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THE UNITED STATES NAVAL WAR COLLEGE  
SCHOOL OF NAVAL COMMAND AND STAFF

THESIS



INTELLIGENCE AND THE ROLE OF PEACEKEEPING  
IN THE UNITED NATIONS (U)

by

Gilbert H. McKelvey

Lieutenant Commander, United States Navy

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Signature

Date

30 April 1971

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
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Abstract of  
INTELLIGENCE AND THE ROLE OF PEACEKEEPING  
IN THE UNITED NATIONS

A study of the role of intelligence in peacekeeping by the United Nations. U.N. force proposals and the U.N. peacekeeping role are surveyed to determine what has been proposed and done in the past. In only two of the U.N. peacekeeping operations, Suez in 1956 and the Congo 1960, was intelligence used to support operations. Two examples of the successful use of intelligence by the United States, Cuba 1962 and the Congo, are examined as examples for their potential to support U.N. policy makers and peacekeepers. In areas of potential and actual superpower confrontation, there has been no better alternative devised to U.N. peacekeeping operations. Quarrels between small powers resulting in violence and internal disorders which threaten to draw in powerful outsiders seem to be the most likely areas of future international problems. The deficiency in information gathering and assessment has been an important defect in U.N. peacekeeping operations. The paper concludes that technological advances in collection and analysis should be considered as useful tools to close the intelligence gap in the U.N. The question of sharing information should be explored. Some capacity to gather and use appropriate

intelligence by the Secretary-General and his staff is mandatory to most efficiently carry out the important roles of peacekeeping.

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INTELLIGENCE AND THE ROLE OF PEACEKEEPING  
IN THE UNITED NATIONS

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The science of weapons and war has made us all . . . one world and one human race, with one common destiny. In such a world absolute sovereignty no longer assures us of absolute security. The convictions of peace must pull abreast and then ahead of the inventions of war. The United Nations, building on its successes and learning from its failures, must be developed into a genuine world security system.

President John F. Kennedy,  
September 20, 1963

Mankind would stand an excellent chance of suffering destruction if the traditional organization of military power on a strictly national basis, and the traditionally weak impediments to the use of military power, were continued in the nuclear age. In fact, both the United States and the Soviet Union have chosen to behave with extraordinary circumspection in international crises that previously would have touched off a chain reaction of military conflict. Yet this unilateral national restraint does not inspire sufficient confidence in man's ability to avoid warfare-- hence the widespread interest in measures, however uncertain, for international peacekeeping by the United Nations.

As never before, national security has become dependent on international security and on international arrangements on behalf of international security. In a world saturated with explosives, violence anywhere constitutes a threat dangerous to all, and nations everywhere have an incentive to help contain and speedily extinguish brushfire conflicts, no matter how small or remote, and to organize themselves for this purpose.

It is with this in mind that U.N. peacekeeping is examined to discover the role of intelligence in past operations and its potential to support U.N. policy makers and mission commanders in future activities.

The question of acquiescence by either of the superpowers to provide military forces to U.N. command for peacekeeping in areas in which a vital interest is at stake is not addressed. The matter of national attitude in this area is beyond the scope of this paper.

The matter of financing intelligence activity is not addressed. The question of financing U.N. operations and its history as a Cold War football is another subject and beyond the purview of this thesis.

For perspective on the subject of peacekeeping, it is necessary to review the proposals for international military forces. The major observer and operational efforts by the U.N. in its first twenty-five years are significant in this



appraisal because they represent a variety of activity and experience that can be considered relevant to the probable areas of future observer and peacekeeping forces.

The lack of a sufficient capability to gather and analyze information and develop intelligence has been a defect in all U.N. peacekeeping operations. This deficiency not only affected the field missions but also U.N. headquarters in New York. The latter instance has been perhaps the most critical because the headquarters and the policy makers were deprived of the foreknowledge of the intentions of participants in crises and their actions and therefore could only act intuitively on an ad hoc basis in most cases.

The focus of intelligence activity for U.N. peacekeeping efforts should be on tactical intelligence. This category of intelligence has potential to provide the kind of information that would be most useful to the policy makers and peacekeepers. Two useful examples of tactical intelligence and the central role they played in the formulation of policy are examined.

The crisis areas for U.N. peacekeeping that have the potential to involve the United States and the Soviet Union in a confrontation are surveyed. The interest of the member states of the U.N. would be served by a U.N. peacekeeping capacity that could dampen superpower confrontation and avoid the conflict escalation of violent quarrels between small

powers and internal disorders. The information and intelligence required to support this effort ideally is without limit. Obviously, there is a practical limit. Recent technological advances are explored with a view to closing the intelligence information deficiency in U.N. planning and operations with the use of technical collection and retrieval methods.

## CHAPTER II

### PEACEKEEPING FORCE PROPOSALS

In 1911, Commander T.W. Kincaid, U.S. Navy, writing of the Hague Tribunal, suggested that the defect that posed a potential and fatal impediment to the permanent good accomplished by that international court was the lack of backing by an adequate military force.<sup>1</sup> He suggested that the leading nations of the world should unite for the formation and maintenance of an international navy deployed to the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans to support the judgments of the Tribunal. Commander Kincaid combined the peacekeeping idea of the international fleet with the potential for general disarmament: ". . . should the project of an international fleet realize the hopes of the present writer, the maintenance of a large individual naval force in addition to the international quota (of ships) would within a few years be manifest folly."<sup>2</sup>

The idea of an international peacekeeping force is so logical that it is surprising that there have been so few serious attempts in history to establish such a force.

In 1930 Lord Davies identified three main schemes for the organization of an "international police Force":

(1) A Force made up of quotas drawn from members of the League of Nations under the supervision of a general staff

at the headquarters of the international authority, remaining under national control in peacetime, and falling automatically under command of the international authority on being mobilized;

(2) A Force comprising, after abolition of all national forces, a complete self-contained international army, navy, and air force under the sole direction and control of the international authority;

(3) A composite Force made up of national quotas formed around a specialized contingent enlisted, equipped and controlled by the international authority.<sup>3</sup>

France persistently and fruitlessly sought to provide the League of Nations with the power and authority through a force that would have enabled the League to meet the challenges it faced--Manchuria in 1931, Ethiopia in 1935-36, Spain in 1936-37, and Finland (the Russo-Finnish War) in 1939.<sup>4</sup> The only occasion in which a truly international police force was successfully employed by the League of Nations was in connection with the 1935 plebiscite by which the Saar basin was returned to Germany.<sup>5</sup>

The framers of the United Nations Charter had the experiences of the League to draw on when they sat down to decide what force, if any, should be available to the new organization which was to emerge from World War II. Out of these efforts grew Chapter VII of the Charter which was a far-reaching blueprint for world collective security.

The key article, Article 43, required all member states to earmark elements of their armed forces and other "assistance and facilities" for use when the Security Council called for them. Article 43 provided, on paper, a world police force, consisting of quotas contributed by states (a "quota force"). (For this and other relevant articles of the Charter, see Appendix I.)

There were many stumbling blocks to the implementation of Article 43. The primary cause of failure was the false assumption of postwar cooperation by the Big Five on which Chapter VII had been based. Plans for a force became swept up in the then incipient cold war.

The unanimous disarmament resolution of the United Nations General Assembly in December 1946, declared: "The General Assembly, regarding the problem of security as closely connected with that of disarmament, recommends the Security Council to accelerate as much as possible the placing at its disposal of the armed forces mentioned in Article 43 of the Charter."<sup>6</sup>

All through 1946, generals and admirals of the United States, the U.S.S.R., the United Kingdom, France, and China had met regularly together in private sessions of the Military Staff Committee; men like General Matthew B. Ridgway and Admiral H. Kent Hewitt of the United States, Generals A.F. Vasiliev and A. R. Sharapov of the U.S.S.R., Air Chief Marshal

Sir Guy Garrod of the United Kingdom, General Pierre Billotte of France and General Ying-chin Ho of China.<sup>7</sup> Their main task during this period was to seek agreement on the recommendations they would make to the Security Council on the basic principles that should govern the organization of the United Nations Forces.

The recommendations made to the Security Council in 1947 were the subject of debate, the main problem being the principle that should govern the respective contributions of the five great powers. The U.S.S.R. insisted on the principle that each should make equal contributions of land, sea, and air forces. The other four delegations supported the principle of comparability with allowance made for wide differences in the respective contributions of land, sea, and air forces.

The Military Staff Committee submitted estimates of the overall strength of the armed forces that should be available to the Security Council to enable it to fulfill its responsibilities for the maintenance of peace. Agreement was never reached on these proposals.<sup>8</sup>

	FRANCE	U.K. (China agreed)	U.S.A.	U.S.S.R.
Air Forces				
Bombers	775	600	1250	600
Strategic	(225)			
Medium	(150)			
Light	(400)			
Fighters	300	400	2250	300
Reconnaissance	200	...	...	...
Miscellaneous	...	200	300	300
Total:	1275	1200	3800	1200
Ground Forces				
Divisions	16	8-12	20	12
Armored	(3)			
Airborne	(3)			
Motorized or mountain	(10)			
Naval Forces				
Battleships	3	2	3	...
Carriers	6	4	6	...
Cruisers	9	6	15	5-6
Destroyers	18-24	24	84	24
Escort Vessels	30	48	...	24
Minesweepers	30	24	...	24
Submarines	12	12	90	12
Assault shipping and craft for divisions shown	1	2-3	6	

In June, 1948, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Trygve Lie, concerned over the failure to implement Article 43, proposed a comparatively small guard force of 1,000 to 5,000 men.

It could be used, Lie suggested, "for guard duty with United Nations missions, in the conduct of plebiscites under the supervision of the United Nations, and in the administration of truce terms. It could be used as a constabulary under the Security Council or the Trusteeship Council in cities like Jerusalem and Trieste during the establishment of international regimes . . ."<sup>9</sup>

The idea ran into stiff opposition from all sides in the 1948 General Assembly. It was approved in 1949 as a "Field Service," that is, a team of unarmed international civil servants to assist field missions in various ways, including the operation and maintenance of vehicles and communication equipment.<sup>10</sup>

That was in 1948-49. Later, in the context of the Uniting for Peace Resolution, Lie proposed a "United Nations Legion" (later called a "United Nations Volunteer Reserve") of 50,000 to 60,000 men.<sup>11</sup> Unlike the Guard, the Legion was to be a fighting force. It was conceived of primarily as a way in which small countries, unable to provide large fighting units, could offer manpower which would supplement units earmarked by larger states. The men could volunteer for the duty and would be held at home, in their own country's forces, until needed by the U.N. When they were not assigned to U.N. duty, the states could use them in the same way as any other of their soldiers. Mr. Lie even provided that if the



home government wished, it could refuse to let the men fight for the U.N. when the U.N. called for them. The states were to have full control over the use of the units thus organized.

The idea did not catch on and it seems to have died from lack of interest, rather than deep-seated opposition.

No serious consideration was ever given to asking member states to contribute units of their armed forces to a fighting force which would be stationed at an international base and placed under U.N. control. No country was prepared to relinquish control over its citizens to the world organization. Some countries seriously doubted that the General Assembly would have power, under the Charter, to organize and employ a force of this kind.<sup>12</sup>

Under the title "Uniting for Peace," the U.N. General Assembly, on 3 November 1950, adopted a resolution which provided, among other things, for establishment of a Peace Observation Commission of fourteen members including the five permanent members of the Security Council, to observe and report on the situation in areas where peace was threatened. Further, a Collective Measures Committee of fourteen members was established to report on methods which might be used collectively to maintain peace.<sup>13</sup> No material proposals resulted from the deliberations of this committee.<sup>14</sup>

In 1969, after a long period of controversy and discussion over the proper role of peacekeeping operations within

the United Nations, some 'models' for study were proposed.<sup>15</sup> The study of "model I" addressed the authorization, establishment, and composition of observer missions created by the Security Council.<sup>16</sup> Private discussions between the superpowers indicated considerable agreement on the outlines of a possible "Model 2" study, which, in the words of the Soviet representative, "would include such matters as the participation of military contingents."<sup>17</sup>

The mechanics of peacekeeping is a phenomenon that was not precisely contemplated by the drafters of Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. Most member states have made a distinction between those security operations established to prevent conflict, to observe, and to maintain agreements and cease-fires, and those operations authorized by the Security Council to enforce a decision.<sup>18</sup>

At this point it remains to be seen to what extent successful completion of these and perhaps other studies will serve to provide a genuine common ground of agreement for future peacekeeping operations.<sup>19</sup>

## CHAPTER III

### MAJOR UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

Since the end of World War II, the United Nations has been engaged in numerous peacekeeping activities that ran the gamut from small observation groups to large scale military involvement.

Despite the sharp political controversy in the U.N. over the form, peacekeeping has become a most important aspect of U.N. action in the field of international security. Almost from the beginning of the U.N., peacekeeping operations have been authorized. Security operations, observation missions and the maintenance of truce agreements and cease-fires have been conducted in Greece in 1946; Palestine, 1947; Indonesia, 1947; Kashmir, 1948; Lebanon, 1958; West Irian, 1962, Yemen, 1962; and India-Pakistan, 1965. The peacekeeping operations to prevent conflict were conducted in Egypt in 1956; the Congo, 1960; and Cyprus, 1963.

Greece. The United Nations first peacekeeping venture occurred in response to Greek complaints to the Security Council in December 1946, that the northern borders of Greece were being violated by neighboring Albania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia, each of which was allegedly assisting guerrillas in Greece.<sup>1</sup> Within thirty days a commission, authorized by

the Security Council, began on-the-scene investigations. U.N. action on the commission's recommendations was prevented, however, by a series of Soviet vetoes in the Security Council.<sup>2</sup>

At U.S. insistence the issue was brought before the veto-free General Assembly, which established in October 1947, a United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans (UNSCOB). UNSCOB was empowered not only to investigate and report on the border situation but also to provide the parties with mediation assistance.

In 1952 Greece's northern borders became relatively quiet, after UNSCOB had been replaced in 1951 by a subcommission of the Peace Observation Commission that the General Assembly had established earlier under the Uniting for Peace resolution.<sup>3</sup> The U.N. presence in Greece was terminated in August 1954.

Palestine. During the twelve months preceding the expiration of the British Mandate for Palestine in May 1948, various U.N. bodies, commissions, and authorized individuals sought to facilitate a Jewish-Arab settlement concerning the future of Palestine.<sup>4</sup> All attempts failed, and within hours after the Provisional Government of Israel declared independence on 15 May, neighboring Arab states invaded Palestine.

After a brief cease-fire collapsed in July, the Security Council ordered another, this time under Chapter VII of the Charter. Negotiations under U.N. auspices commenced early in 1949 between Israel and each of its four Arab neighbors-- Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria.<sup>5</sup> By July of the same year, each of these states had concluded an armistice agreement with Israel. Included in the implementation machinery for each agreement and for Security Council resolutions was a United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) with authority to report on observance of cease-fire and armistice agreements.<sup>6</sup>

UNTSO supplied U.N. observers on all of Israel's borders. After the war in 1956, UNTSO's functions on some borders were taken over by the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) which was located in Gaza and Sinai.<sup>7</sup>

Indonesia. Disagreements between the Netherlands and the Republic of Indonesia over the implementation of the Indonesian independence agreement that had been signed by the two parties in March 1947, led to military hostilities in the early summer of that year.<sup>8</sup> In August, at the request of Indonesia, the Security Council called for a cease-fire and established a Good Offices Committee to assist in carrying it out. The Committee was aided by a small group of military observers from the staffs of the Consuls General

in Indonesia. After the cease-fire broke down several times, a truce agreement was negotiated with U.N. assistance in January 1948. This too failed to hold, and hostilities resumed during the final weeks of 1948.<sup>9</sup>

In January 1949, the Security Council again requested a cessation of the fighting, and reconstituted the earlier Commission as the United Nations Commission for Indonesia (UNCI), also with a complement of military observers. Agreements were reached in November 1949, embodying a Dutch transfer of sovereignty to Indonesia. After completing its tasks regarding implementation of the transfer agreement, the U.N. mission was disbanded in early 1951.<sup>10</sup>

Kashmir. When India and Pakistan became independent shortly after World War II, they divided between them some five hundred "states" formerly under British sovereignty. One of these, Kashmir, has been a source of bitter antagonism ever since its Hindu ruler opted in 1947 for attaching his predominantly Moslem state to India.

In January 1948, India accused Pakistan in the Security Council of sponsoring raids in Kashmir.<sup>11</sup> The Council acted by establishing a United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP), whose authorization included investigation and reporting as well as assisting mediation efforts.

By January 1949, the parties reached agreements that permitted a cease-fire. To assist UNCIP in overseeing the

cease-fire, a group of military observers became operational almost immediately. They became known as the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP),<sup>12</sup> which had responsibilities for maintaining the uneasy truce in Kashmir.

Egypt. In late October 1956, Israel, France, and Great Britain launched concerted attacks against Egypt. Security Council action to restore peace and secure troop withdrawals was prevented by French and British vetoes.<sup>13</sup> Consequently, with U.S. and Soviet acquiescence, Yugoslavia invoked the provisions of the Uniting for Peace resolution and initiated a Security Council resolution which transferred the issue to the General Assembly.<sup>14</sup>

During the first week of November, the Assembly adopted a cease-fire resolution and authorized Secretary-General Hammarskjold to plan a peace force. The parties agreed, a cease-fire went into effect, and the Assembly created the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF).<sup>15</sup> Ten countries voluntarily provided troops, which numbered as many as 6,000 at one point<sup>16</sup> --the first example of U.N. peacekeeping by comparatively large-scale military forces. These nonfighting units patrolled within Egypt along the Israeli borders in the Gaza Strip and the Sinai desert until May 1967, when Egypt requested their withdrawal.

Lebanon. In May 1958, Lebanon went before the Security Council to charge the United Arab Republic with massive intervention in its internal affairs, with infiltrating men and arms, and with conspiring through financial and other means against the Lebanese government.<sup>17</sup> The Security Council waited to see whether the League of Arab States would be able to ease tensions. When the League could not do so, the Council acted in early July to dispatch the United Nations Observer Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL) to ensure that no infiltration was occurring.<sup>18</sup>

Middle East tensions increased in mid-July with the overthrow and assassination of the King of Iraq. Lebanon and Jordan immediately called for--and received--military support from the United States and Great Britain respectively.

Great power differences stymied the Security Council, and an emergency session of the Assembly was convened after the Secretary-General had proceeded to enlarge UNOGIL. The United States and Great Britain agreed to withdraw their troops. By November the withdrawals were completed, elections had stabilized Lebanon's internal situation, and the borders were quiet. UNOGIL terminated operations by mid-December.<sup>19</sup>



Congo. The largest, costliest, and most complex U.N. peacekeeping operation was a product of the chaos that followed the Congo's attainment of independence at the beginning of July 1960.<sup>20</sup> Within two weeks the army mutinied, law and order broke down completely, Katanga seceded, and the central government requested help from the United Nations. Secretary-General Hammarskjold requested the Security Council to act urgently. It responded by authorizing the United Nations Congo Operation (ONUC), with the United States and the Soviet Union voting affirmatively.<sup>21</sup>

Utilizing civilian as well as military components, ONUC was authorized during the next four years to maintain law, order, and essential services throughout the Congo. Eventually, ONUC was granted authority by the Security Council to use force if necessary to perform its functions.<sup>22</sup>

At its peak ONUC consisted of almost 20,000 military and specialized personnel contributed by 35 countries. ONUC cost the United Nations approximately \$411 million.<sup>23</sup> The military force of the ONUC withdrew completely from the Congo in the summer of 1964 with most of the U.N. objectives achieved.

West Irian. The main problem left unresolved by the Indonesian attainment of independence in 1949 was the status of the territory of West New Guinea (West Irian).<sup>24</sup> The

Dutch continued to administer the area despite Indonesian claims that the territory was an integral part of Indonesia.<sup>25</sup> After more than a decade of political wrangling, Indonesians and Dutch clashed in minor military episodes during late 1961 and early 1962.

Negotiations in and outside the U.N. brought an agreement in August 1962, governing the terms of an immediate relinquishment of Dutch sovereignty, an interim period of control by the U.N., and an eventual transfer of administrative authority to Indonesia, to be held until a plebiscite in 1969.<sup>26</sup>

Even before the U.N. formally acted to implement the agreement, the Secretary-General's military adviser and a small observer unit arrived in West New Guinea to assist in the immediate tasks of implementation. One month later, in September 1962, the General Assembly authorized the establishment of the United Nations Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA).<sup>27</sup> UNTEA maintained local security and, under the ultimate authority of the Secretary-General, fully administered West New Guinea until Indonesia took over in May 1963.<sup>28</sup> In addition to a core of U.N. officials, UNTEA comprised a security force of some 1,500 Pakistani troops, as well as local military personnel who were temporarily placed under UNTEA's command.

Yemen. Throughout 1962 Yemen was caught up in a civil war between royalist and republican factions, supported directly and actively by Saudi Arabia and the UAR, respectively.<sup>29</sup> Diplomatic missions from the United Nations and the United States managed by early 1963 to arrange a disengagement agreement under which the warring parties and their supporters would cease military activity and undertake a phased withdrawal of forces.

To supervise the disengagement and to police demilitarized zones, the Security Council created the United Nations Yemen Observation Mission (UNYOM).<sup>30</sup> The enabling resolution was adopted in June 1963, and observers arrived in Yemen within several weeks with authority to certify whether the parties were complying with the agreement. Despite extremely difficult physical conditions, they were able to report that compliance, particularly on the part of the UAR, was minimal. Without authority to force a solution on the parties, UNYOM's functions therefore could not be performed. Accordingly it was withdrawn in September 1964.<sup>31</sup>

Cyprus. Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities entered a period of fragile and irregular cooperation following Cypriot independence in 1960. Internecine rivalry between the preponderant Greeks and the minority Turks erupted into violent fighting during Christmas week of 1963.<sup>32</sup>

Immediate tasks of maintaining peace fell to the British, whose troops were already in Cyprus by treaty right. After attempts to reach agreement on a NATO peacekeeping force failed during the early months of 1964, largely because of resistance by Cypriot President Archbishop Makarios, the U.N. acted in March.<sup>33</sup> Without objection by any of the great powers, the Security Council authorized the formation of a United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), which became operational in late March. Since then, the Security Council has regularly extended UNFICYP's mandate to remain on the island.<sup>34</sup>

Nine countries have provided military units of small contingents of civilian police, which at their peak numbered nearly 7,000. These forces are responsible for assisting in the maintenance of law and order and for normalizing conditions on the island.

India-Pakistan. War broke out between India and Pakistan in August 1965, and the matter was soon brought before the Security Council for action.<sup>35</sup> After the parties ignored its calls for a cease-fire during the first week of September, the Council used exceptionally strong language and, with the consent of the United States and the Soviet Union, demanded a cease-fire and a subsequent withdrawal of military forces. Three days later a cease-fire formally went into effect.

The Council delegated to the Secretary-General the responsibility for assisting in the supervision of the cease-fire agreement. He strengthened the existing U.N. observers in Kashmir (UNMOGIP), and created a new group to patrol the borders between India and Pakistan, for which UNMOGIP had no responsibility. The new machinery was called the United Nations India-Pakistan Observation Mission (UNIPOM).<sup>36</sup>

UNIPOM commenced operations in late September 1965, and remained on the scene until its functions had been completed in March 1966. UNIPOM was then disbanded; UNMOGIP has continued its role in Kashmir.

## CHAPTER IV

### THE POTENTIAL OF INTELLIGENCE AS A UNITED NATIONS RESOURCE

The major peacekeeping operations by the U.N. over the past twenty-five years have been of an ad hoc nature. In most cases very little if any advance planning was accomplished prior to commencement of activity by U.N. observers or forces.

One of the major deficiencies that affected all U.N. peacekeeping activities was the lack of a capability to gather and analyze pertinent intelligence in an area of operations. If disputes that have the potential to engage the superpowers and international attention are to be controlled and contained by the U.N. then an effective early warning system supported by timely and adequate intelligence is necessary.<sup>1</sup>

Source of Intelligence. One high intelligence officer, Captain Ellis M. Zacharias, U.S. Navy, a World War II Deputy Director, Office of Naval Intelligence, once wrote that in the Navy 95 percent of peacetime intelligence came from open sources, another 4 percent from semiopen sources, and only 1 percent, sometimes less, from secret agents: "There is very little these confidential agents can tell," he wrote, "that is not accessible to an alert analyst who knows what he is looking for and knows how to find it in open sources."<sup>2</sup>

Twenty-five years of cold war have elapsed since those words were written. During that time, intelligence operations by secret agents have greatly increased, though it is debatable whether the information they supply has increased accordingly. The fact remains, however, that the great bulk of intelligence information still is gained from nonsecret sources, or, increasingly, through technological means.

To use the United States national intelligence as an example, a rough breakdown of the sources of intelligence for most of the 1947-1967 period has indicated to one analyst the following magnitudes with respect to sources and collectors:<sup>3</sup>

	Percent
Clandestine operations, covert sources, and other secret agents	20
Press, radio, tourists, published documents, and other standard sources	25
Routine reports, Department of State and other government agencies abroad	25
Military attaches accredited by foreign governments and from routine military operations	30

To recall a remark which William J. Donovan, former head of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), made at the end of World War II, intelligence work is mostly a matter of "pulling together myriad facts, making a pattern of them, and drawing inferences from that pattern."<sup>4</sup>

Intelligence Defined. A useful definition of intelligence may be found in the Dictionary of United States Military Terms for Joint Usage.

Intelligence--The product resulting from the collection, evaluation, analysis, integration, and interpretation of all available information which concerns one or more aspects of foreign countries or areas, which is immediately or potentially significant to the development and execution of plans, policies, and operations.<sup>5</sup>

The categories of intelligence that would be appropriate to consider in support of peacekeeping operations by the U.N. are strategic intelligence, tactical intelligence, and counterintelligence.

Strategic Intelligence. Strategic intelligence has been defined as "Intelligence which is required for the formation of policy and military plans at national and international levels."<sup>6</sup>

Strategic intelligence is the broadest in scope. It refers to information regarding the capabilities, vulnerabilities, and intentions of foreign nations required by planners in establishing the basis for an adequate national security policy in time of peace. It includes both long-range forecasts of political, economic, and military trends and early warning of impending political or military actions. It also provides the basis for projected overall military operations in time of war. As Sherman Kent has put it:



"If foreign policy is the shield of the republic, as Walter Lippmann has called it, then strategic intelligence is the thing that gets the shield to the right place at the right time. It is also the thing that stands ready to guide the sword."<sup>7</sup>

Strategic intelligence should therefore be considered the primary concern of national interests and not applicable in principle to support the altruistic aims of the Charter and the U.N.

Tactical Intelligence. Tactical intelligence has been defined as "Intelligence which is required for the planning and conduct of tactical operations. Essentially, tactical intelligence and strategic intelligence differ only in scope, point of view, and level of employment."<sup>8</sup>

Tactical, or operational, intelligence is sometimes termed combat intelligence because it usually concerns information required by a commander in the field engaged in tactical operations. The distinction between tactical and strategic intelligence, however, is decreasingly clear-cut. It is tactical intelligence that will be considered in detail as the most useful category for the U.N.

Counterintelligence. Counterintelligence denotes that phase of intelligence activity devoted to countering the

effectiveness of hostile foreign intelligence operations. Essentially it is a police function. More specifically its purpose is to protect information against espionage, to guard one's intelligence operations from infiltrations or one's material against sabotage.<sup>9</sup>

Intelligence Goals. The primary goal of all intelligence, as the definitions above suggest, is to provide foreknowledge, to supply policy makers and operators with sound evaluations of the present and future status, capabilities, and intentions of foreign powers.

Intelligence contribution to an analysis in depth of the social, political, economic, and military forces at work in a country is likely to be of key importance for developing a "country strategy" that would set forth sound guidelines to U.N. officials charged with responsibilities in peacekeeping.

Intelligence is concerned with the relevant future and past, as well as current, properties of the external environment. Foreknowledge of relevant changes in the outside world is needed so that policy can be formulated in time to meet those changes.

An estimate of future situations in the outside world is a direct operational requirement of intelligence. Concern with past states of affairs in the outside world is subsidiary,

but knowledge of both past and current situations permits the discovery and analysis of trends that are useful to forecasting.

Prediction is a central concern of intelligence although it is one of the most difficult. The United States military intelligence establishment, for example, tends to avoid estimating a potential enemy's intentions but instead to appraise his capabilities and to assume that he will do whatever mischief he can.<sup>10</sup> In the U.N.'s peacekeeping role, the identification of a potential enemy is not relevant since that is a policy matter for member states and is beyond the purview of the Charter for the Organization. The important factor for the U.N. is that the intentions of the parties involved in a dispute are assessed.

The expanding role of intelligence in support of those who formulate and execute policies is abundantly evident today. Assuming that in some cases some kind of effective military force is necessary for United Nations peacekeeping, then an adequate intelligence system should be integral to these operations. This system must be able to provide an accurate picture of the world as a whole, of the capabilities and intentions of potential and actual disputant parties, and of the chances of disturbance in the Third World. It must furnish information on political, diplomatic, military, economic, and other matters.

U.N. Peacekeeping and Intelligence. There is a paucity of information on the use of intelligence by the U.N. in peacekeeping operations. From the conduct of the operations, it is fair to assume that in all cases very little planning or thought had been given to the need for intelligence to conduct a particular mission and the examples of problems related to the lack of intelligence in the Congo in 1960-64 and Suez in 1956 are representative.

The Congo operation might have been launched more smoothly if some advance planning had taken place. The U.N. had practically no information on the Congo prior to the actual undertaking. The first maps of the Congo, in fact, were obtained from a Belgian shipping company on Wall Street in New York.<sup>11</sup> Lack of information made it particularly difficult to plan for support requirements--how, for instance, should ammunition be stored in the Congo climate, what sort of shelter did the troops require, where were airstrips located and which of them were suitable for which types of aircraft? As one professional soldier remarked, "You might just as well have asked the New York Yankees to establish a military force there."<sup>12</sup>

The U.N. force commander instituted the requirement for gathering of intelligence at the beginning of operations.<sup>13</sup> A number of means were exploited to secure intelligence,

especially in the seceding Katanga Province. They included radio interception, air reconnaissance, combat and other types of patrol (including helicopter), and a system of provincial or field liaison officers, whose specific function was to keep the U.N. force commander in Leopoldville informed of the local situation.<sup>14</sup>

There were other deficiencies in the U.N. intelligence system in the Congo, and the results of the effort were considerably less than adequate.<sup>15</sup> The ONUC was hampered by having too few qualified specialists and too little equipment, especially for aerial photography and for recording intercepted radio broadcasts. A major problem was the lack of money to buy information.<sup>16</sup> In spite of these limitations, the ONUC was able to secure, mainly by aerial reconnaissance, sufficient information in December 1962 and January 1963 on the location of all Katangan aircraft, which they were able to destroy on the ground at the beginning of the operation to drive the French and South African mercenaries out of Katanga in the phase of operations called 'Round Three.'<sup>17</sup> This was perhaps the most successful operation based on intelligence during the course of the crisis.

Secretary-General Hammarskjold admitted that the lack of an intelligence network in the Congo was a serious

handicap. He justified this lack on the grounds that the U.N. 'must have clean hands', and therefore could not do the sort of thing that intelligence services habitually do--lying, bribery, blackmail, theft and so on.<sup>18</sup>

An earlier mission, the U.N. Emergency Force (UNEF) in the Suez crisis in 1956, exemplified the U.N.'s lack of planning and lack of supporting intelligence regarding the area of operations when most of the troop contingents turned out to be ill equipped for desert operations.<sup>19</sup>

Intelligence Support of Policy and Decision. The role of good intelligence for national powers in the making of sound and successful policy decisions has been significant. There have been some international crises that involved the United States where intelligence support played an important role in national decision making that may have applicability to U.N. peacemaking and peacekeeping activity. The Cuba situation used strategic and tactical intelligence while the Congo was a situation where current, tactical intelligence was of importance. In these two situations, the role of tactical intelligence will be examined as to its potential for support of the Secretary-General and the Secretariat.

Cuban Example. The Cuban missile crisis in 1962 lends itself to detailed study of the complex intelligence role

because the crisis was of limited duration, the major events of the drama were sharply etched in detail, and intelligence played a central role in the formation of policy before and after the discovery of the Soviet strategic missiles in Cuba. From this incident, many general principles of the intelligence function for United Nations peacekeeping may be derived; from it may be seen how intelligence can serve as an instrument of policy. For this confrontation required of intelligence a general estimate of a basic political situation: that of the Soviet-American power equation and of fundamental Soviet security policy.<sup>20</sup> Intelligence also had to look for specific signals that would indicate important changes in Russian behavior patterns. Throughout the crisis, intelligence provided the decision makers with greater leeway than otherwise would have been the case, in such crucial choices as the timing of their reaction, the diplomatic method and arena of response, and even the substance of the policy adopted.<sup>21</sup>

American intelligence operations by the beginning of September 1962 discovered the presence of various defensive dispositions, the most significant of which were surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), and the presence of at least 3,500 Russians in Cuba. The intelligence was gained from photo-reconnaissance and clandestine sources within Cuba. At

this point there was no evidence of offensive weapons (surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs) and bombers) emplaced on Cuba. It appears that after the midsummer decision to place SSMs in Cuba, the Russians began to ship supportive materials there in early September and the missiles began to arrive in the middle or latter part of that month.<sup>22</sup>

Air reconnaissance was intensified in late September. A U-2 flight on 14 October revealed the construction of SSM sites and later photographs enabled intelligence officers to estimate the full scope of the Soviet effort. The week of 16-22 October was devoted to reaching a decision as to the basic American response, and the following period, 22-28 October, brought on the famous confrontation. The President revealed the crisis in a speech on 22 October; the naval quarantine on missile shipments to Cuba took effect on 24 October; Mr. Khrushchev's first letter arrived 26 October; an American U-2 was destroyed 27 October in the only military engagement of the incident; and the Soviet Union agreed to a withdrawal of its strategic weapons on 28 October.<sup>23</sup>

The intelligence gained in the area of operation significantly aided the U.S. policy makers in the crisis. The Russians' intentions were not misread, and their technical capacity, sufficiency of audacity, and analysis of their actions on the basis of what the United States might do in



a similar situation were all properly evaluated in a timely manner for the President and his advisors.<sup>24</sup>

Although the Cuban missile crisis brought requirements by U.S. policy makers for both strategic and tactical intelligence, this latter category, consisting of the U-2 photo missions and the clandestine reports from agents in Cuba, all helped the President to assess the tactical situation and prepare an appropriate response. It is with this category of intelligence that the Secretary-General and his staff could best be served.

Congo Example. The smaller and much different intelligence operation by the United States in the Congo in 1960-1964 serves to highlight the relevance of timely and accurate information to support political objectives in the international arena. It also serves as an example of activity that could be useful to the United Nations.

The pertinence of the tactical intelligence activity in the Congo engaged in by the U.S. is that by having experienced intelligence personnel in the field, the government leadership in Washington was apprised in a timely manner of the fast changing events taking place. This enabled the decision makers to take reasoned and informed action to implement policies and decisions that were in the national interest. This has relevance for international peacekeeping

activity by the U.N. One of the most important problems confronting U.N. missions in the field and the Secretary-General in New York has been the deficiency of adequate intelligence and information in particular areas of operations.

The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) is a much maligned organization whose failures are usually well-publicized and whose successes are seldom known. An exception to this latter category is their role in the Congo.

When the Communist and Western worlds began to wrestle for influence in the vast, undeveloped Congo in 1960 after it had gained independence from Belgium, it was necessary for the policy makers in Washington who wanted to block the creation of a pro-Communist regime, identify and support the leaders for a pro-American government, and supply the advice and support to enable that country to survive, to have a capability on the scene to collect and evaluate information in a timely manner.<sup>25</sup>

In the preindependence days, the Belgians had forbidden Americans to meet with Congolese officials. The CIA, starting almost from scratch, dispersed its agents to learn Congolese politics from the bush on up, to recruit likely leaders, and to finance their bids for power.<sup>26</sup> Its agents had the capability to quickly gather and transmit information and soon identified for the Washington policy makers

those leaders who appeared to have the best chance with friendly support to create stability from the chaos.

Joseph Mobutu, Victor Nendaka, and Albert Ndele were the principal leaders identified, and their eventual emergence as President of the country, Minister of Transportation, and head of the national bank respectively, proved a tribute to the judgment of those on the scene.<sup>27</sup>

## CHAPTER V

### INTELLIGENCE AND PEACEKEEPING

All member states of the U.N. have a long term interest in strengthening its peacekeeping machinery. Both the United States and the Soviet Union have experienced the perils of unilateral involvement. Both the superpowers, and the world as a whole, would benefit from a policy of reciprocal abstention by the superpowers from local conflicts and a strengthened U.N. capacity to patrol borders, supervise elections and verify compliance with peacemaking directives.<sup>1</sup>

Crisis Areas. In the fifteen years since the creation of the first United Nations Emergency Force for the mission in Suez in 1956, no better alternative to U.N. peacekeeping operations has been devised for avoiding escalation at two types of danger points: quarrels between small powers resulting in violence, and internal disorders of the Congo or Cyprus variety which threaten to draw in powerful outsiders.<sup>2</sup> U.N. peacekeeping seems the most likely method of dealing with potential crises at such points as Kashmir; Rhodesia, Angola or Mozambique; South Arabia; any one of a dozen African states that are far from being nations and may have chronic border disputes; the Middle East; or South Africa, where the potential for violence is unlimited.<sup>3</sup>

Diplomats gathered in alarm some midnight may once again ask, as Adlai Stevenson said Adam asked when Eve hesitated for a moment after his proposal of marriage, "Is there someone else?"<sup>4</sup>

Peacekeeping Defect. The deficiency in information gathering has been an important defect in U.N. peacekeeping operations. There is no limit to the amount of ready information which may be needed to deploy and use a U.N. force. Yet the accumulation of vast quantities of quickly decaying information is expensive, wasteful, and often deleterious when obsolete information is accepted as a basis for decision or action. While a great deal of relatively permanent information is available and might well be included in a U.N. military reference room, the U.N. staff should depend for the bulk of its information gathering on the knowledge of individual staff officers gained in their past experience, through frequent liaison visits both to potential areas of U.N. operations and to potential donors of forces, and through improving and formalizing liaison arrangements with national military establishments, primarily through their military delegations at the U.N. Locating reliable sources from which current information can be assuredly obtained at a short notice should be one of the primary jobs of the U.N. staff.

The U.N. does not have a staff which gathers intelligence and engages in contingency planning (i.e., establishing the possible situations and developing appropriate plans for each). The U.N. does not have a single man who does either of these things. Secretary-General Hammarskjold actually refused to have an intelligence staff. Perhaps he thought that ideally the U.N. should not have any permanent military organization.<sup>5</sup>

Any planning for the future of U.N. peacekeeping should consider the recent technological advances that might be employed for intelligence gathering.

Collection Technology. U.S. satellites circling the earth at 17,000 miles an hour have ". . . the capability to count the intercontinental missiles poised in Soviet Kazakhstan, monitor the conversations . . . between Moscow and a Soviet submarine near Tahiti, follow the countdown of a sputnik launching as easily as that of an Apollo capsule in Florida, track the electronic imprint of an adversary's bombers and watch for the heat traces of his missiles."<sup>6</sup>

Only ten years ago, at least one human pilot was still required to guide a black U-2 jet across the Soviet Union from Pakistan to Norway, or over Cuba or Communist China from bases in Florida or Taiwan.

The cameras and listening devices, capable of picking out a chalk line or a radar station from 15 miles up, were incredible in their day, the product of imaginative research and development. But spies in the sky now orbiting the earth do almost as well from 100 miles up.<sup>7</sup>

In 1965, in testimony before a Congressional committee, Secretary of Defense McNamara suggested that the United States could orbit a satellite capable of photographing and otherwise "inspecting" Soviet space spies, while other equipment could photograph them from the ground with remarkable detail.<sup>8</sup>

The U.S.S.R displayed extraordinary interest in the Middle East during mid-March 1971, particularly over Israel, Suez, Lebanon, and Turkey. One of its spy satellites was kept in space over the Middle East for fourteen days, shifting orbit twice. Over Israel it operated its long-range camera by transmitting pictures instantaneously back to earth. Usually, the exposed photography is stored for later transmission or recovery.<sup>9</sup>

Sources of Intelligence and Technology. At CIA headquarters in Langley, Virginia, intricate machines, some unknown a decade or even a few years ago, read, translate, interpret, collate, file and store the information gathered by satellites. Months or years later as required, the data

can be retrieved from libraries of microfilmed information.<sup>10</sup>  
An important aspect of U.N. control of disputes is an effective early warning system. If the threat to the peace, or the requirement for help, can be ascertained while it is still small, the possibility for effective control increases.<sup>11</sup> There is a need for a more efficient system of information sharing, especially some arrangement to bring warning intelligence to the attention of the Secretary-General. It is not inconceivable that some day the U.N. will be given access to information obtained from space satellite systems, to electronic intelligence, and to other "black box" information<sup>12</sup> obtained from the gadgets of modern technology.

Levels of scientific achievement in detection devices are clearly of key importance. Television, radar, infrared-detection, surveillance by space satellites, and computations by high-speed computers, rather than human observation and analysis, can yield both the source data and final conclusions of early warning and situation analysis for mission planning.<sup>13</sup>

The combination of personal observation and technical methods of intelligence collection and analysis will probably be increasingly weighed in favor of technical methods. Earth satellites equipped with TV cameras and other instruments should in fact enlarge many times the amount of economic and military intelligence that can be uncovered by



present day methods of aerial photography.<sup>14</sup> These developments, however, are hardly likely to eliminate or even diminish the importance of the analyst. Photos of factories do not tell all that goes on under the roofs of the factories. However effective these technological advances, intelligence is still a difficult process of collection, analysis, evaluation, and synthesis of information. It remains a job for well-trained, competent, experienced, and dedicated professionals.

Summary. The U.N.'s role as peacemaker and peacekeeper has a continuing requirement for planning and preparation for operations in areas of conflict. To most effectively carry out this role, there should be a capability to gather and analyze pertinent information for the Secretary-General and the Secretariat. The use of tactical intelligence by U.S. policy makers in the Cuban and Congo crises is an example of how effective reliable and timely information can be. A principal requirement would be to have a staff in the Secretariat able to support the Secretary-General in areas where a crisis becomes a problem for U.N. consideration. The deficiency of information of any sort has been a detriment to the effective commencement and carrying out of peacekeeping efforts. Through liaison visits by a U.N. intelligence staff to potential crisis areas, the capability for gathering

information for future operations would be enhanced. The sharing of information by those U.N. member nations who have satellite, airborne, and other reconnaissance capabilities could be of benefit to U.N. planners. The use of computers to read, translate, file, store, and collate the quantities of information available through open sources could bridge a manpower gap. It is not expected that member nations would support a comprehensive staff.

## CHAPTER VI

### CONCLUSION

The United Nations is an utterly indispensable organization. One of the problems is that much of its work gets very little attention. General agreement, serenity, a successful negotiation are not news. It takes a little blood and controversy to get public attention.<sup>1</sup>

Undoubtedly there will continue to be brushfire conflicts each year, ignited by struggles for power within governments, insurgencies and counterinsurgencies, external subversion, racial tension, religious conflict, and border disputes. As in the past, most of these will be resolved by the action of individual governments, or by coups d'etat, or by some form of negotiation, conciliation, mediation, or arbitration. But some of them will get out of control and will require an international fire brigade.

The U.N. is the principal source of peacekeeping know-how, experience, and authority, and it provides a feasible alternative in some circumstances to superpower confrontation. The U.N. has demonstrated on several occasions a capacity to conduct effective peacekeeping operations with military personnel in disputes where forces identified with either superpower would not have been welcome, and where their unilateral interposition would probably have had disastrous consequences.

The number of internationally significant outbreaks of violence has been increasing from 34 in 1958 to 58 in 1965.<sup>2</sup>

Most of these have occurred in the Third World states of Asia, Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East; in particular, in the areas of the power vacuum remaining after the demise of European colonialism.

The question of sharing with the U.N. selected information gained by member governments from satellite and manned aircraft photoreconnaissance should be explored. Implicit in this is the necessity for agreement on who will supply what intelligence and how security of the information can be maintained.

The U.N. information interest in support of the peacekeeping role can be fairly well focused. The potential problem areas where the U.S. and U.S.S.R. would not want to arrive at a confrontation could be targeted.

Assuming that the U.N. peacekeeping and peacemaking roles have and will continue to have validity in the future, then, it is important, and it appears practicable, that the Secretary-General and his staff should have a capacity to gather and use appropriate intelligence to most efficiently carry out these important roles.

NOTES

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None

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## APPENDIX I

### SELECTED ARTICLES FROM THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER

#### Chapter I: Purposes and Principles

##### ARTICLE 1

1. To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression of other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment of settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace. . . .

##### ARTICLE 2

7. Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.

#### Chapter IV: The General Assembly

##### ARTICLE 11

2. The General Assembly may discuss any questions relating to the maintenance of international peace and security brought before it by any Member of the United Nations, or by the Security Council, or by a state which is not a Member of the United Nations in accordance with Article 35, paragraph 2, and, except as provided in Article 12, may make recommendations with regard to any such questions to the state or states concerned or to the Security Council or to both. Any such question on which action is necessary shall be referred to the Security Council by the General Assembly either before or after discussion.

## Chapter V: The Security Council

### ARTICLE 24

1. In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its Members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf.

### ARTICLE 25

The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter.

## Chapter VI: Pacific Settlement of Disputes

### ARTICLE 33

1. The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.

### ARTICLE 36

1. The Security Council may, at any stage of a dispute of the nature referred to in Article 33 or of a situation of like nature, recommend appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment.

2. The Security Council should take into consideration any procedures for the settlement of the dispute which have already been adopted by the parties.

3. In making recommendations under this Article the Security Council should also take into consideration that legal disputes should as a general rule be referred by the parties to the International Court of Justice in accordance with the provisions of the Statute of the Court.



## ARTICLE 37

1. Should the parties to a dispute of the nature referred to in Article 33 fail to settle it by the means indicated in that Article, they shall refer it to the Security Council.

2. If the Security Council deems that the continuance of the dispute is in fact likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, it shall decide whether to take action under Article 36 or to recommend such terms of settlement as it may consider appropriate.

## Chapter VII: Action With Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression

## ARTICLE 39

The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.

## ARTICLE 41

The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such Measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.

## ARTICLE 42

Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.

#### ARTICLE 43

1. All Members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security.

2. Such agreement or agreements shall govern the numbers and types of forces, their degree of readiness and general location, and the nature of the facilities and assistance to be provided.

3. The agreement or agreements shall be negotiated as soon as possible on the initiative of the Security Council. They shall be concluded between the Security Council and Members or between the Security Council and groups of Members and shall be subject to ratification by the signatory states in accordance with their respective constitutional processes.

#### ARTICLE 44

When the Security Council has decided to use force it shall, before calling upon a Member not represented on it to provide armed forces in fulfillment of the obligations assumed under Article 43, invite that Member, if the Member so desires, to participate in the decisions of the Security Council concerning the employment of contingents of that Member's armed forces.

#### ARTICLE 45

In order to enable the United Nations to take urgent military measures, Members shall hold immediately available national air force contingents for combined international enforcement action. The strength and degree of readiness of these contingents and plans for their combined action shall be determined, within the limits laid down in the special agreement or agreements referred to in Article 43, by the Security Council with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee.

#### ARTICLE 47

1. There shall be established a Military Staff Committee to advise and assist the Security Council on all

Questions relating to the Security Council's military requirements for the maintenance of international peace and security, the employment and command of forces placed at its disposal, the regulation of armaments, and possible disarmament.

2. The Military Staff Committee shall consist of the Chiefs of Staff of the permanent members of Security Council or their representatives. Any Member of the United Nations not permanently represented on the Committee shall be invited by the Committee to be associated with it when the efficient discharge of the Committee's responsibilities requires the participation of that Member in its work.

3. The Military Staff Committee shall be responsible under the Security Council for the strategic direction of any armed forces placed at the disposal of the Security Council. Questions relating to the command of such forces shall be worked out subsequently.

4. The Military Staff Committee, with the authorization of the Security Council and after consultation with appropriate regional agencies, may establish regional sub-committees.

## Chapter VIII: Regional Arrangements

### ARTICLE 52

1. Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action, provided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.

2. The Members of the United Nations entering into such arrangements or constituting such agencies shall make every effort to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies before referring them to the Security Council.

3. The Security Council shall encourage the development of pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies either on the initiative of the states concerned or by reference from the Security Council.

4. This Article in no way impairs the application of Articles 34 and 35.

#### ARTICLE 54

The Security Council shall at all times be kept fully informed of activities undertaken or in contemplation under regional arrangements or by regional agencies for the maintenance of international peace and security.

#### Chapter XV: The Secretariat

#### ARTICLE 99

The Secretary-General may bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security.

#### ARTICLE 100

1. In the performance of their duties the Secretary-General and the staff shall not seek or receive instructions from any government or from any other authority external to the Organization. They shall refrain from any action which might reflect on their position as international officials responsible only to the Organization.

2. Each Member of the United Nations undertakes to respect the exclusively international character of the responsibilities of the Secretary-General and the staff and not to seek to influence them in the discharge of their responsibilities.