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THESIS

RELATIONS BETWEEN RUSSIA AND THE UNITED STATES,
AND THEIR INFLUENCE ON U. S. FOREIGN POLICY

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In the analysis of relations between the United States and Russia it is necessary to consider the basic factors and forces which have shaped the foreign policy of our country since its establishment as a sovereign power. By this means we can better understand the conflicts which naturally occur when circumstances arise which necessitate a modification of our policy.

A study of American political and diplomatic history reveals that among the major influences which have shaped our foreign policy are the following:

1. Geographical position. The separation of the continents of North and South America from Asia and Europe by the Pacific and Atlantic oceans respectively, permitted the United States during its period of early development, to follow a policy of comparative isolation from those two continents of ancient civilizations. The slow means of transportation and communication prevailing at that time accentuated this isolation. The newborn nation was thus able to expend the greater part of its energy in self-development rather than in a succession of enervating wars.

2. Absence of strong aggressive neighbors. The United States has seldom been threatened by its neighbors of the Western Hemisphere. Of course there have been brief periods of danger, such as the war of 1812 (when there was the possibility of an attack through Canada), and the establishment by the French of an empire in Louisiana and Mexico, and the possible formation of a separate Southern Confederacy during the Civil War. But these dangers have not approached those inherent in the presence on one's borders of strong and aggressive neighbors. Initially we had, instead, large undeveloped and comparatively uninhabited areas close at hand into which we were able to expand and become established without long and exhausting wars. Jules Jusserand, French ambassador to

the United States 1902-1932, summed these assets up humorously when he once said that America was fortunate among the nations since on the north she has a weak neighbor; on the south another weak neighbor; on the east fish; on the west fish.

3. Democratic form of government. The democratic principles upon which our government was founded and operates has made us intolerant of dictators and absolute monarchs. We have either encouraged or sympathized with sincere democratic movements elsewhere, and have always been among the first to recognize newly formed governments based upon truly democratic principles.

4. Public opinion. In our democracy it is permissible for the public to make its opinion known and to bring pressure upon its elected representatives, for conformance thereto. This is as true in international relations as in domestic affairs. Of course the State Department may attempt to influence public opinion, and rightly so, but there is a definite limit to which it can go contrary to the wishes of the public. It is therefore necessary for the appropriate government officials to keep the public as accurately informed as security will permit in order to obtain the requisite support.

Until fairly recently the American people have generally been more interested in domestic than foreign affairs. Their isolation and freedom from menacing neighbors have permitted them the luxury of primary emphasis upon internal affairs. While this has resulted in great industrial development and a high standard of living for the populace as a whole it has also resulted in a lack of appreciation of the difficulties inherent in international relations.

5. Industry. We have always been an exporting nation. Our immense natural resources permitted us to export raw materials even in our early history. As we developed industri-

ally we added manufactured goods and agricultural products to our exports. This great sea-borne commerce has made us vitally interested in the freedom of the seas.

6. European wars. The interminable wars of Europe kept the great powers of that continent so involved that the United States was left free to consolidate her position in the Western Hemisphere. In this respect we followed, with great advantage to ourselves, the line of action suggested by the Swedish ambassador in London when in 1784 he remarked to John Adams:

"Sir, I take it for granted, that you will have sense enough to see us in Europe cut each other's throats with a philosophical tranquility."

Now in order to understand the influence of Russian and United States relations upon United States foreign policy we must understand what that policy has been in the past, and how it is being modified at the present time. Let us see then what United States foreign policy has evolved from those factors enumerated above. We often hear the opinion expressed that we have had no basic foreign policy in the past, and consequently our relations with other countries have been inconsistent and unpredictable. Such statements do not reflect thorough analysis and mature consideration. Temporary deviations, however, have been found necessary under pressure of world events, just as they have for the foreign policies of all great nations.

It must be accepted that the foreign policy of any nation, the United States included, is based primarily upon self-interest. In our case this is tempered somewhat by our inherent idealism, which has led us at times into the error of overestimating the trustworthiness of others. Indications are that our recent disillusionments in this respect are being kept fresh in our memory by the tactics of Russia so that we may be less likely to commit this error in the near future.

The United States since colonial days, has followed generally and to the maximum extent practicable a policy of isolation, non-intervention, and non-entanglement in the affairs of nations outside the Western Hemisphere. She has sought to be free to work out her own destiny without the distractions of the interminable disputes among nations of the Old World. Integrated with this traditional policy of isolation from the affairs of Europe is the concomitant policy of "America for the Americas". Accordingly we have sought to keep the Americas free of European powers. In the Peace of Paris, 1763, France was largely removed. When France reacquired Louisiana Thomas Jefferson took positive steps to obtain it for the United States. No sooner was this accomplished in 1803 than we began to take steps to eliminate Spain. By 1821 this latter was accomplished by the purchase of the Florida Territory. Our efforts to oust the British have not been satisfactory although we have twice invaded Canada. However by the purchase of Alaska in 1867, the last overseas power, except England, was removed from the North American continent.

The Monroe Doctrine, pronounced in 1823, was born of this desire to keep the Americas free from the political systems of, and colonization by, the powers of the Old World. This doctrine has become one of the cardinal principles of our foreign policy, and has been strengthened with the passage of the years. It is appropriate to this thesis to note that among the strongest influences to the enunciation of the Monroe Doctrine were the actions of Russia at the time. As the titular head of the Holy Alliance she was a champion of the monarchial system of government at a time when the South American Republics were struggling for independence, with the blessing of the United States.

The United States, as a great mercantile nation, has

always been an advocate of the freedom of the seas, and consequently has resisted the increasing restrictions by belligerents upon the sea-borne commerce of neutrals. The war of 1812 was fought to maintain our rights upon the high seas. For months prior to our entry into World War I we objected strenuously to England's extension of the principle of visit and search of neutral shipping. One of the primary reasons for our final decision to enter on the side of the Allies was the ruthless violation of the freedom of the seas by Germany's unrestricted submarine warfare.

The policy of the "Open Door", or the right of Americans to engage in commerce and industry on an equal basis with other foreign powers, was announced by John Hay in 1899 in an effort primarily to prevent the further dismemberment of China after she had revealed her weakness in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895. While we have never gone to war in defense of this policy, probably because of our relatively small commercial investment in China, we stand by the principle not only as applied to China but to other countries as well.

While the United States has not hesitated to go to war in defense of her honor she has been a leader among nations in the attempt to settle international disputes by mediation, arbitration, and other diplomatic means.

For political, commercial, cultural and security reasons, and as a means of decreasing European influence in the Western Hemisphere the United States has sought a close association of the American Republics. This emphasis upon Pan-Americanism has been especially strong since 1933. While success has not been as complete as desired, some progress has been made.

Research leads to the conclusion, then, that United States foreign policy basically has been fairly consistent,

although it cannot be denied that its manifestations have undergone some evolution.

The above discussion gives us an insight into American psychology as it affects our international relations. In an attempt to understand some of the Soviet maneuvers on the international stage it appears necessary to take a similar look into Russian background and psychology, without going very deeply into Russian history. In this manner we should be able to understand better the basic conflicts or parallelisms of the respective foreign policies of the two countries.

Historically the Russian people have been accustomed to a harsh climate, a low standard of living, an inferior industrial status, and ruthless rulers who periodically have suffocated the populace by the most brutal tyranny. These factors frequently have inspired violent revolutions, either local or national in character, but after subsiding the status of the peasant remained relatively unchanged. Industrial and commercial backwardness as compared to the western world has been one of the major factors in Russia's comparative isolation from Western Europe, of which she has never considered herself a part in a cultural or political sense. In this respect the iron curtain is not new. The remarkable mind of Peter the Great, who ruled from 1689 to 1725, recognized the backwardness of his people, and he attempted with some success to enforce upon them many elements of European civilization involving rules of conduct, culture, and technical advancement. This beginning, however, was not followed up by the great majority of his successors to the throne so that Russia, in spite of her immense natural resources, remained far behind the western world in industrial development.

From a political point of view Russia has been disappointed in her contact with the West. While her diplomatic prestige reached a high point during the reign of Alexander I

when the defeat of Napoleon was hastened by the great Russian contribution, she was unable to effect a basic change in the attitude of European diplomats. This is probably due largely to two major factors: first, her industrial backwardness, and second, the series of military and diplomatic reverses she suffered during the latter half of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth. This second factor deserves at least a brief comment.

Russia was defeated in the Crimean War by France, England, and Turkey. In the Peace of Paris, concluded in March 1856, the Black Sea was declared to be neutral, no warships were to sail upon it, and no arsenal was to be constructed on its shores. Thus were blocked Russia's naval efforts in this direction since the time of Catherine the Great. Navigation of the Danube was to be free. Russia lost some territory, and she was forbidden certain steps she had anticipated taking in the Balkans in regard to the protection of the Christian subjects of Turkey. By this Peace of Paris Russian ambitions in the direction of the Balkans received a severe setback.

Upon the rise to power of Bismarck in Germany Russia found a great obstacle to any extension of her influence in Western Europe or the Balkans. So strong was Germany's position that after Russia had won a war against Turkey in 1878, and had signed the Treaty of San Stefano which satisfied most of her war aims, Bismarck called a conference of major European powers to modify the treaty and nullify most of the Russian gains. By this action of the Congress of Berlin, June 1878, Russia, after a victorious war, was again rebuffed in Europe and was forced to sign a humiliating treaty dictated by noncombatant powers. Tsar Alexander III thus lost much of his support at home, and Russia's hostility towards Western Europe was increased.

This increasing resistance to her expansion into the Balkans, and Germany's subtle suggestions that she turn her attention to the East had their effects upon Russian foreign policy. Forsaking temporarily any major extension of her influence in Europe Russia sought expansion in the Far East. This policy brought her into conflict with the rising power of Japan, and the result was an inglorious defeat at the hands of that oriental power in 1905. Even here the power of Western Europe was felt because Japan was encouraged by a treaty with England in 1902 wherein it was agreed that in event of a war between Japan and Russia the entry of any third party on the side of Russia would be followed by that of England on the side of Japan. Russia's primary loss as the result of that war, however, was that of prestige, largely because of the efforts of President Theodore Roosevelt to minimize Japan's material gains.

Rebuffed in both the East and West, where was Russia to turn now? Again she sought to extend her influence in the Balkans. The ultimate result was the First World War when she fulfilled her promises to Serbia after that country was attacked by Austria. After a series of military reverses administered by Germany, the culmination of the war for Russia was revolution at home, the overthrow and assassination of the Tsar, and the signing by the revolutionary government of the unfavorable Brest-Litvosk Treaty, which lost Russia nearly all territory gained since the accession of Peter the Great. Beaten by Germany and accused of desertion by the Allies, the new Soviet State found its prestige among the major powers of the world at a point lower than that of the Tsars at any time. Under this cloud of foreign hostility the U.S.S.R. had its beginning in the Russian Revolution of 1917.

In addition to inheriting these traditional conflicts with her neighbors the new Soviet government's philosophy of world revolution, her violent propaganda against capital-

ism, and her ruthless oppression of opposition are so foreign to the democratic concept that the result was a further isolation of the U.S.S.R. from the rest of the world. Let us now consider the ways in which the tactics of the Soviets and the Western World have served to increase or reduce this friction, because it is with this Soviet government that the United States now has to deal on a plane of reality.

In her appraisal of the international aims of the U.S.S.R. the United States could not overlook the violence in which the new regime was born, the precepts upon which it was founded, and the public statements of some of the founders of the Soviet government, as well as the positive action they took to give substance to those statements.

In 1923 Lenin said that the Communist Party "must be ready for trickery, deceit, lawbreaking, withholding and concealing the truth," and further that they could "and must write in a language which sows among the masses hate, revulsion, scorn and the like toward those of different thought."

At the Thirteenth Conference of the Communist Party of Moscow in 1925 Stalin stated:

"We have an ally, impalpable, impersonal, but in the highest degree important - that is, conflicts and contradictions between capitalist countries ---. Undoubtedly the greatest support of our power and our revolution is strife, conflict and war among our enemies. These, I repeat, are our greatest ally."

We might be able to dismiss such statements as propaganda for domestic consumption in the establishment of the new regime in its early days, but statements of recent date, are in a similar vein. In his book "The Problems of Leninism", the latest edition of which was approved in 1939, Stalin says:

"It is inconceivable that the Soviet Republic should continue to exist for a long period side by side with imperialist states- ultimately one or the other must conquer

Is this the basis of present Soviet foreign policy? The expressed opinion of many of those Americans who have had

intimate dealings with the Soviets believe it is.

Finding her announced intentions of the early overthrow of world capitalism impracticable, the Soviets were forced by reality to associate with the capitalist nations, to exchange representatives with them and to enter into trade relations with them. Despite these facts, however, they have repeatedly reaffirmed their basic hostility to these nations and their determination to destroy them in the end. The United States watched with interest the development of the U.S.S.R. and took due notice of her anti-capitalist statements. Until 1933 we could not see our way clear to recognize a government professing such aims. However, this policy of non-recognition appeared to make no improvement in the relations between the two countries. Furthermore, pressure for recognition increased from business men who wished to trade with the U.S.S.R., and from liberals who discounted Soviet hostile talk as propaganda for home consumption and who believed that overtures on our part would change the basic attitude of the Soviets so that they would be more compatible. Accordingly we recognized the U.S.S.R. in the fall of 1933. Between that time and the start of World War II our relations with the Soviets were not extensive, but our act of recognition did not materially alter basic conflicts. The Soviet attitude toward us did not change. Trade with her did not increase. Many Americans who were sent to Moscow to represent the United States were disillusioned and returned with no faith in the possibility of improved relations. During this period the U.S.S.R. was acutely aware of the menace of Germany. In 1939 while ostensibly negotiating for an alliance with England and France she was simultaneously concluding a non-aggression pact with Germany. When the latter was accomplished Germany felt free to initiate the Second World War. Thus the U.S.S.R. saw the major capitalist countries

divided into two hostile camps engaged in a death struggle with each other. At this point we should recall Stalin's statement quoted above regarding the Soviet's greatest ally, "strife and war among the capitalist countries." Soviet duplicity in concluding this alliance with the Nazis and thus leaving Germany free to perpetrate World War II left a feeling of disgust among Americans, and is a constant reminder today of the capabilities of Soviet diplomats.

With the invasion of Russia by Germany, beginning on 22 June, 1941, and the subsequent entry of the United States into the war in December of the same year came the supreme opportunity for a permanent change in the basic relations between the U.S.S.R. and the United States. Passing together through periods of great danger while fighting side by side in a death struggle against a common foe is one of the greatest incentives for the establishment of a traditional and lasting friendship between countries. The United States sought to make the most of this great opportunity. As Russia exhibited such unexpected power and resilience after initial defeats this became all the more important because it became increasingly apparent that our relations with her in the post-war world would be of major importance. Accordingly, at the instigation of President Roosevelt and other liberal minded government officials there was inaugurated on the part of the United States government a policy of excessive demonstrations of good will and confidence towards the Soviet government. Most of those who had had close dealings with the Russians were dubious of such a policy, since experience had convinced them that the Soviet character was so different from ours that we could not expect a favorable response to such overtures on our part. Appropriate advice and warnings were given by many of these so qualified but the exigency of war-time overcame these objections. For the next three years the

policy of seeking Russian friendship by extravagant demonstrations of good will and confidence was pursued with the utmost vigor, even at the sacrifice of our own interests at times. Some examples of our efforts are of interest here. We poured into Russia billions of dollars of Lend-Lease equipment without the customary requirements that the Russians justify their need for the quantity requested and in spite of their unwillingness to let us see how the material was being used. The citizens of the United States voluntarily contributed great quantities of wearing apparel and money for Russian War Relief. For neither Lend-Lease material nor voluntary contributions did the Russians give what we felt to be proper recognition in the press or otherwise. We permitted a great many Russians to visit our industrial plants engaged in the production of war material, even at the risk of violating many aspects of national security. While delivering goods to the Russians under the terms of Lend-Lease we permitted them to sell in this country for cash. We agreed to Russia's acquisition of the former Japanese territory of the Kuriles and the southern part of Sakhalin Island. We agreed that certain Balkan countries be included in Russia's sphere of influence in spite of the fact that such action jeopardized seriously the provisions of the Atlantic Charter. Since the cessation of hostilities we have not only met our wartime promises to Russia but we have exhibited extreme patience and tolerance in regard to her excessive demands and her successful efforts to date to prevent the stabilization of European affairs and the expeditious formulation of peace treaties. One prominent and qualified lecturer has made the following statement:

"I know of no instance in world history in which any people and government have ever gone to such lengths to demonstrate their friendliness and their desire for good neighborly relations with another country as this government went to in its relations with Russia in the years

from 1942 to 1945."

What has been the Russian reaction to these repeated exhibitions of generosity on our part? In answering this question I record the following, which represents my best evaluation of a great mass of conflicting information. Our efforts to transform our relations with the Soviets into a pattern of cordiality, good will and confidence by the execution of the above outlined policy have failed. Instead of expressing gratitude for materials furnished them the Russians have complained because they were not given more. After each concession on our part they have asked for more. We find the Soviets making a great effort to increase their military strength, the current armament budget being approximately one third more than ours in appropriations alone, and discounting the added purchasing power of such appropriations in Russia. The Soviets have provided grounds for distrust by keeping United States military observers from the fighting fronts during wartime; by sending to us and other allies diplomats who refuse to confide to anyone the most elementary information; by imposing severe restrictions upon news correspondents and other foreign travelers in Russia; by depreciating our efforts in the war, even to the point of claiming that they delivered the knockout blow to Japan; by promoting on Russian soil or through the Comintern partisan conspiracies against the governments of a few of the United Nations; by exerting pressure in Iran and Turkey; by removing the industrial machinery from Manchuria; by employing the most arbitrary and obstinate obstructionist tactics at international conferences and in the settlement of the Korean problem.

We have then an earnest desire for true friendship with the Soviet government and people but their tactics have in-

duced in us disillusionment and distrust. We feel that the Russians are constantly using subterfuge and excessive demands in order to improve their own strategic position at the expense of the democracies.

What is the Russian attitude toward us? The traditional sense of mental isolation from the rest of the world was only augmented in the revolution of 1917. This latter fact was stated recently by Brooks Atkinson of the New York Times as follows:

"It seems to me that the most conspicuous and also the most irritating abnormality in Soviet leadership is group paranoia. The leaders imagine that every man's hand is against them; they imagine that they are surrounded. In view of the size, strength, courage and inexhaustible resources of the Soviet Union, this phobia about being trapped and cramped would be hilarious, if it were not so troublesome to foreigners who want to find some way of getting on with the Soviet Union."

It has been demonstrated repeatedly that one of the precepts of Soviet ideology is that the capitalist world is overwhelmingly hostile to Russian Communism.

Therefore, we have, in addition to a conflict of material interests, a major obstacle in the form of mutual distrust between the leading exponents of the communist and democratic ideologies. This latter barrier must be largely eliminated before we can make substantial progress in the improvement of basic relationships.

Now let us see how these conflicts have been brought to the front of the international stage where they are now playing a major role in the development of United States foreign policy, and consequently exercising a great influence upon the entire field of international relations.

As I have pointed out above, the United States has sought throughout its history to isolate itself from the affairs of Europe. In times of peace we have not made a major effort to determine the destiny of those turbulent people. However,

even in the early periods of primitive means of communication and transportation the pressure of events rather than our idealistic desires has dictated our choice between war and peace in times of world wide conflicts. During the last two hundred years there have been five world wars. We have participated in all five. As colonists we fought on the side of England against France in the French and Indian Wars of 1756-1767; the American Revolution was a part of a world war; in the Napoleonic Wars we showed our versatility by fighting on both sides; then came World Wars I and II. In each case, except the last, we have withdrawn into our domestic shell after the cessation of hostilities and there concentrated upon our internal affairs while the European nations promoted another war. Prior to the period after World War I the pursuance of this policy enabled us to devote so much time and effort to industrial development that we have been able to transform a great expanse of undeveloped territory, populated by only scattered aboriginal tribes, into the strongest nation on earth. The foreign wars in which we engaged had no seriously debilitating effect upon us. As a matter of fact we generally emerged in a relatively stronger position among the world powers, and with increased prestige.

In future wars of great magnitude in which we are involved such a sequel is not definitely assured. In World War II we experienced the first serious drain upon our natural resources. While our population loss was not great we were approaching the limiting capacity of our manpower. The nature of weapons in use and under development gave us a preview of possible widespread destruction of our own population and industry. Anticipating the nature of a future world war, and convinced that our participation in such a war is inevitable, we have determined accordingly to play an active part in any effort to prevent such a war. As a result of our new

international outlook, which in turn has received a great impetus from Russia's post-war maneuvers, it appears to me that new trends in our foreign policy have taken five definite paths all leading to the general objective of world peace, and to the specific objective of a more positive guarantee of our own national security. These five paths will now be discussed in turn.

1. WE HAVE REASSERTED A VITAL INTEREST IN ALL PARTS OF EUROPE AND THE NEAR EAST.

The United States has apparently come to the definite decision that she must enter and remain in the affairs of Europe to the same extent as any of the European powers themselves. Aside from the Western Hemisphere the European continent is the center of western civilization and as such has contained the most powerful nations of the Old World. While many wars have been fought over the weaker nations of the remainder of the world, particularly Asia, the issues involved in most modern wars of great magnitude have normally been decided on the battle-fields of Europe or in waters immediately adjacent to that continent. Europe and the Middle East have frequently been the center of maneuvers for the balance of power among the great nations of the world and from such struggles have stemmed the world wars into which inevitably we have been drawn.

Our present policy, as announced by Secretary of State Byrnes at Stuttgart, Germany, reiterated at Paris on 3 October, 1946, and later repeated in many forms, by action as well as words, definitely commits the United States to an active intervention in the affairs of Europe. This includes not only the drafting of the peace treaties but subsequent participation to the amount necessary to determine a favorable destiny for European nations. In this commitment we have not gone simply halfway. The spectre of Russia casting

her shadow over the whole of Europe, which now except for England consists of relatively weak nations, is keeping fresh in our minds the similar tactics of Germany and the abyss into we were drawn because of our lack of sufficiently early interest in her aggressive expansion.

Our position was well defined by Mr. Byrnes in his speech at Paris on 3 October last as follows:

"The people of the United States have discovered that, when a European war starts, our own peace and security inevitably become involved before the finish. They have concluded that if they must help finish every European war, it would be better for them to do their part to prevent the starting of a European war."

Our expression of policy has not been confined to verbal pronouncements alone. We have given no indication that we intend to withdraw our occupation forces until European conditions definitely are much more stabilized. We are maintaining a strong naval force in European waters, and we have not hesitated to dispatch it to the troubled areas of the Mediterranean when we felt that its presence there might be effective.

Our efforts in war have been a major factor in bringing victory to ourselves and our allies. Perhaps our efforts in peace will have a proportionate weight in the prevention of war, or in establishing such a balance of power as to insure victory should another world war come.

2. WE ARE USING EVERY PROPER DIPLOMATIC PRESSURE NOW AVAILABLE IN ORDER TO CHECK AN EXPANSION OF RUSSIAN IMPERIALISM OUTSIDE HER RECOGNIZED SPHERE OF INFLUENCE.

While ostensibly providing for her security Russia has sought an increasingly great expansion of her ideology among those neighbors on her western and southern frontiers, particularly in the Balkans. As in the past she has been unable to influence great masses of people but she is establishing in her satellite nations a form of government similar to her

own whereby the political leaders in power and only a small percentage of the population are members of the communist party. But the strong organization of such a government, and its control of the armed forces gives it dictatorial powers over the entire country which is then brought into the Russian orbit. The cases of Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Roumania, and Czechoslovakia are typical examples. If permitted, Russia would undoubtedly continue this process until all nations of the Middle East and Europe, except England, formed a political and industrial entity under her political domination. This would give her an additional 200,000,000 people and industrial establishments which have been able to support the devastating wars of the past. It would give her the northern shore of the Mediterranean and put her in a strategic position for the control of the Suez Canal and the Straits of Gibraltar. In the face of such a coalition of powers Britain would be impotent in Europe, North Africa, and possibly Asia. The United States would then have arrived at that position which we so feared when German power was at its peak, and which the late President Roosevelt described as an island of democracy surrounded by a sea of dictatorships. Obviously such a condition must not be allowed to obtain; and the best, easiest, and most logical prevention is to oppose any initial expansion of Russian power so that it will have no opportunity to become greater progressively as did that of Nazi Germany during her period of virtually unopposed expansion from the time that she renounced the Treaty of Versailles.

What diplomatic means can we use to prevent such expansion which inevitably would eliminate democracy or the beginnings of democracy in the areas under consideration? In the first place we are in the process of drafting peace treaties as a result of World War II. We are thus perhaps fortunate

in that this gives us an opportunity to have present at the conference table practically all the nations of Europe at this time when the future of that continent is being determined. Fortunately for us the interests of the great majority of the western European powers coincide with our own. We are thus able to bring the maximum amount of concerted pressure to bear against unjustified Russian expansion. It appears to me to be vitally necessary that we take maximum advantage of this opportunity in order to avoid the necessity of bilateral solutions of conflicts between ourselves and Russia later.

In our efforts to win and retain the friendship of the nations outside the Russian orbit we should be unafraid to pit our democracy against the communism of the Russians. It is a generally accepted fact that Russian ideology as such is not an unbreakable cement even among the Soviet States. For instance when the Germans invaded Russia in 1941 the Ukrainians more or less welcomed the Germans, as they were dissatisfied with the Soviet government. It was only after the administration of the Ukrainians had been transferred from the German army to the bestial Nazi civil government that they rebelled against German rule and assisted in the expulsion of the invader.

In these diplomatic maneuvers for the good will of the small nations of Europe we have an initial advantage over Russia. The American way of life has built among those countries a faith in our political and economic structure. Our democracy which began as a great experiment has survived all crises which have faced it, and in addition has given our citizens a freedom and a standard of living unknown in any other country. However the intangible factor of faith alone is not sufficient to maintain unyielding loyalty of other nations in times of great international stress, either war or

peace. Regardless of our stature and the high regard in which the small nations of Europe and Asia hold the United States it must be remembered that the existence of these small nations in the final analysis depends upon economic succor from large and powerful nations and from the positive security which these latter can offer. We must therefore meet Russian advances with a guarantee of economic life and progress as well as a guarantee against military aggression. This latter must not be restricted to the subsequent freeing of such nations after they have been occupied, but must be of such nature as to preclude their being overrun initially, and ravished. During World War II we witnessed many instances of small nations thoroughly in sympathy with the Allied cause who were forced to join the Axis powers to avoid being ruthlessly crushed by them because we were in no position to prevent such action if the nation concerned offered resistance.

The precarious position in which a small nation is placed when asked to pursue a policy in concert with other nations which jeopardizes her economic and national security was very clearly expressed before the Plenary Assembly of the League of Nations, by Mr. Rias of Uruguay on September 26, 1921, when, in the discussion of the practicability of small nations participating in economic sanctions against larger nations, he stated:

"My country is also one of those which is the neighbor of nations far more powerful and consequently it is inevitably bound to them from an economic point of view while enjoying cordial and friendly relation in the political and moral fields.

Uruguay is situated in a corner of South America, hemmed in between the Argentine Republic and Brazil. It is separated from the former by a narrow river, and it has an almost open frontier of 500 kilometers contiguous to the latter; and it would be unable to carry out its duties as a member of the League of Nations, and maintain a blockade against either the Argentine or against Brazil should either of these countries fail in their international duties."

The contention of Uruguay was borne out in several in-

stances when sanctions were sought against Italy in her conquest of Ethiopia. Those countries which considered that their material interests would be jeopardized by the application of sanctions refused to apply them. Earlier when sanctions against Japan were discussed because of her invasion of Manchuria, many of the small nations of Europe were anxious that such measures be taken. In this case they had little direct contact with Japan so that their economic position would not be affected adversely. On the other hand if sanctions were applied, a precedent would be established and the smaller countries would feel that their security was definitely more assured by a greater number of powerful nations acting in concert. Therefore we must not lose sight of the fact that small nations whose security is threatened will choose the most promising expedient of the moment rather than temporarily undergo great hardships with only the promise of a possibility of greater advantages in the long run. Apparently many of the Russian diplomatic maneuvers are based upon a recognition of this principle.

Individually the small nations of Europe would not in most cases be a decisive factor in a world conflict, but collectively they represent a tremendous asset in man-power and industrial capacity to the belligerent with whom they are allied. In addition, many of them occupy strategic positions for military operations. For example the route through the Balkans and the Near-East leads through comparatively warm climates to the most highly industrialized and agriculturally developed part of Russia. It would be far easier to traverse those routes if they pass through friendly instead of hostile countries whose defenses had been strengthened by Russia in the years of peace. Another major factor in our calculations towards maintaining the good will of these countries is the nature of present and future weapons of war.

In our operations against Japan in the Pacific we were able by our overwhelming force and technique to effect landings upon any part of Japanese territory regardless of its state of defense. With the possibility of the atomic bomb and effective guided missiles in Russian hands the whole character of amphibious landings against well defended enemy territory is changed. Large concentrations of shipping and troops off a limited beach-head are so highly vulnerable to atomic bomb attack that it may prove entirely infeasible to effect amphibious landings as we have known them in the past war. To me it appears imperative that in time of peace we should make definite provisions for the establishment of such beach-heads in countries on the route to the heart of Russia, so that troops and supplies can be funneled through them from a variety of positions by air or sea with the minimum amount of concentration within any one area off the coasts or harbors.

There is not an area outside the iron curtain where our influence should not be exerted to the extent necessary to insure at the very least neutrality, but preferably cobelligerency, in case of war against Russia. All areas are important in this respect but a few of the most important ones will be discussed here in more detail as typical of the issues at stake.

It is probable that Turkish friendship is one of the most important of all the countries under consideration. This is because of her control of the Dardenelles and her strategic location in relation to the Near East and the Suez Canal. In Turkey the Anglo-Saxons have a wide field of opportunity. Things have not gone smoothly there for the Russians whose demands upon Turkey have met with a strong resistance which is likely to be changed only should Britain and America demonstrate extreme weakness. Turkish opinion is almost un-

animously pro-Anglo-Saxon. Knowing that she has British and American backing she has demonstrated her determination to withstand Russian pressure in spite of vast Russian military preparation in the Black Sea area. With this vitally important lever in the Near East we should be especially alert to detect and foil any attempt on the part of Russia to undermine the Byrnes-Bevin Middle East policy which to date has been to back Turkey in her resistance to Russian demands.

Austria is another country that must be saved from Russian domination. Here again we have a golden opportunity to capitalize upon the high regard in which we were held by those peoples. To date however we apparently have failed. There are few cases in modern history where military occupation has so completely demoralized the people. Most Austrians are now reduced to apathetic anti-foreignism. Despite the very poor behaviour of the Russian troops in Austria, and despite ruthless Russian requisitioning of public and private properties, there is a danger that Austria will be invited lock, stock and barrel into the Soviet economic and social system and that this invitation will be accepted in order to obtain an immediate, although possible temporary, amelioration of the hunger and cold now prevailing.

The importance of retaining France within the democratic orbit cannot be overestimated. We have recently witnessed the great handicap which must be overcome when the gateway through France to the heart of Europe is closed. We must even prevent our recent bitter enemy, Germany, from entering wholly into the Russian orbit. A unified Germany with her technical and industrial ability under Russian domination would be a serious blow to our diplomatic efforts in Europe, as well as to any future military operations against Russia.

We could go on taking up each of the countries separately and pointing out the great assets of their friendship for us,

but this subject can be covered generally by the statement that the greater the number of nations under influence of the Anglo-Saxon philosophy, the greater the diplomatic resistance we will be able to offer to Russian expansion. The immense prestige earned by the Anglo-Saxon armies in the recent war must not be frittered away recklessly. Such a procedure would indeed be a calamity.

3. WE ARE ATTEMPTING TO PREVENT EUROPE FROM BEING DIVIDED INTO TWO IRRECONCILABLE CAMPS SEPARATED BY AN IRON CURTAIN.

It may appear anomalous for the United States to resist Russian expansion by all diplomatic means available, as outlined above, and at the same time to attempt to prevent the division of Europe into two diplomatically hostile camps. However in spite of the firmness of our present foreign policy, we are attempting to accomplish this latter aim. At this time progress is admittedly slow and it will probably be some time before any advance is perceptible. There are many ways however in which the foundation for future progress can be laid. One of these is by sincere participation in the activities of the United Nations without actually sacrificing any of our national security. Exhibiting the utmost patience in meeting the obstructionist tactics of Russia and her satellites, and at the same time standing firm at the point beyond which we deem it advisable to go, we have made it plain that we much prefer the method of peaceful settlement of international differences. In the final analysis the iron curtain has been established by Russia herself, and by conciliation where advisable, but firmness where necessary, we may convince her in time that the curtain itself is merely a barrier to international goodwill which at the same time offers no security to herself. Furthermore, if at this time when international tension is at a relatively high pitch,

we are able to weather the storm instead of using military means to settle our differences with Russia at a time when we are superior, and if by diplomatic means we are able to contain Russia for an extended period of time, she may become convinced eventually that our democracy, which she calls capitalist imperialism, is no offensive threat to her security. By constant assaults upon the barrier which she has established we might succeed eventually in the exchange of sufficient cultural, religious, educational, and industrial information as to make headway in the elimination of her self-enforced isolation.

While the procedure outlined above will require extreme patience as well as alertness on our part it is believed that it is the only alternative to incessant diplomatic warfare. Admittedly such a policy will tax our ingenuity and patience to the utmost.

4. WE HAVE GIVEN SUBSTANCE TO OUR TRADITIONAL INTEREST IN THE WESTERN PACIFIC AND FAR EAST BY A MORE POSITIVE DIPLOMATIC, MILITARY AND NAVAL POLICY.

From the time when we extended our frontier to the Pacific coast we have had an increasing interest in the Far East. After our acquisition of the Philippines and Guam our commitments in the Western Pacific reached great proportions but our ability to meet them under all circumstances did not increase correspondingly, as our initial losses in the recent war so amply demonstrated.

The menace of Japan prior to World War II has now been replaced by the aggressive maneuvers of Russia in the same theater. However, we have met those maneuvers with measures so prompt and so positive that, except in Korea, Russian reaction has not been as violent as was at first expected.

It is possible that in time China and India will become great nations. However, greatness today depends to a great

extent upon the possession of an independent industrial system which can be turned to the purposes of war. Obviously a considerable time lag will occur before either China or India will develop such a system. In the meantime the United States is executing its own program of security independent of any security afforded by the machinery of the United Nations.

For the present the politics of bases is more important in the Far East than the politics of people. Modern and prospective weapons of war make it imperative that we have distant bases from which offensives can be launched if we are to minimize the results of attacks against our continental shores. The American program includes a trusteeship over the formerly Japanese mandated islands and over some purely Japanese territory such as Okinawa. We propose to designate the security areas ourselves, and that such areas be exempt from the trusteeship provisions. The bases would be made over to us by the United Nations, and we would undertake to use them to defend world security as well as American security but no control or inspection would be exercised by the United Nations.

The occupation and administration of Japan have been kept almost entirely in American hands. Russian participation and influence have been kept to the minimum. This policy should result not only in depriving Russia of Japan as a satellite but may result eventually in making Japan an ally of the United States.

The Korean situation is far from satisfactory but apparently it was only by our prompt action at the end of the war against Japan that we prevented Russia from occupying the entire country. Information indicates that we are determined to restore independence to Korea as soon as it can be done with the assurance that Russian influence will not be dominant.

With the ascendancy of Russia and the eclipse of Japan we have sought the stabilization and democratization of China. In accomplishing these we seek to end the Kuomintang's inefficiency, corruption, and monopoly of power. At the same time we are attempting to insure that the representatives of any coalition government will favor the Kuomintang as a whole and will also safeguard American sponsored military and economic interests as opposed to the pro-Russian interests. To date Russia has not exhibited the interest in China which we originally expected. The United States set out to block any Russian attempt to dominate China through the Chinese Communists but the Soviets have not offered the competition we expected. Perhaps if Russian policy in China does not change we may be able to strengthen our position in the Far East more than we had originally hoped.

5. FOR THE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF THE ABOVE LISTED GOALS WE HAVE ALLIED OURSELVES WITH THE BRITISH PEOPLE, WHOSE INTERESTS IN THESE MATTERS ARE PARALLEL WITH OUR OWN.

While we have had many differences with the British Empire since the war of 1812 they have all been settled by peaceful means and our two peoples have consistently grown closer together. Our common heritage has developed into common ideals and has led to the present close relationship which forms the democratic opposition to the spread of the communist ideology and influence into what we consider the vital areas of the world. Having fought side by side to victory in two world wars of this century the United States and the British Empire find themselves faced with another antagonist whose potential power and aggression represent a grave threat to our way of life. Aside from the fact that British political philosophy so nearly parallels our own and therefore forms a strong bond between our countries, the

British Empire provides by far the greatest outside material asset in any struggle in which we might become involved with Russia. The natural resources of the British Commonwealth of Nations augment our own to provide a considerable superiority if properly integrated. By our combined domination of most of the world's points of narrow entrances and exits to the vital sea areas, by our control of the greater part of the sea-borne commerce and sea routes of the world, and by having in our combined navies a means of exercising that control, there is presented to the aggressor a hurdle which none in the past has been able to clear.

There are some who look with misgivings upon such close ties with a country that admittedly in the past has sometimes outmaneuvered us in the diplomatic field. However, regardless of the desires for an ideal solution to all the world's problems, history has demonstrated repeatedly the advisability of diplomatic expediency. There are few who will deny that the Russian threat is infinitely worse than any diplomatic triumph which we would permit Great Britain. British and American mutual support during the last two wars has demonstrated a formidable combination.

I have heard the opinion expressed by more than one responsible authority whose source of information was far more reliable than the daily press, that the recent Russian pressure in the Middle East was designed primarily to inflict a serious wound upon the British Empire by depriving her of the oil reserves in that area and by gaining a position from which the sword of Damocles could be kept dangling over the Suez Canal and the Eastern Mediterranean. Our common resistance to this pressure is an example of the cooperation which is necessary and which may be expected in the future.

The above discussion indicates the diplomatic course we have set, a course determined largely by the U.S.S.R. Regardless of the extent to which it may vary with tradition it is based upon a seasoned analysis of world events today as well as their prognosticated trend in the future. As long as we are convinced that this policy is sound we must adhere to it at all costs and we must insure that we have available the necessary means to execute that policy whether such means be diplomatic or military.

It appears appropriate that we should here investigate briefly the means by which the armed forces can give substance to this policy during times of peace, for the army and navy are instruments of foreign policy in peace as well as in war. Since the close of World War II the army and navy have been in a position not only to maintain, but to augment the tremendous prestige which America has won on the sea, in the air and on the land. To many of the conquered peoples it was their first opportunity to witness the human product of the democratic ideology. By a demonstration of those attributes which have made our country the epitome of freedom and greatness we have had the opportunity to use the most persuasive instrument which could be desired. From information available we have not used that instrument to its best advantage. The demonstration of our troops overseas in protest against what they considered to be slow demobilization, together with black market operations and a general breakdown in discipline have lowered rather than raised our prestige in the eyes of those whose good will we so urgently require. The fact that performance of the Russian occupation forces has in some instances been less commendatory does not justify our shortcomings in this respect.

From the earliest days of our history as a sovereign nation the navy has exerted a great influence upon the

respect with which other nations regard our country. It was while flying aboard a man-of-war that our national ensign received its first salute from a foreign power. It can be said with pride that by and large in the showing of our flag abroad and in our contacts with foreign nations the navy has acquitted itself with distinction. Our present friction with Russia makes it imperative that our performance of duty in this respect be maintained at its traditionally high standard. The international implications of misconduct on the part of even a single individual should be thoroughly impressed on each officer and man who might be brought in contact with foreign peoples. It is not enough that we demonstrate our material might and martial ability to those nations whose collective friendship we seek. Our personal conduct in their presence must be above reproach in order not to appear overbearing, and in order not to offend the delicate sensibilities of any small nation to whom the hand of fortune has not been so generous.

While the personal factor of individual and collective conduct and discipline as outlined above is highly important as an effective propaganda agent, the actual strength of the military and naval forces has a more positive effect. A foreign policy devoid of the armed force to give it substance is impotent. Among our most glaring mistakes in the diplomatic field in the past has been our failure to recognize this fact. Thereby we have repeatedly made foreign commitments beyond our capacity to meet should they be challenged. Accordingly I will include here a short discussion of the vital necessity of our maintaining a military and naval establishment capable of meeting our commitments in the international field. Such maintenance is particularly pertinent at this time because of the aggressive attitude of Russia, and because of the premature faith some idealists

may place in international organizations such as the United Nations.

In the years immediately following World War I we discarded the lessons of that conflict and weakened ourselves by a military and naval policy which left us so unprepared that our very existence as a sovereign nation was later dangerously threatened by smaller nations who had spent those same years building up, and well known to us, vast military machines repeatedly demonstrated for but the single purpose of conquest by force. Those who at the time realized the seriousness of that danger period are filled with apprehension at the very thought that we might again revert to a similar policy of military and naval complacency.

Study of history must lead us inevitably to the conclusion that the basic cause of war is the lack of universal brotherhood and good will. The experiences of our own life time must just as inevitably lead us to the conclusion that this international brotherhood is as lacking today as at any time in the past, and that it is not present on our visible horizon. Its absence on the recorded pages of history, our recent dilemma caused by our blinded hopes that perhaps it had at last appeared, and the unbounded proportions to which its diametrically opposite has grown, logically may lead us to the supposition that it is not present on our projected horizon.

The pages of history are replete with examples of leaders lustful of power and possessing the attributes of leadership (not always similar) necessary to produce a sufficient following for the partial realization of dreams of conquest, fulfilled at the expense of peaceful and militarily unprepared peoples.

It must be apparent to the great majority of thinking people that mankind has not progressed universally beyond

the period of unprovoked aggression. To assume that it has would be to disregard completely the examples of history as exemplified by Genghis Khan, Alexander the Great, Caesar, Napoleon, Kaiser Wilhelm II, Hitler, Mussolini, and the war lords of Japan.

Fortunately for us and the world the potentially most powerful combination of nations, i.e. the United States, Great Britain, and those nations now loyal to them, are the least aggressive in a military sense except when aroused to the defense of their cherished possessions and freedom. That the two leaders of this combination have no further territorial ambitions to be realized by the method of deliberate and unjustified attacks upon weaker nations has been proved in recent history when, at the close of wars and during periods of peace, they have not taken undue advantage of their unquestioned ability to acquire such additional territory by force of arms. Unless actually permitted to do so by these pacific nations whose non-aggression policy is a matter of record, it is not possible for the aggressor nations, collectively or singly, to attain sufficient relative military strength to challenge with any hope of success, the ability of the pacific nations to prevent international piracy. Note that I said relative military strength. In the final analysis it is this relativity which is the deciding factor. The height to which a nation has attained in military power does not matter, for it is at a tremendous disadvantage when pitted against another nation that is actually stronger at the moment, regardless of potential power. This is but one means of application of the well established military and naval principle of concentration of superior power at the decisive point. I do not believe that this means that we must keep ourselves on a continual war footing, and to so burden ourselves with

the weight of armaments that it would be economically ruinous. We entered World War I absolutely unprepared against opponents backed by huge well equipped armies with almost three years of actual experience. We entered World War II against a much more powerful combination of enemies. Again we were in about the same state of relative unpreparedness. In both of the above cases we were victorious, but only so because of our tremendous efforts exerted under the pressure of the prepared enemy and because of our valuable allies who absorbed many of the initial thrusts while we prepared ourselves.

At the outbreak of World War II the military superiority which the axis powers had attained for the moment was probably near the optimum.* In spite of this we were victorious, but only after serious initial blows to our prestige, and only at a great sacrifice of money and property.

Fortunately, the number of nations whose national policy is founded upon the preparation for, and the execution of, conquest by force is small at any one time when compared to the number opposed to such a policy. The natural crystallization of world opinion against tyranny, and the natural amalgamation of peace loving nations when one of them is ruthlessly attacked, are in themselves powerful deterrents to unprovoked aggression. Considering the strength which these two phenomena have demonstrated themselves capable ultimately of generating, it would not appear necessary for us to be always ready for immediately taking the field in full force. Our failure in the past to be able to do this at any time has not been our greatest weakness. It is imperative, however, that we be equipped with the ability to recognize and appreciate aggressive tendencies among others and the willingness to take effective and timely counter-measures. Possessing these qualities,

which are vital, it should be sufficient for us to be comparatively well prepared to the extent that we can without delay and when necessary, accelerate our preparedness and even defensive combinations as dictated by circumstances.

In retrospect we can now see that our policy of the recent past was cast in an imperfect mold, shaped by too high an evaluation of international integrity. Pursuance of this policy for a period of some twenty years so dulled our acuity that we became impervious to the stark realism of the international perfidy actually prevailing. Undoubtedly the utopian goal is the functioning of some international organization to which all nations will subscribe to the extent necessary to endow it with the ability to settle international disputes without resort to war. However, the development of such an organization is one of slow evolution, and therefore responsibilities should be transferred to it only after it has demonstrated a reasonable ability to accept them.

A discussion of foreign policy, which it is reiterated, includes military and naval policy, would not be complete without emphasizing the great need for consistency regardless of the political party which is in power.

The tolerance of an active opposition party is one of the distinguishing features of our democratic form of government. In our elections held at stipulated intervals the opportunity is presented for a nation-wide discussion of the policies of the administration, and of those advocated by the opposition. These naturally differ in many respects, and the people have the opportunity to choose between them. In domestic matters any reasonable major change in policy can eventually be absorbed internally without unduly disturbing our relations with other countries. A change in any

fundamental aspect of our foreign policy, however, whether it is motivated by inconsistency in the administration itself, or by the election of a President from another party, is more serious because of the international repercussions which might ensue. When we enunciate and commit ourselves to a line of action in the international field any change from the basic policy should be made only after the most mature deliberation. Frequent deviations from an announced policy results in a loss of prestige to our own position, and often means the adoption of a more unfavorable attitude by other nations, if not a reorientation of their own policy. This consistency does not mean inflexibility but rather an assurance that the fundamental policy will continue to govern, modified only as dictated by the national welfare, and not by internal political considerations.

During World War II and since the termination of hostilities there has been increasing evidence that a more consistent American foreign policy will be followed regardless of which political party is in power. During the war such a consistency was necessary because of the magnitude of the task before us and the necessity for close cooperation among the Allies. Since the war the threat of Soviet expansion and influence has kept alive a sense of insecurity and consequently has acted as a catalyst in the crystallization of a bipartisan foreign policy. Considering the power and prestige of the United States I can think of no greater influence in the stabilization of world affairs than the knowledge among the potential aggressors that an American foreign policy dedicated to active and unyielding opposition to conquest by force is not subject to change when a new party comes to power.

Such consistency is not easy, despite the fact that post-war Soviet tactics have generated more interest in

foreign affairs among our population as a whole than any recent peace time occurrence. Present public interest in our foreign policy, and the cooperation of the opposition party as evidenced by Senator Vandenburg's active participation in the formulation of our present policy, are examples of two obstacles which have been overcome in the struggle for consistency. The battle has not yet been won, however. The recent speech by Mr. Wallace, and his earlier letter to the President, both of which condemned the announced policy of "firmness but patience" in our dealings with the U.S.S.R., undoubtedly leads other nations to the conclusion that there still remains the possibility that our foreign policy might be moderated somewhat. The belief in such a possibility is an incentive to the potential aggressor for further attempts at forceful expansion, and it instills doubt, if not fear, into those who rely upon consistency on our part in the formulation of their own foreign policy based upon the same precepts as ours.

In view of the influence which Mr. Wallace has over certain elements in this country, and in view of the fact that publication of his views probably adds to any hope the Soviets might have of our softening our policy toward them, it is considered necessary to indicate here some of the fallacies of Mr. Wallace's argument which has been presented to the public by his now famous speech in New York last September, and more ably presented in his letter to the President last July. His primary contention is that Soviet foreign policy is the expression of legitimate concern about security, based upon past experience of capitalist hostility. Mr. Wallace argues that this concern will only be strengthened by a policy of firmness on our part, but can be allayed by a sincere policy of assuring Soviet security.

Observation indicates that some of our top policy makers

in the State Department entered into the early negotiations with the Russians with this same point of view, but bitter experience over a long period has convinced these same officials that such a view ignores the motivating force of Soviet policy. That force is the Soviet interpretation of the aims of capitalism as being monopolistic and imperialistic, to the extent eventually of jeopardizing the Soviet system. Apparently the State Department officials have become convinced that this interpretation is so firmly ingrained in the Soviet mind that no action on our part, short of actually transforming the nature of our economy, will allay the resultant suspicion on the part of the Soviets. These officials feel that by adopting a policy of firmness Russian expansion may be retarded sufficiently so as to provide a prolonged period of peace, during which the democracies will have a chance to demonstrate that they have no aggressive aims towards the Soviet Union.

Mr. Wallace has proposed that we seek to reduce Russia's fears by a reduction in our armed forces and the giving of less attention to preparations for the forceful defense of our national security. Those who have had intimate dealings with the Russians feel that such a procedure would demonstrate a complete lack of appreciation of Russian psychology. Such action would, they feel, be interpreted by the Russians as confusion and weakness of a decadent capitalist democracy. In the pre-war dealings with the Axis powers we have witnessed the results of such a policy. While perhaps temporarily strengthening the moderates in the aggressor nations such a policy provides added material for extremist propaganda so that the net result is further aggressive maneuvers. Post-war interrogations have revealed that the Munich agreement was a betrayal of the anti-war German because of the extremist interpretation as a sign of profound weakness on

the part of England and France. Recent Soviet tactics can lead to no conclusion other than that her interpretation of such a policy on our part would be exactly the same. Those who have had a recent insight into the minds of those formulating Soviet foreign policy feel that adoption of the Wallace policy would augment the relative strength of the Molotov extremists over that of the Litvinov moderates.

The November, 1946, issue of the Atlantic Monthly sums up the Wallace argument very succinctly as follows:

"The support for the Wallace position within the government increases directly in proportion to the distance from concrete dealings with the Russians. Many people in the State Department who a year ago would have agreed with Wallace's position, today do not, but it should be remembered that many other government officials, like many men of good will throughout the country, have not had the same chastening experience."

The national elections held last November with the result that both the Senate and House have a Republican majority again presents this problem of continuity for solution at a most important time in the evolution of our foreign policy. It is greatly encouraging to recall that in most important questions of foreign policy the Republicans in Congress have given the Administration consistently strong support since the end of hostilities. The United Nations Charter, for example, was ratified in the Senate by a vote of 87 to 2, and the supplementary question of the United Nations Participation Act, giving the President unprecedented power to make American forces available to the Security Council to halt aggression, was overwhelmingly approved by the House of Representatives, and the Republican vote in the Senate was 23 to 6 in favor. This does not mean that there are not important differences between the Republican and Democratic positions. These concern primarily matters of international finance and economics. For example the \$3,750,000,000 British loan was opposed by a majority of

Republicans in both the Senate and the House. The same was true of the extension of the Hull reciprocal trade agreement program which some believe to be the key measure of our foreign economic policy. Republican control of Congress is not likely soon to reverse adopted policy in this respect because no other foreign loans approaching the magnitude of the one to the British are contemplated, and the present law authorizing the President to negotiate reciprocal trade agreements does not expire until June, 1948.

In the formulation of our post-war foreign policy as a whole, the activities of Senator Vandenburg, Senator Austin, and Senator Taft, and the strong approval and support of these activities by the Republican voters are examples of evidence of the bipartisan character of our present policy. Mr. Vandenburg interpreted the election as an "unmistakable endorsement of the united bipartisan foreign policy through which we are striving for national security and world peace." The apparent Republican role is therefore in striking contrast to that played by Henry Cabot Lodge when he became chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee after the mid-term elections of 1918. These should be items of great interest to foreign governments, particularly Russia because of the great part she unwittingly has played in bringing them to pass.

With a foreign policy based upon firmness towards the aggressor, and which has the endorsement of our two leading political parties, it appears that our international relations are upon a sound basis. We should never forget, however, that our idealistic nature makes us vulnerable to a display of pseudo good intentions on the part of a potential adversary. Failure to recognize this fact and act accordingly has been one of Russia's greatest post-war mistakes.

However, we must never forget this weakness on our part but must ever remain alert to the possibility of duplicity.

It is apparent then, that our post-war foreign policy has assumed a course considerably at variance with that of the past. Two major factors have dictated the choice of this course. The first was the war of conquest by force initiated by the combination of Axis Powers which derived its strength from a lack of cooperation among the democratic nations. The second, and presently more important, is the post-war maneuvers of Russia, which are so reminiscent of Axis tactics. After the defeat of our former enemies, which was so crushing that they offer no direct danger to our security for some time to come, we were not able to withdraw from the international scene with a feeling of security. Instead we have been kept on our toes by what we interpret as ulterior motives of one of the victors who emerged with a power and prestige so enhanced as to make her a major threat to our security if given free rein in her aggressive desires. To Russia we may attribute the final crystallization of our foreign policy in Europe and Asia at a time when its influence will be most effective in the stabilization of world affairs.

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