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RHODESIA: A DILEMMA IN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

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## INTRODUCTION

The crisis precipitated in November 1965 by Rhodesia's unilateral declaration of independence has created a dilemma in the formulation of United States foreign policy with that country. The United States has increasingly found itself forced to choose between certain of its' traditional principles and its' real world interests. It has been forced to choose between supporting its' long-time ally, Britain, on the one hand and the newly emergent nations of Africa, with which it has striven to establish close ties, on the other. It has been forced to choose between favoring stability and prosperity or creating instability and economic depression in that area. Indeed, the United States has been asked to choose between peace and conflict in that small country.

The thesis is submitted that the United States, in its' attempt to remain responsive to the interests of various factions, has, in fact, created a policy which serves the interests of none. The current policy, aimed at toppling the Smith government through economic warfare, has met with a conspicuous lack of success. The thesis contends that the United States must adopt a new and positive policy in seeking its' objectives in Rhodesia.

The thesis is limited to U.S. foreign policy and how effectively that policy supports U.S. objectives in Rhodesia.

Related and important issues such as the morality of racial discrimination and the legality of the United Nations' intervention are considered subjects of such magnitude as to be beyond the scope of this paper.

Although the colony calls itself Rhodesia, the official name is Southern Rhodesia, since the British Parliament is the only legal authority which can change the name of the territory. For simplicity and in keeping with common usage, the name Rhodesia will be used throughout this paper.

# RHODESIA: A DILEMMA IN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

## CHAPTER I

### AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY DEFINED

In order to properly analyze American foreign policy, it is necessary to determine what constitutes foreign policy and to place it in context with such related concepts as national interest, principles and objectives.

Definitions. The following definitions, taken from the Brookings Institution Publication, United States Foreign Policy 1945-1955, will assist in establishing the relationship between these terms.

The national interest may be defined as the general and continuing ends for which a state acts; to maintain its' security and to promote its' well-being. The concept of the national interest undergoes periodic redefinition in order to support the changing interpretations of the requirements of security and well-being.

Principles are the enduring modes of behavior or the established guides to action that characterize nations. Principles are deeply imbedded in the general culture and political philosophy of a society. They represent those underlying patterns of value to which determinations of interests, objectives and policies tend to conform.

Objectives are specific goals designed to secure or

support an interest, a principle, or some combination of the two. Long term objectives are generally characterized as national goals.

Policies refer to specific courses of action designed to achieve an objective. The distinction between policies and objectives is that between means and ends. (17:471)

A nation's foreign policy is, therefore, determined by the current interpretation of its' interests and objectives and of the principles that it professes.

Principles of American Foreign Policy. American foreign policy has, traditionally, been strongly influenced by its' moral standards. The following fundamental principles have continued to guide American relations with other states:

- 1) the sovereignty of nations,
- 2) the right to self-defense,
- 3) the right of self-determination,
- 4) the sovereign equality of nations,
- 5) the peaceful settlement of disputes,
- 6) the refraint from the use of force in dealing with other nations,
- 7) the granting of independence to all qualified dependent peoples,
- 8) the minimum obligations of every state to other states. (17:27)

President Lyndon B. Johnson, in a 1964 address, defined certain additional principles that have guided his administration in the formulation of foreign policy as follows:

The principles of this American foreign policy...reflect the realities of our world and they reflect the aims of our country.

First...we have labored to build a military strength of unmatched might...the costs of weakness are far greater than the costs of strength and the payment far more painful...

Second, we have strongly resisted the communists' efforts to extend their dominion and expand their power...

Third, we have worked for the revival of strength among our allies...because our future rests on the vitality and the unity of the Western society to which we belong.

Fourth, we have encouraged the independence and the progress of developing countries. We are safer...in a world where all people can govern themselves in their own way and where all nations have the inner strength to resist external domination.

Fifth, we have pursued every hope of a lasting peace...In that pursuit...we have been the leading power in support of the United Nations... We will work to reach agreement on measures to reduce armament and lessen the chance of war.

In his address, President Johnson limited his remarks to those principles most significant to the existing international situation. (8:28)

Concept of American Foreign Policy. In relating the foregoing principles to foreign policy, former Secretary of State John Foster Dulles defined his concept of American foreign policy by extending the ideals contained in the Preamble to the Constitution of the United States to the international sphere.

"To form a more perfect union" meant to assist in making the United Nations an effective organization for peace. "Establish justice" meant to promote the sway of international law to bring peace accompanied by justice. "Insure domestic tranquility" meant to assist other peoples to achieve their just aspirations through peaceful change rather than violence. "Provide for the common defense" meant to join with other independent nations in a common effort to protect their and our freedoms from any force, particularly international communism, which sought to destroy them. "Promote the general welfare" meant to adopt such policies of economic assistance and trade as would stimulate economic development in other nations. "Secure the blessing of liberty" meant to make known to other peoples that the American Revolution was the true revolution for human freedom. (3:22)

Former Assistant Secretary of State Andrew Berding relates this definition to national interests when he states: "Essentially our foreign policy is designed to promote the national interests of the United States... the national interests of the United States are promoted only by having a world at peace, by helping justice prevail everywhere, by aiding the less-developed countries, and by working for international order under law." (3:23)



## CHAPTER II

### AMERICAN INTERESTS IN RHODESIA

The National Interests. It has been established that American foreign policy is determined by the existing interpretation of the national interests. The national interests are, in turn, dependent upon the requirements of national security and well-being. American security is served by maintaining peace in Africa, by containing communism and by the continued availability of strategic resources to the West. American well-being is promoted by maintaining economic conditions favorable to American investment and trade. The next step is to determine just what are American interests in Rhodesia.

Peace in Africa. The maintenance of a peaceful environment within Africa is based on two prerequisites: 1) the political stability and internal security of the individual countries and 2) the ability of those countries to resist external pressures. The political situation presently existing in Rhodesia meets these two requirements.

Political Stability. The government of Ian Smith is in firm control. When Prime Minister Smith unilaterally declared Rhodesia's independence from Britain in November 1965, he was well armed with an overwhelming victory at the polls by his Rhodesian Front party some six months before.

The question of Rhodesian independence was the prime issue during this election. (22:695) The events which have transpired since then, including the stiff resistance to the ensuing economic sanctions, have had the net effect of further uniting the white Rhodesians behind Smith. There has been no evidence that the whites, who have the most to lose by these sanctions, are becoming disenchanted with their government. To the contrary, there was great rejoicing among the white Rhodesians when the Prime Minister rejected a final British ultimatum before the matter was taken to the United Nations in December 1966. (31:36)

While the Smith government commands the solid backing of the white Rhodesian minority, it is interesting to note that the people most affected by the racial policies of that government, the vast black majority, have appeared to be supremely apathetic about the whole affair. (31:42)

The internal security of the country is quite adequately handled by the 7400-man internal security force. Should future developments require, the internal security force could be augmented by the country's armed forces, its' non-territorial forces and its' reserves. (6:n.p.)

The external threat of military aggression is not a serious one in the eyes of the Rhodesians. The British have repeatedly rejected the use of force in bringing down the Smith government. Similarly, the United Nations

renounced the use of force against Rhodesia when it resolved to impose mandatory economic sanctions against that country in December of 1966. And, while the black African states privately talk about armed intervention in Rhodesia by black African forces, such threats are without substance. Not only are the black Africans confronted with the lack of adequate forces to do the job but also with the almost insurmountable problems of co-ordination, command and logistics. But probably the most important deterrent is that most black African leaders are well aware that their own regimes, being supported to a large degree by their armed forces, would be jeopardized if these troops were not kept close at hand. (4:98)

The Rhodesian armed forces are quite adequate to meet any military threat from black Africa. Its' armed forces, though small, are both tough and well equipped. They have been described as one of the most efficient military organizations in Africa. (6:n.p.)

The Rhodesian Army, which is organized along British lines, consists of the 3400-man Regular Force, the 7000-man Royal Rhodesian Regiment and 1400 Reservists. The Army has integrated the units of the Regular Force and the Rhodesian Regiment at the brigade level to effect a highly co-ordinated command structure. The Army is equipped with modern light weapons, armored cars and light tanks which afford a high degree of mobility and flexibility. (23:465)

The Royal Rhodesian Air Force is well organized to support any foreseeable military commitments. The Air Force consists of 1200 men and 80 modern aircraft of the following types: one squadron of 15 Canberra medium jet bombers, one squadron composed of 12 Hunter MK-9's and 12 Vampire fighter-bombers, one squadron of T.52 Provost jets fitted with machine guns and wing stations for bombs and rockets, a transport squadron of Dakota and Argonaut aircraft, a squadron of 8 Alouette III helicopters, plus training aircraft. These types of aircraft are well suited to provide both close air support to ground forces and longer range air interdiction missions. There is also a parachute training school. (23:465)

From a defense standpoint, Rhodesia can view her political boundaries with a certain degree of security. To the east is Mozambique, to the south is South Africa; both of these countries share her political views. To the west is Botswana, a newly independent nation, without any armed forces and completely dependent on South Africa. Only black-ruled Zambia to the north poses any threat. While Zambia energetically supports the black African demands, it is significant to note her reliance on Rhodesian coal and Kariba dam electric power to run her copper industrial complexes and that her refined copper exports (which contribute 70% of the government revenues) are transported mainly

by the Rhodesian railroad to the seaports of Mozambique. Also, in 1964, Zambia received 60% of her imports from Rhodesia and South Africa and trade has increased since. (13:151)

In the event military intervention by forces external to Africa should prove a threat more than Rhodesian assets are able to cope with, she has only to turn to her southern African neighbors who share her racial policies. The Republic of South Africa and Portugal, in protecting her overseas territories of Angola and Mozambique, are both firmly committed to support Rhodesia. "The white governments of southern Africa are realizing that defeat for one is defeat for all. These countries of southern Africa are turning themselves into a white bastion completely ready to defy the outside world indefinitely." (11:40)

Communism in Africa. Communist influence in Africa reached its' high point in 1963. Starting with the alleged Chinese communist involvement in the Zanzibar revolution in January 1964, the African countries have viewed communist approachments with a certain degree of suspicion. The rivalry caused by the Sino-Soviet falling out has done little to advance the cause of international communism in Africa.

The overthrow of the pro-communist regimes of Ben Bella of Algeria in July 1965, of Nkrumah of Ghana in April 1966 together with the attempted overthrow (suppressed by Cuban "advisors") of Prime Minister Naumazalay of the Congo (Brazzaville) in July 1966, all evidence the decline of communist

influence on the continent. Also, dissension is growing toward the communist-supported government of Mali, where the amount of the foreign debt exceeds the national budget. (9:72)

However, the United States must consider the fact that international communism is always a force to be reckoned with in situations involving rebellion and violence. Russia still retains a foothold in Guinea and the Congo; China, who blatantly supplies military arms to rebels, is well established in Tanzania, Burundi and Mali; and Cuban advisors wield considerable influence over the Congo (Brazzaville) regime. From these bases the communists would be quick to exploit any dissatisfaction on the part of the black Africans with the West. Also, the communists would be equally ready to take advantage of any unrest within the black African countries in order to extend their area of influence.

Rhodesia has a long, honorable history of close association with the West. Her troops served with distinction along with the British in World War II. Many of the streets of her capital bear the names of allied victories and the Union Jack continues to fly there. In spite of all the pressures brought to bear on her, Rhodesia continues to align herself with the West and remains strongly opposed to communism. Together with Angola and Mozambique, Rhodesia affords an effective barrier to communism in southern Africa.

Strategic Resources. While Rhodesia itself ranks among the top ten in the world production of three strategic materials, the full significance of its' contribution to the free world market must be viewed as a part of the contribution of southern Africa as a whole. Because of the interdependence of the individual national economies, the loss of the Rhodesian economy necessarily will have a profound influence on southern Africa as a whole.

In the case of Zambia and the Congo, the relationship is an economic one. The mining industries of these countries are to a large degree dependent on power produced from Rhodesian coal or from the Kariba dam in Rhodesia. Zambia, in addition, is dependent on the Rhodesian railroad as her principal export route.

South Africa, because of a similar racial policy, has committed herself to an economic alliance with Rhodesia for political reasons. South Africa thus affords an outlet for Rhodesian exports. Therefore, a loss of Rhodesian strategic materials would imply a similar loss of South African resources.

Among free world producers of strategic materials, the countries of southern Africa ranked in the upper ten in eleven resources in 1965. South Africa ranked first in the production of antimony, chromite, gold, manganese and platinum; second in asbestos and vanadium; fourth in uranium; eighth in coal and ninth in copper. Rhodesia ranked second in the

production of chromite, third in asbestos and sixth in gold. Zambia ranked second in the production of copper and cobalt. The Congo ranked first in the production of cobalt. South-west Africa ranked third in vanadium. Of strategic importance is that South Africa has the only known supply of amosite asbestos, a type utilized in naval turbine plants due to its' resistance to high temperature steam.

Of United States' imports in 1965, southern Africa supplied 40% of the antimony, 100% of the amosite asbestos, 67% of the chromite, 38% of the cobalt and 41% of the uranium.

The conclusion to be drawn from these statistics is that the continued availability of these strategic resources is vital to America's national interests. (7:v.p.)

American Investment and Trade. American private enterprise has a considerable interest at stake in American foreign policy toward Rhodesia and southern Africa. The manipulation of international trade, through the imposition of sanctions by the Administration, has an immediate and profound influence on American business in that area.

In Rhodesia, American private industry is well-represented. The Umtali oil refinery is owned in part by the American companies of American Independent Oil, Caltex and Socony Mobil Oil. This major refinery, which was completed in 1965, is to be the major source of petroleum for Rhodesia. Large chromite mines are operated by the Union Carbide



corporation and the Vanadium Corporation of America. The Ford Motor Company has built a new automobile assembly plant (presently shut down due to the U.S. embargo on automobile parts). In Salisbury, Eastman Kodak has a microfilm processing plant and National Cash Register has recently opened a data processing center. (1:117)

U.S. imports from Rhodesia amounted to \$9.8 million in 1965 and will be approximately the same for 1966. The U.S. imported one-third of its' chromite requirements, amounting to some \$6 million, from Rhodesia in 1965. The U.S. purchase of Rhodesian pig iron rose from practically nothing in 1965 to \$2.2 million in the first ten months of 1966. Likewise, American purchases of Rhodesian tobacco rose from \$770 thousand in 1965 to \$850 thousand in the ten months of 1966. (20:1)

Rhodesia purchased some \$23 million worth of American products in 1965. Due to government imposed sanctions, American private industry realized only \$6 million in exports to Rhodesia during the first three quarters of 1966, a decrease which did little to help America's balance of payments problem. (20:1)

In addition to the loss of her economic interests in Rhodesia, America also faces the possibility of the loss of her markets and investments in South Africa. South Africa has refused to support the United Nations' mandatory sanctions

imposed against Rhodesia in December 1966. In response, the U.N. may well extend those same sanctions to include South Africa herself. Should this occur, American economic foreign interest would suffer noticeably.

In 1965, 259 American firms, represented by such industrial titans as General Motors, Chrysler and International Harvester, had plants operating in South Africa representing an investment of \$700 million in American capital. The amount of this investment is presently growing at 15% annually. These investments are earning a return of 21% annually, making South Africa the most profitable country for private capital in the world. (21:9)

South Africa has been a major trading partner of the U.S. in recent years. In 1965, South Africa purchased \$460 million worth of products from the United States. At the same time her exports to the United States amounted to some \$200 million. (21:9)

Summary. In the foregoing discussion, the premise has been developed that America's national interests in Africa are served in the following manner:

- 1) Peace in Africa--that Rhodesia is politically stable and militarily secure; that Rhodesia does not seek to interfere in the affairs of other states; that Rhodesia has powerful allies to assist her; and that the black ruled African nations do not possess the unity or military force to intervene in Rhodesia.

2) Containment of Communism--that while always a threat, communist influence in Africa is on the decline; and that Rhodesia, through her historical ties with the West, remains strongly pro-Western.

3) Availability of Strategic Resources--that southern Africa ranks within the top ten in the free world production of eleven strategic resources; and that the U.S. imports significant amounts of five of these resources.

4) American Foreign Investment and Trade--that America has substantial private investments in Rhodesia and southern Africa; and that southern Africa comprises one of America's principal areas of foreign trade.

## CHAPTER III

### UDI: CAUSES

The crisis which has been generated by Rhodesia's unilateral declaration of independence from Britain has assumed proportions far in excess of an argument between an imperial power and her rebellious colony. The highly explosive racial overtones involved in the crisis have generated repercussions throughout not only the African continent but the whole world. As this unilateral action by Rhodesia has become the very crux of American foreign policy, the causes which precipitated this event and the world-wide effects it has had will be investigated.

Prosperity. Prior to declaring independence, Rhodesia had achieved a state of economic development in sub-Sahara Africa surpassed only by that of the Republic of South Africa. This economic success was due principally to the ingenuity and industry of the European pioneers who came to Rhodesia from England and from South Africa. Starting in the late 1880's, when the territory was proclaimed a British sphere of influence to be administered by the British South Africa Company, Rhodesia has continued to prosper under the guidance of its' white settlers until today it boasts a gross domestic product in excess of £300 million. The white Rhodesians, who have created the economic advantages the country enjoys, are reluctant to turn over the

reins of government to the black Africans whom they feel are not yet qualified for the task. (30:3)

Self-Government. A major factor influencing Rhodesia's unilateral action is the high degree of self-government she has traditionally enjoyed. In 1922 Rhodesia voted in favor of responsible government (the alternative being annexation to the Union of South Africa) and in 1923 the territory became an internally self-governing colony of the crown. As a colony, Rhodesia had her own legislature, civil service, armed forces and police. While Rhodesia was never directly administered from London, Britain retained the right to intervene in matters directly affecting the African population. Except in areas of foreign affairs and defense, Rhodesia enjoyed a high degree of autonomy. A new constitution, granted by Great Britain in 1961, removed most of the few remaining legal controls held by the United Kingdom.

Denial of Independence. Between 1953 and 1963, Rhodesia, for economic reasons, joined in a multi-racial federation with the British protectorates of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. While the federation was an economic success, the black African-ruled protectorates feared they would be unable to achieve independence within the federal structure. The federation was dissolved at the end of 1963 and the protectorates, now Zambia and Malawi, were granted independent status within the Commonwealth the following year. Rhodesia,

however, because of her white supremacy policies, was denied similar status and remained a self-governing colony under her 1961 constitution. Rhodesia, with her more highly developed economy, regarded the granting of independence to these less developed African-ruled countries a direct affront to her national pride. Britain, under pressure from the U.N. and the African members of the Commonwealth, attempted to force the Rhodesians to revise their 1961 constitution in order to provide for the eventual transfer of political power to the country's four million Africans. This prospect was unacceptable to the quarter million white Rhodesians and after more than two years of futile negotiations, Prime Minister Ian Smith made the unilateral declaration.

Chaos in black Africa. In justification of their adamant resistance to turning the government over to their African majority, the white Rhodesians cite the unfortunate record of political instability experienced by their black-ruled northern neighbors. Excerpts from a report of the recent political turmoil witnessed in black-ruled Africa would support this argument.

Nigeria. Since gaining independence in November 1960, political and tribal crises have threatened on at least five occasions to split the country...corrupt politicians have made a mockery of the ideal of democracy...the "take" from graft and the looting of public funds have been huge...independence has substituted tribal hatreds for racial problems.

Congo. In six years of independence, the country has had five governments, two military coups, two mutinies and a rebellion that nearly turned the country into a communist state...two prime ministers have been assassinated...the Congo is presently ruled by a military dictator...President Mobutu dismissed eight ministers for incompetence, laziness and dishonesty.

Congo Republic (Brazzavile). An attempted mutiny by the army was suppressed by 400 Cuban "advisors"...the Cubans gained paramount influence over the government...the country is one of the poorest in Africa...prospects are bleak.

Ghana. President Nkrumah was overthrown in May 1966...the country is one billion dollars in debt...at the time of the overthrow the country was on the verge of becoming a Soviet base.

Guinea. After gaining independence, Guinea turned to Russia for aid...by 1960 it was virtually a Soviet satellite.

Uganda...is beset by tribal problems... conflict is chronic...President Obote gained power through a coup in which 1,000 tribesmen were killed...Obote is a virtual dictator... there is little sense of national unity because of tribal animosities.

Rawanda...is beset by tribal wars.

Burundi...is plagued by tribal wars...the Chinese communists are well entrenched...the most recent King dethroned his father and was in turn dethroned by the Prime Minister.

Lesotho. Three months after gaining independence, the first power struggle between the King and Prime Minister occurred...the Police Minister and five others were killed with dozens wounded. (4:98)

The year of 1966 also saw the overthrow of governments in Dahomey, Central African Republic, Upper Volta, Tanzania and Togo. In summing up the situation, one

American report states:

Most black-ruled countries are finding themselves bogged down in poverty, tyranny and bloodshed...there is a wide-spread feeling among Africans that life was less violent and more prosperous under colonial rule...In some places, independence has triggered tribal wars and rebellion. In others, black rule has brought economic ruin. (4:100)

Success of South Africa. In vivid contrast to the political and economic chaos which prevailed among her black-ruled northern neighbors stood Rhodesia's southern neighbor, the Republic of South Africa. South Africa, a country which shares Rhodesia's views of white racial supremacy, had resisted similar British pressures in 1961 by withdrawing from the Commonwealth and proclaiming herself a republic. The continued success and prosperity since enjoyed by South Africa greatly influenced the final decision reached by Rhodesia.



## CHAPTER IV

### UDI: EFFECTS

The unilateral declaration of independence proclaimed by Rhodesia in November 1965 had profound repercussions not only throughout Africa but throughout the world. From the halls of Parliament in London to the halls of the U.N. in New York, the event caused vehement argument and debate.

Britain. As the nation most affected by the Rhodesian proclamation, Britain immediately found herself in the center of the world stage. Britain, even though she could foresee the coming event for a long time, was faced with a multitude of problems.

Negotiations had been going on between Rhodesia and Britain over independence ever since the dissolution of the Central African Federation in December 1963. The principal stumbling block had always been the question of majority rule. In October 1965, Britain set forth five principles, to which a sixth was later added, which she would consider the basis for granting independence to Rhodesia. These principles are as follows:

- 1) That there be unimpeded progress toward majority rule.
- 2) That there be provisions against any retrogression by Rhodesia on the constitutional guarantees for majority rule.

- 3) That there be immediate constitutional advancement for the Africans.
- 4) That there be progress in reducing racial discrimination.
- 5) That the 1961 constitution be acceptable to a majority of the whole population.
- 6) That there be no oppression of majority by minority or vice versa. (29:2)

Rhodesia had threatened UDI for some time and Britain was always quick to point out the consequences connected with such action. So, when after two years of futile negotiations, Rhodesia took the situation in hand, she knew what Britain's reaction would be.

Britain had made it known that she would not resort to the use of military force to put down the threatened rebellion. There were several reasons for this. First, the British considered the white Rhodesians, by their common English heritage, both "kith and kin". Prime Minister Wilson would not ask Englishmen to shed the blood of other Englishmen. Secondly, military intervention in Rhodesia was considered a highly risky adventure and not at all assured of success. Thirdly, there was considerable opposition to such action in England. Wilson's Labor party enjoyed only a slim majority over the Conservatives who opposed any strenuous action against the Rhodesians. An example of

the division of opinion in England was the voting in Parliament on a motion to prohibit the use of any military force, including a naval blockade, to bring down the Smith government or to enforce the oil embargo. This motion was narrowly defeated by a 52% majority. To advocate an armed expedition to put down the Smith regime would have been political suicide at home. (18:33)

Wilson was also under considerable pressure from the Afro-Asian members of the British Commonwealth. These countries strongly advocated military intervention as the only effective way to quickly end the threatened rebellion and, at the same time, to rectify the basic problem of instituting majority rule. They did not believe that economic sanctions would prove to be effective. Wilson, however, favoring the principle of popular support at home, adamantly rejected the use of military force to re-establish British control in Rhodesia. Britain consequently committed herself to put down any rebellion in Rhodesia by means of economic warfare.

When word came on 11 November 1965 that Rhodesia had, in fact, unilaterally declared herself independent from British rule, Prime Minister Wilson moved swiftly to implement diplomatic and economic sanctions. Through the British Governor, Sir Humphrey Gibbs, the Smith government was dismissed from office. Smith, in turn, divested Sir Humphrey of all

executive powers. The two countries then recalled their respective High Commissioners. Sir Humphrey agreed to remain in Rhodesia to act as liaison between the two governments.

Britain's initial economic steps were to cut off all economic aid, to stop any exports of arms, to remove Rhodesia's access to the London capital market, to suspend Rhodesia from the Commonwealth preference area, to apply special exchange control restrictions and more important, to place a ban on purchases of Rhodesian tobacco and sugar.

To these measures, Smith responded by blocking the payment of rents, interests, dividends, profits and capital to British nationals. He prohibited payment in sterling for Rhodesian exports and for railroad freight charges. He also threatened to increase the price of coal, reduce imports from the U.K. and increase railroad tariffs. Smith indicated that should sanctions create unemployment, measures taken to relieve the situation would include the deportation of alien workers. This would include some 400,000 black Africans (200,000 of which came from Zambia and Malawi). It can be seen that the sanctions which were imposed against the whites ironically would have initial impact against the black Africans.

Britain knew she along could not bring sufficient economic pressure to bear to end the rebellion. It would be

necessary to enlist the support of other nations with whom Rhodesia carried on economic relations. The United States had already given Britain assurance of American support. To enlist the support of the rest of the world, Britain went before the United Nations calling for voluntary international support for Britain's economic sanctions. The forthcoming support, while widespread, was far from complete. South Africa and Portugal (Mozambique) were the notable exceptions.

In December 1965, Britain increased the economic pressure by extending the sanctions to include asbestos, copper, iron, wheat, meat and foodstuffs. Britain also seized control of the Reserve Bank of Rhodesia which accounted for approximately one-half of Rhodesia's foreign assets. In mid-December Britain applied her most effective measure--an embargo on oil shipments to Rhodesia.

Rhodesia replied to these additional pressures by barring petroleum shipments through Rhodesia, destined for Zambia and the Congo. She further held Britain liable for the Rhodesian foreign debt because 1) Britain had seized the Rhodesian foreign assets and 2) Britain had guaranteed the loan for financing the Kariba dam.

The effects of these sanctions, while depressing the Rhodesian economy substantially, were insufficient to cause the capitulation of the Smith government. Far from causing dissention among the ranks of the white Rhodesians, the

sanctions had the opposite effect. The sacrifices endured by the white Rhodesians have only caused them to unite more firmly in support of the Smith government. Whatever white opposition there was to UDI at the time has largely disappeared as the whites join in common resistance to external pressures. Prime Minister Smith stated that because of the restrictions and sanctions, Rhodesia would emerge from the economic conflict a much stronger and more unified nation. (10:77)

On economic balance, the sanctions have been less than successful. Because of South Africa's and Portugal's refusal to support the sanctions and their stated "business as usual" policy, the sanctions were undercut from the start. Unemployment among whites has amounted to only one percent. Credit for business and industry is readily available (mostly from South Africa). By employing rationing, the oil and gasoline supplies received from South Africa have kept up with Rhodesia's requirements. Where imports have been cut off, Rhodesian companies have attempted to provide substitutes. Shortages of consumer goods have not been serious. While Rhodesian foreign earnings have been reduced by some 15%, foreign exchange from Zambia, which normally amounts to \$100 million a year, has actually increased since UDI. The United States, while reducing its' sales to Rhodesia by some two-thirds, held its' imports from Rhodesia constant;

the net result being a shift in the balance of payments to Rhodesia's favor. (11:40)

The mandatory sanctions imposed by the United Nations at Britain's request in December 1966 are estimated to further reduce Rhodesia's economic activity some 10 percent. A 25 percent depression in a country's gross national product would be considered seriously damaging to a nation's economy under normal circumstances. But, considering the stake of the white Rhodesians, it is highly questionable that economic pressure alone will be sufficient to end the rebellion. (20:15)

Britain must also consider her own self-interest in determining her course of action. The pressures placed upon her by the Afro-Asian members of the Commonwealth have already been mentioned. But there were also pressures from business interests at home. Over 100 British companies have interests in Rhodesia valued at some \$200 million. Britain, in imposing the sanctions against Rhodesia, has herself incurred financial liabilities. The budgetary outlay for imposing the sanctions amounts to some \$25 million a year, mostly in the cost of air-lifting oil into Zambia. If Zambia cuts off all trade with Rhodesia, this figure could double, as Britain is committed to absorb the extra cost of replacing imports from Rhodesia. On its' balance of payments, Britain forfeits \$98 million. The net loss on invisible earnings is running about \$22 million. The disruption

of normal supply for Zambian copper has increased its' cost to Britain by \$22 million. Lastly, much of the \$84 million worth of imports formerly received from Rhodesia with payment in sterling must now be purchased elsewhere with payment in dollars. (18:38)

After giving the sanctions some six months in which to operate, it was apparent to Prime Minister Wilson that the sanctions were not having sufficient effect to bring the Smith regime to its' knees. Wilson now seeked a solution to the Rhodesian crisis by means of a negotiated settlement.

There ensued a series of negotiations between London and Salisbury at which both sides seemed anxious to seek a peaceful settlement. Wilson, under fire from both the U.N. and the African members of the Commonwealth, based his negotiations on his six principles. Smith, being closely watched by his own Rhodesian Front party, was unwilling or unable to make any major concessions.

At the Sixteenth Commonwealth Conference held in September 1966, Wilson had established a deadline of December for the sanctions and/or negotiations to end the rebellion. If this failed, Wilson pledged he would 1) take the crisis before the United Nations asking for mandatory sanctions, 2) withdraw all previous proposals for settlement and 3) thereafter grant independence only on the basis of majority rule.

In an eleventh hour attempt to come to a settlement,



Wilson and Smith met aboard the British cruiser TIGER off Gibraltar. During this meeting, a working document was drawn up which included the required constitutional changes together with procedures for "returning to legal government". These procedures required the dissolving of the parliament and the turning over of control of the army and police to the British Governor, Sir Humphrey Gibbs. This amounted to the surrender of the Rhodesian independence for which the whites had sacrificed for over a year. The Salisbury government agreed to make the major concessions concerning the constitutional changes but rejected the requirement to surrender their independence. Wilson had stated the working paper had to be accepted in total or not at all. Therefore, this final effort to find a settlement, which came so close to success, ended in failure.

In accordance with his pledge, Wilson placed the matter before the United Nations requesting selective mandatory sanctions. (31:42)

The Commonwealth. The African members of the British Commonwealth adhered to the general black African policy of armed intervention. Led by Tanzania and strongly supported by Ghana, Zambia, Kenya, Uganda, Nigeria and Sierra Leone, these members strenuously demanded Britain to employ armed force to end the Rhodesian rebellion.

At the Lagos conference held in January 1966, Prime

Minister Wilson managed to retain control of the situation by pointing out the difficulties of mounting a military operation of sufficient dimensions to accomplish the task. Wilson then laid before the conference his own blueprint for bringing down the rebel regime which called for a two month softening-up period of economic sanctions capped by a complete severance of trade by Zambia. One of Wilson's main problems at this time was restraining Zambia from taking premature action. The African members skeptically and reluctantly agreed to support Wilson's plan but called for a review of the situation after six months.

Subsequent leaks which developed in the sanctions together with an inability to implement the Zambian boycott ultimately caused Wilson's program to fail.

At the Sixteenth Commonwealth Conference held in London in September 1966, the African states strongly demonstrated their dissatisfaction with the British measures to end the rebellion. Even before the Conference began several of the member states threatened to withdraw from the Commonwealth unless stronger action was taken. Tanzania, which had previously broken diplomatic relations with Britain over the crisis, boycotted the conference. Only 10 countries out of 22 were represented by their heads-of-state. The African members, pointing to the failure of the sanctions, adamantly demanded armed intervention. Wilson again managed

to weather the storm of protest by pledging to end the rebellion by Christmas or to lay the problem before the U.N. The Commonwealth communique strongly implied the disagreement by most of the members with Britain, stating that "force was the only way to bring down the illegal regime in Rhodesia". Zambia and Tanzania did not withdraw from the Commonwealth only because they had nothing to gain and too many economic benefits to lose.

As was noted earlier, the rebellion was not ended by Christmas and Wilson kept his pledge by taking the matter to the U.N. (5:1)

The Organization for African Unity (OAU). Generally, the predominant theme running throughout OAU resolutions concerning Rhodesia has been armed intervention. Even before Prime Minister Smith made the declaration, the OAU passed a resolution calling on Britain to take over the administration by force, to prevent unilateral action on Rhodesia's part. A week after UDI, the OAU's Defense Committee of Five called for military force to bring down the Smith regime; hopefully by Britain; if not, by the United Nations; and lastly by the OAU. In early December, the Council of Ministers voted that member states sever diplomatic relations with Britain if the rebellion was not ended within two weeks. Subsequently, Tanzania, Guinea, Senegal, Niger, Ghana, Algeria, Congo, Mali, Mauritania, Sudan and

the UAR broke relations with Britain. The OAU called upon member states to break all relations with Rhodesia and to sponsor resolutions within the United Nations calling for mandatory sanctions. A special sub-committee was formed to study the feasibility of sabotage and Pan-African military action against Rhodesia.

The OAU has bitterly criticized Britain in each of its' communiquees. It rejected the British sanctions as not being strong enough. It renounced any and all negotiations between London and Salisbury as a sell-out or a conspiracy on the part of Wilson to extend recognition to Rhodesia. It called on all states to refuse to recognize Rhodesia or any state which might subsequently be formed by British-Rhodesian negotiations which was not based on majority rule. Finally, the OAU repeatedly exhorted Britain to immediately employ armed force to bring down the Smith regime (Britain has rejected these demands for force saying she would not be pressured into a war she believed was wrong).

The United Nations. One of the fundamental principles upon which the United Nations was founded is the "respect for the principles of equal rights and self-determination of peoples" (Article I of the U.N. Charter). The U.N. was, therefore, a logical forum of world opinion before which the African nations might seek to argue their cause against Rhodesia. In the General Assembly, the African nations, supported by other under-developed countries and the communist-bloc,

enjoyed a voting majority to support their resolutions. In a review of black African sponsored resolutions, one report notes, "In the U.N., black Africans are tending to ignore these problems (of backward populations and lack of natural resources which block their own chances of achieving prosperity) and even world issues such as Viet Nam, while they rail against the white rulers of Rhodesia..." (4:99)

Even before Prime Minister Smith made the declaration, two separate resolutions were passed by the General Assembly calling on Britain to suspend the Rhodesian constitution and establish representative government, using force if necessary. Britain abstained from voting, claiming that the Rhodesian question was a domestic issue and not within the purview of the United Nations.

Immediately upon the proclamation of UDI, the United Nations passed two resolutions calling on all nations not to recognize or give assistance to the rebel government and calling on Britain to take all necessary steps to end the rebellion. Britain, in rejecting external interference, countered by asking for voluntary support of her economic sanctions and warned against attempts to impose a constitutional solution by military force. Soon thereafter, the U.N. added an oil embargo on Rhodesia.

When a breach of the oil embargo was threatened in April 1966, the Security Council passed a British resolution

endorsing the use of naval warships to turn away tankers, loaded with oil destined for Rhodesia, from Mozambique ports. (26:1)

In October 1966, while Britain and Rhodesia were meeting in an attempt to negotiate a settlement of the crisis, the Africans made their most blatant move yet in the U.N. when they pushed through a resolution which prejudged any outcome of the negotiations. The resolution 1) condemned the talks as jeopardizing the inalienable rights of the African people to self-determination and 2) reaffirmed the obligation of Britain to transfer power to the African majority. (28:18)

When the TIGER talks failed and Wilson laid the problem before the United Nations, requesting selective mandatory sanctions, the African nations added eight amendments to increase the severity of the sanctions. Five other amendments were rejected, including moves to deplore South Africa and Portugal for trading with Rhodesia and to deplore Britain for refusing to use force against the rebel regime. Because Britain would not agree to employ "all means" in enforcing the sanctions, the Africans denounced the final resolution as ineffective. After the final vote, the African criticism of Britain and of the U.S., which supported Britain, was as strident as any by the anti-West delegations. (12:6)

The Communist Countries. International communism, primarily Russia, has used the Rhodesian crisis mainly as a tool for embarrassing Great Britain and the United States. In this regard, Russia has been a staunch supporter of the most fervent black African demands. The Russian endorsement of the militant attitude of some of the black Africans was attested by Premier Kosygin when he stated in December 1966, "Take Southern Rhodesia. There will be a war of national liberation there." (18:31)

It has been in the United Nations that Russian support has been most evident. The Russian delegate made the keynote speech supporting the African-sponsored resolution in October 1966 condemning the British-Rhodesian talks. When Britain brought the Rhodesian matter to the U.N. in December 1966, Russia demanded a total embargo on oil shipments and asked the Security Council to penalize South Africa and Portugal for their economic support of the Smith regime. The Russian endorsement of the African program strengthened the latter's determination to oppose the milder British plan for selective sanctions. In the final analysis, it would appear that the Soviet Union is the residuary beneficiary of the African anger at the moderate wording of the resolution. The Russians charged that the United States, in lining up with Britain, had showed its' true face of neo-colonialism.

South Africa and Portugal. The reaction to UDI by Portugal and South Africa, countries which share similar policies of white supremacy, might be expressed as that of guarded support. Neither Portugal nor South Africa desired the world-wide criticism which would be forthcoming should either country officially recognize the rebel government. By withholding such recognition, Portugal and South Africa were able to retain the maximum degree of diplomatic maneuvering room. Both countries endeavored to remain officially neutral. While South Africa and Portugal refused to extend official recognition, they also refused to support the economic sanctions levied on Rhodesia. Instead they declared their intention to continue their "business as usual" relationships with Rhodesia.

Neither South Africa nor Portugal failed to recognize that the sanctions imposed against Rhodesia served as a test case. If these sanctions succeeded in toppling the white government in Rhodesia, the black Africans would be encouraged to seek similar sanctions against them.

As time passed and pressures continued to mount, it became increasingly evident to these white governments that defeat for one meant defeat for all and that life as they knew it in southern Africa would disappear forever. Therefore, while these governments hesitated to afford official support to Rhodesia, they had no such compunctions concerning



private endeavors in this area. Both countries, through private arrangements, have given Rhodesia the vital support necessary for her to survive the sanctions.

South Africa has a special friendship for the Rhodesians in as much as some forty percent of Rhodesia's white rural population are of South African Afrikaner descent. South Africa has kept Rhodesia supplied with some three million gallons of oil per month. In addition to "trade as normal", South Africa has served as a major outlet for Rhodesian exports of copper, asbestos, iron, chromite and tobacco.

Portugal has denied the use of Mozambique port facilities to any future United Nations forces. She has declared a policy of allowing all landlocked countries access to Mozambique and Angola ports. Under the Portugese-Rhodesian trade agreement, by which Portugese exports received preferential custom tariffs, trade between the two countries continued on a reduced scale during 1966. Portugal, by virtue of her NATO membership, could count on the United States to blunt some of the criticism from the U.N. Portugal also had a powerful diplomatic lever in the American air base in the Azores, the treaty for which expired some four years previous and had not been renewed. (16:42)

In the United Nations, South Africa and Portugal have consistently opposed all African-sponsored resolutions

directed against the Rhodesians, the only two nations to do so. Both countries have announced they would not support the mandatory sanctions imposed by the Security Council in December 1966. South Africa states she would seriously consider withdrawing from the United Nations before agreeing to halt trade with the Rhodesians.

## CHAPTER V

### U.S. FOREIGN POLICY -- A REVIEW

The role America has played in the course of events which finally culminated in Rhodesia's unilateral action has varied from one of almost complete passivity to one of active concern. U.S. foreign policy toward Africa has at one time or another favored American interests or American principles but rarely both at the same time. With reference to the definitions given in Chapter I, it will be recalled that foreign policy is formulated to achieve certain objectives which, in turn, support or secure national interests or principles or both. Therefore, before a review of American foreign policy can be made, it is necessary to establish the objectives of that policy.

Objectives. In support of those national interests developed in Chapter II and of the American principles described earlier, the following objectives of American foreign policy toward Africa are submitted. The first four objectives support American interests:

- 1) To establish a peaceful environment in Africa.
- 2) To contain the encroachment of communist influence in Africa.
- 3) To maintain the continued availability of southern Africa's strategic resources to the free world.

- 4) To promote economic conditions in Africa favorable to American investment and trade.

Additional objectives, derived from American principles, are as follows:

- 5) To encourage the orderly transition to self-determination by qualified dependent peoples.
- 6) To promote the mutual support between interested European allies: Great Britain, Portugal, France.
- 7) To promote the mutual support between other interested nations: South Africa, Zambia, the Congo, Tanzania.
- 8) To retain or gain favorable voting support in the United Nations.
- 9) To support the United Nations in its' efforts to promote peace.

Past American policy toward Africa and Rhodesia will now be reviewed to determine how effectively that policy has served the above objectives.

Pre-World War II. American interest in Africa in the interval between the abolition of the slave trade and the Second World War is most noticeable due to its' almost complete absence. American foreign policy during this period did not go much beyond criticizing the African policies of other governments.

World War II. It was the Second World War that first

aroused serious American interests in Africa. In addition to the North African campaigns fought there between German and Allied troops, Africa served as the jumping-off point for the Allied invasion of southern Europe. America soon recognized the strategic significance of African logistics and communication facilities and the availability of African strategic resources.

Post World War II. After the war ended, America was immediately faced with the advent of the Cold War. The expansion by the Communists into Europe, the Middle East and Asia was soon followed by the Korean War. This new threat to world peace required the U.S. to devote its' full attention to rebuilding its' own strength and that of its' allies. Of necessity, Europe dominated the concern of America and Africa was relegated to secondary importance. The U.S. was willing to follow the lead of its' Western allies who had more experience in African matters. While America expressed its' general sympathies for the African nationalist movements, its' declarations were carefully modulated so as not to offend its' European friends. American encouragement to the Africans was carefully qualified by such terms as "orderly transition" and "qualified peoples". During this period, America regarded its' African policy essentially as an extension of its' policy toward Europe and on important issues deferred its' position to coincide with

with that of its' European allies.

The 1950's. While aware that important political changes were evolving in Africa, the United States regarded the situation as a whole as developing quite satisfactorily without direct American participation. From the African point of view, this American policy was grievously negligent and defective. From a world-wide perspective however, the U.S. policy did achieve its' primary objective, i.e., the protection of American and European security interests. In attempting to remain in rapport with both European and African interests, the U.S. became the inevitable target of criticism from both. To the Europeans, the U.S. presented a mild but irritating pressure, ~~pressure~~, pushing them toward concessions to African demands for self-determination. To the Africans, the U.S. policy appeared inadequate and disappointing. From the American point of view, the critical test was whether the loss in prestige or the irritation caused our allies were so great as to produce lasting damage to U.S. interests. By this criteria, American policy during the 1950's was successful. It did not produce serious conflicts with American allies during the period of greatest threat from Soviet expansion. With respect to the Africans, the U.S. has been able, with few exceptions, to work effectively with the governments of the newly independent nations.

The 1960's. With the coming of the "New Frontier" of the Kennedy administration, American foreign policy toward Africa assumed new proportions. This change was spurred in part by Russia's promptness in extending diplomatic recognition and economic aid. To meet the Soviet challenge, the U.S. moved quickly to establish friendly relations with the new states and to give them substantial assistance in economic, educational and social development.

The change in American policy was not so much in content as in degree. Whereas before, the U.S. couched its' support in terms of the dangers of premature independence and in cautioning the African nationalists against impetuousness, the U.S. now shifted to a more positive policy which "welcomed any step" taken by her European allies in preparing their colonies for self-government and independence.

American power and prestige were first committed in Africa in support of the United Nations peace-keeping force during the Congo crisis of 1960. After a short period of comparatively relaxed tensions, the Congo situation flared into crisis proportions again in 1964. This time the African rebels held several hundred white persons as hostages near Stanleyville. The United States assisted a Belgian air-born expeditionary force sent to rescue these hostages. While the paratroop landings were viewed as a humanitarian

effort by Western Europe and the U.S., it led to a series of reckless and even racist attacks by the black African delegates against the U.S. in the United Nations. These attacks, together with the spreading signs of internal instability and breakdown, the increasing intrusions by Chinese and Soviet communists and the aloofness of African neutralism on important East-West issues led to a profound re-examination of American policy. There was serious concern within the government that the U.S. stood in danger of being drawn into an endless, costly and ultimately futile set of African commitments, possibly beyond its' interests and responsibilities. There was feeling the U.S. would be distracted from its' obligations in other parts of the world, including Viet Nam.

From the foregoing, it can be seen that American foreign policy toward Africa has varied from indifference, to favoring interests, to preoccupation, to favoring principles. (14:5ff)

Current Policy. Recognizing Great Britain's sovereignty over her colony, the United States has followed Britain's lead in the formulation of American policy toward Rhodesia. The American position was set forth by Paul F. Geren, former U.S. Consul-General in Salisbury as follows:

First, we recognize that Great Britain has a special concern and a unique influence in Southern Rhodesia. Second, we hope for continued political development along non-racial lines and the elimination of racial discrimination...Third, we hope there



will be progressive development toward...universal adult franchise. Fourth, we hope Southern Rhodesia will have peaceful and mutually beneficial relations with its' neighbors. (14:55)

In the weeks immediately preceeding the UDI, the United States firmly reiterated its' position in a series of diplomatic dispatches culminated by a personal message from President Johnson to Prime Minister Ian Smith. The Rhodesian government was informed that the United States would 1) firmly support the position of the British government, 2) not condone any political arrangement acceptable only to the minority, 3) consider a unilateral declaration a tragic mistake which would serve the true interests of no one, and 4) strongly oppose any unilateral declaration of independence by the Rhodesian government. (27:2)

Post UDI. Immediately after Rhodesia's unilateral action, the United States, in accordance with its' previously declared policy, announced it would not recognize the Salisbury regime but continued instead to recognize British sovereignty over the rebellious colony. The American Consul-General was recalled and the Rhodesian representation in Washington was stripped of its' diplomatic status. In support of Britain's request for voluntary economic sanctions, the U.S. imposed an embargo on military equipment and petroleum, and sanctions against imports of chromite and tobacco from Rhodesia. In taking the initiative, the U.S. cancelled the entire 1965 Rhodesian sugar

quota, then on the high seas enroute to the United States; extended the sanctions to include asbestos and lithium; suspended action on applications for U.S. government loans and credit guarantees to Rhodesia; and officially discouraged all American private travel to Rhodesia.

In the United Nations, the United States has continued to support Britain in her policy of economic warfare much to the displeasure of the independent African members. At the same time, the United States has attempted to remain in rapport with the Africans by supporting OAU-sponsored resolutions concerning racial equality and self-determination directed against South Africa and Portugal. Additionally, the United States has supported African resolutions concerning Rhodesia calling for measures short of armed intervention.

American foreign policy toward Rhodesia has been in strong opposition to the white minority government of Salisbury; partly to its' unilateral action but more fundamentally to its' basic philosophy of racial discrimination and political restriction. While America has caused that country considerable difficulties by the application of diplomatic and economic pressures, Rhodesia has chosen to remain friendly to the United States. Rhodesia has reaffirmed her anti-communistic orientation and her traditional alliance with the Western camp. Rhodesia has supported the United

States' position in Viet Nam to the extent of offering this country "tangible" assistance in Southeast Asia. At the time, Prime Minister Smith declared: "In this age of ideological conflicts, when the forces of the Left are ranged against the forces of the Right in bitter war, one cannot understand why the forces opposed to communism are at variance on the fundamental issue." While her motives for such support may be open to question, it must be noted that Rhodesia is the only country in Africa (or Europe for that matter) that has offered such support of the American cause. (18:37R)

## CHAPTER VI

### A FUTURE U.S. POLICY

Recent U.S. foreign policy toward Rhodesia (and southern Africa in general) indicates a strong leaning toward the "principle" objectives, seemingly at the expense of the "interest" objectives. The U.S. has steadfastly pursued a policy embracing the principles of self-determination, racial equality and democracy. It would appear difficult to find fault with such an idealistic policy. But reflection upon world response would show this policy to be noticeably deficient in achieving America's objectives in Africa.

Deficiencies in Present Policy. The deficiencies alluded to above are due in part to the basic conflict of interests between the parties involved; the Africans, Britain, the white Rhodesians and America. Instances in which the U.S. has deferred its' own interests to those of Britain or the Africans and has received precious little in return are not difficult to find.

while the United States has energetically supported Britain in her efforts to end the Rhodesian rebellion, Britain, in turn, has shown absolute negative support of U.S. efforts to contain communism in Viet Nam. Indeed, that government's official position is that Britain will not sell the U.S. any needed arms whatever, directly or indirectly,

that might support the fight against the Viet Cong. In support of this position, Britain refused in June 1966 a Washington request to buy conventional bombs "on the likelihood that the U.S. would use the weaponry in Viet Nam." While the U.S. co-operated in Britain's voluntary oil blockade against Rhodesia, it was reported that a majority of the free-world vessels supplying North Viet Nam were British. As one U.S. senator observed, "it is tragic to observe how our allies continue to show flagrant disregard of the U.S. effort in Viet Nam." (2:28)

While the United States has consistently supported the black African-sponsored resolutions in the United Nations and has historically championed the cause of self-determination and independence, reciprocal African support of American interests has been transient at best. The Africans have preferred to remain aloof to American and Western interests, pursuing instead the Afro-Asian bloc policy of neutralism and seeking the best of both East and West.

The United States has resolutely abided by the principle that any solution to the Rhodesian problem would be, first and foremost, a peaceful solution. Not only did this policy fulfill America's paramount interest, i.e., peace in Africa but, additionally, supported the fundamental purpose of the United Nations, to maintain international peace. In contrast, the Africans, supported by the Asian and communist

countries, have repeatedly called for military intervention in Rhodesia--a policy which could well precipitate a racial bloodbath involving the whole of southern Africa. For her efforts in the U.N. to find a peaceful solution, the U.S. has been subjected to African criticism as strident as any originating from anti-Western powers.

In supporting the British and U.N. sanctions, the U.S. has committed itself to a course of action seriously defective in three respects. The first is that the sanctions, for reasons previously discussed, are destined to failure. The second is that, ironically, the first people to feel the bite of the ensuing economic depression were the black African workers. Thirdly, the sanctions had serious economic impact upon both black African-ruled Zambia, whose economy was extensively integrated with Rhodesia's, and upon America's NATO ally Portugal, whose colony of Mozambique lost considerable transportation revenues. Britain, herself, has found the sanctions to be a costly venture, for in addition to the loss of trade, she is committed to support the implementation of the sanctions, including subsidizing Zambia's economy. (15:12)

One of America's primary objectives in Africa is to promote peace and stability. However, in its' endeavor to bring down the white minority government of Rhodesia, the U.S. is undermining this very principle. The stability

represented by Prime Minister Smith's government is unique in sub-Sahara Africa where seventeen coups (thirteen of which were successful) have occurred in the past three years. In spite of adverse Western pressures, Rhodesia has proclaimed her strong anti-communistic position. Yet, in the name of majority rule, the United States would appear to favor an African government in Rhodesia of doubtful administrative qualifications, questionable stability and of unknown political orientation.

Finally, the United States is involving itself in an attempt by external interests to force, by diplomatic and economic pressures, an evolution in the political, social and economic order within Rhodesia which may well be obtainable only by military force. It is not believed that armed intervention is a step the United States is willing to support.

Considerations for Future Policy. In formulating its' foreign policy in Rhodesia, the American government is influenced by two opposing diplomatic philosophies. The proponents of the "hard line" school argue that the U.S., in keeping with its' position of world leadership, should take the initiative with a more positive and aggressive policy in supporting the cause of self-determination and majority rule. The opposing school would advocate that the U.S. involvement in the Rhodesian crisis is foreign to its' real

world interests and that the U.S. disengage itself from the turbulent issues involved. In light of America's responsibilities, inherent in her position as a world power, and of the demands of her multitude of world-wide commitments, neither of these extremes would appear to be a realistic policy. Instead, the U.S. must seek her objectives in Africa by following a middle course determined by the most practical aspects of each school. Certain considerations for this future U.S. policy are submitted. (12:6)

The fundamental consideration of U.S. policy should be the recognition of Britain's primacy of interest in Rhodesia. Two practical arguments support this consideration.

The United States has substantial commitments in other parts of the world--areas in which she is able to more effectively project her influence. Examples are Europe (NATO), Asia (SEATO, ANZUS, Japan, Philippines, Taiwan, Korea) and Latin America (OAS, Alliance for Progress). It has been argued that instead of America assuming the role of the world's policeman, other free world countries should be encouraged to assume the responsibility in those areas of the world in which they have effective influence.

Rhodesia is a colony (de jure) of Great Britain and the U.S. has pledged to recognize British sovereignty over the rebellious colony. Since the days of Cecil Rhodes, Rhodesia has been within Britain's traditional sphere of influence in



southern Africa. Over sixty percent of the white Rhodesians are of British descent and strong traditional and family ties remain between the colony and England. In Rhodesia, Britain has a great deal more at stake than the U.S., both with respect to economic investments and trade and to diplomatic credibility with the colony, the Commonwealth and the world.

Britain's proclaimed objectives in Rhodesia are fundamentally compatible with those of the U.S. The United States should, therefore, attempt to seek her own objectives in Rhodesia through positive and energetic support of British policy. At the same time, however, the U.S. should make it clear to Britain that mutual support of foreign policy is not a one-way street but that Britain, for her part, would be expected to reciprocate in kind.

For America to project her policies through Britain, it will first be necessary for Britain to re-establish the dialogue with Rhodesia. Therefore, despite the anticipated African outcries, the United States should encourage Britain to withdraw her proclamation of "NIBMAR" (No Independence Before Majority African Rule) as being an unrealistic and unacceptable basis for negotiations.

A consideration of equal importance is that the United States should continue to seek a peaceful solution to the Rhodesian problem. Conversely, the U.S. must strenuously

oppose any proposed solution based upon military intervention. To do otherwise could have uncontrollable consequences.

Three basic facts make it apparent that the U.S. must adopt a fundamentally new approach in seeking its' objectives in Rhodesia. The first is that economic pressure alone is insufficient to force a solution. The second is that armed intervention is unacceptable. The third is that independence is a fait accompli which the Rhodesians are unwilling to surrender (TIGER rejection). Perhaps a more practical reason would be the conspicuous lack of success of the current policy in accomplishing its' goal.

The attempt by Britain and the U.S. to undermine the government of a friendly country is truly a negative policy and unworthy of these great powers. This policy, which will bring political instability and economic depression to one of the few countries in Africa not already beset by these conditions, serves the true interests of no one.

The U.S. and Britain should seek a positive policy aimed at encouraging economic and political stability on that troubled continent. Whatever else it may represent, the Smith government does represent stability in sub-Saharan Africa. In pursuing its' objective of self-determination, the U.S. should seek to influence the de facto government in this direction by persuasion and encouragement

on matters concerning majority rule. The acceptance by the Smith government of the constitutional amendments contained in the TIGER document would indicate distinct possibilities in this area.

There are several courses of action available to the U.S. to encourage the orderly transition to majority rule. The most significant would be to assist in raising the general qualifications of the Rhodesian African to assume positions of political and economic responsibility. Working with the Smith government, the U.S. could make aid available which would be directed toward increasing the training opportunities available to the African. While Rhodesia's primary education standard for Africans is one of the highest in Africa, additional aid could be programmed to provide increased secondary and higher education. The U.S. could increase the opportunities available to the Africans for advanced education abroad. (19:61)

The U.S. could urge every American-controlled company operating in Rhodesia to present, to the maximum extent possible, a creditable example of wage, employee and race relations policy.

By refraining from becoming a principal to the quarrel, the United States would remain in a position to offer, should the opportunity present itself, to act as a mediator or conciliator between Rhodesia and Britain and the Africans.

Considerations for U.S. participation in the current U.N. dialogue concerning Rhodesia would have the U.S. continue to oppose resolutions based on measures involving armed conflict. The U.S. should use its' maximum influence on the African nations to direct their resolutions toward non-violent, realistic, positive and prudent goals.

The U.S. should urge the U.N. to abandon its' economic sanctions as a negative policy which, by its' failure, has embarrassed the U.N., is inherently insufficient to accomplish its' objectives and is economically damaging to innocent countries.

Furthermore, the legality and wisdom of the U.N. intervention in the quarrel is open to question. However morally offensive Rhodesia's racial policies may be, it is not a direct and aggressive danger to any other nation. While Rhodesia's racial policies may be inflaming passions throughout the non-white areas of the world, its' conduct to date cannot be called a threat to the peace by any reasonable interpretation of the charter. Indeed, if there is a threat to the peace in this sense, it is largely the result of the attitudes of the independent African states--not of Rhodesia.

The U.N., in the past, even in the face of major and real threats to the peace, has declined to exercise its' mandatory powers on the grounds that to do so would have destroyed the organization or would have increased, not

lessened, the dangers to peace. Examples are Russia in Hungary, China in Tibet, Indonesia in Malaysia and currently the UAR in Yemen and North Viet Nam in South Viet Nam. Unfortunately, an objective appraisal of the situation would indicate that Rhodesia, like similar situations in South Africa and Southwest Africa, is another area where the U.N. has been unable to act effectively.

In prospect, it is evident that the United States, in seeking its' objectives in Rhodesia, must adopt a fundamentally new approach based on a positive policy directed toward creating stability and prosperity in that country. The U.S. should continue to support the cause of self-determination by working with the Rhodesian government to raise the qualification level of its' African population. The U.S. should use its' influence in the U.N. in promoting a peaceful and positive approach to the Rhodesian question. Finally, the U.S. should continue to recognize the British primacy of interest and legal sovereignty in Rhodesia and not become a principal in that quarrel.

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