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SEAPOWER AS A FACTOR IN
CONTAINMENT OF COMMUNIST CHINA (U)

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Abstract of SEAPOWER AS A FACTOR IN
CONTAINMENT OF COMMUNIST CHINA

Analysis of the elements of the Communist Chinese threat and strategies, with an evaluation of the interactions of seapower in opposition to these elements, would validate seapower effectiveness and indicate potential exploitation.

China and its leadership are motivated by internal pressures of nationalism, revolutionary Communism and a chagrin associated with past failures. Economic poverty and demographic expansion aggravate these pressures with prospects for deepening austerity, such that the status quo is intolerable and future Peking policies are unpredictable.

The Communist regime in Peking has adopted strategies for relief of pressures and achievement of goals which threaten free-Asian states by indirect aggression. The objective of these strategies is Chinese dominance over a communized Asian region as the key to economic and world-power status. Peking's strategic plan adapts an inadequate Chinese power to this expansive goal. Free-Asian comparative weaknesses and Chinese nuclear capability are exploited to "blackmail" free-Asian governments--in order to incite insurgencies led by overseas Communist parties. Simultaneous "wars of liberation" would supposedly disperse opposing free-world control.

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The Communist Chinese Navy is the largest in Asia, but by direct comparison with the U.S. Seventh Fleet, its prospects in competing for seapower dominance are nil. A clear and overwhelming superiority of U.S. free-world naval power exists and is required for accomplishment of the interdiction task.

As Chinese strategies are analyzed in terms of their frustration, it becomes apparent that they are coordinated to the simultaneous achievement of political and economic objectives-- both intermediate and ultimate. The indirect but aggressive threat depends upon "blackmail" or power factors and is focussed initially against free-Asian "confidence" psychology. The additional threat generated by Chinese internal pressures and consequent instability is also of concern. Both explicit and implicit threats can be interdicted by influencing and supporting free-Asian stability. Free-world seapower as manifested by the U.S. Seventh Fleet is an effective instrumentality for this purpose, based upon its demonstrated and credible power, its visible presence and its mobility to display that power in support of Asian "confidence" over a wide area.

Past and present effectiveness, as validated, could be exploited and improved in the future by solving problems so as to expand the area of seapower influence by extensions of naval operations into southeast Asian and Indian Ocean straits, ports and areas.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER		PAGE
	ABSTRACT	ii
	INTRODUCTION	v
I	INTERNAL PRESSURES IN COMMUNIST CHINA . .	1
	Competitive Communism	1
	Image Deficiencies	6
	Economic Pressures	10
	Demographic Pressures	13
	Total Pressures and Prospects	17
II	COMMUNIST CHINA'S STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES . .	19
	The Psychological Target	19
	Economic Goals	22
	Political Objectives	25
	Military Objectives	35
III	THE BALANCE OF SEAPOWER IN ASIA	43
	Chinese Naval Forces	43
	The U.S. Seventh Fleet	48
	The Dominant Inequality	51
IV	NAVAL INTERDICTION OF CHINESE COMMUNIST OBJECTIVES	54
	Political Stabilization	54
	Military Deterrence	58
	The Residual Threat	63
V	CONCLUSIONS	65
	Seapower vs. China--Significant Highlights	65
	Polishing the Strategy--Recommendations.	67
	BIBLIOGRAPHY	70

INTRODUCTION

Like an invalid giant, rabid with infectious Communism--improverished but ambitious--China lies within reach of healthy smaller neighbors whose transfusions could restore her to power. Up to the present time, free-world counter-strategies have successfully prevented spread of the infection. One of the instrumentalities contributing to the prima facie past success has been U.S. seapower.

However, strategies and counter-strategies change with the passage of time. For the near and middle future, beneficial knowledge, and even some assurance, might be realized by an updated analysis of Chinese objectives and strategies--with a consideration of how best to continue their frustration. This study is directed to that purpose with particular interest in the efficacy of seapower as a containment system.

The Communist Chinese threat is both implicit and explicit. Internal conditions generate an aura of unstable unpredictability as to future Peking policies. Announced objectives and strategies subtly target the independence of other Asian States. For orderly examination of this rather broad chaos, a sequence and methodology has been undertaken which first identifies the elements of Chinese pressures and strategy. A brief comparison to validate the present and future seapower balance in Asia is then presented. Thereafter the interactions of threat and strategy elements versus the demonstrated characteristics of prevailing seapower are considered.

The hazards of in-expert interpretation of the esoteric "Aesopian" style of utterance emanating as direct source material from Communist Peking are known to the author. As an attempt to compensate, comparative cross-reference sources from western scholars* of recognized expertise and competent authority have been utilized alternatively. It has been an enlightening and gratifying experience to discover the satisfactory degree of general correlation.

The assistance and contributions of my dear wife--who patiently transcribed an untidy scrawl into typed form-- Professor Clyde Sargent of G.W.U., who provided superb guidance, and the Naval War College Library staff--are most gratefully acknowledged.

C.H.C.

* Note: "Authorities" include a number of names of Chinese origin, some of which have retained traditional sequence and some of which have been westernized. To avoid confusion, in footnotes and bibliography, and where applicable in the text, Chinese surnames have been rendered in upper case.

SEAPOWER AS A FACTOR IN
CONTAINMENT OF COMMUNIST CHINA

CHAPTER I

INTERNAL PRESSURES IN COMMUNIST CHINA

"At a constant volume pressure of a gas
varies directly with its absolute temperature."
Gay-Lussac's Law

Competitive Communism

A point of origin for consideration of Chinese¹ motivations is the invariable, pervasive compulsion of Chinese nationalism. This one common denominator pre-dates modern China, stands firm through the chronology of Chinese history and is the single uncomplicated and comprehensible value which clearly emerges when the torturous labyrinth of oriental incentive and indirection is contemplated from the vantage point of Western logic. Even the contradictory mysteries of the Sino-Soviet split, with their record of illogical reverses, become clearer when Chinese nationalism is given primary weight as a factor. Recognized Sinologists increasingly have become aware of the import of this fundamental force, including Doak

¹For brevity and clarity, this discussion will use the abbreviated phrases "China" and "Chinese" to mean Communist, mainland China, i.e., the Peoples' Republic of China. Reference to the nationalist Republic of China will be differentiated specifically, using full names or, occasionally, the abbreviation "Taiwan."

Barnett, who asserts that "China's long history and imperial tradition have bred in its people a deep sense of cultural superiority and a belief in China's natural primacy in Asia."² Robert C. North also detects the impact of pressing ethnocentrism and its historical background:

Some men (and some nations) hunger as much for recognition or status as for economic well-being, and this gap can be as potent as any other. Undoubtedly the Chinese are motivated in part by a determination to restore the power, prestige, and perhaps the uttermost boundaries of the ancient Chinese Empire at the peak of its ascendancy.... Here we have powerful dynamics for Mao Tse-tung and his colleagues to harness and direct.³

Nationalism, often overlooked or underrated in the case of China, nevertheless can not in itself differentiate that state from others, since it is so remarkably forceful and common in all. Obviously Chinese nationalism is now uniquely identified by the Red hue of its ideological partner - Communism. The history and rationale of this marriage need not detain us here. Suffice it to say that Chinese nationalistic instincts and communist ideology mutually "evaluated each other" as optimum allies for rapid, victorious achievement of goals - and, in the crucible of historic events, the partnership was consummated. Barnett observes, "The Communist party's

²A. Doak Barnett, Communist China and Asia (New York: Harper, 1960), p. 66.

³Robert C. North, "Two Revolutionary Models: Russian and Chinese," in A. Doak Barnett, ed. Communist Strategies in Asia (New York: Praeger, 1963), p. 53.

victory within China was due in no small measure to its success in appealing to nationalist sentiment both during the war with Japan and afterward."⁴

More important to this analysis is the resultant characteristic of the ethno-centric-ideological combination. Modern China's adoption of Communism as a means to achievement of national prestige, concurrently embraced the total Pandora's Box of traditional Marxist-Leninism - with its Chinese disciples, revolutionary fervor, dictatorial leadership and goals. Thereafter, Chinese nationalism became Communist nationalism - and it is now "...the ideological convictions of Peking's leaders which shape their [Chinese] present view of the world, mold their strategy, and provide the rationale for both the ends and means of their policy."⁵

But more than pure ideology came to partnership with Chinese patriotism. From the caves of Yen-an came the victorious, charismatic Mao Tse-tung, - indomitable, seasoned Communist revolutionary - to apply his own shades and tints, not only to Chinese nationalist hopes, but even to traditional Communist ideology itself. Mao, then and now, considers himself the contemporary in Communism, not with Stalin, Khrushchev or their successors, but with the revered authors of the

⁴Barnett, p. 67.

⁵Ibid.

ideology - Marx and Lenin themselves.⁶ He explicitly claims title as "the Asian Marx" with the prerogative "to go down in history as one of the prophets of, rather than a disciple of Communism."⁷ It is hardly surprising to find such a leader taking advantage, for his image, of the more grandiose aspects of the enthusiasms of his flock - Mao, as both a Chinese nationalist and a Communist revolutionary, charts visionary paths to power for the Chinese people as vanguard of "the billion folk that live in the colonial countries of Southeast Asia." Moreover, he sees "himself the leader of the revolution in all underdeveloped areas, including Asia, Africa and Latin America."⁸

In his recent, now famous, polemic of 3 September 1965, Marshall Lin Piao, concurrently vice-chairman of the Chinese Communist party's Central Committee, vice premier and minister of defense,⁹ gave utterance, among many other assertions, to Maoist status aspirations of the latest vintage. Except for fresh and explicit expression, there were no variations announced in this speech to Mao's ambitions as we already know them. Significantly, however, much of the impassioned

⁶Donald S. Zagoria, The Sino-Soviet Conflict 1956-1961 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1962), p. 16.

⁷Ibid., p. 14.

⁸Ibid., p. 16.

⁹Chalmers M. Roberts, "The Chinese 'Mein Kampf'," The Providence Sunday Journal, 19 September 1965, p. N-39:1.

exhortation was defensive - angrily rationalizing the "Chinese model" as the "correct" interpretation of Marxist-Leninist theory.¹⁰ Here are significant clues to current Chinese psychology. Lin's loud and defensive arguments are certain indicators of the instinctive, burdensome Chinese suspicion that the "Chinese model" of Communism remains yet to be proved in the eyes of the world, particularly those of the emergent neutral states. More significantly, there was clear reflection of the Chinese instinct to compete and prevail against any rival, including the U.S.S.R., for leadership status, - Asian, Communist or "world."¹¹

Lin reveals then, and we note, a major characteristic of modern Maoist Chinese Communism - the spur and pressure to frenetic competition within the Communist sphere. Nor is further confirmation lacking. Although not generally publicized, Lin's polemic was anything but original. Rather, it was drawn directly from a Central Committee proposal endorsed by Mao and transmitted to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on 14 June, 1963. This proposal, a major development in the Sino-Soviet rift, has been assessed as a key declaration for Chinese power status, and an outright challenge of the Soviet Communists for ideological leadership based on

¹⁰LIN Piao, Long Live the Victory of the Peoples War, (Washington: U.S. Govt. Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report Supplement No. 171 (45), 3 September 1965), throughout, particularly p. 19-24, 27-30.

¹¹Ibid.

"correctness" of the "Chinese model" in contrast to CPSU "deviation."¹²

Image Deficiencies

Any competitor, individual or nation, strives to win, and in the long term, to establish a history of victories. Little such gratification is available to China, and the image she would offer as example to attract loyalties of imitators, satellites,--even her own populace,-- is tawdry and wretched.

After stabilization of Korean hostilities, China embarked with energy and high hopes on a First Five Year Plan of rapid industrialization. Upon its completion in 1958, the Plan had resulted in impressive achievements - steel, machinery, shipping, mining, exports, building, - all showing remarkable gain. Meanwhile, however, inattention to agriculture precipitated a major setback in food production - rewarding the new Chinese industrial "proletariat" with near-starvation for their efforts.¹³ Nevertheless, an euphoria of industrial accomplishment spurred Chinese leadership into a Second Five Year Plan. Moreover, persuaded that necessary adjustments of the agricultural sector had been properly organized. Mao

¹²Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, "A Proposal Concerning the General Line of the International Communist Movement" 14 June 1963, as quoted in John W. Lewis Major Doctrines of Communist China (New York: Norton, 1964), p. 238-280.

¹³CHENG Chu-Yuan, Communist China's Economy 1949-1962 (Washington: Seton Hall University Press, 1963), p. 130-133.

accelerated this plan into the clumsily conceived "Great Leap Forward." The frantic productive energy thus put into action remains a phenomenon of contemporary history - where its catastrophic failure is also recorded. The Chinese manipulation of statistics to balance differences between goals and production, the embarrassing revision of goals, the failures and back-lash of agricultural communes and the back-yard furnace programs are well-known events, along with the drought, flood and famine disasters of 1959-61. Pertinent to our concern in this study was the concomitant drastic degradation of the prestige of the Chinese model of Communism.¹⁴ In addition, internal to China proper, the spectacular failure of Mao's management resulted in a grave and fundamental deterioration of revolutionary fervor, as well as disinterest in further progress towards world status. The initial enthusiasm and support of the Chinese populace, by 1961, had degenerated to apathy, poor health, loss of confidence and utter lack of further incentive.¹⁵

This over-all portrait of governmental failure was relieved, it is true, by a number of political successes. The Peoples' Republic of China continued to enjoy sovereign national security against external power. The aggressive and threatening Chiang Kai-shek, even with U.S. support, was unable to assault the Chinese mainland - in fact, the Tachen

¹⁴Ibid., p. 137-149.

¹⁵Ibid.

Island group was returned to Communist Chinese sovereignty. The Communist Chinese regime occupied Tibet and maintained its control, unshaken in both Tibet and China, despite a serious revolt there.¹⁶

Yet, far from ameliorating internal chaos, this small record of external successes was itself overshadowed by concurrent external failure. Quemoy, Matsu and Formosa remained under Taiwan's control, more than half the world's nations declined to recognize the Communist government of mainland China, United Nations membership for China was denied, and the growing rift with the Soviet Union threatened needed support for industrial achievement. On balance, in 1961, Peking was - and still is - ridiculously short of any reasonable interpretation of its own goals.¹⁷

With regard to consequent internal pressures, what has been the domestic reaction to Peking's net record of failure? The governing Chinese elite have developed bitter resentment and hatred against those who impede their progress--both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. They have adopted a compulsive, psychotic insistence on the "correctness" of the "Chinese model" of Communism. Increasing desperation and frustration have become apparent in the tone of policy pronouncements from Peking. The Chinese public, however, has not yet entirely

¹⁶Allen S. Whiting, "China," in Robert E. Ward and Roy C. Macridis, eds. Modern Political Systems: Asia (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963), p. 189-190.

¹⁷Ibid.

recovered from its apathy, although latent lower-class pressures are discernable.¹⁸ Records assembled in Hong Kong show a typical incidence of approximately 16 rebellious events annually in China, many of which involved violence and fatality.¹⁹ However, small rebellions seem to present little problem to the seasoned revolutionaries in Peking. Their alert policy adjustments and quick repressions of any dissension within China are so skilled as to preclude any hope for internal breakdown of Communist control.²⁰ Barnett sees "...considerable evidence of disaffection within Communist China...Although the expression of this dissatisfaction has been suppressed by rigorous controls, its sources have certainly not been removed."²¹

Even more recently, during the past year, Chinese external objectives and influence have continued their sorry tradition of failure. After early gains, the Chinese international export of revolution has deteriorated in North Korea, North Vietnam, and Cuba. Border incidents with India have disassociated the Indian Communist Party from Indian Nationalism. The Chinese acquisition of nuclear weapons has isolated the

¹⁸Ibid.

¹⁹John Scott, Crisis in Communist China (a Report to the Publisher of TIME), TIME, Inc. 1962, p. 145-146.

²⁰Ibid.

²¹Barnett, p. 10.

Japanese Communist Party from socialist and Trade Union support.²² The collapse of the Indonesian coup in October 1965 was a drastic reversal for Asian Communism.²³

Thus, it is apparent that China is subject in full measure to the pressure of "frustration"--the mid-game desperation of the "loser." Although the tangible penalties of failure have been heaviest upon the population, internal reaction is well controlled. It is the reaction of the Chinese elite which is unpredictable. There, significantly, the pressure of habitual failure and its intolerable political image represent a constant and sinister potential for resort to irrational policies for relief.

Economic Pressures

By the nature and interrelationship of the grinding problems in China, an account of economic conditions is, in effect, an extension and amplification of the political failures already noted. Despite Peking's anguished attempts to distort or avoid the odious truth--China is an underdeveloped nation with unimpressive prospects for a long tedious economic emergence. As with newer and smaller nations in the same early phase of development, China is absolutely dependent

²²Donald S. Zagoria, "Assessing Chinese Progress Along the Revolutionary Road," The Providence Sunday Journal, 19 Sept. 1965, p. N-39: 3-6.

²³Stanley Karnow, "An Aging Mao Watches Revolution Slip Away," The Providence Sunday Journal, 2 Jan. 1966, p. H-4:2.

upon agriculture as a foundation for economic growth. Serious obstacles continue to discourage the establishment of such a foundation--mechanization of production, lack of arable acreage and un-availability of capital for investment in fertilizers.²⁴ Until these are overcome, grandiose industrialization aspirations remain in the category of pure folly, as the Chinese have already proved--to all except their own leaders. As we have already noted, the First Five Year Plan generated impressive gains in China's industrial sector. However, this net success was "one-dimensional"--and was actually a net setback across the total national economy. The populace, though growing hungry, remained generally gratified until 1959, when, during the "Great Leap," "...the radical commune movement triggered widespread resistance throughout the countryside. The resulting dislocation of production and distribution was compounded by amateurishly designed programs of deep plowing and close planing. Agricultural production fell catastrophically, accelerated in its decline by unprecedented droughts, floods and typhoons in 1959-61."²⁵ Thus events on gigantic scale dramatized forcefully China's central economic (and political) dilemma--the vicious circle of interdependence between agriculture, industry, and population growth.²⁶ (This "interdependence" should not be understood as harmonious and

²⁴CHENG Chu-yuan, p. 169-170.

²⁵Whiting, p. 190-192.

²⁶cf. post, p. 13.

SECRET

supporting,--rather, it is a relationship of competition and conflict.)²⁷

For incomprehensible reasons probably associated with the mystical conceit of their dogma, the Communist elite in Peking, after a decade and a half, have been unable or unwilling to assimilate,--or perhaps accept,--these hard lessons. There is a significance in this mystery beyond the illogical obstinacy. China's monumental economic problem would brutally test any type of government or ideology in Peking. Mao's Communist regime, through doctrinaire excesses, has been greatly aggravating rather than solving the problem.²⁸ Since the collapse of the "Great Leap Forward" there has been no real progress toward full recovery, much less achievement of economic goals. The political aims and policies of Chinese leaders are simply economically irreconcilable. Chinese economy is not likely to recover until the Communist elite realistically puts economics ahead of political objectives, supporting expansion of agriculture,--keystone of the problem.²⁹ Analyzing the potential capability of China to achieve self-sufficiency in food production, Demographer Ping-ti HO

²⁷CHENG Chu-yuan, p. 172-177.

²⁸Central Intelligence Agency, Political Problems and Prospects in Communist China NIE 13-7-65 (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 5 Aug 1965), p. 5. SECRET

²⁹North American Air Defense Command, Economic Progress of China Hobbled by Political Aims of Its Leaders Weekly Intelligence Review, WIR 32/65, (Ent AFB, Colo.: 6 Aug 1965), p. 10-14. SECRET

concedes that necessary improvement of per-acre yield is entirely feasible -- if advanced agricultural technology is widely and intensively introduced throughout China--now. Nevertheless, long-range prospects would still remain adverse, -- even intensive cultivation and advanced technology will be insufficient to avoid a future point of diminishing returns.³⁰ China's population versus food "showdown" could be delayed, but it is ultimately inevitable.³¹

The inventory of pressures within China, then, includes the real pangs of mass hunger, with the accompanying mental anguish in the knowledge that alleviation is unlikely or even impossible. Communist policies well-nigh guarantee that today's hunger will inevitably become tomorrow's starvation and famine. Only the time element is uncertain. How much inscrutable oriental equanimity is needed, -- and for how long, -- to withstand the painful pressure of daily hunger embellished with sub-conscious panic?

Demographic Pressures

The time fuze on China's ultimate starvation is the irresistible juggernaut of growing population. Whether or not Malthusian processes are in operation, the monstrous

³⁰Ping-ti HO, Studies on the Population of China, (Cambridge, Mass.: Howard University Press, 1959), p. 195.

³¹NORAD, p. 14.

demographic base in China generates growth statistics, at any reasonable computation rate, of such awesome magnitude as to preclude accuracy and comprehension. To dramatize in retrospect the tendency to underestimate demographic absolutes, note that Warren S. Thompson, an eminent demographer, from the best data available in 1929, predicted, "A century hence there may be one great Chinese nation, with six hundred millions or more people, covering most of the area from Siberia on the north to Singapore on the south [underlining supplied]."32 He further predicted that, although quiescent in 1929, and for "several decades," the Chinese would, in the course of time, develop national leaders and expand aggressively "to secure larger resources."33 Few would dispute the sound validity of Thompson's general instincts -- his only error in the past, as ours could be for the future, occurs in matching statistics to their time scale.

It must be accepted, in considering Chinese demography, that accuracy will be entirely elusive. The first organized and sincere attempt to make a nation-wide census in modern China was initiated by Peking in 1953. After years of official chagrin with obvious flaws and inaccuracies, completion was announced in 1964. At that time, a total

32Warren S. Thompson, Danger Spots in World Population, (New York: Knopf, 1929), p. 135.

33Ibid., p. 68-69.

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population as of 1953 was roughly correlated at 583 million, with an unconfirmed growth rate of 2 percent annually.³⁴

Subsequently, the United Nations Economic and Social Council has published estimates forecasting a 1968 Chinese population with media ranging between 748 and 792 millions, depending on assumed birth rate indices. Mortality/fertility uncertainties set error factors such that the predicted absolute low limit is 719 million and the absolute high, 837 million.³⁵ On the same bases, quinquennial population growth for the period 1968-1973 was estimated at a median 7 to 8 percent with variation from a possible low 3 percent up to an explosive 15 percent.³⁶

For classified computations, the U.S. Intelligence Board employs a total figure, for Chinese population in 1965, of 739 million with a 15 million annual increase. The prediction for 1980 is 924 million³⁷--approximately double Mao's already monstrous original inheritance.

The foregoing figures admittedly fall short of perfect correlation -- yet by their very magnitude demonstrate the

³⁴Ping-ti HO, p. 94-97.

³⁵United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Report VI The Population of Asia and the East, 1950-1980, (New York: United Nations Publication, 1959), Table 15, p. 25.

³⁶Ibid., Table 16, p. 26.

³⁷U.S. Intelligence Board, Economic Intelligence Committee, Population of the Countries of the Sino-Soviet Bloc and of Cuba (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1963), p. 9, 24.

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irrelevancy of precise statistical accuracy. If a generous margin of error of some 50 millions is introduced, little influence in reality results to affect China's population-based problems. "To put it crassly, 50 million Chinese more or less makes no essential difference to the current crisis in China."³⁸

Of all China's pressures and problems, population growth is the most basic, critical³⁹ and oppressive -- and least adaptable to correction by policy adjustment. Library of Congress analyst Leo A. Orleans states, "Finally, no matter what one assumes China's population to be, it is undeniable that the size and rate of growth of this population are a deterrent rather than an asset to communist political and economic ambitions."⁴⁰ Moreover, beyond the frustrations of the population burden, its potentiality explosive characteristics were the subject of a comment by Sir Julian Huxley, former Director General of UNESCO, -- "Not only does overcrowding generate a frustrated and quarrelsome spirit, but overpopulation promotes territorial aggression to gain new space. The demand for Lebensraum has repeatedly been made the excuse for aggressive war."⁴¹

³⁸Scott, p. 135.

³⁹Ronald Freedman, ed., Population: The Vital Revolution (Garden City, N.J.: Doubleday, 1964), p. 227.

⁴⁰Ibid., p. 238.

⁴¹Sir Julian Huxley, The Human Crisis, (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1963), p. 78.

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Total Pressures and Prospects

Thus far we have noted four major pressure factors in China. The ideological drive to compete for national world status and Communist leadership as well as the passion to reverse failures of image are both compulsive and unique to the political philosophies of the Chinese Communist leadership. Economic poverty and population growth are overwhelming natural pressures characteristic of China under any government. However, we have also seen that all these pressures interact in conflict. Leadership policies aggravate rather than relieve natural pressures, not alone by tight control, but also by gross misdirection. Natural pressures of circumstance multiply the challenge and frustrations of leadership. The Chinese diet is now at a bare subsistence level -- in normal years. Per capita daily intake averages about 2000 calories, but grim prospects for its decline persist undiminished. The Chinese peasant under Mao's leadership thus far has realized only increased regimentation and the unrelieved tedium of strenuous labor without tangible material compensation.⁴² The race of industrialization with population growth is already being lost.⁴³ Peking can offer only party, ideology,⁴⁴ and

⁴²Central Intelligence Agency, Communist China, N.I.S. 39A (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., Dec. 1961), p. 75.
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⁴³CHENG Chu-yuan, p. 171.

⁴⁴Whiting, p. 213.

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painful deepening austerity for the coming decade.⁴⁵ Yet we also have observed that internal pressures are well contained.

Although the regime has mishandled many of its programs, it has been remarkably effective in enforcing its basic control over the country. We see little chance that this control will significantly weaken...nor is there much chance that internal difficulties will force Peiping to alter its aggressive foreign policies. Rather, the prospect is for an accumulation of difficulties and pressures that will have to be accomodated by some future leadership.⁴⁶

Even so, pressures cannot be eliminated or relieved by "containment." Laws of elementary physics provide an applicable analogy in declaring a contained pressure vessel in contact with a heat-energy source to be a very dangerous apparatus. However, it is not the purpose of this thesis to speculate as to China's ultimate fate, be it explosion, implosion, or catastrophic starvation. It is sufficient to have demonstrated, as a basis for further exploration, that irresistible forces and pressures are in operation within China, which absolutely preclude acceptance and toleration of the 1965 status quo for the future.

⁴⁵Central Intelligence Agency, Political Problems and Prospects in Communist China, p. 5. SECRET

⁴⁶Ibid., p. 9. SECRET

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CHAPTER II

COMMUNIST CHINA'S STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES

"At a constant pressure the volume of a gas varies directly with its absolute temperature."
Charles Law

The Psychological Target

Having noted the compulsive pressure of combined nationalism and communist ideology in China, it is appropriate to inquire into the manifestations and goals of this force.

Peking's leaders consider their country to be one of the world's major powers, and they are determined that China shall play the role of a great power.... The history of China, the traditional Chinese view of the world, and the force of modern nationalism all play a part in making this a driving force in Peking's policy.¹

It has assuredly not escaped the observation of Chinese leadership that the fullest definition of "great power" and "world status" involves more than strong, dignified, individual national identity. World powers have been traditionally concurrent leaders of some significant sphere of influence. The United States leads the free-world and the western hemisphere. Great Britain is the focus of influence over the former empire and dominions. France or Germany, at various times, have held hegemony of prestige in Europe, Russia (except for polycentric contradictions) controls the

¹Barnett, p. 65-66.

Communist bloc, and even Nasser has a particular status in the Arab sphere. Peking thus views Asia as China's counterpart, -- a sphere for predominant Chinese influence. An historical obligation is felt to rest on the Communist leadership to extend both Chinese influence and revolutionary Communism throughout the Asian area² "...not only for ideological reasons, but also because the spread of Communist regimes across Asia would promote the immediate interests of China as well as those of the world revolutionary movement."³

Thus far, however, China's thrust towards expanded prestige and Asian primacy has been thwarted by free-world interests in diametrical opposition. We have already noted the pressures of political failure, tarnished image and frustration.⁴ If rival opposition should be removed or eliminated, it might seem to the Chinese leadership that progress towards Asian hegemony would ensue with relative ease -- a valid supposition, as later chapters will show. This in turn, to Peking, would represent a major step, not only in relief of frustration pressures, but also towards achievement of ultimate aspirations. Where, then, is the

²James E. Garvey, Marxist-Leninist China: Military and Social Doctrine, (New York: Exposition Press, 1960), p. 320.

³Barnett, p. 80.

⁴cf. ante p. 6-10.

focus of free-world opposition? -- where is its source? To the Chinese, the answer is painfully obvious -- the United States. Moreover, this "racial" opponent is coincidentally and superbly qualified for designation as concurrent, traditional "foreign devil." Here is an eligible, credible custodian of blame for even internal Chinese failures -- easily attributable to past or present "injustices" or "intrusions." In an intense content analysis of recent Sino-Soviet official dialogue, significant differences were noted, not only in objectives, but also in emotional tensions. China scored notably higher in terms of hostility, frustration and impulse for radical action to change the international status quo. Moreover, Peking viewed the United States as principal archenemy, while the Soviet Union demonstrated concern with wholly different opposition. The Chinese elite evidenced sensitive concern to the threat of U.S. power through bases in Japan, support of Taiwan, interests in South Vietnam, and through the U.S. Seventh Fleet.⁵ Chinese hatred for United States has intensified to group psychosis in the Peking elite --who, as their single violation of pure Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy, transcend ruthless practicality by hating the United States and its system with excessive and irrational emotionalism.⁶

⁵North, p. 54.

⁶Garvey, p. 104.

John Scott, in repeated trips to China, observed that, though Chinese policies have varied widely in other respects, there has been absolute consistency in blaming the U.S. for Chinese troubles, real or otherwise. According to Peking, the U.S. is responsible for "aggression" in the Taiwan Straits, dropping bacteria on Chinese cities and even sabotaging Asian weather cycles by seeding clouds with iodine crystals⁷ -- among the many other accusations. Neither does Peking overlook the internal political utility of this pressure "relief valve," -- "Systematically the centralized propaganda machine has sought to create a fanatic anti-Americanism, and prepare the people to suffer and die if necessary in the 'inevitable' and 'just' war against American 'imperialism'."⁸

Economic Goals

In contrast to intermediate action policies and objectives in support, China's economic goals are forthright, legitimate and acceptably competitive. As a backward, but intensely ambitious nation, it is entirely comprehensible that China should energetically pursue her own economic salvation through industrialization. Those features which are unique, however, to Chinese economic policies in practice

⁷Scott, p. 108.

⁸Ibid.

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are a hoodlum recklessness of international ethic (arch-typical of Communist practice) and the hopeless inability of the policy leadership to match rate of industrial development with support capability.

The Western intelligence community has already detected Peking's compulsive anxiety to rebound from the "Great Leap" disaster with its succeeding apathetic hiatus by resumption of active programs favoring direct industrial development.⁹ We have previously noted, however, that the agricultural prospects are probably inadequate for future support of the status quo, much less any subsequent Five Year Program. The intelligence analysis concurs, predicting further accumulation of difficulties in the Chinese economy, within the leadership, and between the Communist regime and the Chinese people.¹⁰ There are some indications that Peking is learning or adjusting to past lessons "the hard way" by overseas purchase of food. Despite the desperate drain on the thin foundation of monetary assets and credit, it is also concluded that China expects to resort to the purchase of imported machinery, equipment, raw materials and food for several years to come.¹¹ The economic contradiction of this

⁹Central Intelligence Agency, Economic Prospects for Communist China N.I.E. 13-64, (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 28 January 1964), p. 2. SECRET

¹⁰Ibid. SECRET

¹¹Ibid., p. 8. SECRET

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intolerable, temporary expedient, leads directly to identification of one fundamental and governing Chinese objective -- substitution of a feasible alternative, which is more acceptable as a long-term economic balance. This alternative is the acquisition, control and utilization of external resources, on a "permanent" basis, for support of China's development into a modern industrialized power.¹²

Southeast Asia, -- mainland, insular, and oceanic, -- is far more significant to Peking's aspirations than simply as an adjacent sphere of Chinese geographic and political domination for world-power "image." This area is a wealthy source -- in some cases the world's principal supplier -- of industrially vital natural products. Briefly, Southeast Asia exports:

As a dominant world source:

Crude rubber	(90% world total)
Tin	(60% world total)
Copra	(80% world total)
Cocoanut oil	(80% world total)

As the principal, largest world source:

Rice	Teak
Quinine	Pepper
Kapok	Tapioca flour

As a significant, competitive world source:

Sugar	Spices
Tea	Natural resins and gums
Coffee	Petroleum
Tobacco	Iron ore
Sisal	Bauxite
Fruit	

¹²R. G. Boyd, Communist China's Foreign Policy (New York: Praeger, 1962), p. 86.

"All these economic and strategic factors have attracted European and Japanese colonialism in the past, and they invite Communist China's attention today."¹³

In summary, the predominant Chinese economic "action" objective is further confirmed in the correlation of Professor Rupen's independent assessment with the above. Rupen concludes that underlying the acquisition of "image" and other political intangibles, sought through domination of the Asian Pacific region, is Peking's real economic goal. This objective is Chinese access to and economic hegemony over Asian sources of tin, rubber and petroleum as essential elements of industrial development, itself a prerequisite to China's achievement of coveted world-power status.¹⁴

Political Objectives

Traditionally, and by definition, political objectives are the ends sought by leadership policy, in the management of government, which facilitate and support both real and intangible national interests. Accordingly, in China, political goals are no more or less than policy slants -- or political facets -- of other national objectives already identified in their nationalistic, Communist or economic

¹³Barnett, p. 302.

¹⁴Interview with Professor Robert A. Rupen, Consultant in International Relations, U.S. Naval War College, Newport, R. I. 16 November 1965.

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guise. By restatement, then, China's underlying broad or ultimate political objectives are export of communist ideology, reacquisition of traditional territories and prestige, ejection of rival interests from Asia,¹⁵ leadership and economic hegemony in that area, and achievement of world-power status by the foregoing means plus industrialization.¹⁶

As to intermediate or implementing political "action" objectives, however, we turn again to an excellent, perhaps optimum source -- Marshall Lin Piao's September, 1965, policy address.¹⁷ This polemic -- a skilled doctrinal re-assertion on how to re-make the world in Peking's image, according to Mao Tse-tung -- is in effect a Chinese "Mein Kampf" (focussing antagonism squarely on the U.S.). Peking's view of its importance may be judged by its internal publication in all five languages of China as well as its full external broadcast throughout the world.¹⁸

Lin's speech is well-nigh tantamount to a post-graduate course in political science within its own few pages. Condensing pungently, he makes point after countless point of Maoist dogma. It is a multi-purpose, "all things to all men" approach, difficult to analyze except in great length and detail.

¹⁵Central Intelligence Agency, Communist China, p. 59
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¹⁶cf. ante, p. 22-25.

¹⁷cf. ante, p. 4.

¹⁸Roberts, p. N-39:1, 3.

SECRET
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Nevertheless, for the purpose of our immediate interest, it is at least possible to itemize a number of Lin's pronouncements in relation to general categories of political aim and thrust. For internal propaganda, rationalizing past obstacles, difficulties and events (failures)--Lin:

Re-emphasizes past successes of the Chinese "Peoples War."¹⁹

Exhorts that people and their spirit are more powerful than nuclear weapons.²⁰

Defies U.S. in any ground war on the Asiatic mainland.²¹(underlining supplied)

Decries threat by opposing naval and air superiority.²²

Protests "occupation" of Taiwan by "U.S. imperialists" and China's determination to liberate that island.²³

For emphatic clear declaration of primary Chinese political objectives -- alignment and exploitation of "third-world" neutralist nationalism and its alienation from the U.S.S.R. and Western association--Lin:

Boasts of successes of the Chinese "People's War" guerrilla tactics, recommended for "oppressed" nations.²⁴

¹⁹Lin Piao, p. 1-17.

²⁰Ibid., p. 26, 30.

²¹Ibid.

²²Ibid., p. 31.

²³Ibid.

²⁴Ibid., p. 15, 17, 20.

Amplifies the above by Maoist "long-war" theories of strategic retreat, enemy over-extension, strong-point piecemeal defeat (Maoist "ten-fingers" theory) -- "despise enemy strategically and take full account of him tactically."²⁵

Recommends, for all countries, seizure of power by violence as the "highest form of revolution," -- exhorts application of Mao's "continental" rural-urban conflict (Asia, Africa, Latin America vs. North America, Europe).²⁶

Pointedly identifies the U.S. main dread and vulnerability as a simultaneity of insurgent "people's wars" of liberation in numerous parts of the world.²⁷

Lin Piao condemns "Khrushchev revisionists" for public appellation of China as "bellicose" in contradiction of purist militant Leninist gospel.²⁸ Yet, he paradoxically castigates "war" as the product of U.S. imperialism and aggression.²⁹ Such a contradiction is easily rationalized by the Chinese Central Committee, -- "...war is the continuation of politics by other means, and every war is inseparable from the political struggles which give rise to it. [Clausewitz?]³⁰ ...There are different types of peace and different types of war. Marxist-Leninists must be clear about what type of war is in question."³¹

²⁵Ibid., p. 16, 21.

²⁶Ibid., p. 20-22.

²⁷Ibid., p. 26-27.

²⁸Ibid., p. 28-29.

²⁹Ibid., p. 22.

³⁰Karl von Clausewitz, On War, Trans. by Col. J.J. Graham, Rev. Ed. V. 1, (London: n.p., 1918), p. 23.

³¹CCP Central Committee (Lewis), p. 257.

Mao Tse-tung himself defines the "differences" --

War is one of the highest forms of struggle for the settlement of contradictions between classes, nations, states, or political groups... There are only two kinds of wars in history: revolutionary and counter-revolutionary. We support the former and oppose the latter. Only a revolutionary war is holy. We support holy national revolutionary wars and holy class revolutionary wars.³²

Lin Piao also deals, by superb and devious blurring, with the political aspects of Chinese foreign aid -- a subject of incredible paradox and contradiction. Promising aid and assistance to "wars of liberation" on the one hand, he also exhorts "self-reliance" and "liberation" by the "masses" under Communist leadership.³³ By semantic implication, "aid" is given an ambiguous meaning -- anywhere from direct assistance-in-fact to as little as Chinese assistance by "sympathy and concern." In Lin's words, "...revolution can not be imported."³⁴ Actually, since 1956, China has committed over U.S. \$750 million "aid" equivalent to 19 countries, but has mostly avoided any implementations of hard-currency sectors of the commitment. Political effect has been modestly favorable to China, marred somewhat by inefficiency, but supplemented by China's practice in disclaimer

³²MAO Tse-tung, On Peoples Democratic Dictatorship, English Language Series, (Peking: New China News Agency, 1949), p. 7.

³³LIN Piao, p. 17-19.

³⁴Ibid., p. 29.

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of and disassociation from identifiable political tie-ins (in contrast to U.S. aid disappointments).³⁵ Peking's awareness of the propriety, correlation and potential of foreign aid with other facets of Chinese policy is apparent not only in Lin's statement but also in Peking's sincere attempts to maximize an aid program even at great expense to other aspirations. There is good evidence that current Chinese support to North Vietnam is in direct trade-off with set-backs to construction projects in Canton -- by diversion of both material and technicians.³⁶

A comparison of Lin Piao's "implications" with the views of a number of western Sinology scholars or sources is appropriate. These views on Chinese political objectives are intensively condensed in the following paragraphs.

Professor Powell, American University --

- (1) China's own achievement of political and military power status under a communist system.
- (2) Unilateral domination of the Asian continent, (U.S. ejected)
- (3) Leadership of the Communist world.
- (4) Leadership of export and support of world "peoples" revolutions.³⁷

R. G. Boyd --

- (1) China's success in protracted political struggle against the West.

³⁵Melvin Gurtov, "Communist China's Foreign Aid Program," Current History, September 1965, p. 152-153.

³⁶Defense Intelligence Agency, Construction Difficulties in Canton, China, D.I.A. Intell. Bulletin 188-65, (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 28 Sept. 1965), p. F-9. SECRET

³⁷Ralph L. Powell "Communist China as a Military Power," Current History, September 1965, p. 136.

UNCLASSIFIED

- (2) Export of Communism throughout Asia, by
- (3) Establishment of satellite Communist governments in all other Asian countries.³⁸

Professor Russell Fifield --

- (1) Ejection of U.S. from Taiwan as a demonstration and reversal of Chinese image vis-a-vis U.S.
- (2) Dominate Asia for political dividends in control of Southeast sector.
- (3) Dominate Asia for strategic and economic benefits in control of critical straits and sea lanes.
- (4) Dominate Asia for economic control of Southeast Asian rice, petroleum (Brunei), tin and rubber.
- (5) Regional domination for Chinese priority on Japanese technological and industrial support.³⁹

Central Intelligence Agency --

- (1) Eject U.S. from Asia.
- (2) Expand Chinese influence over Asian countries.
- (3) Expand Chinese influence over "third-world" countries.
- (4) Supplant U.S.S.R. influence with Communist world.⁴⁰

The correlation and general consistency are clearly seen -- whether Chinese political objectives are derived from psychological and economic indicators, scholarly analysis, or directly from Peking polemics. Lin Piao has been perhaps the more enlightening source, having surpassed the

³⁸Boyd, p. 87.

³⁹Russell Fifield, "U.S. Objectives and Treaty Organizations in Asia and the Western Pacific," Lecture, U.S. Naval War College, Newport, R.I.: 18 November 1965.

⁴⁰Central Intelligence Agency, Communist China's Foreign Policy N.I.E. 13-9-65, (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 5 May 1965), p. 1. SECRET

others by indicating (implicitly, but obviously and purposely) something of the political methodology and technique which China proposes to employ towards achievement of these political objectives. Without unnecessary summary, it is worthwhile to note that the common thrust of objectives and methods sharply focus a number of sound predictions -- China's struggle will be primarily political; the area will be Asia; banners and spirit will be Communist; score points and subsequent pawns, when captured, will be neutral and small states; overseas Communist parties will be the front-line cutting edge and insurgency will be the tactical technique.

What have been the effects and progress thus far of these policies? "third-world" neutrals, with understandable self-interest, continue to play off polycentric sides of the Communist World against each other, just as they play Communist against free world. Helmut Sonnenfeldt believes that "...Chinese appeals to the developing countries on the basis of racial affinity, their efforts to establish Peking as the leader and spokesman of these countries...have had inconclusive results."⁴¹ This opinion is true in part and in general, particularly in Africa and Latin America. It is far less true in Asian countries,

⁴¹Helmut Sonnenfeldt, "International Consequences of the Sino-Soviet Dispute," in L. Labedz, ed. International Communism after Khrushchev, (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1965), p. 208-209.

particularly those with a vigorous Communist party. Asian Communists share Chinese views on objectives, strategy and U.S. "imperialism."⁴² As one example of Chinese influence, note conditions and events in Indonesia. Sukarno's religious concept of his mission -- "God's will" -- is to unite all islands between Asia and Australia and between the Pacific and Indian Oceans, including British Borneo and Malaya. He, with minister Subandrio, has reached accommodations with Chinese Foreign Minister Chen Yi and joined in "party-line" statements in the past.⁴³ The premature Partai Komunis Indonesia coup on 1 October 1965, was a mistake and a Communist reversal,⁴⁴ but whatever its background and presently wavering outcome, it is significant that the episode was precisely in the pattern of the Lin Piao provocation. This was strong indication that the Chinese strategic model is far from sterile in the Asian region.

In Japan, the Communist party has wavered between Moscow and Peking,⁴⁵ lately favoring the latter.⁴⁶ Peking's

⁴²Donald S. Zagoria, "Asia," Ibid., p. 89.

⁴³Frank J. Johnson, "Eleventh Hour in Indonesia," Washington Report WR65-13, 29 March 1965, p. 1-3.

⁴⁴William L. Ryan, "Abortive Indonesian Coup Could Be a Premature Move by Communists," Newport Daily News, 6 Oct. 1965, p. 20:5-7.

⁴⁵Paul F. Langer, "The JCP Between Moscow and Peking," in A. Doak Barnett, ed. Communist Strategies in Asia, p. 81-82.

⁴⁶Ibid., p. 89.

interest in Japan is particularly active,⁴⁷ this country being regarded as a key element of Chinese regional strategy,⁴⁸ and its Communization a major goal.⁴⁹ Japan is considered the Asian alternative to estranged Russia for available industrial support to China's development. In the eyes of Peking, -- "The [former] Japanese proposition of a co-prosperity sphere of Greater East Asia, based on the inner bloc of Japan-China-Manchuria, still sounds reasonable."⁵⁰ However, in contrast to Chinese influence in Indonesia, progress in Japan has been essentially negative.

Finally, in one other major Asian nation, there are indications of effect, or potential effect, in Chinese support being smuggled to the Hukbalahap Philippine Communist movement and rumors of impending activity in that quarter.⁵¹

Chinese political objectives are obvious and, in the long term, feasible unless opposed. They are aggressive and expansionist.⁵² Thus far, despite industrious struggle well

⁴⁷Ibid., p. 82.

⁴⁸Barnett, Communist China and Asia, p. 80.

⁴⁹Ibid., p. 256.

⁵⁰Claude A. Buss, The People's Republic of China (Princeton, N.J.: D. Van Nostrand, 1962), p. 73.

⁵¹George Modelski, ed. SEATO, Six Studies (Melbourne: Cheshire, 1962), p. 194.

⁵²Barnett, Communist China and Asia, p. 68.

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SECRET

evidenced, advancement toward these objectives, under present conditions, has been substantially insignificant. These conditions and their future perpetuation will be analyzed in subsequent chapters.

Military Objectives

It would be brief and efficient, as well as approximately correct, to identify or designate Chinese military policies as force aspects or extensions of political objectives -- a traditional relationship. However, a more meaningful and useful orientation can be realized by deliberate consideration of China's unbalanced military power and how the Peking leadership is applying that unbalance in support of political aims.

We have already observed that Peking regards the United States as its primary enemy. Considering the "short reach" of Chinese land-army military power, it can be assumed at the outset that any interface between U.S. and Chinese military forces will fall well within the Asian region,⁵³ where China's current and historical power influence has always been more successful.⁵⁴ Otherwise stated, -- for the foreseeable future, there are no Chinese military objectives in Africa and Latin America, for example.

⁵³Central Intelligence Agency, Communist China's Foreign Policy, p. 1. SECRET

⁵⁴Zagoria, "Assessing Chinese Progress Along the Revolutionary Road," p. N-39:2.

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What about the Asian region proper? The Chinese are not only Communist, but remain also professional revolutionaries. It is a maxim of the revolutionary creed, particularly developed and emphasized by Mao, to retreat when confronted by a superior determination or balance of power.⁵⁵ Even with a large army and primitive nuclear capability, lacking a sound economic base and U.S.S.R. support, Peking can be expected to continue a policy avoiding major war involvement -- so long as prospects for indirect political expansion appear favorable.⁵⁶ Dr. Robert A. Scalapino, endorses this view, but with a cautionary note that the equilibrium is unstable. Chinese fervency of ideology, pressures and resentments continue to thrust Peking in the direction of militancy and dangerous adventurism, such that the future is not entirely certain.⁵⁷

It thus appears, at this point, that our search for tangible Chinese military objectives has had essentially negative results. World-wide, including Asia, so long as confrontation is an element and prospects for indirect expansion exist, China apparently has no overt military

⁵⁵Zagoria, The Sino-Soviet Conflict 1956-1961, p. 400.

⁵⁶Modelski, p. 193.

⁵⁷U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs Hearings. Sino-Soviet Conflict: Report on Sino-Soviet Conflict and its Implications, (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1965), p. 226-227.

objectives. Indeed this is true -- but it is a most false and treacherous "portrait for peace." Key, barbed words dominate and control the statement. These words, -- "confrontation," "overt," and "indirect expansion," -- REPRESENT THE VERY ESSENCE OF THE CHINESE MILITARY STRATEGY. Though superior military power is lacking for doctrinal challenge and confrontation of the west, China is well-oriented and competent to provide covert military support to Communist insurgencies (indirect expansion) in nearby countries, and her military power-in-being is critically influential as a threat to blackmail political cooperation and compliance by neutral Asian governments.⁵⁸

Further analysis of Lin Piao's convenient speech,⁵⁹ substantially confirms the above derivation of Peking's military strategy and provides useful elaboration. Minister of Defense, Marshall Lin Piao is considered China's most prominent military strategist.⁶⁰ Not surprisingly, his remarks, like the elements of Peking's combined political-military objectives, also had a doubled thrust. He designated the United States not only as principal adversary, but also as a threatening aggressive military enemy -- exhorting Asian resistance by force.⁶¹ With skilled and ominous perception,

⁵⁸Boyd, p. 85.

⁵⁹cf. ante, p. 4.

⁶⁰Whiting, p. 164.

⁶¹LIN Piao, p. 20.

he incited Asian action against the United States' principal vulnerability -- over-extension -- by numerous simultaneous hostilities or "wars of liberation."⁶² Moreover, the "military" meaning was forthright and arrogant in the challenge to Asians and other "oppressed" nations of Africa and Latin America to seize power by violence, -- and to combine in assault against the "urban" continents of North America and Europe.⁶³

Note particularly that Lin confirms our estimate of Chinese strategy, and does so mostly by what he significantly fails to declare. There is bluster and bravado about people's land-army defense of China,⁶⁴ but a marked absence of assertions concerning China's own overt military action against any confronting power, with the possible exception of vague belligerence concerning Taiwan. This policy declaration, in all reality, is a "poverty" strategy of China's own military paralysis -- a frustrated bombast of words, not deeds, -- much as we have already derived.

There are some additional military details of particular interest. In a policy address most of which was cast at the elevated level of theoretical ideology, it is remarkable and

⁶²Ibid., p. 26-27.

⁶³Ibid.

⁶⁴Ibid.

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significant that Lin should have made particular issue with the specifics of both the Taiwan problem and the threat of U.S. naval and air superiority.⁶⁵ Lin's mention of these specifics may or may not be valid at face value, but it was indicative that they are critical details commanding Peking's awareness. Certainly it is credible that Peking would delight in overturning these particular abrasive points of friction and image-irritant on a high priority, if and whenever Chinese strategy could be improved above the present "poverty" level. There has been logical speculation that the Peking regime uses Taiwan as a counter-irritant in control of the fervor and loyalty of the apathetic populace.⁶⁶ However, the major consensus concludes that both Taiwan and the off-shore islands are genuine, primary Chinese objectives,⁶⁷ since among other evils, they represent, "...a major nuisance in the [Peking] conduct of foreign affairs [image], particularly in areas where large numbers of Overseas Chinese reside."⁶⁸ Lin Piao's specific addressal of the question is, of course, consistent with that conclusion.

Since the well-publicized initial atomic test in October, 1964, and China's entry into the "club," there is a

⁶⁵Ibid., p. 31.

⁶⁶Scott, p. 140.

⁶⁷Central Intelligence Agency, Communist China, p. 64.

⁶⁸Scott, p. 100-101.

nuclear aspect of Chinese military strategy to consider. While some shift in strategic emphasis since that time, or even in the future, would not be surprising, indications thus far are otherwise. Apparently Peking's primitive nuclear capability is being employed to intensify, rather than change or supplant, present strategy. Anything resembling confrontation of western power is still absent as a strategic element, but Peking's intention to exploit this new power for political and psychological effect is clearly discernable.⁶⁹ "Strategic intensification" consisting of "nuclear blackmail" -- holding Asian neighbors hostage against both Western pressure and their own will to resist Peking -- is being applied and can be expected to grow heavier. Deterioration in Asian welcome of U.S. interests, bases and military forces is entirely conceivable. Sabre-rattling by provision of token implicit nuclear support to "wars of liberation" may be expected.⁷⁰ Significantly, China's "nuclear club" membership could engender the same "confidence," now characteristic of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., towards increased willingness to engage in small conventional hostilities.⁷¹ In any event, early effects of "nuclear blackmail" are apparent, since China's tests, in India's

⁶⁹Powell, p. 141.

⁷⁰Ibid., p. 180.

⁷¹Ibid.

"inferiority complex" and, until the P.K.I. coup, in Indonesia's accommodation with Peking favoring ejection of U.S. interests from Asia. Burma and Cambodia have since maintained a friendly attitude towards China; Malaysia and Thailand have evinced increased susceptibility towards "hard" neutralism. Even the Philippine government has suggested a "nuclear-free" zone and both Australia and New Zealand have shown some tendency towards "compromise."⁷² Although China's achievement of political objectives, under present conditions, has been insignificant thus far,⁷³ the Chinese nuclear capability is already generating possibilities for ominous change in the future unless counterbalancing forces are present.

Summarizing, China's military objectives rest within the Asian region and the threat, such as it is, faces southward and eastward.⁷⁴ There is no intent to employ Chinese forces overtly, nor to engage superior U.S. power in a major direct confrontation, nor is there any military threat to U.S. or Western security outside of Asia. Peking has accommodated an inadequate military power to support of Chinese

⁷²Shen-yu DAI, "Peking and the 'Third World'" Current History, September, 1965, p. 145-146.

⁷³cf. ante, p. 35.

⁷⁴Robert A. Rupen, "Sino-Soviet Alliance," Lecture, U.S. Naval War College, Newport, R.I., 15 November 1965.

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goals by indirect strategies of exhortation, covert support and exploitation of Asian insurgencies. The relative Chinese military power, vis-a-vis Asian neighbors, and China's nuclear capability demonstrations are the leverage expected to compel effectuation of this indirect strategy. China, by military "blackmail," therefore, constitutes a latent but persistent menace to the Asian region and to U.S. and free-world interests in that region.⁷⁵

⁷⁵Central Intelligence Agency, Economic Prospects for Communist China, p. 2. SECRET

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CHAPTER III

THE BALANCE OF SEAPOWER IN ASIA

Chinese Naval Forces

In skillfully adapting an unbalanced and deficient power to expansionist objectives by a "make-do" strategy of static threat,¹ Peking is by no means resigned to acceptance of military inferiority as a permanent status. Ever since the inhibiting withdrawal of U.S.S.R. support in 1960, continuation and tangible, albeit slow, progress has been detectable in the Chinese "war industry" -- notably in manufacture and self-supply of weapons, tanks, artillery, radar and electronics equipment. There is even evidence of a possibility of limited manufacture of aircraft, on the Russian MIG-21 design.²

The Chinese Communist Navy, however, receives lower priority with less than a proportionate share of war industry output, and remains the weakest of China's armed services.³ Comparison elsewhere is somewhat different since the same force is in fact the largest indigenous navy in Asia, and includes the fourth largest submarine fleet in the world.⁴

¹cf. ante, Chapt. II.

²Powell, p. 139.

³Ibid., p. 137.

⁴Central Intelligence Agency, Communist China -- Section 82, Naval Forces N1539A, (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., February 1964), p. 1. SECRET

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Operational Chinese naval forces total 380 ships, but many of these are too small to be considered sea-going craft. Principal units are 28 submarines, 4 destroyers, 4 destroyer escorts and 250 marginal off-shore patrol vessels. Personnel total 76,700 including 14,700 in the land-based Chinese Communist Naval Air Force.⁵ Approximately 500 aircraft are assigned in the naval air branch, organized as nine jet fighter regiments, six light jet bomber regiments, a piston-engined light bomber regiment and small reconnaissance, helicopter, transport and training units.⁶ Origins and development of China's navy were anything but classical and orderly. Present surface and air strength consists of a heterogeneous collection of units having a wide diversity of source, design and age.⁷ This force is entirely incapable of significant operations in remote deep-water areas, or of engaging in combat with any modern Western naval power. Nevertheless, it does have a "desperation" capability to inflict isolated incidents of damage or loss against an enemy fleet off the China coast by mining, motor torpedo boat, strikes by land-based naval aircraft over short range, and by submarine attacks.⁸ The Chinese submarine force deserves

⁵Ibid. SECRET

⁶Ibid., p. 7. SECRET

⁷Ibid., p. 1. SECRET

⁸Central Intelligence Agency, Communist China, p. 107.
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a separate evaluation. This element was initially badly impeded by lack of technology, but over the recent period, tangible progress in submarine construction and operations has been achieved.⁹ Chinese operational submarine expertise remains well below western standards,¹⁰ limited by inexperience, an economically-enforced low tempo of operations, and lack of modern surface training "partners."¹¹ Nevertheless, the submarine force is the only long-range offensive element of the Chinese Communist Navy,¹² and U.S. Seventh Fleet commanders have universally regarded it as a valid and competent threat.¹³

Peking is fully aware of the maritime aspects of the Asian region and China's own vulnerability across it's long coastal perimeter. Economic constraints and present strategies have necessarily combined with such factors into formulation of naval strategic concepts which are primarily defensive.¹⁴ Except for an element of unpredictability as to the submarine force, the Chinese Communist Navy, in all

⁹DeWitt Copp, "The Chinese Communist Undersea Menace" Washington Report, WR-65-27, 5 July 1965.

¹⁰Central Intelligence Agency, Communist China, Section 82 Naval Forces, p. 26. SECRET

¹¹Ibid., p. 107. SECRET

¹²Ibid. SECRET

¹³Powell, p. 138.

¹⁴Central Intelligence Agency, Communist China, Section 82 Naval Forces, p. 11. SECRET

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

reality, rates as a typical coastal defense force, with missions of patrolling territorial waters and littoral, guarding against unauthorized coastal movements of personnel, information or goods, and local protection of Chinese sea transport.¹⁵

The Chinese Communist Navy developed with a respectable rate of growth from its inception in 1949 until its current level of strength was achieved in 1960. With the removal of Soviet technological assistance at that time, further growth terminated. Except for possible slow development by intense concentration on submarine elements, future prospects for Chinese naval progress and expansion appear to be limited.¹⁶ General economic difficulties have forced decisions between competitive shipbuilding programs.¹⁷ Consistent with political strategies, Peking has elected policies for application of limited ship construction resources to the achievement of mercantile maritime power. In line with these policies, the Chinese merchant marine has been developed from a state of near non-existence in 1949 to assets exceeding 700,000 dead-weight (550,000 gross) tons in approximately 165 seagoing ships. This fleet now represents a limited but real capa-

¹⁵Central Intelligence Agency, Communist China, p. 106.
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¹⁶Ibid., p. 107. SECRET

¹⁷Central Intelligence Agency, Communist China, Section 82 Naval Forces, p. 14. SECRET

UNCLASSIFIED

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bility for effective participation in maritime trade.¹⁸

Appropriations priorities further impede China's naval power development (probably more of Mao's self-contradictory "omniscient" mis-management).¹⁹ The total annual military budget in Communist China has remained at the approximate level of U.S. \$2.0 to 2.5 billion since 1953. Chinese secrecy protects actual figures, but the naval slice has been estimated to somewhat exceed 5% of the total allocation -- on the order of U.S. \$100 to 125 million.²⁰ Note that such a figure approximates about 1% of U.S. naval appropriations.

Nuclear capabilities, of course, have their overtones in all services. China's nuclear program has not yet been weaponized by correlation to any delivery system -- naval or otherwise. However, as a counter-navy threat, Chinese air and naval air forces must be credited with a feasible capability for a primitive gravity delivery of nuclear weapons by manned aircraft. Initial true weaponization, probably to a medium range missile delivery mode, is predictable for about five years hence, along with possible warhead development to thermo-nuclear function and yield parameters.²¹ Consequent threat to

¹⁸Central Intelligence Agency, Communist China, p. 32.
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¹⁹cf. ante, p. 12.

²⁰Central Intelligence Agency, Communist China, Section 82, Naval Forces, p. 12. SECRET

²¹Powell, p. 140.

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U.S. naval forces within missile range would incrementally, but not substantially, increase at that time. A significant Chinese intercontinental nuclear missile threat is not foreseen until an indefinite date within the 1970s.²²

The U. S. Seventh Fleet

The naval component of joint military power permanently deployed in support of U.S. national interests in the western Pacific and Asian areas is the U.S. Seventh Fleet. This force is a balanced organization of all naval capabilities -- equipped, trained and capable for modern control of the air, surface and sub-surface ocean environments as well as naval support of amphibious and land area combat. It utilizes an arc of forward bases in Japan, Okinawa and the Philippines to facilitate logistic support, but also includes mobile support forces in order to be independent of land-base restrictions if necessary for fully mobile hostility operations.²³ Weapons systems organic to the Seventh Fleet provide full combat capability over the entire spectrum of hostilities from survey and reconnaissance to multiple nuclear delivery missions of megaton yield

²²Central Intelligence Agency, Communist China's Advanced Weapons Program. Conclusions, N.I.E. 13-2-65, (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 10 Feb 1965), p. 2. SECRET

²³John S. McCain, The New Four Ocean Challenge, (Washington: Bureau of Naval Personnel, 1964), p. 16-17.

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strikes -- and at all combat levels between. Balanced and coordinated surface, air, missile and anti-submarine self-defensive systems are also inherent.²⁴

Both organization and assignment of units to this force are flexible, rotating and variable. Strategically tailored as a true "task" force, the Seventh Fleet shares over-all total U.S. naval resources with other world-wide requirements deployed according to the proportionate contingency situations in all areas of U.S. naval commitment. In normal cold-war equilibrium periods subsequent to the Korean disengagement, the Seventh Fleet basic striking unit has been configured around a force strength of two or three first-line attack aircraft carriers. Taking a more recent time period to illustrate an initial, partial augmentation representative of response to acceleration of threat or hostility (first Vietnam build-up) -- in March, 1964, the Seventh Fleet consisted of:

- 3 Attack carriers plus aircraft (approx. 250)
- 2 Anti-Submarine carriers plus aircraft (approx. 100)
- 2 Heavy or light cruisers
- 9 Destroyer divisions (36 DD)
- 11 Submarines
- 1 Amphibious assault carrier plus aircraft
- 31 Amphibious assault ships
- 1 Marine Division
- 1 Marine Air Wing
- 1 Marine Battalion Landing Team (Reinf.)

²⁴Ibid.

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- 25 Auxiliary ships (logistics pipeline)
- 4 Mining Divisions (27 Minecraft)²⁵

Representing a second build-up, and the Seventh Fleet strength at this time, for accomplishment of both accelerated Vietnam support as well as continuous permanent commitments normally a Seventh Fleet responsibility, the Seventh Fleet organization from May 1965 to January 1966 reflects force assignment as follows:

- 5 Attack carriers plus aircraft (approx. 450)
- 1 Anti-submarine carrier plus aircraft (approx. 50)
- 2 Heavy or light cruisers
- 12 Destroyer divisions (38 DD)
- 16 Submarines
- 2 Amphibious assault carriers plus aircraft
- 32 Amphibious assault ships
- 1 Marine Division
- 1 Marine Air Wing
- 1 Marine Battalion Landing Team (Reinf.)
- 36 Auxiliary ships (logistics pipeline)
- 6 Mining Divisions (35 Minecraft)²⁶

All units relieve and rotate or combine for active direct or indirect support of current hostilities in the Vietnam area. Main striking component for projection of direct force in the supported land area are the 5 attack carriers with 19 destroyer escorts in company.²⁷

²⁵Commander Seventh Fleet, Commander Seventh Fleet Operation Order 201-60 Annex A (C7F Note 05440), (U.S.S. Providence: 3 March 1964), p. 1 ff. CONFIDENTIAL

²⁶Commander Seventh Fleet, Commander Seventh Fleet Operations Order 201-64 Annex A (C7F Note 05440), (U.S.S. Oklahoma City: 3 May 1965), p. 1 ff. CONFIDENTIAL

²⁷Commander Task Force 77 -- Commander Carrier Division 1 Task Force 77 Operation Order 201-65 Annex A (CTF 77 Note 05440), (U.S.S. Independence: 11 September 1965), p. 1 ff. CONFIDENTIAL

The Dominant Inequality

Historically, the U.S. Seventh Fleet generated from the more massive (but less potent) interchangeable 3rd and 5th U.S. Pacific Striking Fleets which participated in the assaults and seizure of the western Pacific, Asia and enemy Japan in World War II. Over the intervening twenty years, this naval force has been a key instrument in the prosecution of U.S. interests in the forward western Pacific area, whatever their variation. From 1945 to 1950, this fleet participated in and supported post-war occupation and stabilization of the area. In 1950, for three years, the Seventh Fleet prosecuted the sea-based striking campaign against Communist forces in Korea. From 1949, and particularly since the Korean armistice, this task force has been on general stand-by alert both as a conventional and nuclear system countering Sino-Soviet complex war threats to the area, the Pacific and, the continental U.S. At the present time, support of Vietnamese operations has been added to other long-term responsibilities. These latter, and the continuous Seventh Fleet mission, past and future, concern counterbalance of the principle threat to U.S., regional, and free-world interests -- Communist China.

It is neither necessary nor sensible to prove seapower relationships in the western Pacific and Asian sea areas by an analysis of hypothetical interactions and alternatives

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between U.S. and Chinese naval forces. Simple inspection of the factors of force quantity, quality and performance, as briefly summarized in the foregoing sections, confirms, beyond any question, the absolute, imperative predominance and control of the Asian sea areas by U.S. naval power. Moreover, indications of any shift in the general balance are entirely absent for the foreseeable future, unless a general world war intervenes with drastic revisions.

Yet, this relatively massive naval predominance does not necessarily confer concomitant license for optional relaxation or reduction. Asian geographic characteristics, oceanic borders, distances and areas dictate that seapower should be the optimum instrument for projection of positive influence in that region. The Chinese Communist Navy is the alternative dominant force.²⁸ As counterbalance to this and many other important facets of the Chinese threat, neither indigenous regional forces nor other western service arms can provide substitute equivalence to the U.S. Seventh Fleet presence. Moreover, despite a popular western opinion that China is militarily a "paper tiger", boastful but impotent,²⁹ there is also an Asian viewpoint to be considered. If internal Chinese pressures and Peking's "blackmail" strategy

²⁸cf. ante, p. 43.

²⁹"Red China: 'Paper Tiger'?", U.S. News & World Report, 25 October 1965, p. 40-44.

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are to be contained, Asian island free peoples must be well supported in their resistance to the threat of nuclear fang and naval claw of the Chinese "tiger" as it appears to them! Their interests and those of the U.S. depend directly and to a great extent upon the certain and obvious dominance of Seventh Fleet seapower throughout the entire Asian region.

CHAPTER IV

NAVAL INTERDICTION OF CHINESE COMMUNIST OBJECTIVES

Political Stabilization

Of the several Chinese objectives, there are two -- world power status and industrialized economy -- which fall into the category of intangible, "second-generation" or ultimate goals dependent upon the achievement of intermediate objectives for their realization. These two are by no means unique to China. They exist universally as strategic goals in the national interest of all states which can not yet claim their full achievement. Even in well-developed nations, parallel objectives are espoused in modified form such as "maintain" status or "improve" industry, for example. For the very reason that they are the compounded and complex resultant of multiple elements, "world status" and "industrialization" stand independent of specifics, both in their achievement and in their direct interdiction by outside force. It is the specific component objectives with their supporting strategies which are the arena of contest when national -- or bloc -- interests collide.

In the case of China's aspiration to world power status, is there necessarily a collision with U.S. and free-world

bloc interests? Why must these aspirations be opposed by interdiction of supporting secondary objectives? "Containment" does not have to be enforced against India and Indonesia, for instance. The answer, of course, resides in the Communist stain which defaces Chinese nationalism with its doctrinal obligation for imperialistic export of a totalitarian political system. Over the nineteen years since its announcement in 1947, the U.S. interests and policy (and presumably to a certain extent those of the free-world) relating to Communist expansion have been expressed in the Truman Doctrine of "containment".¹ Consistent with that policy, it is indeed necessary and appropriate that China's progress toward world power status under the Peking regime should be opposed and supporting strategies thwarted.

As for the Chinese basic objective of enhanced economy through industrialization a somewhat different rationale governs. On its face, such an objective does not "collide" with U.S. interests in the previous sense. Even recognizing the interdependence of industrialization and Chinese world power status, there is thin justification for economic "containment" by western force. Such a policy, overt and intended, would be tantamount to blockade contrary to U.S.

¹Harry S. Truman, "Address of the President of the United States -- Greece, Turkey and the Middle East," in U.S. Congress. House (Joint Session of the House and Senate), Congressional Record, H. Doc. No. 171, Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 12 March 1947, p. 198:2.

image "policies" under international law. Moreover, the internal economy of a nation is not necessarily controllable by external "containment" and, in any event, considering "image" factors, open economic "competition" is the more promising technique. What is needed in connection with the interdiction of Chinese economic objectives is simply to "keep them honest". However, re-examination of the supporting objectives and strategies which would build industrialization in China, by convenient coincidence, shows them to be intimately coordinated, interlocked and, in fact, the same as those associated with achievement of "world power". Chinese interest in external trade is clearly apparent,² but there is little obvious emphasis on supporting policies of the "honest" type in Lin Piao's doctrine.³ Consequently, there will be clear consciences but little sympathy in the free world that interdiction of China's political objectives should also incidentally operate against the underlying questionable economic goal of unethical trade domination in the Asian region.⁴

Attention is re-focused on the supporting objectives and strategies, as we consider how to oppose China's aspirations towards world and economic status. China's critical

²cf. ante, p. 46.

³cf. ante, p. 27-28, 37-38.

⁴cf. ante, p. 24-25.

intermediate step, as we have seen⁵ is political and economic primacy over the Asian region states -- this to be achieved by a strategy of aligning governments to the Communist bloc. Here is, of course, a euphemism pure and simple, for Communist political aggression. There is little the U.S. and the west could or would want to do, in order to block natural dispersion of a pure political ideology -- particularly one which was sound on its own merits. However, the exportation of communism is not of this ilk -- by actual Leninist definition, "dictatorship" of the proletariat, "revolution" and violence have long since placed it out of the pure ideological and into the force and coercion category. The Truman Doctrine applies. There are available, of course, several techniques of interdiction, including the combined effects of counter-propaganda, aid and assistance, counter-aggression by internal intervention, opposing alliances, diplomacy and power presence. Propaganda and aid have a long-range but uncertain effect. Internal intervention is inconsistent with U.S. and most free-world policies. Diplomacy and alliances do not seem to be positively effective against "indirect political aggression."⁶ The Asian dilemma, therefore, reduces itself to its "power" fundamentals, and

⁵cf. ante, p. 26, 30-31.

⁶Fifield, (lecture).

it is "power" which must be employed for desired interdiction and control. The U.S. is now dealing with "indirect aggression" in Asia in the most effective way -- that is, by actual deployment in the region of forces-in-being,⁷ which of course include the U.S. Seventh Fleet. The Secretary of Defense reported the efficacy of this policy in the following words:

Throughout the Far East and Southeast Asia, the presence of large and powerful U.S. forces provides an important stabilizing influence, as well as clear evidence to friendly nations in those areas of our willingness and ability to meet our security commitments.⁸

Thus, it is seen that the interdiction of Chinese political-economic objectives -- ultimate and intermediate -- is in turn dependent on successful interdiction of the supporting, coordinated Chinese power strategies -- a responsibility and function of opposing military force, with its included sea-power components.

Military Deterrence

Although Lin Piao did specifically mention Taiwan, the absence of other overt physical military objectives was notable.⁹ Indeed this is, no doubt, the consciously

⁷Ibid.

⁸Robert S. McNamara, Statement of the Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara Before the House Armed Services Committee on the Fiscal Year 1966-70 Defense Program and 1966 Defense Budget, Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 18 February 1965, p. 15.

⁹cf. ante, p. 27-28, 36-39.

intended military strategy of the Peking regime. However, the mounting internal pressures in China can be said to generate several additional unspecified or unintended potential objectives which lurk in the background as latent but sinister threat to the free Asians.¹⁰

As a first example of seapower influence, consider the one Chinese objective which did receive Lin Piao's specific mention:

It is quite clear, in fact, that since 1950 the most important deterrents to a Communist attack on the island have been the American commitment to defend Taiwan -- a commitment backed by the Seventh Fleet -- and the water barrier which separates Taiwan from the mainland.¹¹

Similarly, although comparatively well-armed for Asian countries, island Japan and peninsular South Korea are fully dependent on U.S. power for their defense against the implicit threat of internal Chinese pressures.¹² In less potent areas Malaysia, Singapore and the Straits of Malacca are under a similar threat -- and any disturbance of the latter would have critical effect on Japan's (Middle East) petroleum-dependent economy.¹³ The threat de-stabilizes Sukarno's unpredictable neutrality and even Australia with

¹⁰cf. ante, p. 18, 36.

¹¹Barnett, p. 120-121.

¹²Ibid.

¹³Anthony Harrigan, "Australia; an Ally Threatened Once Again," Washington Report WR65-35, 30 August 1950, p. 2.

inadequate defensive force, is affected.¹⁴ Seapower negation of this "classical" type of latent Chinese threat, through characteristic mobility of Seventh Fleet power to any strategic point in the predominating sea geography of the region -- is obvious. Barnett notes:

American strength in Asia is a powerful deterrent to potential large-scale aggression by Communist China. But because the ground forces of the United States and its Asian allies are relatively small in numbers, in the final analysis the single most important factor counter-balancing the huge Communist ground forces is the atomic weapons in the hands of American naval and air forces.¹⁵

Parenthetically, as an interesting sidelight -- educated inverted proofs were ventured by Drs. Abraham M. Halpern,* Lucien Pye** and Donald S. Zagoria*** in expert testimony before a Congressional hearing. Speculating in response to inquiries concerning a hypothetical absence of U.S. power in Asia, these scholars concurred that the vacuum would result in various accommodations to a Chinese dominance by the Asian nations which would be gravely adverse to U.S. interests.¹⁶

¹⁴Ibid., p. 3-4.

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**Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

***Columbia University, Research Institute on Communist Affairs.

¹⁵Barnett, p. 124-125.

¹⁶U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs Hearings, p. 134-135.

However, there are more explicit and sinister Chinese strategies which must be interdicted in reality. These are the Chinese alignment of Asian neutral nations by communization of their governments under threat of conventional force or nuclear blackmail--accompanied by multiple indigenous Communist party insurgencies to dilute western counteraction. Theoretically, thereafter, U.S. opposition would be withdrawn or ejected from the Asian region.¹⁷ The simple, yet subtle, interdiction of this strategy rests in the very presence in the region of strong U.S. military force to deter the activating element upon which the strategy depends. For such a strategy to succeed, the scenario would presumably occur in the sequence:

1. Presently free Asian majorities lose confidence.
2. Chinese "blackmail" becomes effective.
3. Communist parties initiate insurgency and seize control.
4. Chinese strategy succeeds.

Unless item 1. initiates the process, items 2. and subsequent remain sterile. Thus strategy and counter-strategy both rest on a single touchstone factor -- the collective psychology of the free Asian peoples -- wavering or confident. (We have come full circle back to the concluding

¹⁷cf. ante, Chapter II.

assertions of Chapter III).¹⁸ Here the characteristics of Seventh Fleet seapower realize their fullest utility. Here naval mobility provides visible manifestation of strong U.S. supporting power to bolster the courage of free Asian majorities throughout the entire vast region -- while remaining detached and immune from local complications, political intrusions and defense vulnerabilities inherent with land-based forces.

It is axiomatic, of course, that the influence of power "presence" must include as an element evidence or reputation of demonstrated competence in action. Since World War II, Seventh Fleet activities in the Taiwan straits and Korea have validated the reality of its power. Now, the dynamic current events in North and South Vietnam are providing additional daily evidence of such "competence". Recognizing that Hanoi is not Peking, and that the South Vietnam confrontation has escalated to relative extremes as a "war of liberation", nevertheless in the context of this analysis, the parallel is clear. Seventh Fleet seapower has again engaged in its traditional and functional task -- dominating and protecting Asian sea lanes for the projection and support of total balanced U.S. armed power, while contributing to the offensive striking mission of that power. Similarities and implied relationships between

¹⁸cf. ante, p. 53.

this opposing seapower capability and the Chinese "war of liberation" strategy are readily apparent for free Asian consideration as well as that of Peking.

The Residual Threat

It would be an illogical exaggeration to credit the Seventh Fleet with a uniform influence factor in all Asian areas subject to Chinese threat. There are borders deep in the continental land-mass where sheer distance attenuates the application of sea-based power. In these same locations the principle threat has a variant character -- with emphasis on the aspect of swift invasion by overwhelming Chinese land-army hordes. Considering also the primitive state of Asian communications media, it cannot be expected that land-oriented population groups are as aware of or as impressed by sea-power potential as their coastal conationals or neighboring littoral states. In Nepal or Bhutan, for example, the stabilizing influence of the U.S. Seventh Fleet is unlikely to be held at the same value as in Malaysia or Indonesia. Moreover, whereas potential support by seapower may lend a stabilizing influence to the government and coastal population concentrations in Burma and Thailand, its indirect affect in control of attitudes and events in their northern Chinese border regions is grievously uncertain. Hopefully, the competent utility of the U.S. Seventh

Fleet as an instrumentality of containment in its own sphere will not divert U.S. planners from the provision of coordinated total counter-strategies for interdiction of Peking's total objectives.

Even in the Asian ocean sectors, the strategic benefits of seapower dominance are badly diluted by the vastness of distance and area. As a consequence of seemingly constant preoccupation in Seventh Fleet with priority responsibilities -- restrictive general war posturing, Korean and Vietnam support, and other commitments -- all necessary -- there has remained little time and opportunity for deployments in demonstration of "presence". Many straits, ports, inter-island seas, and coastal areas from Ceylon to Celebes and West Irian, where seapower influence might be beneficially exploited, have been long un-exercised and un-visited.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSIONS

Seapower vs. China--Significant Highlights

Strong psychological pressures in China--nationalism, Communist ideology and compulsion to remedy a poor "image"--motivate the nation in aspirations for world-power status. Concurrent internal economic and demographic pressures along with negative prospects for their relief aggravate leadership problems and preclude acceptance of the status quo. These conditions force the Peking regime towards adoption of expansive policies, unpredictable irrationality and adoption of strategies which threaten the independence of the free states of the Asian region.

For the immediate future, Peking has devised and undertaken a policy of indirect aggression adapted to China's limited capabilities. Strategies are intercoordinated to achieve simultaneously psychological, economic and political objectives, relief of internal pressures and world-power status by ultimate communization and domination of the Asian region. Implementation of these strategies is based upon a Chinese power threat and nuclear "blackmail" against the confidence of free Asian peoples and their governments, so as to incite and facilitate multiple insurgencies led by overseas Communist parties. Free-Asian

capabilities are such that accomodation in lieu of resistance is predictable, therefore Chinese strategies are feasible of achievement in the absence of interdiction by free-world influence and power.

Because of the oceanic geography of the Asian region which is the objective of Chinese strategy, seapower has been and will continue to be a major element for control of the area. By quantity, quality and demonstrated competence, free-world seapower in the U.S. Seventh Fleet unquestionably dominates the sea regions of Asia and will continue to do so. This force is particularly effective and efficient for interdiction of the implicit threat generated by Chinese "pressure" instabilities because of its mobility characteristics and capability to concentrate stabilizing counter-force at any point throughout a wide area. It is also effective against the explicit, overt Chinese strategy. As the dominant naval force, its visible presence represents free-world support in direct interdiction of the Chinese initial objective--free-Asian psychology. Mobility characteristics again enhance seapower utility by extending this critical effect over an extensive area where it can influence the confidence of many independent Asian nationals.

Seapower effect cannot fully reach all (land) areas under Chinese threat. It is also attenuated by the vastness of the region and frequent diversion of the U.S.

Seventh Fleet to priority missions. Coordinated supplementary counter-strategies are still required for total interdiction.

Finally, the success of seapower interdiction and containment of China's pressures has and will in itself contribute to increase of those pressures, mounting tension and intensified instability within China. There is little promise of early relaxation or resolution of the Chinese threat, although continued stabilization and strengthening of free Asian states is certainly a key process contributing towards the goal of long-range solution in the free-world interest.

Polishing the Strategy--Recommendations

There can be no question that the immediate requirement and responsibility concerning the U.S. Seventh Fleet at this time is the full support of the "containment" operation in South Vietnam at highest priority. Such application is inherently consistent with the concept of seapower influence as espoused in this analysis, whereby interdiction of the threat of "wars of liberation" automatically supposes active engagement of the force in any outbreak of such a war. We must look beyond the immediate situation, however, for ideas leading to long-range exploitation or improvement of the effectiveness of seapower against Chinese strategies. It has been asserted that the effectiveness of the U.S.

Seventh Fleet centers on its stabilizing "presence", the mobility of that "presence" and the accessibility of much of Asia to its influence. Here is our obvious clue for beneficial emphasis.

Prior to involvement in South Vietnam hostilities, (and with admitted exceptions), the normal Asiatic "beat" of the Seventh Fleet "policeman" extended over a relatively small but critical sector of the Asian region from Japan to the Philippines. Valid justifications as well as problems of communications, logistics and general war posture responsibilities governed then--and still apply. No adverse criticism is intended. Yet, for the future, significant advantages may be attainable in the exploitation of seapower to counter the Chinese threat on a wider scope and more directly against the azimuth of its thrust. Moving the center of gravity of the "beat"--the Seventh Fleet operating area--southward would achieve this effect. Similarly and concurrently extension of fleet presence into the Malaysian-Indonesian area should be advantageous. Displacing the normal south-western terminus of the routine Seventh Fleet patrol and logistic contact into the Indian Ocean--to Trincomalee, Rangoon or even Penang--would also serve to broaden seapower benefits. The critical straits of Macassar, Malacca, Sunda and Lombok should be occasionally exercised by peaceful passage, not only for demonstration of "presence" but also to establish precedents of

usage. Port visits by Seventh Fleet units should be emphasized to the maximum over the widest possible area. The beneficial aspects of "presence" in conjunction with naval visits should be emphasized by active benevolent programs, such as Operation "Handclasp", honors, protocol, hospitality and publicity. The opportunities for "presence" counterstrategy in Indonesia and Malaysia may become particularly fruitful in the immediate future.

The numerous and incredibly difficult obstacles involved in such a program are obvious and acknowledged. Problems of fleet dispersion, distances and logistic support would initially defy solution. Diplomatic coordination and clearances appear to be well nigh impossible of attainment. Priority employment of the Seventh Fleet in active crises and responsibilities has been the rule in the past, and there are no guarantees as to its availability for extended exploitation of "presence" in the future.

Yet large issues are at stake and opportunities to better control them are open and available. As each "impossible" problem is challenged and solved, more area and more Asians can be brought within the stabilizing influence of free-world seapower--and the threat of Chinese Communism can be more certainly contained.

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