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NAVAL WAR COLLEGE

Newport, R. I.

THESIS

THE SOVIET LITERARY INTELLIGENTSIA: PATTERNS OF DISSENT

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The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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15 April 1971

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B.S., Bradley University, 1961

A Thesis submitted to the Faculty of
The School of Public and International Affairs of
The George Washington University
in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Science in International Affairs

30th September 1971

Thesis directed by
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Abstract of

THE SOVIET LITERARY INTELLIGENSIA: PATTERNS OF DISSENT

An examination of the nature of literary dissent within the Soviet Union since the death of Stalin and the regime's efforts to repress, control and use the dissent for its own ends. After the Revolution, the Soviet state created and mobilized institutions to fulfill its goals and increase its power. At the 20th Party Congress in 1956, Khrushchev initiated an anti-stalinist policy to strengthen his personal power. This began an era of "freezes" and "thaws" that alternately gave hope and despair to those intelligentsia looking for a relaxation of institutional controls. The literary elements then began distributing their works in the literary underground or publishing them in the West to circumvent the Soviet censorship policies. The government responded with trials and persecution of the outspoken elements, but has since been confronted with the award of the Nobel Prize for Literature to a dissident writer and the embarrassment of protest by some of the most distinguished members of the intelligentsia. The Czechoslovakian invasion was a warning to the intellectuals that little liberalization will be forthcoming. Despite this, the protest has flourished and the drive for the elimination of censorship and for greater individual freedoms will likely continue to exert pressure on regime policies, but dramatic changes in literary toleration should not be expected.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this thesis is to examine the nature of literary dissent within the Soviet Union since the death of Stalin and to contrast this with the efforts of the regime to repress, control or use the dissent for its own ends.

The denunciation of the excesses of the Stalin era by Khrushchev in 1956 at the 20th Party Congress began a chain of events that not only produced the wide ranging disaffection of today, but a questioning of the relevancy of ideology as well. The dissent ranges widely across the social spectrum of Russian life, of which the literary portion is only one aspect. Challenges have been levied against virtually all the institutional controls that regulate even the minor areas of Soviet society. The regime is confronted with demands for the end to religious persecution; the right of Jews to emigrate; struggles waged by various national groups within the U.S.S.R. against suppression of their rights; chafing against the censorship and ideological controls over literature, science and management; and a tremendous increase in underground literature and the smuggling of works west for publication.

To analyze the regime's response to the literary dissent, first, the relationship between literature and ideology is studied, followed by a discussion of the institutional bodies through which censorship is implemented. Second is an examination of the liberalization of

literature under Khrushchev and its uses in the power struggle within the collective leadership. Finally, an analysis is made of the development and increase in the dissent since the fall of Khrushchev and the attempts at control by the government.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE, IDEOLOGY, AND INSTITUTIONAL CONTROLS.

The Party and the intelligentsia share common aspirations socially and philosophically. That is, the aspirations are shared, but the techniques of achievement vary. The Party moves toward its ultimate goals through individual manipulation and collective effort carefully channeled by an institutional network. The Party's ideological pronouncements emphasize the continuation of world revolution and the total transformation of man.

The Soviet intellectual shares the Party's goals of social achievement, but looks toward its attainment by the liberal philosophy of individual effort. These roots go deep into the traditional Russian intelligentsia and literature and serve as the basis of stress between the regime and the intelligentsia's efforts to obtain a more liberal existence and a reduction of institutional controls over literature and the arts.¹

Although the intellectuals and the state may share the same higher goals, conflicts over means is inevitable. The ever-present concern of the state is with power. Inkeles states:

Traditional liberalism, because of its emphasis on the individual, his rights and needs, naturally tends to see first in totalitarianism its direct impact on the individual, in particular his subordination to state purposes. . . . Totalitarianism has given special and primary emphasis to the subordination of the traditional human associations, the organizations and institutions of which the individual is a member.²

Then under the totalitarianism, the individual may not be fully exploitable for the regime's purposes if all institutional controls are not centralized.

Intellectual awareness of these concepts is evident. Careful analysis of the available dissent literature published in the West and even the "samizdat".³ finds nothing anti-social or anti-patriotic. With few exceptions the focus is on liberalism and the main effort on prying loose the general institutional controls maintained over artful creativity. Beginning with the first "thaw" after Stalin's death, the Party carefully relaxed and then strengthened its grip over both literary subject matter, style and ideological interpretation.

The state then becomes all embracing; it is able to create and mobilize institutions not only to fulfill its goals, but to maintain its power. A strong current opposition to this monolith are the dissenting intellectuals. The intelligentsia is not an organization and perhaps contains only those intellectuals whose ideas and aspirations transcend their own narrow occupational specialties. Generally disunited and frequently working at cross purposes, they are a widely divergent group as to causes. Slonim sums up their aims as follows:

Russian writers simply aim at a separation between the state and art--like the separation between the state and the church which took place all over Europe in the nineteenth century. In the sense that all of them are anti-dogmatic and humanistic, they also are, openly or implicitly antitotalitarian. Such an attitude they claim is perfectly consistent with the acceptance of socialism, the belief in its superiority over capitalism in the long run, and the expectation of its final triumph on earth. The vision that we find again and again in the works of the liberals is a generous dream of justice and freedom. It corresponds to the secular traditions of Russian literature, its relentless search for truth, its profound idealism and its high moral and social aspirations.⁴

But this is perhaps an oversimplification for it expresses the idealistic dream rather than concrete experience. A major factor in the vision

expressed by Slonim is the great fear of re-emerging Stalinism. This is the major foe that unites the dissident intellectuals; this is what makes the protest viable for it directly mirrors the intellectual efforts to influence the continuing power struggle that has existed since the death of Stalin. Literature has been used effectively in the ambitious maneuvering of top party officials, thus the idealistic motives of the intelligentsia become both a tool to be used and a weapon to be feared.

Throughout the brief history of the U.S.S.R., the Party's institutional apparatus has been designed to influence and shape the thinking of the Russian people. This requires the mobilization of those resources, the mass communications media, Marxist-Leninist philosophy and the output of the intellectual community as the guiding force. The key organizational influence is the Party for it is responsible for guiding the course of events to the foreseeable end that it hopes to achieve. Therefore, institutional controls over those persuasive devices, are the key elements for success of the planned action. The party sets the goals and controls and activates the resources for achievement. This usually has a measure of agitation and propaganda necessary to insure the requisite support of the Party's efforts.⁵ Since the Revolution, the Party has maintained control over the literary output through a combined program of ideological interpretation and self-serving institutions.

LITERATURE SERVES THE PARTY

The period after the revolution before the inception of the first five year plan was a relaxed period of literary controls. Up to this point the regime had been content with the literature as it existed.

The introduction of the first five year plan in 1928 brought literature into the mold envisaged by Lenin: "Literature must become a part of the general proletarian cause, a "cogwheel" in a single great social-democratic mechanism, which is set in motion by the whole conscious avant-garde of the working class."

The first major organizational effort to affect literary thought control occurred with the establishment of RAPP (Russian Association of Proletarian Writers). This movement was an attempt to bring art and literature into full support of the five year plan. It was an attempt to bring revolutionary influences and military approaches to literature. Literature as literature was immaterial. Literature was only to be used in support of ideology. This brief period of revolutionary fervor lasted only until 1932, but was the first significant effort by the regime to employ literature as a major ideological tool.

The creation of the Union of Soviet Writers in 1932 ended the RAPP period, and created a single writers organization. This reorganization brought all literary affairs within the province of a single ministry for the regulation and promotion of the arts.

The establishment of the national writers organization also marked the beginning of social realism as the dominant ideological influence in Russian literature. Social realism in the Soviet sense is a difficult concept to grasp, for it is realism of a unique sort. One of the earliest interpretations was made by Zhdanov in 1934: "Soviet literature cannot be content with merely reflecting or truthfully portraying reality; it must be instrumental in the ideological remolding of the toiling people

in the spirit of socialism."⁸ This, however, may be a contradiction in terms, for social and realism may not be compatible. "Realism" is usually thought of in terms of an accurate portrayal of life or things as they exist; whereas the adjective "social" looks toward existence as it should be in the Party's eyes. The writer or artist is compelled to interpret the spread between Communist idealism, realism and the latest propaganda effort.

With varying levels of intensity, the concept of social realism has been the principle factor in Soviet literature from its inception to the present. During the war years, some of the restrictions were relaxed to accomodate some originality to further the war effort. But with the end of the great struggle and the start of the hostility toward the West, the hard line of Zhdanovism evolved in the summer of 1946. Heavy verbal attacks were directed at various Soviet writers—the most notable of whom were Zoshchenko and Akhmatova—for deviating from the tenents of social realism. The attacks were in the forms of decrees and resolutions from the Central Committee and from speeches by Zhdanov.⁹ In his essays Zhdanov stated:

The Soviet people expect from Soviet writers genuine ideological armanent, spiratural nourishment that will aid in fulfilling the plans for great socialist construction, for the restoration and further development of our country's national economy. . . . Bolsheviks value literature highly. They see clearly its great historical mission and role in strengthening the moral and political unity of the people. . . .¹⁰

The implication is clear that all literature was to serve party purposes.

The statements of Zhdanov characterize the most militant aspects of social realism. The emphasis is focused on the developing of a model

dedicated bolshevik into a national hero for the masses to emulate and idolize. This was the period of post-war recovery and national economic rebuilding in which literature served the Party to encourage greater efforts from the Russian people.

Social realism remains as the main philosophic basis for literature in the Soviet Union. The relaxation of police methods has changed the manipulative techniques used to effect ideological change and has allowed the liberals to press their claims and seek incremental changes during periods of relaxation of tight control over the arts.

BUREAUCRATIC CONTROL OF LITERATURE

To be published in the U.S.S.R., state approval is necessary. The following is a look at party and government organizations that guide, control and manipulate the writer's efforts in the Soviet Union and ultimately, his success or failure. The government maintains absolute control over the press and publishing and regards any unauthorized literary ventures as a threat to the state. Membership in the Union of Soviet Writers is required before permission may be obtained to participate in any literary activity. Under these conditions of control, the only readily available place that the aspiring writer or poet can turn to be published is the literary underground. In the United States and other western countries there are numerous magazines which offer the beginning writer a place to practice his skills. There are no publications of this nature in the Soviet Union. The "illegal" underground journals fulfill the function performed in the West by various small literary publications as well as by high school and college magazines,

of giving the aspiring writer the satisfaction of seeing his work in print.¹¹

The purpose of the Union of Soviet Writers as stated in its charter, is to be a forum of those writers "to participate through their creative work in the class struggle of the proletariat and in socialist construction" and whose goal is "the creation of artistic works worthy of the epoch of socialism".¹² Ideally, the Writers Union would be an organization that existed for the benefit of its members; that is, to encourage the production of great literature, serve as a writers' forum, and generally assist the well being of its membership. In actual fact, the Writers Union serves the Party in determining what literature is socially correct and functions to guide writers in producing works that are not alien or offending to the socialist society.

Power inside the Writers Union is concentrated in the Secretariat which administers the handling of policy questions and organizational problems within its membership. It supervises the various commissions established for concerns of literary affairs, controls, with the various editors, the functioning and policies of the literary journals, and in the final analysis, decides what will or will not be published and in what form. The organization acts as a buffer between the government and the writer and serves the Party in enforcing the censorship standards set forth by Glavlit, the government censorship agency.¹³

The bulk of the important publishing activities in the Soviet Union is centered in an organization known as the Union of State Publishing Houses. Both the publishing houses and the Union of Writers work according

to economic plans and are required to meet output norms of novels, plays and other literature. The publishing is directly supervised by the Communist Party Central Committee's Department of Propaganda and Agitation and by the censorship agency, Glavlit.¹⁴

For writings submitted for publication, the first step toward approval in the literary screening process rests with the Union of Soviet Writers. It is here that the product is molded to conform to the literary standards that are currently acceptable to the Party. Those works that are considered deviant at this point require modification or are rejected. Doubtful products are referred to the Central Committee for authorization if their literary merit warrants such a course, but this reportedly occurs infrequently. The editors of the various literary papers and journals are themselves held responsible for insuring that literary policies set by the Party are enforced, so they become directly responsible for publishing works that knowingly or unknowingly exceed the regime's standards. Finally, those drafts authorized by the Writers Union pass through Glavlit screening and are published.

Perhaps in the final analysis the censorship process begins with the writer himself. For he is the product of another carefully controlled Party institution--the Soviet education system. Before the finished work is submitted to the bureaucracy for publication, "the internal censor" has affected the product.¹⁵

In spite of the relaxation of police controls since the death of Stalin, the KGB (secret police) still exercise considerable control over all aspects of society to control social behavior and repress dissent.

After his defection to Great Britain in 1968, Kuznetsov revealed how deeply the KGB reaches into Soviet literature:

I do not know a single writer in Russia who has not had some experience with the KGB; this experience can be one of three different kinds. The first kind: you collaborate enthusiastically with the KGB and have every chance of prospering. The second: you acknowledge your duty to the KGB, but refuse to collaborate directly; in that case, you are deprived of a great deal, particularly travel abroad. In the third category, you brush aside all advances made by the KGB and enter into conflict with them; in that case, your works do not get published and you may even find yourself in a concentration camp.¹⁶

Thus, the domineering institutional controls established by the Party to ensure that literature meets the tenants of ideology serves to preserve its power. That some consider ideology to be no longer relevant within the U.S.S.R. is missing the point. Ideology may be viewed as irrelevant by the populace or as simply a dead shell by the intelligentsia, but it provides the legal framework and justification for formulation of all policy and for the existence of the ruling elite. If the Soviet leaders feel themselves to be on the ideological defensive, then they probably feel it essential to strengthen the institutional bureaucracy rather than weaken it.

Those intellectuals leading the drive for liberalization of institutions are possibly only the leading edge of an alienation that is far broader, deeper, but quieter. The censorship is viewed as an insidious evil that not only forces conformity and stifles creativity in the arts, but continues to frustrate the hopes for greater freedom that arose after Stalin's death. Though police controls over the years have been relaxed to a degree, the states literary policies have encouraged the growth of

underground literature and illegal publication in the West. Despite the frustration of the masses, there is little likelihood that greater literary freedom will develop under the present leadership for the institutions are the embodiment of power—the most sacred of the Party's possessions.

CHAPTER 3

DISSENT: FROM THE DEATH OF STALIN TO THE FALL OF KHRUSHCHEV

Until Stalin's death, dissent in any significant form simply did not occur in the Soviet Union. A great number of writers and intellectuals, along with revolutionaries, party and military functionaries disappeared or were imprisoned during the "Great Purge" of the thirties.¹ The first thaw occurred in the ensuing months after Malenkov was named party chairman. A few more liberal novels and plays appeared that were not as restrictive as previously, but the most notable literary work of this period was Ilya Ehrenburg's The Thaw, an attack on the pressures applied to writers under Stalin. This brief period lasted until May 1954 when anti-liberal articles began appearing in Pravda and the literary papers.²

Understandably, these were cautious beginnings. Soviet writers had been striving for years for more creativity to be tolerated, but the political atmosphere probably prevented a headlong rush to exploit this brief relaxation of control. It was not until the 20th Party Congress that the difficult past was really recognized as over and a certain measure of new creativity could emerge out of the "social realism" that had dominated Soviet literature for so long. At the Second Writers Congress in December 1954, a number of writers derided the colorless, mediocre writings that had dominated the literary scene for a number of years, but no program for significant change occurred from the deliberations.³

During 1955 certain changes were permitted in describing the literary

approach to kolkhoz life. Greater realism was allowed as long as it could be related to individual human causes and not to the Communist system.⁴ This was the era of the attempted agricultural reclamation of the virgin lands and tremendous effort was applied in encouraging voluntary, permanent resettlement and summer work by students. However, this brief relaxation did not last long, for various writers were disciplined and a number of works in progress were rewritten to conform to new doctrine.⁵

Khrushchev's speech to the 20th Party Congress in 1956 formally opened the attack on Stalinism and produced major ferment among writers and artists although this was initially obscured by the uprising in Hungary. Various Soviet writers were resurrected during this period, many of whom were victims of the purge.⁶

Until 1955 at least, Khrushchev gave no indication that he was not an orthodox Stalinist in his political outlook. With his speech depicting Stalin's crimes to the 20th Party Congress, he determinedly took the lead in the anti-stalinist campaign. Foremost among his motives was the obvious drive for concentration of personal power and the use of this tool against the anti-party group.⁷

In the power struggle, a repudiation of the strong institutional controls over the population was intended to have a strengthening effect on the party cadres. In actuality, it probably had the opposite effect, for it re-established a new "personality cult" in the form of those younger party men in support of Khrushchev. This weakened the competing "old guard" revolutionary forces who had to look over their shoulders to prevent themselves from being implicated in past crimes brought to light by the

destalinization drive. In actuality, the process of destalinization began under the period of collective leadership headed by Malenkov. Malenkov, also, had favored the loosening of control in various areas. Certainly there was a policy that ended routine mass arrests and saw such measures as a stated "ban on police methods" as a solution for political conflicts and some freeing of political prisoners.⁸

The use of destalinization by Khrushchev was the key to the literary freedom throughout his tenure of leadership. As we will see, this was the key element used to consolidate his personal power and to balance the liberal-conservative forces of ideologically opposed camps.

The 1958 appearance of Boris Pasternak's great epic novel Doctor Zhivago in the West brought immediate world fame to the poet. He had been long well known in the U.S.S.R. particularly between the years 1914-1932 for his poetry. His translations of Georgian poets in the thirties won Stalin's approval and probably saved him from the camps of the terror.⁹

Pasternak's novel should be considered a milestone in terms of the dissent literature, particularly in its influence on other writers during this period and beyond. His influence on Sinyavski, in particular, is profound, for the two had a long association and friendship. Sinyavski wrote a lengthy introduction to an edition of Pasternak's poetry published in Moscow in 1965.

During the thaw of 1955 there were great hopes that the novel would be published in the Soviet Union, but it was barred and still has not been published there. The expectations in the wake of the 20th Party Congress that the narrow guidelines in which writers worked would be widened did

not materialize. Through some means, the book got to the West, and when published, was an instant sensation that brought considerable recognition and great personal anguish to its author.

The novel had a tremendous unsettling affect on Russian literary circles. After the award of the Nobel Prize for literature to Pasternak and his subsequent refusal in October 1958, the poet was expelled from the Writers Union and, by political expediency, exiled into the obscurity of his dacha until his death in 1960. Both Sinyavski and Daniel (both were to suffer imprisonment later) were pall bearers at his funeral. 10
Pasternak's publication added a new dimension to the dissent. As Helene Peltier-Zamoyska wrote:

In 1956, the year of the 20th Congress, Sinyavsky wrote his essay On Socialist Realism and his first short novel, The Trial Begins. Manuscripts began to circulate all over the country, which were seized by the need to tell of those years which had passed by in tears, blood and terror. The abscess had to be lanced--not only by the leaders, but by simple mortals as well--a right that was granted to them very reluctantly. The brutal attacks on Doctor Zhivago (1958) soon came as a reminder that in practice, the burning questions of the day were still taboo and that one couldn't treat them in a spirit different from that imposed by official dogma. This attitude on the part of the authorities only enhanced Pasternak's prestige among the youth, whetted their appetites to express themselves by any possible means, and reinforced their skepticism as to the possibility of doing this through official Soviet publishing houses. Hence, Sinyavski's first work to be published abroad came out in 1959. 11

After the Pasternak episode, the Central Committee issued a new ruling forbidding Russian writers to publish abroad material not already cleared for publication inside the Soviet Union. 12

In 1962 a trend towards liberalism appeared briefly. This was during the period of the 22nd Party Congress where Khrushchev again spoke of the repressions that occurred during the "cult of personality". Literature

became a tool by which Khrushchev used to promote destalinization. Although it is doubtful that Khrushchev's motives had anything to do with furthering the cause of liberty for the Russian masses, it was a situation that liberal writers were eager to take advantage of. For them the attack on Stalin was an opportunity to shake off controls and to write with true realism rather "than in the vein of forced optimism labeled socialist realism".¹³ The liberals regarded the destalinization trend as an opportunity to be creative and to denounce the deceit and administrative shackles that had characterized Russian literature for decades. The summer and autumn of 1962 saw mass poetry readings occurring and the appearance of abstract art and impressionism in painting. This type of painting had always been considered decadent by the bureaucrats, but was tolerated during this brief period.

In September 1962, Khrushchev apparently made two decisions in order to intensify the liberalization trend. The first was to authorize publication of Alexander Solzhenitsyn's "One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich" in the November issue of Novy Mir. Rumors spread all over Moscow of the impending publication of this article, for this was something the Soviet public was not used to seeing. This moving description of life in the Soviet prison camps under Stalin did much to stir public sentiment against those responsible for the crimes of the Stalin era. The shock of this article rekindled the anti-stalinist climate as Khrushchev had anticipated.¹⁴

The second decision was to allow publication of Yevtushenko's poem "Stalin's Heirs." This appeared in the literary section of Pravda on October 21st, the eve of the Cuban missile crisis. Though not of the same

literary quality as Solzhenitsyn's work, its theme of those Stalinists waiting to reassume power caused considerable stirring among the liberals. The poem rather pointedly depicts several ex-central committee members ousted in the anti anti-party group campaign after the 21st Congress in 1959 by Khrushchev. The destalinization trend, however, went under with the Cuban missile crisis, and the return to conservatism was readily apparent later that winter.

In December 1962, several meetings between Khrushchev, members of the Presidium and about 400 artists and writers occurred.¹⁵ Khrushchev at this time reversed the policy of liberalization and destalinization. The first target was Ilya Ehrenburg, whose memoirs "People, Years, Life", had recently appeared in Novy Mir. Ehrenburg was chastised for keeping silent during the purge years while knowing that many of those who disappeared in the terror were falsely charged. This was an unallowable extrapolation of statements made by Khrushchev in his secret speech to the 20th Congress. Khrushchev claimed that the purge was organized and directed by, and the total responsibility of, Stalin. Though the purge was carried out through Yezhov, Beria, and other lesser functionaries, Stalin alone bore the responsibility for the guilt or innocence of those who suffered, not the Party. Ehrenburg's indiscretion made him appear to be a silent accomplice of Stalin, knowing what was happening, but unwilling to speak out, thus in effect condemning innocent people. Ehrenburg retorted that Soviet citizen ever publicly protested in those years if he valued survival. Never the less, he was accused of insulting a whole generation of Russians for knowing about the crimes of Stalin, but keeping silent because of fear.¹⁶

This first salvo against Ehrenburg was simply the opening of a campaign to bring literature closer to ideology and to stem the tide of liberalism. The destalinization momentum could easily turn against Khrushchev. Critical questions were being raised as to whether the guilt of the purges should be monopolized by those who led them or shared by those surviving accomplices now in the leadership.

The answer was not long in coming. On March 8, 1963, Khrushchev delivered a speech, far reaching in its policy aims, emphasizing that "literature and the arts must develop under the strict guidance of the Communist Party and its Central Committee." The limits of tolerance had been reached in terms of what was publishable and what was not. There could be no further thought of publishing works on the theme of "One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich." "Magazine and publishing houses had been flooded with manuscripts about the life of people in exile, in prisons, and in camps." Khrushchev emphasized that literature and the arts would not be separated from ideology, and he pointed out specific deviations by Ehrenburg and Yevtushenko.¹⁷

What followed was an anti-intellectual campaign by right-wing elements of the Party that resulted in a number of recantations by some liberals. The Party had spoken through Khrushchev to the liberals, and though expected to accept censure through self criticism, many remained silent.

The new freeze extended into May, when again the levels of tolerance mellowed. The conservative elements in cultural matters had suffered a severe setback with the heart illness in April of Kozlov, their strongest ally on the Presidium. The following is extracted from Pravda of May 19, 1963:

Although the Party directs the development of art and literature in accordance with Leninist principles, it sees no need to control our intelligentsia at every step, to explain in detail how to write a book, stage a performance, produce a film or compose music.¹⁸

Thus, a critical balance was maintained between what was acceptable and what was prohibited. The literary oscillations followed power considerations which Khrushchev used to strengthen his relative position against that of his opponents. The government could not allow much movement either to the right or the left. Victory for those Stalinist elements that would have probably resulted in unrestrained reprisals was no more desirable than the unknown consequences of unrestricted liberalism.

Destalinization finally ceased to be a factor in censorship policy with the fall of Khrushchev in October 1964. This policy had been a key element in Khrushchev's maintenance of personal power and in controlling the tolerable levels of emerging dissent. Literary policy was effectively molded to each power consideration during the Khrushchev era beginning with the attack on the anti-party group in 1956-1957 to the consolidation efforts of the winter and spring of 1963.

CHAPTER 4

DISSENT: SINCE KHRUSHCHEV

Cultural exchanges of limited though increasing scale with the West began after the 20th Party Congress and brought outside influences and alternatives to the older closely controlled patterns of life that had characterized Soviet society for so long. The new influences increased the material wants of the masses and broadened the desire for liberalism in the arts. A cultural opposition was created that not only questioned the relationship between ideology and the arts, but also doubted the relevancy of ideology in modern Soviet society. By 1961 significant numbers of literary works began to circulate unofficially. Troupes of young actors, musicians, and entertainers organized expositions to perform their own works.¹

The fall of Khrushchev marked the end to even brief periods of liberal toleration in the arts. Indeed, institutional controls by the Party have been strengthened by strong conservative trends within the collective leadership. The return to power by the conservative elements in 1964 has dismayed many of the intellectuals since for eight brief years under Khrushchev social isolationism had been abandoned by the regime.

Even though Khrushchev found literature to be a formidable political weapon in the power struggle, the relaxation of institutional control, even for brief periods, brought significant and lasting effects. The volume of samizdat literature increased tremendously during the sixties and literature considered ideologically unacceptable by the regime has

found a ready outlet outside of the Bloc countries. Books by writers such as Solzhenitsyn, Eugenia Ginzburg, Sakharov and Marchenko--the descriptions of the terrible sufferings by the people and the legal immorality of the regime under Stalin and since--plus information about the imprisonment and trials of Russian intellectual dissidents find their way back into the Soviet Union with the help of the Western mass media and Russian emigre organizations.*

The successors to Khrushchev can probably be considered middle-of-the-road bureaucrats, but the coalition of collective leadership was nurtured and trained during the Stalinist era. As the Party prepared for the 23rd Congress in 1966, it was readily acknowledged that hard-liners were prepared to undo much of the destalinization reforms that had been accomplished. The haunting memory of the personality cult has had a profound influence not only on the form and style of Soviet literature, but has also placed many of the intelligentsia in opposition to Party doctrine. The threat of re-emerging Stalinism prompted a group of notable Soviet scientists and intellectuals including Sakharov, Kapitsa and Tamm to send a letter to Brezhnev, the Party's First Secretary, warning of the dangers of neo-stalinism. The effect of the letter is unknown, but the rehabilitation of Stalinism did not become an issue at the 23rd Congress.²

*Books and articles are frequently read over Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty. A White Russian emigre organization called the N.T.S. had assisted in publishing and smuggling back into the U.S.S.R. many books and manuscripts. At some of the trials the prosecution has attempted to link the defendants with the activities of this and other emigre organizations.

The memory of Stalinism has had powerful influence on the literature of the sixties. The single event that aroused protest both among Russian and Western intellectuals was the Sinyavski-Daniel trial in early 1966. Sinyavski was literary critic who published his writings in the West under the pseudonym Abram Tertz. Daniel was translator, almost unknown in the U.S.S.R., who published in the West under the name of Nikolai Arzhak. Daniel stated at his trial that he wrote what he did and sent his works to the West because he "felt there was a real danger of a resurgence of the cult of personality. . . ." ³ Of the two, only Sinyavski was a member of the Union of Soviet Writers. A total of 14 essays and stories were sent West by them and both were convicted of having engaged in anti-Soviet propaganda and agitation under article 70 of the R.S.F.S.R. criminal code, which penalizes

agitation or propaganda carried out with the purpose of subverting or weakening the Soviet regime or in order to commit particularly dangerous crimes against the State, the dissemination for the said purposes of slanderous inventions defamatory to the Soviet political and social system, as well as the dissemination or production or harboring for the said purposes of literature of similar content. . . . ⁴

Sinyavski received a seven year and Daniel a five year labor camp sentence. World wide protest and continual efforts to date to win pardon or reduction of sentences have been unsuccessful. The severity of the sentences indicates the degree of warning that the regime believed necessary to give to the intelligentsia for such acts of indiscipline.

The trial was unique for a number of reasons. First, the two men were secretly arrested and received a lengthy pre-trial confinement. The government did not acknowledge their arrest for several months. Second,

since there is no specific ban on the use of pseudonyms, the regime concentrated on proving that the expressed views of the fictional characters in the literary works actually represented those of the authors themselves. This was the first time in the U.S.S.R. that writers were put on trial for what they had written. Many Soviet writers have been imprisoned, banished, executed or driven into silence, but never after a trial in which the principal evidence against them was their literary work.⁵ Third, an analysis of article 70 implies that intent is the basic element to be proven. Since intent was crucial to the prosecution's case, severe attacks on the defendants were conducted by Ereman in Izvestia on January 13, 1966, and by Kedrina in the Literary Gazette on January 22, 1966, and hopelessly prejudiced the trial.⁶ Fourth, the trial was open--a rare occurrence in the U.S.S.R.--and the defendants pleaded not guilty to the charges. On the surface, this would appear to be a significant precedent in Soviet judicial proceedings. The trial was eventful not only for the nature of the charges against the accused, but even may have been an attempt by the regime to demonstrate the progress made in Soviet judicial proceedings. Open trials were common under Stalin, but none had not guilty pleas. Increasingly Soviet lawyers have been able to argue solid points of law and obtain verdicts within the limits of socialist legality. The release of Amalrik from exile in 1967 is a case in point.⁷ The critical feature of the legal process here, in spite of the progress described above, is the demonstrated weakness of legal guarantees when political issues are at stake.⁸

The long pretrial detention coupled with particularly vicious

newspaper attacks forestalled any possibility of a fair trial for the defendants. Eremin's Izvestia article was particularly prejudicial; for example; "As we have seen, the renegades' writings are imbued with malicious slander against our social system and our state: they are models of anti-Soviet propaganda."⁹ Perhaps the regime should heed the warnings of Amalrik:

Those in high office ought surely to reflect that without a proper rule of law they themselves may one day share the fate of Sinyavski and Daniel. As long as we live in a state that violates its own laws, nobody, from the rulers of the country down to the unregistered attic dwellers, will have any sense of responsibility for their actions or feel assured of their personal safety.¹⁰

The trial evoked a storm of protest among both Western and Soviet intellectuals and should be regarded as the foundation for the widespread dissent that exists in the Soviet Union today. This single event brought forth large numbers of letters of protest and petitions to the highest

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Party organs. Hayward states:

What was tragic about the trial is not only that the two men were tried and sentenced for heresy, sacrilege and blasphemy, but that the trend toward an improvement in the administration of justice, the frequently expressed desire to do away with "distortion of justice" as part of Stalin's legacy—all this has received a severe setback. . . . We find that, just as in Stalin's time, reason of state prevailed over the rule of law. . . . This is what has shocked and frightened the Soviet public.¹²

But the trial did more than this. It focused the protest on some basic elements: the rule of law, founded on respect for the basic rights of man;¹³ it stirred the apathetic members of the intelligentsia to question and even protest and validity of many of Soviet social institutions; it significantly broadened the base of the protest movement and brought about forms of protest that required further repression by the government; and

it invited (though unwillingly) questions by some of its respected members as to the relevancy of communism in today's world.

The first reactions to the trial came from the young students and writers. Protest demonstrations were held in Moscow in early 1967 that resulted in the trial and conviction of four young dissidents, V. Bukovski, V. Delone, V. Khaustov and Y. Kushov under article 190-3 which was added to the R.S.F.S.R. Criminal Code in September 1966. This article

prohibits the organization of, as well as participation in, group activities that grossly violate public order, involve clear disobedience to lawful orders of the authorities, or entail disruption of the operations of transport, state and public enterprises or institutions.¹⁴

This trial was a remarkable measure in view of the constitutional guarantees by which Soviet citizens are legally granted the freedom of street processions and demonstrations.¹⁵

In December 1967, Pavel Litvinov, the grandson of the late Soviet Foreign Minister distributed both the text of V. Bukovski's final trial statement¹⁶ and a transcript of a KGB interrogation held concerning his activities in compiling the trial statement in the literary underground and mailed copies to foreign newspapers.

The trial of A. Ginzburg, A. Dobrovolsky, Y. Galanskov and V. Lashkova was held in January 1968. The first three had long been involved in underground literary activity, whereas Lashkova was merely a typist of various samizdat publications. Ginzburg had compiled a "White Paper" containing the only semi-complete transcript of the Sinyavski-Daniel trial. The Soviet government at this writing has not issued a transcript

of the trial. This, in turn, was followed by the trial and sentencing of Litvinov and Larissa Daniel, the wife of convicted writer Yuli Daniel, for holding a demonstration in Red Square calling for the immediate withdrawal of Soviet troops from Czechoslovakia.

The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia added a new dimension to the dissent. The invasion was regarded as a Stalinist form of repression against the type of liberal reform that the dissenting elements of the intelligentsia were trying to achieve. Madame Daniel followed her husband into exile for four years and Pavel Litvinov was exiled to a remote region for five years. Part of his sentence is probably attributable to his act of defiance of the Party in sending letters and articles to the West for publication.

While the Sinyavski-Daniel trial was the single event that multiplied the protest, it was perhaps also the event that solidified the underlying discontent among the intelligentsia. If the intent of the regime was to publicize the progress made in Soviet legal processes in order to use it as an instrument of propaganda, it was a dismal failure. Modest improvements in the field of human rights were made under Khrushchev and the impact of the KGB's tight grip on society was diminished. But the trials as an instrument to silence the intellectuals can only be regarded as a failure not only to bring about a return to "socialist legality" instituted after the 20th Party Congress in 1956, but also as a judicial sham that reflects enduring Stalinist traditions and continues to be an embarrassment to the Soviet government.

One must question why the government chose open judicial proceedings

to quell the dissent, for certainly other options were available. Censorship, refusal of publication, harassment, blackmail, deportation, exile, imprisonment, confinement in mental institutions, and execution have all been freely and sometimes indiscriminantly exercised by the regime depending on the personalities in power. Expulsion from the Writers Union, in the case of Sinyavski, or making it impossible, for either of the two writers, to hold their jobs or find other work would certainly have been heavy punishment and not likely to draw the degree of attention that the open trial provided. Perhaps the answer is that the identities of the two writers were a mystery both in the Soviet Union and the West for so long and that when they were discovered, the regime wanted to leave a lasting reminder to the intelligentsia.

The regime obviously considers the dissent both an embarrassment and a threat. The series of trials indicate that increasing numbers of Russians appear willing to challenge acts of authority in the attempt to bring governmental practices into conformity with the law, particularly judicial proceedings. The regime has been ready to invoke its absolute power to increase the costs which the dissidents must pay for their actions. The contest is, of course, uneven, with the only hope of the dissenters being the publicization of the events through the mass media in the West.

From the point of view of the underground, the publicity gained from the trials was of considerable benefit although a heavy price was paid in terms of the prison sentences received. In a film interview the writer P. Yakir as a spokesman for the dissent stated, "We're trying to publicize every arrest, every dismissal."¹⁷ The foreign news provides an alternative

to the domestic news available and gives the Soviet citizen access to internal news in which varied views are available. Berry states:

Seen in this light, the trials of dissidents become a kind of 'foreign' influence on the Soviet populace, and in this respect they are not unlike developments in Czechoslovakia prior to the August (1968) invasion. Clearly one of the purposes of that invasion was to prevent contagion by example and it is a sign of the times in the Soviet Union that the latest important trial was of protesters of that invasion.¹⁸

Amalrik points to one aspect of the dissent within the U.S.S.R. as a "Democratic Movement", a political movement, largely diffuse within the intelligentsia, with no definite organizational structure.¹⁹ This movement was said to have begun as an outgrowth of protest to the 1968 trials and claims responsibility for various collective means of the expression of protest such as public demonstrations, group letters and petitions. Amalrik grants that the organization is small, diverse and largely unorganized, "several dozen active participants and several hundred who sympathize. . . and give it their support."²⁰

It is not clear just where this "Democratic Movement" fits into the patterns of dissent and who are its participants. Its goals are the elimination of institutional, bureaucratic and ideological restrictions. The views that characterize the liberalization efforts are three: The first is the belief that the regime has perverted the true principles of Marxism/Leninism and that they must be returned to for the ills of society to be cured. The second is what Amalrik calls "Christian ideology", in which moral principles are emphasized in terms of political doctrine rather than religious philosophy. The third is the focus on a transition to Western democratic principles in a socialistic society in which the state retains owner-

ship over the means of production.

The "Democratic Movement" probably sponsored the public demonstrations during the 1966-1968 trial period. The "movement" could also be ascribed responsibility for the various underground journals such as Phoenix, Syntax, and recently, The Chronicle of Current Events, of which at least fifteen

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issues have appeared. It may also have been responsible for the sending of a petition protesting political persecution in the U.S.S.R. to the Commission on Human Rights of the United Nations with 52 signatures.

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Solzhenitsyn has become a symbol of conscience in the Soviet Union, both in his life and in his writing. His writings have made him the best known Soviet literary figure abroad since Pasternak. Unlike Pasternak, he has defied the opposition of the regime and accepted the Nobel Prize for Literature.

24

On the eve of the Fourth National Congress of Soviet Writers held in May 1967, Solzhenitsyn submitted an appeal for the abolishment of Soviet censorship. He charged that the censorship imposed by Glavlit is illegal since it is not provided for in the Constitution and "imposes a yoke on Soviet literature." He further called on the Union of Soviet Writers to demand the end to this censorship and to become the writers' forum that the organization was meant to be; namely, to defend and encourage writers and creative literature rather than act as an instrument of the state in the censorship screening process.

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The writings of Solzhenitsyn reflect the deeply felt moral injustices done to the country and the Russian people and the compulsion to reveal this suffering. Solzhenitsyn is a product of the Communist system and his

generation includes or is more relatable to the younger intellectuals than Pasternak, a product of pre-revolutionary days. For youth, especially be they intelligent and sensitive, the questions of the terrible sacrifices made in the building of Socialism under Stalin by their parents directly relate to their own modern experience. Were the sacrifices purposeful, the results meaningful, or have the ends of Socialism been damaged by the means used to achieve them? ²⁶ Solzhenitsyn's writings portray the impossible struggles of those in conflict with the social system. His writings methodically expose the bureaucratic oppressiveness of the system and depict Soviet reality as a vast concentration camp. Rothberg's description of Solzhenitsyn's writing is especially revealing:

Solzhenitsyn deliberately chooses institutions which by their nature permit the selection and depiction of a cross-section of Soviet life. People of different classes, education and ethnic backgrounds can be shown, peasants and workers, soldiers and secret police, bureaucrats and intelligentsia, are thrown together so their varying characters and viewpoints are contrasted. Throughout there is the one constant of traditional Russian literature: the "they" of the rulers and the "we" of the ruled, of the oppressors and the oppressed; but even the rulers and oppressors are themselves ruled and oppressed by those above them in the hierarchy, so that almost all of his characters are at the mercy of others, almost none have control over their own lives, almost all live in fear and servility; tyranny, pain, deprivation and death are epidemic and inevitable. . . . Because almost no one is free and independence is always threatened, meaningful life, personal integrity and the sense of values are always under assault, both from above and from below.²⁷

Few of those in the protest movement have the literary stature of Solzhenitsyn, which gives some measure of immunity to the more drastic forms of retaliation by the regime. But even the well known are not totally immune. In May 1970, the biologist Zhores Medvedev, known for his refutation of the Lysenko doctrine, was arrested and confined to a

mental institution until a wave of Russian public protest won him his freedom. Others such as the nuclear physicist Andrei Sakharov along with Solzhenitsyn have started a "Human Rights Committee" among the scientific intelligentsia. The influence and renown of these intellectuals, both within the Soviet Union and in the West, gives them a more responsive audience and a greater shield from reprisal.

The writing of Sakharov is probably the most radical in terms of the relationship between ideology and the needs of society. In his essay, Progress, Coexistence and Intellectual Freedom, he proposes a liberal manifesto that rejects the class struggle as a method for achieving social progress in this era and regards ideology as outmoded for the solution of human problems.

The division of mankind threatens it with destruction. . . . Only universal cooperation under conditions of intellectual freedom and the lofty moral ideas of socialism and labor, accompanied by the elimination of dogmatism and pressures of the concealed interests will preserve civilization.²⁸

Sakharov sees the establishment of thought, discussion and an end to the "bureaucratic oligarchy" with its weapon of ideological censorship as a primary requisite for the solution to problems facing Soviet society. He further presses for liberal-democratic reform, including the institution of a multi-party political order. This must require considerable patience from the regime, for it is, in fact, a rejection of Communism as a political system to ensure the preservation of mankind.

The other faction of the literary dissent is made up of the younger intellectuals. They have little or no influence and directly confront the authorities outside of, or on the fringes of the law. They probably

comprise the bulk of the "Democratic Movement" and the literary underground. They tend to be of two types. The one is a dissenter who has spent many years in and out of the camps or in exile and has been hardened to the extent that he no longer can visualize a future for himself in contemporary Soviet society. It is very difficult for an expolitical prisoner in the U.S.S.R. to find professional work and he is frequently forced to live on the fringes of society, doing odd jobs to avoid being rearrested for "parasitism".²⁹ The other has neither experienced the Stalinist terror or World War II. As said by one Russian, "They do not have the fear of the labor camp in their bones." These are the young turks who are concerned with contemporary society and to whom the revolutionary struggle means little. In a real sense they represent the failure of fifty years of Soviet education designed to produce utter loyalty to the government and Party. Instead, larger numbers of a modern version of the Christian martyr³⁰ are appearing among the Communist elite.

CHAPTER 5

PROSPECTS AND CONCLUSIONS

This paper has only explored the implications of current dissent in literature and the arts and as such only looks at a fraction of the dissatisfaction that today exists within the U.S.S.R. Equally adamant with doubts as to the relevancy of ideology are the scientists, managers and engineers, for whom a criteria of productivity, progress, efficiency and national prestige are of greater importance. Repressive bureaucratic institutions do not point toward the plateaus of progress, socially or industrially that a freer, more creative society is capable of achieving.

The dissent makes up only a small number of the intelligentsia and scarcely touches the other segments of the masses of Soviet society. But dissent and protest touches some of the most prestigious within the intellectual elite and this indicates a basic underlying discontent affecting larger numbers than a glance would indicate.

It is the literary voice that speaks loudest in pointing out the abuses of power, that speaks to the abolition of censorship and other institutional controls, and documents the lost cause of the individual caught in the web of "socialist legality". The lawlessness of the bureaucratic institutions enrage the dissident intellectuals and the more radical elements have paid heavily under the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime. Many dissenters have given up all hope of persuading the government to liberalize its policies. When this occurs in any society, usually more violent forms of protest begin to appear.

Obviously the level of dissent that is occurring in the U.S.S.R. embarrasses the regime. The regime has an ideology for export to fulfill the expectations of the Communist revolution. Large amounts of dissatisfaction at home are difficult to explain away abroad. Worse yet, it implies ideological rejection of Communist philosophy by the educated elite.

Society always has dissent for it is a part of the normal political process whether restricted to within one party or among many. It is the institutional makeup and the power relationships that limit the forms and the extremes of protest. The various thaws and freezes have brought varying degrees of relaxation of tensions and liberalization to Soviet society. Since Khrushchev there have been no thaws, but the foundation for dissent has been thoroughly established and will undoubtedly continue in various forms. To quell all of the protest, the samizdat and the petitions, the government requires more secret police and informers than the society can probably afford.

Whether the regime views the dissent as a distinct threat to its power base is not easily discernible. Undoubtedly it is considered a substantial irritant and poses serious questions to the Party as to how to best handle it without further alienating the intelligentsia. Concessions in one area frequently breed discontent in other areas. As long as individuals feel their civil liberties are unduly restricted, dissent is inevitable. However, there is scarcely a regime that understands or goes to such extremes to protect its power structure as do the Soviets. The power structure is built upon an ideological foundation that is considered by more and more to be meaningless. As such, it may draw protest from those who consider

it irrelevant, but it cloaks the regime in the garment of legitimacy and serves as its basis for existence.

Amalrik states that, "In order to remain in power, the regime must change and evolve, but in order to preserve itself, everything must remain unchanged."¹ New ideas threaten the bureaucracy for they assault its prerogatives. The fear of the regime to allow liberalization of its institutions was dramatized by the invasion of Czechoslovakia. The present leadership is not willing to relax its grip. Its concern is with holding on to its power and it has not hesitated to use its strength in varying degrees when it deemed it essential. The punishment of Sinyavsky and Daniel Levites warning against those who would commit similar deeds. One could speculate that the cult of personality will return if the protest movement doesn't diminish. The regime has readily been able to mobilize selective terror, but the focus of the terror of the purges under Stalin was spread across all of society unremitting against peasants and intellectuals alike. It is doubtful that the present collective leadership can mobilize such a phenomenon.

One must finally ask what the prospects are for success of the dissent. Strong dissent and challenges of ideas, coupled with objective crises within a country, have been the combination of elements instrumental in bringing down other centralized regimes. In the U.S.S.R. the dissent is not organized and mass loyalty is still too strong for this to occur in such a closely regulated society. Still, the dissent will undoubtedly flourish and grow, for the iron curtain no longer can totally shut out the impact of outside influence. One alternative is that the regime's conservatism will gradually

wear down allowing a gradual liberalization of institutions--giving in here and there on small points--with ideology becoming less and less significant. Khrushchev attempted brief intervals of liberal toleration, but quickly had to restore the controls. A slow, gradual erosion over the years may be possible. The other and more likely alternative is that the leadership will grudgingly tolerate a certain level of protest, but will quickly move to stamp out those that exceed the permissible bounds, in other words, continue the status quo. They may well look to the amount of internal dissent in the United States which has been much worse than that experienced in the U.S.S.R.--strengthening their view that even small doses of liberalization will only expand the discontent further.

So, the inner war will proceed. Protest literature will flow to the West and to the samizdat and selective repression will continue. Perhaps from this tragedy more writers of the stature of Solzhenitsyn, Akhmatova and Pasternak will give a rebirth to the great literature of Russia.

NOTES

Chapter 2

¹Sidney Monas, "Engineers or Martyrs: Dissent and the Intelligentsia," Problems of Communism, September/October 1968, p. 6.

²Alex Inkeles, Social Change in Soviet Russia, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968), p. 68.

³Samizdat means self publishing in Russian. This term is generally applied to the hundreds and thousands of typewritten plays, poems, novels, and trial transcripts and other writings illegally distributed among the Russian intelligentsia.

⁴Marc Slonim, Soviet Russian Literature, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964), p. 336-337.

⁵Inkeles, p. 268.

⁶Robert Conquest, The Politics of Ideas in the USSR, (London: Bodley Head, 1967), p. 31.

⁷Slonim, p. 159.

⁸Victor Erlich, "Soviet Literary Criticism: Past and Present," Abraham Brumberg, ed., Russia Under Khrushchev, (New York: Praeger, 1962), p. 351.

⁹Harold Swayze, Political Control of Literature in the USSR, 1946-1959, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1962), p. 36.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 37-38.

¹¹Maurice Friedberg, "What Price Censorship," Problems of Communism, September/October 1968, p. 19-20.

¹²Pervy vseoyuznyy syezhd sovetskikh pisatelei, (Moscow, 1934), p. 716-717, quoted in Swayze, p. 217.

¹³Glavlit is the Soviet censorship agency established by decree of the Council of Peoples Commissars in 1922. All published material must be approved by Glavlit. In recent years, it has been renamed a "Chief Directorate for the Protection of Military and State Secrets in the Press." See Max Hayward, On Trial, (New York: Harper and Row, 1967), p. 58.

¹⁴Inkeles, p. 284.

¹⁵Swayze, p. 238.

¹⁶Anatoly Kuznetsov, "Why I Left Russia," Readers Digest, November 1969, p. 73-74.

Chapter 3

¹See Eugenia Ginzberg, Journey into the Whirlwind, (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1967), for a graphic description of the treatment of intellectuals and prison camp conditions during this period.

²Robert Conquest, Power and Policy in the USSR, (New York: St. Martins, 1961), p. 246.

³Harold Swayze, Political Control of Literature in the USSR, 1946-1959 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1962), p. 113.

⁴Robert Conquest, The Politics of Ideas in the USSR, (London: Bodley Head, 1967), p. 128-129.

⁵Ibid.

⁶Swayze, p. 151.

⁷The anti-party group were those Presidium members accused of power abuses during the later period of Stalin's rule. The group consisted of Kaganovich, Malenkov, Voroshilov and others later ousted by Khrushchev.

⁸Michel Tatu, Power in the Kremlin. (New York: Viking, 1969), p. 141-142.

⁹Marc Slonim, Soviet Russian Literature (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964), p. 220.

¹⁰Max Hayward, On Trial (New York: Harper and Row, 1967), p. 5.

¹¹Ibid., p. 4-5. Madame Zamoyaska, whose father at that time was the French naval attache in Moscow, brought out to the West virtually all of the works of Sinyavski and Daniel and arranged for their publishing.

¹²Priscilla Johnson, ed., Khrushchev and the Arts (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1965), p. 39.

¹³Tatu, p. 246.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 248.

¹⁵For a notable exchange between Khrushchev and Yevtushenko, see Johnson, p. 120-122.

¹⁶Roland Gaucher, Opposition in the USSR, 1917-1967 (New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1969), p. 495.

¹⁷N. S. Khrushchev, translated in Johnson, p. 147-186.

¹⁸Tatu, p. 354.

Chapter 4

¹Andrei Amalrik, Will The Soviet Union Survive Until 1984? (New York: Harpers and Row, 1970), p. 7.

²Peter Grose, "25 Soviet Intellectuals Oppose any Elevation of Stalin's Status," The New York Times, 21 March 1966, p. 2:4.

³Max Hayward, On Trial (New York: Harper and Row, 1967), p. 185.

⁴Reprinted in Hayward, p. 21.

⁵Ibid., p. 24.

⁶Both articles are reprinted in Hayward, p. 212-232.

⁷See Andrei Amalrik, Involuntary Journey to Siberia (New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, Inc., 1970).

⁸Abraham Brumberg, ed., In Quest of Justice (New York: Praeger, 1970), p. 5.

⁹Hayward, p. 219.

¹⁰Amalrik, Journey, p. 114.

¹¹See Hayward, p. 287-302 for reprints of post-trial protest letters.

¹²Ibid., p. 30.

¹³Amalrik, Survive, p. 13.

¹⁴Reprinted in Robert Conquest, ed., Justice and the Legal System in the USSR (New York: Praeger, 1968), p. 92-93.

¹⁵Article 125 of the Soviet Constitution reprinted in Brumberg, p. 87.

¹⁶Ibid., Document 2.

¹⁷Filmed interview with P. Yakir, A. Amalrik and V. Bukovsky with Bill Cole of CBS News. The film was shown on US television in August 1970. All three writers have since been arrested.

- ¹⁸ Donald D. Berry, "Dissident Intellectuals: Views From Moscow," Survey, Winter/Spring 1969, p. 152.
- ¹⁹ Amalrik, Survive, p. 10-20.
- ²⁰ Ibid., p. 14-15.
- ²¹ Ibid.
- ²² "Dissent in Russia: The Thin Wedge," Newsweek, 1 February 1971, p. 30-31.
- ²³ Reprinted in Brumberg, p. 457-461.
- ²⁴ Abraham Rothberg, "Alexander Solzhenitsyn: The Obsession of Morality," Interplay, February 1971, p. 36.
- ²⁵ Brumberg, Document 49.
- ²⁶ Sidney Monas, "Engineers or Martyrs: Dissent and the Intelligentsia," Problems of Communism, September/October 1968, p. 5.
- ²⁷ Rothberg, p. 38.
- ²⁸ Andrei Sakharov, Progress, Coexistence and Intellectual Freedom (New York: W.W. Norton, 1968), p. 28-30.
- ²⁹ Amalrik, Journey.
- ³⁰ Robert L. Shaynon, "Voices From the Russian Underground," Saturday Review, 22 August 1970.

Chapter 5

- ¹ Andrei Amalrik, Will the Soviet Union Survive Until 1984? (New York: Harper and Row, 1970), p. 22.

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