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GROUP STUDY 1970

AN ANALYSIS OF THE FUTURE REQUIREMENTS FOR NAVAL WARFARE IN  
A RIVERINE/INSULAR RESTRICTED WATERWAY ENVIRONMENT, AND A  
CONSIDERATION OF THE POLICY OPTIONS AVAILABLE TO THE  
UNITED STATES IN SUPPORT OF THESE REQUIREMENTS (U)

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Abstract of

AN ANALYSIS OF THE FUTURE REQUIREMENTS FOR NAVAL WARFARE IN  
A RIVERINE/INSULAR RESTRICTED WATERWAY ENVIRONMENT, AND A  
CONSIDERATION OF THE POLICY OPTIONS AVAILABLE TO THE  
UNITED STATES IN SUPPORT OF THESE REQUIREMENTS

A study of the future requirements for naval warfare in combating insurgency in a riverine/insular restricted waterway environment, provides considerations of the policy and program options available to the United States to meet the requirements. The geographic distribution of suitable environments is assessed, and identification made of states/territories incorporating these environments which demonstrate a high susceptibility to insurgency. A brief study of the capabilities of these high susceptibility states/territories to combat insurgency in their riverine/restricted insular waterway systems (internal waters) develops a measure of the future requirements for naval warfare in these environments. A review of present and developing United States foreign policy trends places the requirements of high susceptibility states/territories for improving their capabilities in context with available United States' policy options to provide assistance. An assessment of United States and other nations contemporary involvements in combating insurgency with naval warfare in internal waters provides a measure of the effectiveness and past areas of shortcomings of this unconventional form of naval warfare. Finally, a review of present United States Navy

programs for internal water naval warfare indicates the status of U.S. Navy internal water warfare forces and its program for assistance to foreign navy forces.

The study concludes that: (a) a significant number of underdeveloped states/territories, which incorporate internal waterway systems, can be identified as being highly susceptible to insurgency and that they have limited to extremely limited capability to provide their own internal water defense; (b) contemporary experiences in internal water naval warfare has demonstrated that it can perform a significant and vital role in combating an insurgency; (c) United States' foreign policy trends strongly indicate that in the foreseeable future the United States will not become actively involved in assisting friendly nations in combating insurgency, but will provide only limited assistance in the form of military aid and possibly advisory assistance; and (d) the United States Military Assistance Program, while recognizing the need to provide assistance to foreign navies in developing and improving their internal water defense forces, is not, as presently constituted, adequately meeting this requirement. The study recommends that: (a) the U.S. Navy not reestablish its own internal water naval force; (b) the Military Assistance Program establish under CINCSTRIKE, CINCPAC, and CINCSOUTH, Navy elements to provide to foreign navies orientation and training, both formal and informal, in the doctrine and tactics of internal water naval

warfare; and (c) the Naval Inshore Operations Training Center (NIOTC) be maintained to provide training in internal water naval warfare to U.S. Navy personnel assigned to MAP advisory and training billets and to provide advice and assistance in doctrine, tactics, and craft development and evaluation to the Navy MAP elements.

## PREFACE

### Problem and Objective Definition

During the initial meetings of the group study officers, discussions were centered upon the establishment of the point of departure and the problem definition for the group research study. There was unanimous agreement of the officers that the study should be oriented toward assessing the measure of the projected requirement for naval operations in inshore restricted waterways, examining this threat assessment in the context of current United States treaty commitments and foreign policy trends, and finally to assess the measure of the effectiveness and shortcomings of contemporary experiences in naval operations in restricted inshore waterways. By such an approach it was believed that as a conclusion to this study, a realistic recommendation for a post Vietnam, U.S. Navy "riverine" policy could be offered. Accordingly, the study group formulated the following statement for the study problem:

"An analysis of the future requirements for Naval Warfare in a Riverine/Insular restricted waterway environment, and a consideration of the policy options available to the United States in support of these requirements."

### Definition of Terms and Study Parameters

During the initial discussions by the group study officers,

and in the initial research by the officers, it quickly became apparent that contemporary experiences with riverine warfare were restricted exclusively to wars of insurgencies. Accordingly, it was agreed that in assessing the future requirements for this type of naval warfare the study would concern itself exclusively to the threat presented by insurgencies and would not attempt to address other possible involvements of riverine forces in conventional overt warfare.

Additionally, the study group considered the current terminology of "riverine warfare" to be unduly restrictive. The terminology suggests too limited a scope of environment and nature of waterway systems, and because of contemporary Vietnam experiences is too primarily suggestive of tactical assault by ground forces from shallow draft craft. Accordingly, terms have been developed by the study group to describe the environmental and tactical naval operations which are considered to be more suggestive in connotation and more precise in actual definition. The terms developed are defined as:

Internal waters. Those water systems comprised of rivers, delta waterways, canals, lacustrine areas and the inshore restricted waters of archipelagos and littoral island systems which form the basis of the intra-national waterborne commerce of a territory or nation.

Internal water naval operations. The control

of waterborne traffic moving upon and across internal waters and the attempt to control surface movement across or immediately parallel to these internal waters by the tactics of patrol/surveillance, interdiction by fire, and armed assault from naval craft. Specifically excluded from this definition is the assault by combat troops embarked in naval craft for the purpose of controlling land areas.

Assault by combat troops from naval craft in an effort to control land areas is specifically excluded from this study and the terminology of the study because of possible conflict with U.S. Amphibious Warfare Doctrine and because the decision to employ naval craft for this task is a decision made by the Unified Commander or ground force commander based upon the specific nature of the terrain, a comparison of the availability and suitability of other types of craft such as helicopters and landing vehicle tanks (LVT's), and other considerations of the specific operation. Therefore consideration of the effectiveness and suitability of the employment of naval craft in this role was beyond the scope of a general study. It is not meant to suggest, however, that the actual employment of naval craft in internal waters may not require assault by embarked troops in order to gain control of or to gain temporary access into internal water systems for the purpose of conducting patrol/surveillance and interdiction missions.



The definition of internal waters excludes operations in and along international water boundaries and the normal protection of the sea boundary areas of the nation from hostile naval actions in order to separate this traditional naval mission from the more unconventional mission of internal water defense as considered in this study. Separating this traditional coastal defense and control mission from the scope of this study is not intended to derogate in any manner the vital importance of this mission in an insurgency.

#### Outline of Presentation

Chapter I develops the assessment and identification of states/territories which incorporate significant internal water systems and toward which a significant threat of insurgency can be identified. Chapter II outlines the nature and extent of U.S. treaty commitments and foreign policy trends which will influence present and future U.S. military assistance efforts and involvements in assisting these significant high threat states/territories. Chapter III assesses the effectiveness and areas of shortcomings of contemporary experiences involving naval operations in internal waters, with emphasis upon the recent experiences in South Vietnam. Chapter IV discusses the present status of U.S. programs and capabilities for internal water naval operation, and develops a rationale and specific recommendations for improvements in policy and

programs to meet the projected needs of nations to which the United States is now or may be committed to provide assistance.

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CHAPTER I

POTENTIAL REQUIREMENT FOR CONTINUING NAVAL WARFARE ACTIVITY  
ON INTERNAL WATERWAYS WORLDWIDE

Introduction

The general approach taken in seeking to determine the potential or actual requirement, if any, for continuing naval warfare activity on internal waterways worldwide is: first, to ascertain where and if an insurgent threat, as it relates to internal waterways, actually exists today, outside of Vietnam; second, if such a threat does exist in given areas, then ascertain if the degree of susceptibility to insurgency manifested by these affected areas is sufficiently high to warrant concern; and last, if levels of susceptibility in these areas are relatively high, then ascertain the capability of the threatened political units to combat insurgency on their internal waterways.

Geographic Assessment

A geographic assessment, conducted as the first step in this analysis, revealed a vast assortment of regions manifesting significant internal waterway characteristics.

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Exclusive of archipelagoes and areas of substantial lacustrine environments, there are in excess of thirty-five major river systems whose lengths exceed 1,000 kilometers and whose deltaic areas range from 2,072 to 59,570 square kilometers. (27:3)

The majority of these significant internal waterways are found between 35 degrees North and 35 degrees South Latitude and, exclusive of Australia, New Zealand and Oceania, this 70 degree belt of latitude accommodates over half of the world's population and encompasses 122 separate states or significant territories. (40:100) It is readily apparent, however, that the mere existence of this environment does not automatically infer a high potential for insurgency, or the requirement for an internal waterway defense capability in all of these many political units. Within this 70 degree belt of latitude, and constituting part of the 122 political entities therein, are a number of highly developed extremely stable nations which contain significant internal water systems but which demonstrate little or no potential for internal waterway supported insurgency.

However, it is equally apparent that there is an extremely high correlation between insurgency, internal waterways, and underdeveloped states/territories. Underdeveloped states have demonstrated in recent years, and currently continue to demonstrate, an extremely high incidence of insurgency (40:103), and those manifesting significant internal waterways have been particularly susceptible. (41:12)

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This pronounced susceptibility to insurgency by these underdeveloped states/territories with significant internal waterway environments is due principally to their almost total dependence upon these waterways as a major part of their transportation and communication systems. (39:90-92) Adequate highway, railway or air transportation systems just do not exist at this stage of their development. Additionally, the bulk of their population tends to be found along these rivers, lakes and/or insular restricted waterways. (41:13-14)

These governments, therefore, almost totally depend upon these waterways as a means of communication with, and access to their population centers. Loss of such communication and access would, and has, meant the loss of effective government control of the populace.

This environmental vulnerability of underdeveloped states/territories is greatly compounded by a high degree of internal instability due in great part to, "economic infirmity, a dearth of capable technicians and administrators, endemic poverty, disease, susceptibility to natural disaster, internal rivalries and, quite frequently, an undercurrent of Communist supported fomentation." (40:101) Underdeveloped societies with significant internal waterway environments, in conjunction with inherent factors of political instability, thus become extremely fertile breeding grounds for subversive insurgency. Insurgents have found, and continue to find, these waterways admirably

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suites for ingress of clandestine external support. The insurgents further have utilized these waterways to great advantage as means of access to areas of safe sanctuary, after having capitalized to some extent upon the elements of indigenous dissatisfaction and instability. Lastly, and most significantly, the insurgents operating in such an environment, with minimal support from indigenous elements, can effectively preclude governmental access to the bulk of the population. This exclusion of government forces, if maintained over an extended period of time, effectively permits the insurgents to assume control of the population. (32:2) Control of these remote, but large populations is conceded to be a major indicator of successful insurgency; and in underdeveloped areas this has derived in great part from the vested government's inability to freely utilize and/or control this environment.

#### Susceptibility to Insurgency on Internal Waterways

While evidence does suggest that there is a correlation between insurgency, underdevelopment and internal waterways; and while application of the general criteria of significant internal waterway environment and national underdevelopment does appreciably reduce the scope of area consideration, nevertheless, what remains still represents an extremely large assortment of states/territories which could be tentatively, and somewhat arbitrarily, categorized as "potentially

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troublesome." As such, this does little to make the point, other than in a very general way, that insurgency on internal waterways in underdeveloped areas is at this time a very real and relatively urgent threat. That point is perhaps more dramatically and concretely made by commenting upon a number of those underdeveloped states/territories which currently "standout" in terms of manifesting a significant/high susceptibility to insurgency on internal waterways.

Determination of "standout" states/territories was made principally on the basis of their "best fit" against an idealized set of geographic vulnerability and political instability factors, utilizing country study data from current U.S. intelligence sources.

It is not intended that the "standout" states/territories identified here be considered as the exclusive areas of pronounced susceptibility to insurgency. Susceptibility is in many respects a nebulous phenomenon, greatly affected by numerous and rapidly changing variables. Therefore, the specific states/territories singled out in this analysis are, at best, representative of a widespread condition of threat susceptibility on internal waterways.

The idealized geographic vulnerability and political instability indices utilized here to identify and/or point up specific areas of pronounced susceptibility to insurgency on internal waters are as follows:

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1. Littoral or archipelago with significant littoral-island or inter-island restricted waterways.
2. Major navigable inland waterways (including rivers, lakes, canals, etc.).
3. Inland lakes, rivers or canals on, or serving as borders with other states/territories.
4. Communist state, or Communist sympathizing state/territory sharing same inland lakes, rivers, canals; or in the immediate proximity of littoral-island or archipelago inter-island restricted waterways. (28:7-8)

Political Instability Factors

1. Active insurgency in progress (Communist supported or otherwise).
2. Presence of potentially hazardous dissident ethnic, religious and/or political interest groupings.
3. Intensity and incidence of political violence over time.
4. Current governmental stability. (28:72-73)

The geographic factors of vulnerability are self-explanatory; however, the political instability factors warrant some amplification. Active insurgency in progress, encompasses all currently active extra-legal and violent movements, whose activities are directed toward achieving political objectives. This by definition excludes all isolated acts of terrorism and violence which may derive from non-political motivations, such as banditry. Presence of dissident groups, is the existence of dissatisfied ethnic,

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religious, or other motivated, but identifiable internal groups, who may or may not be involved in an active insurgency, but whose presence of and by itself represents an actual or potential insurgent hazard. Intensity and incidence of political violence, reflects the assumption that political stability is related to the extent to which the political system and rules are accepted by the citizenry. Violence of relatively high intensity occurring sporadically, but frequently over time is a reasonably good indicator of such acceptance. Violence considered here again, is that related to achieving political objectives. For "rating" purposes on the basis of this indicator, the following applies: If a state of territory has had seven or more significant outbreaks of politically motivated violence since 1946, or a major insurgency lasting more than two years it is evaluated as "high." Any state having less than that, but having had at least a single incident, is evaluated as "moderate." For states which obtained independence after 1946, the period from independence to the present was used. Current governmental stability, is an estimate of the viability of the existing government, and its prospects for the future over the long and short run.

In utilizing these geographic vulnerability and political instability factors, some nineteen underdeveloped states/territories can be identified as currently standing apart in terms of having a significant/high susceptibility to insurgency on

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internal waterways. These nineteen political units and their distribution by region are as follows:

<u>South America</u>	<u>Southeast Asia (Less Vietnam)</u>
Argentina	Burma
Brazil	Cambodia
Columbia	Laos
Venezuela	Malaysia
Peru	Thailand
<u>South Central Asia</u>	<u>South West Pacific</u>
India	Philippines
Pakistan	Indonesia
<u>East Africa</u>	<u>West Africa</u>
Mozambique	Congo (Brazzaville)
Kenya	Congo (Kinshasa)
	Nigeria

A detailed consideration of the findings supporting the estimates of susceptibility for each of the above political units is set forth in Appendix I.

#### Capability to Combat Insurgency on Internal Waterways

Having identified a number of specific underdeveloped political units which currently "standout" as having significant/high susceptibility to insurgency, it is appropriate at this point to address the related problem of evaluating the current capabilities of these units to meet the requirements of combating an insurgency on their internal waterways. Internal security requirements are generally based upon the potential or actual range of threats prevailing in each political unit; therefore by virtue of the susceptibility analysis each unit evaluated here can be considered to have significant/high requirements.

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In assessing the capabilities of these units to meet the requirements imposed by the actual or potential threat, the criteria utilized here, while related to, and for the most part derived from estimates of general naval strength is, nevertheless, more particularly based upon the current or planned existence of shallow draft waterborne craft (as reflected in current military intelligence summaries) which can effectively function as surveillance and/or interdiction platforms in the subject environment. Surveillance and interdiction in this context is specifically and exclusively intended to mean, the ability to patrol, detect, overtake, identify and destroy, if necessary, all types of relatively small waterborne craft utilizing internal waterways in support of insurgent activity. Subsumed within these parameters is included the ability to effectively break any inland waterway blocking efforts by the insurgents, in the way of embankment ambushes or limited mining.

Capability assessment here also includes the assets of national maritime police, waterborne customs inspection organizations, or any other existing assets (if any) which could be utilized in a surveillance/interdiction role. Military assistance from whatever source is also considered in this assessment, and other more tenuous or indirect assessment criteria utilized include: evaluations of the peacekeeping potential of regional organizations which the subject political

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units may be members; other formal political agreements bearing upon their national security; and lastly, general political orientation of the states/territories.

Detailed capability evaluations of the individual states/territories manifesting a significant/high susceptibility to insurgency, utilizing the above evaluative criteria, are set forth in Appendix II. Such variations in capabilities between states as are brought out in the evaluations, tend to fall within the relatively narrow spectrum of non-existent to moderate range, and only in three instances could a state be evaluated as having a moderate capability.

A summary of the nineteen individual state/territory capability estimates, based upon the detailed evaluations in Appendix II, are as follows:

<u>State/Territory</u>	<u>Capability Estimate</u>
Argentina	Low
Brazil	Low
Columbia	Moderate/Low
Peru	Low
Venezuela	Low
Burma	Moderate
Cambodia	Moderate
Laos	Low
Malaysia	Moderate
Thailand	Moderate/Low
Philippines	Low
Indonesia	Low
India	Low
Pakistan	Low
Mozambique	Low
Kenya	None
Congo (Brazzaville)	Low
Congo (Kinshasa)	Low
Nigeria	Low

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In almost all cases the navies of these states/territories are tasked by their mission to assist in maintaining internal security on internal waterways; yet even when supplemented by other non-navy assets they are severely limited by insufficient, inadequate, and poorly maintained equipment. In general, the findings can be said to reveal a depressingly consistent pattern of relatively low capability to combat insurgency on internal waterways in all nineteen significant/high susceptible states/territories. Additionally, the findings provide little grounds for belief that these states will be able, by themselves, to significantly close the gap between requirements and capabilities in the near future. (28:10)

#### Summary

In summary, analysis reveals a significant/high susceptibility to actual or potential insurgency in at least nineteen underdeveloped states or territories manifesting relatively significant internal waterway environments. Assessment of current or projected assets available to these political units for combating an insurgency in such an environment reveal a consistent pattern, with but few exceptions, of relatively low capability; with little prospect of major self-improvement over the short run. Additionally, those regional organizations and bilateral/multi-lateral agreements, of which these significant/high susceptibility political units are

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signatories, have no provision for direct assistance in combating domestic insurgencies; and provide indirect aid only in the way of limited military assistance programs in certain instances.

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## CHAPTER II

### U.S. SECURITY INTERESTS, COMMITMENTS, GENERAL FORCE PLANNING AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE POLICY TRENDS RELATING TO AREAS OF HIGH SUSCEPTIBILITY TO INSURGENCY ON INTERNAL WATERWAYS

The security interests of the United States in these highly susceptible developing areas are for the most part indirect rather than direct interests. That is, U.S. concern does not arise primarily from the prospect that hostile control of any of these high susceptibility/low capability areas would so directly affect the balance of power--by providing the Communists or denying the U.S. essential raw materials, markets or military bases--as to undermine U.S. security. Continued U.S. access to some of these areas remains important, but by no means critical.

In most of these highly susceptible developing areas, U.S. concern arises principally from the indirect effect on U.S. security that a successful insurgency could have. Should such an occurrence bring a anti-Western regime to power, it could result in the deprivation of resources which are highly critical to the continued economic development and viability of U.S. allies in Western Europe and/or East Asia. In addition, successful anti-Western insurgencies in these highly susceptible areas could also result in reduced confidence on the part of our industrialized allies on U.S. commitments affecting their security, and could possibly increase chances

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of hostile powers miscalculating U.S. responses in other contingencies.

Other U.S. security interests which must be given some weight are those in which strong ties of sentimental and past association exist, even though a material U.S. interest is not involved. One developing highly susceptible area, generally conceded to be an exception to the "indirect interest" concept, are those states of the Western Hemisphere facing on the Caribbean. Here a special combination of military and political factors would cause the United States to consider a successful insurgency resulting in a hostile regime (i.e., Communist/Communist sympathizing) coming to power as a potentially direct threat to U.S. security. (82:4)

U.S. formal commitments to these highly susceptible developing states/territories generally reflects indirect political rather than direct strategic security interests. The U.S. has bilateral or multilateral mutual security treaties with eight of the nineteen high susceptibility/low capability states or territories. (45:276-278) However, in each instance the formal treaty commitment provides against external threats only, and not against indigenous insurgencies, which may or may not be externally supported, and which presently constitutes the principal hazard to these nations' security.

For the most part, U.S. formal commitment to these susceptible areas has been confined to limited military assistance

programs, which vary from relatively large in-country advisory groups and substantial equipment grants, to specific military sales agreements. The U.S. has military agreements with eleven of the nineteen susceptible states/territories, of which eight are the same mutual defense treaty signatories mentioned above. (See Appendix II)

Department of State policy recommendations and general force planning proposals, in support of U.S. security interests in these underdeveloped, highly susceptible states/territories, in late December 1968 indicated that U.S. efforts should be oriented primarily to the threat of overt and direct attack on those countries to which the United States had an explicit and firm treaty commitment. Where the threat of attack was likely, and where the commitment was firm and explicit, it was proposed that the U.S. should maintain the necessary forces in being to redress any local imbalance in military power. Where the threat was less likely, but where the allies needed reassurance, and again where the commitment was firm and explicit, it was proposed that forces should not be specifically programmed to meet the need, but reliance should be placed on the general pool of existing U.S. capabilities. (82:ii-iii)

In the case of those nations to whose defense the U.S. was not firmly committed, it was proposed that: (a) Any U.S. military power that might be required to redress a local imbalance of power should be drawn from capabilities already

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programmed for firmer U.S. commitments; (b) Primary reliance should be placed on indigenous combat forces in countering the threat of externally supported insurgency; (c) U.S. forces maintained under the guide lines above should normally be kept out of the country and should be structured mainly to support the combat operations of our allies, rather than for U.S. participation in ground combat. (82:iii)

It was further suggested at this time that in the case of those nations to whom the U.S. was firmly committed, but where U.S. forces were not needed to deter aggression, that mutual security arrangements and force planning should be adjusted to create a situation of greater national and regional self-help. To this end military assistance and sales were to be increased. (82:7)

These general policy/force planning proposals, developed immediately prior to the new Republican Administration coming to power, suggested a more than subtle shift in political orientation regarding "appropriate" degrees of military commitment essential to support U.S. security interest, direct or indirect, in the developing world. While there still was a relatively unequivocal willingness to commit troops in support of firm mutual defense treaty commitments against aggression, nevertheless, the threat would have to be an immediate and external one involving Communist forces. There would be no commitment of U.S. forces if the Communist supported or

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executed threat was deemed to be a marginal one, or if the external threat was the result of non-Communist motivated regional animosities. There further would be no commitment of U.S. forces to contain indigenous insurgent movements. In short, troop commitments, even in support of nations having firm and explicit defense agreements with the United States, would be critically assessed and grudgingly made at best.

With regard to those developing areas wherein the United States had no firm or explicit defense agreements, the 1968 proposals alluded to the prospect that U.S. could possibly commit forces against Communist supported external aggression, should it be deemed appropriate to do so. However, the allusion to such a possible commitment is so vague, and the overall thrust of the proposals in their entirety being so patently negative with respect to such a possibility, that it hardly could be taken seriously as a possible option. All things considered, in place of "force commitment" in this specific instance, "limited military assistance program agreements" could more reasonably be inserted as the actual projected action.

The national security policy favoring maximum indigenous self-help and limited or non-involvement of U.S. combat forces in the underdeveloped world, suggested in part and on a relatively low key by the 1968 policy/force planning proposals, have been taken up with some enthusiasm by the new Administration.

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On 25 July 1969 President Nixon held a press conference on Guam, M.I., wherein he set forth what has come to be called the "Nixon Doctrine." The two major points of emphasis in the Guam announcement were: first, that the United States would keep its treaty commitments; and second, that except for the threat of a major power involving nuclear weapons, the United States was going to encourage, and had a right to expect, that security problems be increasingly handled by Asian nations themselves. (24:1-8) More specifically, the "doctrine" implied that the United States would not be enticed into future wars like the one in Vietnam; that the United States would redesign and reduce its military commitments throughout non-Communist Asia; that U.S. military assistance would be somewhat reduced; and that internal subversion and external aggression would have to be dealt with by the Asians themselves. (37:1,9)

In the months following the pronouncement at Guam, the President and other spokesmen of the Administration have reiterated the "doctrine's" basic themes: no more Vietnams, reduced U.S. commitments, reduced military assistance, and indigenous self-help. These spokesmen have also expanded the "doctrine" to encompass the underdeveloped world outside of Asia. For purposes of this consideration, perhaps the most fundamental and pertinent tenet of the "doctrine" was expressed by Undersecretary of State Elliot Richardson when he said,

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"We cannot, it now seems clear, do the job of fighting insurgency for someone else. We cannot provide the indigenous will and resolution, or the toughness and durability that are needed if this kind of warfare is to be waged successfully." (42:258)

While the United States cannot provide "will and toughness," and may not be willing to provide U.S. troops to combat insurgency, nevertheless, it seems readily apparent that if these embattled underdeveloped nations are to survive, and if direct and indirect U.S. security interests are best served and protected if they do survive, then it would seem that the only viable alternative remaining is to continue providing limited military assistance in the way of outright equipment grants, sales and personnel training.

Unfortunately, at this point in time, and apart from the "Nixon Doctrine," the military assistance program alternative appears to be an extremely "weak reed" upon which to lean for support of U.S. security interests in the underdeveloped world. Appropriations for military assistance have steadily declined, with the exception of 1963, from approximately 2.2 billion dollars in 1959 to 654 million dollars in 1968. (25:66)

Prospects for any reversal in this trend over the short run are extremely poor. United States public and legislative support of foreign military assistance and development aid in general is declining. The U.S. is slipping well below the average of the other developed countries in across-the-board

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aid as a percentage of GNP, and successive Congressional crisis threaten the very survival of development aid and military assistance programs. (81:10)

A number of basic reasons for this declining support for foreign aid and military assistance are: first, there is no generally accepted rationale for aid, and there is general backlash from the implicit proposition that aid makes friends, in the face of continuing unfriendly behavior by aid recipients; second, foreign aid and military assistance has no constituency and therefore is uniquely vulnerable among U.S. government programs; third, there is the feeling that the United States is bearing more than its proper share of the burden; fourth, Congressmen find it difficult to vote for foreign aid when urgent domestic needs are not being met; fifth, there is widespread belief that aid and military assistance programs are inefficient, wasteful and generally unproductive; and last, people are bored with the subject of aid and military assistance. It has gone on for a long time and the world has not seemed to have gotten any better. (83:3-4)

The future of limited military assistance programs in support of underdeveloped nations is indeed a bleak one, and the implementation of the "Nixon Doctrine" does nothing to improve that prognostication. Yet paradoxically, the methodical implementation of that "doctrine" in eliminating other more publicized, high visibility military commitments, has

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the indirect effect of pushing military assistance programs forward as being the only, limited as it is, positive means of protecting U.S. interests in the underdeveloped world.

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## CHAPTER III

HISTORICAL ASSESSMENT OF U.S. AND CONTEMPORARY EXPERIENCES  
IN INTERNAL WATER WARFAREIntroduction

Although the history of internal water warfare dates back over 900 years this chapter will concern itself only with United States experience and certain contemporary experiences of other countries. The campaigns selected will, inasmuch as possible, fit the geographical and environmental considerations developed previously as necessary for naval involvement. In addition, the campaigns discussed will be of an insurgent nature even though that terminology may or may not have been understood at the time the campaigns were waged.

This assessment is not an attempt to provide a day by day chronology of historical happenings or to analyze individual battles or tactics. It is rather a broad overview to determine why there was a need for naval involvement and what the nature of this involvement was and to use this as a basis of assessing effectiveness and to comment on lessons that might be pertinent for future consideration.

Early United States Experiences

Riverine Warfare has played an important part in the history of the United States. It was used successfully against

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a superior naval force during the United States struggle for independence and through the early years of its nationhood.

Unfortunately the lessons learned in campaigns during the Revolutionary War and the war of 1812 were soon forgotten as the United States began to develop a modern fleet. Less than thirty years after the last campaign on inland waterways no internal water capability existed and the United States Navy was to find itself totally unprepared to fight an indigenous enemy.

This shadowy enemy to which the Florida Everglades and the rivers of West Florida were home, posed a threat to the internal security of the country. A study of the Seminole and Creek War of Florida (1835-1842) is significant not only for the lessons to be learned but because of the many similarities to the war being fought in the Mekong Delta of Vietnam today.

The enemy was comparatively unsophisticated and lacked the industrial base necessary for conventional warfare. However, by using superior knowledge of his environment to the best of his ability he forced the United States to fight on his terms, which was to his advantage. The use of a "modern" weapons systems was futile and to provide a versatile force, different types of vessels to meet different needs dictated by the environment, were required. Since adequate craft for this type of warfare were not available within the Navy, local flat-bottomed boats, plantation canoes, and sharp-ended bateaux craft had to be commandeered.

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The primary goal of the United States was to control the waterways, reestablish internal order and restore normal activity. This became predominantly a naval mission because these waterways not only were restricted waterways, but they crisscrossed the land so completely that land transportation was nonexistent and water was the primary, if not the only, source of transport.

The type of operations used were similar to those used in Vietnam. "In cooperation with the Army, McLaughlin's forces attacked and destroyed the strongholds of Abraka. They patrolled and explored the interface between the coastal waters and the open sea as well as the navigable inland waterways. And they sliced hundreds of miles into tributaries and swamps to raid the Indians, destroy their supply caches and crops." (35:325) This was, as defined here, assault, surveillance and interdiction, by internal water naval craft.

It might be said that the successful conclusion of this campaign is justification for not maintaining a ready inventory of suitable internal water craft. It is true that the mix of commandeered vessels eventually proved adequate; however, it took seven years to conclude this campaign and victory was finally achieved only through sheer weight of numbers and the ability of the sailors, soldiers and Marines involved to adapt themselves to unsuitable craft.

At the conclusion of this campaign the units involved and

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their organizations were dissolved. The experience gained during the seven years was lost only to be relearned the next time naval forces found themselves operating in internal waters when in 1861 the United States found itself engaged in a civil war.

The Civil War is interesting because it was the first extensive war using the technology garnered in the Industrial Revolution and it is a prime example of a navy performing tasks for which it was ill prepared. The Union Navy began the war with only forty-two ships in commission, none of which were designed for internal water combat operations. Nor did they have the trained personnel, doctrine or tactics with which to prosecute the inland operations soon to be required of it.

As ill prepared as the Union Navy was, it was vastly superior to the Confederate Navy. A significant condition of conduct of successful internal water warfare is that one of the two opposing forces holds control of the high seas adjacent to the inland waterways where confrontation occurs. The North having that control, was allowed to press its advantage into all the rivers and inland waterways of the Confederacy.

The Union strategy was pursued along three broad areas: (a) blockade the Southern coast to cut off supplies to the already under-industrialized area; (b) capture coastal strong points and ports to force the South to disperse defenses over a wide area; (c) split the Confederacy along the Mississippi

and its tributaries to prevent consolidation of its forces and assets.

Although much of the history of this period deals with various assaults on river forts and towns it should be understood that assault in this case was tactical to permit extended operations of the inland naval forces. The overall mission was one of interdiction aimed at cutting the Confederacy in half to sever its lines of communication and means of internal support.

As the Union Navy had no craft on hand for riverine use a crash building program was initiated. The City Class gunboat was built from the keel up. These were built, manned and delivered under vast difficulties. Other types, such as the motor barge, were built, but the majority were commandeered and converted. Due to the urgency, the boats were armed with any available weapon, a situation similar to that found in Vietnam. Not all of these vessels proved suitable and it soon became necessary to adopt even more ingenious designs and construction methods for use in confined waters.

The Union Navy's internal water forces were successful in accomplishing all facets of their mission; three thousand miles of coastline were blockade, the Confederacy was split down the middle and many key strong points such as New Orleans were captured. These forces displayed the ability to carry the war rapidly to the enemy and to be decisive by the use of

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flexible and versatile tactics. Most of all they again proved that control of inland lines of communication can be a decisive factor in insurgent warfare. At the end of the war, President Lincoln wrote, "Nor must Uncle Sam's web feet be forgotten, at all the watery margins they have been present. Not only in the deep sea, the broad bay, the rapid river, but also up the narrow muddy bayou, and wherever the ground was a little damp, they have been and made their tread."

Unfortunately, "Uncle Sam's web feet" were quickly forgotten. The Civil War river craft were sold and their organization disbanded. Once again the Navy found itself devoid of an internal water warfare capability.

The significance of having had a large selection of commercial boats and ships which could be modified for river combat missions and a great pool of experienced civilian manpower including pilots, engineers, builders, fishermen and merchant marines from which the Navy could draw to quickly build an internal water naval force was forgotten. These natural assets were not available when it became necessary to introduce U.S. combat units into Vietnam.

#### Contemporary Experiences

The United States was not involved in a major inland waterway campaign again until 1965 although there had been several related activities such as in Nicaragua in 1920 and the

gunboat patrol on the Yantze River in China prior to 1939. Internal water warfare did not play an important part in World War II as the normal forms of conventional operations were decisive.

Following World War II as the problems of developing nations became better understood and defined, the threat of insurgencies against these nations increased. Since, unlike World War II, conventional operations were not decisive in these areas, internal water warfare became important as a means of combat this threat and counter the external support necessary for a sustained insurgency.

The French-Indo China War (1946-1954) was fought in an area ideal for naval type involvement. In the overall conduct of operations the French Navy was assigned the mission to (a) ensure freedom of action and maintain lines of communication along the coast while denying the same to the enemy; (b) provide security against the mine threat to ports and their approaches; (c) ensure the security of inland water lines of communication. (47:199)

Mission (b) is a necessary, but secondary, role of naval activity in riverine warfare. The other two missions fall into the areas of surveillance and interdiction as developed here. However, there is no evidence that the French thought of these terms in this sense. Perhaps their real value was not understood or if it was there were not enough forces available to pursue it to any great extent.



The French had to patrol 1500 miles of coastline with a few frigates, coastal patrol launches and airplanes. They maintained their sea lines of communication since they were never threatened. On the other hand, it is debatable whether they were successful in denying the coast to the enemy, particularly trans-coastal traffic. It is known that the VC maintained coastal strong points and even watch towers along the coast. With only a small number of units employed in this mission, it would have been difficult if not virtually impossible to counter a determined enemy effort of transshipment.

The French had little trouble in keeping the major ports and their approaches open but as far as control of inland waterways was concerned, the French did not have the assets to successfully accomplish this task.

For the latter mission, they used great ingenuity to adapt boats to uses for which they were never intended. These included World War II LCM's, LSSL's, LSIL's, LCVP's, LCU's, and LCT's. Most of these craft were used to transport supplies, men and local commodities, again a secondary role. The converted LCM's, LCVP's and a few other types of craft were eventually employed as the DINASSAUT, which was a group of naval craft with embarked assault troops. The DINASSAUTs were employed primarily as interdiction forces and to provide a show of strength in contested areas. While they proved to be effective, at a maximum strength of six units, it is

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debatable that there were enough of them to be significant. After the French capitulation in 1954, there was a tendency to dismiss the experience and conclusions of the French efforts. This is unfortunate because the French Naval forces were effective insofar as their numbers allowed. Contrary to what may be the general impression, French operations on the inland waterways of Tonkin "were almost uniformly successful." (10:12)

They made a major contribution to riverine warfare in the form of the DINASSAUT. Bernard Fall considers this as one of the most significant concepts to come out of the French war in Vietnam. (9:36)

The importance of flexibility and versatility for river units was proven and advances in the naval combat operations doctrine of unit employment, counter-ambush tactics and the value of the flamethrower and air support were established. (38:28)

From the standpoint of the U.S. Navy's future involvement in Vietnam more attention should have been paid to Dr. Fall when he said in 1962, "The Indo-China War has shown that serious studies are almost totally lacking in such fields as modern river warfare and the use of rivers as vital supply lines in countries where the road and rail net is destroyed or inadequate." (26:363)

Before reviewing U.S. involvement in Vietnam, two other

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insurgent campaigns which were successfully countered by pro-Western governments should be mentioned briefly. In both the Philippines and Malaysia shallow draft coastal shipping is a primary mode of surface commerce and transportation within the country, and positive government control of this internal mode of transport was a significant factor in limiting the insurgent's freedom of movement and isolating the insurgents from possible external assistance.

#### Prelude to Vietnam

In 1954, the President of the Naval War College, writing to the Chief of Naval Operations said: "There are many years of the world in which a substantial naval capability for operations in restricted waters, including lakes and rivers, will be required of the U.S. Navy and its allies under limited as well as global war conditions. The United States does not now appear to have sufficient of this capability." (34:1)

Yet in 1961 the Chief of Naval Operations excluded "rivers and estuaries" from Navy responsibility and by implication limited the Navy's role in restricted waters to combatant ship operations. (30:1)

In South Vietnam the maze of inland waterways provide an unequalled opportunity for the employment of internal water naval forces. The Mekong Delta alone has over 4,000 miles of interconnecting inland waterways. It comprises one quarter of

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the area of South Vietnam and contains more than one third of its population. This delta is composed of three regions and each with a distinct type of terrain: The Plain of Reeds, west and north of Saigon, a vast area of reeds and grass that during the flood season lies under one to six feet of water; the lower Mekong Delta which extends northwest of Saigon through the dense forests of the southern and western Cau Mau Peninsula; the mangrove and nepa palm swamps of the Rung Sat Zone. In addition to these there are over 1,000 miles of coastline, much of which is shallow.

Despite the scope and importance of these internal waters, and the existing and developing commitment to this new government, the last thing the United States Navy expected to do was to fight a war on the rivers, inshore, and coastal waters of South Vietnam. (29:77) One of the most prevalent schools of thought concerning internal water warfare minimized the requirement for U.S. involvement and overrated the U.S. ability to project amphibious power into inland waterways. (11:40-48)

Even as late as 1966 there was no overall doctrine to guide internal water forces nor a specific doctrine for Navy involvement in internal water operations. The U.S. had yet to organize and procure a naval group to deal specifically with wars of national liberation. (36:42)

At the time that the United States assistance and advisory effort to the Naval Forces of the Republic of Vietnam began in

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1954, the Vietnamese Navy consisted solely of the remnants of the French naval establishment left in the South, composed of a small River Force and a smaller Sea Force.

The River Force was largely disbanded by 1959. In 1961 the use of a DINNASSAUT type organization was reviewed and as a result the River Force was reorganized into River Assault Groups, River Escort Groups and Transport Groups. The review had been necessitated by the success of the Viet Cong in choking off the rice supply in the Mekong Delta, indicating a need for the government to open the vital river and canal system lines of communication.

In 1962 the Junk Force was created and given the task of coastal patrol along the surf line. These units were composed of indigenous fisherman familiar with the local area and people, using craft similar to local craft which simplified maintenance and training requirements.

The few internal water warfare ships and craft which the updated Sea Forces used, SC, PGM, MSGM and PCE types, were distributed by the U.S. Military Assistance Program. Of even more importance, the parallel training of local crews was oriented chiefly towards conventional ASW and amphibious techniques. The design of these ships and their component systems was not oriented to internal water warfare nor even a minimum adaption made to it. Most of these units were surplus World War II assets, distributed through the Military Assistance

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Program, with no effort made to adapt them to the local Vietnamese theater nor to an insurgency situation.

One major aspect of the U.S. Navy's involvement in the prelude to Vietnam was the training, equipping and providing advisory support for the indigenous Vietnamese naval forces. This involved, among other things, providing the type of craft well suited for riverine warfare and training advisors in this type of warfare. "It was apparent, however, that certain necessary types of craft were not readily at hand. Furthermore, there was little operational experience or doctrine available to provide a basis for developing indigenous naval forces capable of carrying out specific requirements . . . or to guide advisors engaged in helping the counterinsurgents." (11:46)

It would appear that when a country is threatened with an insurgency, the early stages of the training and equipping of the local forces should be focused primarily on the specific requirements for counterinsurgency. That attention was not paid to counterinsurgency is evident by the degree and type of support given in South Vietnam.

Far too few U.S. advisors had sufficient knowledge of the Vietnamese culture or language to bring about understanding and to achieve a degree of influence. Rosters were crowded with technically competent officers, ill prepared by experience or training to serve in an advisory role. (33:2) Unfortunately,

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although our advisors brought organizational talent, maintenance know-how, leadership, ingenuity and initiative, it was often the Vietnamese counterpart who advised on riverine concepts, doctrine and the tactical use of the units involved.

The primary factor in this lack of training of the U.S. advisor was that the United States had no internal water warfare force and no naval group designed to cope with wars of national liberation, let alone a doctrine for river warfare or even a research and development program. Advisors had to adapt from their past general seamanship experience and their ingenuity. One of our early advisors sharply stated the situation when he said, "There is nothing in my Navy training, and I've been in the Navy 18 years, that prepares me for this." (43:41) Another said, "A man trained over a long period of time in military procedures that have proven highly effective will not forego this easily. Rather than change his viewpoint to meet a new situation, he tends to adapt what he has known and used in the past to fit the new problem. He thus achieves a hybrid result of dubious value." (44:77)

#### Vietnam--Active Involvement

Since, initially, the Vietnamese Navy was inadequately trained and equipped to conduct the necessary counterinsurgency internal water naval operations and as the U.S. Navy advisors were ill equipped to train them, it ultimately became necessary

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for the United States Navy to take overall responsibility for, and to conduct these operations.

History indicates that navies have always been called upon to operate in inland waters from time to time. The threat in Vietnam was obvious as was the fact that this area was ideally suited for internal water warfare. Although there was ample warning, when it became necessary to become actively engaged in Vietnam in 1965 the United States was unprepared.

The United States Navy did not have sufficient personnel experienced in riverine warfare. The few who were available with any practical experience were those who had done a recent tour or two in South Vietnam or perhaps at some other MAAG/JUSMAG post. While it can be said that these few people were invaluable in constituting our internal water navy they were too few in number to be of any significance and after their random tours what had happened to them? In what regular naval force was their internal water warfare know-how retained, even assuming they stayed in the Navy? As there was no internal water warfare force or operational commands, this knowledge was not transmitted into SOP's, doctrine, or tactics development but resided solely with the individual.

There was a lack of suitable craft for internal water warfare; as with previous U.S. experiences apparently the implicit assumptions were made that when the craft were required they could be (a) procured or commandeered quickly in

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quantity; (b) that adequate numbers of all types of needed craft already existed either within the Navy or within U.S. commercial and pleasure craft fields; and (c) that it was not necessary to adapt craft to the mission, situation or locale since the day would be carried by sheer weight of numbers. There is nothing in the history of our Vietnamese involvement to support these assumptions.

When in February 1965, a steel hulled trawler was caught trying to smuggle arms to Viet Cong forces in South Vietnam, the South Vietnamese Government concluded that their small navy could not provide an adequate coastal surveillance effort and requested assistance from the United States Navy. This request was honored in March of 1965 when the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the operating concept of a South Vietnam coastal patrol and ordered it implemented. The U.S. Seventh Fleet undertook the original effort using available assets and TF 115 (Coastal Surveillance Forces) was activated in July of 1965. The effort consisted of an air barrier of VP aircraft, a seaward barrier of DER's, MSO's, WHEC, LST's and MCS's and an inner barrier of PCF's and WPB's augmented by Vietnamese Coastal Junk Groups. Its mission was to stop the infiltration of men and materials into Vietnam via sea from an external source and to stop transshipping along the coast within Vietnam. (17) A secondary mission was the harbor protection of certain designated ports.

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In the latter part of 1965, it became apparent that, as a part of the increased counterinsurgency effort in South Vietnam, pacification operations would be necessary in the Mekong Delta and Rung Sat Special Zone. To that end TF 116 (River Patrol Force) was established in February 1966.

TF 116, or Game Warden as it came to be called, was introduced for the purpose of impeding the VC's use of the Mekong and Bassac rivers. Its assigned mission was to conduct river patrols and inshore surveillance, enforce curfew, prevent VC infiltration, movement and resupply along the Delta estuary coast and across the major rivers of the Mekong Delta and Rung Sat Special Zone. (19) It also had the secondary mission of keeping the water approaches to Saigon open.

Game Warden focused on the interdiction of insurgent lines of communication over a broad area by exerting pressure on traffic along the main arteries and adjacent areas and enforcing strict population and resources control.

TF 117 or Mobile Riverine Force (MRF) began operations in the Rung Sat Special Zone in February 1967 and was then moved into the Delta in the early spring of 1967. This force was charged with the mission of conducting operations aimed at the destruction of Viet Cong main force units. (20) In the initial planning it was envisioned that this force would be a joint U.S. Navy-U.S. Marine Corps operation, however, because of the heavy Marine Corps commitment to I Corps, the Army's 9th Infantry

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Division was tasked with providing the assault troops. Both the Army and Navy units were tasked to operate in close cooperation and coordination with the Navy tasked additionally to furnish the Army direct support.

The Mobile Riverine Force did contribute to reducing the effectiveness of main force Viet Cong units in its area of operation, as indicated by its record of 2,188 VC KIA for a one year period ending 16 February 1967. (21) The assessment of the effectiveness of the internal water navy craft assigned to this force in contributing to this essentially ground war mission is beyond the scope of this study as indicated in the definition of terms in the Preface of this study.

By the fall of 1968, TF 115 had greatly expanded its naval gunfire support operations and had begun raids into IV Corps Tactical Zone rivers and canals while continuing to maintain effective coastal surveillance. The River Patrol Force had increased its strength sufficiently to maintain patrols on all the major rivers of the Mekong Delta. It thus became feasible to commence coordinated operations of the task groups for the first time.

In October 1968 Operation SEA LORDS (South East Asia Lake, Ocean, River, Delta Strategy) was initiated. TF 194 was activated in order to facilitate the coordinated and integrated employment of units from all U.S. Navy task forces in internal water interdiction and pacification campaigns.

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The mission of TF 194 was to interdict enemy lines of communication from the Gulf of Thailand to the Bassic River, open the trans-delta waterways and pacify the adjacent area, clear the Bassic islands and pacify these areas, and to harass and interdict the enemy to keep him off balance. (85)

The absence of long-range planning for internal water naval operations and for the provisions of suitable craft imposed handicaps and delays in implementation in both the river patrol and coastal surveillance operations. This was the case in spite of the shortcuts taken in meeting craft requirements through off-the-shelf procurement of commercial type PCF's and PBR's.

In the case of Market Time, the buildup from time of conception until all 84 units became operational in November 1966 took twenty months. The follow-on Mark II boats were not completely delivered until late in 1969 or well over four years from the implementation of their mission requirements. (87:A-3)

In the case of Game Warden, the buildup to 120 units took 15 months. This initial number proved to be inadequate and 80 additional Mark II boats were programmed. These did not become operational until late in 1968, or nearly three years from the implementation of the mission requirements. (86:A-3)

Of even more significance was that it was not until October 1968, over three years after the United States initial

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combat involvement, that sufficient craft were in country to permit the coordinated overall internal water naval operations of SEALORD.

Thus the implicit assumptions that when internal water warfare craft were required they could be procured or commandeered quickly in quantity or that adequate numbers of all types already existed either with the Navy or within the U.S. commercial and pleasure craft fields, did not hold true in respect to the United States' Vietnam experience.

Another implicit assumption also proved invalid in Vietnam; that it was not necessary to adapt craft to the mission, situation or locale. Such adaptation requires that a specific mission and concept of operations be developed before designing the prototype and this in turn required prior doctrine and experience be available. The shortcomings in these areas have already been noted and as a result craft were ordered and sent to combat without any real knowledge of what would be suitable. Indeed, there was barely time to fully test the prototype units.

As a result of this and the fact that both the PCF and PBR hulls were off the shelf procurement of craft not specifically designed for military purposes, many shortcomings quickly developed. The hull, fitting and electrical systems of these units were not rugged enough to withstand the hard use of sustained combat operations. Crews were faced with added maintenance burdens which resulted in somewhat reduced mission

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performance and the craft did not perform to specified engine speed and handling characteristics. Due to the urgency of delivery dates many specifications were modified and the characteristics of quietness and speed, vital to proper performance of the mission were compromised. Some of these problems need to be discussed in detail so that their seriousness can be appreciated.

PCF's were built with only one bilge pump. One PCF was lost because the single bilge pump could not keep up with flooding from a hole in the hull. The installation of a second pump was recommended to provide greater flexibility and additional damage control capability. (12) One PCF Oinc reported that there was inadequate surveillance coverage because the radar ranges that could be achieved with the Decca 202 were far inferior to the ranges upon which planning for the operation had been based. (16) The ineffectiveness of the radar adversely affected not only Market Time patrol security but also the morale of PCF crews. (13) The most serious problem with the PCF did not become apparent until the spring of 1967. (14) Evidence of serious and excessive corrosion was noted. Inspection of all 84 PCF's revealed that 24 of these units in Vietnam were in need of corrective action. (15)

Additional problems could be cited and like shortcomings found in the PBR program. These defects became so acute that

it was recognized that they could be overcome only by incorporating significant changes in a second generation craft and by establishing a project manager to oversee these programs. Both follow on PCF's and PBR's were ordered and the Naval Inshore Warfare Project (PM-12) was established within the Naval Material Command to assist in the design and procurement of a family of improved internal water warfare craft.

Measuring the effectiveness of internal water warfare, particularly surveillance and interdiction, is difficult. One measure could be the probability of infiltrators successfully evading detection. In-depth studies are lacking to form a basis for honestly predicting a probability of successful evasion. There is no reliable intelligence on numbers of men or tons of supplies which have penetrated through an interdiction net or of the increased level of effort in manpower or equipment required; in fact, it is sometimes difficult to estimate how many or how much was actually stopped. Using the number of infiltrating targets successfully attacked over time is meaningful only because it is the one area where accurate information is available. Even if one decides on a method of measurement, the question of what level of effectiveness is necessary to cause the enemy to change his tactics or strategy is a difficult one.

The discussion of measure of effectiveness of internal water naval operations is further complicated as there are too

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many other areas where any type of measurement is impossible. How much goodwill is generated by a MEDCAP or civilian MEDVAC? What is the value of entering an insurgent controlled area almost at will? How much is pacification aided by removing or curtailing insurgent activities such as tax collection? What is the psychological impact of establishing and maintaining a "Sea Float" base in the middle of an insurgent stronghold and how does this contribute to the overall war effort? It is in these latter areas that internal water warfare in Vietnam has made a significant contribution.

One positive indicator of effectiveness is available however. In early 1966 the Viet Cong held the majority of the Mekong Delta virtually as their exclusive purview. (1) By the end of 1969 the situation had changed drastically to the point when the VC for the first time had to deploy regular NVA battalions to that area to shore up their VC cadres.

Many factors contributed to this improved situation but among the foremost were first the TF 116 operations and then the coordinated TF 194 operations. "That Operation Game Warden has been highly successful is undisputed . . . . They have achieved the extension of naval power far beyond the surf line and miles deep into the mangrove swamps and waterways of the Rung Sat Special Zone. They have established control of the main lines of communication in the heavily populated, river-interlaced Mekong Delta." (86:13) They also aided

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legitimate river traffic by inhibiting alleged VC activities. It was reported that the Viet Cong "tax collection" was reduced from 1,000,000 piasters in 1965 to 97,000 in 1966 after Game Warden was implemented. (84:12) This small force of PBR's was able to deny the enemy unrestricted freedom of movement on the waterways of the Delta. (18)

SEA LORDS basically extended the successful Game Warden concepts to a much broader area and into other areas where it had not been possible to conduct operations previously. It extended and maintained allied presence in this broad area and thereby dissipated the Viet Cong claim to area control and at the same time disrupted the VC communication network, imposing the dual burden of interrupting logistical support and the need to establish alternate lines of communication on smaller ancillary waterways, resulting in a loss of VC efficiency and a greater susceptibility to detection by ground forces.

While primary emphasis was placed on the interdiction of Viet Cong infiltration and liaison routes, the secondary benefit, and in terms of pacification a most significant benefit, was to open to commercial traffic many waterways which had previously been heavily taxed or blocked by the Viet Cong. The early SEA LORDS success led to establishing an infiltration barrier extending from just south of Tay Ninh, 50 miles northwest of Saigon, to Ha Tien on the Gulf of Thailand, 140 miles east of Saigon.

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The Viet Cong have lost the complete freedom of movement they once enjoyed. His supply lines have been severely disrupted and his offenses blunted both in duration and timing. Throughout history internal water warfare has been characterized by its flexibility in strategy and tactics that permitted swift adjustment to emergencies, the capability to seize fleeting opportunities, and its ability to carry the war to the enemy. This is particularly true of recent United States' Vietnam experience.

#### Summary

Despite the initial shortcomings of the U.S. Navy's efforts in South Vietnam, it is the unanimous opinion of the study group that the final stages of Game Warden and Market Time and the present SEALORDS efforts have substantially assisted in controlling the insurgency in their areas of operation. A rhetorical question can be asked however; if adequate craft, adapted to the mission, environment and tactical situation and had suitable doctrine, training and U.S. Navy advisors been available to the South Vietnamese during the period between 1954 and 1965 would the scope and level of U.S. involvement in internal water naval operations have become necessary? Would the cost to the U.S. in dollars and personnel resources have been more effectively directed to the advisory effort than they were subsequently in the direct involvement?

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## CHAPTER IV

## PRESENT U.S. PROGRAMS AND POLICIES FOR INTERNAL WATER NAVAL OPERATIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVEMENTS TO THE PROGRAMS

Introduction

An assessment of susceptibility to insurgency in under-developed states/territories manifesting significant internal waterway environments, conducted as the first step in Chapter I of this study, revealed that the threat was a very real and, in certain cases, a relatively urgent one. Further investigation also revealed that these same areas manifesting a significant/high susceptibility to insurgency also manifest a generally low indigenous capability to cope with the threat.

A consideration of U.S. policy trends relating to those high susceptibility/low capability areas, wherein U.S. security interests are for the most part indirect, indicated that focus required to combat the threat would have to continue to be indigenous; and further that Congressional and Executive support for military grant-aid programs was waning.

Prior U.S. efforts to assist indigenous forces in combating insurgency on internal waterways have, as demonstrated in Vietnam, generally been inadequate, but in spite of that inadequacy, naval operations in this environment have nevertheless demonstrated that such endeavors substantially contribute to the overall effort of combating insurgency, a fact

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of no small consequence apart from the specific Vietnam phenomenon.

### Present Policy and Programs

Post Vietnam planning calls for the United States internal water warfare capability to be effectively terminated. By 1 June 1970 most of the Navy's internal waterway craft will have been turned over to the Vietnamese Navy under the Accelerated Turnover to the Vietnamese Program (ACTOV). The remaining active inventory craft, 23 river assault craft of various types, 9 patrol craft--fast (PCF), 39 patrol boat--river (PBR), will be dedicated solely to the training of replacement advisors for Vietnam at the Naval Inshore Operations Training Center (NIOTC), Mare Island, California, or as replacement craft for South Vietnamese attrition losses. (23:1-3) In addition, four PBR's will be sent to Guantanamo Naval Station for harbor defense.

Budget cuts and the competition for dollars with other high priority navy programs have further eliminated any discussion of a force in being. One interesting proposal for the post Vietnam period was to establish two Reserve Coastal Patrol Divisions of 14 PCF's each and two Reserve River Patrol Divisions of 10 PBR's each. (23:2) As noted above there are no craft available for assignment to these units and very little likelihood that funds will be made available for new craft.

Even if the assets could be made available, it is questionable whether this would be an acceptable alternative in terms of the threat developed by this study. While a reserve force would serve the purpose of training personnel in tactics and doctrine, there is an understandable reluctance on the part of any administration to mobilize reserve units to engage in foreign insurgencies and this is particularly true in light of the Nixon Doctrine.

Assistance to friendly foreign navies for internal water defense forces has been and is being provided through the Military Assistance Program, with the objective of enhancing both internal and external security. For the underdeveloped countries in particular, assistance has been provided in the form of U.S. grant ships, craft and equipment under the MAP Grant Aid program. Determination of the number and types of ships and craft to be provided to a country is the result of negotiations between the in-country Navy MAAG element and that navy to produce, as a section of the Country Plan, a listing of the grants to be requested. The requested grant list is forwarded to the Department of Defense, with comments by the MAAG, for review by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and OPNAV. Allocations of the grants is made based upon the results of the DOD agencies reviews, the availability of surplus U.S. assets, if these are suitable, and action by Congress in case appropriations

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are required. As a result the actual grants are, as is to be expected, compromises between the desires fo the foreign navy as to type of forces required, the views of the MAAG element concerning the country's requirements, the decisions of OSD, JCS and OPNAV both to type of forces deemed to be most required and the availability of surplus assets or program dollars for procurement, and finally decision by Congress on the actual appropriations to be provided.

The recent MAP grants have provided modest numbers of internal water craft to eligible foreign navies with the preponderance of the grants allocated to "blue water" and coastal patrol ships, which in limited cases are also suitable for internal water operations. The relatively modest grants of craft suitable for internal water operations is not surprising in view of most foreign navy's natural desires to enhance and modernize their small ocean going fleets, the orientation of the Navy MAAG officers which by experience and background is almost uniformly in U.S. fleet operations, and the combination of the limited number of suitable U.S. surplus craft and the limited appropriations for new procurements.

What, in the opinion of the study group, is most unfortunate is the tendency of the Navy portion of the MAP program to orient the training assistance offered through the MAP to the equipment provided under the Grant Aid or Military Sales Programs. Quite naturally an underdeveloped, low technology

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nation will require extensive schooling and training assistance in the operation of U.S. provided ships systems and equipment. Accordingly, with the exception of the very limited CINCSOUTH Small Craft Inspection and Training Team (SCIATT), the preponderance of MAP provided training is oriented toward the "blue water" ships and craft provided through the program.

SCIATT was established in 1965 to provide training (formal courses, on-the-job and orientation) and mobile training inspection teams to Central and South American navies receiving internal water patrol craft through the MAP. Originally intended to operate through FY 1967, SCIATT is now programed to operate through FY 1971, with an allowance of 1 officer and 9 enlisted men. The modest extent of this endeavor is reflected in the programed yearly operations budget of \$22,000, although this program cost has been exceeded in some fiscal years to cover one time costs. (22: vol. II)

#### Recommendations

It is apparent that the existing United States Navy's programs to enhance its internal water naval operations forces or to provide assistance to friendly nations in developing their forces, except for the current effort to South Vietnam, are extremely limited. The United States Navy finds itself in a position not unlike that of the mid 1950's when responsible officers recognized the need, but when severe budgetary

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limitations and the overriding requirements for the development and procurement of new ships, aircraft and weapon systems prevented the allocation of resources to this area. The existing overwhelming requirements to modernize the fleet, maintain development and procurement of new generations of aircraft and weapon systems within the Navy, the restraints of the Nixon Doctrine toward expanded foreign commitments and expanded levels of commitment, and the pressures within the Congress for reduced U.S. military appropriations and reduced military and foreign assistance programs all strongly mitigate against the development of new major programs.

It would appear imprudent, however, to ignore the lessons learned in the United States Navy's initial faltering and failing in attempting to assist our ally, and later in its own efforts in the rivers and internal waters of South Vietnam. Particularly would it be imprudent to ignore the inadequacies of our forces and those of nations to which the United States has a measure of commitment, formal or informal, in the face of the high susceptibility of the nations identified in this study, and perhaps others.

Perhaps one of the major lessons to be learned from the United States Navy experiences in Vietnam is the greatly increased resources required to combat an established insurgency. While supporting factual data may not be available for substantiation, it certainly can be safely postulated that a much



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lesser allocation of resources is required to contain and combat a developing insurgency. What is required then to most effectively respond to the requirements of the significant/high susceptibility states/territories identified in this study and possibly other states as well, are adequate internal water defense forces-in-being in these threatened states.

It is axiomatic at this point in time that internal water defense forces-in-being must be indigenous forces. The Nixon Doctrine and the prevailing mood of Congress against new United States interventions, most strongly persuade that United States forces could not be committed until, at a minimum, significant proof of direct major aggression by a third power on behalf of the insurgents could be substantiated. Because of this, the study group considers it unnecessary for the United States Navy to plan for or to allocate resources to the reestablishment of its own significant internal water warfare force-in-being, either now or in the future. Rather, the United States Navy must adopt as a policy, the active encouragement and support for the development of effective internal water naval defense forces in friendly nations which demonstrate a significant susceptibility to insurgency.

The existing United States Military Assistance Program does recognize the requirement for strengthening foreign navy internal water defense forces and actively seeks to encourage

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and support their development. In the opinion of the study group however, this effort is severely handicapped by the actual administration of the Grant Aid Program. This program element tends to place the foreign navies' requests for grants for conventional naval ships in direct competition with grant requests for internal water defense craft. Additionally, the absence of a formal or informal active program for training foreign naval personnel in internal water naval operations doctrine and tactics, except for the extremely modest CINCSOUTH SCIATT effort, must make it more difficult for the Navy MAAG element to promote this functions with their counterparts. In a word, the United States' Military Assistance Program has not designed a program for internal water defense which the Navy MAAG elements can promote or actively "sell" to their counterparts.

To be effective an United States Navy program for assistance to foreign internal navy defense forces need not, nor should not, be oriented primarily toward providing craft and equipment. While modern internal water defense craft are lacking in most foreign navy forces, this need, relative or actual, should not derogate from a program to provide training of the forces. Local craft with a minimum of communication equipment and armament could be expected to adequately satisfy the requirement, particularly during the early periods of an insurgency. Emphasis upon training of foreign crews in doctrine

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and tactics of internal water naval operations in locally available craft will reduce the normal tendencies of these foreign navies to place their reliance upon complex, highly advanced equipment and craft, for which they will require extensive and time consuming training in maintenance technology and techniques. Training and experience in actual operations will permit the indigenous forces to adapt the best of their local craft to the needs of their internal water environment.

By emphasizing tactics and doctrine in local craft, rather than the necessarily more complex training in effective maintenance and operation of more sophisticated United States' provided craft, the numbers of and the duration of presence of United States naval advisory teams in the host country can be minimized. This is highly desirable, not only to reduce possible adverse criticism concerning the presence of foreign forces by dissident elements in the local populace, but also to make the program more palatable to possible critics in the United States Congress. In-country presence by United States advisors can be reduced further by the establishment of regional training schools, sponsored solely or jointly by the United States, at which foreign senior petty officers and officers can receive formal training and schooling. These schools could be established at appropriate United States military bases in the region, or possibly at foreign military

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installations of a government which is a party to a regional defense pact.

There remains a requirement, of course, for Military Assistance Program grants of internal water defense to eligible requesting nations, particularly those who are actively involved in combating insurgencies. Craft made available for this purpose should, to the maximum extent possible, be designed for and adapted to the environment of the requesting nation, rather than being available surplus assets of the United States, which is the general practice at the present time. By making use of the experience of the advisory teams and training schools, simplified craft meeting the requirements of the current doctrine and tactics can be developed.

Specifically it is recommended that the United States Navy sponsor within the Military Assistance Program, under CINCSOUTH, CINCSTRIKE, and CINCPAC, component Internal Water Defense Training Elements modeled after the CINCSOUTH Small Craft Inspection and Training Team (SCIATT) concept. The elements should be established under the Naval Components of the CINC, with the mission of establishing and maintaining a formal school and training center for foreign naval internal water defense, and to provide mobile training teams to requesting navies. The training centers should be initially established at an appropriate United States military installation, with a goal of ultimately locating the centers at a

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central location within the region of responsibility of the CINC.

It is considered that the yearly costs of maintaining adequately staffed and equipped element would be minimal in view of the budget of the present CINCSOUTH program. An allowance of 5 officers and 25 enlisted men should be sufficient to establish and develop the CINC's program, with adjustments thereafter governed by the degree of support required by participating foreign navies. An initial annual budget of some \$300,000 should be adequate for all teams, projecting this amount from the CINCSOUTH program. This yearly budget projection is not considered to be incompatible with existing Navy MAP costs, and should be capable of being financed from within the existing program fund levels. One time construction and procurement costs to establish and equip the necessary facilities and craft should not be major and again are considered to be capable of funding within existing MAP budget levels.

The most immediate value of these Internal Water Defense Training Elements would be to provide the Navy MAAG elements with a "product" to promote with their counterparts. The United States Navy is the only major navy of the world to have had the experience of conducting significant combatant operations in internal waters. In South Vietnam the Navy has not only learned some difficult lessons but has established in the

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contemporary era the value of internal water naval operations in successfully combating a major insurgency. It must not, to paraphrase an old proverb, "hide its knowledge under a basket" while it returns to the vital tasks of improving its ocean fleet.

Finally, it is recommended that the Naval Inshore Operations Training Center be maintained to promote and update the doctrine of internal water naval operations, serving as the advisor to the various CINC elements in matters of doctrine and tactics, and serving as the training center for naval personnel ordered to duty with the CINC elements and to in-country MAAG assignments. The NIOTC will continue to serve as the activity to sponsor research and development and to accomplish the evaluation of craft, equipment and material developed in support of current internal water doctrine and tactics. It is recognized that the Naval Inshore Operations Training Center performs essentially these functions at present, and the recommendation is made solely to emphasize the importance of maintaining this command as an active, dynamic function as budgetary constraints within the Navy continue.

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## APPENDIX I

DETAILED CONSIDERATION OF POLITICAL UNITS MANIFESTING  
SIGNIFICANT/HIGH SUSCEPTIBILITY TO INSURGENCY

The nineteen political units considered here have been singled out as currently having significant/high susceptibility to insurgency, utilizing the aforementioned geographic vulnerability and political instability susceptibility indices. What follows is a detailed exposition of the findings which supported the significant/high estimates of susceptibility for each of these units.

South America1. Argentina.

Geographic Vulnerability. Argentina has a vast inland waterway system which totals approximately 6,800 navigable miles. These waterways are of considerable importance in that they serve the most populated and highly industrialized regions, as well as carrying much of Argentina's foreign commerce. (48:15) Additionally, Argentina has both rivers and lakes on, or serving as borders between Chile, Bolivia, Paraguay, Brazil and Uruguay. None of these states presently constitute a threat to Argentina's internal security.

Political Instability. There is no major active insurgency in Argentina at the present time. It is reported, however, that approximately one hundred Argentines have received

guerrilla training in Cuba, and commencing in April 1969, there has been a series of widespread raids on military installations and arsenals for purposes of obtaining arms. (78:2)

There also are a relatively large number of dissident groups in Argentina which could constitute a potential source of insurgency. Included here are the Revolutionary Peronists, Castro-Communists, Communist Party of Argentina and reactionary extremists such as the Nationalist Restoration Guard. With exception of the Communists these groups are relatively small. (62:1)

In terms of intensity and incidence of violence, Argentina must be rated high (even by South American standards), having had over seven major incidents of political violence since 1946. (28:91) Prospects for long range governmental stability are not particularly good in view of the waves of violence sweeping the country subsequent to the police breaking up a peaceful student demonstration in May 1969. Order was restored only through the use of considerable force; political activity is currently banned and no elections are scheduled. (78:1)

## 2. Brazil.

Geographic Vulnerability. Brazil has navigable internal waterways totaling approximately 31,000 miles. These river systems provide the major and often the only means of access to the sparsely settled and generally underdeveloped sections of the country. In the more densely populated areas of the



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east and the south the waterways are important adjuncts to the rail and highway systems. (49:23)

Brazil also has rivers on, or serving as borders with ten other nations. None of these adjoining states constitute a threat to Brazil's security.

Political Instability. At this time there is no major rural guerrilla insurgency in progress; however, in 1969 there were numerous instances of urban terrorism, including the kidnapping of the U.S. Ambassador. Most of this terroristic activity has been conceived, coordinated, and executed by the outlawed Communist Party. Party membership is estimated at between 13,000 and 15,000, and this is split between pro-Chinese and pro-Moscow factions. While the Party is divided, it nevertheless has considerable influence in labor and student organizations, and that influence is growing. This increasing influence and heightened level of violence are becoming matters of growing concern to the government. (78:1)

Like most of the Latin American countries, Brazil has dissident ethnic groups and other potentially dangerous factions. Presently, however, the Communist inspired urban terrorism is considered a far more serious hazard than any other ethnic/political disruption.

Brazil, in terms of intensity and incidence of political violence, is rated as moderate, having had fewer than seven major incidents of political violence since 1946. (28:91)

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The current government appears relatively stable in spite of the fact that President Costa e Silva suffered an incapacitating stroke in August 1968. Prior to his stroke he had recessed Congress, suspended right of Habeas Corpus, instituted censorship, and ruled by presidential decree. These measures have for the most part been maintained by the three ministers of the armed forces who now rule Brazil. Things are presently quiet, but tensions remain high. (49:1)

### 3. Columbia.

Geographic Vulnerability. Columbia has an extensive internal waterway system, principally consisting of three major rivers: the Amazon, Cuaca and Magdalena. These waterways are extremely important to Columbia; in fact surface transportation in eastern Columbia is almost exclusively limited to the river system in that area. (46:4-2)

Columbia has rivers on, or serving as borders between four other states. None of these adjoining nations constitute a threat to Columbia's security; however, Cuba is sufficiently close, as events have shown, to represent somewhat of a hazard in terms of training, equipping and infiltrating Columbia insurgents.

Political Instability. Columbia presently has one of the oldest and most strongly entrenched insurgency problems in Latin America. Prior to 1967, the nature of the insurgency consisted of the violent activities of a large number of

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heterogeneous armed groupings with varying political origins and orientations. Since 1967, however, all active insurgents have combined into, or are now associated with the pro-Moscow, pro-Peking, or Castroist Communist movements. Divided as they are these groups to date have only constituted a threat to local law and order. (64:1-3)

This Communist inspired active insurgency is made doubly explosive, however, because of the difficult, and apparently unimproving, lot of the Columbian peasant and urban worker. (46:S-6) This economic discontent provides continuing support for the Communist oriented insurgency, while at the same time constituting a potential source of sporadic and ideologically unaffiliated insurgent activity of and by itself.

In terms of intensity and incidence of violence, Columbia must be rated among the very highest of the violence-prone Latin American states. Varying degrees of active insurgency have prevailed, almost continuously, in Columbia for the last two decades. (28:92)

In spite of the active insurgency and widespread discontent, the Columbian government itself, nevertheless, appears relatively stable, and is taking steps to improve economic conditions and move against the insurgents. (64:3)

4. Peru.

Geographic Vulnerability. Peru has an extensive internal waterway system which is of major importance as part of the

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nation's transportation and communication system. Inland waterway transport is the only practical means of surface transport in eastern Peru. Peru's major inland waterways are comprised of the Lagos Titicaca in the southeast, and the Amazon system, which by itself provides 5,400 miles of navigable waterways. (57:19)

Peru has rivers and lakes on, or serving as borders between four other states, none of which presently represents a threat to Peru's security.

Political Instability. Peru, like Columbia, is faced with a continuing state of active insurgency. In June 1965, a castro-Communist inspired insurgency was launched against the government. The revolutionary movement was effectively beaten down by government forces in 1966, nevertheless, remnants of the movement are still active, and continue to constitute a threat to internal security. (78:1)

Peru also has more than its share of dissident ethnic groups and other potentially dangerous elements of varying political interests and orientations. Combined with the Communist led movement, these dissident elements constitute another potential hazard to internal security.

Peru also rates extremely high in terms of intensity and incidence of violence, having had over seven instances of insurgency or major violence since 1946. (28:91)

The present government appears firmly entrenched in power

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at this time in spite of significant internal divisions and agitation. However, prospects for long range stability are not particularly good. Since October 1968, Peru has been ruled by a Military Revolutionary Committee which dismissed all elected officials on both federal and provincial levels. Since that time animosity toward the regime and accompanying political tensions have run relatively high. (78:1)

5. Venezuela.

Geographic Vulnerability. Venezuela has approximately 4,450 miles of inland waterways. They are largely unimproved, but are fairly evenly distributed and reach all parts of the country. They are well suited, and almost totally dependent upon, as the means of moving bulk cargo of minerals and petroleum from the interior. (58:18)

Venezuela has rivers on, or serving as borders between three other states, none of which are hostile to Venezuela. Cuba, however, is quite close and does constitute an indirect threat to Venezuela's security.

Political Instability. Venezuela has an active insurgency currently in progress. The movement is Communist inspired, supplied and coordinated. Up until 1968 it was known that Cuba was actively supporting the insurgents, although this is no longer a certainty at this time. The most serious insurgent violence occurred late 1969, when five engagements were fought between guerrilla and government forces. Government response

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was immediate, and for the present the violence appears to be stemmed. Nevertheless, the present low scale continuing insurgency still remains a major threat to Venezuela's internal security. (78:2)

Dissident ethnic and other motivated groups prevail in Venezuela; however, the level of Communist supported and coordinated insurgent activity has been such, that distinguishing heterogeneous non-affiliated groups is most difficult at this time.

In terms of intensity and incidence of political violence, Venezuela would have to be rated quite high, having had almost continual insurgency of one kind or another over the past ten years. (28:91)

In spite of the recurring insurgency problems, the government to date appears relatively stable. In 1969 the first Venezuelan president ever to complete a term did so, and then, also for the first time, turned over the presidency peaceably to a popularly elected opposition party candidate. The new president's party failed, however, to achieve a majority in congress, and therefore stability is not totally assured. (78:1)

#### Southeast Asia

1. Burma.

Geographic Vulnerability. Burma is a classic example of an underdeveloped country wherein there is almost total

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dependence upon internal waterways. Here they function as both lines of communication and as sources from which water is drawn for irrigation purposes. Most of the Burmese terrain is difficult to traverse and the great rivers, the Irrawaddy, the Chindwin, and the Salween provide the major natural arteries. In the Irrawaddy delta alone, there are some 1,700 miles of navigable waters. (2:10, 277)

Burma has rivers on, or serving as borders between five other states, and this presents special problems in terms of potential insurgency in that one of the adjoining states mutually served by common internal waterways is the People's Republic of China. In addition, that part of the Laotian border area which faces Burma over a common waterway is from time to time Communist controlled.

Political Instability. Burma is presently confronted with an active insurgency waged by Burmese Communists and dissident ethnic minorities. Since late 1967 this insurgency has intensified, largely because of Chinese aid to the indigenous Communists. There are an estimated 5,000 armed Communists who, along with the ethnic dissidents, exert de facto control over approximately one third of the country. (63:1)

The ethnic dissident groups mentioned above consist of approximately 17,000 armed men principally from the Shan and Kachin states. These groups have been involved in continuous and varying degrees of rebellion against the central authorities

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for over a decade, and are greatly encouraged and somewhat supported by the Communists. (63:1)

What with chronic ethnic terrorist campaigns, combined with the growing Communist inspired insurgent movement, Burma certainly rates high in terms of intensity and incidence of violence. (28:104)

The Ne Win government appears relatively stable at this time, however, the economy continues to decay due to inept government control of the means of production and distribution. (63:1) This condition combined with the continuing Communist/ethnic insurgency does not permit an optimistic prognostication for governmental stability over the long run.

## 2. Cambodia.

Geographic Vulnerability. Internal waterways constitute the most important geographic features of Cambodia, and the Mekong River and Tonle Sap, especially, have dominated the Cambodian economy and regulated the lives of Cambodians for ages. Inland waterways provide primary access to most of the villages of the great central plain, and carry the bulk of rice and fish from this area to market. (3:25, 317)

Cambodia has rivers on, or serving as borders with Thailand, Laos, and South Vietnam. Of these, Laos and Vietnam represent special problems in terms of potential insurgency, in that Communist insurgents operating in both of those states utilize Cambodia as a safe sanctuary and/or route for infiltration.

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This is done with the tacit approval of the Cambodian government, although it is abundantly clear that this tacit approval is primarily a de facto recognition of conditions which are beyond the Cambodian capability to control.

Political Instability. Cambodia has a relatively low-level active insurgency currently in progress, and since 1967 it has been increasing in scope and intensity. Government forces have been unsuccessful in suppressing the movement to date. It is impossible, at this time, to assess the extent of participation by outside forces in the dissidence, but Prince Sihanou has, on several occasions, charged that the Laotian Pathet Lao and Vietnamese Communist elements are supporting, if not directing the insurgency. (74:1-2)

Cambodia is also confronted with dissident ethnic groups, and this problem is compounded by chronic traditional factionalism even within groups that manifest ethnic homogeneity. In spite of this Cambodia, since independence has had only two major instances of political violence and, the present insurgency notwithstanding, must be evaluated as moderate in terms of intensity and incidence of political violence over time. (28:83)

At this point Conservatives dominate the cabinet and anti-government activities are rampant. Sihanouk's heavy handed authoritarianism has tended to prevent the government from dealing effectively with political factionalism or the rising

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insurgency. Prospects for long range governmental stability are, therefore, not particularly good. (74:1)

3. Laos.

Geographic Vulnerability. The inland waterway system of Laos consists of the Mekong, its tributaries, and the headwater sections of several streams draining into North Vietnam. These waters are well distributed throughout the country and provide a navigable system of approximately 2,850 miles. In many areas internal waterways provide the only practical means of transport, and the Mekong is the principal trade route between population centers. (53:12)

Laos has rivers on, or serving as borders between Thailand, Burma, China, and both Vietnams, all of which, directly or indirectly, have contributed to the Communist directed insurgency problem in Laos.

Political Instability. Laos is presently engaged in a situation of politically motivated violence which in many respects can no longer be called an insurgency. Civil War or an undeclared war with North Vietnam, perhaps more accurately describes the current activities in Laos. It is estimated that there are now approximately 47,000 Pathet Lao, and 56,000 North Vietnam cadres operating in Laos and exerting de facto control over forty percent of the country. (74:1-2)

Since independence, the history of Laos has been replete with protracted insurgencies, rebellions, and related violent

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activity, and therefore must be rated high in terms of intensity and incidence of political violence over time. (28:83)

Dissident ethnic and other politically motivated groups (other than Communists) have and do play a major role in the Laotian insurgency problem. At present some 3,300 dissident "neutralist" troops are participating in anti-government activity. (74:2)

Prospects for long range governmental stability are poor. Souvanna Phouma's "tripartite" coalition remains the legal government, but repeated rightist coup attempts and withdrawal of the Communists have made the coalition unworkable. Stability in non-Communist areas depends on cooperation between Souvanna, Army, regional leaders, and the King. Any real progress is impeded by factional, family, and regional loyalties; not to mention the Communist "national war of liberation." (74:1)

#### 4. Malaysia.

Geographic Vulnerability. Malaysia has extensive internal waterways on both the Asian landmass and in Sarawak and Sabah on the island of Borneo; as well as those restricted internal waterways between the mainland itself and Borneo. Internal waterways are no longer of great economic and transportation importance within the mainland section of the nation, but have remained the principal transport arteries between the mainland

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and Borneo and within the federated states of Sarawak and Sabah. (6:610)

Malaysia has rivers on, or serving as borders between Thailand and Indonesia (on Borneo), and neither of these states, as a matter of policy, presently constitute a threat to Malaysia's security.

Political Instability. Malaysia is presently confronted with active insurgency both on the mainland in the Thai-Malay border region, and on Borneo in the Sarawak-Kalimantan border area shared with Indonesia. The violent activity in both areas appears to be a "resurgency" in that the hostile elements represent the remnants of previous major movements against the government. Specifically, the insurgents in the Thai-Malay border area are elements of the Communist Malayan Races Liberation Army, which was defeated in 1960. In Borneo the insurgents are the Communist led remnants of the Indonesian "Confrontation," which terminated upon the fall of President Sukarno. (31:16-18)

Malaysia is also confronted with dissident ethnic and religious groups. There is considerable and continuing animosity between the "overseas" Chinese population and the Moslem Malays. The resultant tensions and sporadic outbursts of violence between these groups compound the problem of maintaining internal security in the country.

In spite of the current resurgence of anti-government

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activity, Malaysia must be evaluated as moderate in terms of intensity and incidence of political violence over time; having only experienced, since independence, the Indonesian "Confrontation," and riots in Singapore, before Singapore's separation from the federation. (28:83)

However, the rising "resurgency," squabbling ethnic religious groups, and traditional factionalism, combined with low economic growth rate, do not present grounds for optimism regarding long range governmental stability.

5. Thailand.

Geographic Vulnerability. Rivers and canals still carry a very large part of the goods transported in Thailand. The most important river system is that of the Chao Phraya. Four rivers flowing southward from the mountainous country in the north unite to form the Chao Phraya, and this great system of waterways is further supplemented by numerous canals in many areas. (8:495)

Thailand has rivers on, or serving as borders between Burma, Laos, Cambodia, and Malaysia. All of these border states represent possible routes of insurgent infiltration and/or safe sanctuary, even though these states do not officially maintain a hostile policy toward Thailand.

Political Instability. Thailand is presently involved in combating a major insurgency in the northern provinces, which is known to be directly supported by Communist China and

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North Vietnam. This movement began on a very minor scale in 1959, and escalated to major proportions by 1966. The terrain and close proximity of the area to China, Burma, and Vietnam all present very serious obstacles to effectively destroying the movement which is very active at this time. (46:S-9, 5-1)

The Communist movement has in great part capitalized upon the chronic pattern of discord between the government and the dissident tribal groups in the north, particularly the Meos who have received training from the Thai dominated Communist propaganda teams working out of Laos. (68:1) This almost continuous state of tribal rebellion over the years, combined with the current Communist supported insurgency, warrant a high rating for Thailand in terms of both intensity and incidence of violence. (28:83)

The present government is evaluated as relatively stable with fairly good prospects of remaining so, providing the Communist and tribal insurgents can continue to be contained.

#### South Central Asia

##### 1. India.

Geographic Vulnerability. India has approximately 5,000 miles of navigable waterways, of which over 1,500 miles are navigable by power vessels; the remainder of which can be navigated by poled boats. River navigation is principally confined to the Ganges and Brahmaputra Rivers, although in

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the south the canals in the Godavari and Krishna deltas also account for a substantial volume of river trade. (4:644-645)

India has rivers on borders with five other states, of which three (China, Pakistan and Burma) constitute a serious hazard in terms of insurgent infiltration and safe sanctuary.

Political Instability. India is presently confronted with a combined infiltration/ethnic insurgency in Nagaland, located in the northeast area of India. Here Chinese trained Nagas are infiltrating across the Burmese border. The Nagalanders fought an inconclusive eight year war against Indian rule before agreeing to a cease-fire in 1964. Since that time, however, clashes between Indian troops and the tribesmen have continued unabated and China has been quick to take advantage of the unrest. (46:S-6, 3-9, 3-11)

The Communist Party is legal in India and presently holds 43 seats in the 523 men lower parliament. The Communists have considerable influence in labor and student groups, and have been instrumental in fomenting numerous recent strikes and demonstrations. (73:2) This activity, combined with the almost continuous tribal insurgency, rank India high in terms of intensity and incidence of political violence. (28:104)

In spite of this wide spectrum of dissident activity, the Indian government is evaluated as very stable and, providing economic discontent (even more than insurgency) can be mollified, prospects for continued stability are good. (73:1)

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2. Pakistan.

Geographic Vulnerability. Internal waterways are of negligible importance in West Pakistan, but of great importance in East Pakistan, where some 4,600 miles of waterways provide the primary, and in some cases the only mode of transportation. (56:26)

East Pakistan has rivers on, or serving as borders between India and Burma. In both border areas the rivers represent potential routes for insurgent infiltration, even though active hostility does not presently exist between the three states. Mutual animosity with India over the Kashmir issue make this absence of hostility a tenuous condition, and the border between those two states is a very sensitive area.

Political Instability. Pakistan presently is confronted with sporadic ethnic insurgency. Pathan and Baluch tribes in unsettled areas continue to defy all efforts to subject them to central government authority. In addition to the rebellious tribesmen, the Communist Party, operating through front organizations, has played a major role in the recent anti-government demonstrations which resulted in the resignation of President Ayub Khan. (73:1)

Problems deriving from dissident ethnic groups are further compounded by the animosities and divergent interests of West and East Pakistan. These dissident elements have contributed greatly to the upsurge of anti-government activity over the

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past few years; which results in Pakistan being evaluated as moderate to high in terms of intensity and incidence of violence over time. (28:104)

The outlook for long term governmental stability in Pakistan is evaluated as poor. Serious internal divisions, and absence of viable democratic alternatives anticipates prolongation of military rule and possibility of new civil disorder. (73:1)

### South West Pacific

#### 1. Indonesia.

Geographic Vulnerability. The waterways between the numerous islands of the Indonesian Archipelago constitute a major part of that state's transportation and communication systems, and are of vital importance to economic development. As such they are a legitimate internal waterway system. They connect the key political and economic centers of the nation, and failure to control them would render the state impotent.

Inland waterways, i.e., rivers, canals, lakes, etc., are of little importance on Java, but provide a major part of the transportation system in Borneo and eastern Sumatra. (5:631)

Indonesia is separated from mainland Malaysia and Singapore by a narrow strait and has rivers and minor internal waterways on borders between the Malaysian state of Sarawak on Borneo and Australian administered territories on New Guinea.

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There are no Communist or Communist sympathizing states in the immediate proximity of the archipelago.

Political Instability. Indonesia is presently confronted with sporadic insurgency in two widely separated areas. On the island of Borneo there are insurgents operating on the border between the Malaysian state of Sarawak and the Indonesian state of Kalimantan. These insurgents are the residue of infiltration parties encouraged by President Sukarno of Indonesia when he was in power. Both governments are now cooperating in an attempt to eliminate these bands. (46:S-7) Another totally separate infiltration/insurgency problem exists on the island of New Guinea. In 1969 the citizens of West Irian voted to remain part of Indonesia, however, there are groups in West Irian who refuse to accept the authority of Djakarta and a minor and sporadic insurrection is in progress, with considerable activity in the border area adjacent to the Australian controlled territories. Communist influence remains at a relatively low ebb with approximately 3,000-4,000 Party members still at large, and less than ten percent involved in organized activity. (76:1-2)

The bloody activities deriving from the attempted Communist coup in 1965, the sporadic insurrection of dissident elements in Borneo and New Guinea, and the chronic ethnic animosity and violence between "overseas Chinese" and Malay stock Indonesians, warrant a rating of high for Indonesia in terms of intensity and incidence of violence over time. (28:83)

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Prospects for long range governmental stability appear relatively good. In 1968 General Suharto was appointed President for a five year term, and efforts are being made to implement badly needed economic and social reforms. Failure to act expeditiously in these matters would probably result in the Indonesian Communist Party rising again to present a potential threat to internal security. (76:2)

2. Philippines.

Geographic Vulnerability. Restricted waterways linking the many islands of the archipelago constitute a major part of the Philippine transportation and communication systems, and as such are essential to economic development and governmental control. (7:241) The southernmost island of the archipelago is separated by a relatively narrow expanse of water from the Malaysian section of the island of Borneo, which constitutes the Philippine's closest neighbor. There are no Communist or Communist sympathizing states in the immediate proximity of the archipelago.

Political Instability. The Philippines are once again confronted with a resurgent HUK movement in central and north-east Luzon. This same area was the focus of the original HUK movement, and now, as then, is heavily populated, continuously impoverished, and difficult to administer. At this time the resurgency is in the terrorist phase, and though the government insists that the present activity is banditry, there is good

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evidence to support the contention that the present movement is a direct lineal successor to the Communist HUK insurgency of a decade ago. (31:16)

In addition to the resurgent HUK movement there also are problems deriving from ethnic/religious dissident groups in the Philippines. Specifically, there is a Moslem anti-Christian atmosphere in the southern islands which poses a potential, and at times actual, hazard to internal security. (76:1)

The Philippine chronic penchant for local, politically motivated, violence since independence; the continuing HUK activities; and the recent outbreaks of civil disorder in the capital itself warrant an extremely high rating for the nation in terms of intensity and incidence of violence. (28:83)

Prospects for long range governmental stability are not good. The Communist Party, which is outlawed, is gaining in strength and is presently estimated to have 6,000 hard core members and a 30,000 mass base. (76:1) The Communist have considerable influence in agricultural, labor and educational circles, and have played a major role in the recent civil disorders. The general unrest and resulting violence cannot, however, be totally attributed to Communist agitation. It is primarily a reaction to spiraling inflation, and related economic dislocation resulting from government corruption and inefficiency, which has come to characterize the Philippine administrations of the last decade.

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West Africa1. Democratic Republic of the Congo (Kinshasa).

Geographic Vulnerability. The Congo River and its fourteen principal tributaries form the axis of the country's transportation network. These inland waters are extremely important to the Congo, carrying over forty percent of the nation's total tonnage and passenger miles. (51:19) In addition the Congo(K) has an extensive lake complex on its eastern border which are economically significant.

The Congo(K) has rivers and lakes on, or serving as borders between nine different states/territories. The lakes in the east, particularly Lake Tanganyika, and the Congo River have served as major infiltration routes for various insurgent groups over the years. The Congo(K) shares the Congo River as a common border with Congo (Brazzaville) which is currently ideologically inclined toward Communism.

Political Instability. While no major insurgency currently prevails in the Congo(K), nevertheless, root causes of unrest remain, and some Uganda based rebels have been sporadically active in the eastern border area. The Congolese Army remains in control, but is unable to completely eradicate the violent activity. (71:1)

Dissident ethnic groups represent a particularly hazardous element in the Congo(K). Since independence (and before) the country has experienced repeated instances of bloody tribal

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warfare. (28:98) This, combined with the rebellion of 1964-1965, and the sporadic externally supported insurgent activities, result in Congo (K) being rated extremely high in terms of intensity and incidence of political violence. (28:101)

Current political stability under General Mobutu is evaluated as good, in spite of potential/actual tribal warfare and sporadic insurgency. He will continue to rule by decree until elections are held in 1970. (71:1) Prospects for long range stability are not particularly good, particularly in view of rising dissatisfaction within a fragmented society due to almost negligible economic development over the past few years.

2. Congo (Brazzaville).

Geographic Vulnerability. Congo (B) has approximately 4,030 miles of navigable waterways of which 2,910 are navigable by powered craft. They constitute a major part of the Congolese transportation and communication systems. (50:13) Congo (B) has rivers on, or serving as borders between five territories/states, none of which constitute a potential hazard to Congolese security at this time.

Political Instability. There is no active insurgency in Congo (B) at this time, however, even a suggestion of a political power struggle could result in north-south tribal warfare. There is no Communist Party as such, but Communist influence is great. (71:1) As indicated above, potential tribal

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major active insurgency in Nigeria at this time, although the seeds of tribal dissidence (particularly amongst the Ibos) still prevail. (71:1)

In view of the lengthy and bloody activity of the recent civil war, and the sporadic tribal violence preceding it, Nigeria must be evaluated as high in terms of intensity and incidence of political violence since independence. (28:101)

Current governmental stability, and its long range prospects are not altogether clear at this time. General Gowon's government is now again in full control of Nigeria, however, the fundamental tribal problems which initiated the rebellion are still present.

#### East Africa

##### 1. Mozambique.

Geographic Vulnerability. Mozambique's internal waterway system comprises approximately 2,330 miles of routes navigable by vessels carrying cargoes of timber, ore, agriculture and petroleum products. The Zambezi River dominates waterway transport, accounting for more than two thirds of the total traffic. (54:17)

Mozambique has internal waterways on, or serving as borders between six different states. Of these, Tanzania and Zambia have been a source of insurgent infiltrators, and have provided safe sanctuaries for these elements. Tanzania is

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dissidence constitutes the greatest potential hazard to the Congo's internal security. In spite of this chronic hostility and tension between tribal elements, Congo (B) must be evaluated as moderate in terms of intensity and incidence of political violence over time, having had fewer than seven major disorders since independence. (28:101)

Prospects for long range governmental stability are not good. In 1968 a political power struggle resulted in the ouster of the president, and control of the government taken by military leaders. Extent of security force support for the present government leadership is not known and stability is further threatened by frictions between regional and tribal elements and particularly within the security forces. (71:1)

### 3. Nigeria.

Geographic Vulnerability. There are approximately 5,330 miles of navigable waterways in Nigeria, and they provide the principal means of transporting bulk cargo out of the interior, and in some areas, namely the Niger delta, they constitute the sole means of transportation. (55:16) Nigeria has rivers on, or serving as borders between four states/territories, none of which presently constitutes a potential or actual hazard to Nigeria's security.

Political Instability. The Central government under General Gowon is now in full control of Nigeria, what with the recent collapse of the Biafran rebellion. There is, therefore, no

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presently very sympathetic toward Communism, and Communist Chinese economic and military presence there is extensive. (71:1)  
As such, Tanzania presents a continuing potential and actual hazard to Mozambique's internal security in terms of increasingly promoting and providing support for insurgent elements.

Political Instability. Mozambique is considered an Overseas Province of Portugal. It is essentially a Portuguese colony wherein a white minority controls a huge black African majority. The black Africans have substantial grievances over their lack of political rights, health and education facilities, and job opportunities. This social structure is the source of deep discontent, and a number of Africans have resorted to illegal means and have established exile nationalist organizations, whose main goals are the political freedom of Africans and an independent Mozambique. These movements have evolved into active insurgencies which thus far have consisted of widespread planting of anti-personnel mines on roads and trails; ambushed of Portuguese troops; and attacks on native settlements which were considered to be cooperating with Portuguese administrative or military authorities. (54:49-50)

In terms of dissident groups in Mozambique, anti-government activity is less attributable to tribal based animosities, as is the case in most other African states/territories, and is more a function of various black African groups in rebellion against their white Portuguese masters. (28:105)

Until the upsurge of sporadic insurgent activity over the last few years, Mozambique has generally presented a relatively moderate picture in terms of intensity and incidence of political violence. (28:110) However, any governmental stability which has existed in the past or will continue to prevail in the future, was or will be a direct function of rigid government and police control. (54:49)

2. Kenya.

Geographic Vulnerability. Inland water transport in Kenya is principally confined to the lakes in the west, particularly Lake Victoria, which has approximately 3,215 miles of navigable routes serving thirty-four landings. (52:13) Kenya has rivers and/or lakes on, or serving as borders between five other nations. Of these states, Somali has from time to time encouraged, supported, and provided safe sanctuary for insurgent elements operating against Kenya. Another lake sharing neighbor is Tanzania, which is openly sympathetic to Communism with extensive Communist Chinese economic and military presence. Somali also manifests a left-leaning orientation, but not so pronounced as Tanzania. Somali's involvement in Kenya's internal affairs has less to do with ideology and more to do with encouraging Somali tribesmen living in eastern Kenya to effect a successful secessionist movement and join Somali. (66:10)

Political Instability. Kenya is presently confronted with a sporadic, but active insurgency in its eastern regions,

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primarily involving the Somali tribesmen mentioned above. Official Somali support for the dissident tribesmen has dwindled in the past year and their violent activity has commensurately declined. (71:1) Nevertheless, while the insurrection continues even at a lower intensity, the movement still has a high potential for adversely affecting Kenya's internal security, particularly if Somali again chose to actively support the rebels.

In addition to the Somali tribesmen problem, Kenya since independence has been plagued with other dissident tribal groups which have from time to time arbitrarily fought with each other or the government. (28:105) This tribal violence or tribal based separatism, while constituting an obstacle to internal security, nevertheless, has not been as frequent or as violent as other new African states. Kenya has had fewer than seven major politically motivated violent upheavals since independence and, therefore must be evaluated as moderate in terms of intensity and incidence of political violence over time. (52:110)

Prospects for long range governmental stability are not good. The recent assassination of Tom Mboya, Minister of Economic Planning and Development, has intensified tribal antagonism throughout the country. In addition, there is also potential for instability from further political maneuvering and tribal friction after the demise of aging president Jomo Kenyatta. (71:1)

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## APPENDIX II

## CAPABILITY ESTIMATES

Some nineteen states or territories, manifesting significant internal waterway environments, have been singled out as currently having a significant/high susceptibility to insurgency. What follows is an individual assessment of each susceptible political unit's capability to combat insurgency on its internal waterways.

South America

1. Argentina. The Argentine Navy is specifically tasked by its mission to assist the Army in maintaining internal security. (77:8) However, in view of the magnitude of Argentina's internal waterways and the paucity of navy assets available, such assistance as could be provided would be minimal. The Argentine Navy at this time has a total of nine shallow draft patrol craft, and of these only seven are committed to patrol over 6,000 miles of navigable inland waterways. (61:13)

The Navy is assisted in this task by the Argentine National Maritime Prefecture. The Prefecture provides light surface patrol of navigable inland waterways and coastal areas. Unfortunately the Prefecture is severely hampered by a lack of equipment and insufficient training facilities. (62:60)

Argentina has a bilateral military assistance agreement

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with the United States for specific military cooperation (77:4-5); is a signatory to the 1947 Rio Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance; and a member of the Organization of American States (OAS). The OAS, however, is principally directed against external aggression and this, combined with traditional Latin American sensitivity concerning nonintervention in the internal affairs of sovereign states of the hemisphere, has precluded all efforts to "modify" the organization for purposes of assisting in combatting internal insurgencies, regardless of source or external support. (80:6)

All things considered, Argentina's capability to combat an insurgency on her vast internal waterways is evaluated overall as Low.

2. Brazil. The Brazilian Navy is specifically tasked by its mission to protect river traffic (49:121), and to accomplish this massive undertaking the Navy has presently committed a total of six ships, and could probably commit ten more in time of emergency. (61:36-37) The six craft presently utilized in river surveillance work are divided into two river flotillas, one of which operates in the Amazon, the other in the Paraguay River. (79:3)

Brazil is a signatory of the Rio Pact, and a member of the Organization of American States. Brazil also has a bilateral military agreement with the United States for specific

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assistance and cooperation. There is presently a U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group in Brazil. (77:3)

With over 31,000 miles of waterway being patrolled with the presently committed assets, and with little indication of short run improvement, Brazil is evaluated as having a low capability to cope with an insurgency on her internal waterways.

3. Columbia. The Columbian Navy is specifically tasked with assisting in maintaining internal security, and in patrolling the inland waterways of Columbia. (77:6) The Navy's assets to execute this mission consist of approximately fifty-three craft, of which forty-six are committed to river patrol work. (61:74-75) The Navy assets can be supplemented by those of the National Customs Service and the Ministry of Public Works.

Columbia is a signatory of the Rio Pact and a member of the Organization of American States, neither of which has served any useful purpose in resolving Columbia's insurgency problem in spite of good evidence that there has been Cuban intervention in Columbia's internal affairs. Columbia also has a bilateral military agreement with the United States for specific military cooperation and assistance, and there is presently a U.S. Military Advisory and Assistance Group in-country. (77:3)

While Columbia has a substantial number of craft committed to river surveillance, nevertheless, the magnitude of the threat

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and the environment are such as to evaluate the Columbian capability to combat insurgency on her internal waterways, at best, as Moderate/Low.

4. Peru. The Peruvian Navy is specifically tasked with patrolling the country's internal waterways. (57:99) Assets available to the Navy for carrying out this mission are quite limited. At present there are six river gunboats known to be committed to the Amazon River (61:180), and thirteen patrol, and four mine warfare craft available if required in emergency. (78:9)

Peru is a signatory to the Rio Pact and is a member of the Organization of American States. Peru also has a bilateral agreement with the United States for specific military cooperation and assistance. There is presently a U.S. Military Advisory Assistance Group in-country. (77:3)

In view of the continuing internal threat and the insignificant surveillance/interdiction assets available to secure the internal waterways, Peru's capability in this regard must be evaluated as Low.

5. Venezuela. The Venezuelan Navy is not specifically tasked by its mission to assist in maintaining internal security by controlling the inland waterways. (69:63) Nevertheless, the Navy is tasked to protect shipping, and under this mandate it maintains a minimal river patrol capability. Current naval

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estimates reflect only fifteen patrol type craft suitable for river work in the Venezuelan inventory, of which only three currently appear to be committed to internal waterway surveillance. (61:207)

Venezuela is a signatory to the Rio Pact, and a member of the Organization of American States. However, unlike the other highly susceptible states in South America, Venezuela does not currently have a bilateral military assistance agreement with the United States. Venezuela does buy military equipment from the United States, but does not receive grant U.S. military aid. (77:4)

With insignificant assets available for surveillance/ interdiction over a large internal waterway environment, and with little prospect of increasing those assets in the near future, Venezuela's capability to combat insurgency in this environment must be evaluated as Low.

#### Southeast Asia

1. Burma. The Burmese Navy is specifically tasked with a requirement to engage, when necessary, in river warfare in support of the Army. (74:6) To execute this responsibility the Navy has at its disposal approximately seventy-eight craft of sufficiently shallow draft to perform surveillance and/or interdiction roles on the bulk of the inland waterways. (59:15-16)

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Burma is theoretically a "non-aligned nation, but does have a bilateral Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Non-aggression with The People's Republic of China. At the same time Burma also has a military equipment sales agreement with the United States. (74:3)

The assets available, though not necessarily committed to combat insurgency on Burma's internal waterways, do represent a relatively substantial force. However, in spite of this the magnitude of both the threat and the environment warrant evaluation of Burma's capability to combat insurgency in this environment as, at best, Moderate.

2. Cambodia. The Cambodian Navy is specifically tasked to patrol inland waterways and to assist the Army in maintaining internal security. (74:5) Assets available consist of approximately seventy-three shallow draft craft. (59:33-34)

Cambodia is "officially" a non-aligned nation, but has exchanged mutual defense assurances with The People's Republic of China. Cambodia terminated a U.S. military assistance program agreement in 1963, and went on to reject her protocol status in the South East Asia Treaty Organization. Cambodia presently receives some military assistance from France, the Soviet Union, and China. (74:3)

In spite of Cambodia's rather substantial assets, the magnitude of the environment and the increasingly violent insurgency, at best, warrant a capability evaluation of Moderate.

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3. Laos. The Laotian Navy consists of a river flotilla which comes directly under the cognizance of the Army. The FAR (Army) River Flotilla is tasked with assisting in territorial defense and counterinsurgency. (74:5) Its assets consist of approximately thirty-four shallow draft patrol and/or amphibious craft. (59:235)

The Lao government has no known formal military alliances, claims non-alignment, but nevertheless depends upon the U.S. to assist in maintaining security. (74:1) The degree of U.S. commitment to the maintenance of that security is not altogether clear at this time. Nevertheless, Laotian capabilities to combat insurgency, unassisted, on her internal waterways is evaluated as Low.

4. Malaysia. The Malaysian Navy is tasked with securing territorial waters, and providing sea and riverine support of ground forces. (74:6) The Navy has approximately thirty-six ships and craft suitable for this task on inland/restricted waterways (59:243), and Navy assets are supplemented by five hundred and nine very small patrol craft of the Royal Malaysian Marine Police. (67:53)

Malaysia receives military assistance from, and has an external defense agreement with the United Kingdom. (74:3) Malaysia is also a member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). This regional organization does not at present have a particularly high potential for assuming a peacekeeping

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role in this area against external threats, much less against insurgencies. (80:8)

In general, Malaysia's combined assets provide a significant surveillance, and low interdiction capability on inland waterways; and a low surveillance/interdiction capacity on restricted waters between the mainland and Borneo. Overall, Malaysia's capability to combat insurgency on its internal waters is evaluated as Moderate.

5. Thailand. The Thai Navy is specifically tasked to assist the Army in maintaining internal security, and to effect border security along the Mekong River. (74:8) Shallow draft assets available for this task consist of approximately seventy-one units, however, of that number only six to eight are presently committed to river patrol work, the remainder being used in the Gulf of Siam. (59:280-281) The bulk of river patrol work is accomplished by the Thai Marine Police Force, which consists of approximately 6,200 men and forty-eight patrol craft. (68:26)

Thailand is also a signatory to the South East Asia Treaty Organization and is a recipient of U.S. military assistance. (74:4)

In view of the intensity of the present insurgency, the magnitude of the environment, and the paucity of assets available and/or committed, Thailand's capability for maintaining security on its internal waterways is evaluated as Moderate/Low.

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1. India. In spite of the prevalence of a vast internal waterway environment the Indian Navy is not specifically tasked to assist in the maintenance of internal security or to patrol the river systems. Shallow draft assets available in the Navy inventory reflect this non-riverine orientation. There are approximately twenty-nine craft which could be considered capable of river surveillance/interdiction work, and none of them are committed to the river systems. (59:92-94)

India holds to a policy of non-alignment, but does receive U.S. military assistance, which is limited to "nonlethal" end items, and spare parts for "lethal" equipment on a case for case basis. The United States has also agreed to train a small number of Indian Officers in the U.S. India also receives aid from the Soviet Union. (72:3)

Indian capabilities to combat insurgency on internal waterways is presently Low, and the Navy is not likely to make an effort to improve that capability in the foreseeable future.

2. Pakistan. The Pakistani Navy, like India, is not specifically tasked by its mission with any responsibility for providing security on internal waterways; however, recently the Navy has committed approximately twenty craft to patrolling the rivers in east Pakistan. These assets appear to represent the total number of shallow draft craft in the Navy inventory

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which are capable of functioning in a river surveillance/interdiction role. (59:254-255) Additionally, there are no known maritime police assets to supplement the Navy craft.

A U.S. military assistance program was suspended in 1965, although limited U.S. military sales were initiated again in 1967. Pakistan has received military aid from Communist China, and is presently negotiating for increased assistance from the Soviet Union. It has been observed that the Pakistani armed forces are becoming increasingly susceptible to Communist ideological appeal. (73:1) Pakistan is a signatory of the South East Asian Collective Defense Treaty, however, current participation is limited to that of an observer role. (72:2) Pakistan is also a signatory of the Central Treaty Organization.

In spite of shifting ideological orientations which may have some bearing on external Communist support for insurgency in Pakistan, nevertheless, strictly on basis of assets available and committed Pakistan's capability to combat insurgency on its huge internal waterway system is evaluated as Low.

#### Southwest Pacific

1. Indonesia. The Indonesian Navy is specifically tasked to assist in elimination of subversive activity and to maintain security on internal waters. (75:5) For this task the Navy has approximately seventy-nine patrol craft, and a limited

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number of mine warfare and amphibious ships. In addition to the regular naval establishment there is the Indonesian Sea/Air Police Division. This is an organization comparable to the U.S. Coast Guard and has a personnel strength of about three thousand men, and an inventory of approximately one hundred twenty-three afloat units, ranging from sea going patrol ships to small outboard-powered craft. (68:13-14)

Indonesia has adopted a formal policy of non-alignment, and does not at present have any known formal military assistance agreements. Indonesia is a member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) which currently serves no mutual defense purpose. (78:3)

In spite of what appears to be a relatively substantial combined force of police and navy assets, nevertheless, the expanse of internal waterways and coastlines is such as to still warrant evaluation of Indonesia's capability to combat insurgency in this environment as Low.

2. Philippines. The Philippine Navy is tasked with securing territorial waters and assisting in the enforcement of all national regulations. (78:4) To accomplish this task the Navy and Coast Guard (which is now under the Navy) have approximately one hundred assorted ships and craft in their inventory. (79:6)

The Republic of the Philippines is a member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations which, as indicated above,

presently serves no mutual defense function on a regional level. The Philippines also are a signatory to the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty (SEATO), and has a military assistance program agreement with the United States. (75:2)

The paucity of assets, the age of many afloat units, the long coastlines and numerous islands preclude the Philippine Navy from being capable of effectively combating insurgency on internal waterways. Philippine capabilities are therefore evaluated as Low.

#### West Africa

1. Democratic Republic of the Congo (Kinshasa). The Congolese Navy is tasked with patrolling Lake Tanganyika to prevent smuggling and infiltration operations supporting rebels in the eastern Congo. (70:3) It presently is not assigned responsibility for maintaining security on the extensive river system. However, available assets of approximately five patrol craft make effective patrolling of Lake Tanganyika by itself a monumental, if not impossible task. (71:5)

Congo(K) is a member of the Organization of African Unity (OAU). Unfortunately the OAU does not presently have the will, unity, or strength to take on peacekeeping in Africa. (80:7) Congo(K) received minimal military assistance from the United States, Belgium, Italy and Israel. (70:2)

In view Congo's extensive internal waterways, consistently



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high potential for violence, minimal assets, poor maintenance, and lack of qualified personnel, its capability to combat insurgency in the subject environment is evaluated as Low.

2. Congo (Brazzaville). The Congolese Navy is specifically tasked with assisting in maintaining national security by patrolling internal waterways. (70:4) To cover over 4,000 miles of inland waters the Navy has assets of approximately nine patrol craft. (71:6)

The Congo (B) is a member of the OAU, has some defense agreements with France, and has a defense training assistance agreement with the Soviet Union. (70:2) At the present time the Congolese government and armed forces are much influenced, and quite sympathetic toward Communism.

In view of the extensive environment and the negligible shallow draft Navy assets, the Congo's capability to combat insurgency on its internal waterways is extremely Low.

3. Nigeria. The Nigerian Navy is tasked to operate on internal waterways so as to assist in the maintenance of internal security. (70:6) Assets available to accomplish this task consist of approximately thirteen craft or vessels of sufficiently shallow draft to permit operation in a riverine environment. (60:127)

Nigeria is a member of the Organization of African Unity, and has no other known alliances or associations which involve

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a formal military commitment at this time. Communist military aid was received during the Biafran insurrection, but it was under contract rather than formal agreement or alliance. (70:3)

Nigerian capabilities to combat insurgency on its immense internal waterway system are evaluated as Low in spite of possible shallow draft asset increases resulting from the Biafran capitulation.

#### East Africa

1. Mozambique. Portuguese naval forces stationed in the province are charged with assisting in the maintenance of internal security, which includes patrolling the rivers and Lake Nyasa. To accomplish the task of securing these internal waterways there are eighteen hundred naval personnel, thirteen small patrol vessels, and a few minor amphibious craft. (54:65-67)

The United States provides Portugal with limited military assistance through the framework of NATO. However, the United States considers Mozambique a non-self governing territory of Portugal and has specifically indicated that U.S. military aid equipment is not to be utilized in Mozambique, or any other Portuguese colonial area. (54:46)

The present assets of the Portuguese naval forces in Mozambique are minimal and old, the internal waterway environment is vast, and the nationalist insurgency is growing. Unless

the Portuguese Navy provides a substantial increase in shallow draft craft to Mozambique, the capability to combat insurgency on internal waterways there must be evaluated as Low.

2. Kenya. Kenya's Navy is not tasked with the responsibility to maintain security on the eastern lakes, and, therefore, has no known craft committed there. (60:102-103) No other security organization has known assets committed there either.

Kenya does have an agreement with the United Kingdom providing for 28 million dollars in military aid, and has signed a mutual defense pact with Ethiopia. Kenya is also member of the Organization for African Unity. (70:2)

Kenya is evaluated as having No capability to combat insurgency on the vast lacustrine environment.

DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS  
NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED  
DOD DIR 5200.10

UNCLASSIFIED  
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UNCLASSIFIED  
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