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
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A STUDY OF
THE NATURE AND CONDUCT OF A WAR
WITH PURPLE POWERS

26 April 1954

Naval War College
Newport, R. I.

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STRATEGIC CONCEPT
FOR
WAR WITH U.S.S.R.
IN PERIOD
1954-1958

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

1. OBJECT. To present a general strategic concept for war with the U.S.S.R. and associated nations, including "cold war" and post-war considerations as they relate to the issue.
2. NATIONAL OBJECTIVES. The strategy proposed herein stems from and supports the following national objectives:
 - a. To insure the continuing physical security of the United States, to protect the lives and properties of its citizens, and to preserve American institutions, ethical standards, and economic well-being.
 - b. To achieve the establishment, consolidation, and effective operation of a political world order based upon a recognition of individual human dignity and the integrity of national states and committed to the equitable resolution of international problems by peaceful means.
 - c. To induce the U.S.S.R. to act in conformance with the principles of the United Nations Charter and to so reduce, restrain, and limit U.S.S.R. material strength and influence that she ceases to constitute a threat to U. S., and Free World, security.
3. WAR AIMS. On the premise that war results from the present international situation, or as a result of actions intended as a correction thereof, U. S. war aims are presumed to be:
 - a. GENERAL.
 - (1) Achievement of the foregoing national objectives.
 - b. SPECIFIC.
 - (1) Defense of ourselves and our committed allies from Soviet aggression.
 - (2) Complete military defeat of the U.S.S.R. and nations aligned with her in war.

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(3) Post-war dismemberment of the U.S.S.R. into independent, politically-separate entities militarily inadequate to undertake aggressive war.

(4) Establishment of governments, within all nations of the present Soviet bloc, committed to adherence to the principles of the United Nations Charter.

4. SCOPE. The strategy proposed herein takes its departure from the present situation. It admits of the basic desires of the U. S. and Allied Nations to avoid "hot war." But, it assumes such desires do not extend to surrender to Soviet objectives. It follows that, if "hot war" is to be avoided but our avowed objectives are to be achieved, then it is fundamental that we win the "cold war." Our objectives can be attained in "cold war" only by positive actions on our part. Such actions, in light of an adamant Soviet attitude, could precipitate a "hot war" situation. This is the risk that must be accepted. Accordingly, the proposed strategy takes cognizance of the requirement for action, and the results thereof, in "cold war." In this regard it accepts "cold war" as an immediate substitute for "hot war"--indeed, as a possible prelude to "hot war"--and includes consideration of political and economic, as well as military, aspects. It makes provision for:

- a. Continuation of "cold war" with the application of offensive measures as may reasonably promote attainment of national and Free World objectives without resort to "hot war."
- b. Development of Free World combat readiness necessary for defense against Soviet attack and sufficient to support Free World offensive initiation if and when conditions warrant.

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- c. Prosecution of "hot war" in conformance with war aims.
- d. Resolution of post-war conditions as will best achieve national objectives.

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CHAPTER II

ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION

1. GENERAL SITUATION.

a. Political.

(1) Europe. The Berlin Conference (February 1954) clarified the issue and depicted U.S.S.R. policy as based on the theory "divide and rule." Soviet terms for an Austrian peace treaty and German unification are simply abandonment of EDC and scrapping of NATO. Such conditions constitute complete surrender by the West and, of course, are unacceptable. Yet the U.S.S.R. persists in stalemate since she presumes that the leverage she holds against France in the prospect of a settlement of the Indo-China problem at Geneva in April will be sufficient to forestall EDC ratification and the related rearming of Western Germany. If the results at Geneva keep France reluctant as regards EDC, then France will automatically become a continuing U.S.S.R. propaganda target for weakening NATO by fostering the historic threat of a militant Germany rearmed by the direct sponsorship of U. S. and U. K. sans EDC.

(2) Far East. Korea and Indo-China represent the core of the present impasse. Whereas the U.S.S.R. has agreed to negotiate these problems at Geneva on condition that Red China be accepted as a participating conferee, these two Communist nations have given no previous indication that any settlement other than capitulation to Communist objectives is possible. Both oppose Korean unification. China, presumably supported by the U.S.S.R., has aided the Vietminh in Indo-China for several years in the interest of obvious strategic objectives. There is no reason to expect a retraction of purpose at this late date. The best that can be expected is an armed truce in Indo-China. This buys time for both sides, but definitely represents no victory for the French

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and ourselves. The likelihood of U.S.S.R. insistence upon UN forces removal from Korea as a condition for truce in Indo-China is good and would obviously result in completely negative results at Geneva. In addition, Japan could easily become the U.S.S.R. bargaining target. Without a rearmed Japan, defense against Communist expansion and consolidation in the Far East is impossible. U. S. is committed to rearming Japan for her own defense. This the U.S.S.R. will obviously oppose. In her own interests, the U.S.S.R. could profitably concede unification of Korea plus "permanent" cessation of Indo-Chinese hostilities in exchange for neutralization of Japan. This the U. S. could not consider. However, there are certain of our Allies who might be influenced; and, on the theory of "divide and rule," the Soviets would exploit such a situation.

(3) World-wide. Briefly, Soviet-directed Communist influence is apparent in South Asia, the Middle East, North Africa, Europe, and the Americas. It is evidenced in political instability, anti-U. S. "neutralism," and "unnatural" (or at least apparently inspired) nationalist movements.

b. Economic.

(1) Europe. Significant is the fact that in total world industrial output the NATO nations account for 68% against 21% for the Communist World. But it must be noted that this aggregate ratio includes 42% for North America, 26% for Western Europe, and 21% for U.S.S.R. plus satellites. Western Europe is therefore the critical pawn in this economic power alignment. Whereas with Western Europe the Free World holds a 3:1 advantage, should the U.S.S.R. manage to neutralize Western Europe the ratio drops to 2:1. Further, if through the processes of "cold war" followed by a quick successful push to the English Channel ~~leaving~~ ^{is left} much of Western Europe to Soviet exploitation, the competitive economic

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balance would become essentially even. This consideration makes Western Europe a primary Soviet target and a basic Free World defense requirement.

(2) Far East. The economic aspects of the Far East are fundamentally strategic in character. Indo-China, and in fact all Southeast Asia, represent a vital source of rice, tin, and rubber necessary to some or all the Free World nations. In addition, and perhaps more important, Southeast Asia represents an economically strategic target of extreme value to Red China, and indirectly to the U.S.S.R.

(3) Other. Significant are the strategic aspects of Middle East oil and the political aspects of East-West trade.

c. Military.

(1) Enemy. Present Communist bloc strength hinges primarily on massive land forces, backed by adequate air support, capable of undertaking concurrent large scale operations in Central Europe, the Middle East, and mainland Asia. Naval forces have a respectable submarine potential and limited raider capabilities but include no known aircraft carriers. Naval operations outside the range of land-based air would consequently be handicapped. Present air force has only prototype inter-continental round-trip craft although intelligence indicates production of some a near-future capability. The U.S.S.R. can achieve a "risk" capability in long-range aircraft by 1957 and can develop an effective force thereof by 1960-61. The U.S.S.R. atomic/thermo-nuclear capability, now limited, by 1957 will be adequate to support a short-term "risk" offensive and by 1960 will be adequate to support sustained operations.

(2) Own Forces. The adequacy of Allied military posture depends upon the accomplishment of planned 1956 NATO goals. A rearmed Germany is an essential element of this defense. Assuming these 1956 NATO goals achieved, then the

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combination of NATO forces in Europe, the Mediterranean area and the Middle East, with SACLANT (primarily U.S.-U.K. forces) controlling the sea approaches, and backed by the U. S. strategic air arm, should be sufficient to completely deter an offensive move by the U.S.S.R. without a prior large-scale mobilization and redeployment of her forces. Such action on her part would be disclosure of her intentions and justification for initiation of offensive action against her. In the Far East, the defensive rearming of Japan is essential to the maintenance of strategic balance. This is in process and could be accomplished by 1958. Thereafter, in case of an European war, the combination of Japanese, Nationalist Chinese, Australian, and limited U. S. air and naval support should be sufficient to maintain a strategic defensive against Red China should she choose to act in concert with the U.S.S.R.

2. BASIC CONSIDERATIONS. In consideration of recent history and current intelligence, the following basic considerations are pertinent:

a. The fundamental U.S.S.R. objective is Soviet-directed Communist world domination.

b. Whereas the U.S.S.R. does not desire all-out "hot war" if she can achieve her objectives by "cold war" means, she will fight rather than accept any material retraction of her present "cold war" position.

c. When she achieves an adequate capability in long-range, round-trip, inter-continental bomber aircraft and atomic weapons, the U.S.S.R. will resort to "hot war" to further her basic objectives if she is denied any material gains through "cold war" tactics.

d. The basic structure of current Free World defensive alliances will remain intact until at least 1960, but the political coherence thereof will continue responsive to

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international political and economic eventualities.

e. Should the U.S.S.R. openly intensify her aggressive intent the coherence and objectivity of Free World alliances would be enhanced.

f. By reason of the basic duplicity of the U.S.S.R. no effective control or logically guaranteed abolition of atomic-thermo-nuclear weapons is possible within the foreseeable future.

3. STRENGTH AND WEAKNESS CONSIDERATIONS.

a. Current Free World strategy has three basic, defensive objectives, namely:

(1) To discourage the further occurrence of Communist-promoted peripheral proxy-war of the Korea-type.

(This merely promotes the status quo. It does not resolve current German, Austrian, Korean, and Indo-Chinese issues.)

(2) To provide essential Free World defensive posture as a deterrent to Soviet initiation of global "hot war."

(This at best encourages the Soviets to delay action until armed to the teeth, to emphasize "cold war" political infiltration techniques, and to exploit international communism to the limit.)

(3) To provide such defense in the early stages of a Soviet-initiated global war as will blunt the Soviet offense short of success and permit subsequent mounting of a Free World offensive.

(This merely raises the unanswerable question of "How much is enough?"

b. Whereas reason may be the ideal avenue of resolution of the ideological contest between Communism and Democracy, there are certain salient factors in the related power

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problem which morally justify consideration of timely and direct application of force in order to insure our own survival and the survival of other nations who prefer some choice other than Communist domination. These factors are:

- (1) The U.S.S.R. does not desire all-out war if she can achieve her objective of Communist world domination by other means, namely: subversion, infiltration, proxy-warfare, and similar "cold war" techniques.
- (2) Given time and nurtured by improved East-West trade, the U.S.S.R. can exist indefinitely in the face of our conventional "cold war" tactics and, provided she avoids precipitating a prima facie global-war situation, can prosecute her own known tactics with a good prospect of success. In short, she can win the "cold war."
- (3) The U.S.S.R., now and in the near future, could not stand up against a determined military attack launched against her by an achievable Free World alliance.
- (4) Given time to benefit from softening or disintegration of countering alliances, to improve her own military capabilities, and if always granted the initiative, the U.S.S.R. could someday win the "hot war."

4. CONCLUSION. It follows from the preceding paragraph:

a. That we as a nation, and as the leader of the Free World, cannot accept a long-term continuance of the "cold war" wherein the Communist bloc achieves any material gains through military, political, or economic action.

b. That, unless within a reasonable period of time, the burden of maintaining her present offensive posture induces the self-collapse of the U.S.S.R., she must be granted the

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future capability of delivering a crippling, if not a knock-out, blow to the Free World in a global war of her own initiation.

c. That, assuming such a U.S.S.R. capability achievable, the assured defense of the Free World rests on the timely initiation of determined military offensive action by the Free World.

d. That, barring earlier precipitation of global war by, or self-collapse of, the U.S.S.R., the time for Free World initiation of determined military action is before Soviet achievement of optimum "hot war" capability.

5. PLAN OF ACTION. It is contended, in consideration of current relative capabilities, possible future potentials, and prospective eventualities growing out of continuing positive attempts at resolution by negotiation, that a purely defensive, waiting strategy is inadequate for long-term security. A defensive strategy, based on massive retaliation is adequate if, and only if, the threat of it can within a reasonable time: induce a retraction of Soviet expansionism; force Soviet adoption of just and equitable compromise in negotiating concrete settlement of present problems; bring about the liberation of Eastern European "satellite" nations; reduce Soviet military threat and foreign support as an influence in international politics and diplomacy; and destroy the organ of Soviet-directed international communism as an agent of disruption and disorganization. Unless the U.S.S.R. is a complete sham that will fall of its own weight, the above requirements cannot be achieved by a defensive-retaliatory strategy, without first accepting Soviet attack, with possibly grave results, upon the Free World. Accordingly it is recommended, and the concept developed herein is based upon such recommendation, that to the defensive aspects of present "cold war" strategy there be added offensive

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aspects, vis-a-vis the U.S.S.R., to:

a. Force her, by the progressive application of economic and political pressures coupled with the concurrent build-up and strategic deployment of an adequate military competence in being, into concessions contributing to the constructive and concrete settlement of present problems; or

b. Force her, before she achieves optimum military capability, to so act as to make clear and unmistakable her continuing aggressive intent and our responsibility for effectively and appropriately eliminating her power to implement such intent.

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CHAPTER III

GENERAL PLAN

1. BASIS. The general plan and supporting concepts contained hereinafter are based on the premises that:

a. If we desire to avoid "hot war," then we must win the "cold war." This does not mean that the risk of the former can, or should, be avoided.

b. Whereas the U.S.S.R. would prefer to win by "cold war" methods and, having no urgency of conquest, can concede temporary checkmates, she will probably fight rather than accept any enforced retraction of her present "cold war" position that could be construed as real Free World victory.

c. The U.S.S.R. will attain a good "risk" capability for all-out war by 1957-58 and a sustaining capability by 1960-61.

d. The 1956 NATO goals in Europe (including rearmament of West Germany) can be achieved by 1957-58.

e. The Middle East defense complex, keynoting Turkish potential, can be made adequate by 1957-58.

f. Japanese defensive rearmament as a strategic balancing factor in the Far East can be accomplished by 1957-58.

g. The accomplishment of d, e, and f should effectively deter Soviet initiation of war without prior additional mobilization and/or major redeployment.

2. REQUIREMENTS. The plan envisages the following progressive steps:

a. Prosecution of "cold war" action in positive support of national and Free World objectives.

b. Coordination of a. with "hot war" preparation.

c. Promotion of a show-down prior to Soviet achievement of optimum military capability.

3. PHASING. The proposed strategy covers the following phases, each of which is covered separately in succeeding chapters:

a. Phase ONE. "Cold war" period between the present and the development of that situation which will lead directly to either capitulation by the Soviets or "hot war." Based on prospective capabilities and proposed Allied "cold war" actions, it is presumed that the crisis could occur in the Spring of 1958. However, no such specific time-table is proposed. If, as of that date, the Allies clearly hold the strategic initiative and remunerative prospects of further "cold war" pressures are apparent, continuation of "cold war" tactics are obviously preferable. Moreover, on the conjecture that the U.S.S.R., by deliberate or inadvertent action, might trigger the war earlier, Phase TWO is considered flexible in duration in order to allow build-up of Free World strength from a base lower than the 1958 prospect.

b. Phase TWO. The war period commencing with initiation of hostilities (presumably, but not necessarily, by the U.S.S.R.), covering the period of full mobilization and strategic front stabilization, including the conduct of Free World offensive, and ending with the attainment of militarily strategic objectives.

c. Phase THREE. The post-war stabilization period.

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CHAPTER IV

PHASE ONE

1. GENERAL. Phase ONE involves important political and economic, as well as military, aspects. Also, it must be remembered that Phase ONE constitutes an attempt to win the "cold war"--i.e., achieve national and Free World objectives without resort to "hot war." The risk of "hot war" is not avoided; in fact, that risk may well be increased. The following tasks, timed and coordinated one with respect to the others, are essential to the development of the strategy and to the attainment of the objectives:

a. Political. Discredit U.S.S.R. obstructionist position in the UN in order to permit effective objectivity by that organization and promote consolidation of Free World alliances.

b. Economic. Consolidate Free World economic ties and, as practicable and timely, promote concerted Allied economic policies relatively detrimental to U.S.S.R. in order to contribute to her economic difficulties.

c. Military. Continue build-up and effect strategic deployment of Allied strength in order to reduce Soviet potential for a "quick" war.

2. POLITICAL FACTORS.

a. The field of offensive "cold war" political, as clearly differentiated from psychological, action, vis-a-vis the U.S.S.R., lies chiefly in negating her obstructionist position in the UN.

b. The privilege of veto by any permanent member of the UN Security Council is the primary tactic by which the U.S.S.R. is able, and presumably will continue, to thwart progress of that body toward its fundamental, constructive objectives. It is not contended here that the veto privilege need necessarily be completely eliminated. However,

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if the Security Council is ever to act constructively in vital matters pursuant to Article 39, restrictive limitations upon the veto are essential.

c. Within the UN General Assembly, the United States can normally expect a two-thirds majority support on substantive issues. Within the Security Council, as generally constituted, the alignment of opinion is such as to normally foresee a majority vote, including an assured majority of permanent members, on the side of the United States. This situation would prevail even if Red China should replace Nationalist China in the Council.

d. Pursuant to Article 109 (3) of the Charter, an automatic revision conference is scheduled for consideration by the General Assembly in 1955 and requires only a majority vote of Assembly and Council to be established.

e. There exists an exploitable opinion in favor of restricting the veto privilege among a majority of UN members.

f. Whereas, through the veto, the U. S. can probably block Red China's admission into the UN for a long time, the issue will also continue to strain Allied ties.

3. POLITICAL PLAN. Using the issue of Red China's admission into the UN as a tool to gain Allied support of and induce U.S.S.R. concessions to constructive charter revisions, the following plan is proposed.

a. The U. S. continue to oppose Red China's admission into UN except as quid pro quo for all the following concessions in prior charter revision. This position operates as leverage to gain support of allies and to force U.S.S.R. concessions.

b. As per Article 109 (3), promote scheduled revision conference be held in Summer of 1956. This conference date is so chosen to conform with U. S. national elections with the intent of forcing the U.S.S.R. to show her true colors at

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that time.

c. By prior agreement with major Allies, in the 1956 revision conference, promote French or British introduction of the following amendments:

(1) Article 108 (dealing with procedure for adoption of charter revision): change last phrase to read, "including a majority of the permanent members of the Security Council."

(2) Article 109 (2) (dealing with procedure for adoption of decisions of revision conferences): change last phrase to read, "including a majority of the permanent members of the Security Council."

(3) Article 27 (3) (dealing with veto power on substantive issues): change last period to semicolon and add: "and provided further that, in matters under Article 39, involving actual hostilities or physical trespass, invasion, or occupation, a vetoed Security Council decision carrying an affirmative vote of at least seven members including concurring votes of a majority of the permanent members shall be referred to the General Assembly whereupon, with a two-thirds majority affirmative concurring vote by the members of such latter body present and voting, such confirmed decision shall become legal and binding guidance for implementation of the provisions of Chapter VII by the Security Council, the prior vetoing permanent Council member(s) being excused at their discretion from subsequent implementing action in the premises."

4. POLITICAL OBJECTIVE.

a. If U.S.S.R. accepts these changes she can thereafter be effectively blocked from engagement in characteristic obstructionist tactics. In addition, thereafter, positive UN action including issues concerning German unification, Austrian independence, Indo-China war, and U.S.S.R. mal-

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practices in occupied "satellite" nations can be legitimately sponsored to place her continuously on the political defensive.

b. If U.S.S.R. rejects these changes she definitely proclaims herself permanently opposed to any effective accomplishment by the UN of its most vital purpose and encourages the philosophy of Free World initiation of drastic corrective measures.

c. If U.S.S.R. rejects these changes she assumes responsibility for keeping Red China out of the UN with the likely result of losing full cooperation of the latter.

5. ECONOMIC FACTORS.

a. Economic "cold war," since it must involve control if not denial of East-West trade, is difficult of application for it may adversely affect ourselves and our allies as well as our enemy.

b. The Free World is not a homogenous, integrated economic complex. Despite Marshall Plan, Point 4, etc., much effort and much time is still necessary for the achievement of an economic relationship and an availability of markets that will support efficient production levels, full employment, adequate subsistence standards, and purchasing power in the separate Free World nations. In the meantime the U.S.S.R. offers trade opportunities which, at least superficially, are extremely inviting. For the U. S. to oppose all East-West trade means to court disunion within the Allied ranks.

c. Trade is not something that is done only with friends. The basic objective is to derive advantage. If the Communist nations are willing to buy the kind of things we are prepared to sell--good. If they in turn can supply us with things we want--fine. The fundamental requirement is that advantage accrue to us--or to our allies. An overriding consideration

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is that the net strategic advantage must be in our favor.

6. ECONOMIC PLAN. In light of the foregoing, the following are proposed:

- a. Continue foreign military aid and technical assistance programs at the highest practicable levels.
- b. Condition strictly economic aid on bilateral agreements tending to consolidate political and military alliances.
- c. Insist upon NATO Economic Council screening and controlling projected East-West trade with the intent of minimizing flow of strategic goods to U.S.S.R. and with the understanding between NATO members that drastic reduction of trade in 1957, in conjunction with political pressure per paragraph 3. above, is an anticipated, essential "cold war" leverage factor.
- d. Strive for concerted action among Allies to insist upon direct trade negotiation privileges with "satellite" nations rather than with Kremlin front office. If this concession is obtained, gradually channel majority of accepted trade to "satellites," forcing U.S.S.R. to deal through and, in effect, "steal" from her "satellites."
- e. Promote increased off-shore procurement in support of NATO needs.
- f. Encourage and promote bilateral and multilateral trade agreements with and between NATO members.

7. ECONOMIC OBJECTIVE. The objective is strategically defensive--i.e., one of avoiding disunion in the Allied alignment and controlling East-West trade to insure a net strategic advantage--while promoting a strategic offensive in the political and military fields.

8. MILITARY FACTORS. As noted in Chapter II preceding.

9. MILITARY PLAN.

- a. EUROPEAN FRONT. If EDC is not ratified by the Fall of 1954, the U. S., in tri-lateral agreement with U. K. and

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West Germany (or, if necessary, in bilateral agreement with West Germany alone) initiate rearmament of West Germany with a goal of 12 active divisions by 1957 and 24 additional 30-day-notice reserve divisions by 1959. Incorporate in this agreement, and provide formal notification to EDC treaty signatories, the pledge on the part of contracting parties that the forces so provided will be committed to EDC assignment when EDC is made effective through ratification. As they are formed, integrate these divisions into the Central European defense complex.

b. MIDDLE EAST FRONT. Accelerate Turkish training and equipment program including completion of 16 planned NATO naval and air bases in that area. Institute rail and road improvement projects to increase mobility and flexibility of maneuver. Install pipelines from Iraq for direct quantity delivery of appropriate POL supplies to strategic bases. Improve logistic and defense characteristics of Alexandretta. In late 1956 deploy one MATADOR wing to Turkey. By 1957 increase active Turkish army to 500,000 men. Provide amphibious craft to Turkey by 1957 and begin limited amphibious training on Turkish North Coast by Fall of that year.

c. FAR EAST. Maintain stalemate in Korea if no better negotiated agreement can be reached. Continue military aid to French in Indo-China. Push Japanese rearmament now planned and progressively promote 25 active divisions backed by 25 short-notice divisions by 1958. In 1955 initiate sponsorship of build-up of Japanese Navy, stressing amphibious potentials.

d. NORWAY. In 1957, assuming NATO goals including West German rearmament reasonably in sight for Central European defense, conduct NATO exercise involving landing at least two regiments with appropriate air, artillery and AAA support in NARVIK-HARSTAD-TROMSO area. Leave these forces on location

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on an indefinite basis as leverage to expected U.S.S.R. opposition to political tactics of paragraph 3. preceding. Begin immediate NATO projects to improve operational and logistic characteristics of NARVIK base complex to serve as a strategic defensive outpost against U.S.S.R. moving into North Norway in the event of "hot war."

10. MILITARY OBJECTIVE. The fundamental objective of Phase ONE military strategy is to achieve adequate Free World military posture so deployed as to deter U.S.S.R. from initiating war without her resort to mass mobilization and/or major re-deployment of her forces in being.

11. SUMMARY--PHASE ONE. In summary Phase ONE makes provision for the following:

a. Politically.

(1) 1954-55. Continued opposition by U. S. to admission of Red China into UN.

(2) 1956-57. Revision of UN Charter as proposed in paragraph 3. with Red China the pawn to obtain U.S.S.R. concession.

(3) 1957-58. An open propaganda drive against U.S.S.R., keynoting the aggressive intent, if she has rejected the proposed UN Charter changes.

(4) 1957-58. The introduction of German unification, Austrian independence, and "satellite" nation problems as UN issues if U.S.S.R. has accepted the proposed charter changes.

b. Economically.

(1) 1954-56. Acceptance, with control, of East-West trade as a strategic-defensive necessity.

(2) 1957-58. Sponsorship of cut-off of East-West trade as an Allied sanction against U.S.S.R.

c. Militarily.

(1) 1954-55. Initiation of West German and Japanese rearmament.

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(2) 1954-56. Step-up in Turkish defenses and NATO Middle East posture.

(3) 1956-57. Achievement of 1956 NATO goals.

(4) 1957. Establishment of NARVIK defense complex.

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CHAPTER V

PHASE TWO

1. GENERAL. It follows from the preceding chapter that the period July 1957-July 1958 is a year of decision. By the Summer of 1957 it should be clear as to what course U.S.S.R. intends to follow regarding the proposed UN Charter changes. If she chooses not to accept them, she undoubtedly will accompany her rejection with blasphemy of their sponsors. A case for Free World firmer consolidation, if not mobilization, is established. On the other hand, should she accept them, the immediately subsequent raising of Central and Eastern European issues in the UN will automatically place her in a difficult, defensive position. So by 1958, she will be forced to oppose UN consideration of the very type of problems the changes are intended to clear for resolution. A case for Free World mobilization is again established. Should Russia herself choose to mobilize in the face of the tightening pressure, her adamant stand is clearly defined and the stage is set for the big decision. The Spring of 1958, based on the progressive events of Phase ONE, should see the end of the "cold war" either by transition to "hot war" or, less likely, capitulation by the U.S.S.R.

2. INITIATION OF HOSTILITIES. It can be argued that the U.S.S.R. may strike in the period 1954-57. Such possibility cannot be ignored and must be covered by supplementary emergency plans. The event would obviously make more difficult the initial phase of hostilities by the Allies. However, by reason of the fact that Russia has not moved previously and on the premise that she prefers to win by "cold war" methods, it appears probable that she will hold back until faced with a complete "cold war" impasse. At that time, if she chooses not to concede, the issue of whether she or the Allies initiate hostilities is important only from the standpoint of

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vulnerability of the opposition and the related advantage associated with the initiative. Responsibility for action rather than morality of initiation is then the issue and a case exists for Free World initiation in the premises. Particularly is this true in light of the prospective weapons to be employed.

a. Even if the U.S.S.R. is permitted the privilege of the initiative, it is assumed, on the basis of developing events fostered by Phase ONE, that, whereas the specific hour of attack and the total composite nature of concurrent land, air, and sea assault cannot be specifically predicted, the immediately preceding events will have been such as to justify a full alert and partial deployment of ready NATO forces.

b. In event the fatal day of decision is immediately preceded by emergency mobilization measures by both sides (and this is considered a probability), the case of Allied initiation is strengthened and most certainly offers strategic as well as tactical advantages. Such a situation would not change either basic military objectives or prospective alignment of nations, but would materially alter, and likely improve time-wise, tactical operations in support of geographical front stabilization.

c. It is assumed that NATO nations with the exception of France, Denmark, and Italy will be solidly enthusiastic Allied participants in the pre-D-day critical period. If not an enthusiastic partner during this period, France, once war begins, at least becomes the prospective real estate upon which the ground war will be fought if she doesn't support the Allied cause. Thereby her only sensible course, and this her Army commanders presumably will realize, lies in assisting to keep the ground war in Germany as long as possible. This may entail the employment of French combat

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divisions to suppress internal subversive and pacifist actions detrimental to the war effort. Denmark and Italy, at best, are assumed sufficiently firm only to contribute a delaying defense of their own national territories if attacked. Yugoslavia is considered a likely neutral unless attacked by Soviet forces in which case she would join the Allies; or at a later date, when Allied victory appears likely, she would join in hopes of appropriate reward. Spain is assumed available pursuant to existing base-rights agreements.

3. WHAT WEAPONS? This paper assumes the use of atomic/thermo-nuclear weapons by both sides. This presumption stems from the premise that, if all-out war comes, both sides conscientiously desire to win. Russia cannot win without it. Whereas she has numerical superiority of ground troops, the situation under which she could push directly and quickly to the Channel is fast disappearing. When 1956 NATO goals are achieved her opportunity is gone unless she wants to pay what even to her should be reckoned an unacceptable price. Her break-out task is markedly more difficult than that of the Germans in 1939-40, for she has the Rhine to breach. If she resorts to prior mass mobilization she discloses her hand, and as well imposes a drain on her industrial manpower. This latter would be critical since she, rather than U. S. lend-lease as in World War II, must now furnish logistic support to her forces. It follows that she cannot afford to hold back her Sunday punch--she wins a quick war or she doesn't win. As a consequence, even though she may exploit pre-D-day propaganda and blackmail prospects of promoting its prohibition by the inducement of fear, she will use her most potent weapon in the interest of quick victory--the only type she can hope for. That being the case, then we likewise must use ours unless we wish to sacrifice victory for morality. There is one other realistic consideration that is pertinent.

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Once the shooting starts, reasonable censorship and control of information will become effective on both sides. The U.S.S.R. can, at any time, falsely claim immediate prior use by the opposition as justification for her use. And, since both sides must remain poised to employ the weapons in quick retaliation, the issue, as a propaganda item, of who resorts to first use must remain essentially unsolved until the war is over. Frankly speaking, the fruits of victory will outweigh the stigma of wartime propaganda. And conversely, the moral pride of not initiating use of such weapons will be of little merit to the loser.

4. STAGES. Phase TWO envisages two stages of development:

a. FIRST. A defensive-offensive stage during which the principles of position and mobility should be exploited to stabilize basic geographical fronts and to develop fundamental logistic support therefor while engaging in intensive strategic air operations directed toward neutralization of Russian air, atomic-thermo-nuclear, communications, and supporting industrial potentials.

b. SECOND. An offensive stage during which, supported by continuing and intensified strategic air operations and by consolidated and secure logistic overseas supply lines, coordinated two-front land operations are initiated and prosecuted to the extent necessary to force the withdrawal of U.S.S.R. forces well within the confines of traditional Russia and to eliminate the U.S.S.R. capability of continuing war.

5. THEATER DESIGNATION. For purposes of clarity of reference only, the following theater designations in succeeding paragraphs apply:

a. OFFENSIVE THEATER. Mainland Europe, the North Atlantic, Mediterranean and littoral, the Middle East, and U.S.S.R. west of longitude 60° E.

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- b. DEFENSIVE THEATER. Asia east of 60° E. including bordering ocean areas, the Far East, Australia-New Zealand, and the Pacific Ocean.
 - c. AMERICAN THEATER. North American continent and off-shore ocean defense areas.
6. OFFENSIVE THEATER, LAND PLAN. This plan is supported by AIR and SEA PLANS contained in subsequent paragraphs.
- a. CENTRAL EUROPE. Dependent on the tactical situation prevailing and the nature of transition to "hot war" (i.e., whether Allies or U.S.S.R. ring the gong):

FIRST STAGE.

(1) Pinch off the U.S.S.R. occupation salient west of the ELBE-DESSAU-LEIPZIG-ZWICKAU line and anchor this line in the Carpathian foothills of Western Czechoslovakia; or

(2) By retiring action, taking advantage of rivers and terrain to make Russian advance both slow and costly, drop back to RHINE-ZUIDER ZEE. It is believed that, subject to appropriate coordination of other theater operations, the U.S.S.R. ground offensive can be blocked at this line. If not, defensive retirement will continue in stages to west and southwestward making successive stands at SEINE, RHONE, LOIRE, etc.

(3) Stabilize on, or from westernmost retirement regain and stabilize on, ELBE-DESSAU-LEIPZIG-ZWICKAU line.

SECOND STAGE.

(4) In coordination with Balkan-MidEast operations and phased with prior strategic air action, undertake successive offensive forward moves to the ODER-NEISSE-GORLITZ line, and then the VISTULA-LODZ-KRAKOW line as the objective of furthest penetration.

- b. SOUTH EUROPE-MIDEAST

FIRST STAGE.

(1) Unless she is attacked, endeavor to keep

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Yugoslavia in an undeclared neutral status with her forces deployed in the northern and eastern foothills of the EASTERN-DINARIC ALPS chain in the line ZAGREB-BELGRADE-PRISTINA until step (6) below can be initiated.

(2) Blanketly offer Albania neutrality or immediate neutralization.

(3) Concentrate Italian ground defenses in COMO-TRENTO-UDINE line against a possible Red push through AUSTRIAN ALP passes.

(4) Set up Greek defense positions in RHODOPE MOUNTAIN passes on Southern Bulgarian border. Mount raids via these same passes as soon as possible.

(5) Supported by neutralization air strikes on BAKU, BATUM, TIFLIS, and KATASI and on Russian military complexes immediately north of CAUCASUS MOUNTAINS, project limited Turkish forces into the TRANS-CAUCASUS region on harassing and holding operations.

(6) Following and in coordination with massive strategic air bombardment of Bulgarian, Rumanian, and South Russian military and communication complexes, with Yugoslav forces threatening SOFIA from westward, and with Greek harassing raids from the south, strike with Turkish forces into southeast Bulgaria to knock that country out of the war and establish a line along the northern slopes of the BALKAN MOUNTAINS--BELGRADE-LOM-PLEVEN-VARNA. Stabilize on this line while interdicting and wiping up enemy areas in upper DANUBE Valley and in Czechoslovakia and to permit build-up of own area logistics.

SECOND STAGE.

(7) In coordination with Central European operations and phased with prior strategic air action, undertake successive offensives, including amphibious envelopments on the adjacent Black Sea coast, to the BELGRADE-PLOESTI-GALATI

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line, then the CHERNOVTSY-ODESSA line along the DNIESTER River, then the LVOV-KIEV-KHARKOV-ROSTOV line as the objective of furtherest penetration.

c. NORTH EUROPE.

BOTH STAGES.

(1) Maintain a strategic defensive in NORWAY (assisting SWEDEN if she is attacked) with the objective of controlling the BALTIC Exits and preventing Russian projection into North Norway and thereby contributing to control of the ATLANTIC.

7. OFFENSIVE THEATER, AIR PLAN. For purposes of brevity, U. S. strategic air operations, although achieved by coordination rather than theater control, are here considered as a part of the over-all theater air plan.

a. FIRST STAGE.

(1) The immediate objective of this stage is to achieve control of the air over key fronts and to provide air defense of key areas and bases. The ultimate objective is to neutralize U.S.S.R. air arm including destruction of base complexes and sources.

(2) Tactical. Provide maximum practicable air defense and tactical support, both close and deep, to theater ground forces on Central European and Balkan-MidEast Fronts.

(3) Base Defense. Provide air defense to theater bases in Western Europe, Britain, Norway, Spain, North Africa, and MidEast.

(4) Reconnaissance. Initiate immediate reconnaissance in connection with and support of tactical and strategic missions.

(5) Strategic. Initiate, continue, and progressively intensify strategic offensive, employing atomic/thermo-nuclear weapons from the outset against pre-selected military, atomic/thermo-nuclear, communications, and industrial

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target complexes.

(6) Flexibility. Provide for flexible diversion of pre-arranged flight schedules in order to permit prompt and effective allocation of both tactical and strategic air in support of emergency ground operations.

b. SECOND STAGE.

(1) The air objective of this stage is to maintain tactical air control over ground fronts while neutralizing Russia by strategic bombing to the point where logistic support to her ground forces is effectively eliminated.

(2) When ground fronts have progressed to the penetration objectives indicated in paragraph 6. preceding, continue selective strategic operations to induce U.S.S.R. capitulation on terms indicated in Chapter VI following.

8. OFFENSIVE THEATER, SEA PLAN. The basic objective of this plan is control and exploitation of the Atlantic and Mediterranean in order to insure security of sea lanes of communications and effective logistic support to land and air forces deployed in the European-MidEast Theater. A corollary objective is denial of the sea to the U.S.S.R. for the conduct of any effective offensive operations. Essential tasks include:

a. FIRST STAGE.

(1) Establish effective shipping control and routing system and A/S search and reconnaissance.

(2) Protect vital shipping by air and surface escort.

(3) Employing H/K and surface forces in conjunction with (1) and (2), seek out and destroy enemy submarines and surface raiders in order to gain control of the sea.

(4) Interdict Baltic exits, White Sea area bases, and intra-Russia canal system by offensive mining, SS barriers, and carrier strikes.

(5) Destroy Red air threatening combat forces and

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shipping in vital areas.

(6) Provide tactical and strategic air support to operations covered by Land Plan, paragraph 6. Primary first stage effort in this category is presumed to apply in the South Europe-MidEast Area.

(7) Support strategic-defensive in NARVIK-HARSTAD-TROMSO area by air strikes and defensive mining operations.

(8) Provide amphibious lift and amphibious assault forces in support of Land Plan.

(9) Build-up and consolidate logistic support characteristics of advanced bases in the Atlantic-Mediterranean areas.

b. SECOND STAGE.

(1) Exploit and maintain control of the sea in order to maximize logistic support to overseas LAND and AIR PLANS.

(2) Provide tactical and strategic air support to theater land operations.

(3) Project amphibious forces into the Black Sea in support of Balkan-MidEast Land Plan.

9. DEFENSIVE THEATER OPERATIONS.

a. The strategic-defensive should apply in the SOUTH ASIA-FAR EAST Area throughout Phase TWO. The demands of the war in Europe are such that few, if any, Allied forces additional to those in this area at the outbreak of war could be provided. In fact, some forces particularly Naval and Marine may well be required for early deployment to the Med-MidEast Area. With U.S.S.R. engaged in all-out war in Europe she will be forced to reduce to insignificance her aid to Red China. The latter, therefore, except for manpower, will not be in a favorable position to undertake large-scale operations and, due to the lack of any amphibious capability, must confine those operations to the mainland.

b. The key areas that must be defended are Japan,

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Okinawa, Formosa, the Philippines, and Malaya. This may dictate a withdrawal of U. S. forces from Korea immediately upon the outbreak of hostilities and a redeployment of these forces to the aforementioned areas, particularly Malaya.

c. India probably would, and should be encouraged to, remain neutral. Burma should be pressed for neutrality and East Pakistan forces should be so deployed as to encourage such decision. China should be offered immunity from air attack if she refrains from open action in Korea and Indo-China. If she does not, then selective mainland China targets should be hit as a second priority after Vladivostok-East Siberian targets. Indonesia is no problem so long as Malaya can be held. West Pakistan should be encouraged to keep her forces ready and appropriately deployed for raider operations into the Taskent-Samarkand area should Russia decrease her forces there in support of European front requirements.

d. Operations in the area will involve strategic air strikes against Vladivostok and the Eastern Siberian military-communications-industrial complex, mining interdiction of the Sea of Japan, anti-submarine operations to insure open sea lanes to Allied bases, and defense of Southeast Asia by holding-retiring operations as necessary down the Malay Peninsula. An amphibious lift capable of redeploying forces up to division strength should be maintained or built-up in the area as early as practicable. After the optimum strategic-defensive deployment, dependent upon prevailing conditions, this same sea-lift can be employed to lift excess forces via the Indian Ocean to the Mid-East front.

e. Assuming operations as outlined in paragraphs 6, 7 and 8 effective in bringing U.S.S.R. to surrender, then it

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is presumed that Red China, if she has, or is still, engaged in hostile activities, will herself be receptive to surrender negotiations on Allied terms. If she is not, redeployment of forces then available and a transition to offensive operations in the Far East area are within Allied capabilities. No attempt is made here to cover such operations since their success would be only a matter of time and decision.

10. AMERICAN THEATER OPERATIONS. No detail is attempted herein. Tasks include: early warning and air defense; A/S protection in coastal waters; civil defense; detection and suppression of subversion and sabotage elements; and achievement of maximum industrial output and distribution thereof to the overseas war effort.

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CHAPTER VI

PHASE THREE

1. GENERAL. Phase THREE covers tasks of world stabilization following hostilities. No attempt is made here to indicate the time duration of this phase--it may last a generation--maybe longer. But, since the war is to be fought to eliminate the influence of unjust power, the basic post-war objective is to apply the residual power of victory in a firm, just manner to secure a practical world order modeled on the UN Charter principles.

2. BASIC TASKS. The basic tasks, stemming from war aims and national objectives and covering political, economic, and military considerations, are the following:

- a. Consummation of surrender and initiation of rehabilitation.
- b. Demilitarization of the U.S.S.R.
- c. Establishment of geographical boundaries and political entities in Central and Eastern Europe and in Eastern Asia mutually responsive to self-sufficiency and collective world security.
- d. Establishment of sound economic ties between Allies and new states.
- e. Establishment of conditions for readmission into the UN in the case of U.S.S.R., her co-belligerents, and such new states as may be organized.

3. NATIONAL REALIGNMENTS. Subject to compromise acceptance by major Allied powers, the following post-war national realignments are proposed:

- a. GERMANY. Unification West and East and restoration to 1938 eastern border less KONIGSBERG-ALLENSTEIN area then detached.
- b. POLAND. Consolidate with Byelorussia, Esthonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.

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c. FINLAND. Consolidate with Karelo-Finnish SSR, Kola Peninsula, and Ladoga Peninsula.

d. UKRAINIAN SSR. Establish as independent state.

e. ARMENIAN SSR and AZERBAIDZHAN SSR. Cede to Turkey.

f. BULGARIA, RUMANIA, HUNGARY, and CZECHOSLOVAKIA.

Submit to UN trusteeship for territorial and political determination.

g. FAR EAST.

(1) Reestablish Nationalist China in area south of YANGSTE.

(2) "Red China"--Give to "Red China" the Mongolian Republic (U.S.S.R. satellite).

(3) Establish UN trusteeship over Manchuria north of Yalu and east of longitude 120° E.

(4) Unify and establish independent Korea.

(5) Give Japan temporary and conditional trusteeship of Eastern Siberia east of Lena River and north of Amur River, period to be ten years and ultimate resolution to be by UN decision.

4. POLITICAL STABILIZATION. Provide for UN Supervisory Groups to be placed in each of the areas indicated by 3. a., b., c., d., f., and g., (1)-(4), with the intent of bringing about political consolidation through free elections within three years. Maintain all these areas under continuous UN political supervision for at least three years following such elections or until they are accepted into the UN. Provide similar UN supervision of political reorganization and stabilization of such of U.S.S.R. as is left from paragraph 3.

5. ECONOMIC STABILIZATION. Provide UN Economic Advisory and Assistance Groups in all areas requiring rehabilitation. Condition rehabilitation aid on acceptance of political and military demands. Establish trade regulations based on strictly national trade negotiations and requiring all former

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Soviet-bloc nations for the full period of political supervision to process their trade relationships through an European Branch of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

6. MILITARY STABILIZATION.

a. Maintain such occupation forces as are dictated by the circumstances, dividing this responsibility equitably between Allied nations.

b. Establish maximum self-policing limitations of 100,000 men, 500 aircraft of no greater than 500 miles range, and 50 naval vessels of no greater than 1500 tons for each of the former Soviet-bloc nations. For the smaller nations set this limitation appropriately lower.

c. Confiscate or destroy all conventional arms in excess of the requirements of b. and all ABC materials and equipments in the possession of those nations.

7. REACCEPTANCE INTO UN.

a. Compliance with political, economic, and military requirements of preceding paragraphs and a demonstrated satisfactory period of peaceful self-government for a period of five years shall be required of all nations who fought with the U.S.S.R. and for newly formed nations.

b. For the U.S.S.R. this period shall be at least ten (10) years.

c. Neither the U.S.S.R. or any nation who supported her in active combat during the war shall be accepted as a permanent or temporary member of the UN Security Council for a period of ten years following her readmission.

8. CONDITIONS OF SURRENDER. During the course of the war, and presumably after the initiation of the SECOND STAGE thereof, the terms of surrender fashioned on the conditions of the preceding paragraphs should be made known to the enemy nations collectively or separately as appropriate to

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
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the effect to be expected from such notifications. For instance, notification to Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia that their disposition would be by UN decision would be made to them, but not to the U.S.S.R., as a psychological factor. And, Red China should know that she could, for proper conduct on her part, expect the Mongolian Republic but she need not know that she stands to lose South China and possibly Manchuria.

9. RESUME. One realistic fact must not be forgotten. That is simply that power alone will win the war. Power is likewise essential in peace so long as it is exercised with justice. For power, in its simplest definition, is the mastery man seeks to establish over his environment and over his social relations. In the democratic sense, power by its very nature is a trust and its possession by individuals, by a nation, or by a group of nations imposes the obligation, even the responsibility, to use it, in accordance with common standards of morality and justice, in the interests of human liberty and the security of freedom-loving states.

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TAB B
 APPENDIX A
 PHASE TWO
 AMERICAN THEATER
 OPERATIONS



S. R.

MONGOLIA

MANCHURIA

KOMANDORSKIE IS.

ALEUTIAN

HOKKAIDO

KOREA

JAPAN

HONSHU

KYUSHU

OKINAWA

FORMOSA

LUZON

PHILIPPINE IS.

MINDANAO

GUAM

MARIANAS

WAKE ISLAND

STRATEGIC DEFENSE LINE

BURMA

SIAM

INDOCHINA

MALAY STATES

SUMATRA

BORNEO

CELEBES

NEW GUINEA

SUNDA ISLANDS

JAVA

TIMOR

CAROLINE ISLANDS

MARSHALL ISLANDS

GILBERT ISLANDS

PHOENIX

GUADALCANAL

SAMOA

NEW HEBRIDES

FIJI IS.

NEW CALEDONIA

A U S T R A L I A

TASMANIA

NEW ZEALAND

ZEALAND

ANTI-USSR STRA. AIR


ANTI-CHINA " "


GUERRILLA WARFARE

NEUTRAL

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THEATER
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