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THE PEACETIME ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY

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INTRODUCTION

On 14 November 1958, an instruction was issued over the signature of the Vice Chief of Naval Operations designed to encourage all personnel to be mindful and alert to the problems facing the navy in the cold war. Since cold war is our current substitute for peace, it occurs that it might be valuable to investigate the role of the navy in peace from its inception, through its growing pains, to its present position of primacy in the world of sea power, to see if there are any lessons of value today which may be deduced from our employment and policies in the past. This paper is an attempt to document that investigation.

The history of our navy spans the periods of change from the highest development of navies based on men and sail, through the development of the machine as the prime instrument, to the emergence of technology as the "ruler of battle." The role of the navy may have changed through this transition. The employment and composition of naval forces surely has. A clear understanding of these changes is necessary to a proper evaluation of our current strategic requirements, and the proper role for our navy in the immediate future, if we are to be successful as a nation--and remain free to pursue our destiny.

In this bi-polar world of ours, Soviet power cannot "be charmed or talked out of existence . . . /it/ will expand unless it is prevented from expanding because it is confronted with power, primarily American power, that it must respect." (11:10) The efficient application of that power at sea is our job. We do not have any to spare if we are to win the cold war.

THE PEACETIME ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY

CHAPTER I

THE HISTORIC ROLE OF THE NAVY IN PEACE

It is axiomatic that the role of the Navy in peace as well as in war is the protection and promotion of our national interests. This does not set the Navy apart from other elements of our military force or from other agencies of our national government. The same role can be just as well ascribed to the Army, the Air Force, the Department of State, or some separate agency such as the Economic Cooperation Administration so long as the instruments available to that force or staff are implied. Likewise, the reader's understanding of the meaning of that all-encompassing role is markedly different in thinking of peacetime conditions as contrasted with war at any level. Our national interest in all-out or general war is first, survival, and then, the imposition of our national will on the active enemy. In a war limited either as to geography or political aims, the question of survival as a nation is not at stake--although our relative rank as a nation in world politics may be. Imposition of our will on the active enemy as well as on other states sympathetic to that enemy becomes the primary national interest.

In that ideally defined condition of peace in which no state or faction with which we may deal has any intent of recourse to military force, the Navy has no job other than promoting the welfare of the nation. This utopian condition, unfortunately, can never apply--at least for long--so long as nations and their governments are made up of people. Even if there were no inequalities in the territory and wealth of nations, there would still be frictions, disagreements, and claims which sovereign nations would not submit to supra-national arbitration, but would attempt to adjudicate by force or threat of force. So, just as in the case of war, peace as a continuing state involves a large amount of tension, disagreement and threat of force, either economic, political,

psychological or military. And in some cases actual application of military force is possible within the "peace" condition. Generally however, the division between peace and war can be agreed to be that point at which persuasion, arbitration or just agreement to disagree, gives way to the application of armed force. In this more realistic atmosphere halfway between the utopian peace and resort to war is the "peaceful" existence with which we are most familiar. This is the area in which a sound military policy in support of an enlightened foreign policy might maintain such a balance between reason and emotion, between power blocs and competition for establishment of trade in underdeveloped areas, as to preclude any disagreement between nations becoming so serious that one might attempt to solve its problems by resort to war. It is this "natural state" of varying degrees of international tensions, of alignments of nations in friendly and unfriendly groupings, of power balances, of exploitation of weak nations, and of political and economic competition for national advantage with which we wish to deal.

It is in this competitive state, where maneuver and countermaneuver is possible, that our navy, in the past, has been able to make many noteworthy contributions. In pursuit of its mission of insuring freedom of the seas, support of our nation commerce, the demonstration of a "fleet in being" ready for any eventuality, and a precise application of just the right amount of forceful persuasion, the navy has repeatedly been able to settle political and economic differences in our favor.

The Formation of Our Navy.

In 1785, following the close of our war for independence, the United States' first notable act of naval policy was to sell or give its surviving naval vessels to France. This was done in dependence on the political balance of power in Europe to maintain economic freedom of the seas and in view of the depleted financial position of the colonies.

The postwar development of our ocean-going commerce soon ran into difficulties however, which pointed to the need for an active navy to support our economic interests. First and most notable of these was the raiding by the Dey of Algiers of our Mediterranean shipping. While the Dey's plunder of American merchantmen was instrumental in the start of an American peacetime navy, that navy did not get a chance to resolve the situation. The government did that by agreeing to pay ransom for American prisoners and arranging an annual "gift" to the Dey as protection from further raids. With that immediate issue settled, however unsatisfactorily, the naval protection program was cut in half.

Shortly thereafter, we found ourselves squeezed between the contenders in the European balance of power which we had earlier depended on for protection of our commerce. The rights of neutral shippers were jeopardized by both England and France, which put us squarely between the antagonists with no naval force to protect our rights. Our acceptance of a part of the blockade terms imposed by the British further worsened relations with France, until in 1796 their cruisers and privateers were turned loose on American shipping. Their depredations were so effective and extensive that a series of acts of Congress in 1798 created the Navy Department and the Marine Corps, resurrected the building program of 1785, and provided for up to 30 war vessels. This rapidly assembled and small force wisely confined its operations to the Caribbean and east coast approaches in opposition to the limited French force which could be spared for its colonies from France's primary naval preoccupation with Lord Nelson.

The effectiveness of this strategy in restricting French use of Caribbean waters, combined with two victorious frigate actions which occurred when Thomas Truxtun in the Constellation outclassed and defeated the Insurgente and the Vengence, caused France to sue for peace. A satisfactory settlement was achieved at Paris in 1800. While success in this "quasi-war" with France, and particularly Truxtun's victories,

had a tremendous affect on the popularity of our fledgling navy with the people and with Congress, it must be noted that the small American naval force available in the West Indies was able to do the job only because the British blockade of the continent and Nelson's victory at the Nile had held the major French force in Europe-and dealt a serious blow to French morale as well. Regardless of the mitigating circumstances, however, our naval operations against France were successful in protecting a rapidly expanding commerce upon which the stability and growth of our nation depended, as well as enhancing our national pride and unity, and initiating a victorious naval tradition, the intrinsic value of which is hard to evaluate.

No sooner had the quasi-war with France been settled, and the navy's strength reduced to fourteen ships, than it became apparent that renewed activity of the navy would be necessary, this time in the Mediterranean under much more difficult circumstances. In 1801, the Dey of Tripoli, dissatisfied with the tribute received for protection of shipping from his raiders, declared war on the United States. Initial naval action consisted of blockade by a small squadron. Several Turkish cruisers and gunboats were captured, and in 1803 under Preble, many effective bombardments and inshore naval actions were conducted. Negotiations resulted and a treaty consummated in 1805.

The Tripolitan and French conflicts helped to gain recognition among European powers for the naval determination of the fledgling nation. The Navy itself was given useful practical training, and established standards and traditions of good marksmanship, expert seamanship, initiative and fighting spirit which were to stand it in good stead in the forthcoming war against England.

The period from 1906 to 1912 was speckled with incidents of violations, protests, and naval incidents involving the rights of neutral shippers, "continuous voyage" altercations, embargo and non-intercourse acts, and seizure of ships and cargoes at times by both British and

French. Obviously, the most effective answer to such coercion would have been an American navy strong enough to command respect as "diplomats". The war of 1812 resulted from all these causes generally--including a navy too small to protest effectively--but mostly the declaration hinged on British impressment of American seamen from ships stopped by British frigates off our coasts. The most unfortunate note of the times just prior to the outbreak of war was the complete lack of steps by our government to strengthen either the Army or the Navy in anticipation of trouble--especially in light of the stoppage of trade and blockade of our coast which must surely follow any militant declaration on our part.

The Developing Navy.

If this familiar sounding complaint of warlike political noise without effective military preparation sounds familiar, the other common complaint of drastically reducing naval strength following war did not apply immediately after the war of 1812. The year following the peace, an ambitious building program was undertaken. The expanded postwar navy made possible a short and effective punitive expedition to the Barbary coast in 1815 which settled for some time our relations with those pirate strongholds. This new navy served the nation well for several years, but unfortunately was not maintained at this level. The nation's interest was soon centered on the expanding west, and the developing peaceful European balance of power reduced concern over possibilities of war. The need then for a force in being to support foreign policy was correspondingly reduced. This left the Navy free to protect and promote American commercial interests around the globe. That mission was achieved by stationing almost all the available ships in foreign squadrons in the Mediterranean, the East and West Indies, the Pacific, and the South Atlantic. Ships usually steamed singly and concentrated efforts on lending diplomatic support for American merchantmen,

and on holding down piratical or revolutionary forays against our shipping in the Levant, the West Indies and off South America. Probably the most notable incident late in this period was the opening of Japan to U.S. trade by Perry. It is the classic example of effective naval diplomacy and the display of initiative in the field.

A slight shift in emphasis in the role of the Navy occurred in the early 1840's when disputes over the Maine boundary with Canada, the Oregon Territory controversy, and friction over the African slave patrol engendered recurrent war scares. In 1841, Congress established the Home Squadron and ended the practice of maintaining all commissioned ships on foreign station. The shift in policy paid off handsomely in 1846 when Commodore Sloat's Pacific Squadron was able to take California by a series of minor operations in support of a small band of settlers, and Commodore Connor's Home Squadron successfully supported Generals Taylor and Scott and maintained an absolute blockade of the Mexican gulf ports.

The Navy had an opportunity during and after the Civil War to learn many sound lessons and develop as a force in international relations. The war was in many respects a perfect proving ground for giant steps in technology, ship design and tactics. Almost all of the developments of the period were lost, however, in the isolationism and preoccupation with internal affairs that existed in the twenty years following outbreak of the Civil War. The blockade fleet was scrapped and numerous attempts to develop foreign bases and to convert the Navy to ironclad steamships were stultified by ultra-conservatism and meager appropriations. A good example of our post-war naval policy was the visit of Admiral Farragut to Europe in 1868. He was to "show the flag in the ports of the world, but in so doing to stay out of trouble." (19:209) This purpose was most apparent since he made the cruise in the old wooden U.S.S. Franklin, built in 1815 and converted to a steamer in 1864.

Changing Times.

A series of events commencing in 1881 fortunately resurrected the Navy from the postwar doldrums. The Naval Bill of 1881, providing for modernization of the fleet, was accompanied by a renaissance of American thought. The vast industrial expansion then underway also tended toward imperialistic emulation of Europe. A change in strategic conceptions followed, spurred by the founding of the War College in 1885 and the publication of Mahan's "Influence of Sea Power upon History" in 1890. A first step in imperialist development was made in the Pacific with the acquisition of Midway, Hawaii and the naval station at Pago Pago, Tutuila. We rapidly developed an intensive and sometimes bitter competition with England and Germany for bases and commercial concessions. These Pacific developments fired the thinking and arguments for a Panama Canal. As Mahan wrote, "The motive, if any there be, which will give the United States a Navy, is probably quickening in the Central American Isthmus. Let us hope it will not come to the birth too late." (12:88) The imperialist merchants were stimulated also by Mahan's lectures and articles with visions such as; "outside, beyond the broad seas, there are the markets of the world, that can be entered and controlled only by a vigorous contest." (13:12) Mahan also stimulated official naval thinking by his advocacy of seagoing fleets maneuvering and fighting as units. The corrolary to such thinking, the building of a balanced fleet incorporating the long-neglected developments in shipbuilding and ordnance provided the impetus that evolved into a completely new Navy by the turn of the century.

The U. S. as a True Naval Power.

This new fleet in being, operating in squadrons and as modern as any in the world, catapulted us to the rank of a naval power to be reckoned with. It was fortunately so, for the same imperialistic leanings

which fostered its building resulted in a national emotional uprising which forced an unnecessary war with Spain over differences of opinion as to the propriety of the country's treatment of Cuban insurrectionists. With the temper of the country for war, and the tools readily at hand, nothing could stop us. As Westcott reports, "This overbearing naval force, . . . was able literally and actually to 'win the war in an afternoon'". (19:216)

While the Spanish American War has been justified on the basis that it was a "merciful war," which "quickly ended the horrors . . . of chronic insurrectionary hostilities and thereby saved the lives of hundreds of thousands", (3:463), it had a more lasting significance to the Navy in that it provided a test of our new fleet and it launched the United States into colonial empire status with full participation in world affairs. From this point on in our history, a strong Navy became essential to our newly acquired national objectives. From this point our prime emphasis shifted from defense of our flag and its free access to the seas of the world to offensively asserting our position. Whether fortunately or not, it was at this time that we acquired a voice to sound this strident assertion to the world in the person of the aggressive Theodore Roosevelt. Not only did he speak out to the world, but he also convinced America of the importance of the Navy and its position in power politics. Westcott says, "In so far as naval might is quite likely to be the velvet glove of diplomacy, this altered popular temper is of significance in naval history." (19:294)

It is surprising that the establishment of the United States as a world naval power, which was effected by the Spanish American War and events of the decade following, should be accompanied by a policy of two way friendly cooperation in naval matters with Britain. At least half of America's grievances and altercations of the preceeding century involving the Navy had either been directly with Britain or arose from circumstances caused by the British. Now, when we could challenge

British supremacy, we were to support a navy "second only to Britain's". Captain Chichester's act at Manilla Bay of positioning his ships between Dewey's force and the German Squadron as a warning against interference was widely hailed in the United States. Britain's friendliness was also exhibited by her guarding of U.S. interests in Spain during the war, by her intercession with Brazil to effect transfer to the U.S. of two ships building in English yards, by permitting the transfer via the St. Lawrence of revenue cutters from the Great Lakes to the Atlantic, by her concessions regarding fortification of the Panama Canal and by her permanent withdrawal of the British West Indies Squadron. In return, America concentrated her competitive efforts on staying ahead of the Kaiser's naval building program. It was not hard to keep our competitive sights focused on the German fleet in view of the Manila Bay incident, the Venezuela crises by which the Germans tried to weaken our naval hold on the Caribbean, and their speedy buildup of their bases at Tsing-tao and in the Carolines in the Pacific.

Late in the period, Germany was joined in the category of naval forces to watch by Japan. We had been in full sympathy with Japan's wars with China and Russia, looking on her almost as a protègè. But her resounding victories, especially over mighty Russia, gave us pause. "Almost overnight, along with a more just estimate of Nipponese strength, came a realization that some time this nation might seriously threaten our own interests." (19:295) Additional incidents such as seal poaching charges, school segregation of orientals in the U.S., and Japanese dissatisfaction with our efforts at mediating the Treaty of Portsmouth supported these changed relations. In the circumstances, President Roosevelt, never one to wait for the opposition to act first, chose to send the U.S. battle line on the "round the world cruise of the Great White Fleet". Not only was this 46,000 mile cruise effective in advertising our naval might and efficiency to potential friends and adversaries alike, but it also dramatized the worth of the Navy to the

American people. Incidentally, the cruise proved beyond doubt to the Navy of that day the need for a better system of bases and logistic support.

The events of this most fruitful and glamorous period of naval growth, along with technological developments such as the Holland submarine, large battery gunnery development into the ten mile range, perfection of torpedoes, destroyers, and the concentration on training in fleet tactics, gave us a navy of near peak efficiency and capability as compared with that only ten years before. During the following years while war again erupted in Europe, our national preference for siding with Britain both in naval matters and in the interpretation of the rights of belligerents and neutrals (although we had our minor differences with the British too) greatly weighted our sympathies on the side of the Allies. The decision was assured when Germany found it necessary to either limit her submarines to the point of impotency to comply with international law or to disregard the law and have a chance of victory. She naturally chose the later, precipitated our entry into the war--and her ultimate defeat.

Between World Wars.

At the end of World War I, the power pattern of the world was completely upset. The German Empire and the Central Powers were of course defeated and decimated. The Allied Powers of Europe were weakened beyond all previous conceptions and nearly bankrupt. Even England would require a decade to recover from her material and personnel war losses. Russia, of course, was embroiled in a bloody civil war. Either the United States or Japan was in a position to drive for world naval supremacy. Although they had participated in the war, they had been strengthened rather than weakened by the conflict. Japan had unchallengeable power in East Asia, while the United States Fleet was larger than England's and, even before the war, was the admitted master of the waters of the

Western Hemisphere. "The policy makers of the United States Navy--well aware of the profound changes effected by the war--were eager to secure for their country the position formerly occupied by England, dominant world power based on a fleet 'second to none'". (19:336) This concept, as embodied in the Navy's 1919 building program, cooled U.S. British relations perceptibly since it was aimed so obviously at relegating Britain to a secondary role. Japan also was fearful of the program since it threatened her own ascendency in the Western Pacific. The program, however, ran head on into a widespread and highly developed anti-militaristic feeling in the world, a political drive for national economy, and a recurrence of isolationist feeling in the country, which resulted in the scuttling of the program and the eventual moves for arms reduction which resulted in the Washington Disarmament Conference of 1921.

That meeting was "auspiciously" opened with an American offer to scuttle or scrap a goodly percentage of our fleet. From there it proceeded to develop: first, a Four Power Treaty, designed to assure Japan respect for her possessions in the Far East and to abrogate the Anglo-Japanese Treaty of 1902; second, a Nine Power Treaty, guaranteeing the territorial integrity of China; and last, a naval disarmament treaty which established the 5:5:3 ratio of U.S., British, and Japanese battle lines. The proposals accepted were in general ours, and world opinion was enthusiastic. It is true that the treaty obviated the tremendous expense of a full scale naval race. It is also true that it limited our power to control events so that a small change in the balance of naval power would be sufficient to overthrow it.

The Washington Conference, unfortunately, failed to spell out some important details of fleet limitations--details which hurt our relative position--which led to bickering, dissatisfaction and further conferences. The Geneva Conference of 1927 failed miserably to reach any agreement on cruiser strengths, the chief item of discussion. The London Conference of 1930 followed, and achieved apparent success on the basis of

10:10:7 in cruisers and full parity in submarines. The United States had finally achieved full parity with Britain--after throwing away superiority in 1921. At the same time we were obsessed with achieving parity, we were giving Japan the ability to take over the entire Western Pacific and East Asia. Her allowed fleet strength along with her mandate over the former German Pacific islands allowed her supremacy in the area in view of her interior lines of communication--a supremacy it would take the entire U. S. and British fleets to question. And the British government, pacifist and busy with its own problems at home and with Mussolini in the Mediterranean, was not making her fleet available.

Japan did not hesitate to "take charge and march off" with the first step being into China with the "Mukden Incident". Her aim was a proclaimed "Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere" from which white men would be excluded and the Nipponese would serve as merchants and feudal lords to the entire Far East. Our reply was to build our fleet up to treaty limitations and call for a new disarmament conference.

With the complete failure of the London Conference of 1935-36, the lid was off. All naval powers entered into a building race. And with no one power able to rapidly outstrip all others, the only question remaining was not whither, but when.

Preparation for World War II.

It was indeed fortunate for the United States that the problem of expansion of the merchant marine was not forgotten in our preoccupation with naval arms race. Throughout the early history of our country before 1900, the ability of our shipbuilders to build fast and sturdy merchantmen cheaply, the traditional sailing ability of yankee skippers and the sharp trading of our merchants had surmounted tremendous obstacles in taking and holding a large bulk of the seaborne trade of the world. In spite of punitive losses to wars, pirates and the elements, we could carry goods faster and cheaper than any other nation.

From the turn of the century with the passing of the "wooden ships and iron men" and the ascendency of the machine, we lost the ability to compete in the field of merchant shipping. In World War I, Congress found it necessary to grant liberal loans, and subsidies disguised as mail contracts, to encourage shipbuilders--and to build a large bulk of wartime merchant shipping itself. In the 1920's, foreign economic nationalism with direct government shipping aid further enhanced the disparity of operating costs in favor of foreign bottoms. From the point of hindsight then, it is indeed fortunate that we saw fit to pass the Shipping Act of 1936 which established the Maritime Commission and provided for direct subsidy for both building and operation. In 1938, construction was begun at the rate of 50 ships per year, and in 1939, the program was more than doubled. By 1942, contracts had been let for 2300 major merchant vessels. Without this head start, we would have been sore pressed to fight World War II as soon and as effectively as we were.

During the period when Britain and France were busy turning the other cheek in their appeasement policy toward Hitler German, the United States was trying to insulate itself from any conditions which might involve us in war. We had failed miserably in our unilateral protests to Japan on her conquests in Asia. Now we tried to insulate ourselves from involvement in any war by relinquishing our rights as a neutral, and so developed the Cash and Carry Act of 1937. This forbade sale of munitions and allowed no traffic with belligerents in U. S. bottoms or on U. S. credit. At the outbreak of war in 1939, we immediately proclaimed a "safety belt" around the Americas from which belligerents were to be excluded. The Neutrality Act of November, 1939 repealed the ban on sale of munitions imposed in 1937. In 1940, we took sides in Asia by declaring embargos on all materials of war which Japan desired and which she had previously procured from us. Also in 1940, with Germany poised on the English Channel and in control of Norway and the Mediterranean,

we gave up all pretense of neutrality and, by the Lend Lease Act, set ourselves the task of being the "arsenal for democracy." We were only one tiny step away from getting our feet wet. If Japan had not pushed us, we would have jumped in anyway.

CHAPTER II

HISTORY OF THE COLD WAR

In recent years, we have been subjected to a period ostensibly labelled as peace, but fraught with so much tension, maneuverings, threats of force, and ever-shifting pressure, that it has come to be known popularly as cold war. The roots of the current problem period go back to the allied conferences and agreements, subscribed to by our wartime leaders, in which the Soviets managed to achieve agreement on mechanisms and spheres of influence in the contested areas on completion of hostilities, but was unwilling to agree to firm plans for consummating a just peace with the axis powers. These partial solutions to postwar positions of the victors allowed the Soviets legal entry into the defeated areas of their choice with no provisions for a legal way of our getting them out again. This, we find now, was ideal for their purpose of a step-by-step takeover of all occupied areas and the development of a shield of satallites. From that position of bloc strength, the Soviets have developed a defense for their "semi-legally" gotten gains by maintaining an ever-shifting, ever-pressing offense. They shift the pressure from area to area, from economic moves to satellite military pressure, to subversion of weak regimes, to summitry talk, to military support of revolutionist fractions, to psychological attack, and back to economic pressure, and so ad infinitum. Each period of pressure is developed by a timely twisting of the communist screw until we of the free world have reacted, have committed ourselves and have demonstrated our willingness to join the combat--at which point we are allowed to relax, catch our breath, and get ready for the next shift. And one of the horrible facts that makes the technique so effective is that we must react--or the Soviet will take another bite of territory or another million or so free people behind the curtain.

Post-War Developments.

As noted above, the initial power position immediately following World War II was determined in the allied summit conference held during and just after the war. That position, while not wholly apparent at the time of surrender, rapidly thereafter developed into an obviously bi-polar power setup. The power of Germany, Italy and Japan were utterly decimated by the emotional insistance on unconditional surrender. While they would have been lamentably weak anyway, their ability to recover in a reasonable time might have been retained under less stringent conditions. France was wounded deeply both in goods and in morale. Britain had fought doggedly to the end, but was economically on the ropes.

This left only the United States and Russia as the major nations with enough resilliance and reserve strength to aspire to a major power position. Of these two, the United States' prime interest was aimed at disposing of anything reminiscent of the four years of war just completed including major disarmament, and establishment in the world of a balance of power with Germany, Italy and Japan cancelled out of the military power picture to obviate their possible resurgence. Just how this was to be done was never explained. Russia on the other hand was interested in achieving for herself primacy in the world in the politico-military field in support of her prime national interest to convert the world to communism--under Soviet leadership.

With these interests of the major participants in mind, it is not too difficult to understand the difficulties encountered in formulating a peace settlement. Some subjects such as the ultimate independence of Austria, democratization of Italy, punishment of German and Japanese war criminals, independence of Korea, reduction of Japan's empire, demilitarization of Germany, altering the Polish frontiers, ceding of the Kuriles and special rights in Port Arthur and Darien to Russia, and

freedom of Iran were agreed to at conferences prior to the peace. Treaties were rapidly settled for the axis satellites. The altercations over the basic settlements have constituted a part of our cold war problems ever since. In fact, some writers (11:45) (10:146) recommend our best policy position in the cold war as one proposing early and consistent insistance on agreement by Russia to peace treaties for Germany and Japan.

The chaos in central Europe and Asia which followed the war allowed Russia to move into the power vacuum in those areas. These agressive moves have confronted the United States with a series of critical situations which required counter moves and the adoption of security measures including rearmament and alliances. Russia attempted to occupy Iran after the war, but withdrew in 1946 after bitter debate in the Security Council. She infiltrated the Balkan and Baltic states in spite of the free elections pledge and brought them under domination by 1948. The takeover of Greece, attempted in 1947, was thwarted only by major direct assistance from the United States Army and Navy and the Truman Doctrine. In 1948, she tried to evict the allies from Berlin, but was thwarted by the famous airlift. Numerous moves against Turkish control of the Black Sea exit were thwarted by solid United States support. The Chinese Nationalists were finally pushed out of China in 1950 and, shortly thereafter, the worst crisis of all was sprung in Korea. Quick political reaction and a major effort of all services was required to save that situation. Since Korea, we have been subjected to two Taiwan Straits incidents in 1954-55 and 1958, the Indo-China crisis of 1954, the Summit Conference of 1955, the Suez crisis of 1956, the Lebanon crisis of 1958, along with the Iraq crisis which now constitutes for all practical purposes a Soviet take-over. Now, along with Iraq, we have continued subversive activities in Southeast Asia and a new Berlin crisis of Soviet making with diplomatic wrangling pointing to a new Summit Conference. Through it all we have had interspersed psychological and economic attacks from Moscow and Peiping, and support of native movements against

colonial rule at every possible irritating point.

The Navy Since World War II.

Against this backdrop of primarily political events, it is desirable to investigate the function of our naval forces and the interaction with Soviet force so far in the cold war. Along with the other services and in response to our overriding national temper at the close of the war, the Navy was cut back drastically. Probably the outstanding naval move of the period was the program instituted to "mothball" most of the wartime fleet. This was not a new concept--witness the "redlead" World War I destroyers we traded to Britain in 1940--but the magnitude of the mothball effort was of a new order. Reactivation of a portion of this fleet by the ready reserve during the Korea crisis was one of the prime factors which made victory possible in that quasi-war.

The United States Navy found soon after the war that the mantle of the "world's most powerful Navy" carried with it some sticky responsibilities to go with the glamour. It was found necessary to station a fleet in the Mediterranean and one in the Far East on a permanent basis to support our friends and to impress our prospective opponents with our overriding concern for free world access to those critical areas. The Far East fleet based primarily in Japan, while the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean was a free roaming fleet supported by mobile supply forces. Rotation of ships in each fleet was employed to achieve maximum training value and to insure minimum base support requirements. Each fleet was employed periodically to carry out United States cold war strategy of standing firm against communist penetration wherever practicable. Examples of such employment are the support of the Truman Doctrine in Greece and Turkey, cover of the ChiNat withdrawal to Formosa, support for Phillippian government forces contesting with the rebel reds in those islands, evident support for anti-communist forces in Italy during critical elections in that pivotal country, and many others.

With the advent of NATO in 1949 and the need to organize free world navies into effective forces in support of the flanks of the alliance position, our Navy had a major task to perform in assisting in the reorganization and training of NATO navies consistent with each country's willingness and ability to compete. Like the other services, the Navy had an immensely important diplomatic job to do in fostering development of naval forces suited to member nation capabilities, satisfying to national aspirations, and at the same time effectively integrated into a complex alliance capability. The fact that the task involved a mixture of United States and unilaterally supplied material as the result of a complicated financial aid program did not simplify the service jobs. Effectiveness of recent fully integrated NATO maneuvers, near this tenth anniversary of its birth, is evidence of how well that job is being done. Further evidence of NATO's importance, if any is needed, is the abject hate shown toward it by the Soviets. If the United States wants a German and Japanese peace treaty and a nuclear weapons ban bad enough to scrap NATO as the price, it is fully expected that a deal could be made.

The NATO countries are not the only ones, of course, in which naval advisory groups and liaison teams have functioned to help strengthen the ability of nations less rich or less highly developed than our own to develop naval forces capable of supporting their national objectives and of incidentally contributing to the strength of the free world. A large majority of the states of the Western Hemisphere have engaged in such assistance programs with us. All the maritime nations of South America have received material assistance, technical advice and training coordination from United States naval missions in the past few years, most of them on a continuing basis. There are many in the service itself who deplore the fact that we have not gone farther than we have in building up the naval capabilities of the South American republics, especially as regards the development of particular navies to

operate seabased naval aviation for ASW protection of the Hemisphere. Political and economic decisions have precluded this development so far for that area of the world least heated by the cold war.

The other areas where friendly nations have received increasing assistance are the countries of the northern tier of the Middle East and the free SEATO nations of Southeast Asia, where the communist threat originates both from Soviet Russia and from Communist China. Military assistance programs in these areas are designed to support friendly governments and to tailor forces, especially in the case of naval components, to the needs of the particular area. A good example is the need of the South Viet Namese for river patrol craft to combat guerilla infiltration and depredations to lines of communications. In the case of SEATO navies and those of Japan and the Chinese Nationalists, training for unified operations with us or similarly dedicated nations is a requirement. Operation of our active fleet units with naval components of all these diverse navies and alliance groupings is essential to support of our naval missions and to the continued ability of each of our allies to contribute to the free world force. This type employment has been combined effectively in the past few years with flag visits to strengthen the morale of the friendly peoples of the world as well as their navies.

The Fleet in Being.

The two chief factors which have determined the total naval strength of the United States since World War II -- within the political limitation of division of appropriations and tasks between the services--have been, the requirement for a fleet in being to maintain control of the seas as the line of communications to our allies on the front line, and the requirement to supplement the Strategic Air Command in its role of maintaining a ready nuclear deterrent to overt Soviet aggression. This force has been developed in opposition to two

capabilities of the Soviet Union. First, is the capability of Soviet sea power to interdict the sea lanes of the world and particularly those which we must use in case of any general war, and to control the sea areas adjacent to the Soviet Union and sea lines of communications necessary to their own war effort. The second Soviet capability in opposition is their defensive force both passive and active ranged against United States nuclear attack forces, and of course their ultimate nuclear deterrent capability as a counter to our own.

As the result of the political and economic need for as much of our military expenditure as possible to contribute to the nuclear deterrent posture, naval air development has received major budgetary support from its ability to contribute to that mission. Over the past twelve years, the development of a respectable carrier striking force, led by Forrestal carriers and mounting all-jet deckloads of nuclear attack aircraft has been effected. Concurrent developments of ancillary surface ship programs and developments in tactics have been concentrated on contribution to the defense of this carrier force in its continental attack mission. Every effort has been bent toward making the ship and aircraft characteristics serve all comparable naval missions, both conventional and nuclear, as well as contributing to continental attack. Each economy move or cutback, however, has snipped a bit of the versatility from our force in order to save the deterrent capability, until there is real doubt of the fleet's suitability to do its other tasks as well as the strategic attack one.

We have recently developed from the marriage of our nuclear submarine program and the solid fuel ballistic rocket program the concept of Polaris-firing submarines to either take over the nuclear deterrent portion of the Navy's mission or at least to contribute strongly to it. The program has the overriding advantage of making at least a part of our deterrent posture mobile and undetectable and therefore reasonably secure from sneak attack or effective attrition. This represents a

giant step toward true detterence since the major flaw of all other deterrent weapons systems is their vulnerability to location and destruction by ballistic missiles, guided missiles or air launched nuclear weapons before they are released to retalliate.

The Opposition.

The Soviet Navy has been built up in the past fifteen years to a position as the "second naval power of the world", far surpassing any navy but our own. Building has until recently been concentrated on designs developed in 1946-47 and mass production of cruisers, destroyers, submarines and minecraft have now far outstripped us in each of these categories. Naval aviation remains land based and concentrated on reconnaissance and attack types for sea frontier defense. Major emphasis in all Soviet naval building to date has been on the defensive function. Even the concentration on submarines is considered defensive, designed to provide interdiction of our lines of communication and covering naval forces, to destroy our ability to project our power overseas directly against Russia, with little thought given to commerce raiding. Even assuming such a defensive posture, Soviet submarines in the number operating today pose a grave threat to our ability to maintain control of the sea, especially in the Atlantic approaches to continental Europe. Now there is talk, and some evidence to support it, of a shift in Soviet naval emphasis--a shift to nuclear power, guided missiles for air defense, ballistic missile submarines, the possible development of amphibious ships--which can mean, if true, a shift to a more offensive role for their navy and a new overwhelming threat to our naval existence and hence our national existence.

Development to Meet the Soviet Naval Threat.

As a counter to this Soviet capability that we know, and the possible developments that, while not strictly assured, are completely

within proven Soviet capacity to perform, we have concentrated on naval air and on tailored ASW forces. Many of our World War II capabilities have been refined to a higher level of performance. Anti-submarine warfare has been given highest priority in our tactical and materiel development efforts--and much improvement has been achieved. Almost all the improvements, however, are extensions by refinement of World War II equipment and techniques and have done little more than match the improved capability of the submarine to avoid detection and kill. Amphibious warfare, with the exception of heliocopter vertical envelopment techniques and weapons improvement, is essentially unchanged except that active forces are drastically reduced. Mine warfare forces are practically non-existent with only a token force dedicated to developing new techniques and weapons. Logistic support of fleets at sea is improved in techniques but woefully weak in ships, with no shipbuilding to support more efficient concepts. What few improvements the Navy has been able to make in the non-carrier components have been tacked to the coattails of the nuclear navy on the basis of the service pleas for some balance in our forces. A discouragingly small percentage have survived the congressional and administration economy axes.

Unfortunately for the United States, the ability of our present navy to maintain control of the seas against the present Soviet threat cannot be thoroughly tested short of war. Just as surely as we know that, however, we know that any question of its ability to contain the Soviet threat weakens our position in the cold war. Inability to wage limited or conventional war leaves a lever for pressure by the Soviets just as much as a weak nuclear deterrent force would expose us to all out nuclear blackmail.

CHAPTER III

EXTENDING THE HISTORIC ROLE TO THE PRESENT

Sea power, the components of which are combatant ships and aircraft, support ships, merchant marine and support and base structure, has two major functions. First is the protection of a country's seaborne commerce and the prevention of enemy invasion. This function can be classified as a defensive one. The other, an offensive function, involves denying the use of the sea to the enemy, transport and support of one's own invasion forces or support of forces already overseas, and the attack from the sea of enemy bases. The successful execution of these functions depends upon command of the sea.

Command of the Sea.

Command of the sea is an absolute necessity if an insular power is to wage war, for how else is that power to be projected except in a last ditch defense of the homeland, if it cannot be moved overseas to engage an enemy. Also the very life blood of the economic machinery of an insular power--as the United States is today--moves by sea and can be cut off by enemy naval action. "Naval power is worthless . . . unless it can protect the sea lanes over which travel the commerce that is vital to the nation's existence . . . this is the raison d'etre of sea power." (12:270) Corbett concurs, " . . . over and above the duty of winning battles, fleets are charged with the duty of protecting commerce." (6:143) And Brodie in A Guide to Naval Strategy states, "There is really only one kind of command--the kind that enables one side or the other to control the movement of merchant ships." (4:139) Other leading writers in naval strategy have confirmed this position. In evaluating the historical employment of the Navy in Chapter One, this concept of the prime role of the Navy is confirmed in all our policy. Between world wars, it is true, the concentration of effort on maintaining an acceptable position relative to opposing fleets or

combinations of fleets led the United States emphasis toward a force in being in anticipation of the need to win naval battles. Defeat of the enemy fleet however was presumed to achieve control of the sea lanes so that our total power could be projected overseas--as it was. Since World War II, command of the sea and protection of our lines of communication both for commerce and support of our forces and allies overseas has been given a place in our concept, as witnessed by Admiral Burke's testimony before a subcommittee of Congress in 1956:

> Only by the use of the sea can we give continuing and massive support to our allies and our Armed Forces deployed overseas. The capability of the Soviets to cut free world sea communications near Europe and Asia is growing steadily. Many of their programs are specifically contrived to that end. The United States Navy is the principal factor in preventing the isolation of the United States that will surely result if this Soviet strategy is permitted to succeed. The free world cannot stand together if the United States Navy should be unable to insure freedom of the seas. (1:1340)

If this is, then, the primary role of the Navy for war, the primary role of the Navy in cold war must be preparation to that end. We must be concerned with developing and maintaining the ability to counter any capability of the Communist Bloc to contest this mission. In this regard, the Navy's historic peacetime role is fully applicable in cold war and intensified by the magnitude of the threat ranged in opposition. In our thinking on how to handle this threat, however, it is considered wise to divorce ourselves from the chronological development. The Soviet concentration on submarines, mine warfare and sea frontier defense forces rather than on a balanced integrated fleet as developed by all major naval powers from the days of the Spanish-American War through World War II invites us to take our historical corollaries from the earlier naval history when naval emphasis was on raiding, patrol by small squadrons and convoy of troops and goods in confined waters. The range and magnitude of capabilities is greater, but the principles are the same. In this type of warfare, control of the seas is relative, can change hands in local situations, and is never achieved in as absolute

a measure as was the case late in each world war.

Other Peacetime Roles.

We are agreed then that the primary naval role to maintain command of the seas remains. What of our other peacetime roles of projecting commercial influence, providing diplomatic representation, protecting United States trade and interests, providing support for friendly nations and a real evidence of the capacity to react in any degree of force required to those who might threaten our national interests. The development of rapid communications to almost any place on the globe and the extensive representation in almost all areas of our diplomatic and commercial representatives has reduced measurably the need for the Navy to perform in the role of diplomatic representative, as protector of United States trade interests, or as an influence for favoring United States commercial interests in new territories. The role of supporting friendly nations by flag visits, cooperation with friendly armed forces and assistance in need, is still a very real and active one. The only change that the cold war has instituted is to increase its importance and, because of the stationing and visits of troops, air force units and flights, and missions of all services in a majority of friendly countries, to extend the performance of this role to all the services.

The Capacity to React.

The requirement for a capacity to react with any degree of force required to those who might threaten our national interests has been vastly expanded in the present as compared with the historic interpretation of this role. This increased importance, so obvious in fact, is based on the tremendously increased range of reaction force which might be required and the speed of reaction required as compared with the historical counterpart situation. The role has grown to an importance where we are in danger of being obsessed by it to the exclusion of all else.

The curse of peactime readiness is the question of "readiness for what?" Prior to the industrial revolution when our Navy was small in number, it was in a measure isolated from contact with potential enemies. This allowed reaction time of the order of months except in chance encounters. The type of hostile action against which they had to guard was limited. With the shift of national power from the man to the machine, the range of hostile action was tremendously expanded so that fleets in being must be alert to counter at higher speed a greater number of possible enemy actions. Now, in the grip of the technological revolution which has produced A-weapons, satellites, missiles, high mach aircraft and nuclear powered submarines, the range of actions which might initiate hostilities is vastly expanded and the speed of reaction is in some cases reduced to minutes. And recall also that not only must we guard against the almost infinite speed, range, and power of modern weapons, but also against the old fashioned iron bomb, machine age attack--or even guerrilla type attacks where the man with the gun is the proper reaction force. Certainly our reaction must be nicely gauged to match the force employed in opposition. The reaction and, in case of the super-weapons possibly the entire war, will have to be completed with the forces that we have at the start. Hanson Baldwin has grasped the range of the dilema when he says:

> The profound changes these /technological/ developments have wrought in our military policies and in our social and political systems are only beginning to be understood. What has made the change even more difficult to grasp is that the new weapons have not replaced the old; they have limitations--political, economic, and military limitations, which are a direct result of their speed, their frightful power, their awful cost. The A-bomb has not been able to halt guerrilla wars; it played no role in Korea or Indo-China. Man, with a weapon in his hands and a fighting heart, is still the king of battle. (2:viii)

So must the Navy of the United States have more than just A-bombs and complex delivery systems if it is to be king of the seas. We must have the tools to <u>maintain</u> control of the sea as well as to react with graduated force either to deter or to defeat any measure of force exerted on or from the sea which threatens that control.

CHAPTER IV

SOME POSSIBILITIES FOR THE FUTURE

We talk much of "cold war." We deplore its existence. We hate and detest the Soviet rulers for each crisis which prolongs this unnatural state. Some statesmen try to induce the Kremlin to call it off by mixing defensive firmness, marginal formulae for disengagement, and "turning the other cheek". We look longingly to the day when we can all live in peace, and turn all our efforts to making a million dollars faster than our neighbor. We do everything but admit that the Soviets have waged cold war with steady success, that in their eyes cold war and Communist expansion are identical, that they have the world to gain and nothing to lose so long as we think and plan only in terms of war and peace, that they will continue their present policy so long as it is successful. If a third way between peace and war exists for them, it must also exist for us.

While we consider the deliberate inciting of international tension and the application of ever-shifting force by the Soviets unnatural, it is absolutely imperative that it be accepted, absorbed into our planning insofar as possible, and classed as the new "normal" condition in which we plan to operated in the forseeable future. E. A. Mowrer would term this new policy "waging freedom short of major war--and outlasting the Kremlin at its chosen game." (16:6)

A Cold War Strategy.

If we are to wage freedom, to fight the cold war--as we must--what shall be our national strategy? Disengagement allows only defeat unless instituted by the Soviets, and the leopard cannot yet change his spots. At the other extreme, sole reliance on punitive retalliation refuses the existence of the cold war and therefore leads to defeat while we decide at which point we destroy Russia in the face of the moral condemnation

of the world. Preventive war is similarly unacceptable. Simple containment is completely practicable but only slows the rate at which we lose the struggle. Militant expansionism is probably the best policy from the standpoint of defeating Communism, but it is felt that it could not be maintained for the extended period required without use of emergency controls on the domestic economy and within the alliance framework we have built. This leaves the only practical solution to be an opportunistic and vigilant containment policy embodying absolute military containment along with an economic, political, psychological offensive designed for the slow rollback of communism. Waging freedom, to be successful, must be based on a firm foundation of strength and pursued with a firm resolve utilizing all the resources at our command.

A Military Posture to Fit.

Success in the chosen policy above must be predicated on a posture to make it meaningful. Positive action in the cold war must presume a readiness and a willingness insofar as the Soviets view us to engage in either general war or limited war in support of that positive action. In the days when code duello was in effect, you did not insult a gentleman unless you were confident of your swordsmanship--you certainly did not slap his face unless you were feeling fit and ready. That readiness must incorporate a highly trained and securely disposed strategic deterrent force of whatever composition can best insure effective retalliation in event of general war. It must include adequate force, disposed for most efficient employment on a continuous ready basis, for any level of limited war which may be foreseen, or for rapid deployment in finite increments to forstall the outbreak of hostilities anywhere in the free world or on the periphery of the Communist world.

The Navy's Contribution to a Positive Policy.

The Navy probably has more opportunity than the other services to

make a real contribution to the cold war effort in addition to the requirement on all services to be trained and ready with forces in being and plans ready for employment in any eventuality. Due to the mobility of forces, the variety available from air, surface, and subsurface types, and marine units, and the ability to form task units of any size or complexity on short notice, the Navy has the unique ability to exercise discrimination in the application or show of force. This versatility and flexibility is an attribute which we must enhance and employ. Just because of this versatility and diversity of forces, the Navy tasks range across a wide spectrum of employment in general war readiness, limited war readiness and cold war performance. Comparative evaluation of all these tasks must be continously pursued in order that none may be enhanced in prestige or capability at the expense of losing the ability to perform others of equal or greater importance.

General War Readiness.

The injection of carrier aviation into the strategic deterrent posture in the past few years in order to compete for limited appropriations needs to be reevaluated. Carrier forces can be more effectively employed in wresting command of the sea from deployed enemy forces, and are needed for that mission. Earmarking of our carrier force to any area command or task would tend to destroy its flexibility and hobble its mobility, which is its present greatest advantage. Strategic deterrence should be based in the future on a mixture of the best means of atomic delivery to insure absolute assurance of completion of the strategic mission either before or after a Soviet nuclear attack. Forces assigned should have no other commitment and should be limited in size. The force may consist of bombers, Polaris submarines, ICBMs, deployed or sea-based IRBMs, controlled satellites, manned or unmanned space stations equipped to fire missiles, or other vehicles as necessary.

The source or service is immaterial. Control of the mix, of targeting, and of employment should be at a supraservice level.

The Navy's role at the instigation of general war should be to establish and maintain control of the sea lanes. First, we must get to sea with all our forces. Then we must be disposed to defeat the air, surface, and subsurface effort of the Communists, or by any means available deny those forces access to the open seas. First targets should be the Soviet Navy, whether at sea or in port, and their support activities and bases as practicable. If the United States is to survive through a general nuclear war, it will be in large measure because the Navy has been able to hold off the foe and maintain the flow of shipping to help us recover from the first blow and fight back.

Limited War Readiness.

It is in the role of readiness for limited war that the Navy can make its greatest contribution to the waging of freedom in cold war. Our carrier forces, especially if freed from strategic strike commitments, can move with impunity over a majority of the globe bringing to bear air strength that is completely ready and supported for extended operations with either nuclear or conventional weapons independent of prior preparation of airfields, bases, and facilities, independent of rights of sovereign nations regarding base use, overflights, etc. Our amphibious forces, if strengthened, could deliver, either administratively or landed in assault, up to two division-wing teams of marines fully capable of land operations against armed forces of equal or somewhat larger numbers. In support of friendly indigenous forces, their strength could be multiplied many times over as a steadying and guiding force. Our submarines, while few in number, are of sufficiently superior characteristics to be able to effectively interdict any naval effort against us in a limited area. This whole force, if adequate shipping for completely mobile support were provided, could operate independent of bases or territorial commitments within a contested area. Readiness

and willingness to undertake this role in support of a determined national policy is the greatest contribution we can make toward the winning of the cold war. Willingness alone to support this role will do much. The additions to present capabilities implied in this section are considered essential if we undertake it in earnest. Our capability as viewed by the Soviets will be unmistakable--and this is the best way to keep the employment within the framework of the cold war without need for combat.

Contributions to Cold War Strategy.

The obvious first thought in considering cold war strategy is of programs that can be based on the officers and men resident or visiting in foreign countries or through the efforts of individual ships or small groups of ships on flag visits. As concerns the individual, the two key problems to be overcome are first, the language disparity, and second, the position of the serviceman in foreign eyes as representing the United States, the role of personal diplomat. Solution of these two problems either by selection of personnel for overseas billets or by preeducation of the individual would go far to improve our stature, especially with our friends.

Ship visits to foreign ports, and in this category can be added MAAG type commands within the country, can contribute much to our posture by intensified public relations programs, especially if those programs develop from a desire of the command to participate in this type activity rather than as an "international public relations program" as an arbitrary requirement instituted by the pressagent corps. Such acts, policies and programs as concerts and participation in public events by musical groups of the command, either amateur or professional, would be immensely popular. Entertainment of children, a program which has proved valuable for good will in the Sixth Fleet, open house in visiting ships--a resurrection of the old Navy "visiting hours", and

athletic competition with equally matched local teams, especially at sports in which they, not we, specialize, can bring unmistakeable good will. Sightseeing and travel can broaden and cultivate our people so they can better understand the local interests and problems. All these programs, and numerous others in a similar vein can win us friends with the public and with foreign services.

With the foregoing as background, what is felt would be a much more powerful program would be the development and nurturing of a professional comeraderie at all levels between men of our navy and allied navies. In addition to the present formal and social interchanges at the highest levels--which can sometimes be quite stuffy and unsatisfying for each side--it is proposed that the fostering of professional curiosity and exchange of ideas, and as much informal social exchange as might naturally result therefrom, be emphasized at <u>all</u> levels. Free access to our ships and equipment for all professional navy files with exchange of as much "shop talk", familiarization and education as possible on a rate for rate or rank for rank basis could lead to reciprocity on the part of friendly ships and units. It could lead to a realization on the part of our young officers and men that their counterparts have something to offer too, to mutual respect up and down the line, and therefor to a closer cooperation in fighting the free world's battles. If successful, the program would have the advantage of leaving United States boosters in friendly navies who are better able than we to take our part in the give and take of establishing local and national attitudes toward cooperation with United States alliance objectives. Not to mention the advantages that might later accrue based on the truism that the neophytes of today will be the leaders of tomorrow. We could afford to give up a whisp of paperwork security for such a hard core of professional friendship within allied navies.

An extension of such a program envisions the assignment of vessels to visit allied naval installations, or better, short tours of duty

with allied navies, to officially support such a program. Such assignment should be made from types of ships that the subject navy understands and operates. For example, if Pakistan operates mostly DEs, then the assignment of a squadron of DEs to visit and exercise with the Pakistani Navy is indicated rather than a formal call by a guided missile cruiser. If the Danes emphasize mine warfare, then assign a division of MSO, DMS or similar types to operate with them and visit their naval installations. A carrier visit would be impressive for either a public or professional visit to Copenhagen, but the minecraft, it is felt, could make many more lasting friends.

And while we are on the subject, this program has its application too in allied schools both here and abroad. For an example close to home, the foreign officers at the Naval War College, quite senior officers in their own services, could have much to contribute to the education of Naval Warfare students. Conversely, it would take only a short stretch of the friendly bugaboo of security classification to integrate them into many of the Naval Warfare studies--and develop thereby a better feeling on their part for the intellectual level of our studies and an understanding of the composite character of this group of "selected" American fellow students, many of whom they will be dealing with in the future. The opportunity for international cooperation and good will could not come closer to home.

Another major area of cold war strategy is the combination of military and psychological programs which dramatize our fleet in being or its technological or tactical developments. The best recent example in this field is the program of sending nuclear submarines under the arctic ice field to the north pole. This is the best cold war propaganda we have developed--primarily because its military implication is so obvious and unimpeachable. The Navy's contribution to the IGY has also been valuable, but without the obvious military potential. Periodically opportunities will arise for peaceful employment of fleet units that still effectively demonstrate wartime capabilities to friend and foe. For example,

the writer recalls a situation in 1945 when a carrier was returning to Boston for Navy Day. The Captain's old air group, fortunately stationed nearby, flew escort for the ship during her entry into port with the formation spelling out "HI JOE". Conversion of this type effort could have placed a carrier or two off the Belgian coast with the air group(s) flying in formation "SALUTE" over the opening of the Brussels world fair. The conversion to jets would have made it doubly impressive. For another example, on the occasion of the celebration of the tenth anniversary of the landings in Southern France in 1954, we were represented by one CL and four DD anchored out, which only a handful of the thousands of visitors saw. Ships were not even assigned until a short time before the event, with no information on the scope of the festivities or expected participation provided--and apparently noone planning for our participation in advance. Would it not have been more effective to have planned amphibious participation, even possibly to the landing of the U. S. marching units (say a Marine BLT) by mock amphibious assault at the head of the parade route. It could have been done. I am sure the reader can think of a few examples of his own, and undoubtedly more effective ones. The secret to participation in this area is forehandedness. The idea must come early in the planning and developed to perfection in its performance. As such it can be invaluable.

Another area of cold war opportunities arise from the free world position in support to the principles of international law as compared with the Soviet refusal to accept any but their version. Numerous incidents involving no particular danger to naval units could be taken advantage of to emphasize the justice of the free world position vis-a-vis Russia's position based on bluster and show of force. Insistance on limitation of territorial seas, free passage of straits, naval freedom in the Baltic, and demonstration of our firm stand on these principles by example--manufactured if necessary--could win points for us in the cold war. Insistance on the niceties of international courtesies and

naval traditions is another possible area in which we could gain psychological advantage.

It is hoped that a positive approach has been emphasized in the foregoing, for it is the firm conviction of the author that a change in attitude toward the cold war is what is basically required if the Navy and the nation is to benefit. Like any other type of war, cold war has an offensive and a defensive side--and it is still true that a good offense is the best defense. You have to score to win in this game as in all others. We can score--and we can win.

CHAPTER V

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

In the early development of sea power by the United States, we were indeed fortunate in the circumstances of the times and in the quality of our naval leadership, as well as in our inherited British naval tradition. They made possible the development of a victorious naval tradition based on freedom of the seas for all, concentrating on local command of the sea in our particular area of interest. With development of major naval power and world-wide commitments, we had the background to develop the responsibility of a leader, and were fortunate in developing the men and the ships that maintained that leadership to the present.

Now we are beset by new forces. "The concept of Communism, a theoretical democracy but a practicing tyranny . . . under whose banners march the modern barbarians, are scrabbling for place and power amidst the ruins of the old order . . . all over our world vacuums of political, economic, and military power were created, which militant Communism and Soviet Russia have been trying to fill. The growth of the Communist empire has been aided by the dissolution of the great empires of the past, which have been unable to withstand the surging drive of colonial peoples for 'self-determination' . . . But overshadowing these gigantic forces is the technological revolution in warfare and in our social system, which has cast a long, long shadow across the future of Man." (2:vii) Against this backdrop, we, as the great power in opposition, the "Have" nation which the "have not" Communist bloc must defeat to expand, have the task of containing and defeating that expansion. We cannot meet them by maneuver, by trade and concession, because this involves only controlling the rate of that expansion, even if successful. We and our allies of the free world must meet them toe to toe. For every force they apply, we must meet it with an equal and opposite force. We must

wage freedom just as offensively, with as much vigilance and determination, as they wage Communist expansion. We must be ready and willing to contest at general nuclear war, at war on any lower level, limited as to political aim, limited as to area, or limited as to scope or weapons, or at a war of threat and counterthreat, move and counter move, whether political, economic, or military in nature--namely in cold war. And we must fight and win that war of their choice.

The role of the Navy has not changed in principle, but it has changed in scope. Control of the seas in the future for us means control of the seas of the world. We and our allies cannot afford to relinquish one major sea lane to the Soviets--or we will admit to another bite of Soviet expansion. Our task in this cold war then is to be ready for any eventuality on the sea, not to blunt a Soviet thrust, but to defeat it. Our readiness must envisage the full range effort from nuclear holocaust to brushfire. And while we stand ready, we must be always taking advantage of every possibility to move the Communists a step backward. For until Mr. Khruschev or his successors "cry uncle", we will not have peace in the world.

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