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Senior Class of 1938

THESIS

PRESENT TRENDS IN THE FOREIGN POLICIES OF THE UNITED STATES AS AFFECTING THE MONROE DOCTRINE AND THE CARIBBEAN POLICY

Submitted by

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American foreign policy -- what it is and how to define it is a difficult task. Certainly as history progresses it becomes more complicated and, needfully so, ever changing. Professor Simond sums up foreign policy quite conclusively by saying: "The foreign policy of a country is the system of strategy which it adopts for the conduct of its international relations and that the objectives of this are national security and prosperity." Professor Baxter of Williams College stated that national security is the primary consideration of all governments and is the first national consideration. The economic and social well being of the people of the United States depend to a large extent on national prosperity. We can say then that as far as the United States is concerned a foreign policy which has as its objective security for the state and prosperity for the people is one which promotes our national interests. It is a difficult matter, however, for our foreign policy to bring prosperity to the entire country, because of the extent of territory and the diversity of interests which exist in the various sections.

For the United States, national security implies more than the defense of the homeland and territorial possessions, it includes also the protection of our vital trade routes and the safe guarding of life and property of our nationals residing in foreign countries.

The policies of the United States have been largely conditioned by certain fundamental factors, which at various times during our history have played a large part in determining the policies necessary to attain our main objectives.

Among these factors are geography, natural resources, internal economy, and the characteristics of the people.

The decisive factor in the determination of American policies toward the countries of the Western Hemisphere is our geographical position. It is that which has made it possible for us to adopt a policy of non-entanglement in the political affairs of Europe and has made it possible to avoid entanglements in Asia. It is that which made it essential for us to concern ourselves with political developments in all parts of the Western Hemisphere. This aspect of American foreign policy has been recognized by our statesmen from the very beginning of the Republic. Recognition of it is absolutely essential to the understanding of the American policy today.

Geographical position, though most important, is not the only factor tending to draw the countries of the Western Hemisphere together. In the matter of natural resources and internal economy the countries of this Hemisphere complement each other. The United States, for example, exports the products of its manufacturing industries and imports the raw materials and foodstuffs that are required for the homeland. The other countries of the Western Hemisphere supply the markets for the manufactured goods and provide the raw materials and foodstuffs needed to supply the demand made by us. The United States also is in a position to supply capital needed for the development of the resources of the states of the Western Hemisphere.

Another fundamental factor which enters into the formulation of our national policies and which presents difficulties of greater or less proportions is the characteristics of the people. Except for Canada, the countries of the Western

Hemisphere are inhabited by peoples who are of a different racial and cultural character from our own. The great majority are of Spanish or Portuguese origin, with an entirely different background and environment than the peoples of the United States. Professor Rippy describes the people of the Latin American countries as consisting of: "A class system, little experienced in self-government, a wealthy, powerful, and intolerant established church, intellectual repression, and a poor, illiterate, and superstitious population." This is certainly true of most of the countries of Latin America, and it is only natural then that social and economic progress should be slow, and that governments should lack stability, and that democracy exists more in theory than in fact.

So we see that in the study of American foreign policy towards the countries of the Western Hemisphere account must be taken of the diversive as well as the unifying factors. With Canada we have had no trouble in satisfying our demands of security and our economic well-being with the greatest degree of co-operation and with mutual understanding and respect. In the case of the countries to the south our relations have been less peaceful and our advances have been viewed with distrust and at times with open opposition. Not only have we had to take into account differences in race, ideas, politics, culture, and social development between the Latin American peoples and ourselves, but also we have had to contend with the differences between the Latin American countries with which we have had to deal.

The principal policies of the United States with respect to the Western Hemisphere may be summed up as three in number. First in significance from the view point of time

and basic importance is the Monroe Doctrine, which represents our claim to the right of self-defense in the Western Hemisphere. Professor Goodrich aptly describes it by saying that it is perhaps the most generally talked of, of American foreign policies and the least understood. Secondly, and closely related to the Monroe Doctrine is the Caribbean policy, which is a more recent policy than the Monroe Doctrine, and can be regarded as applying the right of self-defense to a specific area. Thirdly, we have the policy of Pan-Americanism which aims to bind the Americas together. Pan-Americanism, which implies mutual beneficial co-operation by the twenty two Republics, rests upon the assumption that they comprise a state system distinct from that of Europe, and that they possess common ideas, principles and interests. In order to appropriately discuss and evaluate the trends of the American policies dealing with these principles, it would seem necessary to go somewhat into their background and origin.

-II-

The Monroe Doctrine

The Monroe Doctrine derives its name from President Monroe, who in the course of his address to Congress in December, 1823, stated certain principles which were to guide us in our relations with Europe and the countries of the Western Hemisphere. Basically, this doctrine, as originally proclaimed, rested on two complementary principles: first, that the United States would not interfere with the political affairs of Europe and, secondly, that European countries would not be expected to interfere with the political affairs of the countries of the Western Hemisphere.

The statement of this doctrine may be regarded as the natural growth of public opinion caused by pressure from France in the South and the Caribbean, and Russia in the northwest. At a meeting of the powers at Verona in 1822, it was decided that France should intervene in the Spanish revolution to restore the power of monarchy. England, however, was opposed to this action, partly through sympathy with the constitutional government, and partly through fear that the intervention would be extended to the revolting Spanish colonies in America, with the result that France might establish political control there, and in any case, that Latin American ports would be closed to British trade. Canning, the British Foreign Minister at the time, proposed to the American Minister at London a joint statement of policy on the part of the British and American governments in opposition to any such intervention in Latin America. The American government finally decided, largely on the insistence of John Quincy Adams, that our position should be stated as a purely American doctrine; British support being

assured by the extent and nature of British commercial interests.

Shortly before this occurance, on the 4th of September, 1821, the Emperor of Russia had issued an Ukase by which he claimed the northwestern coast of North America down to the fifty-first degree. This claim was incompatible with American claims and was contested by Secretary Adams in a statement to the Russian Minister in which the principle was set forth that "The American continents are no longer subjects for any new European colonial establishments." This language was substantially incorporated into President Monroe's message to Congress. The Monroe Doctrine is found in two widely separated paragraphs that occur in the President's message of December 2, 1823. The important statements are the following:

"The American continents, by the free and independent conditions which they have assumed and maintained, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European powers."

"We owe it, therefore, to candor and to the amicable relations existing between the United States and these powers to declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety. With the existing colonies or dependencies of any European power we have not interfered and shall not interfere. But with the governments who have declared their independence and maintained it, and whose independence we have on great consideration and on just principles, acknowledged we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them or controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any European power in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition towards the United States."

The Monroe Doctrine asserts our national right of self-defense in the Western Hemisphere. It is a policy which is influenced by our geographical position and which has as its objective our national security. In this doctrine our policy of non-interference in the political affairs of Europe is reiterated. The Monroe Doctrine not only has been

constantly upheld by our government, but it has been developed to meet new situations which have threatened our security. In 1848 President Polk invoked this in his objection to the voluntary transfer of territory by an American state to a European state. Since its announcement the Monroe Doctrine has been invoked repeatedly to prevent any foreign nation from gaining a foothold on the American continents, which might be developed into a base for military or naval operations against the United States, its possession or its trade routes.

In 1895, in the course of a boundary dispute between Great Britain and Venezuela, the United States intervened under the Monroe Doctrine to force Great Britain to accept arbitration. Secretary Olney's argument was that in a case of a dispute between an American republic and a European nation, where the latter enjoyed a distinct superiority of power and refused to submit the matter to arbitration, the enforcement by the European nation of its claim might constitute an extention of its territory or form of government which would come under the ban of the Monroe Doctrine. While in one or two instances the United States has opposed the settlement of boundary disputes between American republics by European agencies, there would seem to be nothing in such action contrary to the Monroe Doctrine and our considered action has not been to so consider it. When the Doctrine was first announced it received the sympathy and approval of the Latin American republics. While most of our own people and perhaps most of the people of Latin America regarded it as a measure designed primarily for our own country, no objection was voiced at first by any of the Latin American states, as this doctrine protected them against non-American

aggression. As the United States increased in power and wealth, a change in attitude towards the United States became apparent in many of the Latin American republics. Later some of the reasons which caused this change will be discussed, and also the action that the United States has taken in recent years to regain the confidence and good will of its Latin American neighbors.

-III-

The Panama Canal and the Caribbean Policy

As early as 1810 our government showed interest in the Caribbean area. With our expansion toward the west, interest became keen and in 1846 we negotiated a treaty with New Granada by which the United States acquired the right of way across the Isthmus of Panama. The interest in the canal came to the fore with the discovery of gold in California. The Clayton-Bulwer Treaty resulted. This treaty provided for a canal under the joint protection of England and the United States. Interest lagged for many years after this, our country being occupied with its civil war and its devastating results, and it was not until 1878 when it was realized that a canal might be constructed under other than Anglo-American auspices that our interest revived. Then the public sentiment demanded that the canal should be strictly an American enterprise. Consequently from this time on the construction, operation, and defense of a trans-Isthmian canal became a vital concern and was the principal basis for developing a Caribbean policy.

In November, 1903, the people of Panama declared themselves independent of Columbia and a few days later the United States recognized the independence of the Republic of Panama. On November 18, 1903, the United States signed a

treaty with Panama by which it obtained in perpetuity, a zone of land 10 miles wide to be used for the construction of a canal. Work was started at once and the Panama Canal was opened to commerce on August 15, 1914.

The methods employed by the United States in acquiring the Panama Canal Zone caused much indignation throughout Latin America and placed the United States in an unfavorable light. A treaty was finally made with Columbia in 1914 in which the United States expressed regret for its action and agreed to pay Columbia the sum of $25,000,000.

With the Panama Canal completed, its operation and defense became of vital concern to the United States and the principal basis for the further development of our Caribbean policy, which had been initiated prior to the Mexican war when we were greatly concerned in preventing the acquisition of Cuba by Great Britain or France. The Panama Canal was of great importance to us from a strategic stand point as well as for economic reasons. So that our interests in the Caribbean became very complicated and our policy of exercising an international police power there aroused much criticism and hostility in the Latin American countries. However, it was essentially necessary at the time, even though we have suffered from it as a result.

I will speak briefly of the problems with which we had to deal. First, of course, the possibility that some foreign power might welcome a pretext for effecting lodgement within the circle of this strategical area was continually a possibility to be reckoned with, alertly, before the World War. We assumed a responsibility for foreign nationals and property within those republics where law and order might collapse: intervening by force to make them behave

lest good reasons be presented for intervention by some other power less vitally interested in the strategy of the Caribbean. It is interesting to note here, in view of what is now happening in Germany, that it was Germany at that time we had to fear more than any other European country.

In 1902, an international incident in Venezuela made American opinion fear that Isthmian diplomacy of the United States might be frustrated by the lodgement of Germany within striking distance of the future canal. In 1901, the German, British and Italian governments decided to press certain claims which their citizens held against Venezuela. In response to a German inquiry as to whether the United States would regard coercive action as a violation of the Monroe Doctrine, Secretary Hay said:

"We do not guarantee any state against punishment if it misconducts itself, provided that punishment does not take the form of the acquisition of territory by any non-American power."

As a result of an agreement to arbitrate certain of the claims in question serious consequences were averted. Apparently, in the case of Germany, some pressure was brought to bear by President Theodore Roosevelt to secure this result; the German government apparently desiring to test us out on the Monroe Doctrine. This incident provided justification for the exercise of a police power in the Caribbean area by the United States.

It was with reluctance, as means of preventing a repetition of the Venezuela incident, that Roosevelt decided to accept the protection of San Domingo. The republic was in a state of virtual bankruptcy. Most of the creditors were European and pressing for the recognition of their claims. Roosevelt accepted the responsibility of operating the Dominican customs and protecting the rights of all the credi-

ors. In presenting the agreement to be made with the Dominican Republic to Congress, President Roosevelt said:

"It has for some time been obvious that those who profit by the Monroe Doctrine must accept certain responsibilities along with the rights which it confers; and that the same statement applies to those who uphold the doctrine. It cannot be too often and too emphatically asserted that the United States has not the slightest desire for territorial aggrandizement at the expense of any of its southern neighbors, and will not treat the Monroe Doctrine as an excuse for such aggrandizement on its part... The justification for the United States taking this burden and incurring this responsibility is to be found in the fact that it is incompatible with international equity for the United States to refuse to allow other powers to take the only means at their disposal of satisfying the claims of their creditors and yet to refuse, itself, to take any such step."

This is known as the "Roosevelt corollary" to the Monroe Doctrine. It has recently been repudiated.

Other diplomatic developments in the Caribbean area I will review briefly. First, of course, our relations with Cuba based upon economic and strategic interests. We established a virtual protectorate over Cuba, under which Cuba promised not to grant any territorial concessions to foreign powers, not to incur any excessive public indebtedness, to permit the United States to intervene at any time for the preservation of Cuban independence and the adequate prohibition of life and property and to lease to the United States certain lands for naval and coaling stations. These provisions, which were incorporated in the Platt amendment, governed the relations between the United States and Cuba down to their recent abrogation by the Roosevelt administration in 1934.

During President Taft's administration we intervened in Nicaragua and in Hondurus, as we had done in the Dominican Republic and for the same reasons. The Senate at first had opposed the Dominican treaty, therefore they refused to ratify the proposed Nicaraguan protectorate and a

similar one which Secretary Knox negotiated with Hondurus. President Taft gave to these proposed treaties the unfortunate description of "dollar diplomacy."

The policy of armed intervention was again relied upon in the case of Haiti. The events there paralelled those of Santa Domingo. We stepped in when Germany was about to land Marines there as the World War began. At this time, the internal and financial conditions of Haiti were in a most deplorable state. With the promise of no designs on the political or territorial integrity of Haiti, President Wilson ordered the intervention by American forces in 1915. This was done for the protection of foreign lives and property, as well as for the settlement of financial claims.

Our policy of exercising an international police power in the Caribbean area aroused much criticism and hostility in Latin American countries. It weakened the efforts to develop good feeling between them and the United States on the basis of improved trade relations. The Latin American countries regarded our action as a violation of their independence and a threat to their existence. The repeated interventions alienated all sympathy and support which these countries had given to our Monroe Doctrine from the time it was first proclaimed. A feeling arose in some of these states that the policy of the United States had changed from one of benevolent protection to one of imperial aggression. President Wilson realized this condition at the beginning of his administration when he said: "The United States will never again seek one additional foot of territory by conquest."

There were many people who believed that our interests could be best secured by enlisting the friendship and

co-operation of the Latin American peoples. This belief eventually led to a radical change in our relations with the Latin American republics. This change of policy will be taken up later on in this discussion.

-IV-

Pan Americanism

The Monroe Doctrine aims to protect the Americas from overseas aggression. Pan Americanism, which implies the binding together of the twenty-two Republics for their mutual benefit, rests upon the assumption that they comprise a state system distinct from Europe and that they possess common ideals, principles and interests.

In 1881, Secretary of State Blaine invited all the independent countries of North and South America to a congress in Washington for the purpose of considering and discussing methods of preventing wars between the countries of America and for cultivating friendly commercial relations. The war between Chile and Peru prevented this conference from meeting until 1889. This meeting marked the beginning of Pan Americanism as a policy of the United States. The most important result of the 1889 conference was the establishment of a Bureau of American Republics in Washington.

Other Pan American conferences have been held from time to time. The second met in the City of Mexico in 1901, the third in Rio de Janeiro in 1906, the fourth in Buenos Aires in 1910, and the fifth in Santiago, Chile, in 1923. These Pan American gatherings have, as a whole, achieved fortunate results. They have formulated agreements to improve trade and commerce and to better sanitation. They have expressed common ideals as to interna-

tional peace, and have drawn up treaties providing for international arbitration, while the leaders of various American Republics have come to know and appreciate each other better. Probably the most important achievement of the conferences has been the development of the Pan American Union.

Pan American sentiment has always been stronger in the United States than in the Latin American Republics. In the decade following the conference of 1889, ill will and distrust toward the United States began to be apparent on the part of the Latin American countries. This was partly due to our acquisition of territory in the Caribbean area and to the establishment of naval bases at strategic points in that area. When the United States, in 1914, occupied Vera Cruz by its military forces, the action was at once resented throughout Latin America. This attitude changed, however, when our government accepted the mediation of Brazil, Argentina, and Chili. When the delegates of these three Republics, with those of the United States and Mexico, sat around a common table and discussed the settlement of this critical problem of America, it made a deep impression and was accepted as genuine co-operation.

President Wilson's declaration in 1916 that the United States would seek no more territory by conquest, and his refusal to be drawn into a war with Mexico improved, for a time, the relations between the United States and the Latin American Republics; but our decision not to join the League of Nations was interpreted by many of them as a step toward further American imperialism.

Pan American sentiment rose to its greatest height

with the advent of the World War. The Latin American Republics soon realized that as neutrals they had a new bond with the United States, for they were deeply interested in preserving their rights by international law from the aggression of any of the belligerents. When the United States declared war against Germany, Latin Americans, in general, felt that our nation was acting in accordance with high principles and idealistic motives, and the majority of these countries accepted the invitation to follow its course of action.

During President Hoover's administration the United States made a start toward changing its policy of intervention in Latin American countries. This continued under President Roosevelt's administration. At the seventh Pan American Conference held at Montevideo in December, 1933, Secretary of State Hull said:

"No nation need fear any intervention on the part of the United States under the Roosevelt administration."

In a speech made on December 28, 1933, President Roosevelt said:

"The definite policy of the United States from now on is one opposed to armed intervention.

"The main constitutional government in other nations is not a sacred obligation devolving upon the United States alone. The maintenance of law and the orderly processes of government in this hemisphere is the concern of each individual nation within its own borders first of all. It is only if and when the failure of orderly processes affects the other nations of the continent that it becomes their concern; and the point to stress is that in such an event it becomes the joint concern of a whole continent in which we are all neighbors."

A great deal has been done towards removing the causes of suspicion and promoting a better understanding between Latin America and the United States, by what has come to be known as the "Good Neighbor" policy of the present administration in Washington. President Roosevelt

has defined this policy in the following words:

"I would dedicate this nation to the policy of the good neighbor -- the neighbor who resolutely respects himself and because he does so, respects the rights of others -- the neighbor who respects his obligations and respects the sanctity of his agreements in and with a world of neighbors."

With this understanding, Pan Americanism has tended to develop a more friendly co-operation between the American Republics and helped to bind them together in all matters of mutual concern.

-V-

Developments Since the Beginning of the Twentieth Century

In the preceding discussion, the inception and evolution of the three principal policies of the United States with respect to the countries of Latin America have been traced. The trends of these policies will now be considered from the beginning of the twentieth century to the present time.

There have been a few small wars between the nations of the New World in the twentieth century but in comparison to the Old World their general lot has been one of comparative peace and serenity in international affairs.

During the last thirty years the Monroe Doctrine has been most effective in preventing the spreading of rivalries and wars from Europe and Asia to these two continents. A glance at the map of Asia and Africa will show the advances of European and Japanese imperialism, while the map of South America shows the persistence there of sovereign independence.

While the Monroe Doctrine did protect the Latin American states against non-American aggression, unfortunately many people in Latin America, at least until very

recently, felt that this protection was merely a cloak for imperialistic action on the part of the United States. The unnecessary declaration of Secretary Olney, Secretary of State in 1895, that "the will of the United States is sovereign on the American continent," also the action taken by this country, which has been described previously in this paper, in its exercise of its police power in the Caribbean, based by President Theodore Roosevelt upon our adherence to the Monroe Doctrine, aroused great suspicion as to our real intentions toward our Latin American neighbors. Undoubtedly this difficulty of understanding was increased by differences of languages, temperament and culture between the people of North and South America. So through the years the Latin American countries have had little love for the United States. "Yankee Imperialism", "The Big Stick", "Manifest Destiny", and Intervention were the threats under which Latin American pride and dignity continually chafed. Two important conferences first the one at Montevideo, later the one at Buenos Aires, both called at the suggestion of President Roosevelt, were such as to mark the beginning of a new epoch in this hemisphere. At the adjournment of the conference at Montevideo, a complete revolution of feeling had taken place among the nations of the Americas, and an attitude of friendliness, of understanding, and of trust in the motives and purposes of each had resulted. It was the diplomacy and the sympathetic understanding displayed by Cordell Hull, our Secretary of State who headed our delegation, that won the confidence of the continent. President Roosevelt made good all of Mr. Hull's implied promises and assurances with such tangible acts as the ab-

rogation of the Platt Admendment, the withdrawal of the Marines from Haiti, and the launching of the reciprocity trade treaties. These latter have definitely stimulated business, but more important is the feeling of mutual benefit between the countries.

This change in attitude has re-acted to our advantage, particularly in the matter of trade. Following the depression of 1929, the amount of our foreign trade fell to a small percentage of its former level, and the rise of economical nationalism abroad, especially in Europe, made it most difficult to recover the trade we had lost. Due to the goodwill and co-operation which was evidenced throughout the Inter-American Conference, held in Buenos Aires in December, 1936, a ground work for profitable international trade was laid by adopting resolutions for a gradual reduction of high tariffs and other trade barriers. The wisdom of concentrating our efforts at trade revival in the Western Hemisphere has been proven by an increase in export trade with the Latin American countries which is believed at the present time to surpass all other countries with the possible exception of Germany.

The action taken by this Conference at Buenos Aires also bore to a certain extent upon our policy of the Monroe Doctrine. The conventions for the "Maintenance, Preservation and Re-establishment of Peace" (popularly known as the Consultative Pact) was presented as a joint project by all the Delegations. The terms of this convention are an adaptation of a Brazilian project which, using the language of President Monroe, in 1823, referred to the possible interposition of non-American power in any American country with which it had no existing political relationship,

stamped such interposition as an unfriendly act and pledged the contracting parties immediately to consult one another. It thus sought to make the Monroe Doctrine the common doctrine of all the American Republics. This direct challenge to Europe, however, encountered opposition and as finally accepted by the Conference, this article refers in general terms to the situation arising "in the event that the peace of the American Republics is menaced," and it calls in such an event for mutual consultation by the American Republics "for the purpose of finding and adopting methods of peaceful co-operation." The second article in this convention goes beyond the scope of the Monroe Doctrine. It deals with two distinct situations, the one arising in the event of war between American states, the other in the event of "an international war outside America." In both cases provision is made for consultation between the governments of the American Republics; but in the former case the consultation is described as having as its object "a method of peaceful collaboration" within the terms of the Treaty of Paris of 1928 and the Argentine Anti-War Pact of 1933. In the case of war "outside America" which might menace the peace of the American Republics the language used in the convention is non-committal; the consultation is to take place but its object is to determine when and how the American states may, if they so desire, "eventually co-operate in some action tending to preserve the peace of the American continent". In spite of the guarded language of the convention, it is generally accepted as a step forward in the peace machinery of the Western Hemisphere.

The most important factor of this convention is probably its bearing on the "continentalizing" the Monroe

Doctrine. It will be remembered that at various times efforts have been made by many Latin American states to bring the Monroe Doctrine out in the open and secure its re-definition, but such attempts had always been suppressed by the United States. At Buenos Aires the United States not only did not oppose this proposal but gave it active support. If it had not been for the objection of one of the Latin American countries, it is probable that the very words of the Monroe Doctrine would have been used in this convention.

Although the terms of the Consultative Pact, or the "Monroe Doctrine" Convention as it has been called, do not go so far as to really establish a system of "collective security" for the American continent, it may be said that they do recognize the "joint responsibility" of the American republics to render less likely actual war between them. The provision of consultation also lessens the likelihood of an attack on an American state by a non-American state, because it enables the American states to join forces against aggressors. Should an outside nation attack an American state thus menacing the peace of the American Republics, consultation would be called for, with the purpose of "finding and adopting methods of peaceful co-operation." In such a case the Buenos Aires conventions leave the individual states, for example the United States, under the Monroe Doctrine, full freedom of action, once the consultation has taken place. The present trend is to make the Doctrine continental in scope rather than a unilateral policy of the United States; a doctrine that will command the support of all the nations of America, allowing to each, however, complete freedom of action with

reference to the time, the place, and the circumstance of its application.

This change in policy of the Government of the United States has served to remove much of the misgiving and suspicion which has characterized the attitude of the Latin American peoples during the latter years of the nineteenth and the opening of the twentieth century, and has been one of the most important factors in bringing about the era of good feeling upon which we are now entering.

During the last decade, the Caribbean policy of the United States has received a new orientation. The way the Nicaraguan affair was handled by Secretary of State Stimson was an indication of new spirit of our policy of handling such cases. During the Hoover administration, the Nicaraguan intervention was completed and arrangements were made for the termination of the American control of Haiti. The State Department gave a further indication of the new orientation of our policy when, after one of the attacks of Sandino's forces in Nicaragua, it announced that, "this government cannot undertake general protection of Americans throughout that country with American forces." The general shift in policy had to a degree been foreshadowed by the publication in 1930 of a memorandum on the Monroe Doctrine written by J. Rueben Clark, at the time Under Secretary of State. The memorandum, although never officially endorsed by the administration, attracted wide attention because of its strict construction of the terms of the Monroe Doctrine, repudiating the "Roosevelt Corollary" as unjustified by the words of the original statement of the Doctrine, it fell back on the right of self-preservation and self-defense, as the legal basis for

intervention by the United States. This very clear statement of fact, while in no way condemning intervention as such, undoubtedly had a deterrent effect on such action. The policy of avoiding military intervention except when absolutely necessary for the protection of vital interests was followed by President Roosevelt in 1933 at the time of the Cuban revolution.

In 1933, at the Montevideo Conference, we accepted for the first time the principle of non-intervention and also agreed that

> "the territory of a state is inviolable and may not be the object of military occupation nor of other measures of force imposed by another state directly or indirectly or for any motive whatever even temporarily."

On the outbreak of internal disturbances in Nicaragua the Roosevelt administration stated that it would not "intervene directly or indirectly in the domestic concerns of any American Republic." When it was suggested that we co-operate with other American republics in treating with the various political factions of Nicaragua, our government took the stand that our participation

> "must depend in the first place upon the willingness of all political factions in Nicaragua to invite the good offices of other friendly American nations; that in the event, and only in the event, that such invitation was unanimously extended, this governemtn would then be disposed to determine whether it would take part in a joint tender of good offices after consulting with other interested nations of this hemisphere."

It would appear that the United States has not only accepted the policy of non-intervention, but has definitely committed itself by international agreement to that course of action in the future, by accepting the protocol previously mentioned relative to non-intervention included in the recent Buenos Aires Conference.

Very definite manifestations of change in our Carib-

bean policy were evidenced by the Roosevelt administration when treaties with Cuba and Panama were negotiated to take the place of the treaties of 1903. The treaty with Cuba in 1934 abolished the special relationship that previously existed with that country under the Platt Amendment. The new treaty "has made it emphatically clear that this government will not intervene directly or indirectly in the political concerns of the Cuban people." However, the United States retains the right under international law to take necessary measures in its own defense. Our sincere desire to comply with this treaty was shown by our procedure during the revolutions and disorders which have occurred in Cuba during the last few years. Although we had a number of naval vessels in Cuban waters, they were under orders only to remove American citizens and foreignors whose lives were in danger.

No doubt this show of force had its moral effect on the Cubans and aided our diplomatic representatives who were trying to assist in restoring order. Anyway, armed intervention was avoided in accordance with the changed policy. The legal obligation of the United States has been removed and Cuba now has the same status as any other country.

Under the agreement with Panama which was signed March 2, 1936, and now awaits ratification, the United States gave up three important rights which it held under the treaty of 1903: the guarantee of Panamanian independence, the right of intervention for the maintenance of the canal, and the right to acquire lands necessary for the construction, operation and maintenance of the canal by eminent domain. The grievance over the annual

payments to Panama in devalued dollars has been adjusted by an agreement to pay 430,000 balboas yearly.

This agreement with Panama is just another step on the part of the United States towards abandoning our imperialistic attitude toward other American states and is in line with the "good neighbor" policy of the present administration. As has been stated, this treaty has not been ratified by the United States Senate, and there has arisen considerable opposition to its approval, based on the opinion that we should not share our acquired rights in the canal which we built and also the question as to whether the defense of the canal can be assured by a policy of joint responsibility. It would appear that in the observance of this treaty much would depend upon the good faith of future governments of Panama and the extent to which these governments of Panama could be depended upon for the action necessary to insure adequate measures being taken for the operation and defense of the canal.

Though much has been done in the last few years to foster the growth of Pan Americanism, there is still much to be accomplished before continental good will and understanding become a fact. It may be said that the existance of three barriers between the republics of this continent and ourselves form the obstacle which must be removed before Pan Americanism reaches its goal. There existed in the first place the barrier of suspicion on the part of our neighbors that the United States intended to dominate the continent through armed force or through its preponderant material strength whenever it suited us to do so. We have already discussed how the change in policy of the government of the United States has served to remove

much of the suspicion and misgiving of the Latin American peoples and has helped to bring about the era of good feeling upon which we are now entering.

The second barrier was equally formidable. It was the economic barrier created by high tariffs and which prevented to a large extent the sale in American markets of the products upon the export of which the prosperity and national economy of the Latin American republics depended. This policy of high protective tariffs had the effect of making the other countries of this continent reluctant to buy from us and also made them inclined to blame us for their distress during the world depression. The fact that our economic system supplements theirs is an important factor in this situation. Practically all the Latin American nations are large producers of food stuffs and raw materials, and they furnish, therefore, the natural market for the manufactured products of the United States. The axiom that you can not sell unless you buy was recognized by the present administration in Washington and a reciprocal trade agreement program was adopted for the purpose of lowering trade barriers and to increase the market for American exports. The authorizing law was passed in 1934, and since that time reciprocal trade treaties have been concluded with the following countries of this continent, in the order of signing; Cuba, Haiti, Brazil, Canada, Hondurus, Columbia, Guatemala, Nicaragua (expired this month, March, 1938), El Salvador and Costa Rica. Imports from these countries increased 18 percent last year. The State Department is now negotiating for similar treaties with Equador and Venezuela and for a new treaty with Canada.

Under the "unconditional most-favored-nation" clause, the benefits in each dual treaty apply to all the treaty-

making nations. Secretary of State Hull has made these treaties the key stone of his foreign policy, holding that expansion of world trade is a necessary condition for world peace.

The example of Canada shows how practical results can be obtained from these negotiations. Before the trade agreement of 1936, Canada and the United States had engaged in a virtual trade war for more than five years. Since its ratification, every important trade controversy has been straightened out and the volume of business between the two countries has increased 50% over a comparable pre-agreement period. No more constructive step to further the good will between the Latin American republics and ourselves could be conceived. We need their markets and they need ours.

The third barrier, that of cultural and language differences has been a decided element in retarding the development of good will and understanding between the Latin American countries and ourselves. Politically they belong to the Western Hemisphere and the sense of liverty and the rights of free nations is everywhere strong. Culturally they are essentially European. Of Old World stock, principally Spanish and Portuguese, there people have long looked to Europe for their education and culture and it is that influence which has developed their civilization. It is only in comparatively recent times that any attempt on the part of the United States has been made to surmount the cultural barrier which exists between the two continents. These difficulties are not easy to overcome, as can be seen by the comparison of the United States with its English language, literature, common law and

customs compared to the southern republics with their romance languages and Latin traditions. With the advent of the radio, moving pictures, and quicker means of transportation, an era of greater understanding and sympathy was inaugurated. Many voluntary agencies, such as the Institute of International Education, the Guggenheim Foundation, and the Carnegie Institute have already achieved much to strengthen the bonds between the two continents. At the Inter-American Conference, which was proposed by President Roosevelt and held in Buenos Aires in December, 1936, a convention for the promotion of Inter-American cultural relations was adopted, by which each of the American governments will award fellowships in some one of their universities or colleges to two graduate students or teachers from each other American country, and will receive an exchange professor from each of the other republics to lecture and to teach in appropriate institutions of learning. Such cultural interchange will contribute enormously to a better appreciation abroad of the methods of government and of the habits of thought and modes of life in each of the respective countries, and will assist greatly in preventing the misconceptions and needless misunderstandings which unfortunately have so often prejudiced inter-American relations in the past.

If we succeed in leveling these barriers, our inter-American policy will be made of durable material. What greater practical benefit to the United States can there be than a co-operative relationship between the democracies of the western world, free from suspicion and mistrust, and based upon common political and commercial advantage?

The people of the United States, blissful in their

geographical security and busy exploiting economic frontiers, have never turned their minds seriously to the creation of a continuing foreign policy which would guide its conduct in relation to the other members of the society of nations. Isolation and neutrality are the nearest approach to such a policy that we have achieved, and even they have not been continuous or wholly consistant. But it required little thought or reasoning to arrive at a conclusion that a nation is better off if it keeps out of other countries' quarrels -- if it minds its own business and offends no one.

One of the influences affecting the relations of the United States with the republics of Latin America is traceable to the determination of the American people to withdraw as far as possible from participation in European affairs. Whether this is possible or not is an open question, but no one can doubt the marked trend of American opinion in this direction. The United States has done much to develop the present principles of neutrality and has long been the champion of the rights of neutral states. The Neutrality Act of May 1, 1937, represents the present American policy of neutrality and gives the President new weapons with which to maintain our neutrality.

Isolation was not only easy but essential in the early days of our republic when it was necessary that we be let alone to work out our problems and our destiny. But the fact remains today that we are preparing for or against war at a rate which would have been deemed impossible two or three years ago. Our government has decided that whether the public agrees yet or not, merely wishing for the desirable state of isolation will not assure its

blessings to us or our posterity; it believes that more positive steps must be taken.

The belief that this nation could pursue a policy of "self-containment" and at the same time share in prosperous commerce with others by selling and not buying proved to be a delusion. In the recent economic dislocation, the United States has been a victim of her own folly of political isolation and economic nationalism. The advent of the present administration in Washington brought a change in our policy of isolation, and while holding in the main to the original conception, has placed a more liberal interpretation upon its application. We shun political commitments which might entangle us in foreign wars; we avoid connection with the political activities of the League of Nations, but co-operate in the social and humanitarian work at Geneva. We are not isolationists except in so far as we seek to isolate ourselves completely from war. Yet we must remember that so long as war exists, there will always be danger that even the nation which most earnestly desires peace may be drawn into war. The peace and security of the nations of the Western Hemisphere depend in a large part on the attitude of the United States in her policy of international collaboration.

In the 18th. and 19th. centuries, the essentials of our foreign policy were clearly defined and successfully achieved in the teeth of a hostile world. Looking back we made no serious mistakes from our independence to the beginning of the 20th. century. At this time the United States entered a period of readjustment to its new position as a world power. Then there were mistakes and we are just now recovering from the unfortunate results.

Notably in the Caribbean the United States was clearly pursuing its vital interests. It could have secured them following the liberation of Cuba and in the conquest of Porto Rico without intervention. The Panama Canal Zone did not need to be acquired as it was. It was a mistake by which this nation lost much goodwill, throught Latin America for many years. That with out occupation of Nicaragua, Haiti, and the "Big Stick" attitude did more than anything else to hurt our prestige among the Latin Americans.

We seemed to have realized all the mistakes made following the World War; when there was a decided turn away from the imperialistic attitude we had assumed. We restored the Monroe Doctrine to its original interpretation, principally by the definite removal of the Roosevelt Corollary and all it implied as to further intervention by the United States in all countries where the Monroe Doctrine prohibits intervention by non-American powers. The lowering of the tariff walls which had been a great drawback to our more successful commercial relations with South America, was another step forward in our contacts with the Latin American countries. All this has been accomplished by new arbitration and conciliatory treaties, some of which I have mentioned, such as Reuben Clark's memorandum on the Monroe Doctrine, the Pan American treaty of 1933, the ending of the Cuban protectorate in 1934, and most recently the Buenos Aires Conference.

In line with this, the American foreign policy settled back to its early traditions -- a policy of satiation, good will, peace, and defense of the homeland. The policy of satiation is evidenced particularly as regards this hemisphere by the termination of the Cuban and

perhaps the Panamanian protectorates, the approaching end of the protectorates in Santo Domingo, Haiti and Nicaragua save for the exclusive option of a canal there, and possibly independence of Porto Rico. The policy of good will is evidenced by the net work of new treaties of arbitration and conciliation, particularly as regards South America and the new Pan-American treaty renouncing and denouncing the right of intervention in the external and internal affairs of any of the contracting parties. The policy of peacy is evidenced by the confirmed nature of the American public opinion, overwhelmingly against war.

Conclusions.

The position of the Southern Hemisphere is changing rapidly as regards ourselves and the rest of the world. With the development of the Latin American countries, the Southern Hemisphere is fast becoming stronger and we should continue to deal with the countries which compose it with tact and intelligence. It forms an integral part of the economic and political pattern of the Northern Hemisphere. First because we are being brought closer in our relations by the development of air travel, moving pictures, and to a lesser extent the radio. Second, that the rise of industrialism in Latin America is in the process of changing these republics from economic dominions of ours to economic competitors. Third, that Europe is showing increasing interest in Latin America, economically as well as politically, evidenced by the great trade rivalry between the countries of Europe, particularly England, Germany and Italy. Also the fact

that the fascist dictatorships of Europe are attempting to advance their influence in the South American countries. This is a decided factor in Brazil, where the growing influence of the "Intergralists" is becoming a menace.

With the rapid changes in Latin America, it is well that this country changed its policy of imperialism to that of "good neighborliness." We are aware that Latin America is growing up, we are aware that with the present state of Europe, Latim America is the best field for our industrial efforts; we are aware that the European attacks on democratic institutions threaten Latin America; we are aware that for our own peace and strength we must be, in the future years, the paramount strength in Latin America politically, economically and culturally. So this administration's policy is an open and candid avowal of the fact that the friendship of the Latin American republics is as essential to the United States as is the friendship of the United States to the Latin American republics. This fact is the most significant one, so far as this country is concerned, in the entire post-war reorientation of world economy. The disturbed state of Europe, the war in Asia, and the industrial advance of the Latin American states all combine to make Latin America the natural object of the United States' concern.

Our foreign policies and our international relations, in the past, have been based primarily on our desire to avoid entanglements in foreign political matters and to prevent foreign countries from interferring in matters which principally affect the American states. This is a sound basis on which to rest our future policies. However, this vast industrial nation cannot successfully withdraw

itself from the economic and political problems, ideas and emotions which envolve not only Latin America but the whole world.

Lasting and effective peace must be achieved through a more constructive program, one which would seek to break down the economic barriers to peace, exert pressure against the resort to force by other nations and to co-operate with other peoples in upholding standards of justice and order in international affairs.

The futility of war as a means of advancing democracy and civilization has been abundantly proved since 1917, but the idea that national isolation might solve the problem is equally baseless. Since neither resort to war nor attempted isolation offer adequate defense what must be our course in a war threatened world? First, we can seek in every practicable way to liberate world trade and to eliminate or reduce excessive trade barriers; second, we can exert a constant and powerful pressure throughout the world against the use of force for the settlement of international conflict; third, we can continue to uphold in every way which seems practical, civilized standards of international conduct. Security and peace are attainable only through building up and maintaining an international order based on law and order, justice and mutual confidence. Upon these fundamental principles American foreign policy is based. For them we are ready to risk and to sacrifice. Through them alone can we hope to safeguard our civilization.

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