

N
420
.F8 2
1967
no. 124

124

THE UNITED STATES NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
SCHOOL OF NAVAL COMMAND AND STAFF
THESIS



CHINESE COMMUNIST SUBVERSION: TANZANIA (U)

LCDR Edward A. Sechrest, USN

This paper is a student thesis prepared at the Naval War College and the thoughts and opinions expressed in this paper are those of the author, and are not necessarily those of the Navy Department or the President, Naval War College.

Material herein may not be quoted, extracted for publication, reproduced or otherwise copied without specific permission from the author and the President, Naval War College in each instance.

Naval War College Library



1000508620

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport, R.I.

CHINESE COMMUNIST SUBVERSION: TANZANIA

1 March 1967

Abstract of
CHINESE COMMUNIST SUBVERSION: TANZANIA

The efforts of the Chinese Communists to gain influence in the developing nations of Africa are examined in order to determine the most productive path for United States foreign policy in Africa. The case study method is used. Tanzania is examined because she exhibits not only the typical problems but also important particular problems.

Initially the internal problems of Tanzania are revealed. Against this backdrop is projected Chinese Communist subversion, both overt and covert. Finally, the results of the Chinese efforts are reflected in the current attitudes and policies of the Tanzanian government and people.

The conclusion is that Chinese influence is minimal in spite of the extensive effort. Chinese failure is laid to a strong nationalist spirit and astute leadership. The suggested course of action of the United States is twofold: (1) increased aid primarily through international agencies and (2) pressure on the minority governments of the continent to take steps toward representative government.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER	PAGE
ABSTRACT	ii
INTRODUCTION	iv
I TANZANIA: A DEMOCRATIC ONE-PARTY STATE	1
Zanzibar: A Colonial Legacy	1
Tanganyika: The Road to Tanzania	6
II CHINESE SUBVERSION IN TANZANIA	16
Stated Versus Real Objectives	16
Political Infiltration	19
Economic Infiltration	24
Propaganda	29
Covert Activity	37
III TANZANIAN REACTION	43
Julius Kamberage Nyerere: Focal Point	43
Politics: Neither East nor West	51
Aid: Desired Without Strings	54
Propaganda: Increasing Inroads	59
Covert Activity: For Export Only	63
IV CONCLUSIONS	66
An Appraisal	66
Principles Under Pressure	67
Freedom Fighters and the Future	68
BIBLIOGRAPHY	71
APPENDIX I - BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES OF INTERVIEWEES	78

INTRODUCTION

Since the Communists gained control of the Chinese mainland, the United States has been the leading antagonist of Red China. Now, confronted with Chinese subversion in Africa, United States policy toward Africa is being reviewed. American response to subversive efforts by the Red Chinese has been inconsistent and often ineffective. Early Chinese successes met sharp reversals in 1965 and 1966 but the United States could take little credit for these failures. President Johnson ordered a fresh look at African relations in May 1966.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the subversive tactics used by the Red Chinese in the developing nations of Africa and to study the African reaction to these tactics. The results will, desirably, indicate a profitable future path for American policy in Africa. In any event, there will be revealed possible pitfalls for the United States and some insight into current African thinking.

One nation, Tanzania, is used as a case study. Tanzania was chosen for primarily three reasons. First, she possesses most of the problems of the developing nations of Africa. Second, her geographical position can be of strategic importance to the East or West. And, last, her apparent stability in a sea of coups and uncertainty suggests that both East and West would value such an advertisement of ideological influence.

The study is directed first and briefly to the recent history of Tanzania and her current internal situation. Then, Chinese efforts to influence Tanzanian policy and thinking are examined in detail. Finally, Tanzanian reaction to the Chinese probes are studied. Particular attention is directed to the actions and statements of the President of Tanzania because, in a very real sense, he is the pulse of his nation.

CHINESE COMMUNIST SUBVERSION: TANZANIA

CHAPTER I

TANZANIA: A DEMOCRATIC ONE-PARTY STATE

The union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar in April 1964 surprised most of the world.¹ The first month of the year had seen a coup in Zanzibar and an army mutiny in Tanganyika. There were persistent rumors of Communist influence within both governments. Yet, from the loose federation formed in 1964 there has emerged one of the most stable and unique governments in Africa--Tanzania. To fully understand this enigma, we must look first at the history of Zanzibar and Tanganyika prior to union.

Zanzibar: A Colonial Legacy. Zanzibar, composed of the islands of Zanzibar, Pemba and the uninhabited island of Latham is located about 20 miles to the east of its mainland neighbor Tanganyika. Dominated by the Arabs for centuries, Zanzibar became a British protectorate in 1890. She was governed by a Sultan with advice and consent of a British appointed legislature until 1956 when Zanzibar's political life then began in earnest.

¹ Sydney Gruson, "Western Allies Surprised," The New York Times, 24 April 1964, p. 8.

Political struggles and strife evolved from the three ethnic groups present on the islands. The Arabs (landowners and businessmen) were attempting to reestablish oligarchic rule under the cloak of a liberal multiracial ethos.² In order to gain time against the better organized Arabs, the Africans (of recent mainland origins) and the Shirazi (indigenous descendents of the Persians) formed a loose political alliance in 1957. This Afro-Shirazi Union (ASU) won five of the six elected seats. But success was followed by strife within the ASU.

A faction led by Sheikh Adeid Karume, an African, demanded rapid moves to independence. The other faction led by Sheikh Muhammed Shante, a Shirazi, was in favor of more gradual progress. The party split along these lines in 1959, forming the Zanzibar and Pemba Peoples Party (ZPPP) under Shante and the Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP) led by Karume. Hostility continued even though the groups exchanged political positions with Shante now demanding immediate independence.³

Despite the unrest, the British continued progress toward self-rule. A new constitution was formulated in 1960 providing for an elected majority in the legislature and introducing ministerial government. The ensuing elections in 1961

²Michael F. Lofchie, Zanzibar: Background to Revolution, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1965), p. 157.

³John Middleton and Jane Campbell, Zanzibar (London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1965), p. 51ff.

produced results which led to rioting. Twenty-three seats were at stake. The ASP won ten, the Arabs won ten and the ZPPP won three. However, the ASP polled more than half of the popular vote. A coalition government was formed by the Arabs and ~~ZNP~~^{ZPPP}; the ASP thereupon boycotted the council.⁴

Rioting took 70 lives and injured 300 people. The British nevertheless seemed intent upon granting self-government in spite of the obvious discontent smoldering among the people. An unsuccessful constitutional convention in London (March-April 1962) produced more public disorder. Finally the major obstacles were smoothed over in early 1963 and Zanzibar became self-governing in June 1963.⁵

The first general elections were held during the following month and the previous inciting results were again obtained. The ZNP-ZPPP coalition won a majority of seats but received less than half of the popular vote. This government of the minority was permitted to guide Zanzibar to independence on 11 December 1963.

There was apparently no reluctance on the part of Britain in granting independence under these circumstances. Editorial comment in the press was noticeably absent. The Economist

⁴ Leonard Ingalls, "Zanzibar Tension Threatens Gains," The New York Times, 12 July 1961, p. 13.

⁵ Central Office of Information, Zanzibar (London: HMSO, 1963), p. 26-27.

devoted only a few lines to the independence ceremony and kept silent about prospects for the future. The New York Times hailed Zanzibar's independence after 73 years of British rule.⁶

Then the bubble burst. One month and one day after independence, the government was overthrown by the Afro-Shirazi majority. The immediate worldwide reaction was varied. The press in general speculated on the cause. Governments were reluctant to recognize the new regime and many suggested that the revolt was communist led.

The Manchester Guardian Weekly devoted half of a front page to reporting the "Left-wing coup in Zanzibar."⁷ The Economist belatedly recognized the intense "racial feeling" coinciding with "class feeling" and said the country had been ripe for revolution.⁸ The New York Times reported "Cuban-trained African guerrillas planned and carried out the coup to establish a Communist regime."⁹

Initial shock was replaced by logic and reasoning, although, for some, the process was slow. The Secretary General of

⁶ "Independence for East Africa," The New York Times, 11 December 1963, p. 46:2.

⁷ "A Left Wing Coup in Zanzibar," Manchester Guardian Weekly, (London), 16 January 1964, p. 1.

⁸ "China in Africa," The Economist, (London), 18 January 1964, p. 177.

⁹ Robert Conley, "Cuban Trained Guerrillas Directed Zanzibar Revolt," The New York Times, 19 January 1964, p. 1:2.

the United Nations saw the unrest as simply "teething troubles" and predicted early stability.¹⁰ Russia and other communist countries recognized the new regime within five days. The United States and Britain recognized the new government late in February.

Twenty miles to the west, there was neither doubt nor hesitancy. One day after the coup, Tanganyika recognized the new regime,¹¹ and sent 300 policemen to help maintain order. To some, this action seemed ill advised because in the absence of the police the Tanganyikan Army mutinied. Tanganyikan President Julius Nyerere however quickly disavowed any connection between the two incidents. Additionally, Nyerere repudiated all suggestions that the incidents were communist inspired.

Time was to prove Nyerere correct in his estimation of the situation. This is not surprising since as early as 1956 he had attempted to promote harmony in Zanzibar's struggle for independence,¹² and his interest in the nation's progress continued through independence.

¹⁰ Thomas J. Hamilton, "Thant Predicts a Stable Africa," The New York Times, 22 January 1964, p. 3:1.

¹¹ Clyde Sanger, "New Zanzibar Regime," Manchester Guardian Weekly, 16 January 1964, p. 3:4.

¹² Lofchie, p. 168.

Karume, an African nationalist quickly emerged as the leader of the new nation even though the revolution was actually accomplished by the Army. Reluctance on the part of the West and quick recognition by the communist countries resulted in large Communist Embassy delegations and increasing influence through offers of aid. Communist China gave a loan of more than 40 million dollars.¹³ Karume, desiring dominance by neither East nor West, turned to his East African neighbors. The union of Zanzibar and Tanganyika resulted in April 1964.

Tanganyika: The Road to Tanzania.

This is not a rich country . . . yet politically, Tanganyika has the potential of being one of the richest countries in Africa.¹⁴

Lying just south of the equator on the east coast of Africa, Tanganyika borders eight nations, three lakes and one ocean. Only about one-third of the land is inhabited due to lack of rainfall and infestation of the Tsetse fly. The population of approximately ten million includes 90,000 Asians and 20,000 Europeans. The African inhabitants consist of 122 tribes. The number of tribes is often given as the reason for the lack of tribalism. This is not true. There are at

¹³Humphry Berkeley, MP, "How Not to Decolonise," The Spectator, 1 May 1964, p. 574.

¹⁴J. Clagett Taylor, The Political Development of Tanganyika (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford Univ. Press, 1963), p. 3.

least twelve large tribes, enough to divide the country into a number of autonomous regions. Only a sense of nationalism, developed in the final stage of colonial rule, has prevented tribal factionalism from plaguing the nation today.¹⁵

The modern history of Tanganyika begins with the German colonial period. This period was characterized primarily by numerous rebellions, wars, and punitive expeditions. After World War I, the British administered the territory under the League of Nations. British rule was indirect, through native chiefs, which supposedly was designed to preserve African culture and to develop native responsibility.¹⁶ One British writer after reviewing the official account of this period described it as follows:

. . . Our administration diligently spent what it received in local taxation; and that was just about that . . . the great desideratum, politically above all, was that nothing should happen tomorrow except what had happened today.¹⁷

This appraisal is somewhat harsh but by comparison to its other colonies, Britain neglected Tanganyika. There are various reasons for this including the fear that Hitler might demand return of Germany's former territories.

¹⁵Basic Davidson, "Tanganyika on its Own," New Statesman (London), 4 January 1963, p. 5.

¹⁶Taylor, p. 46-47.

¹⁷Davidson, p. 5.

After World War II, the new government introduced a new colonial policy which aimed at developing Tanganyika. Immediate implementation was slow. But in 1949, Europe began to recover and the energetic Sir Edward Twining was appointed Governor. He endeavored to carry out his instructions which were (1) to develop the administration and economy and (2) to prepare the territory for self-government. District officers were more diligent in their responsibilities as they administered via the chiefs and newly instituted tribal councils. Large sums of money were appropriated by the British Government in London.

This was the setting for the stirring of Nationalism which was to lead to independence. Colonial rule, during the lifetime of the men who were the catalysts of this movement, had not been oppressive but it had been unproductive. The Economist set the scene as follows:

. . . The Germans opened it [Tanganyika] up in truly surgical fashion in the nineties, and the British then let it stagnate between wars . . . [Now] the African population could look at the primeval scene with equanimity. Sir Edward Twining was in his castle; the chiefs were in their houses; the district officers were in their offices; and nobody had interfered very much. Dar-es-Salaam [the capital] had been put on the map and a few new roads (but no new railways) built. Above all, there were only some 20,000 Europeans in the whole vast country.¹⁸

¹⁸"Tanganyika Moves Forward," The Economist, 5 April 1958, p. 38.

In 1955, a new constitution went into effect, providing equal representation of the three races in an enlarged Legislative Council. Ironically, but predictably, it was the minority races who did not relish equal status of the races. The Africans were willing to accept this status but only as an interim measure.¹⁹ Sir Twining justified this undemocratic policy on the grounds that sound political development depended on racial harmony which in turn could only exist if political dominance was not afforded African, European or Asian.

It is doubtful that the official British mind, including Twining, actually accepted this multiracial theory. Tanganyika, like most of the colonial territories, depended on the administrative and economic leadership of the Asian and European minorities. It was expedient then to give these minorities more political influence than was warranted by their number. The opposition of Nyerere and the Tanganyikan African National Union (TANU) forced abandonment of this policy in 1959.

Often when we think of the modern history of a nation in Africa, we personify the nation by a particular individual. This is probably because the events and the individual are so interwoven that it is difficult if not impossible to

¹⁹Taylor, p. 84ff.

dissociate either from the other. Tanganyika has such a history and the individual is its President, Julius Nyerere. Tanganyika's independence has been called the personal triumph of Nyerere.²⁰ It will be more useful to consider this individual in detail later. For the present, Nyerere's association with TANU is most important.

TANU is the political party formed in 1954 by indigenous individuals for the express purpose of achieving ultimate independence for the Africans of the territory. The party's slogan, "equal rights for all men" spelled the end to the political affluence of the minority races.²¹ Led by the able and charismatic^{At} Nyerere, TANU increased its membership, informed the people of the promises of independence and developed a sense of purpose throughout the Territory.

The British tried to stem the rising tide of popularity of TANU by sponsoring another political party, offering scholarships to some of Nyerere's ablest assistants, and encouraging hostility toward TANU by the native chiefs.²² It is difficult to pinpoint official British policy during this

²⁰ Leonard Ingalls, "Tanganyika Gets Freedom Dec. 28," The New York Times, 30 March 1961, p. 5:1.

²¹ E.A. Bayne, Freedom and Unity? (New York: American Universities Field Staff Inc., 1963), p. 5.

²² Judith Listowel, The Making of Tanganyika (New York: London House and Maxwell, 1965), p. 268-9.

period. This author relied primarily on secondary sources for the British view. Commenting on the lack of official documentation, a British writer said "one cannot follow official reaction to this event [the rise of TANU], because relevant pages in the District Books or in those that I have seen, have been removed."²³ Hostile tactics served only to strengthen the resolve of TANU and to foment its nationalistic dynamism and popular support.

Overwhelming election victories, coupled with pressure from the United Nations resulted in a complete reversal of the British attitude toward Nyerere, TANU, and nonracial self-government. The press was essentially unanimous in their praise of Nyerere's attitudes, policies, and ability. He was hailed for his nonracist policy. He was termed a realist, a moderate, and able to grasp affairs.²⁴

The first year of independence was occupied with establishing domestic stability. 1963 brought an increase in foreign involvement. In February, at Moshi, a small town near Dar-es-Salaam, 400 delegates from 60 nations attended the Third Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference. The conference produced a flood of communist propaganda from speeches by the

²³Davidson, p. 5.

²⁴"Tanganyika," Manchester Guardian Weekly, 6 April 1961, p. 8.

delegates, two thirds of whom were communists.²⁵ Nyerere strongly espoused Tanganyika's nonalignment in his opening session speech. Although warning against a second imperialist scramble for Africa, he made it clear that the East was to be feared as well as the West.²⁶ But the strong invectives of the Communist delegates, pointedly directed at the United States and her allies, certainly made the West take a second look at the ideological trend of Tanganyika.

January 1964 brought a mutiny of the Army. It was necessary for President Nyerere to request the British to restore order. Soon it was determined that the mutiny was for economic reasons--pay, promotions and possible dissatisfaction with the recent rescinding of the policy of Africanization.²⁷ This incident is important because it indicated a reliance on the colonists for internal security which is to be avoided in nationalistic Africa.

April brought union with Zanzibar. Many saw the union as an effort by Nyerere to stave off communism in his backyard^d. (This is discussed in more detail in Chapter Two.)

²⁵Robert Conley, "Tirades of Reds Alienate Africans," The New York Times, 15 February 1963, p. 8:5.

²⁶Robert Conley, "Africa and Asia Warned on Reds," The New York Times, 5 February 1963, p. 1:8.

²⁷Keith Kyle, "Mutinies and After," The Spectator, 31 January 1964, p. 139.

A member of the British parliament saw it as an East African attempt to salvage an unwise British decolonization (i.e., Zanzibar).²⁸ The answer appears to be somewhere between the two assessments. Whatever the original reason, the Union, originally a loose federation, has shown increasing cohesion and progress. The economic, social and political problems are not unique in Africa.

Tanzania's agrarian economy needs outside aid. Continued decline in the price of sisal the major export and past problems of drought and famine make the nation particularly vulnerable. Diversification and new industry have necessitated assistance from the East and West.²⁹

Social problems susceptible to outside influence are led by racial difficulties. Africanization was halted which pleased the minorities but caused some dissatisfaction among the majority. Scholarships from outside sources are sorely needed to provide managerial and technical skills.

The political situation is best portrayed by the general elections held in September 1965. The general atmosphere in the nation at that time has been described as a "climate of confidence."³⁰ Through close contact with the people, TANU

²⁸ Berkeley, p. 574-576.

²⁹ "Tanzania Rallies Despite Drop in Sisal Earnings," The New York Times, 27 January 1967, p. 60:2.

³⁰ Ruth Schacter Morgenthau, "African Elections: Tanzania's Contribution," Africa Report (Washington, D.C.: December 1965), p. 12.

had successfully connected the general welfare with hard work. Being a poor nation, the future was not based on increased wealth but on steady progress. This shared confidence of people and party enabled the government to accept the uncertainties of a genuinely free election.

A one-party state had effectively existed since independence. In 1965, this resulting disenfranchisement of part of the electorate was removed by a constitutional amendment,³¹ which provided for two candidates for each constituency. Both candidates were members of TANU and therefore were forced to campaign on issues rather than being assured of election through the party label. Election officials were almost over zealous in their efforts to ensure that neither candidate received an unfair advantage. In one instance, a candidate was dispensing too much hospitality so the bars were closed.³² Asians and Europeans defeated Africans; long time party stalwarts were defeated; less than 20 percent of the incumbents were reelected. This did not reflect general dissatisfaction with the national government because candidates were not permitted to debate major policy such as Africanization or non-alignment.³³ Future free elections could possibly permit

³¹"Blueprint for a One Party Democracy," Africa Report, October 1965, p. 19.

³²Morgenthau, p. 15.

³³Ibid., p. 14.

infiltration if the government loses contact with the people.

Two current foreign policy objectives have indirectly invited foreign influence. Nonalignment requires that the government favor neither East nor West. This often means the East is invited to give aid comparable to that accepted from the West or vice versa. Support of forces advocating the overthrow of the white minority governments in Africa has made Tanzania look favorably toward any source of aid to these forces.

The foregoing sketch of Tanzania's history revealed four points which are particularly relevant to this study. First, Tanzanians resent the colonial period not only for the common charge of imperialistic exploitation but also because they feel that the usual "benefits" of colonization were not afforded. Second, there is a strong spirit of nationalism running throughout the nation based on (1) general involvement in the struggle for independence and (2) general participation in politics. Third, there is an air of confidence based on steady progress. Fourth, there are political, economic and social problems which make the nation vulnerable to subversion. These four points are the major factors encouraging and inhibiting the Chinese Communists in their efforts to penetrate Tanzania. These efforts will now be examined.

CHAPTER II

CHINESE SUBVERSION IN TANZANIA

Peking's efforts in Tanzania reveal the real Red Chinese objectives in Africa. Tanzania affords the Chinese an opportunity to gain useful strategic and tactical goals, however, a review of the stated Red objectives is useful to emphasize the Chinese use of ideological statements to conceal true foreign policy objectives. Therefore, this chapter will look briefly at the stated objective of Communist China and then turn to the pursuit in Tanzania of more practical goals.

Stated Versus Real Objectives. The Lin Piao Manifesto as published in the Peking Review on 3 September 1965, is considered by the United States Department of Defense as a significant statement of Red Chinese policy.¹ This manifesto expresses China's aim to foster "Peoples Revolutionary Wars" which will result in a Communistic world. Lin Piao views these wars as occurring first in the underdeveloped nations of Asia, Africa and Latin America then engulfing North America and Western Europe. He says, "Taking the entire globe, if North America and W. Europe can be called

¹U.S. Department of Defense, "Blueprint for Aggression: 'The Peoples War'," DOD Gen-21, 31 May 1966, p. 2.

'the cities of the world'. . . . In a sense the contemporary world revolution also presents a picture of the encirclement of 'cities' by the 'rural areas'."² Apparently, in accord with the Marxist-Leninist doctrine, China is committed to the overthrow of the "bourgeois" regimes in Africa.

This stated objective is obtainable within certain limits. If "bourgeois" regimes can be equated with Western oriented regimes then the Chinese prospects are bright. But if to overthrow means to substitute a Communist regime then the Chinese chance of success is minimal. The political forces at work in Africa today such as nationalism and Pan-Africanism are not likely to succumb to imported communism except to permit the exertion of influence. The significance of the stated objective is that it conceals the real objectives of the Red Chinese.

Peking's objectives in Africa during the past decade were at least influenced by: (1) a desire to be recognized as the only legitimate government of China, (2) the desire to gain support in the Sino-Soviet disputes, (3) competition with the United States as the leader of the "capitalist world" and (4) a desire to provide leadership in the Afro-Asian world.³

²Lin Piao, "Long Live the Victory of the Peoples War," Peking Review, 3 September 1965, p. 24.

³George T. Yu, "Sino-African Relations: a Survey," Asian Survey, July 1965, p. 321-2.

Common bonds with many African nations aid the Chinese in their pursuit of foreign policy objectives. China is a developing nation and has many of the tasks of building which young African nations face. The Chinese have been victims of imperialism and the exercise of spheres of influence. There are the bonds of color and racial discrimination. These common ties are stressed by Peking.⁴ China also reveals to Africans a simple economy and primitive industry. In China the African sees a form of progress within his reach.⁵

Thus many nations in Africa are able to identify with the Chinese. Some have particular problems or assets which make them more or less liable to organized subversion. The tiny nation of Burundi for example may have strategic value. A Chinese defector from the Chinese Embassy in Burundi quoted Mao Tse-tung as saying that "if we succeed in capturing the Congo we hold the whole of Africa."⁶ The defector said the Chinese were interested in Burundi as a "step toward the Congo" and he was given instructions to lay the foundations for the use of Burundi as a stepping stone. If his statements are true, it appears that China has adopted the Victorian

⁴For example see: "Friendship Between Chinese and African Peoples Can Never be Undermined" by Renmin Ribao, Peking Review (Peking), 14 January 1966, p. 23.

⁵Fritz Schatten, "Peking's Growing Influence in Africa," Swiss Review of World Affairs (Zurich), August 1960, p. 8-11.

⁶Tung Chi-P'ing, "Red China," Look, 1 December 1964, p. 22.

belief that the Congo is the key to Africa. Tanzania of course offers the same stepping stone to the Congo. It is difficult however to believe that the Chinese are naive enough to focus attention on "capturing" the Congo.⁷ Events have in fact proven the opposite.

Tanzania not only possesses the "common bonds" mentioned above but, as was noted in Chapter I she also possesses political, economic and social conditions which make her vulnerable to penetration. Strategically, Tanzania provides direct access to eight nations and the Indian Ocean; in particular, southward in Mozambique a textbook situation for intrigue and insurgency exist. With the Chinese objectives in mind, it is now possible to examine Peking's use of political infiltration, propaganda, economic aid and covert activity to exploit the weaknesses of Tanzania.

Political Infiltration. Prior to independence, President Nyerere stated that due to limited funds, Tanganyika's diplomatic corps would be limited and that ambassadors would be sent only to London and the United Nations. One day after independence however he announced that Communist China (and Russia) would be permitted to establish embassies in Dar-es-

⁷U.S. Department of Commerce, Translations on Africa: No. 447 China's Activities in Africa, JPRS:38, 229, 18 October 1966, p. 36. (Hereinafter cited as "Translations.")

Salaam.⁸ The establishment of diplomatic relations was negotiated by the Chinese Ambassador in Ghana, Huang Hua. Hua was formerly one of the Korean War negotiators and head of the Western European and African section of the Chinese Foreign Ministry (1954-56).⁹ It was not merely by chance that an accomplished diplomat handled the negotiations. The African branches of the Chinese Foreign Ministry continue to be staffed with their more competent diplomats¹⁰ and Tanzania has always received competent attention.

The present Chinese Ambassador to Tanzania, Ho Ying, assumed the post in February 1962 after serving as a Director in the Foreign Ministry. The Tanzanian embassy staff in 1962 included Lin Chun, a former Deputy Director of the Ministry and in June of the following year a former Assistant to the Director, Shih Ku was added. All of these men had previous diplomatic service. The first Ambassador to Zanzibar also was previously a Deputy Director and, upon union of the two nations, returned to the post of Deputy Director for the

⁸ "U.S. Offers Tanganyika a 10 Million Dollar Loan Fund," The New York Times, 10 December 1961, p. 28:2.

⁹ Charles S. Whitehouse, FSO, "Chinese Communist Activity in Selected African Countries," The National War College Forum, Fall 1966, p. 69.

¹⁰ Bruce D. Larkin, Chinese African Policy: 1954-1964, unpublished Doctorate Thesis (Pol. Sci.) Harvard Univ. 1965, p. 74ff.

newly created African Affairs Department of the Ministry. This new department was a reflection of the increasing importance China was attaching to Africa.¹¹

After this initial establishment of diplomatic relations there appears to be meager evidence of Chinese attempts at political infiltration. There were communist sympathizers on Zanzibar and probably in Tanganyika but neither nation had a true communist party to form a nucleus for political activity. Zuberi Mtemvu, leader of the extremist African National Congress party was supposedly "given funds to seek out 'like minded Marxists' in Tanganyika"¹² and it has also been suggested that the Chinese were supporting Mtemvu in his two election attempts.¹³ If this is true, the resounding defeat of their candidate must have given them second thoughts about becoming involved in Tanganyikan politics.

In Zanzibar, the Chinese were given credit by various sources for engineering the revolt in January 1964 which overthrew the newly (since 10 December 1963) independent government. The New York Times named Abdul Rahman Kohammed Babu, leader of

¹¹Ibid., p. 24ff.

¹²Pieter Lessing, Africa's Red Harvest (New York: John Day Co., 1962), p. 169.

¹³Clyde Sanger, "Independent Tanganyika," Manchester Guardian Weekly, 14 December 1961, p. 7.

the tiny Umma Party and a Labor leader, as one of the powers behind the takeover.¹⁴ Babu was a known communist sympathizer, had close relations with the Chinese and was believed to have received funds from Peking. The Sunday Telegraph (London) published an article "furnishing proof that Chinese newspaperman Kao Liang was the instigator of the revolt. . . ." ¹⁵

With hindsight, more thoughtful observers note (1) that the revolt was not helpful to the Chinese, (2) that the Chinese were giving precoup support to the ousted Zanzibar National Party, and (3) that the heightening of traditional tensions on the island (see Chapter I) probably brought a spontaneous coup.¹⁶ It is notable that an authority on African Affairs in the U.S. State Department commented to this author that coups in Africa seem to have a greater chance of success if they are accomplished within 48 hours of their inception. Events on this continent move fast; secrets are not well kept in a society where so much business is conducted in the open air.¹⁷

The West still suspected that the communists were behind the revolt in Zanzibar. The Soviet Union and Red China

¹⁴ Conley, "Cuban Trained Guerrillas."

¹⁵ "Translations," p. 74.

¹⁶ Whitehouse, p. 79.

¹⁷ Interview with Mr. Robert T. Hennemeyer, Chief Officer Placement Branch, Functional Personnel Program, U.S. Department of State, 27 December 1966, Washington, D.C.

extended diplomatic recognition immediately whereas the U.S. and Britain withheld recognition. Increased economic aid to Zanzibar (see below) from Peking strengthened this belief.

The sudden union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar in April 1964 did little to dispel the belief that Zanzibar was becoming "Africa's Cuba." A report reached London that, in May, 24 Chinese Communists landed in Zanzibar with diplomatic passports. Whitehall was reported to be "gravely concerned."¹⁸ The union was viewed by some as a move by Nyerere to check the spread of Communism in his backyard¹⁹ even though the President was quoted as saying ". . . it is an insult to Africa to read cold-war politics into every move toward African unity." The three leading Marxists, who participated in the coup were given positions in the Union government. This necessitated that they work on the mainland supposedly under the eye of Nyerere.²⁰

There is no evidence of overt attempts at political infiltration since the two nations became Tanzania. But, continued bypassing of Dar-es-Salaam by communist countries, (particularly China) to give economic and cultural assistance to Zanzibar, made the union weak.

¹⁸"China Said to Seek Base in Zanzibar for Subversion," The New York Times, 28 May 1964, p. 18:3.

¹⁹Interview with Mr. Hennemeyer.

²⁰Robert Conley, "Nyerere Names Zanzibar Marxists to Cabinet," The New York Times, 28 April 1964, p. 2:5.

Economic Infiltration. In 1964 there was a major expansion of Chinese economic aid to Africa. The total loans to Africa increased by 53%. Tanzania received more in loans than any other African nation except the United Arab Republic. Tanzania was one of only three African nations prior to 1965 to receive an outright grant from Communist China.²¹

One eminent Asian scholar has described the Chinese economic aid program in Africa as a "handmaiden to politics" and "not intended to have a serious impact upon the total economy of the state concerned"²² but \$42 million injected into an economy where the gross domestic product is approximately 550 million dollars should cause quite an impact. Chinese aid to Tanzania has continued on a large scale and as we review this aid program, the obvious question is why is Chinese aid to Tanzania so great?

In February 1964, almost immediately after the revolution, China offered aid to Zanzibar in the form of labor, machines and money.²³ The aid agreement was not announced in Zanzibar until 8 June. This produced speculation as to whether it should have been made to the government of Tanzania even though the agreement in principle was made prior to union. It was a 14 million

²¹ Yu, p. 326-327.

²² Robert A. Scalapino, "Africa and Peking's United Front," Current Scene, 1 September 1965, p. 6.

²³ "Translations," p. 78.

dollar loan, long-term and interest free. Chinese technicians also arrived to work on tractors a recent gift from China.²⁴ During the same month, the mainland Tanzanian government received a gift of 2.8 million dollars and credits totaling 28 million dollars.²⁵ This marked the first time that Chinese aid to any nation exceeded Russian aid to the same nation.²⁶

Press reports from Nairobi indicated that a shipment of Red arms arrived in Zanzibar during June;²⁷ and in August a Chinese freighter arrived in Zanzibar and unloaded 800 tons of unspecified cargo after Vice President Kawawa visited the vessel.²⁸ Nyerere revealed in August that Communist China was sending an 11 member military mission to train the Tanzanian Army for six months however he insisted that this was consistent with his nonalignment policy since military aid had been accepted from the West.²⁹

²⁴ "China's Loan to Zanzibar," Manchester Guardian Weekly, 11 June 1964, p. 16:5.

²⁵ "China's Effort in Africa," The Interpreter, March 1965, p. 15.

²⁶ Robert A. Scalapino, "Sino-Soviet Competition in Africa," Foreign Affairs, July 1964, p. 649.

²⁷ "Tanzania," Deadline Data on World Affairs, 14 June 1964, p. 3.

²⁸ "Translations," p. 79.

²⁹ "Nyerere Bids West Understand Plight," The New York Times, 1 September 1964, p. 4:2.

A survey of Red Chinese economic aid to underdeveloped nonaligned countries revealed that she pledged only 50 million dollars in 1965 as compared to \$330 million in 1964;³⁰ Tanzania again received the lion's share. Early in January accord was reached between Dar-es-Salaam and Peking on a 7 million dollar technical and economic pact for the construction of a textile mill and for the creation of a 5000 acre experimental farm.³¹ Nyerere's visit to China in February netted a trade agreement worth \$14 million to Tanzania. And by the middle of the year the New York Times reported that Chinese aid to Tanzania "was moving with more momentum than all other aid programs in Tanzania."³²

It was at this time perhaps that some of the glitter of the Chinese aid began to tarnish. The government of Tanzania began to curtail imports from Kenya and Uganda. This was seen as an effort to promote Chinese goods. Western observers felt that some of the Chinese economic projects started or promised were tied to revenue expected from the sale of Chinese manufactured goods.³³ The unfavorable balance

³⁰ Seymour Topping, "Peking Slashes Asia-Africa Aid," The New York Times, 16 February 1966, p. 5:1.

³¹ "Translations," p. 79.

³² Lawrence Fellows, "China is Leading in Tanzania Aid," The New York Times, 10 June 1965, p. 7:1.

³³ Lawrence Fellows, "Imports From Kenya and Uganda are Curbed by Tanzania," The New York Times, 19 June 1965, p. 33:3.

of trade between Tanzania and her neighbors however seems to be an equally logical reason for the new embargoes.

A possible test of China's motives occurred in July of 1965 when Nyerere and President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia called for the creation of an African Development Bank consortium to finance construction of a \$160 million railway line from Dar-es-Salaam to the Zambian copper mines rather than through the Portuguese controlled territory. If China participated she would have to contribute her aid through an international agency. Originally hesitant to finance this venture, China now offered to finance the entire project rather than cooperate with Britain and Canada who were preparing a preliminary survey.³⁴ (This incident is further discussed in Chapter III.) The Chinese made additional agriculture and natural resources surveys during 1965 and by making public the potential of various areas, the Chinese gained favorable propaganda. The West missed this propaganda opportunity since the information was known by the U.S. and British aid missions.³⁵

The year 1966 saw another increase in the momentum of the Chinese economic drive in Tanzania. First, in February

³⁴ Lawrence Fellows, "China May Build Africa Railroad," The New York Times, (Int'l. ed.), 22 September 1965, p. 1:4.

³⁵ John K. Cooley, East Wind Over Africa (New York: Walker and Co., 1965), p. 52.

at least 22 Chinese instructors were sent to teach at the Tanzanian Police Academy at Moshi. On the 8th of June, Peking reported the signing of an economic agreement with the United Republic of Tanzania, details were not revealed,³⁶ but eight days later Dar-es-Salaam radio announced that "the Chinese Peoples Republic has granted Tanzania an interest-free loan of 40 million shillings. . . ." Additionally a grant of 20 million shillings (approximately 3 million dollars) were offered.³⁷ Then in early July it was announced that the two governments had agreed to start a shipping line with the initial capital supplied by China and Tanzania would pay her half out of profits earned. Approximately two weeks later, while touring a ten million dollar radio station being built with Chinese aid, the Chinese Ambassador remarked that there were at present 200 Chinese technicians in Tanzania and more would arrive to start work on the Ruvu State farm project (which includes a reservoir).³⁸ As this is written a team of Chinese experts is in Tanzania conducting an iron ore survey.

Why this economic interest in Tanzania? Professor Alexander Eckstein, a leading expert on the Chinese economy,

³⁶New China News Agency, International Service, 8 June 1966.

³⁷Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania, Domestic Service, 16 June 1966.

³⁸"News in Brief," Africa Report, October 1966, p. 29.

believes that China cannot afford to use economic aid to impose economic dependence. Agreeing that the Chinese have succeeded in concentrating their relatively small program into a few areas in such a way as to maximize the political returns, he concludes that "Chinese economic aid became important only after the governments concerned had made a political decision to pursue a more neutralist or pro-Chinese policy."³⁹ Others feel that Chinese economic aid, especially low interest-long term credits, facilitates Chinese control of the economy. The Chinese insist that their aid program is for the mutual benefit of the nations concerned.⁴⁰ A combination of all three views is more likely. Although it means a more frugal existence for the Chinese at home, the advantages gained through close involvement in the African economy are essential to the national interests of China. Closely allied to economic aid is propaganda; in fact economic aid is good propaganda.

Propaganda. In the sense that economic aid is formal access to a nation, propaganda is informal access to a nation (note that informal access is often made possible

³⁹Alexander Eckstein, Communist China's Economic Growth and Foreign Trade (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1966), p. 256-258.

⁴⁰See Chou En-lai's "Eight Principles of Chinese Aid," "Sino-Mali Joint Communique," Peking Review, No. 5, 31 January 1964.

through prior formal access, e.g., a film agreement between two states makes possible the showing of motion pictures which can be used to influence the populace).⁴¹ Propaganda is "any organized . . . effort . . . to spread particular doctrines, information, etc."⁴² the means by which propaganda can be accomplished are many and varied. China's propaganda effort in Africa has been extensive.⁴³

Various themes have been evident in Peking's propaganda --China as an example, antiimperialism, Chinese identification with every form of African emancipation, anticolonialism.⁴⁴ The methods and means have been even more varied-- publications, radio, exchange of visitors, cultural exchanges, and mass rallies in support of African causes. These efforts in Tanzania are very apparent and in most instances, Tanzania receives more attention than any other African nation.

Visits of foreign delegations afford China an excellent opportunity for propaganda. There is the advance and continuing publicity followed by the "red carpet" treatment. These courtesies, extended to men who in their younger days

⁴¹Yu, p. 328.

⁴²Webster's New International Dictionary, 2 ed. (Springfield, Mass.: G. and C. Merriam Co., 1959).

⁴³Yu, p. 328.

⁴⁴Schatten, p. 8-11.

were often subjected to insults based on race, are very impressionable. Visits are usually concluded with a joint communique or cooperation agreement expressing friendship, etc. During the three years, 1962 to 1964, there were a total of 474 delegations between China and Africa. Three hundred eighteen of these visits were to China from Africa. Tanzania led all nations in the total exchanges sending 51 groups and receiving 33.⁴⁵

In February 1965, President Nyerere visited China. He received the full treatment--a triumphant parade, banquets in his honor and the signing of a "treaty of Friendship." China fully utilized this occasion for further propaganda. At a rally in Nyerere's honor in Peking, the Mayor, Pen Chen, declared "The Chinese people resolutely march forward shoulder to shoulder with the Tanzanian people in the joint struggle against imperialism, colonialism and in the promotion of African-Asian solidarity." This was followed by a joint communique which pledged support to the "anti-imperialist struggle" of the Congolese people and reaffirmed Tanzanian support for Communist China's entry into the U.N. but opposed the "two-Chinas" proposal.⁴⁶ During a banquet for Nyerere,

⁴⁵ Dick Wilson, "Seagull in a Storm," Far Eastern Economic Review, 1 September 1966, p. 400.

⁴⁶ "Tanzania," Deadline, p. 8.

Liu Shao-Chi, Head of State of Communist China again voiced firm support for North Vietnam in its war with the U.S.⁴⁷

One of the fringe benefits of inviting a leader to visit China is that Chou En-lai is then invited to visit the nation concerned. Chou returned the state visit in June and he hoped to include visits to all East African nations. Kenya and Uganda declined to extend an invitation and because of this, the Premier's visit was viewed by some as a diplomatic fiasco and a sign that Chinese influence in East Africa was waning. Yet, The Economist suggested that the incident worked to China's advantage in Tanzania because it appeared he came just to visit this one small nation.⁴⁸ The familiar pattern of a parade, banquets, and a rally accompanied Chou's visit. Before a crowd of 20,000 he termed the U.S. a "bully" and repeated that Africa was ready for revolution.⁴⁹ The exchange of delegations and the propaganda associated with them continued through 1965 and into 1966. It is reasonable to conclude that the minimum gain the Chinese receive from these publicized visits is a public image of good relations with Tanzania.

⁴⁷ "China Warns U.S. on Vietnam War," The New York Times, 18 February 1965, p. 10:3.

⁴⁸ "Africa's Fishy Eye for Chou En-lai," The Economist, 12 June 1965, p. 1261.

⁴⁹ Lawrence Fellows, "Chou, in Tanzania, Calls U.S. a Bully," The New York Times, 6 June 1965, p. 1:7.

Visits are usually thoroughly covered by Radio Peking. Radio is probably the most important medium of information in Africa. The high rate of illiteracy, the difficulty in the distribution of publications, and the existence of a large number of receivers make radio broadcasts the main source of news and entertainment.⁵⁰ Since 1956, Communist China has increased her weekly broadcasts to Africa from 7 hours of English to 108.5 hours of seven languages in 1964.⁵¹ These figures become even more significant for East Africa and Tanzania when it is noted that 42 of the 108.5 hours were in Chinese (an indication of the number of Chinese in Africa) and of the remaining 66.5 hours, 38.5 hours were in English and Swahili,⁵² the language of East Africa.

Peace Corps volunteers told Senator Robert Kennedy (during his visit to Africa in 1966) that they listened to broadcasts from Communist China because they were "far more interesting" although not as factual as the Voice of America.⁵³ The radio transmitters being financed by China in Tanzania may possibly be an attempt to extend their coverage of Tanzania and Africa.

⁵⁰ Whitehouse, p. 76.

⁵¹ Yu, p. 329.

⁵² Whitehouse, p. 76.

⁵³ Peter Kihss, "Kennedy Says He Favors Johnson Re-election in '68," The New York Times, 20 June 1966, p. 1:2.

The printed word is another means used to spread Chinese influence. There are some indications that in this area the Chinese tend to be more covert and subtle; perhaps choosing to speak primarily through agents. The Nationalist, a publication of TANU, appears to comment favorably toward the Chinese. It echos favorite Chinese slogans such as "imperialists" and "anti-people," and is usually anti-West.⁵⁴ In November 1965, The Nationalist initiated a campaign "to combat the propaganda of most of the daily papers and periodicals in East Africa because 'it is obvious . . . (they) are controlled by the imperialists'."⁵⁵

The Zanzibar News also prints articles exhibiting strong Chinese Communist influence such as "Tanzanian Reader Denounces U.S. Pressure," "Chinese people . . . struggle against imperialism," "U.S. - Chiang Agents," etc.⁵⁶ The New York Times in early May 1964 reported that Chinese propaganda magazines were seen frequently in Zanzibar. Propaganda publications such as Vigilance (pamphlet written in Swahili, printed in Dar-es-Salaam, gives distorted version of U.S. acquisition of Louisiana Territory, Alaska, etc.) and the

⁵⁴For example see The Nationalist (Dar-es-Salaam), 26 November 1965, 2 May 1966 and 19-20 June 1966.

⁵⁵"News in Brief," Africa Report, January 1966, p. 25.

⁵⁶"People's Daily Hails Putting Out of Action of Armed U.S.-Chiang Agents," ZANEWS (Zanzibar), 2 February 1965, p. 3 and "Pan African Leader Stresses Need for Armed Struggle in South Africa," ZANEWS, 6 February 1965, p. 2.

Peking Review (magazine written in English, published in Peking, general propaganda) are readily available in Tanzania. The New China News Agency (NCNA) in cooperation with the Peoples' Daily (Chinese Communist Central Committee's newspaper) and Radio Peking provide voluminous daily news bulletins which are available to Tanzanian newspapers generally for free.⁵⁷ These "bulletins" carry the usual barbs against the West, and praise for the African struggle against imperialism, but also include added incentive for African publication with phrases such as "An independent, free and prosperous new Africa will rise like Mount Kilimanjaro in all its splendor."⁵⁸ A Tanzanian newspaper looking for "fill" material could be tempted by the use of his nation's most famous land mark.

The fruits of these efforts is difficult to gauge but apparently China is convinced that her image as portrayed in publications in East Africa is important. The Peking Review devoted more than two pages to proving a magazine, Revolution in Africa was a forgery. The magazine supposedly originated in Albania and purported to show Chinese policy toward a socialist revolution in Africa.⁵⁹

⁵⁷"The New China News Agency," Current Scene, 1 April 1966, p. 5.

⁵⁸"Root Out the Imperialist Forces in Africa," Peking Review, 22 April 1966, p. 26.

⁵⁹Renmin Ribao, "A Clumsy Forgery, a Foul Plot," Peking Review, 5 November 1965, p. 20-22.

Finally, the Chinese have used entertainment and cultural exchanges to good advantage in Tanzania. In September 1964, two full length Chinese films were dubbed in Swahili obviously for showing in East Africa.⁶⁰ A total of nine films on African subjects were released by Peking in 1964 as compared to only six from all other communist countries. Chinese Communist newsreels are also shown in Tanzania.⁶¹ A color documentary on Premier Chou En-lai's visit to Tanzania was filmed in 1965 and shown in 1966.

Tanzania has also been entertained by a 42 member acrobatic group from China. This sort of entertainment is well received in Africa and attendance is large. An art and culture exhibit was held in Tanzania during the summer of 1966 and was highly praised by viewers.⁶² All of these efforts represent a sizable expenditure of time and money by China. Large sums have reportedly been spent covertly also. These covert activities will be examined now from the evidence available.

⁶⁰ U.S. Consulate General, Hong Kong, Survey of China Mainland Press, No. 3305, 25 September 1964, p. 37.

⁶¹ Whitehouse, p. 75-76.

⁶² Zanzibar Domestic News Service, 3 August 1966.

Covert Activity.

. . . 'The four seas are seething, clouds pouring and waters raging; the five continents are rocked by storm and thunder'
. . . .

Chou En-lai used the foregoing words of Mao Tse-tung to describe the "revolutionary storms" in Africa during June 1965.⁶³ He was speaking at a rally in Dar-es-Salaam and his description did not fit the apparent situation in Africa at that time. It is possible that he was hinting at a situation which, in his opinion existed beneath the surface.

Determining the actual situation beneath the surface in Tanzania is difficult. The very nature of covert operations fosters the belief that the revelation of a few attempts indicates the existence of many more. There have been few alleged clandestine operations by the Chinese in Tanzania. These efforts were not directed at the government.

A frequent claim is that Tanzania is the principal base for Chinese subversion in Africa.⁶⁴ The geographical location permits probing eastward to the coveted and unstable Republic of the Congo or southward to the potentially volatile Mozambique, Rhodesia and South Africa. Dar-es-Salaam

⁶³ Dar-es-Salaam Radio, 4 June 1965.

⁶⁴ See: (1) East Africa Standard (Nairobi), (2) "Translations," p. 74, and (3) The Interpreter, March 1965, p. 15.

is a haven for many political refugees and dissidents from other nations. It is the headquarters of the Organization of African Unity's Liberation Committee, the "Mozambique Freedom Fighters" and other organizations in opposition to the remaining white regimes in southern Africa.⁶⁵ It is logical to assume that in such surroundings the Chinese would attempt clandestine operations.

The first reports of such activity were associated with a correspondent for the NCNA, Kao Liang. After being expelled from India for interference in internal affairs, he appeared in Dar-es-Salaam for the NCNA. From this base he supposedly maintained contacts with political refugees, exiled leaders and extremists, supplying some of them with arms and money.⁶⁶ The reports of Kao Liang's activities are so numerous and from so many varied sources including the defector in Burundi that credence must be given to his suggested activity in Tanzania.

Dr. Hastings Banda, Prime Minister of Malawi, declared in September 1964 that he had been visited twice by the Chinese Ambassador to Tanzania and offered (according to The Economist) a 6 million pound sterling bribe in exchange

⁶⁵Colin Legum, "Peking's Strategic Priorities," Africa Report, January 1965, p. 20.

⁶⁶"New China News Agency," p. 8.

for Malawi's recognition of Communist China.⁶⁷ Another source reported that the offered bribe was 18 million pound sterling. Whether six or eighteen, it is an unbelievable sum when the strategic or economic importance of Malawi and the financial resources of China are considered. It is probable that Dr. Banda made the statement, since it was reported by a number of sources, but in view of the internal difficulties within Malawi, this charge was probably an exaggeration for internal consumption. Later Dr. Banda attributed his cabinet revolt to machinations of the Chinese Embassy in Dar-es-Salaam and charged that an invasion of Malawi from Tanzania was being organized by his former foreign Minister.⁶⁸

There have been additional charges by neighbors of subversion originating in Tanzania. In January 1965, the Congo Government (Leopoldville) claimed that arms were being shipped to rebels in the eastern Congo across Lake Tanganyika. In May the interception of a convoy of Chinese Communist weapons in Kenya en route to Uganda from Tanzania threatened to break up the East African Common Market.⁶⁹

⁶⁷ "Gentlemen's Gentleman," The Economist, 16 October 1965, p. 258.

⁶⁸ "News in Brief," Africa Report, January 1965, p. 28.

⁶⁹ Lawrence Fellows, "Kenya's Neighbors Threaten Break," The New York Times, 22 May 1965, p. 8:4.

The number of Chinese Communist agents in Tanzania is a matter of speculation. There appear to be numerous Chinese nationals in the country. Mr. William R. Duggan, a U.S. State Department official, estimated the number of Chinese present in 1965 as more than 1000.⁷⁰ This figure seems extraordinarily large and cannot be substantiated. The Chinese ambassador to Tanzania placed the figure at 200 in July 1966 but indicated it was increasing.⁷¹ These figures of course relate to technicians and instructors but there is also disagreement on the number of accredited diplomatic representatives. The latest Tanzanian government document available in the U.S. Library of Congress in November 1966 listed only six accredited Chinese diplomats to Tanganyika in 1963. Another source placed the figure at between 30 and 40 while commenting that some technicians and NCNA representatives possess diplomatic credentials.⁷² Some credence is afforded the latter statement by a report in the New York Times during the 1967 "Cultural Revolution" in China that some of the technicians returning to China had names similar to those of accredited diplomats.⁷³

⁷⁰Interview with William R. Duggan, Policy Planning Council, U.S. Department of State, Washington, D.C., 29 December 1966.

⁷¹Dar-es-Salaam Radio, 25 July 1966.

⁷²Whitehouse, p. 70.

⁷³Anthony Lewis, "Chinese Envoys Returning Home," The New York Times, 10 January 1967, p. 5:1.

Whatever the number of agents or volume of Chinese arms, their employment is not in clandestine operations within Tanzania. The report of a secret agreement signed by Tanzania and Red China in March 1965 aimed at furnishing arms to start a campaign of diversion,⁷⁴ the reports of direct Chinese aid for a South African group of freedom fighters, the evidence of Chinese training and arms for the organized forays into Mozambique⁷⁵ plus many other similar occurrences --pinpoint Dar-es-Salaam as the center of Chinese covert activity in Central and East Africa. But all evidence points to the exportation of this activity; the agents are careful not to become involved in intrigues involving Tanzania.⁷⁶

Extensive time, money and effort have been expended by the Communist Chinese in Tanzania. The involvement is overt and shows no sign of abating. Particular emphasis has been placed upon projecting the image of a genuine friend. Aiming to use the "rural area" of Africa to achieve her objectives, China has openly chosen Tanzania as the center of operation. The Tanzanian Government, in particular the astute Julius Nyerere, is aware of the facts. The reaction has varied,

⁷⁴"Translations," p. 42.

⁷⁵Lawrence Fellows, "Portuguese Curb Guerrillas in Mozambique," The New York Times, 21 November 1966, p. 1:6.

⁷⁶Legum, "Priorities," p. 20.

set no particular pattern, and generally gives Tanzania the reputation of being an enigma.

The expressed aims of Peking would be enough to make Tanzania wary. The obvious efforts should serve notice that the expressed aims are being pursued locally. Yet, the defense against Chinese penetration is not sustained or directed. At times there is an uneasy feeling that the danger has not been realized but this is followed by a shrewd move which thwarts and frustrates the Chinese. These tactics of Julius Nyerere encourage the cloudy picture that Tanzania presents to East and West.

CHAPTER III

TANZANIAN REACTION

Tanzanian reaction to any external force is primarily Julius Nyerere's reaction to that force. It is therefore prudent to gain some insight into his character before examining his relations with the Communist Chinese.

Julius Kamberage Nyerere: Focal Point.

. . . Sagacious . . . highly principled . . .
grassroots popularity of John F. Kennedy . . .
Statesmanlike qualities of Adlai Stevenson. . . .¹

William R. Duggan, of the State Department, did not hesitate as he gave the above response to this author's inquiry as to his impressions of Nyerere after years of association. Biographers, politicians, statesmen, scholars and reporters have been equally generous in their description of this slight, mild boyish leader. An Arab politician, female, who knew and worked with Nyerere as he guided Tanganyika to independence, describes him as a "sincere politician . . . a practical idealist . . . ruthless without being cruel . . . great moral strength."² The Manchester Guardian Weekly sees him as a realist, an idealist and highly principled.

¹ Interview with W. R. Duggan.

² Sophia Mustafa, The Tanganyika Way (London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1962), p. xiii.

He was described in The New York Times as the first leader in Africa to have surmounted the mental obstacle of thinking of independence in terms of black and white.³

Born in 1922, the son of a Chief of the poor Zanaki Tribe, Nyerere's early life was bleak. In a polygamous society, he eked out an existence with his brothers, sisters, and mother on a small plot of poor land. Overcoming tribal custom and paternal resistance, he was able to become one of the few Tanganyikans to receive a formal secondary school education.

He excelled in secondary school which enabled him to continue his education at Makerere College, in Uganda. After spending four years teaching, he became the first Tanganyikan to study in England and receive a Masters Degree. His teachers and classmates remember him for his sense of fair play, his reserved and courteous manner, and his excellence in debating. His contemporaries were most impressed by his ability to aid others in clarifying their thoughts.⁴

Returning home in 1952, he found a group of Tanganyikans frustrated in the early throes of Nationalism. Within two years he had organized the group both in thinking and action.

³ Richard Cox, "Nyerere Seeks a Middle Way for Africa," The New York Times, 3 December 1961, VI, p. 29 and 120.

⁴ For an account of Nyerere's early life see Listowel, p. 170-177.

They founded the Tanganyikan African National Union (TANU) political party which soon mobilized the territory for a successful drive to independence.⁵

The rapid move to independence was no mean feat. It was a combination of the shrewd tactics and wise policies of TANU and Nyerere. A review of a few selected incidents will aid in illustrating the thinking, motives, and principles of the man who decides and implements foreign policy.⁶

EAST AFRICA FEDERATION. A federation of Uganda, Kenya and Tanganyika is considered desirable for economic reasons.⁷ There existed a common currency and the British had established an East African Common Services Organization which administered the trade of the territories. Goods flowed freely without tariff barriers. There were strategic reasons which made the federation desirable but from the Tanganyikan view continuing the economic advantages was of prime concern.⁸

⁵Taylor, p. 136ff.

⁶Foreign Policy Discussions are conducted by Nyerere and the National Executive Council of TANU. Nyerere is the Official Minister for Foreign Affairs.

⁷Colin Leys, and Peter Robson, eds. Federation in East Africa: Opportunities and Problems (London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1965), p. 191-195.

⁸Interview with Mr. Robert Strong, Country Director, East Africa, U.S. Department of State, 28 December 1966, Washington, D.C.

As independence approached, Nyerere, "with his usual foresight," realized the danger to federation if each territory took separate paths to independence. Although federation would mean discarding thoughts of a prominent position for himself, Nyerere proposed that the independence of Tanganyika be delayed.⁹ Since Tanganyika was the poorer and less important territory, the leaders of Uganda and Kenya would assume the paramount positions in a federation. He was unsuccessful in his unselfish aim but this desire to pursue the course best for his people is still a motivating force. His dream of federation remains but his extensive nationalization of industry and banking in 1967 severely damaged hopes for early Federation.¹⁰

RESIGNATION AS PRIME MINISTER. Less than two months after being elected the first Prime Minister of Tanganyika, Julius Nyerere resigned. Most observers were stunned. Nyerere's explanation was that he wanted to devote more time to the rebuilding of the TANU party and to stimulate political activity among the people. The causes were much deeper than this. Nyerere in the push for independence had gotten out of touch with his party. In parliament he found criticism

⁹Lionel Cliffe, "Tanganyika's Two Years of Independence," Current History, March 1964, p. 179.

¹⁰Lawrence Fellows, "Tanzania Seizes More Businesses," The New York Times, 11 February 1967, p. 12:5.

for his pro-West image and his multiracial policy which permitted equal citizenship to Europeans and Asians.¹¹

Independence had not brought sudden prosperity; the past year had been poor for agriculture and had reduced the economic fortunes of the country. These frustrations were apparently being vented in a racial vein.¹² When he was unable to gain popular support for his moderate policies, he offered to resign.

It is questionable whether Nyerere expected his resignation to be accepted. The radicals in the party however saw this as an opportunity to gain control. They felt the party needed Nyerere's leadership but they wanted to keep him out of power until after the party had assumed a more leftist stance.¹³ Perhaps caught off guard by this attitude, the Prime Minister rationalized that the nation would suffer less if the attacks of the radicals were directed at him as a party leader rather than as the titular leader of the nation. He also believed that he could gain enough support from the people to withstand these efforts to change the stance of Tanganyika. He therefore went to the people; he

¹¹"An Astute Political Move?" Manchester Guardian Weekly, 25 January 1962, p. 2.

¹²"Mr. Nyerere's Decision," The Economist, 27 January 1962, p. 329.

¹³Interview with Mr. Hennemeyer.

wanted to add a new purpose to replace the drive for independence. He toured the length and breadth of the country explaining his moderate policy and explaining the need for hard work few immediate rewards. He rebuilt the party whose ranks had been thinned by the need for administrators and legislators. He helped draft a new constitution for a presidential type government. In December he was overwhelmingly elected the first president thus receiving a vote of confidence from the people.¹⁴

POMPOSITIVITY LETTER. A relatively minor incident reveals more of Nyerere's character and tactics. Shortly after he became president he circulated a "pompositivity letter." This letter made light of the sirens, police, and general excitement generated when the president moved about Dar-es-Salaam. He pointed out that this was not necessary prior to independence and could see little reason for it now. He referred to himself as becoming a public nuisance.¹⁵ He goes on to subtly warn of the danger of public officials becoming too important and detached from the people. Government officials led by Nyerere are examples of the frugality expected of the people. Senior ministers salaries were cut from \$8,700 to \$5,000 annually and the presidential car is a Land-Rover.¹⁶ High

¹⁴"President Nyerere," The New York Times, 14 November 1962, p. 38:2.

¹⁵Julius Nyerere, Freedom and Unity, (Dar-es-Salaam: Oxford University Press, 1966), p. 225.

¹⁶Davidson, p. 6.

government officials are expected to be seen tilling the soil and engaging in community self-help programs.

BREAKING DIPLOMATIC TIES WITH BRITAIN. When Britain would not make a declaration that her aim in Rhodesia was independence on the basis of majority rule, Tanzania severed diplomatic relations with Britain. Nyerere took this action because of his policy of anticolonialism and because Tanzania had agreed to the Organization of African Unity resolution to sever ties.¹⁷ This could have been economic suicide for Tanzania because British aid is essential. Fortunately, Britain permitted the current aid to continue. Such a strict adherence to principle though admirable, is obviously inadvisable when contrary to the general welfare and represents a considerable gamble on Nyerere's part.

DEMOCRATIC ONE-PARTY STATE. Finally it is pertinent to look at the philosophy of the TANU party, the only political party in Tanzania. This philosophy has been worked out almost entirely by Nyerere. Basically it is a belief in the dignity and equality of individuals and has led to Nyerere's policy in foreign affairs.¹⁸ TANU's prominent role in gaining

¹⁷ Julius K. Nyerere, Principles and Development (Dar-es-Salaam: Ministry of Information and Tourism, 1966), p. 6.

¹⁸ Gwendolen M. Carter, ed., "Tanganyika," African One-Party States, (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1962), p. 450.

independence led to the disappearance of all practical political opposition. In order to give the people a voice in the government, all candidates now are members of TANU and must compete on merit. However, candidates must campaign with certain restrictions. The most important of these restrictions for the purpose of this paper is the limitation on debate of major foreign policy. Campaigning is controlled by the party and candidates are not permitted to debate selected and usually critical elements of national policy.¹⁹ Foreign policy is treated as the extension of the domestic struggle against colonialism and other antidemocratic forces.

The one-party state is a general solution to the problem created when a parliamentary form of government is injected into a society where seeking "the sense of the meeting" is traditional. It is too early to decide whether the Tanzanian model is another dictatorship or a new form of democracy as it has been labeled.²⁰ The important thing to note is that Tanzanian foreign policy is the result of the thinking of a small group at best but usually it is the product of the thinking of Julius Nyerere. How have the Chinese impressed Nyerere? What action has he taken to the real and hidden objectives of

¹⁹Morgenthau, p. 14.

²⁰"Party of the First Part," The Economist, 10 April 1965, p. 157.

Peking? To what extent has he permitted the Red Chinese to influence the thinking of Tanzanians?

Politics: Neither East nor West. Although President Nyerere agreed in December 1961 to establish diplomatic relations with Communist China it was not until February 11, 1965, a week before Nyerere's visit to China, that a Tanzanian Ambassador presented his credentials in Peking. But, as events have shown, failure to send an ambassador was not an expression of unfriendliness toward the Chinese. It was more likely traceable to Nyerere's concern, before independence, of the monetary costs of diplomatic representatives abroad. Tanzania's policy of friendship toward China has led to charges that the government has "gone Communist." Yet, Nyerere maintains that this policy is simply implementation of the general policy of "being friendly with any country which is willing to be friendly with us."²¹ The Tanzanian ambassador to the U.S. gave this impression of Tanzania's initial and continued friendliness toward China "With independence came the right to choose our friends; if we had initially disliked China it would have been for borrowed reasons; she is our friend because she has not proven to be our enemy."²²

²¹Nyerere, "Principles," p. 12.

²²Interview with Chief Michael Lukumbuza, Tanzanian Ambassador to the United States, 30 December 1966, Washington, D.C.

Tanzania's avowed policy of nonalignment has irritated both East and West. Being a part of the Western bloc until independence, Nyerere believes that it comes as a shock to the West when the new nations do not automatically align with the West.²³ The West symbolizes colonialism to Africa, and with colonialism is attached the humiliation of discrimination and economic exploitation.²⁴ Therefore, newly independent nations usually assume an anticolonial posture. Such is Tanzania's policy.

But to the consternation of the Chinese, efforts to transpose this anticolonialism of Tanzania into an anti-West position has generally met with defeat. A most notable example of this occurred near the conclusion of Nyerere's visit to Peking in February 1965. After the usual Chinese tirade against the West, Nyerere told the assembly: "We offer the hand of friendship to China, as to America, Russia, Britain and others, we shall see for ourselves what China's intentions are toward us. We shall not be told by others."²⁵

Tanzania's apparent independence from Chinese influence is again reflected in her vacillation between support and

²³ Julius K. Nyerere, "A Statement of Policies," Punch, (London: 16 March 1966), p. 372.

²⁴ Ibid., p. 370.

²⁵ As quoted by Colin Legum, "Julius Nyerere in Peking," Africa Report, March 1965, p. 43.

opposition to various Chinese themes. The Chinese termed Russia's policy of "peaceful coexistence" (with the West) as the "rubbish peddled by Khrushchev revisionists."²⁶ Tanzania, by contrast, has laid special emphasis on the need to solve international disputes by peaceful means and the belief in the principle of peaceful coexistence.²⁷ However, the Chinese call for a cessation of the hostilities in Vietnam and settlement in accord with the 1954 Geneva agreement is echoed by Tanzania including the withdrawal of all foreign troops.²⁸

This independence must not be construed to be nonalignment. One author has commented that (in today's circumstances) nonalignment appears to have become largely illusory. He explains that the power of the East and of the West force alignment and only occasional exercises of independence and sovereignty are permitted.²⁹ This explains Nyerere's statement in Peking when refusing to endorse China's policy toward the United Nations:

. . . the exclusion of China from the U.N. is, to my mind, less a reflection on the U.N. itself. It is rather a painful reminder that perhaps many of us in Asia, Africa, Latin America, and Europe are less independent than we claim to be.³⁰

²⁶Piao, p. 28.

²⁷Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Affairs Bulletin Tanzania, Vol. II, No. 2. (Dar-es-Salaam: April 1966), p. 1.

²⁸Ibid., p. 2.

²⁹Conor Cruise O'Brien, "Non Alignment," New Statesman, 8 April 1966, p. 507.

³⁰Legum, "In Peking," p. 43.

It would be difficult to find pro-Western sentiments or non-alignment in such a statement. A close examination of the Tanzanian view of Chinese economic aid reveals a more pro-West posture yet it is the acceptance of this aid more than any other factor that supports charges of pro-Communist China.

Aid: Desired Without Strings. Tanzania's trade surplus during 1965 was approximately 42 million dollars.³¹ Exports to Communist China, chiefly agricultural products, amounted to slightly more than 12 million dollars,³² (less than 8 percent of the total exports). Chinese aid during this period included a 7 million dollar textile mill, an agricultural implements factory, about 11,000 tons of arms, 22 instructors for the police training academy, and a survey for the Tanzania to Zambia (TAN-ZAM) railroad.³³ The mill and factory are welcomed by the government because they will aid in Tanzania's efforts to become self-sufficient. They are not prestige projects such as Ghana's atomic reactor but instead reflect the practical stance of the government; additionally they are visual monuments to Communist China costing a fraction of "invisible" Western aid for such things as irrigation and public health.

³¹"Drought and Competition Hamper Tanzania," The New York Times, 31 January 1966, p. 64:1.

³²Annual Trade Report of Tanganyika, Uganda and Kenya, 1965.

³³"Drought and Competition."

The arms are needed to support the freedom fighters to whom Nyerere is totally committed. Unable to get Western support for these activities he is greatly indebted to the Chinese for this aid.

There have been inferences that Chinese aid is involved and has influenced major economic decisions by Tanzania. In April 1965, customs duties on Chinese Communist goods were waived by Tanzania.³⁴ This effectively gave these grants in kind a favorable position to other goods and tended to undermine the economies of Kenya and Uganda. Tanzanians, being western oriented, reluctantly buy Chinese goods. It is probable that at least a portion of the proceeds from these goods were to be channelled into government coffers.

Tanzania's decision to withdraw from the common monetary and banking system of East Africa led to a charge by Kenya that China was indirectly responsible for this decision. Chou En-lai during his visit to Tanzania had called the proposed East Africa Federation a scheme of the imperialists.³⁵ Kenya's contention was that the wide range of Chinese goods flooding into Tanzania were to be used to raise money for development projects started by the Chinese and this made a

³⁴Gazette of United Republic of Tanzania (Dar-es-Salaam: Government Printer, 23 April 1965).

³⁵Lawrence Fellows, "Monetary Union in Africa to End," The New York Times, 11 June 1965, p. 8:3.

separate currency more desirable for Tanzania.³⁶ Nyerere says the decision to change the currency was made because it was impossible to plan economic development without the planners being able to control currency and credit.³⁷

This is a satisfactory explanation if for no other reason than it would tend to pressure for federation in a negative manner. Kenya has enjoyed the most favored position in the East Africa Common Market and naturally is against any move to change this position.

Nyerere's economic plans seem to aim at self-sufficiency and decreasing aid, with reliance on monies from international organizations rather than on a single nation or bloc. The five year Economic Development Plan (1965-1970) is based on half of the capital coming from outside grants, loans and gifts. It is Tanzania's desire that these monies be channelled through the United Nations.³⁸ Nyerere recognized that direct loans from nations often carry terms too advantageous to the lending nation. In an address to parliament in December 1964, the President, speaking of foreign loans said, "Governments' policy will be, in every case to examine the balance of

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Julius Nyerere, Our Economy: 1965-1967 (Dar-es-Salaam: Government Printer, 1966), p. 18.

³⁸ Foreign Affairs Bulletin, p. 11.

advantage to this country: we shall look at the total cost, and the benefit. And we shall accept or reject offers on that basis alone."³⁹

Nyerere has refuted suggestions that economic development has been retarded by adherence to principles related to foreign affairs.⁴⁰ He believes that his policy of nonalignment and friendship with the Chinese have cost "something" in the form of economic aid,⁴¹ but without compromising his principles, the President attempts to achieve a balance between aid from the East and West.

The Tan-Zam railway episode is an example of "China versus the West economic aid competition." Determined to relieve Zambia's reliance on Rhodesia, Nyerere and President Kaunda of Zambia are deeply committed to building a railway from Zambia to the coast.⁴² They were temporarily stymied when the World Bank advised that a road should be built instead of a railway and neither East nor West appeared interested in the railway. According to the Washington Post accounts, Nyerere and Kaunda then proposed financing of the railway through an

³⁹ Julius K. Nyerere, The Tanganyika Five Year Plan and Review of the Plan (Dar-es-Salaam: Tanganyika Information Services, 1965), p. 7.

⁴⁰ Nyerere, "Principles," p. 1.

⁴¹ Ibid., p. 12.

⁴² Whitehouse, p. 73.

African Development Bank consortium. Presumably to avoid cooperating with the West, the Chinese started surveying the route. The Chinese action precipitated western interest; Britain and Canada then agreed to finance a survey.⁴³ In September 1965 China offered to finance and build the route.⁴⁴ A comparable offer has not been made by the West but the Chinese offer has not been accepted. Here we note the preference for international aid and the reluctance to accept Chinese aid. It is reasonable to assume however that in instances such as this, unilateral Chinese Communist Aid will be accepted if aid is not forthcoming from other sources. International agencies of course are not compatible with the Chinese desire for influence and propaganda.

Although at present the stated desire is for aid from international sources, there is less reluctance to accept western aid now than was evidenced shortly after independence. U.S. aid at that time was viewed with an anticolonial jaundiced eye and Nyerere was wary of the strings which might be attached.⁴⁵ Today, there are indications that more strings are attached to aid from China than to aid from the West.

⁴³"Tanzania," Deadline Data, p. 12.

⁴⁴Lawrence Fellows, "China May Build Africa Railroad," The New York Times, 22 September 1965, p. 1:4.

⁴⁵"Tanganyika Eyes U.S. Loan Warily," The New York Times, 11 December 1963, p. 10:3.

Nyerere in a recent press conference spoke of Chinese aid as being given in a "different and novel way" and Western aid as taking less time to negotiate.⁴⁶

It will be some time before Tanzania will not need foreign aid. Efforts appear to be directed toward that goal and progress is being made. The economy is not tied to Chinese aid and future plans are not dependent on it. Aid is welcome but self-reliance not reliance on China or the East or the West is stressed.⁴⁷ The decision to sever relations with Britain cost Tanzania 21 million dollars in aid but continued economic progress in 1966 has added to the air of confidence. Nyerere is however, well aware of the fact that Western nations are richer and aid is of higher quality than that available from China. Dependence will tend more toward the West as long as direct conflict with principles do not develop.

Propaganda: Increasing Inroads. Chinese propaganda is having an effect in Tanzania but results are not always desirable from the Communist point of view. Its effect on government often have a detectable Chinese flavor.

The most apparent effect of Chinese propaganda has been the influence on content of The Nationalist newspaper, an

⁴⁶ Dar-es-Salaam News Service, 10 June 1966.

⁴⁷ Nyerere, "Our Economy," p. 12-14.

organ of TANU and thus a semiofficial spokesman for the government. Editorials not only are anti-West but also pursue current Red Chinese themes. On 20 June 1966, a commentary appeared which could have been written by Lin Piao himself. It was entitled "Imperialism Is Doomed To Failure" and attacked the activities of American philanthropic organizations, the CIA, and Prime Minister Wilson.⁴⁸ Notable in the article was the appeal to the "peoples of Africa, Asia and Latin America," often used in Lin Piao's manifesto and other Chinese publications.

The local radio broadcasts also show Chinese influence. The Dar-es-Salaam Radio on 29 July 1966 reported that President Nyerere was favorably impressed with the modest living conditions of the visiting Chinese experts working on the Chinese financed textile mill. This announcement had a three-fold yield: (1) the popular President had shown his approval of the Chinese, (2) the Chinese had been identified with modest living (which is the norm for most Tanzanians), and (3) Chinese aid was being publicized. Three days later, Zanzibar radio reported the remarks of a Tanzanian government official to the effect that Chinese efforts in Zanzibar very much impress the people of Zanzibar because "we are experiencing the same difficulties as those experienced by fellow nationalists in

⁴⁸ As reported by New China News Agency International Service, 20 June 1966.

the Chinese Peoples Republic."⁴⁹ "Identification" and the "common cause," key Chinese tools are readily apparent.

A newly instituted government policy will probably result in a reduction of Chinese propaganda "vehicles." Nyerere noted that Tanzanian delegations to foreign countries were too many and too large and he intends to restrict such travel to those of real necessity.⁵⁰ Economy was the prime motive, but he also indicated that Tanzanian delegations financed by the host country were usually restricted in what they did and saw. This might be interpreted to mean that the guests were given only desirable (from Chinese view) information to take home. Nyerere, himself, (whose visit was certainly pre-planned by the Chinese) stated upon his return that he was most impressed by the "emphasis on frugality."⁵¹

In the area of foreign policy and international affairs, Chinese propaganda is evident in some of the statements of position of the Tanzanian government. As has been mentioned previously, the position of the Tanzanian government on the Vietnam war is practically indistinguishable from the Chinese position. It is difficult to assess the influence of Chinese propaganda on the Tanzanian position in this case since the

⁴⁹ Zanzibar Domestic News Service, 3 August 1966.

⁵⁰ Nyerere, "Our Economy," p. 16-17.

⁵¹ Legum, "Priorities," p. 43.

arguments used are well worn by other nations. It is worthy of note that Nyerere talks of the Vietnam situation originating in the anticolonial struggle of the postwar period⁵² and a Chinese tool is to link Western action to colonialism where possible.

A review of foreign policy statements by Nyerere and Tanzanian government officials shows moderation in speech. This is true even in such emotionally charged situations as the Rhodesian crisis which resulted in severance of diplomatic relations with Britain.⁵³ On a continent where inflammatory oratory is often the rule, Tanzania and especially Nyerere, is noted for eloquence not irresponsible rantings.

An overall assessment of Chinese gains from propaganda in Tanzania would best be described as considerable and increasing. While noting that Nyerere emphatically rejects the idea that Tanzania has fallen under the influence of Communist China, The New York Times reported in March of 1966 that a recent survey in Dar-es-Salaam suggested that 43% of those polled regarded Communist China as Tanzania's best friend. Two years earlier under 1% held this view.⁵⁴

⁵²Nyerere, "Principles," p. 3.

⁵³Julius K. Nyerere, The Honour of Africa (Dar-es-Salaam: Ministry of Information and Tourism, 1965), p. 1-15.

⁵⁴Drew Middleton, "Tanzanian Denies Peking Influence," The New York Times, 17 March 1966, p. 17:1.

Covert Activity: For Export Only. Finally, we turn to Tanzanian reaction to Chinese covert activities. Earlier it has been pointed out that Chinese covert activities are not directed toward the Tanzanian government. What then is the Tanzanian policy toward other covert activities by the Chinese?

It bears reiteration that Nyerere and Tanzania are firmly dedicated to eliminating the last vestiges of minority rule on the African continent.⁵⁵ This means they are firmly dedicated to the overthrow of the minority regimes in South Africa, Rhodesia, and the Portuguese colonies. Therefore, support of organizations planning the overthrow of these minority governments are welcome on Tanzanian soil. If China chooses to aid those groups, Tanzania will not interfere. In fact, Tanzania is grateful for and encourages this help. Nyerere has stated that he is willing to assist those who oppose the minority governments as far as it lies within his power.⁵⁶ China has indicated a willingness to help with money, arms and training; indications are that it is being accepted.

Nyerere has indicated that he will not support attempts to overthrow duly constituted governments of the majority.⁵⁷

⁵⁵Nyerere, "Principles," p. 3.

⁵⁶Nyerere, "Policies," p. 372.

⁵⁷Foreign Affairs Bulletin, p. 8.

He has deplored various coup d'etats even the disposal of Nkrumah of Ghana whom he had bitterly attacked publicly. Yet for humanitarian reasons, he harbors political refugees from other nations and is therefore prone to suspicion of involvement in their clandestine operations.⁵⁸

There is ample evidence of Chinese arms entering Tanzania. A competent observer however states that Nyerere keeps close tabs on all arms entering the country.⁵⁹ Nyerere insures that arms are stowed and issued under government direction. Whether he doubts the intentions of the dissident foreigners or the Chinese is open to speculation.

Finally, it is no secret that Western failure to support the various "freedom" groups greatly irritates Nyerere and the Tanzanian government. Even covert support would be welcome. Ambassador Lukumbuzya became quite excited and irritated as he spoke of U.S. policy toward South Africa and Portugal. He described U.S. policy as "a somersault." First America supports the colonists, then America supports self-determination and then back to support of the colonists.. He complained that weapons given Portugal, in the name of NATO, are being used to kill Africans struggling to be free.⁶⁰

⁵⁸ Ibid., p. 3-7.

⁵⁹ Interview with Mr. Hennemeyer.

⁶⁰ Interview with Ambassador Lukumbuzya.

The solution to this problem is difficult for the West; simple for the African. As long as China supports the overthrow of these governments she will find friends in Africa and Tanzania. As long as the United States does not actively oppose minority rule she will be accused of supporting late twentieth century colonialism.

Some of the varied political, social and economic problems of Tanzania have been discussed. The extensive subversive efforts of Communist China have been revealed. President Nyerere has been viewed as he walks the international tightrope of nonalignment and juggles the hot potato of freedom fighters. Yet, the considered opinion of U.S. Department of State African Analysts is that Tanzania exhibits the greatest degree of stability in emerging Africa.⁶¹

⁶¹ Interview with Mr. Robert Baum, Deputy Director, Office of Research and Analysis for Africa, U.S. Department of State, Washington: 27 December 1966.

CHAPTER IV

CONCLUSIONS

An Appraisal. Tanzania possesses a varied assortment of internal problems peculiar to many of the emerging nations in Africa. The keys to stability are continued progress and prudent leadership. Thus far, President Julius Nyerere has exhibited the astuteness required for sustained progress; within the foreseeable future he should maintain a tranquil, hard working environment.

The Chinese Communists are extending considerable effort to gain influence in Tanzania. This effort is varied and subtle but not covert. Success can be measured by the modest inroads obtained and the increasing evidence of Chinese influence in Tanzanian newspapers and radio broadcasts. Political influence gained has been negligible, if it exists at all, but considerable leverage for Peking could result from the Tanzanian desire for continued support of the "freedom fighters."

The great enigma is Tanzania's reaction to the Chinese. Nyerere seems naive and even indecisive. There are pressures both internal and external which force him to walk a tight-rope but he also understands that nonalignment is an elusive goal. It appears that he has reluctantly accepted slow development as the price for nonalignment.

Principles Under Pressure. The Chinese obviously want Tanzania as a propaganda platform. Nyerere attempts to counter this but unfortunately, from his point of view, the advantages are usually gained and his efforts are ignored by East and West. It is the statements of Chou En-lai from Dar-es-Salaam which rate front page coverage; the reply of Julius Nyerere is lost.

Chinese economic aid is accepted by Nyerere even though he recognizes the obvious disadvantages. To alienate such nations as the United States, Britain and West Germany is pure folly. These nations are the only hope that emerging nations have of closing the almost insurmountable gap in development. His justification--nonalignment--is compatible with his highly principled behavior but there is a more practical reason. The unsophisticated African mind finds difficulty separating colonialism from the Western nations. Fear, that his people may misunderstand, forces him to remain publicly opposed to anything that remotely resembles imperialism.

Finally, his policy of harboring dissidents must give Nyerere many sleepless nights. This single policy makes Tanzania a target from within and without. It is doubtful that even the United States could afford such a haven indefinitely. The pressure here is from the continent but again principles enter the scene. An avid supporter of Pan

Africanism and an outspoken foe of the minority governments, Nyerere has no choice but to support the freedom fighters. He gives his territory since he cannot afford to give financial support.

It is difficult not to admire and sympathize with Nyerere. He sincerely wants to aid his country. His preference for the title Mwalimu (teacher) is an indication that his desire is to elevate his pupils through experience. Mwalimu is also an indication that at least subconsciously he feels that at present he knows best. These are difficult times for all leaders especially those in Africa, and the stability without tyranny or great prosperity which Nyerere has engendered is no mean feat. He will continue to court Peking and the West.

Freedom Fighters and the Future. Nyerere's base of strength is in his own charismatic personality and the strong nationalist tendencies of most Tanzanians. His dominance of the scene will insure sustained progress unless unbridled adherence to principles strip him of Western aid and goodwill. Continued Tanzanian progress toward self-sufficiency will frustrate Chinese efforts to increase economic dependence. Strong nationalism is a permanent factor and is not dependent upon Nyerere's tenure.

The average Tanzanian's latent desire for affluence will eventually overturn present acceptance of frugality. The

Communist Chinese can and will await this opportune moment. If these desires are to be controlled by the government it will be through accelerated avenues of progress for capable individuals. This would require increased aid. Such aid should be tendered by the West through international organizations thereby precluding charges of financial imperialism and preventing opportunities for Communist ascendancy.

Unwillingly, Tanzania has become an ideological prize. Her increasing stability in the middle of an otherwise uncertain continent make her a jewel for China. From this vantage point China can continue to project an image as a world power benevolently dispensing aid to a needy nation. Also, there will be provided opportunities such as the "Tan-Zam" railway to indirectly confront the West; and the problems in the south present almost unlimited opportunities to point out the inconsistency of Western policy.

The Chinese Reds are content with their progress in Tanzania. The future will see continuing but decreasing aid--just enough to seem friendly and to support revolutions in the south. Chinese agents will remain to export insurgency and to take advantage of propaganda opportunities.

Unfortunately, there is little that the United States can do to compete with the Chinese in Tanzania. Fortunately, the United States has no vital interest in Tanzania to the exclusion of the rest of the continent. Through international

agencies monies should be provided to speed development. Through groups such as the Peace Corps, technical assistance should be provided without cost and to the maximum extent absorbable.

There is one thing that the United States could do that would eliminate Chinese Communist advances not only in Tanzania but in all of Africa. Aid could be given to the "freedom fighters". Assuming that the "freedom fighters" would fight only for the right of self determination of the people in countries ruled by minority governments, this would apparently be in accord with current U.S. foreign policy. But the ramifications of such action in the current time frame are obvious (e.g., loss of the Portuguese bases and weakening of the NATO alliance) and clearly not in the best interests of the United States nor within the scope of this study.

Power tempered by responsible action permits the weak to indulge in policies founded on principle rather than on practicality. The United States as a responsible world leader can ill afford to take action based solely on altruistic principles. Tanzania and all developing nations would do well to reflect upon this.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- "Africa's Fishy Eye For Chou En-lai." The Economist,
12 June 1965, p. 1261.
- Annual Trade Report of Tanganyika, Uganda and Kenya.
London: n.p., 1965.
- "An Astute Political Move?" Manchester Guardian Weekly,
25 January 1962, p. 2.
- Bayne, E. A. Freedom and Unity? New York: American Uni-
versities Field Staff Inc., 1963.
- Berkeley, Humphry, M.P. "How Not to Decolonise." The
Spectator, 1 May 1964, p. 574-576.
- "Blueprint for a One Party Democracy." Africa Report,
October 1965, p. 19-20.
- Carter, Gwendolen M., ed. "Tanganyika." African One-Party
States, Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1962.
- Central Office of Information. Zanzibar. London: HMSO, 1963.
- "China in Africa." The Economist, London, 18 January 1964,
p. 177.
- "China Said to Seek Base in Zanzibar for Subversion."
The New York Times, 28 May 1964, p. 18:3.
- "China's Effort in Africa." The Interpreter, March 1965,
p. 11-16.
- "China's Loan to Zanzibar." Manchester Guardian Weekly,
11 June 1964, p. 16:5.
- "China Warns U.S. on Vietnam War." The New York Times,
18 February 1965, p. 10:3.
- Chi-p'ing, Tung. "Red China." Look, 1 December 1964, p. 21-27.
- Cliffe, Lionel. "Tanganyika's Two Years of Independence."
Current History, March 1964, p. 136-141, 179-180.
- Conley, Robert. "Africa and Asia Warned on Reds." The New
York Times, 5 February 1963, p. 1:8.

- _____. "Cuban Trained Guerrillas Directed Zanzibar Revolt." The New York Times, 19 January 1964, p. 1:2.
- _____. "Nyerere Names Zanzibar Marxists to Cabinet." The New York Times, 28 April 1964, p. 2:5.
- _____. "Tirades of Reds Alienate Africans." The New York Times, 15 February 1963, p. 8:5.
- Cooley, John K. East Wind over Africa. New York: Walker and Co., 1965.
- Cox, Richard. "Nyerere Seeks a Middle Way for Africa." The New York Times, 3 December 1961, VI p. 29 and 120.
Dar-es-Salaam News Service, Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania.
- Davidson, Basil. "Tanganyika on its Own." New Statesman, London: 4 January 1963, p. 5-6.
- "Drought and Competition Hamper Tanzania." The New York Times, 31 January 1966, p. 64:1.
East African Standard (Nairobi), 9 September 1964.
- Eckstein, Alexander. Communist China's Economic Growth and Foreign Trade. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1966.
- Fellows, Lawrence. "China Is Leading in Tanzania Aid." The New York Times, 10 June 1965, p. 7:1.
- _____. "China May Build Africa Railroad." The New York Times, (Int'l ed.), 22 September 1965, p. 1:4.
- _____. "Chou, In Tanzania, Calls U.S. a Bully." The New York Times, 6 June 1965, p. 1:7.
- _____. "Imports From Kenya and Uganda are Curbed By Tanzania." The New York Times, 19 June 1965, p. 33:3.
- _____. "Kenya's Neighbors Threaten Break." The New York Times, 22 May 1965, p. 8:4.
- _____. "Monetary Union in Africa to End." The New York Times, 11 June 1965, p. 8:3.
- _____. "Portuguese Curb Guerrillas in Mozambique." The New York Times, 21 November 1966, p. 1:6.

- _____. "Tanzania Seizes More Businesses." The New York Times, 11 February 1967, p. 12:5.
- Gazette of United Republic of Tanzania. Dar-es-Salaam: Government Printer, 23 April 1965.
- "Gentlemen's Gentleman." The Economist, 16 October 1965, p. 258.
- Gruson, Sydney. "Western Allies Surprised." The New York Times, 24 April 1964, p. 8.
- Hamilton, Thomas J. "Thant Predicts a Stable Africa." The New York Times, 22 January 1964, p. 3:1.
- "Independence for East Africa." The New York Times, 11 December 1963, p. 46:2.
- Ingalls, Leonard. "Tanganyika Gets Freedom Dec. 28." The New York Times, 30 March 1961, p. 5:1.
- _____. "Zanzibar Tension Threatens Gains." The New York Times, 12 July 1961, p. 13.
- Interview with Mr. Robert Baum, Deputy Director, Office of Research and Analysis for Africa. U.S. Department of State, Washington: 27 December 1966.
- Interview with William R. Duggan, Policy Planning Council, U.S. Department of State, Washington, D.C., 29 December 1966.
- Interview with Mr. Robert T. Hennemeyer, Chief officer Placement Branch, Functional Personnel Program, U.S. Department of State, Washington, D.C., 27 December 1966.
- Interview with Chief Michael Lukumbuza, Tanzanian Ambassador to the United States of America. Washington: 30 December 1966.
- Interview with Mr. Robert Strong, Country Director, East Africa, U.S. Department of State. Washington: 28 December 1966.
- Kihss, Peter. "Kennedy Says He Favors Johnson's Re-election in '68." The New York Times, 20 June 1966, p. 1:2.
- Kyle, Keith. "Mutinies and After." The Spectator, 31 January 1964, p. 139-140.

- Larkin, Bruce D. "Chinese American Policy: 1954-1964." Unpublished Doctorate Thesis (Pol. Sci.) Harvard University, 1965.
- "A Left Wing Coup in Zanzibar." Manchester Guardian Weekly, (London), 16 January 1964, p. 1.
- Legum, Colin. "Julius Nyerere in Peking." Africa Report, March 1965, p. 43.
- _____. "Peking's Strategic Priorities." Africa Report, January 1965, p. 19-21.
- Lessing, Pieter. Africa's Red Harvest. New York: John Day Co., 1962.
- Lewis, Anthony. "Chinese Envoys Returning Home," The New York Times, 10 January 1967, p. 5:1.
- Leys, Colin, and Robson, Peter, eds. "Federation in East Africa: Opportunities and Problems," London: Oxford University Press, 1965.
- Listowel, Judith. The Making of Tanganyika. New York: London House and Maxwell, 1965.
- Lofchie, Michael F. Zanzibar: Background to Revolution. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1965.
- Middleton, Drew. "Tanzanian Denies Peking Influence." The New York Times, 17 March 1966, p. 17:1.
- Middleton, John, and Campbell, Jane. Zanzibar. London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1965.
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Foreign Affairs Bulletin Tanzania, Vol. II, No. 2, Dar-es-Salaam: April 1966.
- Morgenthau, Ruth Schacter. "African Elections: Tanzania's Contribution." Africa Report, December 1965, p. 12-16.
- Mustafa, Sophia. The Tanganyika Way. London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1962.
- The Nationalist (Dar-es-Salaam), 26 November 1965, 2 May 1966 and 19-20 June 1966.
- "The New China News Agency." Current Scene, 1 April 1966, p. 1-14.

- New China News Agency International Service (Peking Radio).
"News in Brief," Africa Report, January 1965, p. 22-35.
_____. _____. January 1966, p. 21-36.
_____. _____. October 1966, p. 25-55.
"Nyerere Bids West Understand Plight," The New York Times,
1 September 1964, p. 4:2.
"Mr. Nyerere's Decision," The Economist, 27 January 1962, p. 329.
Nyerere, Julius K. Freedom and Unity, Dar-es-Salaam: Oxford
University Press, 1966.
_____. The Honour of Africa. Dar-es-Salaam: Ministry
of Information and Tourism, 1965.
_____. Our Economy: 1965-67. Dar-es-Salaam: Government
Printer, 1966.
_____. Principles and Development. Dar-es-Salaam: Gov-
ernment Printer, 1966.
_____. "A Statement of Policies," Punch (London), 16
March 1966, p. 372-373.
_____. The Tanganyika Five Year Plan and Review of the
Plan. Dar-es-Salaam: Tanganyika Information Services,
1965.
O'Brien, Conor Cruise. "Non-Alignment," New Statesman,
8 April 1966, p. 507-508.
"Pan African Leader Stresses Need for Armed Struggle in
South Africa," Zanews, 6 February 1965, p. 2.
"Party of the First Part." The Economist, 10 April 1965,
p. 157.
"Peoples Daily Hails Putting Out of Action of Armed U.S.-
Chiang Agents." Zanews (Zanzibar), 2 February 1965, p. 3.
Piao, Lin. "Long Live the Victory of the Peoples War."
Peking Review, 3 September 1965, p. 1-29.
"President Nyerere." The New York Times, 14 November 1962,
p. 38:2.

- Ribao, Renmin. "A Clumsy Forgery, A Foul Plot." Peking Review, 5 November 1965, p. 20-22.
- _____. "Friendship Between Chinese and African Peoples Can Never be Undermined." Peking Review (Peking) 14 January 1966, p. 23.
- "Root Out the Imperialist Forces in Africa." Peking Review, 22 April 1966, p. 26.
- Sanger, Clyde. "Independent Tanganyika." Manchester Guardian Weekly, 14 December 1961, p. 7.
- _____. "New Zanzibar Regime." Manchester Guardian Weekly, 16 January 1964, p. 3:4.
- Scalapino, Robert A. "Africa and Peking's United Front." Current Scene, 1 September 1965, p. 1-11.
- _____. "Sino-Soviet Competition in Africa." Foreign Affairs, July 1965, p. 640-654.
- Schatten, Fritz. "Peking's Growing Influence in Africa." Swiss Review of World Affairs (Zurich), August 1960, p. 8-11.
- "Sino-Mali Joint Communique." Peking Review, No. 5, 31 January 1964.
- "Tanganyika." Manchester Guardian Weekly, 6 April 1961, p. 8.
- "Tanganyika Eyes U.S. Loan Warily." The New York Times, 11 December 1963, p. 10:3.
- "Tanganyika Moves Forward." The Economist, 5 April 1958, p. 38.
- "Tanzania," Deadline Data on World Affairs. New York: Deadline Data Inc., 1966.
- "Tanzania Rallies Despite Drop in Sisal Earnings," The New York Times, 27 January 1967, p. 60:2.
- Taylor, J. Clagett. The Political Development of Tanganyika. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford Univ. Press, 1963.
- Topping, Seymour. "Peking Slashes Asia-Africa Aid." The New York Times, 16 February 1966, p. 5:1.

- U.S. Consulate General, Hong Kong. Survey of China Mainland Press, No. 3304, 25 September 1964, p. 37.
- U.S. Department of Commerce. Translations on Africa: No. 447 China's Activities in Africa. JPRS:38, 229, Washington, 18 October 1966.
- U.S. Department of Defense. Blueprint for Aggression: 'The Peoples War' DOD GEN-21, Washington: 31 May 1966.
- "U.S. Offers Tanganyika a 10 Million Dollar Loan Fund." The New York Times, 10 December 1961, p. 28:2.
- Webster's New International Dictionary. 2 ed. Springfield, Mass.: G. and C. Merriam Co., 1959.
- Whitehouse, Charles S., FSO. "Chinese Communist Activity in Selected Countries." The National War College Forum, Fall 1966, p. 63-85.
- Wilson, Dick. "Seagull in a Storm," Far Eastern Economic Review, 1 September 1966, p. 399-401.
- Yu, George T. "Sino-African Relations: a Survey." Asian Survey, July 1965, p. 321-332.
- Zanzibar Domestic News Service, 3 August 1966.

APPENDIX I

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES OF INTERVIEWEES

The following individuals were interviewed by the author and supplied information useful in the foregoing study.

BAUM, Robert David, Ph.D. 1943, Columbia Univ., Chief African Bureau of Intelligence and Research June 20, 1954. Extensive service in U.S. Department of State Intelligence and Research, Africa, since 1954. Present position includes supervising intelligence research specialists U.S. Department of State since May 22, 1966.

DUGGAN, William Redman, MA, 1939 Univ. of Notre Dame, Consular, Dar-es-Salaam, September 21, 1958; Consular General, 1960 Dar-es-Salaam, October 10, 1960 through January 21, 1962. Member Policy Planning Council U.S. Department of State since 1962. Personal friend of President Nyerere and first-hand knowledge of events surrounding Tanganyika's independence.

HENNEMEYER, Robert T., MA 1950 Univ. of Chicago; consul, Dar-es-Salaam, June 25, 1961, various consular positions, Dar-es-Salaam through August 16, 1964. Direct contact with President Nyerere and Tanzanian government officials.

LUKUMBUZYA, Michael, Tanzanian Ambassador to the United States since October 1965, African Chief, personal friend of President Nyerere.

STRONG, Curtis C., MA Columbia Univ. 1946; Deputy Director, Office of Central African Affairs November 18, 1964; Office of East and South African Affairs since October 24, 1965.