

N
420
.F82
1966
no. 153

153

THE UNITED STATES NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
SCHOOL OF NAVAL COMMAND AND STAFF
THESIS



INDECISION TO ACTION: TWENTY-ONE YEARS
OF UNITED STATES MILITARY AID TO THE
REPUBLIC OF CHINA, 1945-1966 (U)

Major Joseph Richard Gutheinz, USMC

This paper is a student thesis prepared at the Naval War College and the thoughts and opinions expressed in this paper are those of the author, and are not necessarily those of the Navy Department or the President, Naval War College.

Material herein may not be quoted, extracted for publication, reproduced or otherwise copied without specific permission from the author and the President, Naval War College in each instance.

194563



1000507739

THE UNITED STATES NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport, Rhode Island

INDECISION TO ACTION: TWENTY-ONE YEARS OF UNITED
STATES MILITARY AID TO THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA,
1945-1966

Class of 1966

ABSTRACT OF INDECISION TO ACTION: TWENTY-ONE YEARS OF
UNITED STATES MILITARY AID TO THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA
1945-1966

America's deep involvement in the affairs of Asia at the present time has evolved primarily because of the ever-increasing threat of Chinese Communist aggression in that part of the world. This study examines the military aid and assistance effort in China during the waning days of World War II and through the complex and frustrating years of the civil war. A comparison is then made between the negative results of the aid effort prior to the Nationalist defeat on the mainland with that which was instituted on Taiwan after 1950 to assist the Republic of China in training and modernizing its armed forces.

This study discloses the inconsistency in American policy toward China both in the latter years of World War II and in the years immediately following. Loss of mainland China to the forces of Mao Tse-tung is shown to be the result of many factors, including the incompetency of many of Chiang's generals, the increasing civil unrest caused by runaway inflation and the terrorist activities of the Nationalist secret police, of a blundering and corrupt bureaucracy, and finally, by the inconsistent and often naive American policy toward the Chinese Nationalists.

American military aid to Nationalist China on Taiwan has fluctuated from that of providing no aid or assistance in 1949 to that of building up the armed forces immediately following the outbreak of hostilities

in Korea. An analysis is made of the modernization of the armed forces of the Republic of China during the period from 1950 until the present time. It clearly depicts the transformation of a battered and beaten army which fled the mainland of China in 1949 into one of the Free World's most modern and best-trained fighting forces.

A recommendation is made to continue the military aid necessary to equip and modernize the armed forces of Nationalist China in order that this fine fighting machine may continue to stand as a menace to Chinese Communism on an island only one hundred miles off the coast of Mainland China. It is further recommended that closer ties be effected between military personnel of the United States and of the Republic of China, especially in the form of encouraging small-unit joint exercises on Okinawa and Taiwan. Finally, a recommendation is made to make fuller use of Nationalist military strength in the field against the forces of Communist China and its allies.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER	PAGE
ABSTRACT	ii
INTRODUCTION	vi
I VICTORY: BLESSING OR CURSE?	1
V-J Day in China	1
Scope of World War II aid to China	1
Rivalry between Nationalist and Reds	3
Sino-American Treaty of 1943	4
Stilwell's efforts in China	4
Stilwell's dismissal	8
Wedemeyer's assignment	9
Effect of Yalta on China	11
American troops in China	12
Surrender of Japanese troops	13
Soviet occupation of Manchuria	16
Deterioration of events	17
II OPTIMISM TO DISILLUSIONMENT: THE MARSHALL MISSION TO CHINA, DECEMBER 1945-JANUARY 1947	19
Marshall's instructions from Washington	20
Political Consultative Conference	22
Growing rift between Chiang and Mao	23
Renewal of fighting in Manchuria	24
Effects of cease-fire	25
American reduction in aid	26
Major Nationalist offensive	27
Failure of Marshall Mission	28
III NATIONALIST CHINA'S DRIVE TO OBLIVION: THE FALL OF MAINLAND CHINA, 1947-1949	31
Limitation on aid to China	31
Nationalist victories in north	32
U. S. Naval Mission to China	33
Wedemeyer Mission to China	34
Communist drive to the south	36
Establishment of JUSMAG	37
Causes of military collapse	38
Loss of mainland	39

IV	FORMATION OF A SOUND AMERICAN MILITARY POSITION TOWARD THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA, 1950-1966	41
	United States' "hands-off" policy	41
	Incidents in Taiwan	42
	Nationalist naval blockade	42
	Establishment of MAAG Taiwan	44
	Economic and military progress	45
	First Quemoy crisis	46
	Loss of Tachen Islands	48
	Quemoy crisis of 1958	49
	Build-up of Seventh Fleet	50
	American involvement in Taiwan	51
	Development of a modern military force	52
	Nationalist aid to South Viet Nam	54
	New American bases in Taiwan	55
V	AMERICAN MILITARY AID AND ASSISTANCE TO THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS	56
	Inconsistency in American aid policy	56
	Reasons for loss of the mainland	57
	Failure of aid on the mainland	58
	Readiness of Nationalist forces today	59
	Effect of native Taiwanese in military	60
	Recommendations	61
	BIBLIOGRAPHY	63

INTRODUCTION

From the outbreak of World War II until the present time, the United States has been embarked upon a broad and highly ambitious program of foreign aid, both military and economic, to stem the advance of the forces of aggression throughout the world. During World War II, this aid was indispensable in halting the aggressive designs of Germany, Italy and Japan. Since the end of that conflict, American aid, especially that of military aid and assistance, has taken the form of attempting to contain the spread of world communism. This study focuses on one country, - China, in an attempt to see how effective American aid and assistance has been in fulfilling this goal.

An examination and reappraisal of the American aid effort was certainly required after the tragic results leading to the fall of mainland China to the forces of Mao Tse-tung. This study examines the achievements and the shortcomings of the American military aid and assistance program in China during the waning days of World War II and in the bitter period of the civil war which followed. It examines some of the factors leading to the loss of the mainland in 1949, including the failure of the American aid effort. It then compares the aid and assistance given to the Nationalist Chinese during these years with that extended to the Republic of China during the years following their exodus from the mainland to the island of Taiwan.

In making an evaluation of the over-all effects of the American military aid and assistance program in China and on Taiwan, this author

draws on his experiences as a member of the 1st Marine Division in North China during the crucial days of the civil war, and later as an advisor to the Chinese Marine Corps on Taiwan during the years, 1947-1948.

Finally, the author makes recommendations on the course which he believes American military aid and assistance to the Republic of China should take in the years ahead.

INDECISION TO ACTION: TWENTY-ONE YEARS OF UNITED STATES
MILITARY AID TO THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA, 1945-1966.

CHAPTER I

VICTORY: BLESSING OR CURSE?

V-J Day was greeted in New York, London, Paris and Moscow with considerable enthusiasm and rejoicing. In the cities of mainland China however, there were no riotous scenes of joy, relief and unrestrained gaiety. The hated Japanese had been defeated, but the future looked bleak. Civil war loomed on the horizon. The victorious forces of Chiang Kai-shek were faced with the prospect of having to fight in order to reclaim their own national territory. How was it possible that despite a significant American aid effort during the war, the Nationalist army was not capable of exerting immediate control over all of China? To understand the scope of this problem more fully, a brief consideration of wartime aid policies is necessary.

American military aid to the Nationalists during World War II took many forms. The scope of aid and assistance was greatly affected by the constantly changing views of key American military and political leaders as to what role in the Pacific War the forces of Chiang Kai-shek should play.

Some influential Americans, such as Admiral William D. Leahy and General George C. Marshall believed that it was essential to render sufficient aid to Chiang Kai-shek to enable him to keep his troops in

the field even though these troops might be poorly equipped and poorly fed. It was their contention that the presence of such a sizeable land army, even though it could not fight well, would tie down a large portion of the Japanese army. Likewise, the denial of mainland China to the Japanese would deprive them of a further base of operations in the event that Japan itself was successfully overrun.¹

Prior to America's entry into the war against Japan, aid to China consisted principally of loans for the purpose of building up their armed forces, although many Americans volunteered to fight side by side with the Chinese. An example of this was the American Volunteer Group composed of inexperienced but highly dedicated young pilots who fought bravely in Burma and Yunnan. After 1942, a program of financial, military and technical aid was extended to China.² Numerous American bases were soon established on Chinese soil and the United States embarked upon a concentrated effort to supply, transport and train the armed forces of China.

In analyzing the United States' aid program to China during this critical phase, one point becomes increasingly clear. Only meager resources were committed to the China-Burma-India Theater. Our major effort against Japan was not to take place in China but in other areas,

¹Tang Tsou, America's Failure in China 1941-1950. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1963). p. 43-44.

²John F. Fairbank, The United States in China. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1949). p. 328.

such as the islands of the South Pacific. Top American military men had fully explored and debated the desirability of making a landing on the Chinese coast after first building up the Chinese army into an effective fighting machine. Had this step been taken, the army of Chiang Kai-shek would have been regrouped, fitted with the latest equipment and weapons and developed into a fighting force far different than that which emerged at the conclusion of World War II.³

As the war against Japan became more intense, American leaders were dismayed not only by the lack of aggressiveness on the part of the Nationalists against the Japanese, but by the growing internal rivalry between the Nationalists and the Communists. American military leaders noted that the war effort was being hindered by this rivalry, but even more importantly, pointed out that civil war might break out. Thus, by late 1943, American policy was to encourage political settlements between Chiang Kai-shek and the Communists while continuing to build up and reform the armies of Nationalist China.⁴ Both the Nationalists and the Communists agreed verbally to abide by the American plea for peaceful settlement of their disputes. Despite this verbal agreement, both the Nationalists and the Communists committed the bulk and the best of their forces against each other rather than against the Japanese.⁵

³Tsou, p. 46.

⁴John F. Fairbank, The United States and China. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1958). p. 264.

⁵John Peck and Paul Lippe, The World in Our Day. (New York: Oxford, 1960). p. 105.

Several steps were taken to bolster the world-wide prestige of China. First of all, a Sino-American treaty was signed on January 13, 1943 ending United States extraterritorial rights in China.⁶ Likewise, the Cairo Declaration of December 1943 guaranteed the return of all territories lost by China to Japan. However, Chiang knew that the Japanese were not the only obstacle to extending his control over all of China, including Manchuria and Taiwan. The forces of Mao Tse-tung had to be dealt with. For this reason, by early 1944, more than 400,000 Nationalist troops were blockading the Communist areas rather than fighting the Japanese. In June 1944, Vice-President Wallace was sent to China in an attempt to ease matters between the Nationalists and the Communists. He did succeed in instituting an American Military Observer Mission in Yen-an, the seat of Communist strength. Although the mission did not accomplish much, it conveyed the strength and political threat of the Communist forces to the American commanders.⁷

General Joseph W. Stilwell, the commander of the American forces in the China-Burma-India Theater and the Chief of Staff to Chiang Kai-shek fought exceedingly hard to improve the fighting qualities of the Chinese armed forces during this period. Stilwell was disappointed, frustrated, disgusted and enraged by the attitudes and policies of Chiang and his military and political subordinates. The American-Chinese dis-

⁶Nathaniel Peffer, The Far East: A Modern History. (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1958). p. 419.

⁷Fairbank, The United States and China. p. 265.

agreements over proper employment of Chinese troops could fill volumes. General Marshall desired that Stilwell be placed in command of the Chinese armed forces. Naturally, Chiang Kai-shek resented and resisted this move. He exerted strong pressure in Washington to block such action.

General Stilwell warned Washington that immediate steps had to be taken to prevent the dispute with the Communists from wrecking the war effort. He did not believe that a full-scale civil war would break out until after the Japanese had been defeated, but he warned that Lend-Lease supplies sent to China for the prosecution of the war were being stockpiled for use against the Communists. During this period, Stilwell had to contend with the opposing views of Major General Claire Chennault, commander of the 14th Air Force, and a close personal friend of Chiang Kai-shek. Stilwell also disagreed with General Patrick J. Hurley, President Roosevelt's special adviser in China. Chennault tended to minimize the importance of ground forces in China, emphasizing that air power could successfully defeat Japan. Hurley, a well-meaning but inexperienced soldier and diplomat, believed that persuasion could bring the Nationalists and the Communists together. Hurley was highly critical of Stilwell's blunt opinions of Chiang and his top leaders.⁸ Thus, it is readily seen that American views on how to cope with this delicate

⁸Hurley especially disliked Stilwell referring to Chiang Kai-shek as "Peanut".

matter were widely split.⁹

Stilwell emphasized the point that air strikes against the Japanese were fine if the Chinese could hold the airfields for Chennault. He felt that they lacked the will and the experience to do so. He was shown to be correct in April of 1944 when the Japanese, in a major offensive through central and eastern China, overran most of the American-built airfields. Tons of valuable American supplies for China were lost.¹⁰ If Stilwell had been permitted to take command of the Chinese forces, select his own commanders and eliminate the political generals, this serious defeat would probably have been avoided.

This defeat in China alarmed President Roosevelt. Although he had tended to be extremely sympathetic with Chiang, the defeat, coupled to Chiang's threat to pull Chinese forces out of North Burma if the United States did not extend an additional billion dollars in aid, caused him to question the over-all value of our aid program in China.¹¹ At this point, he asked Chiang to place Stilwell in over-all command of the Chinese armed forces in order to successfully prosecute the war.

Unfortunately for Stilwell, and for China in the long run, Chiang had much influence in Washington. He was offended by Stilwell's rude

⁹ Edmund O. Clubb, 20th Century China. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1964). p. 239.

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 240.

¹¹ Ibid.

comments.¹² Pressure was exerted to have Stilwell removed. This was done even though Stilwell had unflinchingly fought to improve the readiness and caliber of the Chinese armed forces. From the day he arrived in China in March 1942, he had to fight to overcome the problems of ill-fed, ill-led and ill-trained troops.¹³ Under his guidance, 2,213 American personnel were brought to the China-Burma-India Theater to train the Chinese army. Stilwell intended to train, equip and put into the field at least forty-five elite divisions. However, Chiang was more concerned at this point about the future threat of the Communists than with fighting the war.

During this period of personality clashes in Chungking, the Communists in the north contented themselves with limited attacks on the Japanese. At this time, they improved the caliber of their fighting

¹²Joseph W. Stilwell, General. The Stilwell Papers. (New York: William Sloan, Assoc., 1948). On pages 190-191, there is a typical Stilwell statement, - the type that was relayed back to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and infuriated him:

"Compare it (the Russian war effort) with the Chinese cesspool. A gang of thugs, with the one idea of perpetuating themselves and their machine. Money, influence, and position, the only consideration of the leaders. Intrigue, double-crossing, lying reports. Hands out for everything they can get; their only idea to let someone else do the fighting; false propaganda on their "heroic struggle", indifference of "leaders" to their men. Cowardice rampant, squeeze paramount, smuggling above duty, colossal ignorance and stupidity of staff, total inability to control factions or cliques, continued oppression of the masses. - - - And we are maneuvered to the position of having to support this rotten regime and glorify its figurehead, the all-wise great patriot and soldier-Peanut. My God."

¹³Charles Romanus, and Riley Sunderland. United States Army in World War II, C-B-I Theater. (Washington: Dept. of Army, 1956). p. 3-4.

forces. Their main effort consisted of guerrilla activities behind the Japanese lines, thus strengthening their power position for the day when the Japanese would be driven out of China. In this way, they managed to extend greater authority over wide areas of North China.¹⁴

Disturbed by the reports of Stilwell and the other military analysts on the scene regarding a possible Communist menace in China, the U. S. War Department commissioned a study group to report on the threat. Although this study was made in 1944, it was not released until July 1945 and kept secret until 1949. Basically, it pointed out that the Chinese Communists were really Communists and not merely agrarian reformers as some writers and statesmen had indicated. It also noted that the Communist forces were the best organized force in China and that they had greater public support than the Nationalists.¹⁵ It would have been helpful in the long run if more Americans in key positions had clearly understood the impact of this report!

Thus, despite Stilwell's efforts in China and the continuing disturbing moves of the Chinese Communists, Chiang succeeded in having Stilwell removed. Through Chiang's brother-in-law, T. V. Soong, the Chinese Ambassador to the United States, appeals were made to Hurley and to Harry Hopkins (President Roosevelt's key adviser) that Stilwell's removal was essential for the continuance of good Chinese-American rela-

¹⁴Clubb, p. 236.

¹⁵Loren Fessler et al., eds., China (New York: Time, Inc., 1963), p. 3.

tions. On 18 October 1944, over the objections of General Marshall and Secretary of War Stimson, Roosevelt agreed to replace Stilwell with Lieutenant General Albert C. Wedemeyer. At the same time, he divided the China-Burma-India Theater into the China Theater and the India-Burma Theater.¹⁶ Thus, Chiang won a personal victory, although the loss of an experienced and dedicated soldier like Stilwell certainly did not help him.

In December 1944, General Hurley, who had been F.D.R.'s special adviser in China, replaced Clarence E. Gauss as Ambassador to China. Gauss submitted his resignation after Stilwell's dismissal.¹⁷ Hurley seemed confident that he could bring the Communists and the Nationalists together in a common effort and, by so doing, further the war effort and prevent a future civil war. He devoted all of his energies to this end.

Wedemeyer, for his part, faced the same problems that had confronted Stilwell, namely, the corruption, inefficiency and lack of aggressiveness on the part of the oligarchy of the Chinese armed forces. Although many military supplies had been sent to China, much was stupidly wasted. For example, over 80,000,000 rounds of 7.92 mm ammunition oxidized in the rice paddies of Assam in India where it had been dumped two years previously by the China Defense Supplies, Inc.¹⁸ Wedemeyer, like

¹⁶Clubb, p. 240-241.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 242.

¹⁸Romulus and Sunderland, p. 281.

Stilwell, was angered by this waste. He was aided by the disbanding of the old China-Burma-India Theater and the creation of two separate areas of operation, however. This act simplified his command relationships and made it much easier for him to confine his attention to the problems of China.¹⁹

Wedemeyer placed his sights on the effective utilization of American advisors in training and equipping a total of thirty-nine Chinese divisions.²⁰ He managed to secure Hurley's permission to send 4,000 - 5,000 American paratroops and technicians into the Communist areas in January 1945, to bring about closer Communist support for the war effort.²¹

For his part, Hurley was determined to prevent the collapse of Chiang's government, improve relations between Chiang and Wedemeyer and unify all Chinese forces, including the Communists, to better carry out the war with Japan.²²

With Hurley and Wedemeyer on the scene, a more conciliatory approach was used with Chiang. Wedemeyer had been instructed by Washington to keep clear of the political mess in China and get on with the war effort. This was difficult to do. He was aware of the implication of the Communist threat, and although he sent some advisors to the

¹⁹Herbert Feis, The China Tangle. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1953). p. 201.

²⁰Fairbank, The United States and China. p. 265.

²¹Tsou, p. 178.

²²Ibid., p. 176-177.

Communist areas, he managed to restrict aid supplies for them to small quantities of medicines. By so doing, he hoped to strengthen the Nationalists at the expense of the Reds.²³

The military picture in the early part of 1945 looked encouraging. Japanese forces were being pushed back slowly but surely from all of their island strongholds in the Pacific. Devastating air attacks on Japan were taking their toll. This fact was extremely clear to both the Nationalists and the Communists. The day of reckoning was close at hand.

At Yalta, the Soviet Union agreed to enter the war against Japan when specific conditions had been met. As far as China was concerned, the Soviets demanded restoration of former rights in Asia which they had surrendered to Japan in 1904. To insure these rights, the Soviets wanted a Sino-Soviet treaty drawn up to guarantee their rights, especially those pertaining to the use of Dairen and Port Arthur. The Russians reserved the right to determine when they would enter the war. In this respect, Chiang's fate was firmly sealed at Yalta. The Soviet Union could choose its own time of entry in the conflict and move into areas advantageous to them. Certainly, this included the rich industrial area of Manchuria. Without Manchuria, with its vast mineral deposits and industrial base, the Nationalist government could not hope to remain as the dominant force in China.²⁴ However, the Sino-Soviet treaty was

²³Feis, p. 206-207.

²⁴Clubb, p. 246-247.

seen by some people, even by some Nationalist leaders, as guaranteeing the turn-over of areas liberated by the Russians only to the forces of Chiang Kai-shek.²⁵

As the war with Japan moved to its conclusion, the bulk of the Nationalist forces were located in the southwestern corner of China. The rich and strategically located areas of northern and central China were remotely distant from these forces. American and Chinese strategy as envisioned by Wedemeyer called for a major operation designed to seize the important ports of Canton and Hong Kong prior to the conclusion of hostilities. But the dropping of the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, coupled with the entry into the war of the Soviet Union, brought Japan to early defeat. This rapid cessation of hostilities caught both the Americans and Chinese off balance. They were unprepared for the rapid events which were bound to occur.²⁶

The training and equipping of the thirty-nine elite Nationalist divisions had not been completed. Few American troops were in China. On V-J Day, the total American troops in China numbered about 60,000.²⁷ Wedemeyer responded rapidly to this situation as capably as he could. He utilized all available air and sea transportation to move a large portion of the Nationalist army to the larger cities and lines of communications in North China and in the Yangtze Valley. Primarily due to

²⁵Fairbank, The United States and China. p. 265.

²⁶Tsou, p. 300-301.

²⁷Ibid., p. 341.

his insistence, 50,000 United States Marines were sent to North China. These actions were not designed to imply American participation in a conflict with the Communists. The American forces were instructed to stay clear of incidents.²⁸

Like the Chinese Nationalists, the Communists were equally surprised by the sudden end to the conflict. However, they were better prepared to act rapidly in the north. By the end of the war, the Chinese forces of Mao Tse-tung had a total estimated strength of upwards of 900,000 regular troops, with an estimated militia strength of over 2,000,000.²⁹ These forces were spread throughout areas in the northern and central portions of China. The Communist forces moved quickly into Manchuria with the obvious encouragement of Soviet commanders in the area.³⁰ These forces, though large in size, did not compare numerically with the Nationalist army which ended the war with over 5,000,000 troops. Likewise, the major portion of China and its people were under the control of the Nationalists.³¹

Despite orders from Chiang to the Communists to stay in place and permit the Japanese troops to surrender to Nationalist army units, General Chu Teh, Commander-in-Chief of the Communist forces ordered his troops to accept the surrender of Japanese and puppet troops in their

²⁸Ibid., p. 73.

²⁹Ibid., p. 301.

³⁰Kenneth S. Latourette, China (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1964). p. 145.

³¹H. Forman, Blunder in Asia. (New York: Didier, 1950). p. 3.

vicinity and to occupy all towns and communication lines previously held by the defeated forces.³² Chu likewise dispatched four armed groups into Manchuria to link up with the advancing Soviet army. Accordingly, a large force of Communist soldiers proceeded up the Peking-Mukden railroad tracks to put the rich prize of Manchuria in Communist hands.³³ Thus, the struggle for the control of China was on.

It would be wise at this point to assess the condition of Nationalist China at the end of World War II. Certainly, this aspect of the problem explains some of the reasons for the later Nationalist collapse on the mainland. China was exhausted by eight years of continuous fighting. Its major industry had been destroyed. The rich farmland in China lay in a state of hopeless destruction and neglect. Inflation crippled commerce in the cities. The few pre-war railroads were in ruins. Instead of being acclaimed as a hero by the Chinese people, Chiang Kai-shek unfortunately symbolized the ills of the Chinese.

What actions could the United States take to cope with this delicate situation? In September of 1945, President Truman directed Wedemeyer and Hurley to assist the Chinese in disarming the Japanese and pledged continued military aid to support a Chinese army of "moderate

³²Clubb, p. 255.

³³Tsou, p. 303.

³⁴William A. Brown, Jr. and Redvers Opie, American Foreign Assistance. (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1953). p. 317.

size"; but he qualified this by emphasizing that these forces were not to be used against fellow Chinese or to support an undemocratic administration.³⁵ This decree certainly placed severe limitations on the amount of American aid which Wedemeyer could extend to the Nationalists. In effect, his hands were tied.

Wedemeyer did succeed in transporting sufficient forces of Chiang Kai-shek to enable them to occupy the key ports and cities of mainland China previously occupied by the Japanese, with the exception of those occupied by the Soviet forces. U. S. Marines were placed in Tientsin, Peking, Chinwangtao and along key railway lines in the north to pave the way for Nationalist forces.³⁶ Since Wedemeyer had been clearly ordered not to support the Nationalist Chinese in a civil war, he made the meaning of this order clear to all American troops.³⁷ Despite his request for seven American divisions, the two divisions of marines were the only combat divisions sent to China.³⁸ Therefore, Wedemeyer found it increasingly difficult to carry out his mission of assisting Chiang Kai-shek while at the same time endeavoring to avoid the displeasure of the Communists. Under these circumstances, General Wedemeyer can not be blamed for the disastrous events which were to follow in the next

³⁵Ibid., p. 319.

³⁶Ibid., p. 319-320.

³⁷Tsou, p. 305.

³⁸Feis, p. 339.

few years.

For their part, the Soviets capitalized on their brief war with Japan. Their forces quickly seized Manchuria, and, as history has so well noted, systematically stripped it of nearly all its industrial equipment and wealth. Once Manchuria was firmly in its grasp, the Soviet Union became increasingly active in support of the Chinese Communist forces. Huge quantities of supplies turned in by the surrendering Japanese troops were handed over to the Communists.³⁹ In accordance with the provisions of the recently signed Sino-Soviet treaty, the Nationalists expected full cooperation from the Russians in Manchuria. However, the Communist forces of General Lin Piao effectively assumed a power position in Manchuria. Soviet forces actually assisted Lin Piao by denying the U. S. 7th Fleet permission to land Nationalist forces at Dairen. With Soviet permission, Chinese Communist troops occupied the other key Manchurian ports of Yingkow and Hulutao.⁴⁰ For all intents and purposes, the Soviet Union called the shots in Manchuria.

By November 1945, it was clear to all concerned American military and political leaders that the situation was deteriorating badly. Ambassador Hurley went to Washington determined to obtain a more rigid American policy. If the Nationalist Government was not to collapse, speedy, effective American aid was needed. Wedemeyer informed the War

³⁹Charles O. Lerche, Jr., Foreign Policy of the American People. (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1958). p. 267.

⁴⁰Clubb, p. 261-262.

Department that the Nationalists would be unable to assume control of Manchuria when the Russians pulled out.⁴¹

To make matters worse, Chiang took this moment to launch a concentrated military attack on the Communist forces from positions along the Great Wall of China. The civil war had commenced. It was not long before incidents occurred between the American marines and the Communists. General Wedemeyer informed Washington that if American forces were to be kept out of the conflict, the marines would have to be withdrawn.⁴²

Washington was unsure of what steps should be taken in China. Finally, on 24 November 1945, the State Department recommended to the President that continued efforts be taken to keep Chiang Kai-shek in power, but that the United States should undertake the role of mediating the Nationalist-Communist dispute. This was too much for Ambassador Hurley. He resigned after launching a bitter verbal blast at alleged Communists in the State Department.⁴³

Thus, the fight for control of the mainland of China was on. In the north, the survivors of the famous "Long March" of 1934 had the upper hand.⁴⁴ These ardent Communists who had fought both the Nationalists and the Japanese were now in a position to make a concentrated bid for power.

⁴¹Ibid.

⁴²Feis, p. 400.

⁴³Ibid., p. 404.

⁴⁴Fessler et al., p. 112.

President Truman reacted to this crisis with his appointment of General George C. Marshall, who had just resigned as Chief of Staff, to undertake a mission to China in an attempt to mediate the civil war. Thus, the United States embarked upon a new chapter of involvement in the affairs of China.

CHAPTER II

OPTIMISM TO DISILLUSIONMENT: THE MARSHALL MISSION TO CHINA, DECEMBER 1945-JANUARY 1947

To most Americans, China has always appeared to be an immense, over-populated country colored by mystery, intrigue, poverty and corruption. It is safe to say that no two Americans have adopted the same views on what the official United States position toward China should be. China's remoteness from the North American continent, its unfamiliar culture and traditions, and its constantly changing political and military posture have led to this uncertainty on the part of most Americans, especially by those military and diplomatic officers whose duty it has been to advise on United States policy toward this slumbering giant.

General Marshall's mission to China reflected this uncertainty. President Truman was convinced that only a person of Marshall's background was capable of mediating the Chinese domestic dispute. Marshall had been Chief of Staff for all of the combat theaters of operation in World War II, and had performed prior service in China. It was this well-rounded professional background, coupled with the respect held for Marshall by the World War II allies of the United States which seemed to make him the ideal choice for heading this mission.¹

¹Kenneth S. Latourette, The Chinese: Their History and Culture (New York: Macmillan, 1962), p. 394.

Prior to departing for China, General Marshall engaged in a series of talks with members of the Department of State regarding the official United States position on China. Two questions required immediate answers even prior to his departure. First of all, the question arose of whether or not to continue transporting Nationalist troops into areas of North China prior to arranging a cease-fire. It was agreed that Marshall should personally determine the American role in this matter upon his arrival. Likewise, General Wedemeyer had complained that his hands were tied by the restrictions placed on him by Washington. The American forces were to carry out their assigned military tasks while not supporting Chiang Kai-shek in the conflict or interfering in any manner in Chinese politics. This was a difficult order to follow.² Marshall noted that Wedemeyer's forces could not operate under such tight restrictions. It was decided that Marshall would establish the guidelines for American military leaders to follow in their relations with the Nationalists. The Marines would remain at their posts in North China and other American forces would continue to transport Nationalist troops in accordance with the actions to be determined by Marshall. However, Marshall was instructed to avoid direct American involvement in the civil war.³

Thus, Marshall arrived in China determined to do his best to help establish a durable, united and democratic China. It was his belief

²Feis, p. 414.

³Ibid., p. 415.

that Chiang Kai-shek was still strong and popular enough to head a unified government composed of members of the Kuomintang, the Communist Party and Liberals. To accomplish this aim, Marshall had to find a means of ending the bloody civil war and to set up an effective coalition government. This action would require the establishment of a single army for all of China. To give Marshall more convincing strength at the bargaining table, the United States promised extensive economic and military aid to China on the condition that the hostilities cease and that no American aid be used in any type of civil conflict.⁴

Marshall felt a little optimistic about his chances to succeed based on the Communist agreement in principle to cease-fire proposals put forth in December 1945. Likewise, the Reds raised no major objections to the movement of the Nationalist forces into the north.⁵ At the same time, Chiang seemed uncertain of both Soviet and American intentions, and took a more cautious approach to his dealings with the Communists.

One factor which weakened Marshall's hand was the rapid demobilization of the United States armed forces. The American people were tired of war and a great clamor arose to bring all servicemen home as soon as possible. It became difficult to maintain the few ships assigned to the China operation and to maintain a relatively small group of advisors.⁶

⁴Claude A. Buss, Asia in the Modern World (New York: Macmillan, 1964) p. 534.

⁵Feis, p. 415.

⁶Ibid., p. 422-423.

General Albert C. Wedemeyer was still the commander of American forces in China and the Chief of Staff to Chiang Kai-shek when Marshall arrived in China. Wedemeyer noted that Marshall seemed in very poor spirits upon his arrival. Marshall told him of his plans for bringing the forces of the Nationalists and the Communists together. Wedemeyer told Marshall that he did not believe that this would ever be possible. Marshall became extremely angry and bellowed, "I am going to accomplish my mission and you are going to help me."⁷

In order to bring the opposing parties together, Marshall arranged for a Political Consultative Conference to meet in Chungking in January 1946. The purpose of this meeting was to bring about a cease-fire and to reach a political settlement. On January 10, 1946 a cease-fire agreement was reached.⁸ By February, all parties had agreed in principle to the creation of a single army. A tripartite agency was established in Peking to supervise the ending of the civil war. Truce teams were set up headed by American colonels. Each team included a Nationalist and Communist general. These teams were sent into areas where the fighting was still going on and had success in virtually putting an end to all fighting.⁹

During the early months of 1946, Nationalist troop movements were halted except for the movement of some troops into Manchuria and the

⁷Albert C. Wedemeyer, Wedemeyer Reports! (New York: Holt, 1958) p. 363.

⁸Buss, p. 535.

⁹Fairbank, p. 330

routine transfer of military personnel. Plans for the creation of a single national army composed on a ratio of five Nationalist divisions to one Communist division were drawn up. It was determined that within eighteen months, this single army should be reduced to sixty divisions. In order to establish a modern army for all of China, the United States agreed to establish a military advisory group which would supervise the creation of an eight-and-one-third group air force and thirty-nine combat divisions.¹⁰

However, despite his initial successes, Marshall was gravely concerned. It became apparent that both the Nationalists and the Communists were merely giving lip-service to his mediation efforts, and in reality were working against each other. Bitter disagreements occurred over the terms of the cease-fire, the plan for merging the armies, and the writing of a new Constitution. Marshall displayed tact and great leadership ability in attempting to mediate these disputes, but the split widened. In an attempt to bring the two sides closer together, Marshall returned to the United States in March 1946 and recommended that substantial aid for reconstruction be given to China. He managed to secure a loan of \$500 million from the Export-Import Bank for various projects within China.¹¹ Although his reason for leaving China in March was to get aid for the reconstruction of the country, the

¹⁰Buss, p. 535-536.

¹¹Brown and Opie, p. 321-322.

Communists used his absence as a ripe time for tearing up the cease-fire agreement. Red troops poured into Manchuria. As Russian troops pulled out of Changchun on April 15, 1946, the Communists moved in and were able to take over the city on April 18.¹² Their timing was more than a coincidence. Marshall was in the United States, while General Wedemeyer had left China, - the China Theater having been demobilized. Lieutenant General Alvan C. Gillem was left as the commander of the remaining American forces in China.¹³

Marshall hurried back to China on April 18 only to find fighting going on over extensive areas of Manchuria. He ordered American air transports to move seven Nationalist divisions to Manchuria to end the fighting. On May 19, Nationalist forces won a bloody victory at Szepingkai. Chiang personally flew to Mukden to supervise the operation. In fact, Chiang was leading a major attack on Harbin and Kirin which might have crushed the Communists when Marshall asked for, and got, a cease-fire.¹⁴ Historians can only speculate on the outcome of the civil war if Marshall had not intervened at this critical point. Although a truce only lasted from 7 to 26 June, it managed to give the Communists time to regroup and reequip their badly mauled forces, as well as to

¹²Anthony Kubek, How the Far East Was Lost: American Policy and the Creation of Communist China, 1941-1949, (Chicago: Regnery, 1963) p. 330.

¹³Wedemeyer, p. 365.

¹⁴Kubek, p. 330.

expand their control over the area.

This cease-fire seriously hurt Chiang, but to make matters worse, an embargo was imposed on arms and ammunition shipments to the Nationalists, at Marshall's insistence. During the period of the embargo, August 1946 - July 1947, the Soviets were turning over unlimited amounts of captured Japanese equipment, supplies, arms and ammunition to the Chinese Communists. In addition to the Japanese supplies, they gave the Communists large amounts of American Lend-Lease equipment which had been sent to Siberia during the war for possible use against the Japanese.¹⁵ This was a black hour for Chiang. His victorious armies were ordered to halt their advance; a large portion of his supplies were cut off, and at the same time, his rival was becoming more powerful under the protection of the United States.

Thus, by the time the Russians completed their withdrawal from Manchuria in the spring of 1946, the situation had grown serious for the Nationalists. Chiang's occupation troops were spread thin along the key lines of communication and in the cities. The Communists had extended their control around these areas and concentrated their military strength in the entire northeast.¹⁶

Marshall enforced the arms embargo against the Nationalists but did permit certain surplus equipment, vehicles and other supplies to be sold to the Nationalists with the concurrence of Washington. He claimed that

¹⁵Ibid., p. 337.

¹⁶Buss, p. 536.

these were not intended for use against the Communists, but he was bitterly attacked by Chou En-lai for meddling in the civil war. As a result, in September 1946, Marshall ordered a halt to these shipments.¹⁷ Again, the United States buckled to Communist pressure. At the same time, American troop strength in China was being drastically reduced. When Marshall arrived in China, there were over 113,000 Americans there. Within a year, this figure was down to 12,000.¹⁸

American aid reduction was viewed with some alarm in Congress. It was noted that the Nationalists had cooperated with Marshall initially because its government was dependent on American aid.¹⁹ As a result of Congressional pressure, over one billion dollars worth of aid (procurement cost) was earmarked for China. However, this was nearly all non-combat type equipment, such as construction equipment, non-combat ships, dockyard equipment and the like. It did little to help build up the war machine.²⁰

Plans were made early in 1946 to establish a Joint United States Military Advisory Group (JUSMAG), however, because of the mediation efforts, JUSMAG was not formally established until November 1948. A naval mission was authorized for China on July 16, 1946 however, the three

¹⁷Kubek, p. 338.

¹⁸Brown and Opie, p. 322.

¹⁹Pichon Loh et al. The Kuomintang Debacle of 1949: Conquest or Collapse? (Boston: Heath, 1965) p. 7.

²⁰Brown and Opie, p. 324.

hundred personnel sent to China were not permitted to engage in any activities except routine training maneuvers.²¹

Despite the renewal of fighting in Manchuria, General Marshall felt that there was still some hope for a united China if he could induce the liberals in non-Communist China to act as a third force between the Nationalists and the Communists. He worked diligently to bring about a meeting of the National Assembly to write a new Constitution.²² Unfortunately for Marshall, and perhaps for China, the liberals were not united. No colorful educators or liberal politicians were strong enough to make their views heard. If anything, Marshall's attitude antagonized the Nationalists and aroused the deep-rooted suspicions of the Communists. It seems amazing that such an eminently qualified military strategist as General Marshall could have been so naive in assessing the situation in China as it actually existed.

His patience worn thin, Chiang Kai-shek launched a major offensive in October 1946. His forces seized the Communist stronghold of Kalga in Inner Mongolia and Antung, located between Korea and Manchuria.²³ The Nationalists put an end to all political talks with the Communists and convened the National Assembly themselves. Chiang made it clear

²¹Ibid., p. 323.

²²U. S. Department of State, United States Relations With China: With Special Reference to the Period 1944-1949. Washington: 1949 (commonly called the "White Paper on China"), p. xiii.

²³Buss, p. 536-537.

that the Kuomintang would rule China.

Marshall's efforts at mediation were doomed to failure before they started. The voices of men well-acquainted with the situation, such as Hurley and Wedemeyer, had been ignored. Perhaps, the American dream of peace, liberty, and equality for all people is too strong to permit most Americans from facing realities. China was engaged in a bitter civil war. Neither Chiang Kai-shek nor Mao Tse-tung concealed their real aims of controlling all of China. Both sides to this conflict well understood the opposing views very clearly. Marshall did not. Mediation led to the distrust by both the Nationalists and the Communists of Marshall. He was unable to satisfy the extremists in the Communist camp or in the Kuomintang.²⁴ The irony of the American approach to the Nationalists was that Marshall was put in a position of attempting to have the Kuomintang limit its powers, extend an olive branch of peace to the Communists, yet at the same time strengthen its political control over all of China.²⁵

Marshall was faced by a hostile Nationalist government and a distrustful and arrogant Communist group. "Yankee Go Home" signs appeared throughout Nationalist-controlled China. Marshall realized that his mission had failed, and wired President Truman asking that he be recalled.²⁵

²⁴Latourette, The Chinese: Their History and Culture., p. 394.

²⁵Fairbank, p. 331.

²⁶Buss, p. 537.

Many people have questioned whether Marshall ever had a chance to succeed in his search for a unified and democratic China. Some have indicated that if the forces of Chiang Kai-shek had not been forced to continue the war with the Communists immediately after the fall of Japan, that the Nationalists could have put their time, money and resources into work rebuilding the economy of China. Unfortunately, this was not to be.²⁷ Other Americans, such as Walter Judd, Freda Utley, William C. Bullitt, and others, were extremely critical of the Marshall mediation effort as appeasement and clamored for heavily increased military aid to China. Of course, history has well recorded the famous "McCarthy Hearings" where the late Senator McCarthy accused Marshall of treason for his role in China.²⁸

Prior to leaving China, General Marshall praised the outstanding courage and integrity of the American Army and Marine officers who struggled against bitter odds in carrying out the attempt to bring peace to China.²⁹ Marshall blamed reactionaries in the Kuomintang for opposing his policies at every step, and accused the Communists of resorting to force to achieve their aims. Marshall held out the hope that eventually liberal forces in both camps would gain leadership and work for a united China. On this remote note of hope, Marshall dejectedly left for

²⁷A. Doak Barnett, China on the Eve of Communist Takeover (New York: Praeger, 1963) p. 10.

²⁸Frederick L. Schuman, International Politics: The Western State System and the World Community (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1958), p. 544.

²⁹Fairbank, p. 344-345.

home to assume his new post as Secretary of State. Along with Marshall went the bulk of the American troops in China. The mediation headquarters in Peking was closed. All that remained of a once mighty American military effort in China were a few thousand troops assigned to duties as instructors or performing guard duty in isolated sectors of China.³⁰

Mediation had failed. President Truman along with his trusted advisors were now faced with the prospect of re-evaluating the United States position toward China while the civil war daily increased its savage tempo.

³⁰John C. Campbell, The United States in World Affairs: 1947-1948 (New York: Harper, 1948) p. 184.

CHAPTER III

NATIONALIST CHINA'S DRIVE TO OBLIVION:

THE FALL OF THE MAINLAND, 1947-1949

Mediation had proved fruitless in solving the Chinese dilemma. Washington had to face up to several possible courses of action. First of all, the United States could withdraw completely from the scene of conflict, enabling the Nationalists and Communists to fight it out without any influence being exerted by the United States. It could render limited aid and assistance to the forces of Chiang Kai-shek in the form of some military aid and a limited military advisory role. The only other course of action seemed to be to provide immediate massive military aid to the Nationalists strong enough to permit them to wipe out the Communist menace.¹ President Truman had no desire to commit American armed forces to the conflict raging on the mainland. Demobilization policies since World War II would have made this virtually impossible in any event. Despite the insistence of many persons familiar with the grave situation in China, Truman rejected the idea of giving massive aid to the Nationalists. Instead, the official American position was to give limited military aid to Chiang and hope that the situation would take care of itself.² This policy seems extremely ludicrous when one

¹Schuman, p. 191.

²Brown and Opie, p. 326-327.

considers the great effect massive aid to Greece and Turkey had in rolling back the tide of Communism. Perhaps the decision haunted President Truman when only three years later he had to commit American troops on the Asian mainland in a war which massive aid, promptly given, at this time might have prevented.

During this period of American indecision in the early part of 1947, the forces of Chiang Kai-shek continued to score impressive victories. The old Communist city of Yen-an fell in March, and Nationalist forces scored other victories in Manchuria and in Shantung Province.³ However, despite outward signs of military victories, Nationalist China was crumbling from within. Its economy was approaching a state of complete ruin. From mid-1946 to mid-1947, the official rate of the Chinese dollar fell from 3,350 to 38,500 in relation to the American dollar.⁴ The inflation which hit Nationalist China hurt merchant and peasant alike. These two groups had been the main support for Chiang Kai-shek. Added to this burden of inflation were continuing acts of dishonesty and corruption by politicians, especially in the larger cities.⁵ Although Chiang's military at this stage was holding its own, the war was already being lost in the cities and on the farms of Nationalist-controlled China.

³Schuman, p. 536.

⁴Brown and Opie, p. 327.

⁵Barnett, p. 12.

Many people in the United States had written off China as lost. Therefore, many voices were raised questioning the soundness of pouring more good money into an area which America could not save. Though the Export-Import Bank had approved a loan of \$500 million for China in 1946, it refused to make any grants to China sensing that it was a poor business risk.⁶ Some economic aid was given to China in the first part of 1947, however. The final shipment of UNRRA supplies totalling over \$235 million was delivered in addition to over \$27 million in American post-UNRRA relief. This was followed by credits from the Maritime Commission in the amount of \$16,500,000 for the purchase of vessels.⁷

In addition to the naval mission which had been previously established, the United States maintained a military mission in Nanking to train elements of the Nationalist army. American personnel were dispatched to Taiwan in 1947 to assist in the training of Nationalist forces on the island.⁸

President Truman lifted the arms and ammunition embargo on Nationalist China in May 1947. Despite the lifting of this embargo, little military aid was extended immediately to Chiang. The largest sale of military supplies during this period was that of 130 million rounds of rifle ammunition.⁹ China's military resources had been hurt by the

⁶Schuman, p. 189.

⁷Ibid., p. 189-190.

⁸Ibid.

⁹Ibid.

embargo; it was now failing to benefit by the lifting of it.

As the situation in China became more clouded with uncertainty, President Truman sent General Albert C. Wedemeyer back to China in July 1947 on a fact-finding tour. Wedemeyer was given ambassadorial rank and directed to collect as much information on the situation as possible. As Chiang's old Chief of Staff, he was highly respected by the Nationalists.¹⁰ Wedemeyer's mission lasted until August 24, 1947. He traveled extensively throughout China, visiting the front lines, talking with government leaders educators, businessmen and military commanders. The report of Wedemeyer's findings were kept secret by the Department of State. This infuriated Wedemeyer since the only "leak" of his findings involved his criticisms of the Nationalist Government. The criticism involved reports of corruption and inefficiency by the government bureaucracy, and was followed by his recommendations for prompt and extensive reforms.¹¹ His report blasted the terror tactics of the secret police and acts of cruelty performed by certain segments of the army.¹² While this report of his findings was true, - Wedemeyer had personally disclosed his findings and feelings to Chiang Kai-shek prior to leaving China, the main point that Wedemeyer made was that China was not lost if immediate aid on a large-scale was rendered to the

¹⁰Latourette, The Chinese: Their History and Culture, p. 394.

¹¹Campbell, p. 196.

¹²John W. Spanier, American Foreign Policy Since World War II (New York: Praeger, 1965) p. 77-78.

Nationalists. He recommended that the United States request the United Nations to mediate the civil war and set up a trusteeship over Manchuria until the domestic problems were solved.¹³

It became apparent to Chiang that he was going to have to win the conflict with little or no additional American support. In 1947, Chiang's forces still held a two-to-one manpower advantage over the Communists, but several factors weakened the army's effectiveness. Chiang Kei-shek unwisely selected his top military commanders on the basis of loyalty rather than ability. Too often, the key generals in the field did not live up to his expectations. In 1947, capable generals such as Sun Lien-chung, Hsueh Yueh and Wu Chi had been relieved. The most able Nationalist general, Pai Chung-hsi had been relegated to a post of little importance.¹⁴ Perhaps Chiang's greatest military blunder was his strategy of seizing and holding the cities. The occupation of these areas tied his troops down to occupation-type duties while the Communists moved in and occupied and pacified the countryside. This strategy was to prove just as unwise to the French a few years later in Indo-China. Thus, Chiang's armies were spread thin along the main communication lines and in the cities rather than being committed to "search and destroy" missions against the Communists.¹⁵

¹³Wedemeyer, p. 392-393.

¹⁴Loh, p. 8.

¹⁵Spanier, p. 81.

Despite the warnings of his American advisors, Chiang committed the bulk of his best troops to the capture of Manchuria. Chiang knew that Manchuria was essential for the economic well-being of China and its control would be necessary if China were ever to be a prosperous nation. Yet the Communists had all of the advantages in this area. It was a simple matter for the Communists to interdict the railway leading from North China into Manchuria, thereby cutting off needed supplies and reinforcements by rail to that sector.¹⁶ In the latter part of 1947, the Communists launched an offensive into the Ta Pieh Shan mountains which posed a threat to the Yangtze Valley. To counter this threat, Chiang sent his best American-trained divisions by sea to Manchuria in an attempt to break out of the Communist seige of Mukden and then to conduct a major campaign in Manchuria. In so doing, he weakened his military posture in North China.¹⁷ By the summer of 1948, Chiang was forced to rely on air lifts to move supplies to his Manchurian forces. This proved unsatisfactory.

With the situation extremely critical, former Ambassador to China, William C. Bullitt recommended that General MacArthur be directed to assume direct supervision of the Nationalist forces as a special adviser to Chiang Kai-shek to prevent a Communist victory.¹⁸ Of course, this

¹⁶Ibid., p. 82.

¹⁷Fitzgerald, p. 104

¹⁸Buss, p. 537-538.

suggestion was ignored.

By July 1948, the Communists had gained control of all of Manchuria except for the large cities. They also controlled most of North China except for Peking and Tientsin and a small area of land along the Peking-Mukden railway line. Shantung Province was largely in their hands, as was most of Honan Province. The Nationalists had been forced into holding out in the large cities with limited access and faint hope of being resupplied.¹⁹

America responded to this deteriorating situation with accelerated military and economic aid and assistance in 1948. A Joint United States Military Advisory Group (JUSMAG) was finally established in 1948 after two years of discussion.²⁰ In addition, a total of one hundred and thirty-one naval vessels were transferred by the United States to the Nationalist navy.²¹ President Truman recommended the appropriation of \$570 million in assistance to China commencing on April 1, 1948 and lasting for a period of fifteen months. When the China Aid Act of 1948 was finally enacted, it saw this figure cut to \$463 million for twelve months, of which \$338 million was to be used for economic assistance (later cut to \$275 million), leaving \$125 million for the Nationalist Government to use for military purposes.²² This policy of restricting

¹⁹Fitzgerald, p. 105.

²⁰Buss, p. 538.

²¹Brown and Opie, p. 323.

²²Ibid., p. 335

the use of so much money to strictly economic purposes was severely criticized by such prominent people as Wedemeyer, Chennault, MacArthur and many congressmen.²³ This American aid was too little and too late.

Nationalist China died economically and militarily in 1948 and 1949. The cost of the war was consuming more than 90% of the national budget. Consumer production had virtually ceased. The masses of Chiang's former supporters, - the peasants, the merchants (those who had not fled from the mainland) and the educators, either joined the Communist ranks or simply refused to support Chiang.²⁴

Chiang had gone to Peking to personally direct the military campaign, but in November 1948, Mukden, the last important stronghold of the Nationalist forces in Manchuria, fell to the Communists virtually without a fight.²⁵ With the loss of Manchuria, over 300,000 of Chiang's best troops, most of them American-trained, were lost.²⁶ A point that was most discouraging to the American military advisors was the fact that the American-trained regiments surrendered as quickly as those recruited shortly before the Manchurian campaign.²⁷

²³Schuman, p. 199-200.

²⁴Buss, p. 538-539.

²⁵Latourette, The Chinese: Their History and Culture, p. 395.

²⁶Loh, p. 12.

²⁷Buss, p. 539.

General Barr, who was commander of JUSMAG, stated on November 16, 1948 that the war could be won only with the active participation of American forces. He blamed the defeat of the Nationalists not on a shortage of supplies or equipment, but strictly on the poor leadership and incompetent tactics employed by the Nationalist field commanders.²⁸ It was estimated that 80% of the equipment furnished to the Nationalists during and since World War II had been lost, with upwards of 75% falling in Chinese hands.²⁹ These figures are hard to substantiate, however, it was apparent that the Chinese Communist forces in Korea entered that fray well-equipped with American arms, ammunition and equipment which they had seized from the Nationalists.

In the period from September 1948 until the fall of the city of Peking near the end of January 1949, the Nationalists lost over one million men.³⁰ This meant a reduction in the total strength of the Nationalist army by more than 45% in the brief span of four months.³¹

With the fall of Peking, Chiang Kai-shek turned over the reigns of government to Vice-President Li Tsung-jen with instructions to attempt to reach some settlement with the Communists. The fighting came to a virtual halt. From February to April 1949, Li carried on negotia-

²⁸U. S. Dept. of State "White Paper", p. 358.

²⁹Spanier, p. 83.

³⁰U. S. Dept. of State "White Paper", p. 357.

³¹Loh, p. 9.

tions. Communist terms called for a coalition government to be established and for the Nationalist army to be incorporated within the Communist army. The Nationalists refused. They still held the southern and western portions of China as well as Taiwan. With their refusal, the Communists went on the offensive and seized Nanking in April and shortly thereafter captured Shanghai and the southern provinces.³²

Chiang Kai-shek fled to Taiwan. With him he took nearly all of the gold resources of the Chinese Government.³³ Every available mode of air and sea transportation was put into use to move as many of his remaining forces to Taiwan as possible. Nearly all of the Nationalist air force and navy escaped Communist capture along with well over one million troops and key civilians. Pockets of resistance did manage to hold out on the mainland, but these were soon smashed. In December 1949, the Nationalists declared that the Government of the Republic of China would continue to operate from Taipei.³⁴ Thus, even with the American contribution of \$2,254,000,000 in economic and military aid between the end of World War II and the end of 1949, the mainland of China had been lost to the Chinese Communists.

³²Fitzgerald, p. 116-117.

³³Buss, p. 539-540.

³⁴Ibid., p. 541.

³⁵Schuman, p. 534.

CHAPTER IV

FORMATION OF A SOUND AMERICAN MILITARY POSITION

TOWARD THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA, 1950-1966

As elements of Nationalist China's defeated armies poured into Taiwan, the United States adopted a hands-off policy toward the Taipei regime. Many prominent Americans, including not a few military men, believed that Taiwan would soon fall to the Communist forces. Within the United States, many voices were raised calling for the government to recognize the Communist Government on the mainland. However, poor treatment of American diplomatic representatives left in China resulted in the removal of all American consular and diplomatic personnel in January 1950.¹

Supplies purchased under the final \$125 million appropriation for military aid to Nationalist China was diverted to Taiwan when the Reds seized the mainland, however, further military aid was denied when President Truman announced on January 5, 1950 that the United States would not become further involved in the Chinese situation. Truman firmly stated that no American military aid or assistance would be given to the Nationalist Government, and that the United States had no interests in the island of Taiwan.²

¹Kenneth S. Latourette, The American Record in the Far East: 1945-1951 (New York: Macmillan 1952), p. 133-134.

²Meribeth E. Cameron, et al, China, Japan and the Powers, (New York: Ronald, 1960), p. 604-605.

On Taiwan, the Nationalists attempted to regroup their forces on an unfriendly island. The mainland Chinese were met with a large degree of hostility by the Native Taiwanese. Immediately after the conclusion of World War II, oppressive regulations had been imposed on the Taiwanese by the Chinese military governor. A series of bloody incidents increased the animosity of the Taiwanese for these "intruders". To find employment for upwards of one million mainland civilians, unfair employment requirements were instituted. Taiwanese school teachers and civil servants, for the large part, were replaced by mainland Chinese. A good friend of this author was fired from his teaching position in Kaohsiung because he had previously taught under the Japanese. Since the Japanese had ruled the island from 1895 until the end of World War II, it was obvious that all teachers had worked under the Japanese. This was merely one of the absurd regulations which alienated an otherwise friendly people.

With Truman's refusal to extend further military aid, the Nationalists undertook the retraining of their forces on their own. The Chinese Navy instituted a naval blockade of the coast of mainland China and warned all foreign shipping to avoid the blockade. Numerous incidents occurred including attacks on several American-owned ships of the Isbrandsten Line.³ The Nationalists made it clear that the war with the Communists was not over, and that their forces would eventually return

³Ibid., p. 604.

to the mainland. All of their training and planning was to be directed to this end.⁴

American policy toward China has never been consistent, so it was not too surprising that it changed completely when the North Korean Communist forces invaded South Korea. On June 27, 1950, President Truman directed the United States Seventh Fleet to patrol the Taiwan Strait to prevent any Communist invasion of Taiwan and the Pescadores. To Chiang's dismay, he also requested the Nationalists to stop their air and sea attacks against the mainland.⁵

Karl Rankin, the senior diplomatic officer in Taipei, and later Ambassador to China, directed that the senior American military attache in Taipei effect liaison between the Seventh Fleet and the Mutual Defense Assistance operations in the area.⁶ Rankin informed Washington that the Nationalists had dug deeply into their gold and foreign exchange holdings and urgently required American military aid, especially in the form of aircraft, fuel and spare parts.⁷ In December 1950, the United States renewed shipment of arms and supplies to Nationalist China.⁸

⁴Buss, p. 671.

⁵Ibid., p. 685.

⁶Karl L. Rankin, China Assignment, (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1964), p. 68.

⁷Ibid., P. 72.

⁸Latourette, The American Record in the Far East, 1945-1951, p. 136.

Placing Taiwan under the protective cover of the Seventh Fleet was a warning to Red China. However, there were times when no American naval vessels were within hundreds of miles of Taiwan due to the naval commitments of the Seventh Fleet in the Korean waters.⁹

As the Korean conflict continued, Chiang Kai-shek, who had resumed the office of the presidency as well as commander of all of the Nationalist armed forces, offered to send a force of 33,000 combat troops to Korea. This offer was rejected by the United States supposedly because of the shortage of troop transports and for the need of the Nationalist troops to defend Taiwan, however, it was primarily rejected because the United States questioned the fighting ability of the troops and feared the possible retaliatory action which the Chinese Communists might take were Nationalist troops sent to Korea.¹⁰

On May 1, 1951, the Military Assistance Advisory Group, Taiwan was established under the command of Major General William C. Chase, USA. Under his guidance, American advisors went to work training the Nationalist armed forces. Chase recommended that a group of seven hundred and seventy-seven personnel be assigned to MAAG, with one hundred working out of Taipei and the remainder assigned to various Nationalist bases throughout Taiwan.¹¹ The assistance program was given an effective

⁹Rankin, p. 84.

¹⁰H. Bradford Westerfield, The Instruments of America's Foreign Policy, (New York: Crowell, 1963), p. 139.

¹¹Rankin, p. 105.

boost by the approval in 1951 of \$300 million in military aid to Taiwan.¹²

During their first few years on Taiwan, the Nationalists made great strides both in the military and economic fields. Thanks to a far-sighted and well-managed land reform program started in 1951, the agricultural output made great advances. In 1950, Taiwan had to import 50,000 tons of rice. By 1952, it was able to export more than 150,000 tons.¹³ In the industrial realm, electrical power, transportation facilities, mining and countless new industries flourished, thanks to effective American aid and plenty of hard work on the part of the Chinese.¹⁴

By 1953, the Nationalist air force was developing into an effective striking force. It had over two thousand pilots. Although most of its planes were obsolete, it received some jet fighters and had sent fifty pilots to the United States for training in jets.¹⁵

At this time, the Nationalist navy had eighty-three ships, including one destroyer, six destroyer-escorts, minesweepers and other craft.¹⁶

Nationalist morale was given a sharp boost early in 1954 when over

¹²Cameron, p. 629.

¹³Robert A. Smith, "The Rebirth of Formosa", China and the World, Foreign Policy Association (New York), May-June 1953, p. 55-60.

¹⁴Buss, p. 678-679.

¹⁵Smith, p. 60.

¹⁶Ibid.

three-quarters of the 20,000 Chinese Communist prisoners-of-war who had been captured in Korea elected to go to Taiwan rather than return to the mainland. The great percentage of these men promptly joined the Nationalist army.¹⁷

During 1954, Nationalist troops continued to strengthen their fortifications on the offshore islands of Quemoy and Matsu. Despite United States denials later that this action was taken without its approval, American advisors on Taiwan had approved and encouraged the Nationalists to bolster the defenses of these islands off the coast of Fukien Province.¹⁸

When President Eisenhower assumed office, he took the restraints off the Nationalists which had prevented them from launching attacks on the mainland. At the same time, American military assistance to Taiwan increased considerably.¹⁹

On September 3, 1954, Communist artillery batteries opened up on Nationalist positions on Quemoy and Little Quemoy. These islands, along with the Matsus and the Tachens, were of little military value to the defense of Taiwan, but they were indispensable to Chiang Kai-shek as possible jumping-off points in any future attack on the mainland.²⁰

¹⁷Rankin, p. 188.

¹⁸Cameron, p. 632.

¹⁹Ibid..

²⁰Julius Pratt, A History of United States Foreign Policy, (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1965), p. 506.

During the bombardment, two American army officers attached to MAAG, Taiwan were killed. The question arose of whether or not the United States should defend the offshore islands as well as Taiwan and the Pescadores. President Eisenhower declared that American forces would defend Quemoy only if it was apparent that this was a prelude to an attack on Taiwan.²¹

As a result of the Korean hostilities and the attack on Quemoy, the United States felt the necessity of signing a Mutual Defense Treaty with the Republic of China. It signed the treaty on December 2, 1954.²² The treaty assured American defense of Taiwan and the Pescadores, but the position of the offshore islands was not spelled out. It gave the United States the right to station air, land and sea forces in and about Taiwan and the Pescadores after necessary arrangements had been made with the Chinese government. When the treaty was ratified, the United States Senate put a rider on the treaty which stipulated that the Nationalists must not undertake any operations against the mainland without American concurrence.²³

On January 29, 1955, a joint resolution of Congress gave the President the right to defend Taiwan and the Pescadores as well as other positions he might determine should be defended in order to safeguard Taiwan.

²¹Ibid.

²²A. G. Mezerik, China Representation in the UN: Border Disputes. Relations with USSR, US, Taiwan., (New York: International Review Service, 1962), p. 11.

²³Buss, p. 685.

Thus, it was clearly left to the President to decide if American aid should go to the offshore islands.²⁴

Communist aircraft launched an attack on the Nationalist-held Tachen Islands in January 1955. On January 18, Communist troops invaded and seized the island of Ichiang in the Tachens after overcoming a brave and heroic stand by a few hundred Nationalist troops. At American urging, the Nationalists evacuated 14,000 military personnel and 16,000 civilians from the Tachens. United States Navy and MAAG personnel helped to supervise the move.²⁵ Shortly thereafter, the Nationalists evacuated 4,000 troops and 2,000 civilians from the Nanchi Islands when it became apparent that the United States would not assist in their defense.²⁶

Chiang had pulled his troops out of the Tachen and Nanchi Islands, but he vowed to stay in the Quemoy and Matsus. He bolstered his armed forces by enactment of universal military training and the establishment of a reserve training program. Inductees went into the army for a period of two years, or into the navy or air force for three years.²⁷ In this manner, Chiang brought new Taiwanese blood into the armed forces to replace and augment his older mainland forces. From the personal

²⁴Pratt, p. 506.

²⁵Rankin, p. 222.

²⁶Ibid., p. 223.

²⁷Ibid., p. 276.

observations of this author made while serving with MAAG, Taiwan, the Taiwanese troops seem quite well-motivated. To those who doubt their enthusiasm to fight well on the mainland, let it merely be said that with good training and capable leadership, the Taiwanese will do a good job.

By 1956, the Nationalists had twenty-one regular American-equipped divisions which were augmented by two understrength armored divisions and a marine division. In all, the Nationalists had approximately 300,000 combat troops backed up by a similar number of support personnel. The air force was being modernized and had been enlarged to five groups with nine reserve divisions as back-up support. From 1950-1956, over two billion dollars in aid had been poured into Taiwan by the United States.²⁸ MAAG personnel worked diligently advising their Chinese counter-parts. The results were evident in the high degree of military proficiency exhibited by the Nationalists.

The Communists renewed their heavy bombardment of Quemoy and Matsu in 1958. This brought swift and effective American assistance. United States vessels assisted the Nationalists in ferrying supplies to Quemoy.²⁹ Upwards of fifty thousand shells pounded Quemoy on August 25 and heavy attacks continued through September 2. Despite Communist demands that

²⁸Allen S. Whiting, "The United States and Taiwan", The United States and the Far East, (New York: December, 1956), The American Assembly, p. 177-178.

²⁹Buss, p. 686.

the garrison surrender, the Nationalists gamely held on and unleashed their own artillery attacks on the mainland. Planes of the Nationalist air force scored brilliant victories over Communist MIGs in the air over Quemoy. Using American Side-winder air-to-air missiles, ten MIGs were shot down and a force of over one hundred scattered.³⁰ In addition to coping with enemy aircraft, the Nationalist air force dropped tons of urgently needed supplies daily to the Quemoy forces.³¹

Reacting to this situation, the United States strengthened the Seventh Fleet and alerted all American forces in the Far East.³² This build-up included moving the carrier, Essex and four destroyers from the Sixth Fleet along with the carrier, Midway and the heavy cruiser, Los Angeles to the Taiwan area. In addition, a squadron of American jet fighters was deployed to bases in Taiwan. With massive American assistance, the Nationalists held out.³³ This was done despite the presence of some five hundred artillery positions on the Chinese coast off Quemoy, repeated attacks on shipping to Quemoy by nearly eighty torpedo and motor gun boats, and the presence of over one hundred Com-

³⁰O. Edmund Clubb, "Sino-American Relations and the Future of Formosa", *Political Science Quarterly*, March 1965, p. 6-7.

³¹Department of State, Department of State, ICA, The Mutual Security Program: Fiscal Year 1960, GPO, Washington: March 1959, p. 126.

³²Mezerik, p. 73.

³³Cameron, p. 644.

munist jet aircraft over the island.³⁴ It was a great moral victory for Nationalist China.

Following the termination of the Quemoy crisis, the Nationalists wrestled with the economic and social problems of revitalizing Taiwan. Chiang made numerous concessions to the local Taiwanese which gave them greater opportunities in education, civil service, the military and even in the political field. The military budget necessary to support an armed forces establishment numbering close to 600,000 men was a burden on the economy. During the period from 1952-1962, the real national income had more than doubled, yet the tremendous increase in population, coupled with this heavy military debt, cancelled its effect. Taiwan had grown from a population of 6,000,000 in 1945 to over 11,000,000 by 1963. To cope with these serious problems, Nationalist China, at the urging of the American advisors, encouraged private investments to build up the Taiwanese economy. To date, over two billion dollars in foreign investments have assisted in making Taiwan the progressive area it is today.³⁵

American military involvement in Taiwan is becoming more evident daily. In addition to MAAG personnel stationed on the island, agreements were reached to station selected United States forces on Taiwan.

³⁴Tang Tsou, "Mao's Limited War in the Taiwan Strait", Orbis, Fall, 1959, p. 339-340.

³⁵Jacob A. Rubin, Your Hundred Billion Dollars: The Complete Story of American Foreign Aid, (Philadelphia: Chilton, 1964), p. 238-239.

Agreement was reached on April 15, 1960 to establish an American Communications Facility near the southern port city of Kaohsiung,³⁶ and a Scatter Wave Control Facility near Yangmingsha on February 28, 1962.³⁷ Personnel attached to these and similar units would fall under a Status of Forces agreement which was being worked out, whereas MAAG personnel would not.

Military aid to the Republic of China has changed from one of massive aid to that of modernization and refinement.³⁸ By 1962, U-2 planes were being shipped to Taiwan for use by Nationalist pilots in reconnaissance flights over the mainland.³⁹ When the Communists fortified their positions on the mainland near the offshore islands, President Kennedy stated that the United States would not remain inactive in the event of

³⁶Department of State, United States Treaties and Other International Agreements, Vol. 13, Part 2, 1962, p. 2155-2158.

³⁷Ibid., p. 2158.

³⁸U. S. Senate, Hearings on Foreign Assistance Act of 1963, GPO, Washington: 1963. Page 267 includes the following statistics:

SUMMARY OF TOTAL AID FURNISHED TAIWAN, BY 1949-62
(millions of dollars)

Economic, total -----	1,317.0
AID, total -----	1,085.8
Grants -----	886.5
Loans -----	199.3
Food for Peace -----	156.5
Grants -----	130.0
Loans -----	26.5
Other MSP economic ----	74.7
Military, total -----	2,163.9
Grand total -----	3,480.9

³⁹Mezerik, p. 19.

a Communist attack on either Taiwan or the offshore islands.⁴⁰ This action marked a clarification of the official American position in regard to the question of the offshore islands.

Thanks largely to massive American aid and the conscientious work done by MAAG personnel, a modern military machine was functioning by 1963. Nationalist China was able to boast of an army numbering 400,000 personnel who manned twenty-one infantry divisions, two armored divisions and a Nike-Hercules battalion. At the same time, the navy numbered 35,000 men and had a marine force of close to 27,000 personnel. Added to these impressive statistics, Nationalist China developed an air force of 110,000 men. Its inventory constituted three interceptor wings of F-86Fs (with Sidewinders) and F-104s, and one F-100 fighter bomber wing. In all, the airforce had close to six hundred planes.⁴¹ By 1965, the modernization of the armed forces resulted in the addition to the army of two armored cavalry regiments, four special forces groups and an airborne infantry regiment. Of the twenty-one infantry divisions, however, only fifteen are presently being trained and equipped by the United States. At the same time, modern F-105 fighter planes are rapidly replacing the old F-86 Sabre-jets in a five wing air force.⁴² In

⁴⁰Mezerik, p. 84.

⁴¹Institute for Strategic Studies, The Communist Bloc and the Western Alliances: The Military Balance 1962-1963, London: 1963, p. 23.

⁴²Seymour Topping, "Taiwan Trains Division for Amphibious Service", The New York Times, June 5, 1965, p. 4:3,4,5.

another move to modernize the armed forces, the United States transferred a highly developed radar probing system to the Nationalists to monitor the mainland and the Taiwan Strait.⁴³ Advice to this modernized force is provided by a MAAG compliment of approximately eight hundred and six military personnel (from all branches of the United States armed forces), four American civilians, and one hundred and nineteen local civilians working for the American advisory group.⁴⁴

Nationalist forces on Taiwan today bear little resemblance to the bedraggled troops who fled from the mainland in 1949. The forces of the Republic of China stand ready to meet any Communist challenge. In fact, during 1965, the Chinese Nationalists have extended economic and technical assistance to the Government of South Viet Nam. At the same time, it established a military mission in South Viet Nam to train Vietnamese troops in psychological warfare.⁴⁵

America's role in the Taiwan story has turned out to be a positive and enlightened one. Taiwan stands as an example to the people of mainland China of what free people working together can accomplish. Despite repeated Communist demands that the United States abandon Taiwan, American

⁴³Ibid.

⁴⁴Department of Defense, Military Assistance Facts, GPO, Washington: 15 February 1965, p. 30.

⁴⁵Seymour Topping, "U. S. Reassessing Taiwan Forces", The New York Times, June 3, 1965, p. 3:5,6,7.

foreign policy has stood firm in its support of the Republic of China.⁴⁶

Nationalist China's economy has progressed to the point where the American AID program has been phased out. At the same time, Taiwan is contributing a greater share of the money for military expenditures, with United States' funds being used primarily for modernization and replacement of obsolete equipment.

Early in January 1966, Nationalist China showed her determination to work side-by-side with her American ally when permission was granted for the United States to use the Kungwan air base near Taichung for American aircraft operating in direct support of the war effort in Viet Nam. The United States Air Force 314th Troop Carrier Wing and the 6,217th Support Group will operate directly from this base. Since Viet Nam is only four-hour's flying distance from Taiwan for the Hercules C-130 aircraft, the importance of Taiwan to the United States is readily seen.⁴⁷

Much progress has been made in the training and development of the armed forces of the Republic of China since the bitter days of 1949. Today, Nationalist China stands as one of the strongest and staunchest allies of the United States.

⁴⁶ Temple Wanamaker, American Foreign Policy Today, (New York: Bantam, 1964) p. 166.

⁴⁷ "U. S. Taiwan Base to Serve Vietnam", The New York Times, January 11, 1966, p. 1:2; 3:3.

CHAPTER V

AMERICAN MILITARY AID AND ASSISTANCE TO THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA:

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

In examining the history of American military aid and assistance to the Republic of China, it becomes increasingly evident that the United States has never had a firm policy with regard to China. The degree of American assistance has varied from that of small military loans to massive uncontrolled grants to limited non-combat support, and for a short period of time, to no assistance whatever. As might be expected, this uncertainty over what goals this aid was supposed to achieve fluctuated with the political view of the Nationalist regime held in Washington at any given time. This inconsistency hurt the American military effort on the mainland, and it made the role of the advisors on Taiwan quite difficult. Fortunately, in the past few years, the United States has taken the position that the Republic of China on Taiwan has become a strong and trusted ally of the United States, and the degree and scope of American military and economic aid and assistance to China has reflected this new appraisal.

To determine if the present American program of assistance to the Republic of China is sound, an examination should be made of the mistakes made on the mainland to ensure that similar blunders are being avoided on Taiwan.

First of all, could the mainland have been saved from falling

under the control of the forces of Mao Tse-tung? It is obvious that no single factor led to the deterioration and ultimate complete defeat of the Nationalists. China was a relatively undeveloped and economically backward country when the Japanese invaded its territory. Chiang Kai-shek ruled the nation in name, but the real power still remained in the hands of war lords and powerful provincial leaders throughout the country. Forced to move his capital to Chungking, Chiang was deprived of the rich areas of Manchuria and North China as well as of the commercial wealth of the coastal cities. In addition to carrying on a costly war against the Japanese, Chiang had to cope with the fact that the Chinese Communists were using the war as a means of building their own power base in North China. Chiang tended to surround himself with loyal, but all too often, incompetent and even corrupt generals and advisors. Perhaps if Chiang had listened to the recommendations made by General Stilwell on reform measures needed to build up his regime, the Nationalist Government might have emerged from the war better prepared to assume the responsibilities of governing this huge territory. Likewise, Chiang tended to disregard the sound advice given by his American advisors relating to the conduct of the war against the Communists. This was especially true when he committed a large portion of his best troops to a Manchurian campaign, which, in fact, had already been lost. Finally, he ignored the advice of astute men like General Wedemeyer who warned him of the urgent need for the elimination of corruption and terror-tactics in the cities as well as the need for fairer

treatment for the suffering peasants. The mainland was lost because of these and many other factors.

Could the United States have taken a more active role in helping to prevent the loss of the mainland to the Communists? Certainly, a more positive approach to this problem would have had its effects. China was considered to be of secondary importance in the over-all scheme of operations in World War II. The large percentage of American military aid and assistance went to other nations. Active American assistance in China was limited and ineffective. After the war, President Truman did not hide his dislike for Chiang Kai-shek and this attitude was evident in the lack of American support for his regime. The reluctance of the United States to become involved in the civil war prompted the sending to China of the so-called "Marshall Mission". General Marshall could not have come to China at a more inopportune time. The Nationalists were on the offensive, and were making great military gains in Manchuria and North China. Marshall's insistence on a cease-fire discouraged and demoralized the Nationalists, and at the same time, gave the Communists the opportunity they urgently needed to regroup and replenish their forces. Marshall's enforcement of an arms and ammunition embargo against the Nationalists at the same time that the Russians were turning over vast supplies of arms and equipment to the Chinese Communists gave the edge in the war to the Reds. It is doubtful that even with massive American aid that Chiang could have completely destroyed the Communists. It does seem reasonable to con-

clude that China would, at the very least, be governed today by a coalition government, controlled by the Nationalists. Failure of the United States to act effectively in China resulted in our eventual involvement in Korea and the military necessity to be in Viet Nam at the present time.

Would the Nationalist armed forces put up a good fight today if committed to action against the mighty forces of Red China? Any army to be good has to have good leadership, good training, adequate supplies and equipment, and sufficient motivation to accomplish all assigned tasks. The defeated Nationalist forces which fled the mainland in 1949 lacked all of the above requirements. Leadership was almost non-existent; most of the military personnel were young peasants recruited after the war and afforded only the minimum of military training; although much of the equipment was new, there was an acute shortage of spare parts and a shortage of ammunition; as for motivation, the disastrous defeats on the mainland drained whatever fight remained in these troops. However, a remarkable transformation has taken place on the island of Taiwan. Thanks in great measure to an extensive American program of economic and military aid and assistance, Taiwan stands today as one of the most productive areas of Asia. Her economy is second only to Japan as the strongest in the Far East. Militarily, her armed forces have received the very best equipment and training possible. Most of the key officers in the Nationalist armed forces have been trained in the United States. The work of the personnel of MAAG, Taiwan should not be

underestimated. It was their conscientious and diligent labor directed toward the goal of rebuilding capable fighting forces that has resulted in the Nationalist armed forces being considered today as forming one of the strongest military machines, for its size, in the world. Close to 600,000 Chinese Nationalist troops stand as a constant reminder to Mao Tse-tung that any overt moves on his part in Korea or in Southeast Asia might well result in these troops being committed either in the actual battle area or being used in diversionary attacks on the mainland.

Would the Taiwanese members of the armed forces fight well in the event that an invasion of the mainland were attempted? Many persons in the United States believe that the necessity for the Nationalists to induct young Taiwanese into the armed forces will undermine their military effectiveness. The initial hostility of the Taiwanese towards the mainlanders has not been completely overcome. Yet, seventeen years have elapsed since the mass intrusion of upwards of two million mainland Chinese onto the small island. Better treatment is now being afforded the average Taiwanese. They are enjoying one of the highest standards of living in Asia. Considerable inter-marriage between mainlanders and Taiwanese has eased the old feeling of animosity. Taiwanese troops are being given the opportunity to make careers in the armed forces. Eventually, a large portion of the officer and non-commissioned officer ranks will, by necessity, have to be filled by native Taiwanese. Yes, these Taiwanese will fight. With good training and good leadership

there is no reason to expect that they would not perform well on the mainland. Certainly, they would prefer to stay on Taiwan, but most American soldiers and marines in Viet Nam at the present time would have preferred to stay in the United States. This does not mean that they are not fighting skilfully, and in a most dedicated manner, however.

It is recommended that United States military aid to the Republic of China be continued. Nationalist China is one of the few loyal and sincere friends which the United States has in the world today. Military aid should continue to take the form of that necessary to equip and retain a modern and highly mobile striking force on an island only one hundred miles off the coast of Red China.

It is recommended that steps be taken to establish closer contact between the military personnel of the Republic of China and of the United States. This could be accomplished by increasing the number of quotas for Chinese personnel, both officer and enlisted, at service schools in the United States. Likewise, in addition to the large-scale Sino-American joint military exercises which are normally conducted annually, it is recommended that extensive small unit training be conducted between units of the two countries. The proximity of Okinawa to Taiwan would make it a simple operation to arrange for platoon or company size Chinese units to train with United States Army or Marine Corps units in the Northern Training Area of Okinawa. In so doing, both the Americans and the Chinese would gain a greater appreciation of the fighting ability of each other and the bonds of friendship would become

even stronger. In large-scale exercises, the human contact is lost. Individual American and Chinese units remain aloof from each other. Joint exercises on the small-unit level would bring the individual back into the picture.

It is further recommended that due consideration be given to use Nationalist troops in repelling Chinese Communist or Chinese Communist-inspired military action anywhere in the Far East.

Many individuals in the United States feel that Communist China will eventually gain control of the entire Far East and recommend that the United States withdraw from this arena and "let nature take its course". The fact which these short-sighted people fail to recognize is that the United States is not standing alone in Asia. Working together through a series of multi-lateral or bi-lateral defense agreements, the forces of South Korea, Thailand, South Viet Nam, the Philippines, Australia, New Zealand, and last, but certainly not least, the well-trained and well-disciplined armed forces of the Republic of China stand with the United States ready to repel any attempts by the Chinese Communists to force their will on their weaker brothers.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Barnett, A. Doak. China on the Eve of Communist Takeover. New York: Praeger, 1963
- Buss, Claude A. Asia in the Modern World. New York: Macmillan, 1964
- Brown, William A., Jr. and Opie, Redvers. American Foreign Assistance. Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1953
- Cameron, Meribeth E. et al. China, Japan and the Powers. New York: Ronald, 1960
- Campbell, John C. The United States in World Affairs, 1947-1948. New York: Harper, 1948
- Clubb, O. Edmund. "Formosa and the Offshore Islands in American Policy, 1950-1955". Political Science Quarterly. Vol. LXXIV 1959, p. 517-531
- Clubb, O. Edmund. "Sino-American Relations and the Future of Formosa." Political Science Quarterly. March 1965
- Clubb, O. Edmund. 20th Century China. New York: Columbia University Press, 1964
- Conlon Associates. United States Foreign Policy: Asia. (studies prepared at the request of the Committee of Foreign Affairs, U. S. Senate) Washington: GPO, 1959
- Department of Defense. Military Assistance Facts. Washington: 15 February 1965
- Department of State, Department of Defense, ICA. The Mutual Security Program: Fiscal Year 1960. Washington: GPO, March 1959
- Department of State. Treaties and Other International Acts. Series 5728. Washington: 1964
- Department of State. United States Relations With China: With Special Reference to the Period 1944-1949. Washington: 1949 (commonly called the "White Paper")
- Department of State. United States Treaties and Other International Agreements. Vol. 13, Part 2, 1962, p. 2155-2158

- Fairbank, John F. The United States and China. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1958
- Fairbank, John F. The United States and China. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1949
- Feis, Herbert. The China Tangle. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1953
- Fessler, Loren, et al., eds., China. New York: Time, Inc., 1963
- Fitzgerald, C. P. The Birth of Communist China. Baltimore: Penquin, 1964
- Forman, H. Blunder in Asia. New York: Didier, 1950
- Hirshberg, Robert L. "Defense and Economic Development: The Taiwan Experience." Military Review. November 1965, p. 18-30
- Institute for Strategic Studies. The Communist Bloc and the Western Alliances: The Military Balance 1962-1963. London: 1963
- Kai-shek, Chiang (Chiang Chung-cheng). Soviet Russia in China: A Summing-Up at Seventy. New York: Farrar, Straus and Cudahy, 1957
- Kubek, Anthony. How the Far East Was Lost: American Policy and the Creation of Communist China, 1941-1949. Chicago: Regnery, 1963
- Latourette, Kenneth S. China. Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1964
- Latourette, Kenneth S. The American Record in the Far East, 1945-1951. New York: Macmillan, 1952
- Latourette, Kenneth S. The Chinese: Their History and Culture. New York: Macmillan, 1962
- Lerche, Charles O., Jr. Foreign Policy of the American People. Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1958
- Loh, Pichon P. Y. et al. The Kuomintang Debacle of 1949: Conquest or Collapse? Boston: Heath, 1965
- Mezerik, A. G. China Representation in the UN: Border Disputes, Relations with USSR, US, Taiwan. New York: International Review Service, 1962
- Peck, John and Lippe, Paul. The World in Our Day. New York: Oxford Book Co., 1960

- Peffer, Nathaniel. The Far East: A Modern History. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1958
- Pratt, Julius W. A History of United States Foreign Policy. Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1965
- President's Committee to Study the United States Military Assistance Program. Composite Report, Vol. I. Washington: August 17, 1959
- Rankin, Karl L. China Assignment. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1964
- Romanus, Charles and Sunderland, Riley. United States Army in World War II, China-Burma-India Theater: Stilwell's Command Problems. Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1956
- Rowe, David N. Modern China: A Brief History. Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1959
- Rubin, Jacob A. Your Hundred Billion Dollars: The Complete Story of American Foreign Aid. Philadelphia: Chilton, 1964
- Schuman, Frederick L. International Politics: The Western State System and the World Community. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1958
- Smith, Robert A. "The Rebirth of Formosa." China and the World. New York: Foreign Policy Association, May-June 1953, p. 55-60
- Spanier, John W. American Foreign Policy Since World War II. New York: Praeger, 1965
- Stilwell, Joseph W. The Stilwell Papers. New York: William Sloan Assoc., 1948
- Swisher, Earl. Today's World in Focus: China. Boston: Ginn, 1964
- Topping, Seymour. "Taiwan Trains Division for Amphibious Service." The New York Times. June 5, 1965, p. 4:3,4,5
- Topping, Seymour. "U. S. Reassessing Taiwan Forces." The New York Times. June 3, 1965, p. 3:5,6,7
- Tsou, Tang. America's Failure in China 1941-1950. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963
- Tsou, Tang. "Mao's Limited War in the Taiwan Strait." Orbis, Fall 1959, p. 332-350

- United States Senate. Hearings on Foreign Assistance Act of 1963.
Washington: GPO, 1963
- "U. S. Taiwan Bases to Serve Vietnam". The New York Times. January
11, 1966, p. 1:2; 3:3
- Vinacke, Harold M. A History of the Far East in Modern Times. New
York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1959
- Wanamaker, Temple. American Foreign Policy Today. New York: Bantam,
1964
- Wedemeyer, Albert C. Wedemeyer Reports! New York: Holt, 1958
- Westerfield, H. Bradford. The Instruments of America's Foreign Policy.
New York: Crowell, 1963
- Whiting, Allen S. "The United States and Taiwan." The United States
and the Far East. (New York: December, 1956), The American
Assembly, p. 173-201
- Wolf, Charles Jr. Foreign Aid: Theory and Practice in Southern Asia.
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960