountered in the waters of Great Britain or France. The outlook for the Allies was ominous. Germany's announcement of unrestricted submarine warfare had the effect, however, of aligning the United States against her, thus in the end providing the additional weight necessary to turn the scale in favor of the Allies. The United States was able to furnish anti-submarine craft in increasing numbers as the year wore on - a timely and very important assistance to the British and French. At this time also the convoy system for merchant vessels was inaugurated. In the early days of the war it was employed with troop transports, but until 1917 it had not been used with cargo carriers. The reasons given for not convoying the latter class of vessels were (1) the merchant captains were opposed to it, (2) on account of wide diversity of speed of merchant ships, there would be an inevitable slowing down in the turn-around time of many of them, and (3) the British navy could not furnish sufficient escorting vessels. Of these reasons, only the third was really worth considering; and it does not explain why at least a part of the shipping was not convoyed from the date when submarine attacks first became frequent. Whoever was responsible for beginning the convoy system for merchant ships we may not know; but it began almost simultaneously with American entrance into the war, and it employed all of the light craft that the United States could make available. While other methods, such as listening devices and extensive mine fields, were also being pushed as means for combating the submarine, it was the convoy system that finally overcame the menace, and drew the viper's fangs after 15,000,000 tons of belligerent and neutral shipping had been sent to the bottom.

If the year 1917 began ominously at sea, it can hardly be said to have dawned much brighter on land. Late in 1916, Generals Joffre and Haig had worked out a plan of operations for the Western Front

during 1917. But General Joffre had, in the meantime, been superseded, and none as yet had said whether the plan would, or would not, be carried out. There was an atmosphere of uncertainty over the whole Western Front.

In January Mr. Lloyd George startled everyone - more particularly the military - by proposing a combined French-British-Italian offensive from northern Italy against Vienna. The Prime Minister's well-known antipathy for the Western Front was again asserting itself. None but Italy, however, had a receptive ear for such a suggestion.

The new French Commander in chief, General Nivelle, now came forward with a plan for a quick, surprise blow on the Western Front, which he confidently declared would produce a breakthrough of the German lines, followed by a rolling-up of a large section of the front. Military men, both French and British, were generally skeptical of success of the plan. It made a strong appeal, however, to the civilian heads of both Governments, and was accepted. One feature of the plan - which evidently was not put forward by Nivelle, but originated probably with Lloyd George - was the placing of the British Commander in chief and his armies under the direct control of General Nivelle. This step was taken without the knowledge of the responsible British military adviser of the Government. Had the French commander been Marshall Joffre, the arrangement might have worked as well as it did with Foch in 1918. But with Nivelle it was different. The British Commander in chief, already a Field Marshall, and with more than two and a half years of war experience in France, was being subordinated to a French general who was little known and apparently not too highly regarded by the French military themselves. It was an unsatisfactory arrangement, but Haig must be given credit for doing his best to carry out the role and the task assigned to him.

As matters turned out, the arrangement whereby the British were placed under the French Commander in chief was short-lived. The

combined offensive failed to break through the German lines. Meanwhile, a new French Government that had come into office became alarmed at the depleted man-power of France. It superseded Nivelle, and indicated very plainly that French military operations for the rest of 1917 must be confined to the defensive.

As soon as the British were able to do so, they organized another offensive - this time in Flanders - in the hope of clearing the Germans from the Belgian coast which they were using for submarine operations. Bad weather conditions, however, together with the lack of Allied offensives on other fronts to prevent the enemy from sending re-inforcements to Flanders, spelled the practical failure of British operations, with the result that Germany retained her bases in Belgium.

In the Balkans, the Allied force at Salonika remained in much the same status as in 1916. The French, however, who had insisted for two years on maintaining the army there, were running so short of men that their numbers at Salonika began to dwindle. The British then began to get a few men out, though it may be noted that the only British divisions - two in number - withdrawn in 1917, were allowed by Mr. Lloyd George to leave Salonika solely on the stipulation that they be sent to Palestine, where he had embarked on yet another "side-show".

In Mesopotamia, the British under General Maude operated resolutely but with due regard to the limitations of their situation. Before the end of 1917 they had captured Baghdad, and thus regained to a considerable extent the prestige lost at Kut-el-Amara the preceding year.

We now turn to a brand-new British "front", starting in Egypt and extending across the desert into Palestine.

Early operations to the eastward of Suez were for the protection of the Canal and the line of communications with India and the Far East. These were altogether proper from the standpoint of strategy, and resulted in no undue absorption of man-power.

Almost immediately after Mr. Lloyd George became Prime Minister, however, there came suggestions from him for a winter campaign in Palestine, with the capture of Jerusalem as its objective. The Chief of the Imperial General Staff opposed these suggestions for the very good reason that such a campaign, even if it were successful, would not contribute appreciably to the winning of the war. The war could be won only by breaking Germany, by destroying her power of resistance. Germany herself must be struck; and the most direct and effective place to strike - in other words, the proper objective - was the Western Front.

Lloyd George persisted, however, and the campaign was undertaken. A broad-gauge railroad was built across the desert from Egypt during the winter of 1916-17, and by the spring of 1917 the British had advanced to the border of Palestine. In October of that year an offensive began, in which the Turkish flank was turned at Beersheba. By energetically following up this success, the British reached Jerusalem early in December. On the eleventh day of the month, the British commander, General Allenby, made his entry on foot into the Holy City, thus providing the British public with "Jerusalem as a Christmas box", as Lloyd George had urged.

Reviewing the military situation as a whole, the year 1917 was very gloomy for the Allies, particularly in the main theater of operations. In the first place, there came the complete collapse of Russia. Then there was the failure of the Nivelle offensive, and the very evident weakening of France. Later in the year came the Italian disaster at Caporetto. The British, who alone remained active throughout the year, were having extreme difficulty in keeping their man-power near the proper strength in France, due chiefly to these reasons: inadequate laws for combing out the necessary levies of new troops, and too many secondary theaters of operation. Overshadowing all, however, was the submarine menace that, in 1917, was threatening the very life of

Great Britain. No wonder that men feared the American troops could not, in sufficient numbers, arrive in time to save the day.

Looking now to the fields of diplomacy, politics, economics, and morale, in which strategy other than that involving armed forces has sway, the situation is dominated by the same factors that largely controlled the military and naval strategy, namely, the submarine menace, the entry of America into the war, and the elimination of Russia.

Those Englishmen who, in the beginning, had visualized the war activity of their country as purely naval, and believed that an attack on German economic life, by means of a rigid blockade, would in itself cause the enemy to sue for peace, came uncomfortably near witnessing a demonstration of that result - with their own country in the role of supplicant. An insular State, such as Great Britain, is far more liable to defeat by blockade than is a continental State like Germany. With a predominant navy, and with nearly half the world's commercial tonnage under ^{her} flag, Great Britain doubtless had little fear of being reduced by blockade to economic extremity; but Germany, with a new weapon - an undersea navy - narrowly missed accomplishing that very thing. The event emphasized the basic vulnerability of the Island Kingdom, and showed how even a well-conceived and long-tried means of attaining economic security may suddenly be rendered ineffective by new invention.

Entry of the United States into the war against Germany cheered the drooping spirits of the Allies. If fresh troops could be brought into action at this juncture, there was little doubt as to the outcome of the war. But the slow rate at which these troops could get to France during 1917, due to lack of shipping, very soon gave rise to much pessimism. It must be remembered that one ally, Russia, fell as another, the United States, was joining. While the two might seem to offset each other, actually they did

not - for the time being, at least. With the elimination of Russia, the Eastern Front ceased to exist. German troops that had been occupied there could now be thrown to the West. Meanwhile, probably more than a year would pass before America could make her power appreciably felt on the Western Front. In other words, the war-weary Allies along the line from the North Sea to the Adriatic faced the task of holding back a re-inforced enemy for upwards of a year, without the hope of substantial assistance from the new ally. If ever morale strategy had to play a leading part, not only in Great Britain but, even more so, in other Allied countries, it was at this time.

In political and diplomatic fields, chief interest and effort now centered within the Allied group itself. As we have seen, the most powerful neutral had, by this time, associated itself with the Allies; consequently the incentive for expending effort outside had grown less, while recent events had brought out the acute need for a closer-knit organization and possibly a pooling of interests within the alliance.

In November, 1917, after the Italian reverse at Caporetto, it was decided to form a Supreme War Council, consisting of the Prime Minister and one other member of the Government of each of the Great Powers fighting on the Western Front (including the Italian Front), to oversee the general conduct of the war. Each Power designated a military representative to be a technical adviser to the Council; and this representative was required to be supplied with all military plans and information of his own Government relative to the conduct of the war, to the end that these plans become available for study and discussion by the representatives of all of the Allies.

Unquestionably the Supreme War Council aided greatly in co-ordinating national policies; but since its members were entirely civilian, it was not qualified to co-ordinate military action.

Had the military advisers to the Council been Chiefs, or at least representatives, of the respective General Staffs, it appears that objection to the planning and co-ordinating of military operations by the Supreme War Council could have been measurably overcome. The advice and recommendations which the Council received from its military representatives would, under those conditions, have been definite and authoritative - not simply the "curbstone" opinions of military men without responsibility, and possibly without the intimate knowledge of conditions and details necessary to make a proper recommendation. Since the organization of the Supreme War Council, however, made military representatives independent of General Staffs, the conditions were adverse to a proper co-ordination of military operations. This constituted a serious defect in the council system.

We are now ready to consider 1918, the last year of the war.

By that time, conditions at sea had really improved for the British and the Allies in general. Submarine sinkings of merchant vessels had materially declined from the peak of 1917, and there was very good reason to believe that an effective counter for the submarine had at last been developed. It was an old method, dating far back in maritime history - the convoy system - made to fit the new conditions by using fast, light vessels armed principally with depth charges, assisted where practicable by listening devices and air observation for detection of the undersea craft, and by extensive mine fields in areas through which the submarine had to pass in going from or returning to its base. In conjunction with this system was employed a highly efficient British intelligence service, which got information of practically every German submarine that left home ports for a cruise, and managed to keep a reasonably accurate track of its movements and its hunting grounds at sea. So well did the system work that, at least by the middle of 1918, it was doubtless apparent to Germany that her submarine campaign had definitely failed.

Coming as a relief to an otherwise prosaic and uninteresting final chapter in the war at sea were the daring, though but partially successful, attempts of the British to block German submarine exits at Zeebrugge and Ostend on the Belgian coast. These were the high lights of the year. As for the rest, the British fleet maintained its watch on the North Sea to the weary end, expecting that finally there must come a German sortie and a dash for the Atlantic. But it never came. Revolution and mutiny paralyzed the High Seas Fleet as it lay in its base behind Heligoland.

Turning from the naval field, we find plenty of interest and plenty of action in the year 1918. Without attempting to segregate matters into the several fields of politics, diplomacy, military operations, etc., the following resumé of events is given:

On 6 January Mr. Lloyd George made an official statement of the terms on which Great Britain would make peace. He stated there was no desire to destroy the Central Powers, though he advocated autonomy for the various divisions of the Austrian Empire. With respect to Turkey, he said there was no longer a desire to take away Constantinople from the Turks. Previously it had been agreed between the Allies that Russia should have Constantinople; but the Russian revolution and the separate peace arranged at Brest-Litovsk relieved France and Great Britain of having to carry out this undertaking. As for Belgium, Italy, Roumania, Poland, Arabia, Mesopotamia, and Palestine, he declared their national rights must be recognized. Furthermore, he stated that Alsace and Lorraine must be returned to France, and Germany must make reparation for injuries done to Allied territory.

Almost immediately afterward, President Wilson enunciated his famous "Fourteen Points". These two pronouncements, outlining the basis on which peace might be restored, constituted a bit of politico-diplomatic strategy, designed to induce the Central Powers to consider negotiations for peace. But Germany at that very

moment had her plans well underway for a crushing offensive on the Western Front, intended to bring a decision before the American army could become a real factor in the war. Accordingly, a deaf ear was turned to "peace talk".

The close of the year 1917 saw no comprehensive plan in existence for military operations of the Allies during 1918. As we have seen, it had been customary for General Joffre to take the lead in co-ordinating military action between the French and British. But he had passed from command of the French armies, and his immediate successor had soon been removed from command. In the meantime the French, due to a serious decline in their man-power, had assumed on the Western Front a role secondary to the British. It was evident, therefore, that responsibility for the 1918 plan lay with Great Britain. Chiefly on account of difference of opinion between the Prime Minister and the General Staff, however, the new year arrived without a plan having been promulgated.

The British General Staff, as in each preceding year, recommended a concentration of all effort on the Western Front, reducing to the absolute minimum - for defensive purposes only - military activity in other areas. The steady transfer of German divisions from East to West during the fall and winter of 1917 pointed to a heavy offensive in France during the coming year. To the General Staff it appeared that, whether British and French plans for 1918 contemplated an offensive or a defensive attitude on the Western Front, the Allied troops in that area would probably find themselves fighting for their very lives shortly after the beginning of the new year. For this reason, it was urgently recommended -

- 1st, that the entire system for raising new levies of troops be speedily re-examined, to provide adequate man-power for the British army, and
- 2nd, that authorization be immediately given for the transfer of troops from the secondary theaters

in the Near East, in order to insure their arrival in France before the German offensive began.

Neither recommendation was acted upon, at least not until events foreseen and foretold by the General Staff compelled the action to be taken - when it was already too late to avoid serious consequences.

As we have previously seen, Great Britain began the war with a volunteer system of recruitment for her army. This resulted in a deplorable wastage of her finest man-power in the early part of the war. It could not, however, raise and maintain armies on the scale required for such a gigantic conflict. As a result, the system was changed from time to time during the four years of war; but the job was never tackled thoroughly and resolutely until, in the midst of a heavy German offensive, and in the face of desperate necessity, a man-power bill was finally enacted in March, 1918, which gave Great Britain an adequate means for allocating her man-power and getting the necessary drafts to keep up her armies.

As for the other recommendation of the British General Staff, that troops be returned to France from the eastern theaters in anticipation of a German offensive, action was delayed in authorizing the movement until the British lines in France were actually wavering before the onslaught of the German offensive. The record of these days is illuminating.

Troops enroute from Palestine to France "found themselves out of action for several weeks just at the time when every man should have been fighting. They consisted of two complete divisions, twenty four other battalions, five siege batteries, and other details.

"Troops from other Eastern theaters, as well as from England, were hurried to France at the same time as the withdrawals from Palestine were ordered, and, in general, the crudity of British strategy in persisting in the Eastern adventures collapsed like a house of cards. From the first these schemes had, in so far as they exceeded defensive requirements, been devoid of any sound military basis, for we never possessed the surplus of troops or of shipping to justify them. The right course was, as events

now proved, to make sure of victory in the West. If we won there we won everywhere, and if we failed there we lost everywhere".

These are strong words. But they represent the reasoned conclusion, based on careful examination and re-examination of the whole situation, arrived at by the man charged with the drawing up of British military plans, Sir William Robertson, Chief of the Imperial General Staff.

The fact that the recommendations of the British General Staff were disregarded appears to have been due primarily to the strategic schemes of the Prime Minister, who was determined, even in the beginning of 1918, to embark on new operations on a large scale in Turkish territory. From the evidence at hand, the conclusion is almost inescapable that he deliberately ignored the warning of responsible military chiefs, closing his eyes and ears to the storm about to break in France, while giving full rein to his imagination in all sorts of dubious enterprises in the Balkans, Syria, and other unprofitable fields.

Just as the British, after the storm broke, proceeded to remedy their defective machinery for raising adequate levies for the army, so the Allies, under force of necessity, established in March, 1918, an Allied Commander in chief or Generalissimo. We saw in Lord Kitchener's instructions to General Sir John French the attitude of the British at the beginning of the war toward the superposing of any Allied military authority over British forces. As time went on, this attitude was modified. General Joffre, as we have noted, exercised in practice, though not in theory, a considerable predominance among the Allied commanders on the Western Front, particularly as regards co-ordination of action. Then we found that the Allied expeditionary forces at the Dardanelles and Salonika were each placed under a single Commander in chief. Tracing the development of a unified command still further, we see early in 1917 the ill-advised attempt at placing General Nivelle in supreme command of the French and British on the Western Front. The unfortunate part of this

arrangement was not the unification of command but the selection of a Commander in chief who had no outstanding reputation, who was rather deficient in tact and lacking in the confidence of his military contemporaries.

Next it was suggested that there be established an inter-allied staff; but this would have been of little value without a supreme Commander in chief. The need of the latter became more and more apparent early in 1918, at which time, both the British and the French being on the defensive, a call for assistance by one commander might not be fully complied with by the other, for fear of weakening himself to the point where he could not withstand a German attack in his direction. A common reserve was needed - to throw in at the danger spot - but it required someone in authority over both the British and the French commanders to collect and to administer the reserve.

Mr. Lloyd George wished to place such a reserve under control of an executive committee of the Supreme War Council, of which mention has already been made. This scheme, however, did not appeal to the Allies as workable, and was never adopted.

Finally in March, 1918, when the German offensive on the Western Front made further delay fatal, Marshall Foch was made Commander in chief of all the Allied armies, a post he held to the end of the war. The Allies were indeed fortunate in having available for this post a man of such ability, experience, and tact. To the unity of command thus assured was soon added a superiority of man-power that sealed the doom of the Central Powers. By straining to the limit, sufficient shipping had been found to transport twenty five American divisions to France by 1 July, 1918 - more than double the number estimated to arrive by that date - and more troops were coming, at the rate of 300,000 men per month. A Germany that had counted on winning before America became a real factor on land had lost in the race against time.

Having now sketched briefly, year by year, the main incidents of the World War, from the standpoint of Great Britain, it remains to summarize the accomplishments of British national strategy in the war, as illustrated by these incidents, and to note how these accomplishments accord with national policy.

Reverting to the previous statement of British national policy as "security for the Empire", and recognizing Germany's overshadowing predominance among the Central Powers, as well as her singular threat to the safety of the British Empire, the mission of Great Britain at the outbreak of the World War may be stated somewhat in this wise:

To defeat Germany, in order to promote the security of the British Empire.

As a contributory force or agent in accomplishing the national mission, the British navy would then take as its objective,

To gain and maintain control of the sea,

while the other agencies - military, political, diplomatic, economic, and morale - would likewise deduce, or be assigned, objectives appropriate to the accomplishment of the national mission.

Before going further, it is well to bear in mind that the British, after the early stages of the war, came generally to realize that a final decision would be reached on land. Quite the contrary view, however, had been rather widely held in Great Britain prior to August, 1914. The matter was settled, of course, by Germany herself, when she decided to fight the war with her army.

It is quite true that trained British observers had foreseen what would be Germany's course. As far back as 1906, a British military memorandum dealing with a possible war in alliance with France against Germany, expressed the opinion that it would be upon land operations on the continent "that the successful issue of the war as a whole would mainly depend." Whether this opinion had any basis in the "historical fact that although a supreme navy may win victories it cannot impose peace, unless there stands behind it an

army capable of completing and confirming on land the successes gained at sea", is unknown. But the fact remains that British national strategy made the overthrow of the German military machine the chief objective of the war. It is important to remember this in appraising British naval strategy from 1914 to 1918.

In summing up the accomplishments of British strategy during the World War, let us look first to the diplomatic field. Earl Grey, who was British Foreign Minister during the greater part of the war, declares that Allied diplomacy - including, of course, that of Great Britain - aimed at two principal objects: to maintain solidarity between the Allies themselves, and to maintain as friendly relations as possible with neutrals. In their first objective, they were successful until the isolation of Russia and the lack of necessary arms and artillery for her armies brought about the collapse of that ally in 1917. It is not apparent, however, that diplomacy could have prevented the collapse. As regards the second objective, the Allies can at least be said to have had more success than had their enemies. Two States, Italy and Rumania, entered the war on their side, while two others, Turkey and Bulgaria, joined the Central Powers. In carrying out her blockade of Germany, Great Britain came into sharp conflict with many neutrals. The course of diplomacy became extremely difficult; but the British brought to it a skill that managed always to avoid an open break. On the other hand, the Germans, with their unrestricted submarine attacks, provoked a breach that finally brought the United States into the war on the side of the Allies, and gave the latter an ultimate superiority in the conflict.

Consider next the political field. A parliamentary Government like that of Great Britain is at a marked disadvantage, as compared with an autocratic or strongly centralized Government, in conducting a war. Governmental responsibility, as we have seen, is held jointly by a group of Cabinet members. The Cabinet and the Government are not in power for any specified term; they may fall at any time as the result of an adverse vote in Parliament. It is

little to be wondered at that British military writers, in gazing about among the various democratic Governments in existence today, are struck with certain advantageous features exhibited in the Constitution of the United States. The framers of that instrument provided, in case of emergency, for a tremendous concentration of power in the hands of one man, the Chief Executive, who is by law the Commander in chief of both the army and the navy. Moreover, he holds office for four years, subject only to death, disability, or impeachment. All of these provisions are of major importance in carrying on a war.

If we look further into the governmental structure of the British Empire, we note the loose bond that exists between the dominions and Great Britain. This appears to be a source of weakness; but it must be admitted that such did not prove to be the case in the World War. The dominions rallied loyally to support, and to make common cause with, the mother country.

British war-time Governments were of the coalition variety. Various political parties were represented in them, but there was very good co-operation in the task of carrying on the war. An unfortunate complication, however, was the Irish situation, which remained unsatisfactory throughout the whole period.

In spite of its handicaps, British political strategy during the World War supported national policy reasonably well. In the course of the war, many cumbersome methods were changed and a great deal of governmental red tape was eliminated. Change came too slowly, however, in matters of such vital importance as national service laws and the proper allocation of man-power.

British strategy in the economic field accorded very well with national policy. It aimed to supply the economic needs of Great Britain and her allies, and to deny economic support to the Central Powers. As part of this program, it furnished financial credits to allies in need of them. In general, it may be said that British

economic plans contemplated no material interruption of shipping to and from the United Kingdom during the war. In other words, no particular effort was made for heavy stocking of vital supplies and foodstuffs, for the reason that it was believed the British navy and merchant marine would keep the flow of these materials well above a safe minimum. The German submarine campaign greatly upset this calculation, and caused rather drastic rationing of supplies. While the situation became very critical before a remedy was found, it may be stated that neither the armed forces nor the vital industries of the Allies on the Western Front were adversely affected - at least to a material degree - by that campaign. The situation as regards Russia on the Eastern Front was different. Lack of manufactures of her own, and of seaports through which supplies could be obtained from the outside, doomed her to a shortage of munitions and necessary war materials. Whether or not the other Allies could have opened a line of communications to Russia, whereby these materials could be furnished, is perhaps a moot question. The experience at Gallipoli throws doubt upon the success of such an effort, with the forces that would have been available for it. In any event, Russia remained isolated, and collapsed after two and a half years' fighting.

As to the denying of economic support to the Central Powers, British strategy was very successful. It was a slow process, however which did not achieve its full rigor until the lapse of two years of war. Organization of the German Government to control and distribute all supplies and foodstuffs made previous distinctions regarding absolute and conditional contraband and non-contraband articles no longer workable. The result was that everything going to or coming from the enemy, whether directly or by transshipment through a neutral State, was declared contraband and subject to seizure. To make this order really effective, the British, since they did not control the Baltic, adopted as we have seen a measure of rationing the neutral States of Scandinavia. The final result was probably

the most drastic cutting off of supplies from a country that the world has seen in modern times. While this blockade might have developed its full effectiveness in a much shorter time than was actually taken, there were important reasons, touching the relations between Great Britain and neutral States, why it should proceed slowly, as we have already noted in summing up British diplomatic strategy.

We next come to morale strategy. In summarizing British accomplishments during the war, it is believed impossible to lay too great emphasis either on the value of this strategy or on the success with which the British used it. Not only did they become past masters at the art of propaganda, both at home and abroad, but they kept up the spirit of their people and sustained the will to win in the face of bitter disappointment and almost overpowering weariness of war. Britons claim tenacity as a national characteristic; but it is unquestionably true that whatever native endowment they possess of this sort was skillfully nurtured and strengthened by the same strategy that brought the State unitedly into the war, maintained its singleness of purpose, and, at the same time, spread the gospel of the Allied cause to all and sundry neutrals.

A summarisation of strategy of the armed forces has been purposely left to the last. In covering this field, a summary of British naval strategy during the war, together with a brief estimate of its effectiveness, will first be attempted, after which, British military strategy will be similarly treated.

We have seen that British national strategy, as a part of the Allied grand strategy, set as its chief objective the overthrow of the German army. To the navy was assigned the task of controlling the sea - to insure the safety of communications of the British Expeditionary Force, to afford British ships and British commerce the free use of the sea, to put economic pressure on the enemy by cutting off his maritime communications, and to prevent invasion

of any part of the British Empire. In the British national plan - or more correctly, in the Allied plan - it is thus apparent that the role of the offensive naturally fell to the army, since the chief objective lay within its province, while to the navy came a somewhat secondary task of either destroying or containing the forces with which it had to deal. Nothing in this task required the navy to act on the defensive - in fact, there was plenty of room for aggressive, offensive action at sea. At the same time, there is nothing inconsistent with an offensive strategy and a vigorous conduct of war to adopt holding tactics in one or more theaters. Had grand strategy prescribed the destruction of the German fleet as its primary task, then every effort must have been bent to that end. But, rightly or wrongly, such was not the case; and, as was previously observed, this must be taken into account in appraising the strategy adopted by the British navy.

With respect to the safeguarding of the sea communications of British expeditionary forces, the navy can be said to have been successful. There is good reason to believe, however, that this success - at least in the early part of the war - was largely due to a failure of the enemy to act with vigor. In the first weeks of the war the British Grand Fleet was usually much further from the English Channel - in other words, the transport area - than was the German High Seas Fleet. A sortie of the whole German fleet, and a quick blow at the Channel and its ports, might have caused immense damage to the Allies, with no danger to the German ships other than that offered by the Channel and Herwich forces. Even when the Grand Fleet was based at Scapa Flow - and before a part of it was placed at Rosyth - the Germans were in a position to operate on interior lines with respect to that fleet, in so far as the English Channel was concerned. In other words, viewed only from the standpoint of protecting army communications against attack in force by the German fleet, the strategic location of the main British fleet was faulty.

Considering next the matter of securing to British ships and commerce the free use of the sea, naval strategy was very successful until it had to deal with the submarine. It was prepared to cope with known weapons and conditions, but allowed itself to be taken badly by surprise when a new weapon was injected into the situation, and was furthermore dangerously slow in arriving at a proper defense against that weapon.

In its task of isolating Germany and cutting off her economic support from the outside, the navy was very successful. It is possible, however, that a vigorous extension of British naval effort into the Baltic - admittedly a difficult and perhaps impracticable task - might have resulted in an earlier throttling of German trade with the neutral countries of Scandinavia. This trade constituted a serious leak into Germany, which Great Britain finally succeeded in plugging by resort to the drastic system of "rationing" for neutral States. The international repercussions of this system and others closely allied with it in the keeping of supplies out of Germany were, however, very disagreeable. Possibly they might have been avoided had Great Britain seen her way clear to dispute with Germany the control of the Baltic, thus doing away with the necessity for exercising control over the imports of neutral States.

As for preventing the invasion of Great Britain, this was a potential rather than an actual task; but the state of mind of the British public, particularly in the early months of the war, made it a real problem for the Government. There was a time when at least half a million soldiers were located within the British Isles. Some of these, it is true, were undergoing training; a good many others were required for anti-aircraft defenses; but considering the urgent demands at that time for more troops in France, the number retained in the home country was far too great. Had the British fleet, through more aggressive action or better luck, destroyed the High Seas Fleet, the fear of invasion would have ended, and a large number of men could have been released for service at the front. The cautious strategy and tactics of Admiral Jellicoe conserved the

fleet, perhaps; but apparently they did so at considerable cost to the army.

One phase of naval activity requires special mention, namely, the Dardanelles affair. As a purely naval undertaking, this operation appears rather difficult to reconcile with the group of tasks that comprise the naval objective in the war. Why, then, was it attempted? The answer seems to be much the same as that of the famous charge at Balaklava - somebody blundered. Without arguing whether there was or was not a basis of sound strategy in the Dardanelles enterprise, it is definitely certain that such an undertaking was, from the very outset, properly a joint operation. When Lord Kitchener informed the Cabinet that troops were not available for the proposed attack, the scheme should have been abandoned - or at least delayed until a suitable military force could be supplied for the purpose. To attempt the forcing of the Straits by naval action alone - and, when this had failed, then to try to capture the Gallipoli Peninsula by a combined overseas expedition - bungled the affair completely. It gave the Turks ample warning of what was afoot, and doomed the British effort to failure, as certain as it was tragic.

It is now time to attempt a summary and appraisal of British military strategy during the World War. In some respects this is a very difficult, if not hopeless, task; for the military strategy became so involved - so contradictory, at times - as to lead one to suspect that a strategy did not exist.

In the beginning, the British appear generally to have looked upon the war as one of limited scope for them on land. Their preparations were upon that basis. While it appears altogether natural for the average layman to have held such a belief regarding the war, curiously enough, even those who perceived that Germany would make her chief effort on land seem to have visualized a comparatively small British contribution to the Allied army. Lord Kitchener was probably the first to grasp the situation in

approximately its real magnitude. His demand for a million men immediately for the new army, and his estimate that the war would last three years, were for Great Britain the first inkling of what this war was really to mean - when, from an expeditionary force of 160,000 men in 1914, British imperial armies grew within four years to the huge total of five and a half million men.

The first year of war is the story of a pitifully small force fighting for its very life in the face of heavy odds - badly in need of re-inforcements, insufficiently supplied with artillery and machine guns, and terribly short of ammunition. Morale and courage were as great as could be asked; but it was a case of David facing, not Goliath, but Juggernaut.

Just when the situation with regard to men and munitions gave promise of improvement for the British on the Western Front, there began a series of military adventures in the East, destined to continue throughout the war and to fritter away British forces in a manner altogether indefensible. It began with the ill-fated Dardanelles expedition, continued with the establishment of a force at Salonika and the sending of an expedition to Mesopotamia, and finished with the expedition from Egypt into Palestine. In tangible results these expeditions may be summarized as follows:

The Dardanelles - failed disastrously.

Salonika - accomplished practically nothing.

Mesopotamia - saved an oil line, but lost an army;
eventually captured Baghdad.

Palestine - presented Lloyd George with "Jerusalem
as a Christmas gift"

In total numbers, these "side-shows", as they were termed, cost the British, at one time or another, the services of about two and a half million men. The figures are as follows:

Dardanelles - 400,000 British engaged; 120,000 casualties.

Salonika - - 414,000 British engaged; 27,000 battle casualties, and a very large list due to disease.

Mesopotamia - 400,000 combatants, 490,000 non-combatants;
100,000 casualties.

Palestine - 1,200,000 engaged (433,000 at one time);
58,000 battle casualties.

It is of interest to note that not one of these expeditions was recommended by the Imperial General Staff, the agency in the Government responsible for the drawing up of military plans. On the contrary, the General Staff recommended adversely against all of them. In the case of those already in existence, it recommended either complete withdrawal or reduction of the force to the least number required for defensive purposes only.

In each case, the proponents of the expedition were mainly civilian - usually members of the Defense Council. Of the enterprises themselves, all may be said to have exhibited possibilities from a military viewpoint, and some were desirable for strategic reasons other than military. Given unlimited men, munitions, and shipping, the General Staff would very probably have advocated at least such operations in the Near East as gave promise of opening communications with Russia, in order to supply her with means for continuing the war. Limitations being as they were, however, and the principal theater having been determined as the Western Front, the General Staff was obliged to look with disfavor on any diversion of forces eastward exceeding the defensive needs of Egypt, the Suez Canal, and India. Its stand in this case was assuredly in accord with the principles of the objective, of security, and of economy of force.

Let us consider for one moment the relations existing between a Government and its military strategy board, the General Staff. Following the pattern of Clausewitz, the General Staff, on being directed by the Government to produce a military plan, must be informed of the national policy. With the latter as a basis, the General Staff proceeds to draw up the plan. Being a subordinate

body, the General Staff may be reorganized at any time that its membership lacks the confidence of the Government. But for that Government to disregard a plan submitted by the General Staff, and to substitute for it one of its own, while still retaining the same staff as before, is a failure to acknowledge the rights and responsibilities vested by law in a regularly constituted agency, a procedure highly condemnable and altogether wrong in principle. Yet that is what happened in Great Britain. Plans that were the result of careful study by a responsible military staff, presumably the best professional talent in the Empire, were ignored in favor of the schemes of amateur strategists of persuasive tongue and high political position.

It was quite natural, when the Western Front settled down to trench warfare, to look for other avenues, less difficult, through which to reach the enemy. But the shifting of troops to a new theater of action - in the Balkans, for instance - was attended by many difficulties for the British. The Germans could do it easily; with their excellent system of strategic railroads, they could move a division from one side of Germany to the other in six days. Great Britain, on the other hand, would require probably six weeks to move a division from France to the Eastern Mediterranean - to say nothing of the amount of precious shipping that would be required in the process of transporting and maintaining it there. Whoever, therefore, began shifting his theater of operation from one side of Europe to the other was simply playing Germany's game. Moreover, it is not apparent that trench warfare could exist nowhere but on the Western Front. The British might move out of France to avoid it, and, at the end of their six weeks' journey, find themselves confronted, not by a Hindenburg Line, perhaps, but by a good imitation. Then, too, there was the practical certainty that as soon as enough Allies had moved to the Eastern theater, Germany would mass in the West and break through

before the Western Front could possibly be re-inforced. A dozen victories in the Balkans, with Jerusalem and ancient Babylon thrown in for good measure, would never compensate the western Allies for the loss of the Channel ports.

These were some of the considerations that probably led the British General Staff to adhere to the Western Front as the proper theater for British effort. Here the enemy was nearest at hand; here the British lines of communication were shortest; and here security had, in any event, to be maintained. Moreover, whatever losses were here inflicted on the enemy were suffered by Germany herself. In the Near East it was different. There the Turks and Bulgars bore the battle. In as much as it appears certain that neither Turks nor Bulgars would have fought on the Western Front, the sending of British troops into the Balkans and Asia Minor was a two-fold gain for Germany: it relieved her of having to fight those troops herself, and it occupied two of her allies that might otherwise never have pulled their weight in the war. True, those allies might have fought on the Eastern Front - while it remained in existence. But, as we have seen, the Eastern Front largely disappeared after 1916.

Mr. Lloyd George, in urging offensives at Austria and Turkey, through the Balkans and through Palestine and Syria, was always talking about "knocking out the props" from under Germany; but as Sir William Robertson shrewdly remarks, Germany herself was the props. This was abundantly shown all through the war, though perhaps most strikingly in the two months just preceding the armistice. When Germany cracked in September, 1918 - down came the whole structure that had been the Central Powers. German allies simply crumpled. The Salonika expeditionary force, that in three years had scarcely moved out of its tracks, quickly came to life, and by early November was at the gates of Adrianople. The Palestine force, that for eight or nine months had been stationary at Jerusalem, swept rapidly through Syria, and was beyond Aleppo when the armistice came. One can hardly say there were

many indications of "props" in that neighborhood.

There remains to be considered the bringing of the Allied armies under the command of a Generalissimo. This was an extremely difficult task, requiring nearly four years to accomplish. The sentiment against it was strong - and naturally so. National pride and prejudice were involved; but that was only one small phase of the difficulty. Each Allied commander was responsible to his own Government for the safety of his army, and, with this responsibility in view, naturally insisted on being the sole judge of what assistance, in men and material, he could, in a given case, afford to render an ally.

Selection of an Allied Commander in chief is bound to hinge a great deal on personality. If a man is available of such outstanding ability, experience, and leadership that he looms above all the individual Allied commanders, there is very good probability of achieving unity of command. Even so, the man selected must be endowed with tact; otherwise the result may be far from satisfactory. In 1918 the Allies were fortunate in having a man like Marshall Foch whom they could call upon to co-ordinate all military operations, and to exercise supreme command of their armies. His appointment as Commander in chief was a long step toward final victory.

When so much was done that is commendable, and when the arms of Great Britain and her allies emerged finally victorious from the greatest war of all history, one cannot but feel reluctant to raise the voice of criticism. But there were faults so glaring and errors so fundamental in British military strategy, during the course of the war, that to overlook them is out of the question. In the main, as an attempt has been made to show, they consisted of the usurpation by politicians of functions belonging exclusively to the military. It is believed the record clearly demonstrates that, in so far as this occurred, British strategy was at variance with the principles of war, and failed to support national policy.

To the extent that such was the case, Great Britain certainly paid the penalty.

With the conclusion of this rough survey of British strategy during the World War, in its relation to national policy, we now come to a consideration of such lessons as can be applied therefrom to the present national situation of the United States. In general, it is believed a simple statement of the lessons will suffice, with, now and then, possibly a few explanatory remarks. None of these so-called lessons is newly discovered. Without exception, so far as known, they have ^{been} recognized at least since the World War - and most of them since long before that time. In certain cases, provision has already been made by the Government to profit by a lesson; in others, no provision as yet has been made. The list that follows makes no distinction on this score; it simply enumerates a number of items, in the nature of lessons deduced from the war, without indicating whether anything has, or has not, been done as yet to utilize them.

In the first place, our national policy should be critically re-examined, in the light of present world conditions and world trends, to determine its adequacy to the situation. Obviously here is the correct point of departure; for the determination of a proper policy is the first step in the formulation of a correct strategy. What is our national policy? Does it lay sufficient stress on national security? Have we more than one policy at the present time? If so, are they altogether consistent with each other? These are some of the questions that our statesmen must answer before strategy is able to proceed.

We speak of the policy of the Open Door in China; on the same basis, the Monroe Doctrine represents a policy of the United States with respect to matters concerning the Western Hemisphere. These policies are stated principles, the purpose of which is to promote the welfare and security of the United States and its nationals -

as well as of other countries and their nationals, as we carefully affirm. Should we adopt, as did Schuman in the case of Great Britain, a basic statement of American national policy, such as the "security (or the welfare) of the United States", then these so-called "policies" of the Open Door and of the Monroe Doctrine would partake more of the nature of strategy than of national policy, in as much as they would represent Means to an End, rather than the End itself.

Except for the sake of consistency with the definition of terms, and the statement of national policy, employed earlier in this paper in the case of Great Britain, it appears quite immaterial whether the Open Door and the Monroe Doctrine are considered as national policies or strategies of the United States. In either instance, it is a case of the United States having, at one and the same time, two national aims that may or may not entirely harmonize with one another. It is submitted that under our present interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine, there is nothing irreconcilable between that doctrine and the principle of the Open Door in China. But when it comes to the interpretation that others choose to place on it - the "Monroe Doctrine", for instance, that Japan seeks to enunciate for herself in the Far East - there is a world of inconsistency. It would appear, then, that with the overhauling of our national policy, to determine its soundness, consistency, and suitability for the present day, should come a statement of that policy in terms to preclude misunderstanding.

Our traditional attitude of standing aloof from the other nations would seem to be a matter for careful re-examination. Does safety now lie in isolation? Is there not danger of a situation arising such as England faced at the beginning of the twentieth century? This is a matter for serious, statesman-like consideration. Probably nothing would be more foolhardy than the dumping overboard of all of our time-honored traditions about alliances; on the other hand, is it not possible that something a trifle short of alliance - an "understanding", perhaps - between Great Britain and the United

States might, at the present time, have a salutary effect in a certain quarter where the peace of the world is being disturbed? The recent suggestion of General Jan Smuts might be advantageous to both Great Britain and the United States, in addition to being beneficial to the general peace of the world.

If we use the World War as a basis from which to predict the probable character of future wars, we have good reason to be skeptical of success in keeping any of them within the bounds of limited war. The statement of Bacon, that "he that commands the sea is at great liberty, and may take as much or as little of the war as he will", is hardly true under present world conditions. Sir Frederick Maurice says that, except in the case of what may be termed police operations against savage or partly civilized tribes, "it is imprudent for a great Power to regard any . . . war as capable of definite limitation, since its developments and repercussions in the interests of other nations cannot be foreseen". If war threatens anywhere in the world today, we cannot look on with passive interest, thinking in no event to become involved in it ourselves. The lesson is one of being always on the alert, always ready for the eventuality. And this preparedness must pervade every field of strategy - political, diplomatic, economic, military, naval, and morale. The machinery for immediate mobilization of man-power and industry must be at hand and ready to function. By careful survey of the situation, and action in accordance therewith, the Government must insure that no shortage of materials necessary to vital industry will result from a temporary interruption of trade. The development of substitutes for strategic materials must be prosecuted. The armed forces must be kept at a high level of fighting efficiency. Weapons and equipment must be fully up to date, and a substantial reserve of munitions must be kept always on hand. Adequate instruction and training for officers, in anticipation of the needs of greatly expanded forces, must be provided. Care must be taken that no branch nor arm of the service is neglected. As for the fleet, it must be

properly balanced as to type and as to number and characteristics of the individual ships. As long as naval treaties exist, the fleet should be of treaty strength; if treaties are done away with, its strength must be sufficient to enable the Government to carry out its national policy. The merchant marine should be fostered, and brought up to date with faster and more economical ships. We require more fortified naval bases. Captain Knox has indicated this strategic need, particularly in areas covering the approaches to the Panama Canal. Two things that typified England's greatness at sea during, and prior to, the war were her merchant marine and her strategically located bases. While we have no intention of disputing her shipping supremacy, we cannot be blind to the advantages such bases offer both to a fleet and to a mercantile marine of such size as this country demands for national security.

These are but a few of the lessons brought home to us by the World War. Most of them are perfectly obvious, and were recognized long before 1914; but so little has been done, relatively, to profit by some of them, that it is well again to call attention to their singular importance.

One lesson that should be taken to heart is the effect of new weapons on a war. The submarine, the airplane, and noxious gases all made their advent in battle during the World War. The surprise effect, particularly in the case of submarines and gas, which were introduced by one side only, was very great. They brought about a critical situation which, under somewhat different circumstances, could have proved disastrous. In the end, the adoption of counter measures, or the general use of the new weapon by both sides, gradually stabilized the situation. What it meant eventually was three more weapons to reckon with - making war, if not more terrible, at least more complicated. That all of these weapons, and others, too, will be used in the next war is a practical certainty. At least two of them, aircraft and noxious gas, are likely to be much greater factors than they were in the past, particularly in the navy, where

they did not come into practical use during the World War. It behooves us, therefore, to be fore-armed, in order not to be caught at a disadvantage.

While the remoteness of America from her probable enemies will doubtless make air attacks within the national territory much more difficult than they would be in case of a war between European Powers, the United States certainly is not immune to them. Her forces and possessions beyond her continental limits will be subject to air attack; and at least the coastal areas of her home territory are within striking distance of enemy aircraft carriers or possible enemy air bases established in the Western Hemisphere. Careful preparation now against possible contingencies of this nature may well be the means of preventing dangerous alarm and serious reverse in the future.

In case of war involving an alliance, experience of the years 1914 to 1918 teaches the necessity for unity of command. The inter-allied councils of the World War were useful in co-ordinating policy, but they failed in co-ordinating military operations. The lesson for the United States, should it ever be party to an alliance during a war in the future, is that the sooner unity of command can be achieved, the better.

We come now to consider the proper relationship between two elements of the Government, the political and the military - the latter being used in its general sense, to include all of the armed forces. Each of these elements has its own definite field and function. The one is vitally dependent upon the other in the proper conduct of war; but each must confine itself to its own province. The moment that one or the other transgresses its prescribed and proper bounds, history shows that confusion results, and effort is misdirected and wasted. In no other respect was British conduct of the World War more subject to adverse criticism than in the matter of assumption by the politician of functions distinctly and exclusively military.

It is the duty of the statesman to formulate national policy. In case of war, this amounts to prescribing the object for which the war is fought. It is then the duty of the military to decide how that object can best be accomplished, with the means at its disposal - and to proceed, when war is declared, to carry the decision into effect. The political, in the meantime, must insure, by appropriate legislation, that necessary means are provided whereby the military can accomplish its task. Such are the duties of the political and the military, and such is their proper relationship in the Government - the statesman, on the one hand, and the soldier or the sailor, on the other.

Sir Frederick Maurice, as previously noted, has pointed to the United States Government as particularly well designed for the efficient carrying on of war, through a wise provision for concentrating extraordinary powers, in case of emergency, in the Chief Executive. It is sincerely to be hoped that in time of need we shall make the best possible use of this provision. In no way, probably, can we be better assured of success in this respect than through full appreciation and scrupulous observance, by all concerned, of the proper relationship between these two functions of Government - the political and the military.

We try to educate our military for the duties they will be called upon to perform; and naturally the duties we have in mind are those of a state of war, rather than of peace. In the case of our political, the aim of education is quite the reverse; it is almost wholly for conditions of peace, and takes practically no account of training for duties that will come in time of war. While the education of the military may be - and probably is - deficient, there can be no question as to the deficiency of the education of the political; for wars unfortunately must be fought under war conditions. This points to the need of special training for the statesman in the duties that will devolve upon him in war. As Spender says -

" . . . so long as wars endure, politicians need to be as much prepared for their part as soldiers for theirs."

Finally, if there is one great lesson to be learned from the World War, it is the lesson of preparedness. In a world such as we live in today, to relax one's vigilance is dangerous; to ignore the common-sense dictates of security is suicidal. And let us bear continually in mind that, in these days, preparedness does not pertain alone to the army and the navy; it touches every activity, every resource, and every individual of the State.

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