

RESERVE

UNITED STATES NAVAL WAR COLLEGE  
COLLEGE OF NAVAL COMMAND AND STAFF  
RESEARCH PAPER



A REVIEW OF CURRENT RACE  
RELATIONS IN THE U.S. NAVY

by

W. R. Barnett  
LCDR            USN

This paper is a student research paper prepared at the Naval War College. The thoughts and opinions expressed in this paper are those of the author and not necessarily those of the Department of the Navy or the President, Naval War College.

Material herein may not be published, reproduced or otherwise copied without specific permission of the President, Naval War College, in each instance. The content, however, is open to citation and other reference in accordance with accepted academic research practices.

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE  
Newport, R.I.

THE FIRE THIS TIME:

A Review of Current Race Relations  
in the U.S. Navy

by

William R. Barnett

Lieutenant Commander, U.S. Navy

A Research Paper submitted to the Faculty of the College of Naval Command and Staff Management Department in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the Defense Economics and Decision Making Course.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Signature: 

19 December 1973

Research directed by  
John L. Carezza  
Commander, SC, U.S. Navy

Approved by:

\_\_\_\_\_  
Faculty Research Advisor      Date

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER		PAGE
I	THE PROBLEM. . . . .	1
II	THE FOUNDATION . . . . .	6
III	THE PROGRAMS . . . . .	10
IV	WHY WE FAILED. . . . .	14
V	THE NEW PROGRAMS . . . . .	25
VI	THE FUTURE . . . . .	32
	BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . .	46

THE FIRE THIS TIME:

A Review of Current Race Relations  
in the U.S. Navy

CHAPTER I - THE PROBLEM

The Chief of Naval Operations became acutely aware of racism and discrimination in the Navy in November 1970. He advised the rest of the Navy of his concern the following month:

Last month, Secretary Chafee and I, along with other senior officials of the Navy Department, met on one occasion with representative black Navy officers and their wives and later with a representative group of black enlisted men and their wives. Prior to these meetings, I was convinced that, compared with the civilian community, we had relatively few racial problems in the Navy. However, after exploring the matter in some depth with these two groups, I have discovered that I was wrong -- we do have problems, and it is my intention and that of Secretary Chafee to take prompt steps toward their solution.<sup>1</sup>

At this point in time, this was a startling admission; not just for a CNO, but for any public or academic official. As a nation we knew "something" was "wrong," if for no other reason than the burned-out cities in 1967. The Kerner Commission had repeatedly placed the blame on "white racism;"<sup>2</sup>

---

1. "Equal Opportunity in the Navy," NAVOP Z-66 DTG 172054Z, December 1970, par. 2.

2. Otto Kerner et al., Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (New York: Bantam Books, Inc., 1968). Any number of examples could be noted. Some of the most frequently quoted are:

"White racism is essentially responsible for the explosive mixture which has been accumulating in our cities since the end of World War II." p. 10.

"What white Americans have never fully understood -- but what the Negro can never forget -- is that white society is deeply implicated in the ghetto. White institutions created it, white institutions maintain it, and white society condones it." p. 2.

however, a 1968 poll commissioned by CBS showed that only 31% of white Americans agreed with these findings.<sup>3</sup> The Johnson Administration exhibited mixed reactions and never really gave the report more than a luke-warm endorsement.<sup>4</sup> Even more discouraging is the fact that social scientists had virtually ignored the problem as well, and had not developed the theory which would have allowed them to have predicted the riots.<sup>5</sup>

The military, though it was considered by many to be far ahead of the rest of society as far as integrating minorities was concerned,<sup>6</sup> was still able to produce a CNO in December 1970 who would unabashedly state:

---

3. Paula B. Johnson et al., "Black Invisibility, the Press, and the Los Angeles Riot," American Journal of Sociology, LXXVI, No. 4, (January, 1971), p. 718.

4. "Transcript of the President's News Conference on Foreign and Domestic Matters," New York Times, March 23, 1968, p. 12, col. 1.

5. L. Paul Metzger, "American Sociology and Black Assimilation: Conflicting Perspectives," Race Relations: Current Perspectives, ed., Edgar G. Epps (Cambridge: Winthrop Publishers, Inc., 1973), pp. 22-39.

6. Charles C. Moskos, Jr., "Racial Integration in the Armed Forces," American Journal of Sociology, LXXII, No. 2, (September, 1966), pp. 139-140. Also Daniel P. Moynihan, in U.S. Department of Labor, The Negro Family; The Case for National Action (Moynihan Report; Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1965), p. 75, declares that the Negro is treated more equally in the service. He explains that if this seems to be a statement of ideal rather than reality, "it is an ideal that is close to realization."

What struck me more than anything else was the depth of feeling of our black personnel that there is significant discrimination in the Navy. Prior to these meetings, I sincerely believed that I was philosophically prepared to understand the problems of our black Navymen and their families, and until we discussed them at length, I did not realize the extend and deep significance of many of these matters.<sup>7</sup>

This new awareness resulted in a spat of new directives, programs, and messages. In all, more than 200 minority programs were devised in the next twenty months.<sup>8</sup> These programs covered "everything from housing, to the establishment of special minority affairs counseling, to getting black cosmetics in the exchange."<sup>9</sup>

In spite of all this official concern, two serious incidents occurred in late 1972. During the evening of October 12, 1972:

Groups of blacks, armed with chains, wrenches, bars, broomsticks and other dangerous weapons, went marauding through sections of the (USS Kitty Hawk) disobeying orders to cease, terrorizing the crews, and seeking out white personnel for senseless beating with fists and with weapons which resulted in extremely serious injury to three men and the medical treatment of many more, including some blacks. . . .<sup>10</sup>

---

7. NAVOP Z-66, op. cit., par. 3.

8. "Text of Zumwalt's Remarks to Senior Naval Officers on Causes of Racial Unrest," New York Times, November 11, 1972, p. 16, col. 1.

9. Ibid.

10. House Armed Services Committee, Report by the Special Subcommittee on Disciplinary Problems in the U.S. Navy (The Hicks Commission; H.A.S.C. No. 92-81; Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, January 2, 1973), p. 17667.

The second incident involved members of the crew of the USS Constellation between November 3 and 9, 1972. Again, in the words of the House Armed Services Subcommittee which investigated both events:

What has been charitably described as 'unrest' and as a 'sit-in' took place while the ship was underway for training exercises. The vast majority of the dissident sailors were black and were allegedly protesting several grievances they claimed were in need of correction.

These sailors were off-loaded as a part of a 'beach detachment,' given liberty, refused to return to the ship, and were later processed only for this minor disciplinary infraction . . . .<sup>11</sup>

While these two events received the majority of the publicity, several other incidents happened during the same time period. A "racial brawl" occurred on the USS Sumter on September 7, 1972.<sup>12</sup> Four sailors were injured in an incident aboard the oiler USS Hassiyampa during October in Subic Bay, Philippines.<sup>13</sup> In November, five sailors were injured in a clash ultimately involving 130 blacks and whites on Midway Island, and an apparently racially motivated demonstration resulted in considerable material damage at the Navy Correctional Center in Norfolk,

---

11. Ibid.

12. "Racial Brawl on Ship in Southeast Asia Sept. 7 is Disclosed," New York Times, January 11, 1973, p. 77, col. 1.

13. "4 White Navy Men Injured; 11 Blacks Held at Subic Bay," New York Times, October 18, 1972, p. 9., col. 1.

Virginia.<sup>14</sup> Furthermore, a Retention Study Group, composed of twelve minority junior officers (nine blacks, one Mexican-American, one Filipino and one American Indian), submitted, in late October, a report to the CNO which pointedly accused that the Navy was "failing to accept ownership of minority affairs and race relations programs, but instead was passing the problem of minority affairs officers and representatives."<sup>15</sup>

The combination of several of these factors lead to Admiral Zumwalt's celebrated "rebuke" of the flag officers in the Washington, D.C. area.<sup>16</sup> The Admiral's frustration over these problems was evident from his remarks:

It was immediately clear to me from this (retention study group) report, that the Navy has made unacceptable progress in the equal opportunity area and that the reason for this failure was not the programs but the fact that they were not being used. . . .

Plainly stated, we have tended to succeed wherever the establishment of a program met a need without a corresponding need to change or dismantle an existing procedure. We have tended to fail wherever a 'real' change from hallowed routine was required.<sup>17</sup>

The cause of these Navy failures, the progress in the last year, and what appears likely in the future, are the subject matter of this paper.

---

14. "Race Seen Factor in 2 Navy Clashes," New York Times, November 28, 1972, p. 17, col. 1.

15. Terry Johnson, "Problem Ownership," Cruiser-Destroyerman, XVII, No. 10, p. 11.

16. Drew Middleton, "Zumwalt Rebukes Top Navy Leaders on Racial Unrest," New York Times, November 11, 1972, p. 1., col. 8.

17. "Text of Zumwalt's Remarks," loc. cit.



## CHAPTER II - THE FOUNDATION

In order to more fully understand the foundation upon which Admiral Zumwalt built his equal opportunity programs, it would be helpful to examine the 1970 attitudes and behavior of the white Naval officers he expected to carry out his plans. Apparently no studies about Naval officer's attitudes were done in this time frame, however. This should not be too surprising since the general lack of public and academic concern has been previously noted. Fortunately an Army officer, Lieutenant Colonel Samuel R. Shalala, was concerned about these attitudes and behaviors, and concluded a rather serious study of 100 students at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in 1969.<sup>18</sup> While Shalala strictly limited his sample to Army officers, there should be enough similarity between services so his results would approximate a like group of Naval officers.

The questions used were designed to examine three features of the respondent's attitude towards blacks (the study did not address other minorities): his knowledge, perceptions, beliefs and expectations (cognitions) of blacks; his feelings or emotional orientation (affective responses) about blacks; and

---

18. Samuel R. Shalala, LTC, USA, "A Study of Ethnocentrism Among White Professional Military Officers," An unpublished Masters Thesis in Military Art and Science, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1969.

his actions (conations) when dealing with blacks.<sup>19</sup> The reason for isolating these three features was to examine the relationship and consistency between the respondents knowledge, feelings and actions. Also it would allow supposition about the effect on the other two caused by changing one of the features.<sup>20</sup>

The results were arrayed on an overall tolerance continuum which showed that, of the 100 subjects, three were strongly tolerant, 46 were tolerant, 39 stereotyped, eight were intolerant, and four were strongly intolerant.<sup>21</sup> Personnel that fell at either end of the scale exhibited attitude stability and consistency. Those in the middle varied somewhat, according to the subject.

Examining the cognitive feature, it was discovered that very few thought the Negro was intellectually inferior to the white, or that he did not perform well in combat, just to pick two examples. On the other hand, almost 40% considered Negroes clannish and thought that they depreciate property. Other areas, such as "lack of ambition," favored treatment in promotions (reverse discrimination), "lower standards," and sexual amorality, drew responses of 40% or greater in the "undecided category.

---

19. Ibid., p. 8.

20. Ibid., p. 9.

21. Ibid., The results and statistics quoted in the next several paragraphs are found on pp. 73-156 of the study.

The next step was to examine the affective and conative features. Not surprisingly, items relating to sex drew the strongest negative feelings (affective responses). Forty-five percent expressed negative feelings about mixed marriages and a full 72% expressed consternation should their daughter date a black. (Only seven percent were relatively unconcerned about this.) On the other hand, feelings against Negro use of public accommodations or private clubs were almost non-existent. When willingness to act (conations) in these areas were examined, the results were somewhat tempered. Only 19% favored passing a law forbidding racial intermarriage, while 51% agreed that they would "usher" their daughter's black date out the door. In most other areas less than eight percent was willing to do anything in a situation which they may have had strong negative feelings about, however 21% agreed that the actions and influence on the Defense Department of such civil rights groups as NAACP or the Urban League "should be curbed in some manner."

The study's conclusions point to several important factors:

1. Ethnocentric attitudes do exist, however they would normally result in action only when sexual factors are present.

2. The Army's legislation of non-discriminatory practices has had an effect which tempers expected responses. That is, negative feelings are not likely to be expressed in actions since regulations forbid such responses.

3. None of the sample, including the strongly intolerant, stated that they had never discriminated against a Negro in any manner.

If we assume that these findings are probably very similar to the results, we would have found had we conducted research with white naval officers, we can project this sample as the leadership foundation Admiral Zumwalt used to implement his equal opportunity programs. The next chapter will review the programs themselves.

### CHAPTER III - THE PROGRAMS

Admiral Zumwalt's initial response, expressed in Z-66, was to obtain some immediately visible action: Every Commanding Officer was to "appoint an aware minority group officer or senior petty officer as his Special Assistant for Minority Affairs," who would have direct access to the CO. A minority group wife was to be included in an already promulgated "Navy Wives Ombudsman" program. The "special needs of minority groups" were to be provided for in such ways as stocking black cosmetics and grooming aides in exchanges, employing black barbers and beauticians, stocking "soul food" in the commissary, obtaining discount tickets for entertainment events of special interest to minority groups, and providing books, records, and magazines of interest to blacks. All these actions were to be carried out or be in effect by January 15, 1972.<sup>22</sup>

As promised in Z-66, other programs and policies soon followed. The primary directive was SECNAVINST 5350.10A of July 9, 1971: "Equal Opportunity within the Department of the Navy." This document directed that "equal opportunity and treatment shall be accorded all military and civilian employees," and further that "discriminatory treatment, on and off base. . . shall be detected, opposed and overcome."<sup>23</sup> Among other things,

---

22. NAVOP Z-66, op. cit., par. 6.

23. "Equal Opportunity within the Department of the Navy," Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV) Instruction 5350.10A of July 9, 1971, par. 5.

the CNO was specifically directed to devise programs which would insure that "equal opportunity" was understood, that "Affirmative Action Programs" (not specifically defined) were established, that a reporting system was devised, and that regulations or practices that are obstacles to equal opportunity were repealed or amended.<sup>24</sup>

Many results of these programs were in evidence by October-November 1972. Significant strides were taken in the area of recruiting minorities, both officer and enlisted.<sup>25</sup> An "Advisory Council for Race Relations and Minority Affairs" was established to develop and monitor programs. This group was responsible for many of the goals and objectives which were guiding the Navy's efforts. Areas that tend to define or limit individual development, such as job selection and classification procedures, and testing were being critically studied. Filipinos were no longer being recruited exclusively as stewards. Finally, the achievements and contributions of earlier minority personnel were being recognized by naming ships and structures after them.

While these programs were promulgated Navy-wide, individual commands were "experimenting" with programs of their own.

---

24. Ibid., par. 6.

25. Terry Johnson, "Communication--A Key to Equality," Cruiser-Destroyerman, XVII, No. 10, p. 3. The programs described in this paragraph are discussed in this article.

One command which appears to have had a greater than usual amount of success was the Cruiser-Destroyer Force in the Atlantic.<sup>26</sup> Three specific programs included a "Striker Selection Board" which made the path towards designation and rate more clearly defined and somewhat easier. A "Boatswain's Mate Training Program" was a particularly interesting attempt to "rehabilitate" an "unattractive" rate which ususally contains a significant number of minority personnel, while at the same time actually teach, in a formal atmosphere, the deck skills that can normally only be learned through several years experience at sea. Third, a pilot program called "Prep GCT Retake," was developed. This consists of remedial work in vocabulary and reading comprehension which leads up to the opportunity to retake tests which were becoming recognized as culturally biased by this time.

Another program which was particularly effective was developed by the Commander in Chief of the Atlantic Fleet.<sup>27</sup> This concept centered on the seminar or "rap session" since open communications was recognized as the most important means of attaining racial harmony in the service. These sessions,

---

26. Mark Wilson, "CruDesLant Efforts with Race Relations and Minority Affairs," Cruiser-Destroyerman, XVII, No. 10, p. 6 ff.

27. "Basic Minority Affairs Human Relations Programs Manual," Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet (CINCLANTFLT) Instruction 5420.4.

which were organized differently on different ships, were credited with defuzing many misunderstandings, and, as will be seen later, were eventually formalized for use by the entire Navy.

Considering the progress described in this chapter, and indeed, no small amount of progress was actually made, one wonders why the racial flare-ups and incidents occurred in late 1972. The next chapter will examine these causes.



## CHAPTER IV - WHY WE FAILED

Put as simply as possible, we failed because we didn't recognize the problem ourselves. As Pogo once said, "We have met the enemy, and they are us."

The fact that the Navy missed the point is understandable. The whole concept of "racism" is less than a decade old. Gordon Allport's "classic" The Nature of Prejudice<sup>28</sup> published in 1954 does not include the term "racism" in its index. Another "standard" text from the same era, Race and Ethnic Relations, does not use the word either.<sup>29</sup> In the past we have spoken of "prejudice" or "discrimination." It is almost impossible to find anyone who will admit to being guilty of either of these today, particularly in the military. Pre-judging, as Shalala pointed out, "is not the stuff of good decision-making."<sup>30</sup> Therefore, an officer whose performance is evaluated on his ability to make decisions, would hesitate to admit to not objectively weighing all relevant data. Discrimination is explicitly forbidden by regulations.<sup>31</sup> Public sentiment and legal decisions

---

28. Gordon W. Allport, The Nature of Prejudice (New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1958).

29. Brewton Berry, Race and Ethnic Relations (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1958).

30. Shalala, op. cit., p. 102.

31. See "Department of the Navy Manual on Equal Opportunity and Treatment of Military Personnel," Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV) Instruction 5350.6B of September 5, 1973, and "Navy Equal Opportunity Manual," Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV) Instruction 5350.1 of September 17, 1973.

have enforced the same, virtually wholesale, rejection of either prejudice or discrimination, in the general public.

The idea of "racism," however, has not gained general acceptance by the public nor is it understood by the great majority of the population. Definitions differ, but they usually hinge on the concept of subordination due to color:

Perhaps the best definition of racism is an operational one. This means that it must be based upon the way people actually behave. . . . Therefore, racism may be viewed as any attitude, action, or institutional structure which subordinates a person or group because of his or their color.<sup>32</sup>

Another, simpler version of this definition has been formulated:

"Racism (is) the belief that one or more races have innate superiority over other races."<sup>33</sup> Robert Terry would push the concept considerably further to encompass all "injustice," not merely "subordination," and includes the factor of rationalizing the behavior:

. . . racism is any activity by individuals, groups, institutions, or cultures that treats human beings unjustly because of color and rationalizes that treatment by attributing to them undesirable biological, psychological, social, or cultural characteristics.<sup>34</sup>

---

32. The United States Commission on Civil Rights, Racism in America and How to Combat It (Clearinghouse Publication, Urban Series No. 1; Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, January 1970), p. 5.

33. Roger Daniels and Harry H.L. Kitano, American Racism: Exploration of the Nature of Prejudice (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1970), p. 2.

34. Robert W. Terry, For Whites Only (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1970), p. 41.

Therefore, it can be seen that an action or policy which "subordinates" another or is "unjust" to another, can be distinctly different from a pre-judged reaction or a discriminatory response. An example might be a conversation between two whites in which they discuss "jig-a-boos." Most people today will agree that this is "wrong," but both participants would probably reject the thought that they were prejudiced and surely would insist that they had discriminated against no one. The conversation does imply subordination and injustice, and is therefore racist.

This suggest that racism can be much more subtle than prejudice or discrimination. Ever since Stokely Carmichael and Charles Hamilton first popularized the concept in 1967,<sup>35</sup> most authorities have differentiated between individual, overt racism, and indirect, institutional racism. Overt racism is reflected in discrimination based on color per se, such as keeping blacks out of a private club. It is relatively easy to recognize and although some vestiges remain today, it is disappearing in America.

Unfortunately overt racism is the only form most Americans do recognize. Since it is so subtle, institutional racism is

---

35. Stokely Carmichael and Charles V. Hamilton, Black Power: The Politics of Liberation in America (New York: Random House, 1967), pp. 3-4.

terribly difficult to pinpoint. Perhaps an example would be most useful:

An employer who previously discriminated against blacks because of their color has become convinced that this overt racism is wrong. "All right," he says, "from now on I'll hire strictly on skill and ability." Unfortunately the skills he requires are only taught in the well-equipped shop class of a suburban school, and not in the poorly equipped ghetto school. Therefore he never gets any black applicants. That's institutional racism. The parallel between this example and the Navy's "fair" tradition of assigning recruits to advanced schooling as a result of their basic test scores is rather obvious. Poorly educated recruits will score poorly on the test and will not be "eligible."

One of the most subtle examples of institutional racism in the Navy is our policy of granting emergency leave only when it involves the immediate family. Grandparents do not specifically qualify as "immediate," although the regulations include a "loco parentis" clause.<sup>36</sup> A Commanding Officer, being fair to all and complying with the regulations, does not grant leave for the death of a grandparent. While this is probably justifiable for most whites, a large percentage of blacks were actually raised

---

36. Bureau of Naval Personnel Manual, NAVPERS 15791B (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969), Art. 3020075, par. 5.

by their grandparents. An overemphasis on "equality" here is actually institutional racism.

It is not the purpose of this paper to develop the fundamental case for racism, individual or institutional. We do assume it is real, and that it is the problem. Given the newness and subtlety of the problem, it is not difficult to understand why the Kerner Commission charge of racism was not widely accepted, why the Navy missed the point in many of their programs following Z-66, or why the Hicks Committee was unable to find any specific examples of discrimination aboard either the Kitty Hawk or the Constellation.<sup>37</sup> Racism was evident in all cases; the examiners, however, were looking for discrimination or prejudice. The "problem" that existed in each situation was "white racism." Again, Terry states the problem succinctly:

For years, whites have merely reacted to black demands and methods. . . . The alternative to mere reaction requires a fundamental and far reaching realization by whites. The strategic target for solution to the race question is wrong. The white quandaries are misplaced. What is at stake for white America today is not what black people want and do but white people stand for and do. The racial problem in American society is not a "black problem." It is a "white problem." If there are racial ambiguities, conflicts, and contradictions in black America, it is only because these factors are deeper and more far-reaching in white America. The time has come to attack the causes of the racial crisis, not the victims.<sup>38</sup>

---

37. House Armed Services Committee, Report, p. 17668. The Hicks Committee failed to interview the men accused in the incidents, however.

38. Terry, op. cit., p. 15.

Terry Johnson's article, "Problem Ownership," quoted earlier, contains the most direct accusation of the Navy's misunderstanding that we have found:

Minority affairs/race relations is NOT a minority problem but a NAVY problem. All of the 213 minority affairs/race relations programs and Z-grams imply that the problem is a minority problem. . . .<sup>39</sup>

The hearings before the Congressional Subcommittee which investigated the carrier incidents are a veritable garden of racism! Certainly many of the racist comments and implications came from the Congressmen themselves, but in these cases the Naval person agreed or acquiesced. For example, the following exchange took place between Congressman Alexander Pirnie of New York and Captain J.D. Ward, Commanding Officer of the USS Constellation:

Mr. Pirnie: Is there any time when the so-called human relations officers were telling these men that you are lucky that you were accepted into this service; that you had this job, that it was through some flexibility in regard to standards that you were given this opportunity of employment; has anybody ever told them that?

Captain Ward: I would dare say the human relations personnel would not tell them that because that would be casting aspersions on the black man.

Mr. Pirnie: What aspersions would it be?

Captain Ward: Implying he is inferior.

Mr. Pirnie: If he doesn't pass the test, isn't he? Aren't they going to face some of the facts?

---

39. Johnson, "Problem Ownership," p. 11.

Captain Ward: Yes, sir.

Mr. Pirnie: Are we going to indicate that just because he is black he is entitled to advancement even if he can't fill the job?

Captain Ward: No, sir. However we have to be very careful in how we address the black man in that if you are going to tell him he is inferior, right away this is racial.

Mr. Pirnie. Who is telling anybody that he is inferior? You are simply saying that you have standards. You admitted in the testimony you can't communicate with them. How are you going to expect them to carry out commands if you've got to go through some interpreter?

Captain Ward: Your point is well taken. I can't answer it.<sup>40</sup>

The same sense of frustration and inability to cope with the situation was seen when Commander James E. Yacabucci, the chairman of the USS Constellation's Human Relations Council admitted he was unable to communicate with blacks:

Question: Can we get back now to the events and the role of the Human Relations Council in the events during the time leading up to the sit-down on the ship?

Answer: The minority affairs representative played more of a role in the events leading up to this because we feel that he is able to communicate much better. The young blacks, in my estimation, carry a lot of distrust from civilian life, and they do distrust command authority--white. It is almost impossible to communicate with them. They will close their mouths and their minds. Even the

---

40. House Armed Services Committee, Hearings Before the Special Subcommittee on Disciplinary Problems in the U.S. Navy (H.A.S.C. No. 93-13; Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1973), p. 131.

black chiefs have a very difficult time in communicating with them. They are part of the establishment, in their eyes. I think our representative does a pretty good job in communicating when he can.<sup>41</sup>

The "rationalization" of racism which Terry includes in his definition is clearly evident here.

The Commanding Officer of the Kitty Hawk, Captain M.W. Townsend, plaintively expressed his exasperation over trying to deal with race relations.<sup>42</sup> His own racism became evident frequently, however, such as in this answer to a question about what constitutes a "meeting" (emphasis added):

No, sir, a group of 15 blacks who sit in a berthing space listening to music or just talking about what they are doing or talking about where they are from, a large group of that size is an abnormal group. You don't see 15 whites get together in a group that size, so you can't say why don't you break up a group of 15 whites, because people don't congregate in groups of that size.<sup>43</sup>

Even given the lack of understanding of white racism in the country, the fact that the Congressmen could miss a blatant signal like this should be a cause of concern for us all.

By far the major complaint of blacks on both ships was in the disposition of non-judicial punishment. While discriminatory

---

41. Ibid., p. 165.

42. Ibid., pp. 536-537.

43. Ibid., p. 528.



NJP aboard the USS Constellation was documented,<sup>44</sup> Captain Townsend's own testimony was probably the most flagrant. The following exchange, though edited for brevity, keeps the Captain's comments in context and can only be described as a case study in miniature:

Mr. Pirnie: It would appear then, Captain, that any delinquency of command in the way of discriminatory practices did not lay the foundation for this trouble?

Captain Townsend: I don't believe it did; no, sir.

Mr. Pirnie: Did they allege that?

Captain Townsend: Oh, sure.

Mr. Pirnie: In any specific way?

Captain Townsend: Unfair treatment at mast. Why did we leave a couple brothers in jail in Olongapo, which was a rumor, and certainly not true.

Mr. Pirnie: If there is anything in that area you recall, I would just like to have you inject it at this point so we would know what specific allegations of discriminatory practices were made.

Captain Townsend: Sure. The discriminatory practice alleged is the one that has to do with why do I always put blacks in the brig? I put people in the brig if they commit certain offenses-- assault, drugs, this type of thing. You go to the brig for 30 days unless it turns out to be a court case, and you are reduced in rate. It is well known.

---

44. Ibid., pp. 288-289 provide testimony of a black with a clean record who plead guilty to 18 days unauthorized absence at mast, yet was awarded a summary court-martial, which was later returned to mast. Four days later a white, UA for 35 days, was judged solely at mast, and awarded virtually the same punishment.

There was a complaint which accrued from an initial--something in the first week I was aboard ship in which Sailor No. 2 and Sailor No. 4 had been involved in a beating, an assault, with a mob of people on a single white who had passed through a space where he had been insulted. When he passed through and left the space, he passed back the universal Italian sign to the people in the space, and they chased him up the escalator, beat him and threw him down.

He was a good witness, knew what happened, could identify the thugs. It was an assault case, and I put the people in the brig for that.

There was an assault case about 4 or 5 days later against a young black man who was on restriction and doing extra duty. A young black, Sailor 5, who was working down in the engineering space for extra duty, and was being supervised by a nonrated white man, and he dropped a hose, it made a bit of a mess, and the white man told him he had to get back down and get on with the job, and, in fact, hit him. But that of course didn't go over well, because they brought the man to mast, and I dismissed it. The man had a clean record.

Sailors 4 and 2 both had very bad records. . . .

Since then there have been a number of black guys who made mistakes and got off. When they are good people, they have gotten off, because they have a clean record. My own court records in terms of masts is very clean and available to anyone. This is one of the things, though, they complained about. . . .

Mr. Daniel: Why shouldn't he be punished for striking the black man?

Captain Townsend: What he did was a situation that occurred in anger, is what it amounted to, but frustration more than anger. It was not deliberate, not a planned assault.

Mr. Daniel: Not premeditated?

Captain Townsend: No, sir, not assault in the strictest words, but that is NJP, and left up to me. That was a great chance to win a lot of affection from the blacks. I could have thrown that man in jail and had been a hero, but I couldn't have lived with myself since that time, either.<sup>45</sup>

It is hoped that these concrete examples indicate the depth and significance of the problem. The recognition that the problem is us, that the failure is ours, not the minority's, is essential if we are to make any further progress. The next chapter will examine the Navy's renewed efforts in the past year to combat white racism.

---

45. Ibid., pp. 520-521.

## CHAPTER V - THE NEW PROGRAMS

Recent emphasis in the Navy has centered on educational programs; but ones of a distinctly different nature than the standard Navy training courses. The old idea of insuring learning by "telling 'em what you're going to teach them, teach them, then tell 'em what you taught 'em" is noticeably missing. In fact, it could be said that the courses are not "taught" at all. The leaders that oversee classes are called "facilitators." The educational experience is based on three important principles:

1. Adults learn that which is personally beneficial;

2. Adults learn more from feedback than from experience;

3. Adults learn what they discover for themselves."<sup>46</sup>

Thus the leader's job is to "facilitate" this learning process. The racially mixed seminar group "addresses racial attitudes, presumptions, and prejudices, both individual and institutional."<sup>47</sup> The expectation is that "discussions will lead to a degree of self-awareness, personal insight and value analysis.

---


46. UPWARD - Understanding Personal Worth and Racial Dignity - Facilitator's Guide, NAVPERS 15241A, p. iii.

47. "Navy Race Relations Education," Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV) Instruction 1500.42 of August 6, 1973, Encl. (1), par. c.


Group interaction will result in problem confrontation and solution."<sup>48</sup>

There are several features of this program which should be noted:

1. Facilitator teams, made up of one minority and one non-minority person, are military personnel, especially trained to conduct these seminars.
2. Military uniforms are worn and customs relating to titles and names are observed.
3. Although discussions may well become heated as the problem is brought into focus, these are not "encounter group" sessions. The object is to confront problems, not deliberately create conflict.
4. The desired result is to improve interpersonal relations. Previous theory designed to counter racism could be modeled as follows:



The approach taken by the seminars repositions the factor of "attitude":



---

48. UPWARD, loc. cit.

In effect, since improved interaction between people is the result of behavior, the programs admit that attitudes per se don't matter.

Obviously this is a radical reorientation. Earlier efforts had attempted to change attitudes by preaching how we should feel, and justifying it on moral, ethical, or logical principles. In other words, programs had previously focused on feelings or affective features of the problems. Shalala's study indicated the limited results that might have been expected from these efforts. His work also indicated the new solution: change the conative features, or behavior. Although considerable intolerance existed in his sample, it was usually not expressed in actions. Of course it has occurred to the designers of the program that better interpersonal relations, due to behavior changes, will probably cause attitudinal changes, but we don't have to frontally attack that problem which has caused the greatest resistance in the past. This then, is the crux of the Navy's new efforts: improve our knowledge and awareness of the problem in order to effect changes in behavior; attitude changes will ultimately follow by themselves. In fact, early results indicate many rapid

changes in attitudes, although a sample of graduates has not yet been formally studied.<sup>49</sup>

Mechanically the Navy's Race Relations Education Program is directed at three levels with different formal objectives:

1. Flag Seminars. A twenty-hour program for flag officers "designed to assist them in increasing their awareness of personal and institutional racism in the Navy" and to obtain their "commitment to the development of action plans at the highest levels of command."<sup>50</sup> At this time all current flag officers have been through the seminar and this program has been effectually terminated.<sup>51</sup>

2. Executive Seminar. A three-day seminar "for personnel in upper management command and executive levels designed to assist commands in: Problem identification, recognition, and acceptance; self-examination of local race

---

49. The author has not personally experienced a race relations seminar. This construct of their purpose and the thrust of the facilitator's efforts were garnered from an interview with LTJG James Workman, SC, USN, a designated facilitator at the Human Resources Management Center, Newport, R.I., on December 6, 1973; an interview on December 7, 1973 with LCDR Michael T. Midas, Jr., USN, a student at the Naval War College, Newport, R.I., who had previously served as a facilitator; and a study of the UPWARD Facilitator's Guide, op. cit., which serves as a syllabus for the seminars.

50. OPNAVINST 1500.42, op. cit., Encl (1), par. a.

51. LTJG Workman Interview, loc. cit.

relations conditions. . .; and the design of Command Affirmative Action Plans,"<sup>52</sup> which are statements of actions the graduate intends to implement within 30 days of his return to his command. Personnel who would attend Executive Seminars are Department Heads and above, warrant officers, and senior petty officers.<sup>53</sup>

3. UPWARD Seminar. Designed for all other officer and enlisted personnel, these seminars have already been described. At the conclusion students develop "Personal action plans and recommendations for command action."<sup>54</sup> The latter are submitted to the individual's Commanding Officer, "who will keep the members of his command informed as to the status of action on these recommendations. . . ." <sup>55</sup> The immediate goal is to have all Navy personnel complete at least 20 hours of Race Relations Education by July 1, 1974.<sup>56</sup> Following that a continuing requirement of a minimum 18 hours per year "for each Navy man and woman" has been established.<sup>57</sup>

---

52. OPNAVINST 1500.42 op. cit., Encl. (1), par. b.

53. "Navy Race Relations Education," CNO DTG 102257Z May 1973, par. 2.B.

54. OPNAVINST 1500.42 op. cit., Encl. (1), par. c.

55. Ibid., par. 6.

56. CNO DTG 102257Z May 1973, op. cit., par. 2.E.

57. OPNAVINST 1500.42 op. cit., par. 4.



Other improvements, beyond just the educational aspects, have occurred and have recently been incorporated into two revised instructions, known as "Equal Opportunity Manuals."<sup>58</sup> These address all areas of equal opportunity including procedures for investigating complaints of discrimination, directions to monitor personnel duty assignments, equality of military justice, composition and responsibilities of Human Relations Councils, and considerable guidance about dealing with discrimination in the civilian community. While much of the discussion in these instructions has been promulgated before, some of it is startling in it's frankness and clarity:

It is a fact that on a per capita basis, minority personnel have been awarded more disciplinary actions and concomitant administrative discharges than non-minority members.<sup>59</sup>

---

58. SECNAVINST 5360.6B, op. cit., and OPNAVINST 5350.1, op. cit.

59. OPNAVINST 5350.1 op. cit., Encl. (1), par. 8. This fact was statistically supported in a letter dated August 13, 1973, from Admiral David H. Bagley, Chief of Naval Personnel, to "Commanders, Commanding Officers and Officers-in-Charge." The rates are almost exactly double: 52.8 General, Undesirable, or Bad Conduct Discharges per 1000 blacks in the first six months of 1972, as opposed to 26.8 per 1000 for whites of similar aptitude and education. The Admiral expressed a concern that "actions at lower levels in the chain of command . . . may be predicated on racial discrimination resulting in most or administrative actions that in themselves are racially impartial. Division Officers, Department Heads and ultimately Commanding Officers must be acutely conscious and alert to ensure that blacks and other minority personnel are not being placed on report more often than whites for the same offense."

This sort of uncompromising openness will certainly serve to maintain proper focus on the problem.

While incidents involving racist overtones, at least, are continuing to occur in the Navy,<sup>60</sup> they are usually kept "in house," and have not been publicized. Naturally this limits our ability to evaluate the effectiveness of these renewed efforts, however one criterion of success is that no incident comparable to the Kitty Hawk or Constellation conflicts has occurred since. If we assume the new efforts will be successful, we will have to devise some other measure of effectiveness anyway. The next chapter will take a look at the future and try to predict some possible outcomes of these efforts.

---

60. "Two Days of Racial Unrest on Navy Carrier Reported," New York Times, July 22, 1973, p. 30, col. 8. The story details "fist fights" between blacks and whites on the USS Franklin D. Roosevelt during operations in the Caribbean, and the fact that "blacks had complained at grievance meetings of unequal job treatment and lack of communication with supervisors."

## CHAPTER VI - THE FUTURE

The attempt to organize and structure our thinking about future developments in the area of race relations tends to align our studies into three general areas: the possible pitfalls that could terminate or sidetrack the effort, the results we can foresee as probable, and some expanded horizons beyond the limited problem of racism. We shall discuss several examples in each of these areas.

### A. Possible Pitfalls

The most obvious concern would be the possible termination, or at least a de-emphasis, of the programs after Admiral Zumwalt's retirement. The pressures on him, from both inside and outside the Navy, to relax his efforts are becoming better documented all the time.<sup>61</sup> The possibility of a new CNO who, through design or lack of interest, lets the programs wither cannot be overlooked.

Another danger is the possibility of losing sight of the objective due to overstructuring the programs and reporting procedures. As useful and important as the recently promulgated "Navy Equal Opportunity Manual"<sup>62</sup> is, it contains the seeds of vast injustices based strictly on the "fair" application of procedures outlined in it. Provisions for transferring "well documented" discipline cases, for example, can lead to

---

61. See Drew Middleton, "Discipline Crisis is Feared in Navy," New York Times, November 22, 1972, p. 1., col. 1, and House Armed Services Committee, Hearings, pp. 3-84 and pp. 1050-1106.

62. OPNAVINST 5350.1, op. cit.

overzealous efforts to "get the goods" on specific individuals.<sup>63</sup>

Other snares, such as overdependence on Human Relations Councils, indicating failure of the Commander to accept the problem as "his," or half-hearted "appropriate corrective action where racial bias is determined to be a factor" in military justice,<sup>64</sup> must be avoided. Reporting procedures which create a "numbers game" to build up "seminar hours" for reporting purposes could produce misleading indications of progress similar to Vietnam "body counts." Some Commodores are presently requiring weekly phone reports from their Commanding Officers.<sup>65</sup> While this may be most informative and useful, it

---

63. If there is any doubt that such effort go on, Captain Townsend again provides a pointed example: "I never had Sailor No. 3 at a mast, actually. We had never been able to convict him or find anything on him. He had been aboard for 4 months. He had been personally involved in a beating shortly after he got aboard, but we didn't have evidence enough to do anything to him--nothing." (Hearings, op, cit, p. 518.)

64. A glaring example of this occurred during the court-martial proceedings following the Kitty Hawk riot. Six eye-witnesses failed to identify one black accused of riot and assault. A seventh witness whose testimony lead to a conviction including a Bad Conduct Discharge, was later shown to have lied under oath. The Navy overturned the conviction, but never charged the white witness with perjury. The inequality of the prosecution is further emphasized by the fact that they were quick to charge a black with perjury during the pre-trial hearings. That accusation was withdrawn based on the ship's Executive Officer's testimony. Earl Caldwell, "Complaints Persist That Black Sailors Accused in Carrier Incidents Did Not Receive Equal Justice," New York Times, April 1, 1973, p. 59, col. 1. Previous accounts of these particular incidents are found in the New York Times on February 24, 1973, p. 58., col. 5, and February 28, 1973, p. 44, col. 1.

65. Telephone interview with LT Guy Abbott, Commander Cruiser-Destroyer Force, Atlantic's Equal Opportunity Officer on December 7, 1973.

could also force glorified descriptions of progress. Finally, it is interesting to note that the Navy still has not published its investigation of the Kitty Hawk and Constellation incidents. What is expected to appear soon is a summary of "Lessons Learned" from several incidents denoting "characteristics to look for and procedures to follow" during the development and progression of possible future events.<sup>66</sup> While the legitimate value of such a document is obvious, its potential as a repressive and harassing device is equally apparent.

A third area of concern is the fact that "minorities" are frequently equated strictly to "blacks" in the Navy. Although blacks made up only 55% of the Navy's minorities at the time of the carrier disturbances, 95% of the minority programs were directed strictly at blacks.<sup>67</sup> This overconcentration on blacks is reflected further in the fact that while considerable efforts are being made to attract black officers, almost no attention is paid to recruiting Filipino officers, even though Malaysians constitute 4.2% of the Navy's enlisted population.<sup>68</sup>

Yet another, subtle threat has been realized by Charles Moskos:

From an organizational standpoint, it is still unclear whether a race relations assignment is good or bad for one's career. Race relations billets may be a precursor of an eventual "human resources"

---

66. Ibid.

67. Johnson, "Problem Ownership," p. 12.

68. Bagley letter, op. cit., Encl. (1).

career speciality with attendant career enhancement, or it may be nothing more than a cul-de-sac position which is expendable once the command structure perceives a diminishment in the pressures of the moment. That the large majority of race relations personnel are black only compounds the insecurity of the occupants of these newly created positions.<sup>69</sup>

Others have pointed out the inherent dangers of being actively concerned about human relations:

Imagination, creativity, innovation, and aggressiveness, although characteristics of a good Navy leader, are generally unacceptable in a minority affairs representative as too extreme. Fitness reports and evaluation forms do not encourage outspoken and aggressive action in minority affairs and race relations.<sup>70</sup>

Hopefully these weaknesses are being countered by such factors as the newly revised "Report of the Fitness of Officers," NAVPERS 1611/1, which specifically requires an evaluation of each individual's equal opportunity efforts.

Two final hazards, though not pleasant, must also be addressed. A very real fear, and obvious possibility, exists of black hooliganism torpedoing the Navy's best efforts. This was undoubtedly a major factor in the Kitty Hawk riot. The Navy has quietly discharged a large number of disruptive sailors, both black and white, in the past year, and has

---

69. Charles C. Moskos, Jr., "The American Dilemma in Uniform: Race in the Armed Forces," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, CDVI, March, 1973, p. 106.

70. Johnson, "Problem Ownership," loc. cit.

returned to higher recruiting standards. While this may eliminate the problem, "there can be no countenancing of racial intimidation in the living areas of lower-ranking enlisted personnel."<sup>71</sup> Finally, we must assure ourselves that we are not conducting some sophisticated black "pacification" program. As Terry has shown, "whatever strategies are used, they should be judged by the results they produce" for the minorities,<sup>72</sup> not by how "good" the programs happen to look.

#### B. Probable Results

The first result to be recognized is the fact that UPWARD and the other seminars have already been attended by about two-thirds of the Navy's personnel. While the vast majority of these graduates have come away more aware of the problems and therefore can be expected to exhibit changes in behavior, a sizable minority has experienced actual changes in attitude as well. From this group is developing a "cadre" of confirmed anti-racist career personnel at all levels. Although it probably can't be statistically proven, it is likely that the Navy may already be beyond the "point of no return." Terry

---

71. Moskos, "Dilemma in Uniform," loc, cit.

72. Terry, op. cit., p. 76.

suggests that men can sustain change, in spite of outside pressures, "when acting in self-conscious groups."<sup>73</sup> The combination of seminar created self-consciousness and military organizational structure, will probably provide the impetus necessary to continue the attack on racism, regardless of "official" policy changes.

The next, more visible result will probably be the emergence of the first significant black power base. The emotional nuances of this phrase are recognized. Terry deals with this problem too by showing that:

. . . criticisms of black power express the demonic inversion of white racism. For the racists, pro-white necessarily means anti-black. Thus for anyone to be pro-black, he must be anti-white.<sup>74</sup>

While admitting that more radical meanings have been put on the phrase, what most black power advocates want is simply the power within the nation's institutions to have a meaningful voice in establishing the institution's policies, standards, norms, and values. This essay is not about power, black or otherwise, but the relationship of powerlessness and violence has been well established by many authorities, and the need to find

---

73. Ibid., p. 22.

74. Ibid., p. 48



more constructive routes to power has been expressed.<sup>75</sup> The fact is, that a deliberate attempt is being made, by the highest manager of the Navy, to place a substantial number of minority personnel in positions of power throughout the infrastructure. No civilian institution, either private or public, has ever offered such openness before. The result will eventually be a steady flow into civilian life of minority officers and enlisted personnel who have been used to making norm-setting decisions. Tokenism from potential civilian employers will hold no interest for them.

A final occurrence which will result directly from our increased awareness will be a demise in the sharp separation between officers and enlisted in the Navy. Traditionally we have maintained more rigid distinctions than any other service, and many of these difference, such as servants in the form of stewardsmen, are being abolished. As communications improve another form of segregation, the invariable shipboard sign that declares, "Officer Country, Enter on Official Business Only," will disappear. How can we profess to being "open" when the sailor is afraid to bring his problem to us since it's not "official?" Enlisted dress uniforms have been changed to

---

75. See particularly Rollo May, Power and Innocence: A Search for the Sources of Violence (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1972), p. 23 ff., and James Boggs, "The Revolutionary Struggle for Black Power," The Black Seventies, ed., Floyd B. Barbour (Boston: Porter Sargent Publisher, 1970), pp. 33-48.

resemble officer's and a similar change to a common work uniform might be predicted. These examples are by no means exhaustive, however they tend to lead the mind to the final area.

### C. Expanded Horizons

It is our intention in this section to suggest possible results of our race relations programs that go far beyond the problem of racism itself. You will recall that Terry's definition of racism emphasized the injustice of our actions and institutions. His solution is the evolution of a pluralistic society based on guaranteed self-determination and respect for every individual.<sup>76</sup> Pluralism is an affirmation of ethnic variety. It rejects the melting pot myth as simply not capable of surviving close scrutiny. If ethnic differences are truly "melted" in America, why can and do we separate ethnic groups by geographical areas? The vast majority of the "Irish" in Boston or the "Poles" in Chicago are native born Americans. Blacks, as one poet points out, have never "passed the brim" of the melting pot:

---

76. Terry, op. cit., p. 34 ff. This discussion of pluralism is based on Terry's constructs.

And every time he climbed the pot  
They threw him out again.  
'Keep out.' This is our private pot.  
We don't want your black stain.<sup>77</sup>

The pluralist alternative suggests a synergistic society in which the "mixture" of distinct ethnic groups is more efficacious than a thoroughly assimilated culture. In other words, the affirmation of pluralism requires only the realization that our success or failure is affected by the success or failure of those around us. For us in the Navy this ought to be readily recognized and affirmed.

The other feature of Terry's definition of racism is the fact that we rationalize our injustice. Therefore a guarantee of justice for all would eliminate the need for, and source of, many rationalizations. This would allow a new openness in our communication with each other, which would be fascinating to examine, but well beyond the scope of this paper.

As we have tried to indicate, Terry's pluralistic society hints at new attitudes of dealing with human beings.

Raymond E. Miles has formulated an intriguing model of the possibilities.<sup>78</sup> His thesis rests on the distinction between

---

77. Dudley Randall, quoted by Edward W. Crosby, "The Nigger and the Narcissus (or Self-Awareness in Black Education)," Black America, ed., John F. Szwed (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1970), p. 279

78. Raymond E. Miles, "Human Relations or Human Resources?" Organizational Psychology: A Book of Readings, ed., David Kolb et al. (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1971), pp. 229-240.

managers and subordinates. One, which he calls the "Human Relations" approach encourages managers to make their subordinates feel useful and important. In this model the participation of subordinates "oils away resistance to formal authority." By allowing employees to participate in some decisions their morale is improved which makes it easier for the leader to get them to do his bidding on his important decisions. The alternative theory Miles calls the "Human Resources" approach, in which the causal relationship is reversed:

Increased subordinate satisfaction is not pictured as a primary cause of improved performance; improvement results directly from creative contributions which subordinate's make to departmental decision making, direction, and control. Subordinates' satisfaction is viewed instead as a by-product of the process--the result of their having made significant contributions to organizational success.

Therefore, the Human Relations model only allows superficial, or worse, psuedo, participation. The manager allows "only as much participation, self-direction, and self-control as is required to obtain cooperation and reduce resistance to formal authority." The manager using the Human Resources model, on the other hand, would want to "continually expand subordinates' responsibility and self-direction up to the limits of their abilities." This approach would suggest delegating most matters to subordinates for their coordination, decision, and control. This experience gained would enhance their usefulness

when it mattered the most--"on complex and important problems that demand the full talent and complete concern of the group."<sup>79</sup>

The reason the Human Resources approach is not widely used, Miles suggests, is because it directly confronts two of the superior's traditional managerial tools: his perogatives and his control of the situation. The Human Resources model wipes out any idea of immutable managerial perogatives. If any manager really thinks all his decisions arise out of his own well of knowledge, he is kidding himself. Problem solutions arise from many diverse sources and the alert manager will cultivate and develop the best available expertise, regardless of rank. Addressing the second point, the Human Resources outlook rejects the "lump-sum" theory that there is only so much "control" to go around, and therefore a manager who allows participation will loose some of his control.

Instead, it argues that the manager increases his total control over the accomplishment of departmental objectives by encouraging self-control on the part of his subordinates. Control is thus an additive and expanding phenomenon.

The sort of catalyst needed to reorient a Navy manager's thinking is the kind of new awareness and consciousness emanating from race relations seminars. The improved interpersonal relations that are the goal of these training programs point directly to an increase in participatory management within

---

79. Ibid. The quotations in this paragraph and the next are from Miles' discussion.

the Navy. Many officers and petty officers, however, have expressed a concern vocalized by Admiral Zumwalt in his speech to the flag officers:

But it was also clear that we could accomplish nothing by putting our already over-worked commanding officers in the intolerable position of having every move dictated and their every judgement questioned.<sup>80</sup>

The Human Resources outlook avoids this problem entirely. If you allow subordinates enough real participation they will gain valuable experience which you will want to seek out when you have to make an important decision yourself. Your subordinates, on the other hand, know you do depend upon them and will come to them when you need their advise and assistance.

An indicator of the distance the Navy has to go and the possible resistance Human Resources managers may encounter was evident in a message recently sent to major training commands and fleet commanders from the Chief of Naval Education and Training:

It is the Chief of Naval Education and Training's desire to ensure that officers and petty officers continue to be exposed to the most advanced human resource management techniques available in order to enhance Navy mission effectiveness. . . . The sound leadership principles of the past are still the foundation rock upon which the Navy Human Goals Education Program Training Plan is built. We must ensure that social changes affecting society are taken into account in our Navy training programs in order that our officers and petty officers can most effectively lead; promote good order and discipline, and pass on our traditions to future generations of Navy men and women. Our specific challenge is how best to train the young officers and men of today's Navy so that our customs

---

80. "Text of Zumwalt's Remarks," loc. cit.

and traditions are respected and adhered to so that pride of service is a natural personal characteristic.<sup>81</sup>  
(Emphasis added.)

In spite of the fact that he happened to use the phrase "human resources," the Admiral is expounding the "Human Relations" point of view: use the oil of "management techniques" to enhance "mission effectiveness." Furthermore, one questions precisely which "leadership principles of the past" he would have us use when dealing with "social changes?" Minorities might suspect he meant the white racist practices that prevailed for so long. His concern ("our specific challenge") for "customs and traditions," almost in spite of the fact that we must take social change "into account," does not exactly indicate that his real anxiety is for better interpersonal relations. Although the Admiral may only have unintentionally become ensnared in some rather hackneyed phraseology, it is precisely this sort of racism, intended or accidental, that must be eliminated if the Navy is to achieve it's human goals.

The past three years have provided an amazing pattern of change and progress in interpersonal relations in the Navy, as well as decisive feedback in the form of the incidents. The behavior patterns, with their probable attendant attitude changes, altered by the race relations seminars in the past year, may well have marked a turning point not only for the

---

81. "Navy Human Goals Education Training Plan" CNET PENSACOLA FL DTG 191957Z October 1973.

Navy, but ultimately for the rest of society as well. To paraphrase Pogo, Charles Moskos might agree that "we have met the future, and it may be us:"

The American military establishment stands at a crucial juncture in its institutional development. In much the manner that it leaped ahead of civilian society with its integration policies of the 1950s, the military must now again take the lead in the contemporary racial climate of the 1970s. The next phase may well incorporate something along the lines of "beyond equality." There will have to be a tempering of universalistic standards to accommodate and take advantage of the cultural pluralism inherent in our nation's human potential. If our American society is ever to realize its democratic promise, the direction it ought to take in race relations will most likely have been set by its men and women in military uniform.<sup>82</sup>

---

82. Moskos, "Dilemma in Uniform," loc. cit.



## BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Abbott, Guy, LT, USN. Commander Cruiser-Destroyer Force, Atlantic's Equal Opportunity Officer. Telephone interview on December 7, 1973
- Allport, Gordon W. The Nature of Prejudice. New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1958.
- Bagley, David H., VADM, USN. A letter to Commanders, Commanding Officers and Officers-in-Charge, dated August 13, 1973.
- "Basic Minority Affairs Human Relations Program Manual." Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet (CINCLANTFLT) Instruction 5420.4.
- Berry, Brewton. Race and Ethnic Relations. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1958.
- Boggs, James. "The Revolutionary Struggle for Black Power." The Black Seventies, ed. John F. Szwed. New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1970.
- Bureau of Naval Personnel Manual, NAVPERS 15791B. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969.
- Caldwell, Earl. "Complaints Persist That Black Sailors Accused in Carrier Incidents Did Not Receive Equal Justice." New York Times, April 1, 1973, p. 59, col. 1.
- Carmichael, Stokely and Charles V. Hamilton. Black Power: The Politics of Liberation in America. New York: Random House, 1967.
- "Conviction of Black Overturned by Navy." New York Times, February 28, 1973, p. 44, col. 1.
- Daniels, Roger and Harry H.L. Kitano. American Racism: Exploration of the Nature of Prejudice. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1970.
- "Department of the Navy Manual of Equal Opportunity and Treatment of Military Personnel." Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV) Instruction 5350.6B of September 5, 1973.
- "Equal Opportunity in the Navy." NAVOP Z-66 DTG 172054Z December 1970.

"Equal Opportunity within the Department of the Navy."  
Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV) Instruction 5350.10A  
of July 9, 1971.

"4 White Navy Men Injured; 11 Blacks Held at Subic Bay."  
New York Times, October 18, 1972, p. 9, col. 1.

House Armed Services Committee. Hearings Before the Special  
Subcommittee on Disciplinary Problems in the U.S. Navy.  
(H.A.S.C. No. 93-13). Washington: U.S. Government  
Printing Office, 1973.

\_\_\_\_\_. Report by the Special Subcommittee on Disciplinary  
Problems in the Navy. (The Hicks Report); (H.A.S.C.  
No. 92-81).

Johnson, Paula B. et al. "Black Invisibility, the Press, and  
the Los Angeles Riot." American Journal of Sociology,  
LXXVI, No. 4 (January, 1971), 698-721.

Johnson, Terry. "Communication--A Key to Equality." Cruiser-  
Destroyerman, XVII, No. 10, 2-5.

\_\_\_\_\_. "Problem Ownership." Cruiser-Destroyerman, XVII,  
No. 10, 11-13.

Kerner, Otto et al. Report of the National Advisory Commission  
of Civil Disorders. New York: Bantam Books, Inc., 1968.

May, Rollo. Power and Innocence: A Search for the Sources  
of Violence. New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1972.

Metzger, L. Paul. "American Sociology and Black Assimilation:  
Conflicting Perspectives." Race Relations: Current  
Perspectives, ed. Edgar G. Epps. Cambridge: Winthrop  
Publishers, Inc., 1973.

Midas, Michael T., Jr., LCDR, USN. A personal interview at  
the Naval War College, Newport, R.I. on December 7, 1973.

Middleton, Drew. "Discipline Crisis is Feared in Navy."  
New York Times, November 22, 1972, p.1, col. 1.

\_\_\_\_\_. "Zumwalt Rebukes Top Navy Leaders on Racial Unrest."  
New York Times, November 11, 1972, p. 1, col. 8.

Miles, Raymond E. "Human Relations or Human Resources?"  
Organizational Psychology: A Book of Readings. ed.  
David A. Kolb et al. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall,  
Inc., 1971.

- Moskos, Charles C., Jr. "The American Dilemma in Uniform: Race in the Armed Forces." The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, CDVI, March 1973, 94-106.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Racial Integration in the Armed Forces." The American Journal of Sociology, LXXII, No. 2 (September 1966), 132-148.
- "Navy Equal Opportunity Manual." Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV) Instruction 5350.1 of September 17, 1973.
- "Navy Human Goals Education Training Plan." CNET PENSACOLA FL DTG 191957Z October 1973.
- "Navy Race Relations Education." Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV) Instruction 1500.42 of August 6, 1973.
- "Navy Race Relations Education." CNO DTG 102257Z May 1973.
- "Prejudice and Perjury Charged in Investigation of Carrier Riot." New York Times, February 24, 1973, p. 58, col. 5.
- "Race Seen Factor in 2 Navy Clashes." New York Times, November 28, 1972, p. 17, col. 1.
- "Racial Brawl on Ship in Southeast Asia Sept. 7 is Disclosed." New York Times, January 11, 1973, p. 77, col. 1.
- Shalala, Samuel R., LTC, USA. "A Study of Ethnocentrism Among White Professional Military Officers." An unpublished Masters Thesis in Military Art and Science, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1969.
- Terry, Robert W. For Whites Only. Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1970.
- "Text of Zumwalt's Remarks to Senior Naval Officers on Causes of Racial Unrest." New York Times, November 11, 1972, p. 16, col. 1.
- "Transcript of the President's News Conference on Foreign and Domestic Matters." New York Times, March 23, 1968, p. 12, col. 1.
- "Two Days of Racial Unrest on Navy Carrier Reported." New York Times, July 22, 1973, p. 30, col. 8.

United States Commission on Civil Rights. Racism in America and How to Combat It. (Clearinghouse Publication, Urban Series No. 1). Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1970.

U.S. Department of Labor. The Negro Family; The Case for National Action. (The Moynihan Report). Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1965.

UPWARD - Understanding Personal Worth and Racial Dignity - Facilitator's Guide, NAVPERS 15241A

Wilson, Mark. "CruDesLant Efforts With Race Relations and Minority Affairs." Cruiser-Destroyerman, XVII, No. 10, 6-10.

Workman, James LTJG, SC, USN. A personal interview at the Human Resources Management Center, Newport, R.I. on December 6, 1973.

