

*Turner*  
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# THESIS

THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES

Submitted by

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CHAPTER I.

THE BASIS OF FOREIGN POLICY.

Not infrequently one hears the opinion that the national policies of democratic countries are inclined to be vague and changeable. As the usual party system of democratic government requires periodic appeals to the electorate, support by the public of one party or another sometimes seems to hinge upon issues that are local rather than national, or temporary rather than permanent. Then, too, the men who exercise party leadership are not the same from year to year, and new men in power may not hesitate to modify previous commitments in order to carry doubtful elections. Political parties are composed of a multitude of individuals with more or less conflicting interests, and all accepted party policies necessarily represent the accommodation of widely divergent opinions; what is more natural, therefore, than that the positions taken by the party will be indefinite? Furthermore, no party long retains the power of office; occasional recasting of national policies thus might seem a logical accompaniment of the alternation of parties in the control of the national government.

We must admit that such views have a certain degree of justification. In countries where national power remains for years in the hands of one capable individual, or, even more, where control normally passes only from one to another member of a single class with limited numbers and common interests, policies may possibly be more clearly defined and enduring than is the case in democracies. But we should not disregard the fact that policies easily adopted may be as easily abandoned when they seem to run counter to opposing world currents, and that dynastic changes and internal revolution in despotic countries actually have caused oscillations of policy far more violent than we can find in the history of democracies having a



well-developed and stable national character. In countries of the latter kind, enduring policies must necessarily reflect the fundamental convictions of the average people of the nation, and these change but slowly and only as the people themselves gradually acquire a different point of view.

Can we say in truth that the United States actually is a democracy with a stable and homogeneous national character? Most authorities (1) agree that certain general conditions are necessary for the promotion of a spirit of nationalism, which now seems essential to the continued existence of a sovereign state. The most important of these conditions are the mental solidarity, or "like-mindedness," that accompanies racial homogeneity and a common language and culture; free communication between the individuals of a country; continuity of political existence; the ability to produce national leaders; a common religion; a clearly-defined national purpose; a generally sympathetic organization of the national mind; and a national self-consciousness in reaction to other peoples.

It needs but a short examination to discover that in 1776 the American colonists already exhibited most of the characteristics of a nation, and that they acquired the remainder during the struggles of the Revolution and the Napoleonic interlude. Racially, the overwhelming majority of the colonists sprang from that remarkable and stable "sub-race" formed during the long union in Britain of the two principal European strains; racial homogeneity was important because (2) "innate mental constitution, and therefore race, is of fundamental importance in determining national character, not so much directly as indirectly; for it gives a constant bias to the evolution of the social environment, and, through it, moulds the individuals of each generation."

(1) "Inheriting the Earth," Von Engel; "The Group Mind," William McDougall; and others.

(2) "The Group Mind," William McDougall, p. 118.



(Who will deny that the current tendencies in the United States toward social and political disorder are not in large part due to the impact upon American consciousness of the foreign ideas of the millions of recent immigrants from Southern and Eastern Europe---ideas developed in a cultural atmosphere far different from that which has surrounded the descendents of the original founders of the Republic?)

Language and culture were nearly the same throughout the colonies, and though the outstanding feature of the religious creeds was their diversity, they were all Christian. The colonists generally were rebels against dogma and form, and their mental attitude toward the previously accepted religious conditions may have had something to do with their readiness to rebel against oppressive conditions in the social and political spheres. As a matter of fact, they also had traditions of political revolt, since America was settled during a period of British history marked by much internal turbulence. The conquest of adverse conditions in their new land not only induced a spirit of individualism and impatience of restriction, but also bred a feeling of general sympathy among the colonists which British oppression quickly converted into patriotism for America as a whole.

It is a remarkable fact that, while the colonists accepted without difficulty the very harsh, though not unusual, restrictions imposed by the notorious Navigation Acts, they spontaneously refused to pay the very minor Crown tax intended to be devoted to their own military defense, and by rallying to a common resistance to oppression quickly demonstrated their readiness for nationhood.

Denison<sup>(1)</sup> ascribes the founding of the Republic to the "dynamics" composed of a mixture of the Reformation conscious-

(1) "Emotional Currents in American History," J. H. Denison, Introduction, p. ix.



ness of Divine guidance, and the Anglo-Saxon love of liberty. Choiseul at that time said: "The colonists are enthusiastic for liberty---next to fanaticism for religion, fanaticism for liberty is the most daring in its measures, and the most dangerous in its consequences." The cry "No taxation without representation" evoked an immediate response; the reaction came from a universal feeling for liberty and a conviction of political capacity. An inept British government supplied the spark that fused separate colonial loyalties into a general nationalism with the common aim for independence.

The attempt to explain all national movements by reference only to economic and geographic conditions neglects the fundamental realm of ideas, which, ~~when~~ according to Denison,<sup>(1)</sup> when they have "gathered an emotional fringe of reverence, enthusiasm, prejudice, and other such dynamic, can set men by the ears, and turn the world upside down." Was the spread of the Mohammedan Empire to be explained on economic grounds? Was not the decision of the United States in 1812 to resist further oppression by the greatest power in the world made with a full appreciation of the economic hazard that was involved? Will any one assert that "No taxation without representation" had back of it nothing but economic resistance to a ridiculously small tax?

"In modern times the most striking illustration of the power of ideas on national life is afforded by the influence of the ideals of liberty and equality,"<sup>(2)</sup> and these ideals, first realized in America, have remained as the most important single element in the organization of the American national mind.

Of the remaining conditions necessary for a truly national character, virile leadership appeared when needed, while the long-continued struggle to remain free of foreign political

(1) "Emotional Currents in American History," J. H. Denison, Introduction, p. ix.

(2) "The Group Mind," William McDougall, p. 184.



domination developed a national self-consciousness so persistent as to have become one of the outstanding characteristics of American politics.

Some of us may be inclined to regard the United States as a young country. Nevertheless, within the period of its existence every other country in the world has radically changed its form or method of government. The powerful ideals of nationalism and racial unity that, beginning in the Middle Ages, have more and more possessed the human mind, have combined with ideals of democracy to menace or demolish the artificial political ties that formerly bound together great masses of non-homogeneous peoples. That the ties of nationalism are better adapted for the conditions of modern life is well demonstrated by this continuity of American political integrity and by the increasing stability of other nationally organized political units relative to those formed of several racial groups.

It has been asserted that the United States, because of the recent influx of diverse races, has lost much of its national character in the experiment of the "Melting Pot." That this is not altogether true may be gathered from the comment of an eminent British observer, who, though considering the American people as "pretty well mixed" and "but little blended by crossing," still believes them: (1)

"- - - truly a nation, and, perhaps, further advanced in the evolution of national consciousness, thought, and action than many other of the civilized peoples. This we must attribute to homogeneity of mental qualities which is in the main not innate but acquired, a uniformity of acquired qualities, especially of all those that are most important for national life. - - - - Following Munsterberg - - - - we may recognize as individual characteristics, almost universally diffused, a spirit of self-direction and self-confidence, of independence and initiative of a degree unknown elsewhere, a marvellous optimism or hopefulness both in private and public affairs, a great seriousness tinged with religion, a humourousness, an interest in the welfare of society, a high degree of self-respect, and a pride and confidence in the present and still more in the future

(1) "The Group Mind," William McDougall, p. 124.



of the nation; an intense activity and a great desire for self-improvement; a truly democratic spirit which regards all men (or rather all white men) as essentially or potentially equal, and a complete intolerance of caste."

During the first fifty years of its existence the United States developed a group of leaders remarkable for political skill both in domestic and foreign affairs. These men gained very wide experience: successively they were local politicians, congressmen, diplomats, cabinet officers, presidents, and advisers of the nation. Their careers were marked by fierce struggles for the political favors of their constituents, who did not treat kindly those who disagreed with them or failed them. Today these men are regarded as the authors of the great political documents and policies of their time, but a more correct view is that they survived as statesmen because they were best able to compose conflicting opinion and were the most eloquent in giving clear expression to the underlying convictions of the whole people. They were men of their time and in close touch and sympathy with their countrymen: and it was through their mouths that the American people enunciated the policies which ~~xxxx~~ became national in the truest sense of the word.

Indeed, we may accept this as the proper function of the leaders of a democracy: to "engender national unity and to bring it to a high pitch" (1) by putting into words and action the finer ideals of the people as a whole. If a democracy is homogeneous, if it is truly national, and if the convictions of its citizens are sincere and stable, its national policies will flow always in the broad channel of a common purpose, regardless of the conflicting currents that for short periods may deflect them from their course.

Here we have the sources of all the important national policies formulated in the United States: the ultimate convictions of the average American, developed not through his own experience alone, but through the past experience of his family and his race. Strong feeling for personal and political liber-

(1) "The Group Mind," William McDougall, p. 135.



ty, aversion to religious intolerance, jealousy of interference, intense national self-consciousness, humanitarianism, toleration for conflicting opinion, ideals of progress: these are important elements of the national character and therefore form the real basis of American foreign policy. In support of this statement may be cited the fact that in every essential particular the policies that now guide American external relations were developed and enunciated during the fifty years that followed the Declaration of Independence.

We may summarize the foregoing observations by stating that all of the conditions necessary for a stable and enduring nation exist in the United States; that, being a democracy, its policies are founded upon the practically unchanging moral beliefs of its people; that these beliefs are partly an inheritance from ~~the~~ British ancestors and partly a development of the colonial and Revolutionary periods of our history; and that present foreign policies are almost identical with those adopted in the early days of the Republic. In the following pages will be seen many variations in the application of these policies; in the end, however, it will be found that most of the divergences have finally disappeared because the American people have felt them to be inconsistent with the fundamentals of their national existence.



CHAPTER II.

THE FUNDAMENTAL POLICY.

1. The Colonial Background.

The colonial period of the United States covers nearly half its history, and still exercises a profound influence upon American thought. Colonial settlers expected to remain forever in their new homes; some had come for the betterment of their material condition, and others to escape interference with the freedom of their religious institutions. The permanent and necessarily violent destruction of all previous ties of family, cultural association, and political condition, as well as the struggle for survival on the frontier, doubtless had its part in injecting into the new life its vigorous and distinctive character.

For many years the colonies were of small commercial or political interest to the mother countries, and the settlers were left to shift for themselves under what Burke called a policy of "wise and salutary neglect." Colonial government was at first entirely local; the widely scattered communities were of necessity forced to provide for their own defense and to build their own commercial structure. The West Indies and the Orient were more profitable to the home capitalists than were the settlements along the Atlantic seaboard, and the new continental plantations, unhampered by home influences or control, gradually developed strongly ingrained and original concepts of personal and political freedom.

The growth of population and commerce inevitably brought the colonies into the political <sup>e</sup>shame of their European masters; wars started in Europe with European aims were partially fought out in the New World, and disputes with local aims originating in the colonies were carried to Europe to involve the known civilized world. All colonial empires were then under the national trade monopoly systems, and the home com-



mercial control of these great empires gradually grew oppressive for the distant settlements. Local trade that had, though illicit, grown up between the various national groups in the Caribbean and others on the continent was suppressed; all imports were required to pass ~~or passing~~ through the hands of merchants in Europe; unwelcome taxes and political restrictions encroached upon fields that the colonists had long considered as their own. But the free spirit that had been developing was not fully evaluated in England, and the result of a long series of commercial and political interferences was the Declaration of Independence and the separation of the United States from European ties.

This early period had been a time of many difficulties for the colonists; these difficulties and their conquest have deeply impressed themselves upon American traditions and sensibilities; politically and culturally the people of the United States still reach back to colonial days for the inspiration of many of their ideas. It will be long before later history will erase from American consciousness the memory and influence of these years. It is to this early influence that we may trace American jealousy of interference, desire for commercial and political freedom, and sympathy for all foreign struggles for liberty: all three being characteristic of the policies that are fundamentally American. It is of one of the resulting "practically immutable" principles of American diplomacy that John Basset Moore spoke as follows: (1)

"Of these principles the first and foremost was that of 'non-intervention.' This term was used inclusively in a two-fold sense. It embraced, in the first place, non-interference in the internal affairs of other nations. In this sense, while betokening the revolutionary origin of the government of the United States, it was also intended reciprocally to concede to other nations the right to determine their form of government and otherwise to manage their domestic concerns, each for itself and in its own way. In the second place, it embraced non-participation in the political arrangements between other governments, and above all strict abstention from any part in the political arrangements of Europe."

(1) "Principles of American Diplomacy," Introduction, p. viii.



## 2. Early Development of Non-Intervention Ideas.

The United States was favored both geographically and politically to pursue a lone policy from the start: geographically, because in those days of slow communication it was far removed from direct contact with powerful nations; politically, because the series of wars begun by the French Revolution effectually prevented direct European interference in the internal affairs of the new republic until its political stability had become assured. These features the early statesmen were quick to perceive and to exploit. In his Farewell Address, Washington laid down the basis of American foreign policy:

"The great rule of conduct for us in regard to foreign nations is, in extending our commercial relations to have with them as little political connection as possible. So far as we have already formed engagements let them be fulfilled with perfect good faith. Here let us stop.

"Europe has a set of primary interests which to us have none or a very remote relation. Hence she must be engaged in very frequent controversies, the causes of which are essentially foreign to our concerns. - - - Our detached and distant situation invites and enables us to pursue a different course. - - - Why forego the advantages of so peculiar a situation? - - - It is our true policy to steer clear of permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign world, so far, I mean, as we are now at liberty to do it; - - - Taking care always to keep ourselves by suitable establishments on a respectable defensive posture, we may safely trust to temporary alliances for extraordinary emergencies."

Most Americans of his day were in full accord with Washington's precept. John Adams confided to his diary a remark that he had made in 1782 to Richard Oswald, the British peace commissioner:(1)

"It is obvious that all the powers of Europe will be continually maneuvering with us, to work us into their real or imaginary balances of power. They will all wish to make us a make-weight candle, when they are weighing out their pounds. Indeed, it is not surprising; for we shall very often, if not always, be able to turn the scale. But I think it ought to be our rule not to meddle."

Jefferson held the same opinion with respect to alliances; in his inaugural address he expressed the guiding principle for his foreign policy as: "Peace, commerce, and honest friendship with all nations, entangling alliances with none."

While it was obvious from the first that our interests were likely to be different from those of most European powers, and that a neutral attitude would reduce the possibilities of

(1) "Hist. of the For. Pol. of the U. S.", R.G.Adams,p. 164.



friction, it was not entirely a fear for our own safety that led the United States to adopt the policy of non-intervention. Colonial struggles had implanted in the American consciousness a sincere conviction that meddling is out of place as much in the life of nations as in the lives of individuals. In spite of the political instability of the United States in 1793, and in the face of ~~various~~ European antagonisms, Jefferson recognized the French Republic proclaimed by the Assembly, and laid down the classic recognition rule of United States foreign policy. This rule, though diametrically opposed to the European rule then current, has since that time been almost universally adopted. Jefferson wrote to Gouverneur Morris:

"We surely cannot deny to any nation that right whereon our own government was founded, that everyone may govern itself according to whatever form it pleases, and change these forms at its own will; and that it may transact its business with foreign nations through whatever organ it thinks proper, whether king, convention, assembly, committee, president, or anything else it may choose. The will of the nation is the only essential to be regarded."

It seems clear that this recognition policy is of a piece with the non-intervention and non-alliance <sup>policies</sup> favored by the leaders of the young republic, and that all were based ~~on~~ <sup>upon</sup> the strong American feeling for freedom. It is only necessary to mention the enthusiasm evoked in this country by the French Revolution, the struggles for independence in the Spanish republics and the Turkish dependencies, the Irish resistance against the English, the Mexican revolution against Diaz, and the Chinese and Russian overthrow of the imperial power, to be convinced that the <sup>most</sup> important moral foundation of the American system of policy.

### 3. The Recognition Policy.

The application of the Jeffersonian rule as to the recognition of new governments has not always been simple. In fact, considerable variation of method ~~have~~ has appeared from



time to time. The recognition rule employed by the Holy Alliance during the first part of the nineteenth century was merely a somewhat reactionary form of the practice that had long prevailed among the kingdoms of Europe. Essentially, it concerned itself with the legal legitimacy of the succession of the governing power. The recognition of new governments set up contrary to the will of the former ruler was forbidden, and if made, was likely to be regarded as a direct offense against this ruler, and often involved war or a rupture of diplomatic and commercial relations. As a natural democratic reaction to the European doctrine, the United States at first sometimes extended recognition so hastily that it had later to be withdrawn, with resulting damage to the prestige and cordial foreign relations of the country. There is small doubt that recognition was extended to some of the revolting <sup>American</sup> Spanish communities before political stability had been established, even though Spain, due to preoccupations in Europe, was not in a position to re-establish military control. The recognition of the French republic in 1848 proved premature, and the recognition of the Walker government in Nicaragua, formed by the members of a filibustering expedition initiated in the United States, created an international scandal.

This previous rather loose policy of recognizing new <sup>particular</sup> governments without ~~particular~~ regard for their probable stability caused considerable embarrassment for the United States during the Civil War, when it became necessary for it to prevent European recognition of the independence of the Confederacy. As the result of this experience, the recognition of new governments became somewhat more restricted, and in general the practice arose of extending recognition only when the government was "accepted by the people, in possession of the power of the nation, and fully established." (Instructions to the American Minister to Venezuela, 1892).

But even this formula has had its variations. Secretary of State Seward seemed for a time to return rather far toward



the Holy Alliance rule when he refused to recognize a Bolivian government that apparently had not been "adopted through the free will and the constitutionally expressed voice of the people," (instructions to the American Minister to Bolivia), and also when he informed the American Minister to Peru that "revolutions in republican states ought not to be accepted until the people have adopted them by organic law with the solemnities which would seem sufficient to guarantee their stability and permanency." Unfortunately for the success of this policy, the new Bolivian regime proved unexpectedly persistent and popular, and Seward ultimately found himself under the necessity of recognizing it as having become "truly and in fact consolidated." (1)

Forgetful of Seward's difficulties, the United States, though not itself a party to the "General Treaty of Peace and Amity" of 1907 between the five Central American states, for some years followed the recognition procedure prescribed by that treaty. These five states had agreed that recognition should not be extended to a revolutionary government in any one of them until after constitutional reorganization by freely elected representatives. The results of American adoption of this formula have not been altogether happy: both in this country and in Latin-America it has been alleged that undue persuasion was employed by the United States in obtaining the original agreement, which was consummated in Washington. It has also been asserted that the act of recognition or non-recognition by so powerful a neighbor is likely to determine the success or failure of the government of a small power, regardless of the wishes of the citizens of the country.

The recognition policy of President Wilson, though actuated by great friendliness and sincerity toward the southern republics, was essentially the same as that which Seward applied in the case of Bolivia. His policy was embodied in a

(1) "Principles of American Diplomacy," J. B. Moore, p. 212.



public statement, sent also as an instruction to American diplomatic representatives in Latin-American countries, in which occurred references to "cooperation between the peoples and leaders of America," which should be possible "only when supported at every turn by the orderly processes of just government," based "not upon arbitrary or irregular force," but upon the "consent of the governed," and "the public conscience and approval." This policy was applied by the United States in an effective manner for the removal from the Mexican political arena of President Huerta, whose accession to office had been violent. Before the Mexican recognition question was finally settled, the United States twice intervened in Mexico with armed forces.

A divergence from the tradition in the opposite direction occurred when President Roosevelt in 1903 too promptly recognized the Republic of Panama within a few days after independence had been proclaimed, and then took effective steps to prevent Colombia from re-establishing its control over the isthmus. It can not be denied that this action was directly opposed to international law and previous policy, and could only be justified on the grounds of immediate and compelling national interest.

Withholding recognition of the Soviet government can ~~be~~ scarcely be regarded as contrary to established policy, since the announced purpose was the attempt to force that government to recognize the validity of the imperial debts, and also to desist from the encouragement of subversive political activities in the United States. Withholding recognition of the Manchukuo state, on the other hand, seems as yet to be a mixture of old with some new variations. Refusal to deal with a new government by another state whose interests are manifestly adversely affected is not a new element; furthermore, Manchukuo can not as yet be regarded as fully "accepted by the people." But refusal to recognize a new "situation, treaty, or agreement which may be brought about by means contrary to the covenants



and obligations of the pact of Paris of August 27, 1928;"<sup>(1)</sup> that is to say, refusal to accept any change in status resulting from war, is an element that seems entirely new.

It may be pointed out that the Manchukuo problem differs from most recognition situations because it involves not merely revolution but also the armed intervention of Japan. Professor Chesney Hill has drawn an interesting comparison between the action taken by the United States in the case of Manchukuo and in the case of the Japanese Twenty-one Demands upon China in 1915; the wording of the two notes of protest were almost identical with respect to American refusal to recognize any treaty which might "impair the treaty rights of the United States or its citizens in China," but the 1932 note also included the reference to the Kellogg-Briand Pact quoted in the previous paragraph. Professor Hill also cites a declaration of 1932 made by nineteen American republics, (the United States being one), with respect to the Chaco, that "they will not recognize any territorial arrangements of this controversy which has not been obtained by peaceful means nor the validity of the territorial acquisitions which may be obtained through occupation or conquest by force of arms." He further adds the following interesting comment: (2)

"The policy of non-recognition of treaties brought about by means contrary to the Pact of Paris constitutes a tendency towards the adoption of a new principle of international law. In the past, a treaty between states has been valid although accepted by one state under duress. This policy of non-recognition has as object the establishment of the principle that a treaty made under duress is legally void. The policy is based, not upon the impairment of the treaty rights of third states, but solely upon a will to alter existing law. According to international law, the consent or recognition of third states is not requisite for the validity of a treaty made by two states, although the treaty was made under duress. Non-recognition of the treaty does not affect its legal validity."

Whether or not the "Stimson Doctrine," which the League of Nations has also adopted, will continue to be the American policy must be left to the future. Decision on this point may be expected to hinge partly, as in the case of Bolivia in the last

(1) Secretary Stimson's identic note of Jan. 7, 1932, to China and Japan.

(2) International Conciliation Pamphlet No. 293, October, 1933.



century, on the degree of continued stability of the new government, and partly on developments ~~with respect to~~ advantageous <sup>to</sup> commercial relations with Manchukuo and Japan.

4. The Development of the Idea of Non-Intervention in Europe.

After the Revolution the country was weak and ill-organized, and needed a long period of peace to find itself. But peace seemed unlikely, because one of the legacies of the war was the French Alliance. It ~~was~~<sup>is</sup> true that this treaty declared the purpose of the alliance was to maintain the independence of the United States, but when the European coalition declared war against the new French Republic, that government was not slow to demand the assistance of America. Genet fitted out many privateers in American ports, and many acts of intervention were performed, and others planned, against England.

Direct intervention in favor of France, if supported by the government, might easily have meant political suicide for the United States. This government had definite responsibilities under the treaty with respect to the guarantee of the French possessions in this hemisphere, and many citizens of the country were heartily in favor of accepting them fully and going in on the French side. But after much discussion, and partly due to the reaction against Genet's high-handed activities, the United States determined upon a policy of neutrality. Subsequent disputes led to the naval war of 1798 against France, and the only alliance this country has ever accepted was abrogated in that year. The subsequent tremendous political upheavals in Europe strengthened the American conviction that its policy of non-intervention was sound.

That the first conception of a wise course of action to the rest of the world did not entirely exclude all idea of alliances is shown not only in Washington's Farewell Address, but also by the fact that in 1803 Jefferson was willing to conclude a strict treaty of alliance with Great Britain if Napoleon should refuse to continue the right of navigation of the Mississippi and entrepot at New Orleans. He found it possible to consider such a



course in spite of the many serious disputes that had arisen <sup>with England</sup> over trade restrictions and the impressment of American seamen. Previously, in 1793, Jefferson had drafted the articles of a treaty of alliance between the powers of Europe and the United States with the object of making common cause against the Barbary pirates, but the nations to whom the plan was submitted were unwilling to make terms with each other, and the plan came to nothing. It is true that little thought was given to making an alliance with France for military action in the War of 1812, but at that time there was an intense aversion in the United States against the governmental system set up by Napoleon, and, in fact, much opposition to the declaration of war against England.

Even as late as 1823 Jefferson was willing to form an alliance with England. In his letter of October 24th of that year, in reply to Monroe's request for advice as to Canning's suggestion for joint action in recognizing the Spanish republics in America, occurs the following passage:

"Our first and fundamental maxim should be, never to entangle ourselves in the broils of Europe. Our second, never to suffer Europe to inter-meddle with cis-Atlantic affairs. America, North and South, has a set of interests distinct from those of Europe, and peculiarly her own. She should therefore have a system of her own, separate and apart from that of Europe. While the last is laboring to become the domicil of despotism, our endeavor should surely be, to make our hemisphere that of freedom. - - - Great Britain is the nation which can do us the most harm of anyone, of all on earth; and with her on our side we need not fear the whole world. With her then, we should most sedulously cherish a cordial friendship; and nothing would tend more to knit our affections than to be fighting once more, side by side, in the same cause. Not that I would purchase even her amity at the price of taking part in her wars. - - - Nor is the occasion to be slighted which this proposition offers, of declaring our protest against the atrocious violations of the rights of nations, by the interference of anyone in the internal affairs of another, so flagitiously begun by Bonaparte, and now continued by the equally lawless Alliance, calling itself Holy."

Even here, in spite of his "first and fundamental maxim," Jefferson was not averse to taking a verbal <sup>part</sup> ~~hand~~ in Europe by denouncing the Holy Alliance. Americans could easily agree to forbid European intervention in America, but not only Jefferson's, but other voices as well, were raised in favor of a degree of American intervention in Europe. Latane asserts that



"Madison not only agreed with Jefferson as to the wisdom of accepting the British proposal of some form of joint action, but he even went further and suggested that the declaration should not be limited to the American republics, but that it should express disapproval of the late invasion of Spain (by French troops to suppress the revolution) and of any interference with the Greeks who were then struggling for independence from Turkey. Monroe, it appears, was strongly inclined to act on Madison's suggestion, but his cabinet took a different view of the situation."<sup>(1)</sup>

So-called "internationalists" have lately expressed regret that Madison's recommendation as to the Spanish and Greek revolutions was not adopted, on the ground that thus cooperation might have been started looking toward the redress of international injustice a hundred years before the League of Nations was founded. This assumption as to international cooperative possibilities at that period does not seem well founded, since it ~~is~~<sup>is</sup> quite unlikely that England would then have agreed to the encouragement of democratic aspirations in Europe. It is far more probable that any protest by the United States against interference with Spanish and Greek revolutionaries would have encountered a solid front of European opposition. There was in fact at that time but one way in which this country could have assisted in general European cooperation; but this way would scarcely have been popular in democratic America, since it would have involved support of the only existing agency of international political action, the Holy Alliance itself.

The reason back of the desire for verbal intervention in Europe was the strong American sympathy with the spread of republican institutions, and the equally strong aversion<sup>in 1823</sup> to the Holy Alliance, which had been constituted principally to prevent revolutionary movements against the reigning sovereigns, and which consistently made a practice of active interference in Europe, and was then threatening to provide troops to reclaim the former Spanish possessions in America. The political phil-

(1) "From Isolation to Leadership", John A. Latane, p. 30.



osophy that prompted this attempt to solve Europe's political problems has a strangely modern aspect. In effect the "internationalists" of Monroe's time assumed that only themselves knew the correct solution; they believed that interventions by the Holy Alliance to prevent revolutions were wicked, while interventions by the United States to encourage revolutions were noble.

From 1823 onward the United States showed little disposition to concern itself with European politics. Practice gradually shaped itself along the line of individual American action, though occasionally the action was concurrent with similar joint action by several other nations. Thus in 1841 the United States refused to enter the five-power treaty for the control of the slave trade because the signatories agreed to permit foreign visit and search during peace, and America was afraid that England would resort to impressment if English sailors were discovered during the search; nevertheless, American naval vessels took an active part in the suppression of slave carrying in American merchant ships. Also, the United States postponed until 1861 adherence to the 1856 Declaration of Paris because this country would not agree to the abolition of privateering unless private property non-contraband was exempted from capture at sea; but after the War of 1812 the government never again employed the privateering system.

The United States took a leading part in the formation of numerous international agreements such as those which ~~xxxx~~ produced the Red Cross, the Hague Conventions and the Declaration of London, but it avoided participation in purely European disputes except in the one case of the Algeciras Conference of 1906. In ratifying the treaty produced at this conference the Senate in a reservation defined the policy which by now had become a fixture, declaring that this country would not "depart from the traditional American foreign policy which forbids participation by the United States in the settlement of political questions which are entirely European in their scope."



5. From Atlantic to Pacific.

From the end of the Revolution the citizens of the young Republic feared outside interference with the establishment and maintenance of a democratic system of government. The Louisiana and Florida Purchases marked the consummation of one part of an early ambition to rid the United States of strong and therefore politically undesirable neighbors. The other part of that ambition, the annexation of Canada, evaporated in the defeats of the War of 1812.

To the frontiersmen, Louisiana and Florida were practically uninhabited, because few people lived in them except a comparatively small number of Indians, and the rights of these to the land were by no means considered sacred. These annexations were partly strategic, but were also necessary on account of the pressure from the now thickly settled eastern states. Trade had begun to move along the Mississippi River, but the French were reluctant to permit navigation of the river within their own territory, or to permit transshipment of American goods to ocean bottoms at New Orleans. Negotiations that started for the settlement of these two points ended in the Louisiana Purchase and opened a tremendous territory to settlement.

Adventurers from the seaboard penetrated all the way to the Pacific Ocean, both overland and by the sea, and soon no part of the Louisiana Purchase, nor even of contiguous domains, but had within it American hunting parties and trading posts. Men went first, but after a short period women followed, and soon permanent settlements sprang up. It was this tremendous migration of an expanding and prolific people, strong in their sense of superiority over obstacles, which populated the Rocky Mountains, the Oregon Country, California and Texas, and brought on the Mexican War.

The interest of citizens of the United States in the Pacific Coast, while having little to do with the immediate causes of the war, became a factor of importance in the negotiation of peace. As part of the terms of the treaty for the pur-



chase of Florida, Spain renounced to the United States all claim to the Pacific Coast north of the present northern California boundary. In the same year an agreement was made between the United States and Great Britain for the temporary occupancy of the Columbia River country, and in 1826 began the famous "Fifty-four Forty or Fight" agitation, which finally ended in 1846 with the establishment of American sovereignty over the "Oregon Territory." In 1842 England withdrew all objections to American acquisition of California, and in the following year the government at Washington attempted to purchase California from Mexico by agreeing to pay the long-standing individual claims against Mexico, amounting to \$5,500,000.

The exact limits of Louisiana had not been definitely fixed by the treaty, a fact which led to much dispute with both England and Spain. In 1804 Monroe went on a special mission to <sup>Spain</sup> for the purpose of establishing the western boundary, it being a contention of the United States that Louisiana extended from Florida to the Rio Grande. These negotiations failed, and in 1819 this country renounced its claims to Texas in the Florida Treaty, and agreed to a <sup>western</sup> boundary substantially the same as the present northern and eastern boundaries of the state of Texas. But Spain delayed ratifying the treaty for three years; meanwhile Mexico had revolted and the United States had recognized its de facto government. Due to political considerations, chiefly in a desire to receive some compensation for the risks it had taken in recognizing Mexico so promptly, many people felt that the inclusion of the matter of the western Louisiana boundary in the Florida Treaty had been a blunder, because they believed that more favorable terms could <sup>have been</sup> ~~be~~ obtained from Mexico than from Spain.

But the Mexican government adhered to the terms of the Florida Treaty, and instructed their minister in Washington to make arrangements for the marking of the border. The United States temporized, and the matter of the boundary became a political question in the presidential election of 1824. When



John Quincy Adams became president in the following year, he at once made counter proposals to Mexico to establish the boundary at the Rio Grande; failing this, the American commissioners were to try to obtain any part of Texas that seemed possible. Mexico would consider nothing but the border as agreed to with Spain, and Adams next offered to purchase Texas, since the liberal grants to the numerous American settlers who were flocking to Texas appeared to indicate to him that the Mexican government actually placed but little value upon the land. The offer was refused; Adams accepted the situation with good grace, and in 1828 signed a treaty recognizing the Sabine River as the correct boundary. Mexico delayed ratification, but this treaty finally went into effect in 1832.

Friction soon developed between the American settlers and the Mexican government. In 1835 the Texans drove out the Mexican military forces; in the following year they established a republic and maintained it successfully. The United States proclaimed neutrality, but enforced it with difficulty, since a Texas "plebiscite" as to "self-determination" had already shown an overwhelming majority in favor of immediate annexation to the United States. This country delayed annexation for nine years, both from a desire to avoid war with Mexico, and because the Texas question had become involved in the intensely political matter of the expansion of slave territory. Therefore it was not until March 1, 1845, after exposure of the British and French efforts to establish European political control over Texas in defiance of the Monroe Doctrine that Congress finally passed the inevitable act of annexation. The Mexican Minister at once protested and demanded his passports. The United States despatched a special envoy to Mexico in a final effort to effect a peaceful settlement. This envoy was authorized to offer to purchase Texas by the assumption of the \$5,500,000 still unpaid damage claims, and to purchase the territory westward to the Pacific for the additional sum of \$30,000,000. Of interest in connection with this liberal attitude is the fact that by then California had success-



fully revolted from Mexico and from that time forward continued under the control of the revolutionists. Rather than to see California in American hands, Mexico in May, 1846, offered to cede it to Great Britain in return for a war loan.(1) Mexican feeling against the United States had become so bitter that the special envoy could not be officially received; efforts to negotiate were dropped, and the war eventuated. Seldom have military operations been so completely successful as were those of the Americans.

The peace treaty provided for the extension of the boundaries of the United States to the Pacific. Including the cost of the "Gadsden Purchase," the United States paid \$30,000,000 cash to Mexico for these new lands, and assumed the claims of its citizens against Mexico; no indemnity for paying the cost of the war was demanded. The amount paid Mexico was exactly the same as ~~xxxx~~<sup>the sum</sup> the United States had been willing to pay without going to war. "The war had been conducted with humanity and peace had been negotiated with moderation. Europe was surprised at the mild terms imposed on Mexico and at the withdrawal of a victorious army from a country of vast natural resources which lay at the mercy of the conqueror. Rarely had a nation shown such self-restraint." (2) It may be added that rarely has a nation shown such devotion to fundamental principles of national policy.

Regardless of the attitude that might now be assumed by the country with respect to the acquisition of new territory after a successful war, we can not dismiss from the consideration of the Texas and California annexations the fact that in this tremendous territory the inhabitants had comprised only a comparatively few Indians and fewer Spanish, and that without restrictions from Mexico numerous Americans had explored and settled the country. These settlers themselves believed they had as much right to this territory as had the original colonists to hold the eastern seaboard, an attitude strongly supported by Americans who had remained at home. There was also

(1) "American Foreign Policy," John A. Latane, p. 265.

(2) *ibid.* p.280.



a widespread belief that the United States had substantial legal and moral rights in Texas through purchase from France. Additional reasons for the annexations, justified or not, were the lack of interest of the Mexicans in settling the territory, and its strategic and economic ~~importance~~<sup>importance</sup> to a rapidly growing nation. Whether or not the affair would have had a peaceful issue if the British and French had not actively interfered is a matter for conjecture; their intervention, however, made inevitable the action taken by the United States. Strong motives such as the above are likely to be decisive in the future as in the past. The refusal of the United States to demand indemnity, or to interfere in the internal reorganization of Mexico, were in marked contrast to the contemporary extension of British rule over India and French seizure of South China, particularly as the dense populations of those regions had long been politically organized.

#### 6. Expansion into the Pacific.

American commercial and political influences expanded rapidly over the Pacific from the new bases on the coasts of California and Oregon. This new field was free from the familiar inhibitions associated with the European relationship, and therefore policy was able to develop along new lines, unrestrained except by the limitations set by the American public convictions.

#### The Perry Expedition to Japan.

In recent years the initiative taken by the United States in opening up Japan to world trade and intercourse has appeared to some historians as one of the earliest manifestations of imperialism, and ~~marked~~<sup>as marking</sup> the abandonment of the policy of non-intervention. Latane remarks: (1)

"Commodore Perry's famous expedition to Japan in 1852-1854 was a radical departure from the general policy of attending strictly to our own business. - - - the real reasons for this remarkable move have so far not been satisfactorily explained by any of the numerous writers who have described the expedition in such detail."

Reconciliation with previous American practice might at

(1) "American Foreign Policy," p. 348, John A. Latane.



first sight seem difficult, though it is immediately apparent that it was entirely consistent with the prolonged effort to break down the barrier of monopoly that had restricted trade between the United States and the European colonial empires. But that it was also consistent with the fundamental policy is shown by a close examination of the facts.

During the first part of the nineteenth century, American traders had begun to send their ships to all parts of the world. The Asiatic market had become of great value and interest, and seemed to offer unlimited possibilities, and this in spite of the lack of governmental assistance through the establishment of American entrepots or naval bases in the Orient. American goods found their way to Japan through the Dutch and the Chinese, who thus became the recipients of the principal profits. In 1832 the United States government sent Edmund Roberts in the U. S. S. Peacock on a commercial and diplomatic mission to all countries of the Far East; while Roberts was favorably received in Siam and Muscat, he was unsuccessful in China, and he decided not to try/<sup>to enter</sup> Japan because of the very strict isolation system established by that country.

The profits secured through trade in the ports opened up by the Opium War of 1840-1842 further stimulated American ~~xxxxxx~~<sup>merchants</sup> to attempt the Japanese market, still closed except through the humiliating Dutch monopoly. Commodore Biddle with two ships was sent to Yeddo Bay in 1846, but he was unable to establish communication with the authorities, except to the extent of being ordered to depart. Commander Glynn visited Nagasaki in 1849 and with difficulty effected the rescue of imprisoned American sailors who had been shipwrecked in Japan. Commodore Aulick was thereupon directed to use the naval vessels in Asiatic waters in order to influence negotiations, but before he could execute his orders they were modified and Commodore Perry ordered to proceed to the Asiatic with additional warships and to make a determined effort to establish relations with Japan.



Contemporary American evidence on the expedition ~~is~~ may be obtained from the "Narrative of The Expedition of <sup>f</sup> an American Squadron to the China Seas and Japan, Performed in the Years 1852, 1853, and 1854, Under the Command of Commodore M. C. Perry, United States Navy," prepared by Dr. Francis Lester Hawks from Perry's notes and under his direction, and published by Congress in 1856. In Chapter I of the "Narrative" Dr. Hawks gives the following as the underlying reasons for the expedition:

"The treaty which closed the war of the United States with Mexico transferred to the former the territory of California. Its position on the Pacific could not but suggest the thought of an extended field for commercial enterprise; and with our territory spreading from ocean to ocean, and placed midway between Europe and Asia, it seemed that we might with propriety apply to ourselves the name by which China had loved to designate herself, and to deem that we were, in truth, 'the Middle Kingdom'. If the shortest route between Eastern Asia and Western Europe (in this age of steam) across our continent, then it was obvious enough that our continent must, in some degree at least, become a highway for the world. And when, soon after our acquisition of California, it was discovered that the harvest there was gold, nothing was more natural than that such a discovery ~~there~~ should give ~~an~~ additional interest to the reflections suggested by our geographical position.

"Direct trade from our western coast with Asia became, therefore, a familiar thought; the agency of steam was, of course, involved, and fuel for its production was indispensable. Hence arose inquiries for that great mineral agent of civilization, coal. Where was it to be obtained on the long route from California to Asia? Another inquiry presented itself: With what far-distant eastern nations should we trade? China was in some measure opened to us; but there was, besides, a terra incognita in K Japan which, while it stimulated curiosity, held out also temptations which invited commercial enterprise. True, we knew not much about its internal regulations; we knew that it had, for centuries, isolated itself, as it were, from the world, and persisted in a system of excluding foreigners from intercourse; that but one European nation was allowed to approach for purposes of trade, and that repeated efforts made by others for a similar privilege had uniformly failed of success."

Whether or not this expedition was a divergence from policy may be deduced from a consideration of, first, the avowed objects of the government, and second, ~~the~~ the effects of the expedition upon Japanese sovereignty. As to the objects we can do no better than to quote Dr. Hawks summary of Perry's instructions: (1)

(1) "Narrative," p. 323.



"He was to demand explanations of the Japanese government respecting its treatment of American citizens who had been accidentally thrown upon its shores, and to make declaration that the United States government will no longer tolerate such acts; to endeavor to obtain, at least, the opening of one or more Japanese ports to American vessels; and to negotiate, if possible, a treaty with the Empire upon a basis just and equitable; and if a general treaty could not be made, to make the best that was attainable for trade. Of course, there was much uncertainty in regard to the successful issue of the mission in this respect, and the Commodore was resolved to do all in his power by firmly insisting upon what was due to the United States, and discreetly urging the establishment of those relations which seemed desirable for the interests of his country. There would be little difficulty, he thought, in bringing about suitable explanations and apologies, with assurances of kind treatment to all strangers who should thereafter fall into the hands of the Japanese, as also a friendly reception and necessary supplies to whaling ships anchoring in the ports of the empire. These results alone, it was believed, would repay the United States government for all the expenses of the expedition. With respect to the accomplishment of the other objects there was some doubt, unless force should be resorted to. This, however, was an alternative that could only be justified by some overt act of wrong or insult on the part of the Japanese government, and, of course, was not contemplated."

Perry recommended that, in case the Japanese delayed coming to a conclusion, he be permitted to establish a temporary base for naval vessels and whalers in the Liu Chiu Islands, pending a more favorable issue of the main effort. This the government approved, but directed Perry to "pursue the most friendly and conciliatory course, and enjoin the same conduct on all under your command. Take no supplies from them except by fair purchase, for a satisfactory consideration. - - - Make no use of force, except in the last resort for defense, if attacked, and for self-preservation." (1)

On July 8, 1853, the Great Commodore with four ships anchored in Yeddo Bay, and, through firmness and address, but without hostile demonstration, succeeded in presenting his credentials and the President's letter to a high-ranking representative of the Shogun. He returned to Yeddo Bay in February, 1854, and on March 31st consummated a treaty of "amity and friendship" which provided for peace between the two countries,

(1) "Narrative," p. 87, letter of Edward Everett, Secretary of State.



the opening of Simoda and Hakodate as ports for the reception and supply of American vessels, assistance to distressed mariners, "most favored nation" treatment for the United States, and the appointment of an American consul at Simoda. The attitude of the Japanese government, for the first time in modern history, became friendly to a foreign nation. Townsend Harris was appointed consul-general at Simoda, and on July 29, 1858, a treaty was signed for diplomatic representation at Yeddo, rights of residence and trade at several ports, regulation of import duties, the privilege of extra-territoriality, and religious freedom. Before the end of the year similar treaties were negotiated by France and Great Britain, and later by other nations. The treaty derogations of sovereignty, viz., extra-territoriality and the foreign regulation of customs duties, were abrogated by Japan in 1894. Although Perry's naval force was small, there can be no question that military power was largely responsible for the success of his mission, though the only occasion that foreign force was actually used in Japan was against the rebels of the Shimonoseki uprising, which was quelled by a fleet of seventeen foreign warships, of which one was American. The several recommendations made by Perry for the permanent occupation of the Liu Chiu and the Bonin Islands were summarily rejected by the United States government.

The Perry Expedition thus can scarcely be considered as in the main contrary to American practice, and certainly not as falling within the category of foreign imperialism. In fact, the Japanese people have never looked upon this expedition as anything but beneficial to national welfare.

Hawaii and Samoa.

Foreigners in numbers did not appear in Hawaii until about the end of the eighteenth century, when, in addition to the beneficent effects of the presence of such men as Vancouver and John Young, also appeared decidedly adverse influences exerted by many Botany Bay pirates, beachcombers, and other adventurers. After 1800 native rule was unusually stable and



effective, and from 1820 onwards welcomed the assistance of various groups of New England missionaries in the development of the social and political structure of the islands. Progressive steps were taken, although sometimes delayed by disputes with the local representatives of various foreign powers. French naval forces presented demands in 1839, 1842, 1849 and 1851; the first and third demands were accompanied by force. In 1843 a British naval contingent took possession of the islands and deposed the native government; however, this action was disavowed by the British government and the islands turned back to the native king. In 1842 the United States recognized the native government in Hawaii, followed the next year by France and England.

The severity of the French demands of 1849 and 1851 led to the despatch of diplomatic missions to the United States and European powers, and in the latter year the king prepared a secret proclamation placing the islands under the protection of the United States. While this country declined the protectorate, the implications of this action were sufficiently important as to cause the French to withdraw their demands and to refrain from further active interference.

Interest had been created in the United States by the French incident; discussions were initiated looking to the annexation of the islands, but these were terminated by the death of the king. Although Hawaiian internal politics were thereafter considerably influenced by the question of American versus British influence, neither of the two governments seem to have been much concerned in the matter. In 1876 a reciprocity treaty was confirmed between the United States and Hawaii, largely at the latter's insistence, and in spite of the opposition of American sugar interests. Rights to establish a naval base at Pearl Harbor were granted the United States in 1887 as the price of renewal of the treaty, but these rights were not exercised until after annexation.

From 1854 to 1874 the government of the native kings was



liberal and popular, but after that time it became so corrupt and reactionary that in 1887 the business elements of the islands and the descendents of the missionaries, finding themselves unable to obtain a change for the better by ordinary means, staged a peaceful revolution and forced the king to establish a responsible constitutional government. The revolutionary party received the support of many of the more patriotic and responsible native elements, and thereafter retained the balance of power. In 1893 the reigning queen was finally deposed and a republic established. The Hawaiian Republic immediately requested annexation to the United States, but without favorable results until, under the influence of the Spanish War and the beginnings of responsibility in the Philippines, Congress passed the resolution of annexation on July 7, 1898.

The Samoan Islands were not well known until their exploration in 1839 by an American, Charles Walker. Within the next few years foreign capital became somewhat interested and Great Britain, the United States and Germany appointed consular representatives about 1850. The islands had never united under a single native government; a constant succession of native wars occurred, some of them fostered by foreigners. Continued disturbances brought the three governments mentioned to consider annexation, but instead in 1889 they compromised upon what amounted to a joint protectorate. In 1876 the United States had established at Pago Pago a coaling station for the convenience of the commercial steamers to Australia; shortly afterward England and Germany set up similar establishments in the western islands. Continuation of the native wars developed more friction among the three powers soon after 1889, and finally a treaty ratified in 1900 assigned the western islands to Germany and the eastern islands to the United States, Great Britain withdrawing.

The Midway Islands, Wake Islands, and more than eighty uninhabited atolls and rocks in various parts of the world have been occupied by the United States under the provisions of the



Guano Islands Act of August 18, 1856. As these acquisitions were influenced by commercial and not by political considerations, they need no discussion here.

#### The Philippine Adventure.

Since early in the last century, the United States has maintained a naval squadron in Asiatic waters. For a long time this squadron was dependent upon Chinese or foreign facilities for its maintenance, because American public opinion condemned the seizure by European powers of Chinese territory for naval bases, and would never have supported similar action by the United States government. But the Spanish War had left the Philippines on our hands; they were obviously unready for self-government, and Americans generally did not favor returning them to Spain nor to turning them over to some third power. A feeling of responsibility arose for the welfare of their hitherto misgoverned people, who seemed in some ways to be in the category of the Cubans. The retention of the islands would permit the establishment of a strong naval base for the support of our growing Asiatic interests, and Manila seemed possible of development into a secure entrepot for our trade. Annexation of the Philippines was strongly opposed by elements in this country who did not favor a policy of imperialism. Also fixed in memory is the strong support, during the bitter debates that preceded annexation, by those who were swayed chiefly by humanitarian ideas.

Nowhere better than in this case can be seen that curious pattern of motives that governs national action. National pride, personal gain through foreign trade and development of the islands, strategic considerations, a desire to "uplift" the Filipinos: these were some of the things that influenced the decision to embark upon the Philippine Adventure. It is yet too early to classify the motives behind the determination to quit the islands and to relinquish territorial ambitions in the ~~East~~ Orient. Agricultural competition from the islands has influenced some; our military vulnerability in the presence of an aggres-



sive Japan has seemed important to others. There is little doubt that a substantial majority of the American people favor granting Philippine independence at an early date; since 1900 it has been a political axiom that party platforms should declare the only reason for holding the islands was to educate their people for self-rule. Whether or not this sentiment would have disappeared if greater material benefits had accrued can only be inferred; the fact is, that from the first the government of the islands has been in the interest of the natives, and foreign exploitation has been prevented. There has been little in the administration of the Philippines that is antagonistic to the American system of policy.

Alaska.

The annexation of Alaska seems largely to have been an accident, and not the result of settled policy. However, Seward, far-sighted though imperialistic in his ideas, greatly favored it and succeeded in his negotiations in 1867. This expansion may be regarded as partly commercial and partly strategic. Although John Basset Moore said "Its acquisition was - - gratifying to the spirit of continental dominion, which has always been so strongly manifested by the people of the United States," it was obviously to the advantage of both the United States and Russia that the former country should succeed to it rather than Great Britain. Had Russia retained sovereignty, one may speculate as to what would have been its fate after the Russo-Japanese War.

#### 7. The Caribbean Policy.

Although but recently so named, the Caribbean Policy is not of recent origin. In colonial days the islands to the south were more prosperous, and in some ways more advanced in culture, than the settlements along the continental seaboard. Trade between these islands and the mainland was considerable, and in spite of colonial monopolies was for a long time comparatively free from interference either from England, France, or Spain. This intercourse gave rise to a close feeling of sympathy between



the American colonists and the plantation owners of the islands, and this feeling continued for many years after the Revolution. It was disappointing to both these groups when England refused to include in the treaty of peace an article permitting direct trade between the United States and the British colonial dependencies.

The United States and Cuba.

In the days when Cuba and Florida were both under the Spanish government, they were naturally associated together in connection with the possibility of interference with American independence by allied Spain and France. Florida in the hands of a strong European power was a distinct menace, and its annexation soon became a matter of much interest to the United States. Along with the thought of Florida as an addition the thought of Cuban annexation followed closely. In 1810 President Madison wrote to William Pinckney:

"The position of Cuba gives the United States so deep an interest in the destiny, even, of that island, that although they might be an inactive, they could not be a satisfied spectator at its falling under any European government, which might make a fulcrum of that position against the commerce and security of the United States."

Cuba's status became a burning question when in 1817 Great Britain was said to be willing to relinquish the Spanish debt for the maintenance of the Peninsular Army in return for the cession of Cuba.<sup>(1)</sup> It is well known that Great Britain opposed the Florida Purchase, and was reported to have threatened to occupy Cuba in reprisal, though she never publicly acknowledged this to have occurred. So able a man as John Quincy Adams, in writing to the American minister to Spain in 1823, gave expression to the view held generally in the United States:

"In looking forward to the probable course of events for the short period of a half a century, it seems scarcely possible to resist the conviction that the annexation of Cuba to our Federal Republic will be indispensable to the continuance and integrity of the Union itself."

Spain was unwilling to relinquish the "Ever Faithful Isle" either to England or the United States, and these two countries were a unit in opposing its transfer to any other power. Cuba continued to interest the United States for many years, not only

(1) "American Foreign Policy," John H. Latane, p. 285.



for reasons already mentioned, but also <sup>because</sup> the South desired it for the extension of slave-holding territory to offset the free territories of Oregon and California. In 1848 Cuba appeared so important to President Polk that he offered to purchase it for the then huge sum of \$100,000,000, at the same time averring that the United States would not desire to acquire it "except by the free will of Spain." This offer was promptly repulsed. Subsequent filibustering expeditions originating in the United States so alarmed England and France that in 1852 they endeavored unsuccessfully to bind the United States to a tripartite guarantee of the continuation of Spanish rule in Cuba. At about this same time, when the construction of an isthmian canal first became a definite possibility, this country also began to evince interest in Porto Rico.

This ~~long~~ series of incidents has been given in detail in order to make the points that the Caribbean Policy originated in the first days of the Republic, and that early American ideas were, with respect to this area, fully as "imperialistic" as they are today.

The decade preceding the Civil War witnessed other efforts by the United States either to acquire Cuba or to secure its independence. Trade and political relations with the military government were never satisfactory, and the Black Warrior affair, in which an American vessel was seized for an unintentional violation of customs regulations; and the notorious Ostend Manifesto drawn up by the American ministers to Spain, France and England, which proposed American seizure of Cuba, brought the United States and Spain close to war. Then the Civil War and the construction of the transcontinental railroads somewhat reduced American interest both in a canal and in the immediate fate of Cuba and Porto Rico, but the Cuban Ten Years' War beginning in 1868 and the Virginius affair again stirred up interventionist agitation. Direct interference was avoided, however, until the 1895 Cuban Insurrection finally brought on the Spanish War.



By 1898 American commercial interests in Cuba had assumed large proportions; from this cause, as well as for humanitarian and strategic reasons, there arose a far greater popular demand for intervention than ever before. Two special aspects were of great importance: the strong aspirations of the Cubans for self-government, and the proximity to the United States of political conditions involving abhorrent personal cruelties. It was on the grounds that a neighboring power is justified in intervening for the suppression of such inhuman conditions as then existed in Cuba that the brilliant Alphonse Rivier opposed European sympathy for Spain and won considerable support for the American position. It may be observed that public opinion in England wholly approved this intervention, after having for eighty years opposed the extension of American influence in Cuba.

From the beginning of the 1895 insurrection sympathy in the United States was entirely favorable to the insurgents. Congress passed resolutions recognizing their belligerency and demanding Cuban independence. President McKinley made patient efforts to bring matters to a peaceful conclusion through the voluntary evacuation of Cuba by Spain, but the sinking of the *Maine* rendered this impossible, and war was declared on April 19, 1898. The fourth article of the Congressional resolution declaring war reads as follows:

"That the United States hereby disclaims any disposition or intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control over said island except for the pacification thereof, and asserts its determination, when that is accomplished, to leave the government and control of the island to its people."

The temper of the American people by that time was opposed to Spanish retention of any possessions near North America. Consequently Porto Rico was overrun immediately after Santiago was taken, and its cession to the United States as war indemnity was required as one of the terms of peace. There is little question that this island was desired for the future protection of the Panama Canal.



American military occupation of Cuba continued until constitutional government was established on May 20, 1902. The Cuban constitution contained as an annex the Platt Amendment, a stipulation of the United States Congress as to conditions required for continued Cuban independence, and reserving to the United States the right to intervene to preserve independence, maintain adequate government, and carry out the provisions of the treaty of peace with Spain.

The Platt Amendment has to many persons been the outward sign of an American protectorate over Cuba, and an indication that in the Caribbean the United States had embarked upon a career of imperialism on the European model. In South America the amendment has been the object of many attacks for the purpose of preventing any further extension of American "power and prestige" policies.

Under the Platt Amendment one military occupation has occurred for the restoration of order after a serious revolution; American military forces landed in Cuba in September, 1906, and remained for two years. During and after the World War a detachment of United States marines was for several years stationed in Camaguey for the preservation of peace in the eastern provinces.

On June 9, 1934, the United States and Cuba exchanged ratifications of a treaty which abrogated the Platt Amendment. While this action does not bind this country to forego interventions under the principles of general international law, it does indicate a decided reduction of the measure of Cuban "protection" to which it had previously been committed. In this second stage of the history of the Cuban Republic, that country will be able to exercise a greater degree of independence than heretofore, rather than a less degree, as had been feared in Latin-America.

The Caribbean Policy as a general proposition has contemplated no general establishment of United States sovereignty in that region; it has been satisfied with the independence



of all states under national rule, and the maintenance of European rule where already established. It has not been satisfied with the transfer of sovereignty from one European power to another because such transfer would ordinarily be from a weak to a strong nation. Objections made to the transfer of Cuba from Spain to England or France has already been mentioned; another instance is the case of the Danish West Indies.

In 1867 Seward negotiated for the purchase of these islands, a plan overwhelmingly favored by their inhabitants but rejected by the United States Senate. This annexation became of greater interest in 1903 both because of the aggressive attitude of Germany and of their strategic value for the defense of the canal, but at that time Denmark was unwilling. When in 1917 the United States finally purchased them for the sum of \$25,000,000, it was largely to prevent their falling into Germany's hands should that country be victorious in the war.

That native rule in Caribbean states is agreeable to the United States is shown by its diplomatic action after the Civil War for the elimination of European support for the Maximilian Empire in Mexico, and the rejection by Congress of Seward's plan of 1867 for the annexation of Santo Domingo, although the plan had been suggested by the Dominicans themselves. Several other opportunities have been presented for the acquisition of territory, such as the interventions in Nicaragua, and Haiti and Santo Domingo, but each time the forces of occupation have been withdrawn as soon as public order and an apparently stable government has been established. The Panama Canal.

Events leading up to the construction of the Panama Canal under exclusive American control are of interest as constituting a special phase of the development of the Caribbean Policy.

For hundreds of years this canal existed in hope and



imagination before it became a reality. In the early part of the nineteenth century, with the initiation of whaling in the Pacific Ocean and trade with the Orient, Americans began to take a practical interest in the idea, and it was one of the subjects scheduled for discussion at the 1826 Congress of American Republics at Panama. In 1835 and 1839 the United States government opened negotiations with certain of the Spanish-American republics, with a view to defining the political conditions which should govern construction and operation, but no plan could be developed at that time. In 1846 the United States and New Granada signed the first treaty concerning a canal, in which the former obtained equal rights of transit with the latter, and in return guaranteed the neutrality of the canal and the sovereignty of New Granada over the isthmus at Panama. This treaty was ratified in 1848, but no steps were taken to initiate construction.

Discovery of gold in California on January 24, 1848, the annexation of that territory by the United States in the same year, and the resulting tremendous rush of settlers and gold-seekers, gave a fresh impetus to the canal project as an essential to transportation between this country's eastern and western seaboard. Only the engineering difficulties, (which had not at first been fully appreciated), and questions of politics and finance, prevented an attempt to build a canal shortly after 1850. Some reduction of the transportation handicap followed the building of the Panama Railroad in 1850 to 1855, while the completion of the first transcontinental railroad in 1869 afforded further relief. Obvious geographical difficulties at Panama ~~had at an early date~~ indicated that the Nicaraguan route might be the more practicable, and in 1849 an American charge-d'affaires, entirely without the authority or approval of Washington, negotiated a treaty with the weak government of Nicaragua granting the United States the exclusive right to construct a canal through that country.

In 1841 Great Britain took a hand in the situation by



establishing a protectorate over the Mosquito Indians who inhabited the Nicaraguan coast, and whose territory included the mouth of the San Juan River, the only practicable <sup>terminus of a</sup> canal route. Immediately after the signature of the treaty between the United States and New Granada, the British political activity at Greytown increased to such an extent as to make it necessary for the United States either to accept the unsatisfactory conditions established by the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty of 1850, or to abandon altogether the idea of a Nicaraguan Canal. It is not too much to say that continued difficulties with England in connection with her political promotions in this district, and uncertainties as to the interpretation of this unpopular treaty, were at least partly responsible for the long delay in the actual construction of an isthmian canal.

There was considerable uneasiness and indignation in the United States over the establishment of the British protectorate over the Mosquito Indians, a right of interference which England had explicitly abandoned in the 1793 treaty with Spain. Aside from its relation to the canal question, this extension of authority was felt to be a dangerous infringement of the Monroe Doctrine. British "squatter" claims in that region were not well defined; they had always been denied by Spain, and had only been reasserted after the dissolution of the Central American Union in 1838.

In the public and diplomatic discussion of the canal project the relation of the Monroe Doctrine to Central America came to be emphasized more and more, and American resolution gradually hardened into a firm objection to the building of the canal under any but American control. It was the developing purpose to own and operate this important communication that supported the diplomatic effort to modify the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, and that gave rise to the agitation against the construction of the Panama Canal by De Lesseps with French funds, although a few years previously, due to a lack of sufficient American capital, the construction of a canal by private en-



terprise of any character would have been welcome. A better appreciation of American strength as developed in the Spanish War, and increasing French and British absorption in European politics, were finally responsible for European validation of the American point of view as to exclusive control over the canal.

From the first time that the project seemed to come within the bounds of practicability, it was a principle with the United States that the canal would be open to world trade both during peace and war. Clay's instructions to the American delegates to the 1826 Panama Congress contained the following: (1)

"If the work should ever be executed so as to admit of the passage of sea vessels from ~~the~~ ocean to ocean, the benefits of it ought not to be exclusively appropriated to any one nation, but should be extended to all parts of the globe upon the payment of a just compensation or reasonable tolls."

The Senate resolutions of 1835 and 1839 authorizing conversations contemplated the "free and equal navigation of the canal by all nations." (2) In 1849 the United States transmitted to the British government the following expression of its views: (3)

"The United States would not, if they could, obtain any exclusive right or privilege in a great highway, which naturally belonged to all mankind, for they well knew that the possession of any such privilege would expose them to inevitable jealousies and probable controversies which would make it infinitely more costly than advantageous; that while they aimed at no exclusive privilege for themselves, they could never consent to see so important a communication fall under the exclusive control of any other great commercial power."

The Clayton-Bulwer Treaty provided that a canal would be open without discrimination to all nations which should subscribe to the other stipulations of the treaty; the treaty of 1867 between the United States and Nicaragua contained similar guarantees; and even during the subsequent prolonged controversy over the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, exclusive rights to any benefits of the canal for commercial purposes were never claimed by this country. The only time this principle came into question was at the time of the passage of the Panama

(1) Rep. of Int. Am. Conf., vol. iv, p. 143.

(2) "Am. For. Pol.", Latane, p. 310. (2) *ibid.* p. 313.



Tolls Act, which rebated the tolls of American vessels engaged in the intercoastal trade as an incentive to competition between ships and railroads for the American transcontinental carriage of ~~freight~~ freight. Similar rebates were not allowed for cargoes destined for the foreign trade, and Congress appeared to believe that such a law would not violate existing canal treaties, since vessels of foreign registry are forbidden to carry freight or passengers between American ports. However, England took a firm stand against this law as a violation of the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty, which had replaced the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty in 1902, and Congress repealed this portion of the act in 1914.

The story has been different with respect to the permanent ~~neutralization and the~~ fortification of the canal. In the treaty of 1846 with New Granada, the United States assumed a definite responsibility for maintaining canal neutrality and New Granada's property rights. The Clayton-Bulwer Treaty bound the United States and Great Britain never to erect fortifications commanding a Nicaraguan canal, and to preserve the neutrality of the canal in case of a war between the contracting parties. The 8th article of this treaty sets forth the desire of the two governments "to establish a general principle" of extending their protection "by treaty stipulations" to all other means of communication across the isthmus such as those then "proposed to be established by the way of Tehuantepec or Panama." The United States has never agreed that this indefinite article forbids fortification of a Panama Canal, and this matter was finally settled by the provisions of the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty permitting the United States exclusively to construct and manage an isthmian canal, and to exercise police power over it. The treaty omitted all reference to fortification, but retained the principle of neutrality.

An important fact is that the United States also holds exclusive rights to construct a canal through Nicaragua; these rights were granted by Nicaragua in perpetuity.



### The Strategic Caribbean.

In the past thirty years the extension of American commercial influence has been rapid. For more than a hundred years after the establishment of the Republic, European capital flowed into this country in great streams. Mines, railroads, shipping lines, factories, cattle and sheep ranches, cotton plantations were developed through the use of money subscribed abroad. Not until the end of the nineteenth century did this current start to flow the other way, and it was only after the World War that the United States appeared as a creditor, rather than a debtor nation. The present world-wide distribution of American interests is the phenomenon of accumulated capital seeking favorable returns.

American funds have been invested in Canada, Australasia, Asia, South America, the Caribbean countries, and, in even greater amounts, in Europe itself. But this diffusion of capital has seldom been guided by the political branch of the government, as has sometimes been the case with other investing countries. "Dollar Diplomacy," or foreign investment secured with political sanctions, has never been popular with the American public. It is therefore difficult to agree that the consequences of American commercial expansion will necessarily be the extension of our borders or political "imperialism," either in the Caribbean or elsewhere.

American political influence has increased in the West Indies and Central America as it has elsewhere. Without doubt its increase in the Caribbean has been used to prevent the growth in that region of conditions unfavorable to the United States. A special development of policy began to be evident with the assertion by President Cleveland in 1895 of American interest in the boundary dispute between Venezuela and Great Britain. This trend was confirmed by President Theodore Roosevelt's interference in 1902 in the financial claims controversy between Venezuela on the one side and Germany, England and Italy on the other. RM



While both these interventions were made under color of the Monroe Doctrine, it may be doubted if American action would have been so vigorous had the disputes ~~been~~ concerned a country more distant from the Caribbean than is Venezuela. However, these two cases established precedents against the use of force in this area by European powers, and in return the United States has ever since felt bound to exercise over Caribbean states such financial and diplomatic restraint as will forestall any excuse for foreign armed interference.

For instance, in 1905 President Roosevelt arranged that thereafter an American should act as Customs Receiver of the Dominican Republic, and that a certain percentage of the collections should apply to the service of the foreign debt. In 1911 France, Germany, Great Britain and Italy united to demand that Haiti liquidate certain claims within three months or submit them to arbitration; political conditions in Haiti became progressively worse, and in 1915 American marines landed to remain for nineteen years. In pursuance of President Wilson's plan of "assisting each other to orderly processes within our own borders" (1) American military forces exercised control over Santo Domingo from 1916 to ~~1924~~ 1924.

The employment of a degree of financial and political supervision over unstable Caribbean states is principally strategic, and is related to American concern for the safety of the Panama Canal. This concern was strikingly illustrated by the restrictive action taken to prevent a Japanese company in 1912 from acquiring commercial rights in Magdalena Bay which might conceivably later have been converted into rights for basing naval forces. The establishment of non-American powers, even temporarily, in positions across the routes to Panama, is likely to be prevented by the United States at any cost.

(1) Address to Second Pan American Scientific Congress, Jan. 6, 1916



8. The American Idea of Non-Intervention.

The term "intervention" is difficult of precise definition. Professor G. G. Wilson's definition of intervention as an act "that would forcibly limit the freedom of another state" does not seem to cover the field of diplomatic intervention that does not contemplate the use of force; while, on the other hand, forcible acts amounting almost to war could not properly be classed as interventions if made by one state within a field in which national rights are not clearly ~~defined~~ delimited. Says Edmund C. Mower: (1)

"Modern history is full of interventions, justified at the moment on one ground or another--legal, humanitarian, political, or the fundamental right of self-defense. The authorities agree on one basic proposition, that the principle of external sovereignty implies the obligation of each state to respect the independence of every other state. - - - - But beyond this fundamental principle lies a field of controversy, in which theory and practice are in hopeless conflict. It is impossible to deduce generally recognized rules from the practices of states; for not only have different states acted on different principles, but the action of the same state at one time has been irreconcilable with its action at another."

Frederick L. Schuman has made the assertion that:

"Between 1800 and 1927 the United States engaged in no less than seventy interventions in Latin America, many of them for the purpose of protecting investments and collecting debts. Interventions of other powers in Asia and Africa have been even more numerous. Such interventions are often accompanied by efforts to overthrow the local governments and replace it by one more acceptable to foreign interests."

But this seems a rather casual treatment of the matter. How many of these "interventions" were accompanied by the use of armed force, how many times force was used for the immediate protection of persons and property from violence which an actual government was unable to control, and how often force was used for the collection of debts or for related purposes, might give a more exact idea as to the character of the interventions which American policy has classed as legitimate.

(1) "International Government," p. 117.

(2) "International Politics," p.369.



The United States has never given its adherence to the "Drago Doctrine," so popular in South America, which would forbid the use of armed force in the collection of international debts. The adoption of such a policy might be very comfortable for debtors, but scarcely accords with what is the general practice in ordinary commercial ~~xxxxxxx~~ intercourse. It may be stated that the United States has seldom employed force for the collection of debts due from other countries, and at the Second Hague Conference sponsored a proposal that force should not be employed in foreign territory for such a purpose until the possibilities of arbitration had been exhausted. Distrust by Latin-Americans of the so-called "interventionist policy" of the United States can scarcely be justified, in view of the emergency and temporary nature of such interventions as have taken place. President Franklin D. Roosevelt's declaration that "the definite policy of the United States from now on is one opposed to armed intervention" is a reiteration of the policy that has uniformly guided American diplomacy.

The term "Non-Intervention" as applied to United States policy has never been absolute, but merely relative; it connotes the character of American interventions, and not their legality from the standpoint of international law. The American view on questions of intervention has never been better expressed than by President Wilson in his address to the Senate on January 22, 1917:

"I am proposing, as it were, that the nations should with one accord adopt the doctrine of President Monroe as the doctrine of the world; that no nation should seek to extend its polity over any other nation or people, but that every nation should be left free to determine its own polity, its own way of development, unhindered, unthreatened, unafraid, the little along with the great and the powerful."

It was the almost unanimous American approval of this sentiment that was largely responsible for early support in this country of the plan for the League of Nations; it was the discovery of the essentially interventionist character of the League system as actually established that was responsible for the plan's speedy fall from popularity. As early as 1919 David Jayne Hill



remarked: (1)

"The general idea of a 'League of Nations' has - - - been widely accepted and urgently advocated. It has, however, escaped the attention of many persons that the Covenant of the League of Nations prepared at Paris as the first Part of the Treaty of Versailles is not a 'general association of nations' of a pacific character to secure international justice, but a limited defensive alliance for the protection of existing possessions, regardless of the manner in which they were acquired by their rulers, wholly indifferent to the wishes of the populations thus held in subjection, and controlled by a small group of Great Powers whose supremacy is based solely upon their magnitude and military strength. It hardly needs to be stated that a league of this character does not embody the American conception of what such an association should be. Obviously, it not only repudiates the ideas underlying our traditional foreign policy as a nation but presents a contradiction of the fundamental principles upon which our government is based."

The League of Nations has so far failed of adherence by the United States because of the fear that American strength would be used for the advancement of the individual interests of some nations across the line of interest of other nations, and by methods generally contrary to methods that the American people have <sup>approved</sup> ~~developed~~/since the formation of the Republic. Were such a fear to be justified the United States as a League member would then find itself committed to a permanent alliance of the most entangling character, and embarked upon an endless series of interventions of a <sup>kind</sup> ~~whichever~~/that American opinion has never sanctioned.

The results of intervention in European affairs in the World War, even though initiated for the protection of American rights upon the sea, have not been such as to popularize interventions in this country, nor to strengthen any inclination to quit the path of "Non-Intervention," as defined by long-established American practice.

#### 9. Non-Intervention and Isolation.

It is only in recent years that the policy of Non-Intervention has come to be viewed as a policy of "Isolation." Few

(1) "American World Policies," preface, p. vii.



We were accustomed to hearing of the "splendid isolation" of England, and knew that this policy had been deliberately adopted during periods when European political power was so nicely balanced as to obviate any threat against the British Empire from that quarter; but few publicists, writing before the World War, ever applied that term to the United States.

Internationally, nations have exhibited various degrees of isolation in the political, economic and social fields. At one end of the scale we have seen the extreme cases of isolationism shown in China before the Opium Wars and in Japan before the Perry Expedition, with no foreign contacts or cooperation in any of the fields mentioned. The present position of Japan represents probably the most extreme case of isolation existing in the world today: social isolation is almost complete; her external political activities are confined almost exclusively to Asia and the Western Pacific; while commercially, she appears to be setting up a system of monopolistic control in her territories and in her sphere somewhat resembling that exercised by the colonial empires of the eighteenth century.

In spite of the active concern of France in all European and African affairs, that country has long refrained from political collaboration in other parts of the world, regardless of her many important island possessions and her Asiatic empire. France has no social isolation, as she has contributed more than her share to the scientific and cultural advancement of the race; in the economic field, however, she occupies a more conservative position than does even high-protectionist America.

England has long displayed keen interest in affairs in all parts of the globe: but even England no longer occupies herself with politics in the American hemisphere to the extent that she did a few years ago. The Hay-Pauncefote Treaty marked her political retreat to beyond the Atlantic except in matters of direct concern to her own territories on this side. England is in the same class as France socially, but the recent adoption of "Empire Preference" seems a step toward commercial isolationism.



If a refusal to be drawn into matters everywhere that affect more than a single power constitutes "isolationism," then all great nations pursue such a policy when it is to their advantage or when they feel that they cannot afford to try to be powerful in all fields at once. Says Frank Simonds: (1)

"Always, moreover, this policy of isolation - - - has recommended itself to British statesmanship because it insures security without involving risk."

"It is essential that this point should be clear in all American minds, because otherwise the debate over the relative merits of the isolationist and collective methods of insuring national security becomes unreal. Actually the French are unable, because their geographical situation is continental, to pursue an isolationist policy in Europe. But where they can follow such a course, namely in northeastern Asia, they do. As for the British, whenever they are able, they take advantage of their insular position to remain in 'splendid isolation.' And membership in the League and adherence to the so-called collective system which centers in Geneva have not modified the traditional practice of either country."

To confirm the truth of this observation, we have only to call to mind the general European indifference to the fate of Memel, the recent British naval agreement with Germany in disregard of the Treaty of Versailles, French lack of interest in the fate of Ethiopia, and League coolness to the Manchurian affair. On the other hand, it is doubtful if our American internationalists would find many South American publicists agreeing with them when they say the United States is "isolationist."

Those who expound the thesis that there should be no limit to American participation in ~~in~~ international politics would have us believe, first, that "isolationists," (to them a term of opprobrium), have in the last few years pushed the United States aside from its original policy of "cooperation" as laid down by Washington and Monroe, and second, that American interests as well as world affairs are suffering from our refusal to be drawn fully into the collective system peculiar to Europe. To illustrate the lengths to which such advocates may go in support of this viewpoint, the following excerpts are quoted (1) "American Policy in the Post-War Years," pp. 136 and 139.



ted from an essay by Professor John B. Whittton: (1)

"Let us re-read Monroe's words in order to determine exactly his own view concerning isolation: 'Our policy in regard to Europe - - - - remains the same, which is, not to interfere in the internal concerns of any of its Powers; to consider the government de facto as the legitimate government for us; to cultivate friendly relations with it, and to preserve those relations by a frank, firm and manly policy, meeting, in all instances, the just claims of every Power, submitting to injuries from none. - - - - In the wars of the European Powers in matters relating to themselves we have never taken any part, nor does it comport with our policy ~~xxxxxxx~~ so to do. It is only when our rights are invaded or seriously menaced that we resent injuries or make preparations for our defence.'

" - - - - in the Message itself there is nothing which is opposed to a large measure of cooperation with the rest of the world. Unfortunately the Message has been greatly misunderstood and considerably deformed, so much so in fact that there is a strong tendency to veto, in its name, any project for international collaboration. It is not only Monroe, but also Washington and Jefferson, whose counsels have been wrongly interpreted, their arguments twisted and distorted. Opponents of international collaboration have emphasized the negative aspect as the only advice given by the Fathers, and at the same time confusing this part of their counsels with the real Monroe Doctrine. This absolute isolation policy, nevertheless, has never been more than an aspiration, for its strict application has proven to be impossible. - - - - -

"In the coming years the United States will be obliged to assume her veritable role among the nations. Her policy is bound to develop; she will have to face the most difficult and delicate problems, whose solution will demand of her the most serious reflection. Her statesmen would do well to look deep into the experience of the past, where they will find a precious guide in the words of Monroe. - - - - Faced by war or danger of war, the Government would do well to reflect that intervention by the United States is legitimate, according to Monroe, if the nation's rights are in danger, and that since the coming into effect of the Pact of Paris, all ~~and~~ or menace of war, whatever be its theatre, involves not only the interests but even the rights of the United States, and that consequently this country, in the name of the Doctrine itself, ought ~~to~~ to give its support in order to find a solution to restore peace. And if the United States - - - - decides to take effective measures against an aggressor nation, such action would in no way violate the admonition of President Monroe, who himself, also in the name of peace and security, went so far as to forbid all Europe from colonizing or intervening in America. - - - - -

"As a policy capable of serving both the cause of world ~~of~~ progress and the cause of national interest, the principle of absolute isolation is inadmissible under modern conditions: close relations with the rest of the planet are for the United States today absolutely necessary. The peace and security of the nations depend in large part on the attitude taken by the United States, and demand emphatically from that nation a prudent but generous policy of international collaboration. - - - -"

(1) "Isolation: An Obsolete Principle of the Monroe Doctrine," published in International Conciliation Pamphlet No. 290 of May, 1933.



Without pausing to examine this rather fine-spun argument, we may simply remark that the writer apparently has failed to apprehend the essence of the American policy of non-intervention, which merely is refusal to interfere in matters that do not affect vitally the welfare of the United States and its people. In this policy special emphasis has always been laid on careful avoidance of the intricate "broils" of the European system, in order to escape disaster to ourselves.

Through the years the United States has preserved a singularly consistent policy of "isolation" as respects the internal affairs of other nations and the external affairs of European, African and South Oriental countries. It has, however, been as ~~unskilfully~~ consistently interested in the external policies of American and Pacific Ocean powers. There has been a complete absence of isolation as regards social and economic affairs, unless one can class the high tariff system as a form of isolation. And in matters that the people have regarded as predominantly social, even though with strong political implications, the United States has given a full measure of cooperation, and has often taken the lead. Examples of such cooperation are the 1793 endeavor to form a cartel against the Barbary pirates, suppression of the slave trade in the first half of the nineteenth century, participation in the Hague and all subsequent conferences relating to disarmament and the amelioration of the effects of war, control of opium traffic, Red Cross Convention, and many others.

In fact, the United States now, as always, occupies an intermediate position as regards "isolationism," but its position as regards "Non-Intervention" has been almost solitary. For short periods in history one statesman or another may have introduced variations in the ~~the~~ traditional policy, but sooner or later the settled convictions of the American people have forced a return of the main current to the original channel. We can view with some satisfaction the part that this country has played in preventing the transfer to the Americas of the



European collective intervention system. Had the Monroe Doctrine never become established, can any one believe that the Western Hemisphere would not now present a facsimile picture of contemporary European insecurity?

"I would dedicate this nation to the policy of the Good Neighbor--the neighbor who resolutely respects himself and, because he does so, respects the rights of others--a neighbor who respects his obligations and respects the sanctity of his agreements in and with a world of neighbors." (1)

(1) President Franklin D. Roosevelt's Inaugural Address, March 4, 1933.



### CHAPTER III.

#### THE MONROE DOCTRINE.

##### 1. A NEW POLICY.

It has already been indicated that national policies of an enduring character are the mass expression of the mixture of the individual opinions and aspirations of the people or the governing elements of a nation. The Monroe Doctrine was the resultant of the same colonial and early national factors that gave rise to the Non-Intervention Policy. Nevertheless, this doctrine has certain peculiar characteristics that distinguish it from our other national policies, and it came into existence only because, in 1823, two special circumstances arose which required the public expression of a firm national will to prevent the creation of conditions unfavorable to the peaceful development of the United States. These circumstances bore no relation to <sup>concern for</sup> the immediate national safety, which has always operated against the establishment of strong military power in the Caribbean, nor to a fear of becoming involved in Europe. The emergencies that dictated the enunciation of the Monroe Doctrine originated after the close of the Napoleonic Wars; they threatened the continuation of republican institutions in the United States; they pointed toward the reestablishment of the colonial monopolies; and they foreshadowed the transfer to the New World of bitter European political rivalries.

##### 2. ORIGINS OF THE DOCTRINE.

The Pacific Coast of North America was visited in 1741 by a Russian exploration party, and after 1790 several Russian trading posts were established in Alaska and one at Bodega Bay, California. The Spanish had explored the coast much earlier, but took no further interest until the latter part of the eighteenth century, and even then never pushed their settlements



north of San Francisco. Captain Cook put into various bays in 1778; an American, Captain Gray, explored the coast and the Columbia River about ten years later, and in 1805 Lewis and Clarke crossed the Rocky Mountains and followed the Columbia down to its mouth.

The first Oregon settlement was made in 1811 by an expedition sent to Astoria by John Jacob Astor, and although this post was sold to a Canadian trading firm at the beginning of the War of 1812, by that time its trade had already been extended throughout that region and up into what is now British Columbia. Russians never attempted to settle the country, but many Canadians came in during the war and occupied the territory abandoned by the Americans. By about 1821, England having agreed to the pre-war territorial status, Americans and Canadians had settled in considerable numbers along the coast, and had established overland routes to their Eastern markets.

In that year Alexander I of Russia disturbed matters by proclaiming that his dominions extended as far south as the fifty-first parallel, well beyond the limit that Americans and Canadians had considered the boundaries of Russian territory. As both Great Britain ~~claimed~~ and the United States claimed this land, they protested that, since Russia had no settlements in the disputed territory, she therefore had never acquired sovereign rights. Russia agreed to attempt a diplomatic adjustment, and on July 22, 1823, Secretary of State John Quincy Adams issued instructions to the American minister at St. Petersburg for his guidance in handling the case for the United States. These instructions directed the minister to:

"contest the right of Russia to any territorial establishment on this continent, and that we should assume distinctly the principle that the American continents are no longer subject to any new European colonial establishments."

Adams went even further in the private letter transmitting the instructions:

"There can, perhaps, be no better time of saying, frankly and explicitly, to the Russian government, that the future peace of the world, and the interest



of Russia herself, can not be promoted by Russian settlements upon any part of the American continent. With the exception of the British establishments north of the United States, the remainder of both the American continents must henceforth be left to the management of American hands." (1)

In view of the relative military weakness of the United States at that time, this was a most advanced diplomatic position, and one that Adams soon abandoned. Russia had unquestionable territorial rights in America, and any real attempt to exclude Russia from Alaska, or to exclude England, France or even Spain from their important possessions to the south of the United States, would have precipitated many difficulties for this country. But these quotations show the prompt American reaction to a danger that threatened their ambitions in Oregon.

The fact is, the idea of America for Americans was new in 1823. Until shortly before this time, Latin America had been under the firm control of two apparently stable European powers. Many of the colonials were wealthy; these were conservative and had no particular desire for political changes. They had only two particular grievances: they objected to the colonial monopolies which required commerce to pass through the hands of the home merchants and even restricted trade between neighboring colonies; and they resented the denial of political rights to native-born white subjects. (2) But though there had been little sentiment for independence, the absorption of the mother countries in the Napoleonic Wars and the subsequent revolutions in Spain and Portugal led to the development of separatist movements in most of the colonies. Attempts to reestablish European control met resistance, and by 1822 the United States had recognized the independence of Mexico and nearly all of Central and South America. It was

(1) "Digest of International Law," John Basset Moore, vi, p.414.

(2) "One Hundred Years of the Monroe Doctrine," David Y. Thomas, p. 17.



the spread of autonomy over this tremendous area that brought forth the idea that the two continents now belonged to the people who had settled them, and that they should therefore resist further colonization from Europe.

This was the circumstance that inspired the important first part of the Monroe Doctrine. The second circumstance originated in the activities of the Holy Alliance.

Even before Europe was finally rid of Napoleon, England had urged the continuation ~~during~~ of the coalition during the coming peace, in order to restrain further French disturbances. The Treaty of Chaumont of March 10, 1814, "to insure the future tranquillity of Europe," provided for the contracting powers to "take defensive measures against all attempts on the part of France to trouble the results of this pacification." (1) Largely because the stormy Congress of Vienna was interrupted by Napoleon's return from Elba, a "permanent" alliance was effected by the treaty of November 10, 1815, between Austria, Russia and Great Britain. This treaty required periodic meetings "for the examination of such measures as shall be judged most salutary for the peace and prosperity of Europe," which placed this organization well outside the ordinary defensive or military alliance class. Two months previously, moreover, Alexander I had persuaded the sovereigns of Prussia and Austria to accept the mystically phrased "Act of September 14, 1815." This was the famous "Holy Alliance," and the arrangement between its original signers soon led to their domination of the periodic meetings of the allies who ~~had~~ signed the November treaty.

In the "Act of September" the ~~three~~ sovereigns of the three most reactionary nations in Europe bound themselves to observe as a political principle "the duties which the Divine Savior has taught to mankind." The terms of this "Act" seem to have been of small legal significance, though Article I contained the following engagement:

(1) "The Holy Alliance," W. P. Cresson, p. 21

~~"Conformably to the words of the Holy Scripture, which command all men to consider each other as~~



"Conformably to the words of the Holy Scripture, which command all men to consider each other as brethren, the three contracting Monarchs will remain united by the bonds of a true and indissoluble fraternity. Considering each other as fellow countrymen, they will on all occasions and in all places lend each other aid and assistance; towards their subjects and armies, they will extend a fatherly care and protection, leading them (in the same spirit of fraternity with which they are themselves animated) to protect Religion, Peace and Justice."

The last article of the treaty of the Holy Alliance opened the door to adherence by "all the Powers who shall choose solemnly to avow the sacred principles which have dictated the present Act," and Alexander considered it of the greatest importance that Great Britain and the United States join. British Foreign Secretary Castlereagh considered the treaty a "piece of sublime mysticism and nonsense," but <sup>as he</sup> did not ~~them~~ care to break with his allies, <sup>he</sup> persuaded the Prince Regent to "sign it without the intervention of his ministers, as an autographic avowal of sentiment between him and the Sovereigns his allies." (1)

The Czar had done much to uphold American interests in Europe during the late wars, and in 1815 Americans considered his friendship altruistic, and <sup>especially</sup> ~~valuable~~ <sup>because</sup> ~~in view~~ of the precarious diplomatic position of the United States. Consequently his invitation to join in an undertaking having such noble ideals created great popular enthusiasm in this country; to friendly eyes Alexander seemed about to transform the European alliance into a World League to Enforce Peace. Peace societies sprang up all over the United States: by 1818 they were twenty-eight in number, some of them affiliated into a general organization. Several of these societies entered into direct correspondence with Alexander, and expressed warm approval of his pacific intentions. (2) Thus encouraged, the Czar

(1) "British Diplomacy," C.K. Webster, pp. 382-384.

(2) "The European Background of the Monroe Doctrine," G. C. Tansill, pp. 497-500, in "Modern Hispanic America," edited by A. C. Wilgus.



sent a special envoy to Washington to do all he could to bring the United States into the Alliance; practically all the independent European States had adhered, and political pressure was very strong upon Monroe and his cabinet to follow their example. But Adams hesitated to associate this country with a group of powers who had so consistently opposed all liberal political movements on the continent.

Opponents of adherence pointed out that the "Act" itself meant nothing, and that the Allies had as yet made no pronouncement as to the actual policy which they proposed to adopt. Indications were not long in coming that previous policies had not entirely changed: in ~~1815~~ 1816, to British alarm, Russia again started to interfere in Turkey, and in 1817 a report circulated that Spain had secretly ceded to Russia Port Mahon and other naval bases in the Mediterranean. The close personal friendship between Alexander and Ferdinand VII of Spain gave strength to the rumors of projected Russian assistance in the reconquest of the former Spanish colonies. Such a contingency was especially distasteful to England, who had gained important trade advantages from the disruption of the Spanish trade monopoly. Therefore from this time on Great Britain gave less and less support to the projects of the Holy Alliance.

Early in 1818 Ferdinand formally requested the Council of the Ministers of the Allied Powers in Paris, (who then constituted a sort of permanent secretariat for the Alliance), to assist Spain in forcing ~~her~~<sup>the</sup> lost colonies back under ~~her~~ Spanish control. Owing to British opposition the Council would take no action, but the subject came up again at the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle, which assembled on September 30th of the same year. At this Congress "American affairs - - (became) - - - the chief concern of this formal gathering of European Powers." (1) In spite of Russian and French support

(1) "The Holy Alliance," W. P. Cresson, p. 75.



of the proposed intervention, the Congress finally agreed only to the use of its good offices in mediating between Spain and her colonies.

However, it transpire<sup>d</sup>/during the Congress that Russia was pressing for an absolute mutual guarantee of existing European boundaries, and had brought in a scheme for the organization of an Allied General Staff and an International Police Force. (1) The rumor spread that she had signified her readiness to supply Spain with ships and troops for use in South America. General suspicion of the Alliance spread in the United States, though many people credited Metternich and not Alexander with responsibility for these latest developments. Support of American adherence to the Alliance evaporated, and on June 17, 1819, Secretary Adams informed the Russian minister that this country found itself unable to join for the same reasons that had actuated British refusal, viz., that the "Act" was personal as between the sovereigns concerned, and therefore entirely unacceptable to a constitutional government.

During 1819 the king of Spain assembled all his military resources at Cadiz to await transport to America for the subjugation of his rebellious dependencies. These troops revolted and forced Ferdinand to accept the liberal constitution of 1812 which he had discarded when he had formed the absolute monarchy. In the same year there were similar successful revolutions in Sicily and Portugal. Another Congress was called to meet at Troppau on October 20, 1820, to consider this new state of affairs. While the Congress was in session a revolution broke out in Piedmont.

On November 13th the plenipotentiaries of the three original members of the Holy Alliance announced a decision as to joint action which was the complete negation of liberal principles of government. These powers resolved that any state in the Alliance "which may change its form of interior government through revolutionary means, and which might thus become (1) "The European Background of the M. D.," Tansill, p.503.



a menace to other states, will automatically cease to ~~have~~ form a part of the Alliance," and that the "Allied Powers - - - faithful to the principles which they have proclaimed concerning the authority of legitimate governments, - - - refuse to recognize any changes brought about by other than legal means. In the case of states where such changes have already taken place and such action has <sup>(h)ereby</sup> given cause for apprehension to neighboring states, - - - they will employ every means to bring the offenders once more within the sphere of the Alliance." Although England and France publicly disassociated themselves with this declaration, Austrian troops, under the authority of the Alliance, quickly restored absolutism in Sicily and Piedmont. The Troppau action of the Holy Alliance was supplemented in the famous Laibach Circular Despatch of May 12, 1821, in the following words: "Useful or necessary changes in the governments of states must emanate only from the free will and the thoughtful and enlightened initiative of those whom God has made responsible for power."

Early in 1823 France intervened in Spain with the secret mandate of the Congress of Verona, (October, 1822). French soldiers quickly restored Ferdinand, who had been freed by the Constitutionals under an oath to refrain from reprisals. The "thoughtful and enlightened initiative" of Ferdinand immediately prompted him to reestablish an absolute rule of terror and tyranny, with complete disregard of his oath.

The Congress of Verona not only refused to aid the Greek revolution against Turkey, (though it had been largely fomented by government-patronized political societies in St. Petersburg), but the Czar strongly urged its suppression by the Allies in order to show their support of the doctrine of legitimacy. This Congress also evolved a secret treaty to "put an end to the systems of representative government" in Europe, and as a first step in this program to destroy "the liberty of the press." In April, 1823, the Allies notified Great Britain that a Congress would shortly convene to make plans for the suppression



of the revolutionary governments in Spanish America. (1)

These events created a storm of indignation in the United States, and also fears that, once the Spanish republics had been returned to European rule, the next step would be determined attacks upon this country for the purpose of abolishing democratic government altogether. England could not be depended upon for help; the British government was reactionary, and, while ~~xxx~~ it did not favor the return of the colonies to Spain unless the trade monopolies were abolished, it did favor the division of South America into a small number of countries under monarchical government. (2)

Even the members of the national administration of the United States believed that, were European intervention in Latin America successful, its completion would find the Spanish colonies divided between Spain, France and Russia, except that England would be in Cuba. Tansill remarks: (3)

"- - - the Holy Alliance was execrated throughout the United States as an instrument of oppression, and at numerous banquets toasts of the following tenor were frequent: 'The Holy Alliance and the Devil; May the friends of liberty check their career, and compel them to dissolve partnership.' "

The citizens of the United States perceived a solidarity of interest among all the American states, for the preservation of their independence. As early as 1820 Jefferson had given expression to sentiments basically similar to those Adams displayed in his instructions for the Russian negotiations concerning Alaska. He wrote of the: (4)

"- - - advantages of a cordial fraternization among all the American nations, and the importance of their coalescing in an American system of policy, totally independent of, and unconnected with that of Europe. The day is not distant when we may formally require a meridian of partition through the ocean which separates the two hemispheres, on the hither side of which no European gun shall ever be heard, nor an American on the other; and when, during the rage of the eternal wars of Europe, the lion and the lamb, within our regions, shall be drawn together in peace. - - - The principles of society there and here, then, are radically different, and I hope no American patriot will ever lose sight of the essential policy of interdicting in the seas and territories of both Americas the ferocious and sanguinary contests of Europe. I wish to see this coalition begin."

(1) "Digest of International Law," John Basset Moore, vi, p. 375.

(2) "The European Background of the M. D.," Tansill, p. 513.  
(Other refs. on next page).



Here was an idea entirely new to Americans. Washington had warned our citizens not to "implicate ourselves by artificial ties in the ordinary vicissitudes of (European) - - politics," because of the difference in "primary interests." John Adams had been emphatic that "we ought not to involve ourselves in the political system of Europe."<sup>3)</sup> Jefferson had believed that we should "avoid - - - wasting the energies of our people in war and destruction," and therefore should refrain from "implicating ourselves with the powers of Europe, even in support of principles which we mean to pursue," and to his last day had a "perfect horror at everything like connecting ourselves with the politics of Europe."

The previous idea thus had been to forbid American participation in European politics; the new idea that was forming was to forbid the extension of European politics to this side of the Atlantic Ocean.

On his own responsibility, United States Minister Rush in August, 1823, approached Canning, now British Foreign Secretary, to inquire concerning the attitude of the British government toward intervention in America. In view of Canning's note to Spain of the previous March 31st that "time and the course of events had substantially decided the question of the separation of the (Spanish) colonies from the mother country,"<sup>4)</sup> Rush wished to know whether or not England would remain passive if France should try to bring any American state "under her domination either by conquest or by cession from Spain." In reply Canning requested Rush's opinion as to whether the United States would go "hand in hand with England in such a policy."<sup>5)</sup> While Canning is usually credited with initiating conversations on this subject, Rush's letter to Adams of August 19, 1823, certainly indicates that it was he

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References from page 67:

(3) "The European Background of the M.D.," C.C. Tansill, p. 515.

(4) "Digest of International Law," John Basset Moore, vi, p. 371.



who first brought <sup>it</sup> up, ~~this subject~~. This point has an important bearing upon the somewhat controversial subject as to whether or not the Monroe Doctrine was really American, or had originally sprung from British policy. As having some bearing, Rush's letter reports that Canning did not contemplate an immediate public joint declaration by the two governments, as he stated specifically that he did not propose ~~a~~ concerted action with the United States, but believed that it would have an influential effect upon Europe if it transpired that the two governments held the same sentiments on this subject. Upon inquiry, Canning admitted that as yet Great Britain had taken no steps toward recognition of the independence of any of the Latin-American states, but indicated the possible initiation of some action of that nature at an early date.(1)

On August 20th Canning wrote a letter to Rush elaborating the position he had taken in the oral discussion, and defined England's attitude as follows: (2)

- "1. We conceive the recovery of the colonies by Spain to be hopeless.
2. We conceive the question of the recognition of them, as independent states, to be one of time and circumstance.
3. We are, however, by no means disposed to throw any impediment in the way of an arrangement between them and the mother country, by amicable negotiation.
4. We aim not at the possession of any portion of them ourselves.
5. We could not see any portion of them transferred to any other power with indifference."

On August 23d Rush replied that, while he had no powers from his government to enter into any declaration such as that discussed, he believed the position of the United States to be substantially the same as that of England, except for one important difference. With regard to the ex-Spanish colonies, the United States desired to see their "independence maintained with stability," and, since ~~the~~ his country had already recognized their independence, it also desired to "see them received into the family of nations by the powers of Europe."

(1) "Digest," Moore, p. 386, vol vi.

(2) *ibid.*, p. 389.



He again urged Canning to recognize the new American states.

At this stage of the proceedings Canning left London without further action. After he had returned, Rush on October 22d reported to Adams that the Foreign Secretary had dropped the entire matter "in a most extraordinary manner." (1) We now know that in the meantime he had received assurances from the French Foreign Minister that, since France ~~was~~ considered it "utterly hopeless to reduce Spanish America to the state of its former relation to Spain," she now "abjured - - - any design of acting against the Colonies by force of arms." As she accompanied this declaration with a disclaimer of any intention to acquire former Spanish territory or exclusive advantages therein, the whole affair lost its urgency in Canning's eyes, and he was now content to await "time and circumstance." (2)

### 3. ENUNCIATION OF THE MONROE DOCTRINE.

Rush's letter of August 19th reached Adams on October 9th. It immediately received very careful attention from the president, and he requested a number of prominent men both in and out of the government to advise him as to what action they would recommend. The cabinet held frequent meetings from the 7th to the end of November, and after much discussion finally determined upon the course that was to change the history of the Western Hemisphere.

President Monroe decided to take action along the following lines:

- 1st, the United States would make a public unilateral announcement of a new executive policy in the annual presidential message to Congress.
- 2d, This new policy would be constituted about three main principles, the first being the entirely new conception

(1) "Digest," Moore, vi, p. 410.

(2) "The Holy Alliance," Gresson, p. 118.



that the American continents were no longer open to European colonization.

3d, The second principle, also new, was that European powers were forbidden to extend their "system" to this hemisphere; that is, that no such power should interpose for the purpose of oppressing or controlling the destiny of any American state which had declared and maintained its independence, and whose independence the United States had recognized.

4th, The third principle was the policy of non-intervention in the internal affairs of European states. The message would state that this policy had been adopted long before, at the beginning of the late European wars. The enunciation of this principle would not merely emphasize the willingness of the United States to be bound by the reciprocal of the other two principles, but would also serve notice of American disapproval of the interventionist policy of the Holy Alliance in Europe itself.

Those parts of the message which dealt with the new policy are quoted below:

"At the proposal of the Russian Imperial Government, made through the minister of the Emperor residing here, a full power and instructions have been transmitted to the minister of the United States at St. Petersburg, to arrange, by amicable negotiation, the respective rights and interests of the two nations on the northwest coast of this continent. A similar proposal has been made by his Imperial Majesty to the Government of Great Britain, which has likewise been acceded to. The Government of the United States has been desirous, by this friendly proceeding, of manifesting the great value which they have invariably attached to the friendship of the Emperor, and their solicitude to cultivate the best understanding with his Government. In the discussions to which this interest has given rise, and in the arrangements by which they may terminate, the occasion has been judged proper for asserting as a principle in which the rights and interests of the United States are involved, that the American continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European powers.

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"It was stated at the commencement of the last session that a great effort was then making in Spain and Portugal to improve the condition of the people of those countries, and that it appeared to be conducted with extraordinary moderation. It need scarcely to be remarked that the result



has been, so far, very different from what was then anticipated. Of events in that quarter of the globe with which we have so much intercourse, and from which we derive our origin, we have always been anxious and interested spectators. The citizens of the United States cherish sentiments the most friendly in favor of the liberty and happiness of their fellow-men on that side of the Atlantic. In the wars of the European powers in matters relating to themselves we have never taken any part, nor does it comport with our policy so to do. It is only when our rights are invaded or seriously menaced that we resent injuries or make preparation for our defense. With the movements in this hemisphere we are, of necessity, more immediately connected, and by causes which must be obvious to all enlightened and impartial observers. The political system of the allied powers is essentially different in this respect from that of America. This difference proceeds from that which exists in their respective Governments. And to the defense of our own, which has been achieved by the loss of so much blood and treasure, and matured by the wisdom of their most enlightened citizens, and under which we have enjoyed unexampled felicity, this whole nation is devoted. We owe it, therefore, to candor, and to the amicable relations existing between the United States and those powers, to declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety. With the existing colonies or dependencies of any European power we have not interfered and shall not interfere. But with the governments who have declared their independence and maintained it, and whose independence we have, on great consideration and on just principles, acknowledged, we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them, or controlling in any manner their destiny, by any European power, in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States. In the war between these new governments and Spain we declared our neutrality at the time of their recognition, and to this we have adhered and shall continue to adhere, provided no change shall occur which, in the judgment of the competent authorities of this Government, shall make a corresponding change on the part of the United States indispensable to their security.

"The late events in Spain and Portugal show that Europe is still unsettled. Of this important fact no stronger proof can be adduced than that the allied powers should have thought it proper, on any principle satisfactory to themselves, to have interposed, by force in the internal concerns of Spain. To what extent such interposition may be carried, on the same principle, is a question in which all independent powers whose governments differ from theirs are interested, even those most remote, and surely none more so than the United States. Our policy in regard to Europe, which was adopted at an early stage of the wars which have so long agitated that quarter of the globe, nevertheless remains the same, which is, not to interfere in the internal concerns of any of its powers; to consider the government de facto as the legitimate government for us; to cultivate friendly relations with it, and to preserve those relations by a frank, firm, and manly policy, meeting, in all instances, the just claims of every power, submitting to injuries from none. But in regard to these continents, circumstances are eminently and conspicuously different. It is impossible that the allied powers should extend their political system to any portion of either continent without endangering our peace and happiness; nor can anyone believe that our southern brethren, if left to themselves, would adopt it of their own accord. It is equally impossible, therefore, that we should behold such interposition, in any form, with indifference. If we look to the compara-



tive strength and resources of Spain and those new governments, and their distance from each other, it must be obvious that she can never subdue them. It is still the true policy of the United States to leave the parties to themselves, in the hope that other powers will pursue the same course."

In addition to the three main principles, in the last sentence the message expressed a fourth: "It is still the true policy of the United States to leave the parties (Spain and the new republics) to themselves." The explicit part of this sentence relating to non-interference with Spain in her attempts to reclaim her lost dominions was later abandoned, but the implicit part, binding the United States not ~~ever~~ to interfere in the internal affairs of the southern republics themselves, became an additional, and a very important part, of the Non-Intervention Policy. A very significant part of the message was President Monroe's plain announcement, in diplomatic phraseology, that this country would not hesitate to employ force for repelling intervention in the Americas by any power other than Spain.

#### 4. POLITICAL EFFECT OF MONROE'S MESSAGE.

The importance of Monroe's announcement was at once apprehended in Europe. Spain was indignant, refused to concede the validity of the Doctrine, and in 1824 even protested against Canning's belated recognition of several of the new states, but was unable to accomplish anything toward the recovery of her lost territory. Alexander continued to urge intervention, but France, though indignantly declaring that the policy "ought to be resisted by all the powers possessing either territory or commercial interests in that hemisphere," almost immediately withdrew her troops from Spain and abandoned all plans for intervention. Austria confirmed her previous objections to the United States republican system as a dangerous menace to the monarchical principle, but recognized that American opposition was sufficient to "banish all thought" of the return of her colonies to Spain. Canning was surprised



and disconcerted by the pronouncement, and refused to accept the principle of non-colonization, but British liberals enthusiastically favored the policy in its entirety.

In Spanish-America Monroe's message at first received little attention. The Emperor of Brazil favored the idea, and for several years tried to effectuate an alliance with the United States for the defense of the Western Hemisphere, but this country avoided the tie on the grounds that such an alliance was unnecessary because Brazil was in little danger of attack. Bolivar regarded the message as unimportant, but some of his associates thought so highly of it that they persuaded this great leader to include the United States in his abortive plan for an American defensive league. For the most part, Spanish-America has generally given Canning the principal credit for the prevention of European interference at that period.

Present day American writers have a tendency to regard the Monroe Doctrine as a purely selfish policy on the part of the United States, and as merely a natural reaction from the fear that the ultimate result of European intervention would be disastrous for this country. Thomas says: (1)

"Whatever the Monroe Doctrine may be today, certainly there was little altruism in it in 1823. Our statesmen of that time undoubtedly had a friendly interest in the welfare of our sister republics, as they were called, though they were republics only in name, but nowhere do we see this standing out as a prominent motive of action."

While fully agreeing that the Doctrine had strong strategic aspects, no one who is fully cognizant of the tremendous influence that altruistic and humanitarian thought has had upon American political action can fail to be convinced that these factors were of great importance in the development of this new and distinctively American policy. One of the <sup>characteristic</sup> ~~distinctive~~ features of the political life of this country has been the widespread ideal of personal and political freedom. The leaders of the nation in 1823 were thoroughly experienced in

(1) "One Hundred Years of the M. D.", D. Y. Thomas, p. 38.



political affairs and must be given full credit for their far-sighted ability to combine conflicting opinions into an effective instrument for the elimination of the disturbing European political element.

In 1823 opinion in the United States reacted powerfully to the support of this new principle of international relations. Americans believed that they, instead of Canning, had "called the New World into existence to redress the balance of the Old." They felt the pledge to be "sacred and permanent," and, with Daniel Webster, saw that: (1)

"One general glow of exultation, one universal feeling of the gratified love of liberty, one conscious and proud perception of the consideration which the country possessed, and of the respect and honor which belonged to it, pervaded all bosoms."

Although Spanish-America can not be said to have given general support to the Doctrine, some of their leaders have recognized its disinterestedness and its worth to their independence. Calderon has declared that (2) "the primitive simplicity of the Monroe Doctrine - - - upheld the republican integrity of the ancient Spanish colonies." In 1906 the Argentine Deputy Mitre said: (3)

"The Monroe Doctrine exists today with all the force of a law of nations. - - - (It) has been the veto on war between Europe and America; in its shadow these youthful nations have grown which today are sufficiently strong to proclaim the same doctrine as the emblem on their shield. And the most glorious characteristic of this device is that it is a dictate of civilization - - -."

Regardless of what European or American states might think about the legality or the justice of the Monroe Doctrine, foreign powers at once gave up all plans for intervention in this hemisphere, and since that time, except for cases of trifling importance, no American territory has passed under control of any European power. The Doctrine has been a complete success in attaining the purposes which President Mon-

- (1) "One Hundred Years of the M. D.," D. Y. Thomas, p. 47.  
(2) "Latin America, its Rise and Progress," F.G. Calderon, p. 302.  
(3) "One Hundred Years of the M. D.," D. Y. Thomas, p. 372.



roe had in mind in 1823.

5. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE DOCTRINE.

No allusions will be made in what follows to that part of the Doctrine concerning interventions in either European or American affairs, since that feature has been covered in Chapter II.

In 1824 Russia and the United States agreed upon the parallel of 54° 40' North as the southern boundary of Alaska, and the Russian influence in America finally disappeared when this country purchased that territory in 1867. In 1833 Great Britain annexed the Falkland Islands, whose ownership until then had been in dispute with the Argentine. The United States made no protest, probably because England's title seemed to be about as clear as that of Argentine; also, the latter state had created difficulties for American fur sealers who long had operated from a base in the islands.

At an early date the United States extended the Doctrine to the Caribbean. This region had been of interest to this country since the formation of the Republic, and the prevention of the growth of military power there had been a cardinal point of our foreign policy for many years. The new Doctrine furnished a convenient excuse for strengthening this particular point. This aspect of our foreign relations has been discussed in Chapter II, but one or two more incidents may be mentioned to show the close relation between the Monroe and the Caribbean Policies.

In 1870 the United States objected to Sweden's proposed sale of St. Bartholomew to Italy, but eight years later did not comment upon its sale to France. This action was logical enough: transfer to Italy would have brought a new power into the Caribbean, while its transfer to France was unimportant, since St. Bartholomew is small and lies close to



other small French islands. In 1884, when Haiti, after the United States had refused its offer of either the Mole St. Nicholas or Tortuga Island in return for certain guarantees and payments, made the same offer to France, this country informed the French Foreign Office that such a transfer would not be in accord with "our public policy known as the Monroe Doctrine." The same position was taken in 1888 when the same offer again seemed to have been made. (1) In 1844 the United States protested against the proposed cession of Yucatan territory to a foreign power, and also against similar proposals by Costa Rica in 1850 and Honduras in 1880. In 1914 American protests prevented Germany from acquiring rights over the Mole St. Nicholas. (2) Under cover of the Monroe Doctrine President Cleveland intervened in the boundary dispute between Great Britain and Venezuela; the former country denied the legality of this intervention, but finally accepted it, as it was advantageous to do so.

The Doctrine's guarantee against interference with established European control over American possessions was broken only to assist in the final liberation of Cuba. This intervention was not based upon any imputed violation of the Monroe Doctrine, but upon humanitarian grounds. In negotiations with England over questions involving Canada, reference has never been made to the Doctrine, even in the case of the disputed Oregon Territory.

Several attempted extensions of the European "system" to America have been successfully resisted. The permanent acquisition by Great Britain of the Nicaraguan Coast and the Bay Islands off Honduras were prevented by recourse to the Doctrine, and extension of British sovereignty over British Honduras was accepted only in order to clear the path for the construction of an inter-oceanic canal. In 1860 Spain at-

(1) "One Hundred Years of the M. D.," D. Y. Thomas, p. 78.

(2) *ibid.*, p. 555.



tempted to conquer Santo Domingo, and ignored protests by the United States until the end of the Civil War; in 1865 she abandoned this adventure, no doubt partly because of the very effective Dominican resistance. (1) In 1864 Spain and Peru went to war, but in response to an American diplomatic inquiry the former country replied that she did not contemplate annexation. (2)

The most serious attempt to nullify the Doctrine occurred in Mexico during the American Civil War. Mexico was then in a turmoil of revolutions; foreign citizens had been killed and their property confiscated, and payment of interest on government bonds had been suspended. In 1858 Spain informed the United States that she expected to interfere with arms, and in 1860 England and France, after similar notifications, negotiated a tripartite agreement with Spain to act jointly and invited this country to join them in forcing the warring Mexican factions to call a national assembly to form a government for the pacification of the country. The United States refused this invitation, Secretary of State Cass expressing the following views of the government:

"While we do not deny the right of any other power to carry on hostile operations against Mexico, for the redress of its grievances, we firmly object to its holding possession of any part of that country, or endeavoring by force to control its political destiny."

In 1860 the United States sent a special envoy to Mexico to persuade the rival governments to cease attacks on foreigners and to pay their just monetary claims. This envoy signed a treaty agreeing to lend Mexico \$9,000,000 to satisfy these claims, but the Senate refused ratification. No settlement could be made, and in 1862 allied troops landed in Vera Cruz. Great Britain began to suspect French intentions, so when Mexico raised enough money to satisfy British and Spanish claims, ~~these~~ England and Spain withdrew their troops. But

(1) "One Hundred Years of the M. D.," D. Y. Thomas, p. 61.

(2) *ibid.*, p. 62.



the French increased their demands, captured Mexico City in June, 1863, and set up a government approved by a hand-picked assembly of Mexican citizens. This "assembly" chose the monarchical form of government and elected as emperor Maximilian, the brother of the Emperor of Austria.

In 1864 Maximilian signed a treaty with Napoleon III agreeing to pay all French claims, including the costs of the French military expedition; in return, Napoleon guaranteed the maintenance of the Mexican Imperial Throne. This guarantee was in complete disregard of Napoleon's previous disclaimer to the United States of any purpose to establish influences prejudicial to Mexican exercise of freedom in government. When the Civil War ended Secretary Seward informed the French Emperor that the presence of a foreign army in Mexico was a "matter of serious concern to the people of the United States," as it was "in direct antagonism to the policy of this government and the principles upon which it is founded." The French Emperor now found himself in a difficult position: the United States had concentrated troops on the border and plainly meant business, while in Europe Prussia and Austria had finally come to the point of war. He found it hard to withdraw from Mexico under a threat because of the resulting stain on French honor. For some time he delayed the evacuation of his troops, alleging that he was unable to do so in the face of ~~the~~ imminent American intervention. Secretary Seward assured the French minister that fear of such intervention could have no real foundation, since non-intervention was the "chief element of the foreign policy of the United States." (1)

After some further diplomatic maneuvers, French troops were withdrawn, the Mexican Emperor was shot, and the Monroe Doctrine remained secure.

(1) "One Hundred Years of the M. D.," E. Y. Thomas, p. 200.



Questions as to the repayment of debts contracted abroad by Latin American governments or citizens have been among the most troublesome which this country has faced. Difficulties have often been increased because investments had been fraudulent or at least highly speculative, and because European powers, in such cases, have not hesitated to employ force for the satisfaction of debts, whether national or private.

A natural result has been that the collection of international debts has gradually become involved in the question of the enforcement of the Monroe Doctrine. For fifty years after the Doctrine was enunciated, the United States was little inclined to take an interest in financial interventions by European states, provided permanent occupation of territory was not indicated. As a matter of fact, this country followed the European method of debt collection, except that it employed force less frequently. We put no obstacles in the way of interventions, as is shown by the announcement of Secretary Seward that our neighbors were entitled to engage in hostilities "independent of all control or counsel of the United States," and that this country had "no ambition to become a regulator," although he did attempt to obtain information upon such matters as the pledging of revenues as security for loans. (1) But in 1881, when France was about to blockade Venezuela, the latter requested the United States to act in the capacity of a financial agent: she promised to deliver to the United States a certain sum monthly, which this country would then distribute equitably among all foreign creditors. Secretary Evarts approved this proposition and accepted it, but France refused. Secretary Blaine later went so far as to propose sending an agent to Caracas with authority to make the collections, and even to seize and administer two custom houses in case Venezuela defaulted on her payments. France again refused to agree to this

(1) "One Hundred Years of the M.D." D. Y. Thomas, p. 206  
~~plan, although Venezuela refused it. The matter was finally settled by direct negotiations between France and the United States.~~



plan, although Venezuela favored it. This affair was finally settled by negotiation between France and the United States, and the use of force was prevented.

There have been several times in history when the United States joined one or more European states in concerted intervention in Latin America, but action of this nature has been the exception. This country for a long time avoided any involvement, and even as late as 1897 when, after a severe German intervention in Haiti, the latter country requested that the United States establish a formal protectorate to prevent future action of a similar nature, President McKinley refused, the Secretary of State averring that "this country is not under any obligation to become involved in the constantly recurring quarrels of the republics of this hemisphere with other states."

But, as has been mentioned in Chapter II, in recent years the United States has more and more opposed any kind of European interference in the Americas; as a result, it has therefore felt obligated to attempt itself the solution of problems which might lead to intervention. The logical involvement of the Monroe Doctrine with debt collecting was expressed by President Theodore Roosevelt in 1904 at the time the Dominican customs receivership was established: (1)

"It has for some time been obvious that those who profit by the Monroe Doctrine must accept certain responsibilities along with the rights which it confers; - - - - The justification for the United States taking this burden and incurring this responsibility is to be found in the fact that it is incompatible with international equity for the United States to refuse to allow other powers to take the only means at their disposal of satisfying the claims of their creditors and yet to refuse, itself, to take any such steps."

No other president has stated the matter quite so plainly; however, it may be said that the United States has for some years definitely opposed armed intervention in the Americas

(1)"One Hundred Years of the M. D.," D. Y. Thomas, p. 223.



by non-American powers, and has itself been inclined to take diplomatic or other action when direct negotiations have proved unsuccessful.

A distrust of this policy and a fear that the Monroe Doctrine is being used as a cloak for "Yankee Imperialism," is largely responsible for Latin American demands that the Doctrine be abandoned as detrimental to their interests. Many have believed that the United States has assumed an intentionally aggressive position by asserting that the Doctrine is entirely unilateral, and that the United States is its sole interpreter and guarantor. However, it may be noted that since this country has taken an interest in the matter of European financial interventions, there have been few cases where arms have been employed in the collection of foreign debts in this hemisphere.

Even in matters subject to arbitration, the United States has sometimes indicated a wish, where only American states have been involved, that the arbitrators be chosen from this side of the Atlantic. In 1881 Colombia and Costa Rica agreed upon the King of Spain as the arbitrator in a boundary dispute; while this country did not protest, Secretary of State Frelinghuysen said: (1)

"This government cannot but feel that the decision of American questions pertains to America itself, and it would hesitate, even when consulted (?) by the most friendly motives (such as naturally join it to that of Spain) to set on record an approval of a resort to European arbitration."

The Senate ratified the Hague Convention respecting arbitration with a reservation that such action was not to be "construed to imply a relinquishment, by the United States of America, of its traditional attitude toward purely American questions." However, objections have never been raised by our State Department to the choice of European arbitrators in Hague arbitrations, nor even to the intervention of the

(1) "One Hundred Years of the M. D.," D. Y. Thomas, p. 185.



League of Nations in the Tacna-Arica or the Chaco disputes.

Various American statesmen have in the past one hundred years taken a hand at defining the Monroe Doctrine. The occasions of the definitions usually ~~have~~ have been either a European threat against it, or an explanation for the purpose of dissipating Latin American fear and distrust. Several of the most recent interpretations may be quoted for the purpose of showing the present line of United States policy:

Secretary of State Root at the Third Pan-American Conference at Rio de Janeiro, July, 1906.

"We wish for no victories but those of peace; for no territory except our own; for no sovereignty except the sovereignty over ourselves. We deem the independence and equal rights of the smallest and weakest member of the family of nations entitled to as much respect as those of the greatest empire, and we deem the observance of that respect the chief guarantee of the weak against the oppression of the strong. We neither claim or desire any rights, or privileges, or powers that we do not freely concede to every American republic."

President Wilson before the Second Pan-American Scientific Conference at Washington, January 6, 1916.

"The Monroe Doctrine was proclaimed by the United States on her own authority. It has always been maintained, and always will be maintained, upon her own responsibility."

Secretary of State Hughes before the American Bar Association at Minneapolis, 1922.

"The Monroe Doctrine is not a policy of aggression; it is a policy of self-defense. - - - It is distinctively the policy of the United States, and the United States reserves the right to define, interpret, and apply it. - - - It does not infringe upon the independence and sovereignty of other American states. - - - So far as the Caribbean is concerned, if we had no Monroe Doctrine, it would be necessary to create one. - - - Intervention (in Haiti and Santo Domingo was) necessary - - - not - - - to establish a permanent control, but to restore order and the United States will welcome the day when she can withdraw her military forces. - - - The Monroe Doctrine does not stand in the way of Pan-American cooperation - - - Our attitude is one of independence, not of isolation."

President Franklin D. Roosevelt before the Woodrow Wilson Foundation, December 28, 1933.

"The definite policy of the United States from now on is one opposed to armed intervention. - - - The maintenance of Constitutional government in other nations is not a sacred obligation devolving upon the United States alone. The maintenance of law and the orderly processes of government in this hemisphere is the concern of each individual nation within its own borders first of all. It is only if and when the failure of orderly processes affects the



other nations of the continent that it becomes their concern; and the point to stress is that in such an event it becomes the joint concern of a whole continent in which we are all neighbors."

6. PAN-AMERICANISM AND PAN-HISPANISM.

Shortly after Latin America had become independent of Spain, Bolivar promoted a "society of brother nations," which should include in an alliance all the former Spanish colonies. After Monroe announced his doctrine, Bolivar's associates decided to include the United States, and immediately thereafter Colombia issued a call to all sovereign American states, including Brazil, to meet in congress in Panama in 1825 for the purpose of discussing the possibility of a closer political relationship, and "means of giving effect to the declarations of the president of the United States." Only four Spanish-American states sent delegates, and the representatives of the United States arrived too late. After a short period the congress adjourned without having accomplished any permanent results. Mexico, who had sent delegates, tried without success in 1831, 1838, 1839 and 1840 to reassemble the congress, but, although various American nations held important regional conferences from time to time, they held no general meeting until 1889.

James G. Blaine revived the idea of Pan-Americanism in 1881; practically all American states enthusiastically endorsed his plan, but the war between Chili and Peru prevented a meeting until October 2, 1889, when the first Pan-American Conference assembled in Washington. Considerable distrust of this country's motives appeared during the conference, and though it sat for six months, it accomplished little except a partial dissipation of mutual suspicion and the formation of the permanent International Bureau of the American Republics.

Successive Pan-American Conferences have been held in 1901, 1906, 1910, 1923, 1928, and 1933. The Fourth Conference changed the name of the organization to the "Pan-American Union," and established its headquarters at Washington.



Many subjects have been discussed in these conferences, and there can be little doubt that they have served to improve relations and to increase mutual interest among the various states. With the passage of time, and a clearer realization of the political ideas of the Latin American people, the United States has consistently softened its policy toward them. Toleration and understanding have improved, respect has increased, and the general atmosphere has cleared.

Since 1910 the Pan American Union has been responsible for the formation of numerous international scientific and cultural societies and conferences, such as the Pan-American Scientific Conferences, the Pan-American Financial Congresses, the Pan-American Federation of Labor, the Pan-American High Commission, (for improving the uniformity of laws), the Conferences of Women, the Conferences of Students, the Intellectual Union, the Library Union, the University Union, ~~and~~ the American Institute of International Law, and others. While specific legislation by these various bodies has been ~~rather~~ rather small, it is increasing, and opposition to Pan-American rapprochement is not so great as it was a few years ago. Few will deny that the results of the Pan-American movement have ~~not~~ been mutually beneficial.

The Pan-Hispanic movement is largely cultural, and without many of the practical aspects of Pan-Americanism. This movement was started in Spain, and since 1900 several Hispanic congresses have been held in that country. The general tone of Pan-Hispanism is hostile to the United States and to Pan-Americanism, but, so far, this country has done nothing to combat its influence. On the contrary, it has shown a disposition to encourage such features as have appeared to be purely cultural.

#### 7. THE MONROE DOCTRINE TODAY.

Continental Europeans never have accepted the Monroe Doctrine, and today dislike it more than ever, largely because of its assumed denial of universal power to the League



of Nations. Many Latin Americans resent its existence, in spite of some recent realization that their present situation may be somewhat better than if the policy had never been enunciated. Others believe that many of the Latin American nations are now strong enough to stand alone without the aid of the Doctrine, and consequently these would like to see the United States withdraw it, at least so far as they are concerned, in order to remove the sting of an implied paternalism.

It is not unusual for writers in this country to de-  
cry the Monroe Doctrine as a cloak <sup>for</sup> ~~to~~ industrial imperialism; even some very able men have advocated its denunciation on the ground that it ~~is~~ is now out of date and hampers the full development of cordial international cooperation, not only between the nations of this hemisphere, but also between the Americas and Europe.

This view, however, seems untenable. Denunciation of the Monroe Doctrine by the United States would ~~xxxx~~ be a useless gesture, since it is obvious enough that if any non-American power attempted to act contrary to its provisions, public opinion in this country would at once dictate its re-establishment. In all probability, any American state attacked by a European power would request assistance from ~~thkax~~ the United States. Even if ~~it~~ <sup>the Doctrine</sup> were ostensibly modified to a multi-lateral status, at some time in the future the government at Washington might be called upon to determine whether or not some particular foreign aggression could be considered as "dangerous to our peace and safety."

The Monroe Doctrine, although by the Covenant of the League of Nations only a "regional understanding," has from its inception been more influential and consistent than any other national policy the world has ever seen. "Interpretations" and developments have changed it but little, and it remains today what it was in the beginning: a warning, in the words of Theodore Roosevelt, that "none of the great military powers from across the seas shall encroach upon the territory of the Amer-



ican republics or acquire control thereover."

There is little question that the United States has sometimes employed the Monroe Doctrine for its own exclusive benefit, and under circumstances not contemplated by its ~~own~~ author. However, attempts under the authority of the Doctrine to establish the hegemony of the United States over this hemisphere have really no essential relation to the real meaning of the Doctrine, but have merely been the natural result of the expanding strength and energy of the country. "Imperialism" and commercial extension are not inherent in the policy; though lacking a similar excuse, the world-wide expansion of European activities, ~~except in America~~, has been far more ruthless. Financial interventions were far more obnoxious before the United States took it upon itself to act for all other countries as the intervening agent, for the avowed purpose of preventing calculated aggression. In pursuit of the general interest this country has done much, on the one hand, to encourage financial responsibility in American states, and, on the other, to discourage a resort to force by non-American states in the prosecution of questionable claims.

In spite of the tendency on the part of Latin American nationalists and American internationalists to see only flaws in the Monroe Doctrine, it has been a stabilizing factor of tremendous worth, and today must still be considered an essential element of the political atmosphere of the Western ~~XXXXXX~~ Hemisphere.



CHAPTER IV.

DIPLOMACY AND TRADE.

I. TRADE RESTRICTIONS IN 1783.

Foreign trade and travel are now carried on so easily that we can scarcely appreciate how difficult they were immediately after the American Revolution. American traders had lost their British rights and as yet had gained few of their own. England, Spain and Portugal excluded foreign trade from their colonial systems, and Americans, who formerly had enjoyed some of the privileges of the British monopoly, now found themselves shut out from all. Only gradually, as the United States negotiated commercial treaties, were foreign ports opened to its vessels even when loaded only with home produce, and then only upon the payment of the discriminatory dues assessed against aliens.

The modern concept of the "Freedom of the Seas" did not exist in 1783; until 1806 England maintained the right of "The Vail," and required foreign ships sailing the "British Seas" to strike their topsails when meeting British war craft; and French kings still considered themselves the supreme lords over "all the seas that touched their coasts." Until France occupied Morocco in 1825 the Barbary pirates held such effective dominion over the Mediterranean that trading vessels were not safe unless protected by convoy or tribute. "The Danes claimed dominion in the Baltic---a claim never extinguished in principle to this day," and only when the Baltic and the Black Sea were opened about the middle of the 19th century did national control of international waters come to an end. (1)

Neutrality existed in theory but seldom worked out

(1) "The Freedom of the Seas," P. B. Potter, pp. 38 and 90.



in practice; until the end of the 16th century neutrals were practically unknown, and in the almost continuous wars of Europe few except the Hanseatic League were either powerful or disinterested enough to enforce their programs of non-participation in hostilities. Strong nations did not hesitate to employ any means whatever to stop trade to their enemies, and exercised belligerent powers of seizure in a manner most oppressive to weaker states.

One of the important causes of the Revolution was the severe restriction to the freedom of colonial trade. Americans had therefore thoroughly debated the whole subject; consequently, when they negotiated the French treaties in 1778, they had already formulated a plan which, in the words of John Quincy Adams in 1823, "was, to the foundation of our commercial intercourse with the rest of mankind, what the Declaration of Independence was to that of our internal government." The preamble to the commercial treaty (which preceded that of alliance) declared that its purpose "could not be better obtained than by taking for the basis of their agreement the most perfect equality and reciprocity, and by carefully avoiding all those burthensome preferences which are usually sources of debate, embarrassment, and discontent; by leaving, also, each party at liberty to make, respecting commerce and navigation, those interior regulations which it shall find most convenient to itself; and by founding the advantage of commerce solely upon reciprocal utility and the just rules of free intercourse; reserving withal to each party the liberty of admitting at its pleasure other nations to a participation of the same advantages." (1)

(1) "Principles of American Diplomacy," John Basset Moore, p.161.



## II. THE OPEN DOOR POLICY.

During the discussion of the peace terms at the close of the Revolution, Benjamin Franklin put forward a proposition for free commercial intercourse directly between the United States and England and all her possessions, but the British commissioners refused to agree to it. For more than ten years after the close of the war, while American vessels were permitted to carry a few native products to England itself, (with the payment of the alien dues), none could enter British colonial ports, and even British ships were allowed to carry only a very restricted line of American goods direct from United States ports to the colonies. There was no direct trade whatever with

Canada. Although the United States signed "most-favored-nation" treaties with the Netherlands in 1782, with Sweden in 1783, and with Prussia in 1785, trade with the latter had always been insignificant, while Holland and Sweden discriminated so heavily against aliens that their ships carried all the freight both ways. But most of our foreign commerce was transported in British bottoms between this country and England, and from there distributed to the rest of the world.

In an effort to break down the barriers and to foster mutually beneficial trade relations with foreign countries, Congress in 1784 established certain principles which should thereafter govern the drafting of commercial treaties. One of these was that each party should in its own vessels be permitted to carry its own products to the ports of the other, to return laden with the products of the latter, and to pay only such port charges and import duties as were paid by the most-favored-nation. Nothing was then said concerning equalization of charges between citizens and aliens. Another resolution aimed to open direct and similar trade between the United States and the American colonies of all European powers. But these proposals were so radically different from existing regulations that for years nothing came of them.

In spite of continued effort, the Confederation gov-



ernment was unable to bring the British government to agree to a commercial treaty, and finally several of the states and even Congress passed retaliatory laws that almost stopped American foreign trade altogether. It was not until 179<sup>4</sup> that Jay was able to arrange a treaty that permitted free passage and trade by land with Canada, and, with some restrictions, permitted American vessels to trade with India. The Senate struck out one obnoxious article of the treaty which would have allowed American vessels of less than seventy tons to carry goods to the West Indies, on condition that the United States prevent its ships from carrying West Indian products to other foreign countries, either direct or after transshipment in our own ports.

The conflicts growing out of the French Revolution started at about this time, and although they brought many troubles to this country, including two wars, they actually ~~were~~ were instrumental in establishing American prosperity, because they were responsible for the downfall of the colonial monopoly systems. Because their own shipping was needed elsewhere, the belligerents necessarily permitted American ships to enter the colonial trade, although only with temporary permits. But in 1810 began the separation of Latin America from European ties, and the immediate result was that after that year nearly every continental port south of Canada was freely opened to world commerce.

Although enjoying the full benefits of freedom to trade with Latin America, after the conclusion of the War of 1812 Great Britain again restricted her colonial trade to her own subjects and ships. The United States continued to urge the removal of restrictions, and in 1823 Congress formally approved the position long assumed by the State Department that, as a matter of natural right, commerce ought to be carried on between states without discrimination against aliens.



Feeling between the United States and England became bitter over the struggle for commerce; both resorted to embargoes and countervailing duties which several times stopped trade between this country and the West Indies, even in British vessels. But in 1825 Parliament decided to open Canada and her other colonies to a somewhat restricted world trade; in 1830 the two countries came to an agreement substantially in accord with the American position, although several important barriers remained until 1849. The principle of the reciprocal abolition of discrimination against aliens through special regulations, ~~and~~ port charges and import duties has since that time been the consistent policy of the United States; it is the cornerstone of the Open Door Policy and has been included in most of our commercial treaties. The present law, which permits the President to impose added tonnage dues against foreign vessels, forbids such imposition in the case of any nation which does not discriminate against American ships. A second principle applied in the drafting of commercial treaties is that of most-favored-nation treatment, by virtue of which, if in the future one of the parties grants to a third party more favorable conditions than those stated in the treaty, such conditions are automatically extended to the other party to the treaty; where compensation of some sort has been granted by the third party, the new privileges accrue to the second party only after he has given similar compensation.

It must be realized that when the Revolution started all foreign trade of the United States ceased. In order to obtain military supplies and even the necessities of life it was an urgent matter to break the artificial barriers against American commerce. Illicit trade flourished, but it was inadequate, and the leaders of the nation were pressed from all sides to find a solution. The negotiation of favorable treaties became an issue in domestic politics, and some of the most able men in the country were for months and even years maintained at foreign courts for the sole purpose of obtaining



such treaties. The West Indian trade, being close at hand, was naturally the most desirable, but treaties were sought everywhere in order to add to American prestige and to open other ports to American ships and produce. Although not then known by that name, the Open Door Policy, or the policy of equal commercial opportunity, became thoroughly fixed in American diplomacy at a very early date. However, it is more familiar to us today because of its association with the subject of the foreign trade of China.

The new American flag was carried into the harbor of Canton for the first time by the Empress of China in 1784. Although the United States and other powers made many efforts to place their position in China upon a treaty basis, that country until 1842 maintained its isolation except for the technically illegal intercourse at Canton. In that year the Chinese-British Opium War ended, with the result that Great Britain required the conclusion of a regular commercial treaty, the opening of five ports to British trade, and the permanent cession of the island and harbor of Hong Kong. The United States Congress immediately authorized a mission to China for the purpose of obtaining a treaty and trading privileges, and the President appointed Caleb Cushing as commissioner. In 1844 he was successful in consummating a satisfactory agreement, which also included a limited most-favored-nation clause, the provision of extraterritoriality and missionary rights. France immediately afterward arranged a treaty along the same lines.

The Chinese populace resented the intrusion of foreigners into the five treaty ports, and the great Taiping Rebellion, which was all but successful in overthrowing the Manchu Dynasty, was largely anti-foreign in origin. The French and British were quick to employ arms in teaching the Chinese respect for the terms of the treaties, but from the beginning the United States government played a lone hand, and refused to permit its Asiatic Fleet to join with the forces of other nations, or to engage in hostilities except in emergency.



In 1857 England and France invited this country to permit its naval and political representatives to act with theirs in forcing reparations for injuries and more favorable terms in new treaties. They proposed to destroy the forts below Canton and to blockade the Yangtze and Peiho Rivers in order to bring the Chinese to terms. This invitation the United States refused on the ground that its relations with China were not of such a nature as to justify war. The Secretary of State agreed, however, to appoint a minister to China; he instructed him to act alone, but permitted him to advise the Chinese government that he considered the allied demands reasonable; he also directed him to obtain for the United States all the privileges that should be granted the allies. Military operations were initiated by the other two powers, and after some fighting and much negotiation China in 1858 signed new treaties with England, France, Russia and the United States. The final upshot of Chinese failure to live up to the terms of the <sup>new</sup> treaties was the British-French expedition to Peking in 1860, and the permanent establishment of foreign diplomatic representatives in that city. Much criticism has been levelled at this country because, though willing to give diplomatic support to the allies and to share in the new concessions they should obtain, it was not willing to share in the military effort thought necessary for success. On the other hand, while the United States had grievances against China much the same as those of England and France, and was desirous of broadening the treaties, it proposed to attain its ends through peaceful rather than warlike means. It may have been partly for this reason that China signed the American treaties before the others, and that the first article of this document contains the promise that " - - - if any other nation should act unjustly or oppressively, the United States will exert their good offices, on being informed of the case, to bring about an amicable arrangement of the question, thus showing their friendly feelings." <sup>(1)</sup> We may, in fact, (1) "Treaties, etc. Bet. the U. S. and Other Powers," Malloy p.211



now ask ourselves if it is not possible that many of the current Chinese difficulties had their beginnings in the unnecessary hostilities of 1858-1860.

Anson Burlingame, the American minister to Peking from 1861 to 1867, was very liberal in mind, and did much to establish the future policy of the United States toward China. To him is due the original idea of the "territorial integrity of China." Contrary to ordinary practice, he was afterward permitted by his government to become the head of the first Chinese diplomatic mission to the Western Powers.

In another chapter (page 31) has been described the opening of Japan to world trade. It will be recognized that the Policy of the Open Door was highly influential in the initiation of the Perry Expedition and the effort to end the Dutch monopoly of Japanese foreign trade.

Russia began to encroach upon Northern China as early as the 17th century, and, although halted for a time, by the treaty of 1858 obtained the cession of all the territory north of the Amur River, while by the treaty of 1860 she gained all the land to the eastward of the Ussuri. In 1894 Japan "protected" Korea against Chinese aggression (Korea had long paid tribute to the Manchus), and in the ensuing war forced the cession to her of Formosa, the Pescadores, and the Liaou Tung Peninsula. However, at Russian insistence, several of the European powers forced her to give up the latter territory. Japan being out of Liaou Tung, in 1898 Russia leased it from China for twenty-five years, and promptly built the Manchurian Railroad to consolidate her new expansion.

In 1787 France negotiated a treaty with the Annamese king of Indo-China (who paid tribute to the Emperor of China), and shortly afterward a number of French military officers and men assisted the king to regain his throne after ~~her~~ he had been driven from it by rebels. In return, he granted the French permission to trade and to send missionaries



into his territories. But the king's successors resented French influence; about 1833 they commenced a systematic persecution of Christians, and over a period of years killed twenty-three French and Spanish priests and about 60,000 native converts. In 1858 France and Spain intervened with force, and four years later a peace treaty was signed giving France the three eastern provinces of Cochin-China, and a protectorate over Cambodia. Native feeling against foreigners persisted, however, and 1883 found China allied with Annam in a war for the purpose of expelling the French. Peace was restored in 1885, China renounced sovereignty over Indo-China, and France annexed the whole of it.

These encroachments by Russia, France and Japan, and possibly the American victory at Manila Bay, greatly stirred the other expansionist powers, and in 1898 Germany forced a 99-year lease of Tsingtau. England leased Wei-Hai-Wei for as long as Russia should remain at Port Arthur, and as compensation France leased the bay and territory of Kwang-Chao-wan, in Kwangtung Province, and added it to Indo-China.

For some years the United States had viewed the apparently approaching dissolution of China with much concern, since such an event would seriously threaten the extinction of its large commercial and missionary establishment in Asia. The recent acquisition of Hawaii and the Philippines had also given a new turn to the century-long ambition to have a full share of the great foreign trade which it was then generally believed the densely populated Orient would soon be able to support. The Spanish War being over, President McKinley in his 1898 message to Congress said: (1)

"The United States has not been an indifferent spectator of the extraordinary events transpiring in the Chinese Empire, whereby portions of its maritime provinces are passing under the control of various European powers."

(1) "International Law Digest," John Basset Moore, vol.v, P.533



In September, 1899, Secretary of State Hay despatched notes to France, Germany, Russia and Great Britain requesting them to state formally that they would agree to the principle of equal opportunity of trade in the leased territories and in the surrounding "spheres of influence," to the maintenance of the rights of vested interests there, to the continuation of the treaty customs rate in these ports, and to the right of the Chinese government to collect the imposts. These powers somewhat reluctantly agreed, (Japan had been furnished copies of the notes, and she agreed enthusiastically), and Hay notified all interested countries that his proposals had been accepted. It must be understood that this Policy of the Open Door, now first formally accepted by several of the powers mentioned, applied only to leased territories and the surrounding spheres of influence, and not ~~to~~ to territories such as Indo-China that had already been annexed by foreign states. To follow this point up, Hay and his successors announced American opposition to any further alienation of Chinese territory, and obtained a fairly clear assent to this second principle. This idea was originally put forth during the Boxer Rebellion; even before the relief of Peking by the allied expedition in 1900, Hay sent around a circular declaring that the policy of the United States was to "seek a solution which may bring about permanent safety and peace in China, preserve China's territorial and administrative entity, protect all rights guaranteed to friendly powers by treaty and international law, and safeguard for the world the principle of equal and impartial trade with all parts of the Chinese Empire." (1) World public opinion supported this position to the extent that money indemnities, and not territory, were the recompense exacted from China for the injuries sustained by foreigners during the rebellion.

(1) "Principles of American Diplomacy," John Basset Moore, p.180



Russia brought many troops into Manchuria to guard against the spread of the <sup>Boxer</sup> rebellion to that province, and failed to move them out again after the collapse of the movement. Great Britain was as strong an advocate of Chinese "territorial integrity" as was the United States; the British-Japanese Alliance was a direct outcome of the Russian menace, and of the diplomatic support furnished by the United States through its protest to Russia over the presence of her forces in Manchuria. The Russian-Japanese War eventuated in 1904; the result was the transfer of Liaou Tung Peninsula to Japan, and the <sup>latter's</sup> formal annexation of Korea.

After general acceptance of the policy of the Open Door in China, the United States itself assumed a somewhat ~~more~~ more aggressive attitude, and began to give decidedly greater political support to American business interests in the Orient. For instance, its officials facilitated the offer of E. H. Harriman to refinance the South Manchurian Railroad; the Japanese premier at first approved the idea, but the possible consequences of such a commitment so alarmed other influential Japanese that he soon afterward withdrew his consent. In 1909 the United States proposed to Russia and Japan ~~xxx~~ the establishment of international control over all the railroads in Manchuria. Regardless of the possible merits of such a plan, the way for it was not fully prepared, because both countries immediately refused to consider it, and to the Japanese their previous suspicions <sup>of</sup> ~~xxxxx~~ American disinterestedness in China appeared to be confirmed. In 1912 American "Dollar Diplomacy" reached its peak in that region when Secretary of State Knox informed the Chinese government that this country expected it to extend the principle of neutrality to loans. In effect this communication was a demand for American participation in the Six-Power Consortium, which had been ~~xxx~~ formed for the purpose of underwriting a large loan to the new Revolutionary government. After President Wilson was inaugurated, the American bankers concerned inquired from him as to



whether it was his desire that they continue participation, but he replied that he would not request them to do so, because of the resulting "implications of responsibility" of this government in a loan which very nearly concerned the "administrative independence of China," and which "might conceivably go the length in some unhappy contingency of forcible interference in the financial, and even the political" affairs of that country.<sup>(1)</sup> The American bankers thereupon withdrew from the Consortium.

Under President Wilson ~~the~~ American Oriental policy took a decided swing toward the older line of non-interference in the relations between China and other nations. Although much indignation was aroused in this country by the famous Twenty-One Demands of 1915 through which Japan attempted to establish a ~~practical~~ protectorate over China, the United States contented itself with the despatch of identic notes to the two countries ~~to the effect~~ <sup>announcing</sup> that it would refuse to recognize any resulting situation which might be prejudicial to its existing rights. In addition, in the 1917 Lansing-Ishii exchange of notes, Secretary Lansing, though affirming the principles of the Open Door and Chinese Territorial Integrity, agreed that, since "territorial propinquity creates special relations between countries, - - - - the United States recognizes that Japan has special relations in China." At the Peace Conference which closed the World War President Wilson was unsuccessful in ~~gaining~~ <sup>getting</sup> ~~Japanese~~ <sup>to</sup> consent to withdraw from Shantung, <sup>which she had</sup> /conquered from Germany in the war.

In the negotiations leading up to the final approval by the League of Nations of the mandates agreements, the United States took the position that the policy of the Open Door ought to be applied in the mandated territories, and also that, as one of the victors, it was entitled to equal rights with all other victor nations. This venture was unsuccessful with respect to the "C" Mandates, partially successful with the "A",

(1) "Principles of Am. Diplomacy," John Bassett Moore, p. 184.



and entirely so with the "B". The "C" Mandates are administered the same as national territory.

The Japanese occupation<sup>of Shantung</sup> was exceedingly unpopular in this country, and considerable diplomatic tension developed. This condition became one of the principle reasons for calling the Washington Conference for the Limitation of Naval Armaments. The chief results of the conference, so<sup>far</sup> as China was concerned, were an agreement that Japan would withdraw from Shantung, a partial revision of the Chinese tariff agreements, resolutions to investigate postal and railroad abuses, and the Nine-Power Treaty giving the fullest and most emphatic endorsement to the policies of the Open Door and Territorial Integrity, as is shown in Articles I and<sup>VII</sup>/~~XI~~, quoted below:

"ARTICLE I. The Contracting Powers other than China agree:

- (1) To respect the sovereignty, the independence, and the territorial and administrative integrity of China;
- (2) To provide the fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity to China to develop and maintain for herself an efficient and stable government;
- (3) To use their influence for the purpose of effectively establishing and maintaining the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations throughout the territory of China;
- (4) To refrain from taking advantage of conditions in China in order to seek special rights or privileges which would abridge the rights of subjects or citizens of friendly States, and from countenancing action inimical to the security of such States."

"ARTICLE VII. The Contracting Powers agree that, whenever a situation arises which in the opinion of any one of them involves the application of the stipulations of the present treaty, and renders desirable discussion of such application, there shall be full and frank communication between the Contracting Powers concerned."

The Washington agreements concerning China were accomplished solely because of the activity and interest of the American Delegation, and this fact established the United States as the principal champion of China in world politics. Since that time, this country has shown no disposition to employ Dollar Diplomacy in the Orient---on the contrary, during the many Chinese political crises, it has announced its interest in the protection of the lives of Americans who would heed its warning to congregate in the seaports, but that the



protection of property, particularly if located in the interior, is entirely secondary.

On April 14, 1923, by an exchange of notes, the Lansing-Ishii Agreement was cancelled "in the light of the understandings arrived at by the Washington Conference on the Limitation of Armament."

On page 21 is a reference to the action taken by the United States with regard to Japanese intervention in Manchuria and the establishment of the independent state of Manchukuo. While relations between this country and Japan have in the past five years become somewhat strained, the United States government has refrained from taking a fixed position from which retreat will be difficult, except on the question of the recognition of Manchukuo. The decision to relinquish control of the Philippines, the hesitation to go to extremes in the protection of property rights, and the attitude toward Manchuria and North China, seem to indicate that the American people have become somewhat lukewarm on the matter of furthering the Oriental trade; while still devoted to the principle of the Open Door, they seem to be willing to wait for future events to disclose means for the solution of the Chinese problem.

One of the curious aspects of the situation is that the Japanese profess to see in the policy of Japan an analogy to the Monroe Doctrine. The Japanese historian and lecturer Yusuki Tsurumi said in 1930, during one of his Harris Foundation lectures at the University of Chicago:<sup>(1)</sup>

"America was entirely motivated by her self-interest, otherwise she would not have practised such inconsistent policies---one in Asia and one in the Americas. If the Monroe Doctrine with its exclusive attitude in the Caribbean region and Central America is justified, why does she insist on the open door only in Asia? If the open door is her sincere intention, why does she try to be exclusive, sometimes, in her near regions?"

Mr Tsurumi has visited America many times and has made an ex-

(1) "Interpretations of American Foreign Policy," p. 184.



haustive study of our history; therefore when this man fails to apprehend that the aim of the Monroe Doctrine is to exclude foreign political influence from America, and one of the aims of the Open Door Policy is to exclude foreign political influence from China, and that both are entirely harmonious with respect to equal commercial opportunity, it is not at all surprising that Japanese generally do not understand the American attitude in China, which for a long period has been substantially as stated in Article I of the Nine-Power Treaty. Professor Blakeslee has brought <sup>it</sup> clearly the differences between the Monroe Doctrine in America and the Japanese "Monroe" Doctrine in the Orient: (1)

"Japan's relations with China, either material or legal, do not justify it in asserting any measure of political protection over the Chinese government. Yet its responsibility for maintaining peace in Eastern Asia, as interpreted by Japanese writers and speakers, appears to involve a right of veto over China's choice of civilian advisers and technical experts, over its loans, over its selection of military instructors, ~~and over its selection of military instructors, and over the source of its military supplies---~~ and over the source of its military supplies---in short, over any foreign activities in China which Japan may regard as inimical to its interests. Such a demand constitutes a claim to control important functions of China's national life. It appears to violate the sovereign rights both of China and the Western States and to contravene the provisions of the Nine-Power Treaty and the general principles of international law. Japan cannot legally or properly insist that China must either remain weak or else grow strong under the sole guidance of Japan."

As a matter of interest this view may be compared with a rather naive remark made by Yusuki Tsurumi in another of his 1930 Harris Foundation lectures: (2)

"- - - - certain reasonable treaty stipulations with an independent Philippines will give all that Japan wants without going to the danger of outraging the public opinion of the world by an armed conquest with its subsequent troubles. Japan's sincere desire is rather to see more independent nations in the Western Pacific so that she can organize a friendly association of Asiatic nation for the purpose of mutual assistance. - - - - If we had a few more independent countries in the Far East, the friction of Japan and China would be easily smoothed with these countries as mediators."

(1) "Conflicts of Policy in the Far East," G.H.Blakeslee, p. 29.

(2) "Interpretations of American Foreign Policy," p. 238



After all this discussion, exactly what is the meaning of the Open Door? Do nations have any obligation under international law to accept such a policy?

The answer to the second question is an emphatic negative. Great Britain in 1784 was within her strict legal rights in refusing to Americans the privilege of trading directly with her colonies. Although something might be said as to possible rights acquired through previous long exercise, the fact that the United States had attained a new nationality can be held to have extinguished all its claims to rights granted exclusively to British subjects. Whether a nation's ports are closed or open is a domestic question, and included in the general field of the exercise of sovereignty. The basis of the United States' present position respecting its right to trade in mandated territory is that it has a definite claim to sovereignty, acquired equally with other victor nations by conquest, and continuing until the territories in question are finally given  $\hat{=}$  single nationality by becoming separate states or by annexation to ~~an~~ existing state. From this follows that American rights may possibly be less in the "C" Mandates, since these were fully conquered before the United States entered the World War.

We must remember that the Open Door Policy is primarily commercial in character, and to have a basis in international law must have some implication of most-favored-nation status. While the policy has as object the opening of all possible doors to lucrative trade, it can never be asserted as a right unless previously granted by treaty or inherited through the transmission of some degree of sovereignty. Thus the 1885 General Act of Berlin guaranteed the Open Door in the Congo Basin because prior to that time several nations had established vested trading rights in the territory, and the safeguarding of these rights was the condition under which they consented to its annexation by other European powers.

It was no abridgement of the Open Door when the United



States brought the Philippines and Porto Rico within its tariff walls and also forbade foreign vessels in the future to carry goods between these possessions and continental United States ports, because all nations were treated alike. Derogation of existing most-favored-nation treaties would exist, however, if the United States were to permit only a single nation to engage in such carriage of goods. The Secretary of State directed Caleb Cushing to notify the Emperor of China that "the United States would find it impossible to remain on terms of friendship and regard with the Emperor if greater privileges or commercial facilities should be allowed to the subjects of any other government than should be granted to citizens of the United States;"<sup>(1)</sup> nevertheless, until the Emperor had accepted a most-favored-nation treaty, he was under no legal obligation not to grant exclusive privileges to other nations. Cushing's instructions in this respect merely had the effect of a threat of retaliation if American wishes were not granted.

Therefore, where rights have been gained through sovereignty, treaty, or long exercise, the Open Door has a legal status, but all such rights are lost as soon as a complete change of sovereignty has occurred, unless protected by agreement with the new sovereign. For this reason it was of special importance to the United States in 1899 to support Chinese territorial integrity and to gain formal acceptance by other nations that American vested interests would not be destroyed.

Taken by and large, the principles enunciated in the preamble of the French Treaty of 1778 (see page 89) have been fairly consistently followed by the United States in its foreign trade policy, and may be taken as the ideal of the Open Door. The policy is against exclusiveness, and in favor of the peaceful enjoyment of equal opportunities. The United States has never gone to war for the policy and seems never likely to. It may be because war in the Orient has at times

(1)"International Politics," F. L. Schuman, p. 605.



a distinct possibility  
become ~~possible~~ that the strong strategic sense of the American people has impelled them to start withdrawing from the Philippines. Sympathy with China's difficulties is unlikely to be ~~strong~~ <sup>great</sup> enough to push the United States to extreme measures in the defense of rights whose benefits have proved so disappointing.

In fact, the Open Door in China is only a part, and certainly not the largest part, of the general Open Door Policy pursued by the United States since its independence. The policy has been successful in some parts of the world, and not so successful in others; on the whole, it has promoted peace and good understanding, and has gradually extended until it is generally practiced ~~in~~ <sup>all</sup> by commercial countries. The possibility of its temporary eclipse in the Far East is not alarming, because Chinese trade is not vital to American welfare, and in any case the United States may receive its full share in the end.

The present position of the United States with respect to the Open Door, and its corollary, the Territorial Integrity of China, was indirectly announced by the Under Secretary of State in a recent speech before the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations: (1)

"We believe that in general the principles upon which those treaties (aimed at the peaceful regulation of international relations in the Far East) are based and the provisions which they contain are sound, and that, if they are lived up to, observance of their provisions would go far toward maintaining peace with justice in the Far East. - - - - -"

"We believe (the Open Door) is a sound principle and that, in spite of the fact that there have been situations in which it has been disregarded, we can not either wisely or consistently abandon it with regard to any particular area or country."

(1) Associated Press despatch in the New York Herald-Tribune of February 16, 1936.



III. FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION.

International law today is clear enough that ships have the right of innocent passage of international rivers and seas, and few controversies on this subject now disturb diplomatic relations. But this was not the case in the first days of the Republic, and much of the early American diplomacy was devoted to promoting a more liberal attitude in this important field.

By the latter part of the 18th century many of the extravagant claims to national dominion over the open sea had been discarded. But with enclosed seas and rivers it was a different matter. Denmark still held the monopoly of the fisheries between Iceland and Norway, and collected dues from all shipping that entered the Baltic through the Sound and the Belts; England had exclusive rights of fishery in the North Sea and on the Newfoundland Banks; Russia held the Bering Sea as a closed domain; Turkey denied passage of the Dardanelles to all foreign ships; the Spanish Foreign Minister declared that the king of Spain "would never relinquish the object" of keeping the Gulf of Mexico closed to foreigners; and states holding the mouths of rivers would not permit free passage even to vessels owned in states bordering on the same rivers.<sup>(1)</sup>

Even before the acknowledgment of its independence the United States asserted liberal views as to its right of free navigation, and was the first country to advance the idea that a people situated on the upper part of a river have natural rights in the whole of the river, and, if they desire, may permit other than river states to send their ships to their ports, even when it is necessary to pass through the domains of other states on the river; this assertion was made with respect to the Scheldt in advancing the claim for passage through the Netherlands to trade with the people in the present

(1) "American Diplomacy," Eugene Schuyler, Part VI.



Belgium. This new view found support in France, and by 1814 even the five reactionary powers allied against France agreed in principle during the Congress of Vienna to the free navigation of the Scheldt and the Rhine.

The Mississippi River was, of course, of the most interest to the United States. Its claim to ~~xxxxxxx~~ <sup>passage of</sup> this stream was based not only on natural right, but also upon the Treaty of Paris of 1763, which gave British subjects freedom "To navigate the Mississippi, in its whole length and breadth, from its source to the sea, - - - and that the vessel should not be stopped, visited, or subjected to the payment of any duty whatever;" and the 1783 treaty of peace, whose eighth article read: "The navigation of the river Mississippi, from its source to the ocean, shall forever remain free and open to the subjects of Great Britain and the citizens of the United States." Both Spain and France resisted the strong American pressure for free passage and the right of deposit at New Orleans, and the dispute was finally settled only by the purchase of Louisiana in 1803. As England held that the War of 1812 had voided the 1783 treaty, and as the Treaty of Ghent did not renew the stipulation for the free navigation of the Mississippi by British, the United States later refused to permit it, unless some branch of the Mississippi should be found to have its origin in Canada.

None of our first treaties with Great Britain had mentioned the subject of the navigation of the St. Lawrence River. Consequently, although the United States had full jurisdiction over the river channel near Bernhard's Island, Great Britain would not permit Americans to navigate the lower part through Canadian territory. The northern portion of New York State for a time sold their products to Canadians for shipment to Europe, and in 1823 its inhabitants petitioned Congress to secure for them the right to navigate the St. Lawrence, in order that they might escape the payment of the Canadian middlemen's profit. England had supported the principle of free ri-



riparian rights in their own part of the world, and apparently stood ready to grant to Americans the privilege to navigate the St. Lawrence, but refused to concede the right. For a long time the United States refused to accept such a grant, but finally ~~accepted it~~ <sup>acquiesced</sup> in the 1871 Treaty of Washington, and in return granted British subjects the right to navigate the Yukon, the Porcupine and the Stikine, Alaskan rivers having their sources in Canada. (1)

Several of the South American states are situated upon the Plate or the Amazon, or their tributaries. The mouths of these two rivers are held by the Argentine and Brazil, respectively, and they long denied the claims of the upper riparian states; when the United States backed up these claims both countries appeared to fear that Americans had determined to settle and later annex the territory along the rivers in the Texas manner. France and England gave their support to the attempts to open the rivers, but it was not until 1859 that the Plate, and 1868 that the Amazon, were made free to general navigation ~~to~~ <sup>by</sup> merchant vessels of all nations.

The status of European rivers has frequently changed due to successive changes in sovereignty and the gradual liberalization of treaties. The United States was ~~much~~ concerned in the diplomatic exchanges that led up to the ~~drafting~~ of most of these treaties, and signed several of them. In 1795 the French and the Batavian governments agreed to mutual freedom of the Rhine, the Meuse, the Scheldt and the Hondt, and in 1814 <sup>by the Congress of Vienna to passage of</sup> limited general privileges were granted ~~xx~~ the Rhine and Scheldt. But these ~~xxxx~~ <sup>concessions</sup> by no means met the wishes of people having liberal ideas: until the Treaty of Versailles the Rhine remained closed to all but riparian nations, while Holland retained the power to levy tolls on the Scheldt until 1863, when she surrendered it in return for a large indemnity subscribed by all commercial states---the United States paid its share in 1873, amounting to \$606,202.67. (2)

(1) "American Diplomacy," Eugene Schuyler, pp. 282-291.  
(2) do., pp. 345-350.



In 1821 the Elbe was opened to all river states, and in 1844 to all vessels upon the payment of river dues to Hanover; in 1861 other nations paid Hanover a large indemnity to give up the right to collect these dues. Austria and Turkey jointly administered the Danube from 1784 to 1812; in the latter year Russia gained a foothold on the river and gradually increased it until after 1840 she held all the river mouths and made shipping very difficult for the others. The Treaty of Paris of 1856 established the principle of free navigation of the Danube, but the practical results were not satisfactory because, though the Danube Commission controlled the delta region, Austria controlled the river above the Iron Gates. The Treaty of Versailles and the 1921 Danube Statute gave the Danube Commission an international membership upon which non-river states were represented, and gave to it control of the entire river from the mouth to Ulm, and made navigation of the entire system unrestricted and open to all flags on a footing of complete equality. Riverine states may now impose special tonnage dues only for works of improvement, but not for maintenance. (1)

In 1885 the United States joined with thirteen other powers in drawing up the General Act of Berlin which established the Congo Free State, granted freedom of trade in the Congo Basin and free navigation of the Congo and the Niger. One of the articles of the Act was an engagement to "respect the neutrality of the territory." President Cleveland interpreted this as an "engagement to share in the obligation of enforcing neutrality in the remote valley of the Congo;" because he felt that this "would be an alliance whose responsibilities we are not in a position to assume," he remained faithful to the non-alliance policy and refrained from asking the Senate to ratify the Act. (2) Consequently, although the

(1) Encyclopedia Britannica, vol. vii, p. 45.

(2) "American Diplomacy," Eugene Schuyler, pp. 365-366.



United States lost the right of representation on the international commission which controlled the rivers, it retained freedom of navigation and was not politically concerned with the long series of disputes over the maladministration of the Congo Free State, nor with its final annexation by Belgium in 1907.

One of the most difficult phases of the peace negotiations between the United States and England after the Revolution related to the Newfoundland fisheries. Franklin considered American freedom to fish on the Banks and to dry the catch ashore to be one of the necessary conditions of peace. But the British proposed articles which not only forbid Americans to dry fish ashore, but even to take fish within three leagues of the coasts within the Gulf of St. Lawrence, or on the banks within less than fifteen leagues of the Cape Breton shoreline. The American commissioners rejected these articles, and demanded the right to continue fishing "in all the places where the inhabitants of both countries used at any time heretofore to fish," as well as to cure fish on the adjacent Canadian territory. After considerable discussion the British commissioners conceded the American "right" to fish off the Canadian coast, and the "liberty" to dry their fish ashore. The provisions relating to fisheries were not renewed in the Treaty of Ghent, and England at first held that both the "rights" and "liberties" of the earlier treaty had lapsed; in 1815 a British cruiser seized an American fishing vessel forty-five miles from Cape Sable, but the British government disavowed the act and renounced all future authority to control the off-shore fishing. The serious disputes over the Newfoundland fisheries that have since occurred have only concerned American treaty rights within British territorial waters, and not the question of the neutral character of the high seas.

Even as early as 1319 other nations had tried to limit Denmark's claim of jurisdiction over the Baltic. In the early



19th century she still assessed heavy and complicated dues against all ships passing her territory to enter or leave that sea; in addition to the Sound charges amounting to about four per cent of the value of the cargoes, were the assessments for light-money and pass-money; all vessels suffered delays because of being subjected to a detailed examination of cargo, and all were forced to lower their topsails in token of respect when passing the castle of Kronenburg. American commerce in the Baltic was considerable, but until 1826 the United States was unable to obtain a treaty with Denmark, and consequently our vessels paid twenty per cent greater dues than did the vessels of countries having most-favored-nation relations with Denmark. The rightfulness of the dues had never been questioned, and in the 1826 treaty was entirely accepted by the United States, although it shortly afterward made an effort to have them reduced and simplified. In 1843, however, Secretary of State Upshur asserted that Denmark had no real right to the dues; while this announcement created interest and aroused support in Europe Mr. Upshur's death in the Princeton explosion ended the discussion for a time. A few years later Secretary of State Buchanan took a similar position, and offered Denmark an indemnity of \$250,000 for permanent exemption from them. This offer was not well received; consequently Buchanan's successor, Secretary Marcy, withdrew it and in 1855 gave the customary one year's notice of the termination of the treaty of 1826, and announced that after the end of that period American vessels would pay no more dues whatever. As it appeared that several European nations were considering taking the same action, Denmark offered to abolish the dues entirely provided she were given a sufficiently large indemnity. A European Congress ~~xxxx~~ debated this offer, and in 1857 agreed to pay Denmark \$17,500,000 for the surrender of her rights. The United States' share was to have been \$1,050,000, but it refused to become a party to the treaty on the grounds that it did not acknowledge Denmark to



have any rights either to the dues or the indemnity. Shortly afterward, however, it signed a separate treaty with Denmark by which the latter abolished the dues upon American vessels in return for the payment of \$393, 011, this sum being considered as due Denmark for the future maintenance of buoys, lights and pilotage equipment. (1)

After 1774 Turkey signed several treaties permitting the merchant ships of various nations to pass through the Dardanelles, but the United States did not gain such authority until 1830. The 1856 Treaty of Paris and the 1871 Treaty of London threw the straits open to the private vessels of all nations, but specifically excluded war ships. The United States has never become a party to either of these treaties, and has ~~specifically~~ reserved its right to despatch ships of war into the Black Sea in case it desired to do so, although it has never tried to exercise such a right.

During the early part of the 19th century nearly all the ocean trade of the North Pacific was carried in American ships, even the Russians in Alaska being dependent upon them to bring in their supplies and to take out their furs. But when Americans started trading with the natives on their own account, Emperor Alexander issued his ukase of 1821 to warn off these "transgressors," and to define Russian rights in Alaska. Besides delimiting his territory, he attempted to prohibit "all foreign vessels not only to land on the coasts and islands belonging to Russia, - - - but also to approach within less than one hundred Italian miles." But Russia was agreeable to a discussion of the matter, and in 1824 signed a treaty formally agreeing that navigation and fishing in the Pacific Ocean were free to all, and for a term of ten years granting Americans trading privileges in unfrequented bays and harbors. American traders were subsequently accused of exceeding their privileges, and from 1839 to 1867, when Alaska was ceded to the United States, foreign vessels were not permitted to enter Alaskan territorial waters.

(1) "American Diplomacy," Eugene Schuyler, ~~Chapter~~ pp.306-316.



The Pribilof seal herd, numbering 4,000,000 in 1867, was by 1911 reduced to 130,000 through poaching and unrestricted pelagic sealing, and at that time was in grave danger of extinction. (1) The Alaska Commercial Company leased the islands and the sealing rights on them in 1870, and tried to stop the indiscriminate killing; the national government assisted so far as seemed possible, but for many years was unable to accomplish anything because of its lack of authority in the open sea, where most of the killings occurred. In 1892 the United States and England established a tribunal of arbitration to settle questions as to American property rights in the seals wherever they should be found, American jurisdiction in the Bering Sea, and compensation to British subjects for illegal seizures. The United States did not claim exclusive jurisdiction in the Bering Sea, but Russia appeared to have done so; however, the award denied any such right, and found against this country on all counts. The two countries then adopted regulatory measures, but their ineffectiveness led finally to the treaty of 1911 wherein the United States, Great Britain, Russia and Japan agreed to prohibit their nationals from engaging in pelagic sealing north of thirty degrees north latitude, and to protect the seal herd by patrolling. Each country now gives the others a percentage of the seals it kills on its own territory. An interesting feature of the 1911 treaty is that it gives the public vessels of each regulatory power the right to visit private vessels of the other signatories if suspected of violating the laws, but permits punishment to be inflicted only by the government of a culprit. (2) After the ratification of the treaty the United States government retained direct charge of the Pribilof herd, and from 1911 to 1935 it increased to a population of 1,500,000, although meanwhile 57,000 had been legally slaughtered for their pelts. (1)

(1) Barrett Willoughby in "Saturday Evening Post," March 7, 1936.

(2) "Princ. of Am. Diplomacy," John Bassett Moore, pp. 147-159.



United States policy with respect to the freedom of navigation of the open sea, arms of the sea, and international rivers has always been oriented toward the liberalization of regulations and laws, and never toward the establishment of exclusive privileges for its own citizens. Few of the other powers have occupied such a position at all times, France alone seeming consistently to have supported this same view. Some of the disputes with other countries were prolonged, and some became quite bitter; in this field as with the Open Door, the United States has shown no disposition to gain its ends by the use of force, but to be willing to let time and an understanding of "the advantages of free commercial intercourse among nations" to bring others to accept those "common rights of all to the free use of those means which nature has provided for international communication." (1)

#### IV. NEUTRAL TRADE IN WAR.

Formerly the term "Freedom of the Seas" was applied more particularly to peace time trade, the phase discussed in the preceding section, but after the French Revolution Americans used it in connection with the struggle for the increase of the rights of neutral trade in war, an application which in the course of time has more or less displaced the older meaning. (2) Publicists then agreed that existing regulations as to blockade, contraband, and private property at sea were too greatly in favor of belligerents; but liberal opinion gained little official recognition, and prize rules continued for a long time to be established by Orders in Council of Great Britain, the strongest naval power. These rules left very little freedom of trade for the smaller neutral states.

For some time France had officially advocated rules more in favor of the neutrals, and the United States grasped at the opportunity offered by the commercial treaty of 1778

(1) President Pierce's Annual Message of 1853, concerning the freedom of navigation of the Amazon.

(2) "The Freedom of the Seas," P. B. Potter, p. 87.



to place itself in opposition to British policy. This treaty contained many liberal provisions, some being of so advanced a nature that they have never been generally adopted; it went in great detail into the development of the then new idea of "free ships make free goods," and restricted contraband solely to munitions of war. In 1780 Russia by decree adopted much the same set of rules, and was soon joined by Sweden and Denmark in the First Armed Neutrality. Spain, France, Holland and the United States, all at war with England, announced acceptance of the Russian principles, and Prussia, Austria, Portugal and the Sicilies directly associated themselves with the northern powers. In 1800 the Second Armed Neutrality formed by Russia, Denmark, Prussia and Sweden established the principle of freedom from belligerent search of neutral convoys under escort. The United States concluded several treaties in which both parties accepted restrictions of belligerent rights, but during the War of 1812 it enforced the old prize rules except against the countries with whom such treaties existed.

The American decision to remain neutral instead of joining in the wars at the turn of the 18th century had a strengthening influence upon its attitude toward greater freedom for neutral trade. Its development of neutrality rules, though strictly a part of its policy of Non-Intervention, thus had a close relation ~~to~~ its commercial policy.

Washington's proclamation of April 22, 1793, usually regarded as the first American "Neutrality Proclamation," actually did not contain the word "neutrality." It called attention to the state of war existing between Austria, Prussia, Sardinia, Great Britain and the United Netherlands on the one side and France on the other, and stated that "the duty and interests of the United States require, that they should with sincerity and good faith adopt and pursue a conduct friendly and impartial toward the belligerent powers." (1) Of this

(1) "International Law Digest," John Bassett Moore, vol. vii, page 1002.



proclamation Jefferson wrote to Madison the following July:

"When first proposed as a declaration of neutrality, it was opposed, first because the Executive had no power to declare neutrality. Second, as such, a declaration would be premature, and would lose the benefit for which it might be bartered. It was urged that there was a strong impression in the minds of many, that they were free to join in the hostilities on the side of France. Others were unapprised of the danger they would be exposed to in carrying contraband, goods, etc. It was, therefore, agreed that a proclamation should issue, declaring that we were in a state of peace, admonishing the people to do nothing contravening it, and putting them on their guard as to contraband." (1)

The first neutrality act in the world's legislative history passed Congress on June 5, 1794 for the purpose of giving the president real authority to declare the country neutral during any war. This act was simple in nature, and did not clearly define neutral duties; it made no mention of blockade, but merely withdrew national protection from the transport of "articles which are deemed contraband by the modern usage of nations," and from nationals taking part in hostilities; it also provided penalties for the violation of the "law of nations with respect to the nations at war" within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States. On April 20, 1818, a new and comprehensive neutrality law was enacted that became the model for the neutrality laws later enacted by many other nations. The law of 1818 remained on the statute books with little modification until 1909, when it was revised and the present law enacted; the latter was slightly modified during the World War and radically amended by the temporary act of August 31, 1935. Secretary of State Adams said in connection with the law of 1818: "By the usual principle of international law, the state of neutrality recognizes the cause of both parties to the contest to be just---that is, it avoids all consideration of the merits of the contest." (2)

A discussion of the history of the changes that have been made in naval prize rules since the 1778 French Treaty

(1) "Inter. Law Digest," John Bassett Moore, vol. vii, p. 1004.

(2) do., p. 860.



is beyond the scope of this paper. American foreign policy has had much to do with these changes, and has generally had the following aims in relation to neutral maritime trade:

1. Restriction of the right to capture neutral private property at sea, unless contraband or bound to a blockaded port.
2. Restriction of the definition of contraband to munitions of war.
3. Restriction of blockade to localities so guarded as to make approach dangerous.
4. Protection of the persons of citizens at sea.

In addition, the United States has consistently opposed the exercise of any form of belligerent rights during peace. Thus it has been jealous of the right of freedom from visit and search except during war, and has never accepted the legality of pacific blockade.

The chief difference in the points of view held by American and British statesmen concerning the conflict of neutral and belligerent rights has been in connection with the thesis that private property ought to enjoy the same inviolability at sea as on land. Property on shore has long been considered free from seizure except after recompense, or when contraband of war, while private property at sea has been subject to confiscation under a variety of circumstances. The United States from the first raised its voice in defense of the right to carry its trade with a minimum of interference. Due to the weakness of its regular naval forces, it long maintained the legality of privateering, though itself having issued no letters of marque after the War of 1812, and refused to agree to the 1856 Declaration of Paris unless it should also include abolition of the belligerent right to capture private property upon the sea. At the outbreak of the Crimean War in 1854 Mr. Buchanan, then Minister at London, remarked to the British Foreign Secretary that:

"It did not seem to him possible under existing circumstances for the United States to agree to the



suppression of privateering, unless the naval powers of the world would go one step further and consent that war against private property should be abolished altogether upon the ocean, as it had already been upon the land. There was really nothing different in principle or morality between the act of a regular cruiser and that of a privateer in robbing a merchant vessel upon the ocean, and confiscating the property of private individuals on board, for the benefit of the Captor." (1)

Secretary of State Marcy, in rejecting the invitation to adhere to the Declaration of Paris, said that: "Justice and humanity demand that this custom ( capture of private property) be abandoned, and that the rule in regard to property on land be extended to that on the sea."<sup>(1)</sup>

The British government, on the contrary, has always held that private property at sea and on shore can in no manner be assimilated to each other, but that the former must receive different consideration because of the fact of its being in transit. This viewpoint was well expressed in 1930 in a lecture by Lord Eustace Percy:

"By international law or custom it is now admitted that, even on enemy territory, private property should not be seized without compensation or destroyed except as a necessary incident in actual military operations. Why then, some people may ask, should not a similar rule be applied to private property, even to enemy property, at sea? The answer of course is that the sea, unlike the land, is not a place where private individuals own and enjoy their property. It is a highway along which they transport their property, usually for the purpose of exchanging it for other people's property.

"There is no rule of law or custom protecting the trading operations of an enemy on land, and belligerent rights at sea are, in their essence, not rights to seize private property but rights to interrupt trading operations. Such operations imply two parties to a transaction, and belligerent rights at sea apply only where one of these parties is, directly or indirectly, an enemy state or person." (2)

The Declaration of Paris, with its abolition of privateering, its principles of "free ships, free goods," of freedom from capture of neutral goods under an enemy flag, and that blockade to be binding must be effective, went a long distance toward enacting into International Law the fundamentals of the French Treaty of 1778.

(1) "American Diplomacy," Eugene Schuyler, pp. 386 and 394.

(2) "Maritime Trade in War," Lord Eustace Percy, p. 11.



One sometimes hears the assertion that, in its defense of neutral rights, and particularly those that have to do with property, the United States has three times been drawn into European wars, these being the Naval War with France in 1798, the War of 1812, and the World War. One may be permitted to disagree in toto with this point of view.

As previously related, for ten years after the Revolution the United States tried without success to establish satisfactory trade relations with England. This country had made it perfectly clear to France, by the 1793 proclamation, that it did not intend to assist that nation in its war, and France had acquiesced in this decision with reasonably good grace. The Jay Treaty of 1794, inadequate as it was from the standpoint of Americans, at least legalized commerce with England, and to some extent restricted the freedom of British vessels to capture American ships trading to Europe. It possibly injured France somewhat by the mere fact of its having been consummated, and also because it engaged the United States not to enter the war as her ally, but certainly this did not seem to America <sup>enough</sup> to justify the violent reaction it aroused in Paris. In 1797 France broke off diplomatic relations and demanded the abrogation of the Jay Treaty and a more sympathetic attitude toward her as the price of their reestablishment. The efforts of a special mission of three of the most prominent men in America failed to placate France, and the publication of the notorious "X. Y. Z." letters through which Talleyrand demanded large bribes so infuriated Americans that the phrase of "Millions for defense, but not one cent for tribute" swept the country into an undeclared war that lasted for two years. It is true that France meanwhile had seized some of our vessels, but these were far less numerous than the British captures; the fact is that the war was one concerning national honor and the right to remain free from dictation even by a power so closely bound to America by the most sentimental ties. The right to remain neutral had much to do with the war; the rights of neutral trade practically nothing.



In the years previous to the War of 1812 American trade suffered greatly at the hands of both France and England. The United States government had afforded such protection as seemed possible, including a complete embargo upon the departure from port of its own vessels, and the consequent ruin of many of its merchants. But there was little demand for war because of injury to our commerce: New England, which had almost a monopoly of our shipping, bitterly opposed the war and many persons in that part of the country were disloyal even after it started. The demand for the war came from a different part of the Republic, and was founded upon reasons only distantly related to business. In the list of causes which President Madison laid before Congress, he included the impressment of American seamen, (much the most important of all), the violation of American neutrality by British warships, oppression of American shipping through wrongful captures and conduct, the British attempt to disrupt the political integrity of the United States, and British incitement of the Indians to attack American settlers in the Northwest Territory. The complaint concerning trade was important, but this factor was far from being the principal cause of the war.

Many reasons have been advanced ~~for the entry~~ to explain the entry of the United States into the World War, and one would be presumptuous to attempt to evaluate all of them. It is only recently, however, that the blame has been laid upon a determination to protect our trade (an attitude which, regardless of the fact that the United States has never fought about it, seems a reasonable justification for war) and to enforce our ideas of neutral rights. President Wilson said that "The world must be made safe for democracy. Its peace must be planted upon the tested foundation of political liberty;" Mr. J. P. Morgan has stated that we intervened because our cultural sympathy and gratitude to England and France made us fear that otherwise they would lose the war. Certainly there were tremendously greater monetary losses caused by British



interference with the freedom of our commerce with Germany than were caused by German submarine attacks upon our commerce with the Allies. But British activities did not result in loss of life by our citizens. Recollection indicates that from the start of the war, whether from a distrust of Germany fostered by incidents in the Caribbean and elsewhere, or from a racial sympathy with England, gratitude to France, confidence in their democratic institutions, or a combination of all these reasons, the great majority of Americans hoped for Allied success. One may hazard the opinion that it is in the world of ideas rather than business that we must seek the cause of American participation in the World War.

Prior to 1914 successive agreements had formulated rather definite rules concerning belligerent and neutral rights. Public opinion had demanded the codification of these rules, and it seemed that merchants and diplomats had very definite charts to guide them during hostilities. But during the hundred years since the last general war steam propulsion had been perfected, submarines, mines and torpedoes had been invented, and radio and the telegraph had greatly reduced the times necessary for communication. Attempts to apply the fixed rules evolved from disputes of a century before, with little regard for the principles that led to the formation of those rules, met with resistance from the cold facts of modern life.

Blockade now can be as effective five hundred miles from the enemy's coast as within twenty, and is far safer from disruption by minor enemy forces. Privateering is no longer necessary when many fast merchant vessels can be quickly armed and absorbed into the regular forces. Contraband definitions must be elastic when an enemy mobilizes all his industry for the prosecution of the war, and when the industrial condition of the country has so much to do with its ability to convert ordinary commodities to war use. The result in the World War was that, while few of the old principles were denied



by belligerents, most of the existing rules were found to require revision.

Combined with the recognized need for modification of the prize rules, we are today confronted with an idea which some people consider new, and some consider a heritage from the Holy Alliance: the idea that there can be no neutrality in a world fully organized for peace; in other words, that neutrality has no place if all nations agree that they will at all costs prevent war between individual nations. The strong historic desire of the American people to avoid war for themselves and to assist in preventing war for others has led to a considerable recent variation from the previous ideas that it should not judge between nations as to the rightfulness of their disputes, and that its trade and citizens are entitled to the national protection. In an address concerning the request of the Executive to pass a flexible law giving him power to embargo commodities in the American foreign trade, Secretary of State Hull announced that: (1)

" - - - while our primary aim should be to avoid involvement in other people's difficulties and hence to lessen our chance of being drawn into war, we should, on appropriate occasions and within reasonable bounds, use our influence toward the prevention of war and the miseries that attend and follow in its wake. For after all, if peace obtains problems regarding neutrality will not arise.

" Efforts of this government to extend protection to those nationals (trading with belligerents) might lead to difficulties between the United States and the belligerent. It was with these thoughts in mind that the President issued his timely warning that citizens of the United States who engage in transactions of any character with either belligerent would do so at their own risk."

It cannot be said that the attitude of the United States toward the rights of neutral trade has been entirely consistent throughout the whole of its history. It was not inconsistent when during the War of 1812 it adhered to the older prize rules and did not unilaterally adopt for all the liberal ideas it had agreed upon with a few nations. But what shall we say of the decisions of the Executive and the courts during

(1) Radio broadcast as reported in the New York Herald Tribune of November 7, 1935.



the Civil War that blockades were legal when in many cases the naval forces guarding the coasts were entirely inadequate, and that the doctrine of "continuous voyage," previously applied only to contraband, should be extended to cover the shipment of ordinary goods through neutral territory to blockaded ports? And can we say that the second of President Wilson's Fourteen Points, demanding "Absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas, outside territorial waters, alike in peace and in war," and the previous American protests against British treatment of our trade, were consistent with our adoption of very repressive measures against all neutral commerce after we ourselves had entered the World War?

It is easy enough to say that when the United States had a weak Navy, or was itself a neutral, ~~that~~ its voice was strong for the protection of neutral commerce, but that when its Navy had grown strong and it had become involved in war, it favored the application of the old code in all its rigors. With human nature such as it is, this answer can not be dismissed lightly. But its long advocacy of arbitration and peace, of "cultivating general friendship, and of bringing collisions of interest to the umpirage of reason rather than of force;"<sup>(1)</sup> its ~~have~~ acceptance of general and bi-lateral treaties for the ~~more~~ liberalization and the more definite codification of prize rules and other laws of war; its support of measures looking toward the amelioration of the effects of hostilities upon non-combatants; are all of a piece with the ingrained American feeling for individual liberty and humanitarianism, of which the idea of the freedom of the seas is one outgrowth. In spite of occasional swings from a position on one side to a position somewhat on the other side, the United States seems unlikely to abandon its policy of support of neutral rights and property in favor of a policy of suppression of neutral trade because such suppression may for the moment appear to be in the immediate American interest.

(1) Jefferson's Message to Congress, October 17, 1803.



CHAPTER V.

FROSPECTS.

The principal American foreign policies are discussed in the preceding pages, but there have been several others of considerable importance, some of them today still having an interest because of their present influence upon international relationships. For instance, this country has done much to promote the idea of the freedom of an individual to expatriate himself and acquire new citizenship in the land of his choice. The United States has been foremost in advocating the extradition of felons and adamant in opposing the extradition of political refugees. It has participated in nearly every conference that has concerned itself with the codification of International Law or the strengthening of the peace structure through international conciliation, arbitration, and the limitation of national armaments---not at all a new element, as is demonstrated by the continued existence for 118 years of a naval (and, practically, a military) disarmament treaty with respect to the Canadian border.

This paper will make no attempt to go into these phases of American foreign policy, nor to discuss immigration and exclusion, the tariff, and other quasi-political matters which from time to time have occupied the attention of our diplomatic and foreign commercial officials. Every generation, even every administration, has its own peculiar problems whose solutions are of immediate importance for the preservation of friendly relations and the advancement of American interests in the foreign field, but of chief interest are those truly national policies which extend over a period of many years.

The method of treatment herein adopted has not been to give a consecutive narrative of diplomatic history, but rather to cite particular and related incidents, in an effort to discern the trends, the broad sweep, of the main currents of the foreign policies of the United States; to relate their



characteristics to the organization of the national mind; and to discover, if possible, whether or not these currents are likely to carry the American people in the future in the same direction as they have in the past.

To solve the riddle of the future we must find the answer to two questions: first, are the permanent foreign policies as interpreted today substantially consistent with the interpretations given them throughout our history; and second, has the national character of the American people suffered such radical change in the recent past as to presage a new orientation of national life?

To answer the second question first, we may start by admitting that the influx of immigrants of other racial strains during the past seventy-five years has been too rapid to permit orderly and complete assimilation. These foreign elements have brought not only their own social and political ideals, but, far more disruptive in theory, they often retain an active sympathy with the special political problems of their former domicile. The conflicting ideas of the various national groups to some extent counterbalance each other, and from a practical viewpoint, due to their number, may even have the result of strengthening the aloof and neutral attitude traditionally assumed by the United States toward the internal affairs of other nations. Our immigrants still show some tendency to organize into separate national groups, and thus to maintain their own culture instead of absorbing American culture, but this tendency seems less strong since the flow of immigration has been checked, and may diminish with the increase in the time of separation of the new-comers from their former homes. Some rather alarming social consequences have developed that might be traced to an inability to appreciate and reciprocate the toleration that is a feature of the organization of American life, and at times there seems to have occurred a retreat from the idea that the nation exists for the benefit of the individual rather than for the people as a mass.



Changes in the national character might conceivable have followed in the train of the industrial revolution, the tremendous growth of the population, the increasingly universal character of education and culture, greater knowledge of the world through travel and speedier communications, and other conditions of a more active mental life and a more complete material existence. But such things seem as yet to have made few changes in the fundamental conditions: family life, religion, "innate mental constitution," language, national literature, national self-consciousness, political institutions and the democratic spirit. We can not close our eyes ~~that~~ to the fact that the introduction of the foreign influence has <sup>somewhat</sup> ~~xxxxxxx~~/modified the national character; nevertheless, there seems lately to have been a tendency to return to the older tradition, and there are frequent indications that the national traits mentioned in Chapter I (pages 8 and 9) are much like they were at the time the Republic was founded. This brings us back to the first question concerning the present interpretation of our permanent ofreign policies.

The Spanish War was an important milestone of American diplomatic history. While the United States was in some respects a "World Power" almost from its foundation,<sup>(1)</sup> its victory over Spain in 1898 directly brought on the annexation of Hawaii, the Philippines and Porto Rico, furnished an Asiatic interest of sufficient importance to justify the assertion of the Policy of the Open Door and the Territorial Integrity of China, and gave a sharp impetus to the ambition to construct the Panama Canal. Since that date have occurred most of the ventures in Dollar Diplomacy, the two Hague and the London Naval Conferences, the Algeiras affair, the Alaskan seal treaty, the Russo-Japanese War, the World War and its train of political consequences, the rise of the United States as a strong naval power, and the political treaties with regard to China and the Pacific. Since 1898 the United States has achieved a

(1) "An Appeal to Reason," by John Bassett Moore, in "Foreign Affairs," July, 1933, p. 581.



political importance equal to that of any other World Power. Its relationships with the rest of the world have been tremendously affected by its rapid rise as an industrial nation and its degree of material self-sufficiency, and by the increase of its tariff walls to the point where its "favorable" balance of trade has made it a creditor nation with a wholly unwieldy and embarrassing foreign balance.

This position of economic importance, the remarkable success which attended the American effort in the World War, the eagerness of European "maneuvering with us to work us into their - - balances of power," (see page 17), have to some extent gone to the head of the American people. This feeling of self-importance, combined with a realization of United States responsibility as a world power for at least a degree of political collaboration with other nations, and a genuine and unselfish idealism for the promotion of peace, have led the United States into adventures in European affairs unique in history. Its participation in the World War as a full partner of the Allies, actually fighting for their war aims and not for the American objectives that induced Congress to declare war, (see President Wilson's war address), in itself was a complete reversal of position on the question of non-intervention in European politics, because it was exactly for the purpose of avoiding being lured into such wars that the strict Non-Intervention Policy was adopted in the first place. This reversal was continued by President Wilson when he took an active part in arranging the details of the peace settlement, although nine-tenths of them concerned matters having purely European aspects, and many had been in dispute for hundreds of years. The permanent political association of the United States with other powers proposed in the Covenant of the League of Nations was a negation of the long-established rule against entangling alliances, and was avoided only because of the ultimate realization by a majority of the American people that the League was planned as an essentially military alliance of



victors for the enforcement of the peace terms, and as such was in the same category as the detested Holy Alliance of a hundred years before. Although there was little support in the country for the tripartite treaty negotiated by President Wilson for the guarantee of the French eastern border, there has been and still is great support for a "Consultative Pact" with respect to disputed European affairs "to determine which party or parties to the dispute are to be held responsible;" <sup>(1)</sup> the coercive action by other states, which is an implication of the proposed pact, would be likely to involve the United States in a course of action entirely repugnant to its neutrality policy. The proposals to enact flexible "neutrality" legislation, through which the President would have power to discriminate against one party by prohibiting the sale to it of war munitions or even ordinary commodities, as well as to withdraw protection from American citizens and goods found on board the vessels of belligerent powers, certainly constitutes an effort to throw overboard entirely not only the whole neutrality policy, but the championship of the freedom of the seas as well. The Kellogg Pact, which now is rather generally admitted to have no real meaning whatsoever, was a symbol of American repugnance to war, while the fact that the pact contains no sanctions was the practical expression of American feeling against being again drawn into wars in which they have no real interest; the combination of these two features seems for the present to have defeated the intention which "was for M. Briand, before all else, a means to draw the United States, the decisive factor in Allied victory, into the League of Nations." <sup>(2)</sup>

~~But~~ the recent League application of commercial and financial sanctions against Italy, and the possibility of their application in the near future against Germany, enforced, it may be, by military power, brings to the fore the question as to whether this country is willing to be bound by them, and thus

(1) "An Appeal to Reason," by John Bassett Moore, in "Foreign Affairs," July, 1933, p. 573.

(2) do., p. 554



abandon its previous position of refusing to recognize the validity of Pacific Blockade.

There is little doubt that the American people as a whole feel that their intervention in the World War was idealistic and unselfish, and they resent the fact that this has never been appreciated by the Allies. They asked for no material return from the war, and expected that their example in this respect, if followed by other victors, would have gone a long way toward insuring a more permanent peace. When they found themselves unable to compose forever the tremendous racial and national differences that have divided the continent of Europe for a thousand years, they felt that they had been "let down" by the Allies; unreasonable as such a feeling may be, the result has been that they now regret ever having entered the war, and ~~xxx~~<sup>seem</sup> determined never to make any military effort in Europe in the future. Paradoxically, it is exactly this determination to avoid involvement in European wars that leads them to support measures which many experienced diplomats and observers believe will have the effect, if adopted, of insuring such involvement. Many Americans sincerely believe that if the United States were to enter the League of Nations the possibilities that war could be avoided in Europe would be greatly increased, through a self-imposed and unselfish/<sup>American</sup> "leadership" of other nations into the paths of friendship and peace; short of adherence to the League, they favor the Consultative Pact and flexible "neutrality" laws and assert that any one or all of these plans would prevent any situation arising that would call for war on the part of the United States. Aside from any question as to the ~~xxxxxxx~~<sup>possible reluctance</sup> of other nations to accept American "leadership," or the morality of being willing to engage in war to prevent war, these people apparently do not appreciate the impossibility of getting any nation to take an altruistic view of international matters in which their own special interests are involved. A practical opinion as to the difficulties encountered in dealing with



such situations was recently expressed by John Bassett Moore: <sup>(1)</sup>

"But the fundamental defect of the plan was the creation of the warlike devices on the fantastic assumption that the members of the League would, in making use of those devices, divest themselves of their individual interests and prepossessions, of their historic and instinctive antagonisms, and altruistically unite in enforcing the ideal of impartial justice. In the ordinary administration of the law, persons who have formed prejudgments are peremptorily excluded from the jury as being presumptively incapable of weighing the proofs and rendering a fair and just verdict. The members of the Council of the League of Nations are the delegates of governments; the members of the Assembly also represent governments. It cannot either justly or rationally be expected of such bodies to divest themselves of all prepossessions or consciousness of national interests, to say nothing of the fact that they must inevitably differ in opinion. It is for reasons such as these that where a conflict between nations occurs and the warlike devices of the Covenant are invoked they so readily excite apprehension and distrust."

With many Americans trying to push the United States into European politics, with others trying to keep out, and with all averse to entering any European war, the situation is at present ~~more~~ confused. Of the resulting uncertainty as to where the United States stands with respect to its traditional policies, Simonds and Emeny have the following to say: <sup>(2)</sup>

"Confronted by a wholly new international situation, the American people have, as yet, decided upon no viable compromise between tradition and actuality. On the contrary, they, like the British, continue to cherish an apparently ineradicable instinct for 'muddling through.' Inevitably, the result has been an endless series of contradictions and a long-protracted period of confusion. Thus while the national policies of many other powers have seemed clear and their objectives unmistakable, it has always been and still remains a matter of conjecture what ends the people of the United States actually seek."

Without denying that this part of American policy is now in a state of flux, it may be pointed out that the reason for the better definition of the policies of certain other powers is that in the gamble of European politics their very existence as nations is at stake, while the United States, besides trying to protect its foreign trade, is chiefly concerned in keeping out of wars which in no respect threaten its real security. As a matter of fact, in following the pendulum of action from one side to the other, we are merely witnessing the processes of

(1) "An Appeal to Reason," by John Bassett Moore, in "Foreign Affairs," July, 1933, p. 586.

(2) "The Great Powers in World Politics," by Frank H. Simonds and Brooks Emeny, p. 350.



democracy, through which 120,000,000 people ultimately arrive at a conclusion.

For some years there has been a campaign by a considerable number of British politicians and publicists to promote some form of agreement or understanding between Great Britain and the United States to act together in diplomatic affairs, and, if necessary, in naval enforcement of their decisions. The reason given for the adoption of such a scheme is that both countries favor peace, and thus any common action would prevent any other country from gaining improper ends through the use of force against a weaker nation. The advocates of the idea assume an identity of interest of the two "great Anglo-Saxon nations," and have managed to impart to it a sentimental and racial appeal of great influence. If such a scheme were to be consummated, it would be a tremendous triumph for the policy of the "Balance of Power."

Great Britain of necessity has long and successfully pursued the policy of the balance of power, through which groups of nations on the Continent, (and more recently in the Orient), have been kept so aligned as to prevent any one country from obtaining preponderant political and military influence. Great Britain (as is now demonstrated by the events following the German occupation of the demilitarized Rhineland) invariably takes the part of the nation or group which is the weakest at the moment, in order to maintain the balance. Were the United States to be counted upon to back up British action, the <sup>weight</sup> ~~action~~ of the two countries in most cases would be decisive---although sometimes war might ensue.

This effort to form a diplomatic alliance between the two countries is a clear case of "maneuvering" to bring the United States into a political field where it has no real interests. With questions as to the morality of the policy of the balance of power we are not here concerned, but only with the effect upon the future of the United States if it should permit itself to become the tail to another nation's kite. The fact is, American and British interests are not only not



identical, but at most points are opposed to each other. The military situation on the Continent is a matter vital to British national security; it is a matter of complete indifference to the United States with reference to its security, and interesting only from a humanitarian and economic standpoint. The British position in India and China is by no means stable, and England, with her European preoccupations, is not strong enough alone to protect her position against the assaults of several conceivable combinations; the United States not only has no vital stake in Asia, but, in an economic sense, would actually receive benefit from the eclipse of England as an Asiatic power. The United States has a great strategic and financial interest in the Western Hemisphere; should the American position become less predominant in that region, Great Britain would reap a rich political and economic harvest.

Great Britain would obtain all the benefits of a coalition between the two nations, while the United States would bear a most unprofitable share of the cost.

While it may be too early to predict the outcome of the present discussions concerning intervention in European affairs, the maintenance of neutrality, and defense of freedom of the seas, it is reassuring to observe the American aversion to being drawn into another European war, and to note the tendency to liquidate misunderstandings with Latin America and the gradual withdrawal from political commitments in the Orient. These tendencies disclose an increased sympathy toward the traditional policies.

To the writer, the present attitude of Americans toward these policies is not far different from what it was in the <sup>2</sup>early part of the 19th century. Due to greater military strength the determination to maintain a dominant strategic position in the Caribbean and along the Pacific Coast does not require such strong assertion as when the United States negotiated for the purchase of Florida and Cuba, nor when it almost went to war with England over possession of the Oregon country; occa-



sional incidents, however, show this determination to be as strong as ever. In spite of attempts at rapprochement with Latin America, there seems to be no immediate prospect of a renunciation of the Monroe Doctrine. We see today as clearly as did Jefferson the "advantages of a cordial fraternization among all the American nations" (see page 67) and, except for that one majestic sweep of an expanding people across the continent from the Atlantic to the Pacific, and the acquisition of the strategic outposts in Alaska, Hawaii, and the West Indies, the United States has exhibited no desire to extend its political control over its neighbors. The sharp refusal of the American public to support "Dollar Diplomacy" either in the Asiatic or the Americas indicates survival of a belief in the efficacy of patience and toleration, rather than exclusive privilege or war, as the best means for advancing external commercial interests. The attitude of the country toward the payment of war debts due from Europe is derived from the prompt liquidation of Revolutionary obligations, the validation of greenbacks after the Civil War, and patience in the prosecution of financial claims against Latin American states.

The Recognition Policy has suffered many variations of method during its history, and seems now no further off the center of its course than at other times in the past, while the renunciation of territorial imperialism through withdrawal from the Philippines is not only in line with the government's refusal seventy-five years ago to seek easy conquests in other parts of the Orient, but also indicates a reluctance to be drawn into war over questions which are fundamentally commercial. The Open Door is of as great interest to Americans as ever, but its advancement is now sought by the same means as always: political and commercial pressure that does not involve the use of force. So far as concerns Non-Intervention in the affairs of other states in America, the attitude seems stronger for a return to the original practice than at any time during the past fifty years; the tender of



good offices for the accomodation of disputes, either alone or in combination with other American powers, is by no means new, and is not inconsistent with history so long as such tenders refrain from prescribing the conditions of settlement. At times there undoubtedly have appeared indications of an American aspiration to the political hegemony of the Western Hemisphere, but these have not persisted, and the United States has always returned to its true policy of Non-Intervention. The fact that it carries more weight in Pan-American affairs than any other state is due to its size and its widespread business affiliations, rather than to a deliberate attempt through diplomacy to obtain political control throughout the Americas.

The ideal of consistency in foreign policy is likely never to be attained. Many variations in policy have already been noted in this paper, as well as that different statesmen, with differing convictions as to the national interest, have for a time followed divergent lines. The thing to remark, however, is that these variations have always disappeared as soon as the American people have thoroughly examined the questions and have had time to register their disapproval.

Quotations have been made from pronouncements of several of our presidents and secretaries of state. While such statements have sometimes been made for political effect, and cannot always be taken at their face value, when political leaders continue to express the same ideas over several generations, and then follow with similar actions, we may be sure that they express the true convictions of their constituents, and that these particular policies are established in the hearts of the people.

We finish as we commenced: American foreign policy is the product of the American national character and method of government, and is likely to change only as these change. Just as  
H<sub>A</sub> certain other nations are unable to accomodate themselves to other than a despotic national government, and even after



violent revolution immediately set up governments more despotic than ever, so the democratic form is instinctive in the American national system, and grows stronger as the years pass by. This being a fundamental of the national existence, reactions to new situations in the field of foreign affairs, in the future as in the past, will doubtless be governed by the democratic ideal of non-interference and toleration. A consolidation of friendly <sup>inter-American</sup> relationships in politics <sup>and culture</sup> and trade, ~~with~~ ~~the~~ ~~gradual~~ ~~retreat~~ ~~from~~ ~~European~~ ~~and~~ ~~Oriental~~ ~~politics~~, a gradual ~~with~~ retreat from European and Oriental politics, a definite effort to establish mutually beneficial economic contacts, a firm defense of neutral rights, a thoroughgoing assurance of national security, together constitute a reasonable prediction, (and an ardent hope), for the main lines of the future foreign policy of the United States.

THE END.



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