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No. 5

THE UNITED STATES NAVAL WAR COLLEGE

COMMAND AND STAFF COURSE

RESEARCH PAPER



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Class of June 1963

169326

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
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U.S. CHINA POLICY--TIME FOR A CHANGE?

16 April 1963

ABSTRACT

Communist China's national imperialistic, militant, and belligerent attitude toward the west poses a most serious problem for the Free World. Terror, exported from Peking, has taken over much of Asia and threatens the free countries of the Far East, through military and subversive methods. United States policy is aimed at containing this threat by opposing it at all levels.

This paper examines the evolution of the present U.S.-China policy commencing with 1945, considering several of the areas of conflict between the two nations at the present time. It develops the system of political and military actions taken by the United States to contain and isolate Red China, their results and the problems they have created for the United States. It shows that United States policy has not been too successful in containing communist China, not withstanding the fact that China is a weak nation.

The findings of this paper shows that because of the U.S. attitude of denouncing Peking's intentions and supporting the Nationalist, the Peking regime has the avowed aim to drive America from Asia.

That the present U.S. containment has been a partial success is not questionable, but its ability to contain a strong Red China is. Therefore, the U.S. must adopt a

bold policy to roll back communism and destroy its power
in the Far East.

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INTRODUCTION

Nothing in American history equals the complacency with which high U.S. officials, beginning with Harry S. Truman accepted the communization of China. The years 1945-1950 were important in U.S.-China relations. Chiang Kai-shek was defeated and driven from the mainland in 1949 by Owen Lattimore's "Agrarian Reformers."

Since coming into power in 1949, the Chinese communist regime has grown in power and has become a threat to the free Asian nations and the peace of the world.

As leader of the free world, the smaller Asian states looked to the United States for assistance in curbing the Red Dragon. America, through extensive aid programs, alliances, and a policy of isolation, succeeded in temporarily checking Red China.

Today, the U.S. containment policy is partially effective against a weak China. Tomorrow, the U.S. faces a Red Dragon with atomic teeth, most likely cloaked in respectability as a member of the United Nations, and recognized by the majority of the major powers in the world.

It becomes evident that an honest review is required of our containment policy and as a matter of necessity our entire China Policy.

That, then, will be the purpose of this paper. An honest review of the evolution of U.S.-China policy, the

present areas of conflict, and hopefully some conclusions concerning the capability of the present U.S.-China policy, and, most important, a determination of its ability to cope with the Red Dragon tomorrow.

U.S. CHINA POLICY--TIME FOR A CHANGE?

CHAPTER I

EVOLUTION

The conclusion of World War II saw the emergence of a powerful and aggressive Soviet Union in Eurasia. The long awaited war to end all wars served only to signal the commencement of a global conflict, an era of constant economic, psychological, and social war-cold war.

The Soviet Union, pursuing a doctrine that embodied the blind faith in the inevitability and infallibility of their doctrine over that of Democratic Institutions, vigorously set about to complete their "inexorable" goal of world conquest.

The direct and immediate threat posed to the national security of Western European nations by the aggressive communist movement not only shocked but bewildered the United States.

Shaking off traditional U.S. attitudes of noninterference and isolationism, the United States reacted to the Soviets' overt and aggressive tactics through economic assistance, outright grants of money, and military aid. Western Europe was saved from this new menace. However, while the United States was directing its energies toward the salvage and reconstruction of Western Europe a Red

Tiger was emerging in Asia.

"Nothing in American history equals the complacency with which high U.S. officials, beginning with Harry S. Truman accepted the Communization of China." (27-72)

The loss of the mainland of China cannot be explained in terms of any one era, blamed on one individual, or on any single traumatic event. The final victory of the communists over Chiang Kai-shek can be ascribed to a multitude of internal and external factors. Chiang's Kuomintang Party was beset with massive disintegration, demoralization and corrupt bureaucracy, the results of over two decades of war, with external and domestic foes.

What part the lack of any significant aid from the Western Powers played in this tragedy is still an unanswered and much debated question. Subsequent events would most certainly indicate that the United States had failed, in 1947, to realize the awesome menace of international communism.

To fully comprehend and attempt to evaluate the present status of U.S. policies toward China, a review of important points in past U.S.-China relations is deemed essential.

Salient features of United States-China relations over the past eighteen years will be reviewed in two time frames: 1945-1950 (early) and 1950-1963. These specific calendar periods have been selected in that they most clearly and

logically demonstrates the following points:

1. The coming to awareness by the United States of the total and global context of the International Communist movement.

2. The development of a global strategy by the United States to counter communism.

1945-1950

The year 1945, referred to by many students of this subject as the crucial year, proved to be a decisive one in U.S.-China relations. Despite the fact that President Truman was beginning to suspect that all was not going well in "democratic" East Europe, he insisted that Chiang Kai-shek adhere to his 1943 promise, made to Roosevelt at Cairo, to form a coalition government with the communists. (27-73)

It was in December of 1945 when General Marshall arrived in Nanking, as President Truman's special representative, with a mission to mediate between the two parties and attempt to conclude the Civil War in China. Marshall departed China in January of 1947, jointly blaming the Nationalist and the Communists for the failure of his mission. He left without ever fully understanding that there were already two Chinas-- Nationalist China and a Communist China.

Ironic as it may seem, the man whose name was lent to the strategy, Marshall Plan, which was instrumental toward saving Western Europe, casually wrote China, strategic

center of Asia, off the books. Shortly after and due primarily to the Marshall mission, the United States, in 1947, began to lay the foundations for its ultimate disengagement from China. Parallel to this action, America had extended her strategic frontiers from the three mile limit to Western Europe with the emergence of a bold new strategy-- the Truman doctrine.

While the United States was busily engaged in saving Turkey and Greece by applying the Truman doctrine, U.S.-China relations can be best described by John Allison, then second on the China desk and later assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs--"We have a policy toward China--not to get mixed up in that mess over there." (10-39)

The prevailing attitude within the State Department was further demonstrated when, "Marshall coolly suppressed a report from General Wedemeyer recommending large scale aid to the Nationalist Chinese, from the Republican Congress for over two years." (27-87)

Lacking a true perspective concerning the intent of International Communism in Asia, many respectable sources were convinced by the Owin Lattimores and the Henry Dexter Whites that China was in the throes of a true revolutionary movement, not a communist takeover.

Aroused public sentiment did find a sympathetic congress and funds were forced on the administration for the purpose of granting assistance to the Nationalist cause

but, alas, too late--the mainland had been lost.

The shattered Nationalist Army, led by a disillusioned Chiang, withdraw to the Island of Taiwan and the seeds of issue, which today plagues the world, were sown.

No one will ever know what additional U.S. aid would have accomplished. China was war weary; Chiang had been fighting since the thirties and, admittedly, there was some mismanagement on his part. Had the U.S. saved China, there certainly would not have been a Korea nor an Indo-China. The U.S. is now paying in full measure for the loss of China.

"The Truman Administration, sporting a State Department apparently seething with anti-China (Chiang) sentiment, persisted in its evaluation of what had "really" happened in China. This fact was born out by the failure of the U.S. to close its consulates in Red China, until forced to do so by the brutality and oppression of the communists." (29-4,5)

History may have had a strange alternate path to travel, had the American consulate personnel been well treated by the Red regime.

Attempting to systematically place the blame for what had transpired in China on the shoulders of the Nationalist Government, the U.S. State Department issued its famous, though somewhat discredited, "White Paper". It soon became apparent that the State Department had grossly underestimated the U.S. public reaction regarding the pursual of a policy

that had led to the defeat of Chiang and the Nationalists.
(29-3)

In order to further justify their actions to an aroused American populace and Congress, the administration went to great lengths. Secretary Acheson, not only stoutly defended America's action on the mainland, but insured the American people that Taiwan was of "little" strategic value. (27-88)

U.S. disengagement became complete "from that mess over there" when, in reply to Peking's avowed and oft announced intention to liberate Taiwan, President Truman declared in January of 1950 that the U.S. "will not pursue a course which will lead to involvement in the Civil Conflict in China." Less than one week later, an era of diplomacy and a period of misguided strategy was culminated when Secretary of State Acheson defined what the U.S. considered its "defense perimeter" in the Far East. He did not mention nor intend to include Taiwan and Korea. (27-88)

In summing up this period of U.S.-China relations, it is quite obvious that the ultimate failure of Chiang cannot be attributed to any one thing but a combination of many. The most disquieting event during this period was the complete failure of U.S. policy makers to understand the true meaning and threat of International Communism and the strategic significance to the United States of the mainland of China. The aforementioned criticism of the U.S. Department of State is made only in that it most clearly demon-

strates the lack of a strategy that was global in context. Ample demonstration of this is evidenced by the below listed actions which occurred almost simultaneously at different ends of the earth:

1. 1945--China, General Marshall urges the Chinese Nationalists Government to form a coalition government with the communists.

Europe-U.S. urges Western European Governments to purge themselves of communists.

2. 1947--China, U.S. prepares to withdraw from its commitments to China under Chiang.

Europe-U.S. prepares to launch massive aid under the Truman doctrine.

3. 1949--China, U.S. withdraws all military and economic aid; the "White Paper" is issued.

Europe-North Atlantic Treaty, pledging the U.S. to the defense of Europe, is signed in Washington.

The above are but a sample of what occurred during this period in Europe and in Asia. It would certainly appear that the United States recognized the threat of communism, met and contained it in Europe, while permitting the most vital land area in Asia to be conquered by "Agrarian Reformers".

1950-1963

The policy of disengagement, which had been followed

in the latter half of the forties throughout Asia, was reversed dramatically when Truman ordered General MacArthur to halt overt communist aggression on the tip of a small Asian Peninsula--Korea.

Acting with vigor, the then President, in addition to his orders to General MacArthur, instructed the U.S. seventh fleet "to prevent any attack on Formosa" and simultaneously called upon the Nationalist to cease operations against the mainland of China. Hindsight would tend to indicate that the public lashing of Chiang was a tactical error of serious magnitude. Being able to disregard an invasion attempt by the Nationalist Army launched from Taiwan, the communist General Liao Piao began moving his armies from South China to the very borders of North Korea. (10-17,18)

Initially, upon realizing that a strong Nationalist China could not be utilized as a counter balance against the influence of the USSR in Asia, the U.S. had turned to Japan. This course of action was predicted on the erroneous assumption that the Peking regime would for some time remain a relatively insignificant power on the world scene. (19-323)

Overt aggression in June of 1950, by the "Agrarian Reformers" against the United Nations forces in Korea not only dispelled the above misconception, but made it quite evident that an agonizing reappraisal of U.S. Far Eastern policy was long overdue.

John Foster Dulles' statement "We must build a totally new policy toward Asia...The communist regime in China can exert a powerful hostile influence," (8-277) clearly indicated America's awakening and growing concern over Asia.

Thus in 1950, the United States commenced to rebuild its entire Far Eastern strategy. During this period, the United States and the Free World realized that, if the Chinese Communist were to accomplish their stated political objectives, the United States would be divided from its Asia Allies and forced to retreat militarily and politically from Asia.

Overall aims of the policies implemented to counter the Chinese communist threat were basically:

1. Check overt communist military aggression.
2. Promote the political stability, economic progress, and social well-being of Free World Nations.
3. Isolate Red China.

In accomplishing the aim directed at blocking communist military aggression, it became apparent that a renewed emphasis would have to be placed on strategic military security, due to the doctrine of world domination dogmatically held by the Peking regime. To meet the overt military threat of Red China, a series of treaties and alliances were entered into by the U.S. with various Asian countries.

TREATIES AND ALLIANCES

The importance of containing the Red Communist regime in order to permit the smaller Asian states to develop politically, economically, and socially, resulted in the United States pledging her support to the security of several smaller powers.

Initially, the United States entered into the following treaties:

August 1951--United States-Philippine Mutual Defense Pact.

September 1951--Australia-New Zealand-United States Defense Pact (ANZUS)

September 1951--Japanese Peace Treaty.

August 1953--United States-South Korea Mutual Defense Pact.

In response to the massive assistance given to the North Vietnam insurgents by Red China, the U.S. solidified its containment policy by entering into the following treaties:

September 1954--SEATO.

December 1954--United States-Nationalist China Mutual Defense Pact.

June 1960--United States-Japanese Security Treaty.

These latter three arrangements are extremely significant in that they reflect, without question, that the United

States fully realized the Pacific defense line was closely dependent on the successful containment of Red China.

The two bilateral treaties mentioned above are important in that they indicate that the following U.S. aims had been altered:

1. Prior 1953.
 - a. A strong independent, United China. (40-18)
 - b. A free Democratic Japan.
2. After 1953.
 - a. A strong independent Nationalist Chinese government on Taiwan.
 - b. A strong Free Democratic Japan gradually rearming.

ANZUS and SEATO, multilateral treaties, generally require consultation when matters of territorial integrity or military and political security are threatened in the Pacific.

The provisions for consultation, particularly in SEATO, has often worked to the disadvantage of the member states. Overall, the combination of all of the treaties served to halt outright aggression against the member states, driving communism into the use of guerilla tactics. Perhaps the true concern of the Soviets' attitude toward SEATO was expressed by Molotov, in a session of the Supreme Soviet, when he stated: "SEATO is filled with a desire to strangle the national liberation movement in Asia, and is obviously

spearheaded against the Republic of China." (31-140-59)

MILITARY AND ECONOMIC AID

Coupled with the alliance system, the United States has increased economic and military aid in various degrees. The aims of the economic and military aid programs are much the same as those of the alliance system. Strategically, the United States would hope to bolster Asia economy to accomplish:

1. Prevent Asian countries from trading with Red China.
2. Assist in supporting the countries' own security forces.
3. Promote inter-regional trade agreements excluding communist countries.

Toward these goals the U.S. has actively supported the British inspired Colombo plan (1950), United Nations Technical Assistance Program (1950), and the Truman Point Four Program. These programs have had varying degrees of success with the latter two failing, in essence, to address themselves to the real problems of the areas concerned.

(24-274)

Economic and military aid programs to Far Eastern Countries since World War II have amounted to \$20.3 billion dollars. Of this amount, 24% of all U.S. post World War II aid, \$11.8 billion was for aid other than military, and

\$8.5 billion for military aid. (18-56)

Direct military aid to Asian nations has been responsible for fostering, and maintaining large, complete, national armies: Korea, Nationalist China, and South Vietnam, down to smaller forces designed to protect the internal security of a country.

Aid programs have served to provide a large number of indigenous armies that will certainly play a large role in the defense of the Pacific and the ultimate goal of containing Red China. (20-45) Additionally, the increased strength of indigenous forces has had a stabilizing effect on the internal security of Asian countries. Their employment against direct Red Chinese aggression would raise the "Price of entry" for the Red Chinese and serve to gain time for the United States to deploy its military might. (36-155)

ISOLATION

Often an inquiry concerning "China Policy" is replied to by a shrug of the shoulders. Thus it is often implied that there is no policy with regard to China. This, of course, is utter nonsense. If anything, the U.S. position concerning its China policy, particularly that portion dealing with the Chinese Peoples' Republic, is unmistakably clear.

Present policy toward the Chinese communist regime consists of: (7-3)

1. Withholding of diplomatic recognition.
2. Opposing United Nations membership.
3. An embargo on commerce.
4. No cultural or other exchange.

Summing up the period 1950-1963, the areas of conflict between the Peking regime and the United States have been many and varied, supplying a great deal of feeling and animosity between the two countries.

The United States initially not realizing the potential threat posed by the "Agrarian Reformers" soon discovered, through clashes with communist inspired movements in Korea, Indo-China, the Philippines, Malaya, Quemoy, South Vietnam and Laos, that the containment of communism in Europe comprised only a portion of the battle.

Communist China evolved a policy and dedicated the very existence of its regime to drive the U.S. from Asia and ultimately destroy her enroute to the ultimate goal of world domination.

The United States succeeded in countering the Red offense by completely reversing a strategy of disengagement to one aimed at containing and isolating the Red Regime.

Measures taken to limit the expansion of the Chinese communist were by and large effective but not completely successful in bringing to a cession^{pt} the Protracted War in Asia.

Critics at home and abroad have severely attacked the

major portion of the actions taken by the United States to isolate Red China. Most strongly brought under fire are those policies concerning the United States' stand on: recognition of the Red Regime, economic embargo, and admission to the UN.

The next chapter will endeavor to explore these questions in light of what their reversal or modification might have on the ultimate security of the United States and the Free World.

CHAPTER II

AREAS OF CONFLICT

The Red Chinese regimes' growing involvement in international affairs, trade, cultural exchange, and economic assistance cannot be ignored. Of more immediate concern is the awesome prospect that the Peking regime will soon possess atomic power, linking it with the most vital issue confronting the world, disarmament.

The magnitude of the many problems have long prompted critics within the United States and abroad to urge a change in present U.S.-China Policy.

This chapter will consider those questions most often subject to political debate and criticism; economic embargo, recognition, and admission to the UN.

It should be remembered that the above are only the focal points of the major issues. Peking full well realizes that it is United States power and determination that are the main obstacles to her imperialistic moves in Asia and ultimate victory of socialism.

ECONOMIC EMBARGO

Numerous Western powers, led by Great Britain, constantly bring diplomatic pressure to bear on the United States to relax its trade restrictions on communist China. They argue quite vociferously that the embargo placed against the Red

Chinese in 1950, at the inception of the Korean War, is now ineffective. It has been further pointed out that non-strategic materials manufactured in the United States can be procured by Red China from nations with whom the U.S. now trades.

Therefore, on the surface, it would seem that the U.S. embargo has little strategic significance. There are two factors that the advocates of free trade with Red China choose to overlook, or fail to consider.

By far the most important is that any relaxation of the present embargo would surely bring strong pressure from Japan to commence large scale trade with Red China.

Japan is dependent on imports for 20 percent of its food and 90 percent of its raw material, she must export or die. (33-677) Red China is by far in the most advantageous geographical position to provide the raw materials for Japan's industries. A great many Japanese feel that the Red Chinese market is an excellent opportunity for a significant trade expansion which would ultimately benefit the economic growth of Japan (4-25) and in part compensate for increasingly restrictive western markets. Considerable disagreement exists within Japan as to how important trade with Peking can be. Inherent in a substantial increase in Sino-Japanese trade, reaching any appreciable fraction of the total Japanese export trade, is the position gained by Peking to exert political pressure on the Japanese govern-

ment. (4-25)

This pressure could be brought to bear heavily through the exceptionally strong Japanese Socialist Party, whose avowed purpose is: "to secure the withdrawal of American forces not only from Japan but also from Okinawa." In addition, "they would recognize and trade with the communist bloc, in competition with Western Europe." (33-677-678)

Still other critics contend that the U.S. embargo drives the Peking regime closer to the USSR. Undoubtedly true, but is this good or bad? Red China must export to finance its attempts at industrialization and reach her ultimate goal of a self-sufficient China.

Today, 80 percent of Peking's trade is with the communist bloc (13-105) and consists largely of Chinese agriculture for communist bloc machinery and industrial goods. Lacking the capacity, at this time, to produce substantial industrial goods Peking has relied on agriculture to obtain the necessary funds to finance industrialization.

Unable to obtain foreign exchange credits with some nations of the free world, Peking has been compelled to deprive her people of anything other than a bare essential living. Recent natural calamities and the imbalance of the commodity trade with bloc countries has resulted in the expenditure of precious foreign exchange reserves for food stuffs, resulting in a dangerous imbalance in Peking's international accounts. (3-188)

Industrialization is one of the key bridges that must be transversed by the Peking leaders and, without question, a limited market has assisted in slowing the pace of ultimate industrialization.

Indications are, regardless of any embargo, the Red regime will succeed in achieving some status as an industrial power. Attainment of this goal is based on the assumptions of Peking maintaining totalitarian control; that the population remains satisfied with its ideological existence vice demanding greater material compensation for their constant sacrifices; that there is no excessive drain on the nation's resources, such as war; and that no serious shortage of required imports occurs that cannot be replaced domestically. (25-19)

Regardless ^{of} how obtained, an industrialized China adding to her population at the rate of 1700 per hour, (13-412) in the hands of its present militant leaders is a decided threat to the free world.

On the other side of the coin, it has been argued that a resumption of trade with Red China would be highly desirable to U.S. firms; enhance the posture of the U.S. in the international power arena; aid the export problem of Japan and assist in increasing America stature throughout the world. (28-212-216)

DIPLOMATIC RECOGNITION

Peking's pending entry into the nuclear club poses immediate and serious problems to a world already torn apart by the conflict between East and West.

Red China has served notice that: International agreements made without the participation and signature of China would have no binding force; that her participation and adherence were prerequisites of a binding disarmament agreement; and that recognition must be accorded prior to participation in disarmament talks. Thus a portion of the price of disarmament has been made known, Peking has not seen fit to proclaim its ultimate price for adherence to a disarmament pact. (16-18-20)

Although some time will evolve prior an appreciable nuclear capability is obtained by Peking, possibly 1975, (11-5-6) the experimental explosion of even a small atomic device will have a tremendous effect on her Asian neighbors.

Peking has used her pending atomic capability in dealing with the USSR and it would appear that nothing will deter Peking in pursuit of becoming a nuclear power. It can be anticipated Peking will attempt to gain major military and political concessions through the use of intimidation when her prospective nuclear capability becomes a reality.

Most certainly, first priority will be given the political demand for admission to the U.N.

Although the distinct possibility does exist that the Red Chinese leaders would refrain from entering negotiations concerning disarmament, as of this date, they have carefully maneuvered out of committing themselves to any proposals, even those solutions submitted by the USSR.

An explanation of these actions can be partially attributed to the basic difference between the two nations' interpretation of how the world revolution is to occur. (29-35) Additionally, on the surface it would further appear that nuclear warfare is of less concern to Peking than most, in light of their pronouncement of being able to sustain 300 million casualties and still survive. (28-122)

Aside from the pressing problem of disarmament, debate continues upon the basic issues producing many and varied opinions. The United States has cited numerous reasons for not according diplomatic recognition to Peking, ranging from failure to meet its international obligations to emphasizing that the U.S. suffered 142,000 casualties in Korea where Chinese volunteers were waging war against the U.N. (41-385-389) Again on the negative side is the bellicosity and open hostility constantly directed toward the United States.

Critics of the U.S. non-recognition policy, both at home and abroad, take diametrically and dogmatically opposed positions. Quincy Wright states, "The continued non-recognition of the Communist Government of China by the

United States is contrary to the normal expectations of international law and to the traditional foreign policy of the United States initiated by Washington when he recognized the revolutionary government of France in 1793." (45-152)
An interesting sidelight--Wright was a consultant to the State Department in 1943-1944.

Dulles writing in War and Peace advocated admission to the U.N. for Red China (8-191) but some years later as Secretary of State he stated, "Recognition is always a privilege, never a right." (45-152)

Lacking clear international law guidelines, the United States has attached the foundation of the non-recognition policy to the nation's vital interests.

The consequences of a major modification toward or reversal of the present recognition policy are complex and difficult to assess. Immediate results would include:

1. Increased prestige for the Peking regime.
2. Demoralize U.S. Asian Allies. (28-181)
3. Undermine the Nationalist hold on Taiwan. (3-442)
4. Serve as a blow to all anti-communist on the mainland. (29-23)
5. Deprive the U.S. of a strategic base in the Pacific.

Longer term consequences would be: (29-29)

1. Loss of Taiwan to Peking.
2. Endanger America's Pacific Defense arc.

3. Political shifts in Far Eastern nations away from the West and toward recognition of Peking.

Unless there is a startling major change in Red China, the cost of recognition is more than the United States can now afford to pay.

ADMISSION TO UN

"A new era began for nearly one-fourth of the human race on October 1949, when the people's Republic of China proclaimed its existence from the ancient Capital of Peking." (2-1) Within a few weeks' time, the United Nations was presented with a problem that, to this date, has proven unsolvable.

A cablegram dated 18 November 1949 from Peking informed the United Nations that Peking now represented China. (29-79) A Soviet draft resolution, calling for the cancellation of the credentials of the Chinese Nationalist representative, was defeated on January 13, and the Soviet delegate walked out of the U.N., not to return until after the U.N. had committed troops to Korea and condemned Peking as an aggressor.

Now, some thirteen years later, the same problem-- admission of Peking into the UN--exists, clouded with emotion, extremely partisan, and one that has transcended national borders. It is not intended to record in this paper the legal and complex debates concerning this ques-

tion. It is sufficient to note that the United States has steadfastly objected to the seating of Communist China's representatives on the basis of Article Four, which bars all states that are not considered peace-loving and Article 55c which deals with human rights, universal respect, and fundamental freedoms for all. The United States initially sought to avoid using its veto authority against proposals to unseat the Nationalist representative. Upon continued open hostility by the Peking regime subsequent to 1954, and their support of the war in Indo-China, the United States modified its position on the use of the veto, stating it would be used if necessary. Some of the additional arguments submitted in support of non-admission are:

1. Red China is the only country that has been at war with the UN.
2. Red China openly and consistently defies accords reached at Geneva concerning Viet Nam.
3. SEATO has compiled evidence indicating that Peking is interfering in the internal affairs of countries in South East Asia.
4. China would disrupt and undermine the very existence of the UN.

Some of the United States' closest allies are responsible for bringing the greatest pressure to bear concerning this issue. Most prevalent among their arguments are:

1. The "inevitability" of admission to the UN of

Peking. By review of the voting in the UN, advocates of this theory maintain, that the U.S. position has deteriorated consistently each year. (28-164-165)

2. Another group maintains that failure of agreement on the China problem creates serious division among the Allies. (32-137)
3. By and large the most predominate group press for the U.S. to:
 - a. Accept the "Two China" solution.
 - b. Neutralize Taiwan under a UN Trusteeship. (32-141)
4. Still others claim recognition of Peking would enhance our prestige with the Neutrals. (28-281)

What, then, can be expected if Peking was permitted to enter the UN, due a political shift in the U.S. position, there appeared to be one pending in 1961. (29-123-124)

Undoubtedly, the repercussions of Peking ascending to the position of a guardian of International peace would be far reaching.

First, the prestige of Peking would soar to an unprecedented high, particularly in Asia.

There would be an immediate problem concerning the security of the independence of many of the smaller Asian countries who are now favorable to the West. (29-107)

There is no guarantee that admission to the UN would

bring Peking under the influence of the organization. To the contrary, there is good reason to believe just the opposite. (4-66)

There would arise a critical question concerning the status of Taiwan and its ultimate security, particularly since Peking, fresh with victory in the UN, might well decide to "liberate" Taiwan.

Finally, the appearance of Communist China would facilitate the organization's further shift from the Western image it was cast in. There would be only one path that the UN could take, strengthening the communist position. (29-109)

CHAPTER III

STRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE OF TAIWAN MILITARY

In 1950, the United States effectively neutralized Taiwan by interposing the U.S. Seventh Fleet in the Formosan Straits. The Seventh Fleet was withdrawn in 1953 when President Eisenhower announced the unleashing of Chiang.

The summer of 1954 startled America into further action. During this period, Peking openly declared their intentions of taking Taiwan and began shelling the Nationalist off-shore islands of Quemoy and Matsu. Near the close of that year, the United States and the Nationalist signed a Mutual Defense Pact, the American people had now guaranteed the security of Taiwan.

Some three years later, 1958, the Communist began once again to shell the off-shore islands. The U.S. Seventh Fleet was brought into play and materially assisted the Nationalists in re-supplying the off-shore islands. America had not only chose to impose its military power between the island of Taiwan, but, in addition, guaranteed its security by the force of arms if necessary. (39-50-63)

President Eisenhower stated that:

In unfriendly hands, Formosa and the Pescadores would seriously dislocate the existing, even if unstable, balance of moral, economic, and military forces upon which the peace of the Pacific

that constitutes, for the United States and other free nations the geographical backbone of their security structure in that ocean. (39-57-58)

This had not, by any means, been the first cry echoing the importance of Taiwan, "more and more of the military leaders put themselves on record to the effect that Formosa in unfriendly hands would endanger our whole Pacific arc of defense." (10-130)

One needs only a simple mercator chart and a general idea where the various sea lanes of communication are located. To grasp the geographical location of Taiwan lends itself to strategic military significance. Its location places it in a position of control over the heavily traveled sea routes between Japan and Southeast Asia. Taiwan, linked together with the Ruyukus Islands and Japan, forms a natural blockade of the Chinese coast.

With a firm line of defense in Europe, NATO, and discounting an assault over the polar region originating in Siberia, due to climatic conditions, the Sino-Russian forces must pierce the American Pacific defense arc. The success of any military operation of this nature would depend heavily on the neutralizing of Japan, the Philippines, Okinawa, and, foremost, Taiwan.

Thus, the security of the Western coast of the Continental United States could easily rest on the successful defense of several insular areas many thousands of miles

away.

Generally, America considers her defense from the Far East in terms of two zones. The outer zone comprises the islands of the Mid-Pacific to the west. The inner zone comprises those islands laying along the coast of East Asia.

Lacking any degree of amphibious capability other than their fishing fleets, an attack would necessarily be directed against the inner defense arc. Comprising this defense perimeter are: Aleutians, Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines, Indonesia, Australia, and various other smaller island chains.

Taiwan is centrally located and the keystone to this 5,000 mile defense arc.

Anchoring the southern end of the Ruyukus chain, Taiwan, in the hands of an enemy, would serve as the staging area for the conquest of Japan and invasion of the Philippines.

Additional strategic importance can be found in the utilization of the island as an ideal advance base from which various types of attacks could be launched against the mainland of China, 115 miles distance.

The natural mountainous terrain and heavily fortified coastlines along with ^{Chiang's} 500,000 troops presents a formidable obstacle to any would-be invader.

The loss of this island fortress either through lack of force or political ineptitude would be a tragedy almost

equal to the blunder the U.S. committed when the mainland of China was permitted to communize.

SYMBOL

Control of Taiwan by the Nationalist government is of immense importance to the free world, both physically and as a symbol.

The fact that a non-communist Republic of China exists provides a rallying point for the large Chinese colonies, numbering nearly 13,000,000 persons who live outside the borders of China. Maintenance of a free China government on Taiwan gives them at the very least a choice of where they shall put their allegiance. An important measure of defense against communist subversion in Southeast Asia is to pressure the non-communist sympathies of the Chinese residents there. The U.S. has a Military Assistance Advisory Group and have assisted the Nationalist in many ways. A solid foundation was laid in all areas, education, health, land reforms, political and economic awareness. Extensive effort and educational drives have succeeded in substantially raising the literacy rate. Over 6,000 overseas Chinese children come to Taiwan each year for advanced education.

The annual gross national product increased by almost 80% between 1950 and 1958. The implementation of Land-To-The Tiller program has succeeded in almost 75% of the farmers owning all or part of the land they till.

Transportation and communications projects were completed, and other large projects such as reservoir and cross-island highways. Taiwan, with climbing production and an increasingly diversified economy, is second only to Japan in standard of living in the Far East.

The cost of living continues to rise; however, the per capita consumption of consumer goods and food has increased yearly, far outstripping the increased cost of living. In Taiwan there are less extremes in poverty and wealth than anywhere else in Asia.

It is quite plain from the foregoing, Taiwan presents an excellent "show case" for the United States, a Berlin of Asia.

CHAPTER IV

POSSIBLE ALTERNATE POLICIES

There are many who argue for change in America's present China policy simply because they feel the present state of affairs is unsatisfactory. Generally speaking, Americans do not like unclear or uncertain problems. They want answers.

The United States-China Policy, whom so many are calling for a change, has in general been outlined in the first chapter. America's policy toward the Peking regime was formulated in the early 1950's. The basic tenants of that policy will be reviewed in light of today's world situation to ascertain if U.S.-China policy still does and will continue to be able to cope with the Red Chinese.

There exists in Asia certain prime peculiar factors that must be carefully weighed in formulating or modifying any alternate strategy in Asia. These factors must be considered in light of national aims, vital interest, and commitments to allies.

The aggressive, militant, and destructive nature of Peking leave little room for political maneuver and even less for military miscalculation.

Primary considerations effecting U.S. policy in Asia are:

1. The United States position in Asia, hence the

- world depends on the conduct of her China Policy.
2. Communist China will soon possess atomic weapons linking her directly to the disarmament question.
 3. Peking's international activity, political, economic, and propaganda is certain to grow throughout Asia and the world.
 4. One of the basic considerations is not whether Peking will continue to exist but rather by what possible means can a powerful, expansionistic communist China be restrained.
 5. For various political, economical, and ideological reasons, neutralism and non-alignment will remain popular in Asia. Yet, there are definite indications that the Asian nations, as a whole, are beginning to sense, and to a degree fear, the new militant, and dangerous power of China.
 6. Any policy for Asia must derive its strength from the fact that its basic precepts are cognizant of the realities and national interests of the non-communist Asian countries.
 7. Under existing circumstances, basic agreement between the U.S. and Peking on such issues as Taiwan and Korea is inconceivable.

Using the above factors as a general guide, it appears that there are conceivably several paths of approach to the China problem:

1. Containment--accomplished by isolation. The present U.S. policy.

This policy, as outlined in the foregoing paper, is considered adequate for the present time, but completely lacking in basic provisions for the contingencies of the future, particularly:

- (1) To date, containment has been only moderately successful against a weak China. In the future, against a self-sufficient and stronger China the U.S. and her Asian allies will be compelled to commit large forces or disengage.

- (2) Admission to UN--The possibility definitely exists that Peking will be voted into the UN over U.S. objections. Both Peking and the Nationalists have declared that they will not accept a "two China" situation.

- (3) Recognition--Attempts at containing another major nuclear power of a much more aggressive and violent nature, while professing it does not exist certainly lends itself to a complex dilemma.

2. Normalize Relations--A second approach. Support of this action would call for the same general Policy toward Peking that the USSR is accorded by the U.S.

3. Negotiation--A third possible path and would envision:

- (1) A period of exploration and investigation by

informal groups.

- (2) Increased intercourse.
- (3) Easing of trade restrictions.
- (4) Solution of outstanding problems.
- (5) Recognition.

4. Most often submitted as the panacea for the China problem is the creation, by many experts, of "two Chinas". Advocates adhering to this particular solution often present a persuasive case, and often submit it as an integral part of a general settlement to end tensions in the Far East.

Some of the U.S. closest allies and other well-qualified individuals advocate and quite stoutly defend this alternate solution. Careful consideration must be exercised to fully understand the far-reaching ramifications the acceptance of this policy or any form of it would have in Asia and ultimately effect the United States.

Peking has consistently taken the position that Taiwan was a part of China and should again become a part of China. Peking has consistently stated that it is determined to liberate Taiwan. On the other hand, Chiang Kai-shek is in complete unanimity with Peking; he, too, believes there is only one China.

Promoters of the "two China" policy brush aside the above and recommend that the U.S. could not lose anything by making an attempt to persuade Peking along these lines.

They continue their justification on the grounds that even if successful, it would show inherent reasonableness, enhancing U.S. world prestige. Further maintaining that there is, in fact, no moral issue concerned, that by the "two China" policy the Nationalists and the native Taiwanese would be protected.

The arguments continue with the critics of the proposed policy laying the foundation for their argument on the demoralizing effect that even a mention of "two Chinas" has on the Nationalists and our other Asian allies.

A possible solution has been put forth, recommending that Taiwan be put under UN trusteeship guaranteeing her territorial security. (29-47) It is unlikely that the Nationalist or Peking would accept this.

To sum up the possibility of a "two China" solution to the overall problem is highly unrealistic. The U.S. is not ready to hand over Taiwan to the communist in the foreseeable future at any price.

Any answer that even hints of "two Chinas" brings violent reaction by the opposing regimes and there presently is no available means to make either side accept any solution not to his liking. (3-437)

Finally, U.S. acquisition to a "two China" policy could well destroy her Asian system of treaties and alliances.

5. Offensive--The last alternate policy to be considered is one of a limited offensive nature. The

final decision to adopt a policy of this nature should be based on the following:

(1) Present U.S.-China policy has not succeeded in politically or militarily containing a weak China. Anything less, such as the alternatives listed in paragraphs two and three, are idealistic and morally superlative, but in today's world amount to appeasement and ultimate defeat.

(2) The acceptance of any offensive policy, though attractive to many, by the general American public initially is extremely doubtful.

(3) To accommodate the above and any fears raised by U.S. Asian allies, the offensive nature of any action would be limited and regarded as a long range essential defense policy.

(4) U.S. leaders must convince Americans that firmness is required, and bold action is necessary if the U.S. is to survive in this all-out struggle against communism. The Asian situation can best be summed up by, "Without the willingness to use force and without the sacrifice which the use of force as well as the prevention of war entails, no major international crisis ever has been settled short of appeasement or surrender." (36-405)

(5) Limited offensive actions need not be conducted by the U.S. military. There are now 1.7 million indige-

nous troops serving under governments that would welcome such a policy.

(6) Finally--The Soviets and Peking are today engaged in a serious dispute. It is the content of the dispute that bears here. The Soviets feel that Communists strategy must rely on methods which fall short of global nuclear war. Peking advocates a more aggressive policy, including all-out war if necessary. There is no disagreement on the basic problem, burying the West, but only which is the most expedient and least costly method to accomplish it. While the procedure for the American's ultimate defeat is being debated by Moscow and Peking, let everyone remember, "At the beginning of the last decade we were fighting the forces of communism ten thousand miles away, in 1960 the Soviet Union and China were in the process of establishing a protectorate over Cuba, some ninety miles off the coast of Florida." (36-396)

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSIONS

It is apparent that the U.S. State Department was not aware of the total and global context of the international communist movement until the early 1950's. Lack of positive timely action coupled with hindrance and misinformation by a segment of the State Department, resulted in a staunch ally, and the most crucial land area in Asia being lost to the free world.

Aroused public opinion and overt aggression in Asia resulted in the U.S. becoming aware of the need for a global strategy to contain communism.

Over a period of time, the U.S. built an alliance system in order to contain Peking. With the addition of economic and military aid to Asian countries, Red China was temporarily checked.

The sources of conflict between the United States and Peking partially result from those measures taken by the U.S. to isolate her and center mainly over the following:

1. U.S. refusal to recognize the Peking regime.
2. U.S. economic sanctions taken against Red China.
3. U.S. blocking Peking from admission to the UN, and of the measures taken to isolate Peking: the trade embargo has probably retarded Peking's goal of industrialization slightly, but has served as the

basis for some friction between Japan and the U.S. Non-recognition of Peking and blocking the Red regime from the UN have been successful, but are being subjected to heavy criticism from both at home and abroad.

Political and military confinement have been a partial success against a weak Red China.

Pending Peking's manufacture of atomic weapons, being voted into the UN over U.S. objections and ineffectiveness of the economic embargo call for a critical review of present U.S. policy.

Economically, communist China's goal is to industrialize and become self-sufficient. Politically, the Peking rulers have an overriding goal of driving the U.S. influence and power from Asia.

The economic embargo is presently the only major American policy that could conceivably be altered without facing the "two China" question.

Many of the so-called critics recommend the "two China" solution as an answer to most of the involved questions concerning recognition and admission to the UN of Peking. "Two Chinas" is not acceptable to Peking, the Nationalist, or the U.S. for security and moral reasons. There is no way to make either the Nationalists or Red China accept this solution.

The present U.S. containment policy is partially effec-

tive against a weak China. With an aggressive militant nation like Red China possessing nuclear weapons, the U.S. will by necessity have to surrender, to appease, or fight. There^{FORE}, the U.S. must change from a policy of attempted containment of communism in Asia to one of destroying it, or rolling it back.

Americans and their allies must be made to fully realize that firm aggressive action will be required. Indigenous forces of Asia could be used to commence the counter attack and would require extensive support by the U.S. America must adopt a win policy or accept appeasement and defeat.

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