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THE OVERSEAS CHINESE: FRIEND OR FOE

by

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Colonel U.S.M.C.

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
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William Plaskett Jr.
25 Mar '71

5 April 1971

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
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Abstract of

THE OVERSEAS CHINESE: FRIEND OR FOE

A general study of the overseas Chinese problem in Southeast Asia. Cultural, legal and historic background data are presented to form a basis for comparison of the impact the Cultural Revolution in mainland China had on the assimilation and nationalization of the overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia. The overseas Chinese, which were a Chinese national block supporting the government of China while residing outside of China, are found to be shifting their national loyalties away from both Chinas. The People's Republic of China has reduced its efforts to obtain the support of the overseas Chinese community in its foreign policy. The crisis facing overseas Chinese communities in resolving their cultural and nationality problems with their adopted countries is suggested as the problem of individual overseas Chinese and individual national governments. Although progress will be slow, the process of assimilation is working to resolve the question in favor of friend, not foe.

PREFACE

Purpose: The purpose of this paper is to examine the overseas Chinese and their loyalty or lack thereof to the host countries of Southeast Asia where they are residents. The first part of the paper deals with the overseas Chinese problem in general and historic terms. This background provides a base to interpret current trends and the effect of the cultural revolution in the People's Republic of China on the Chinese residing in Southeast Asia.

Chinese culture and tradition are important parts of the make-up of Chinese loyalties. The degree of assimilation of the Chinese within a nation is one of the measures used to determine overseas Chinese loyalties.

Sources: Chinese culture and tradition prior to 1949 are easily documented. Information on changes in Chinese cultural values within the People's Republic of China since 1949 is scarce. To acquire this material, one must rely heavily on news broadcasts, newspapers, and speeches originating within China. Until recently, western observers, with the exception of the English and French, have not had access to Red China to make their own observations and determinations.

The effects of the actions taking place within China are not easily determined by watching the overseas Chinese.

They are subject to many simultaneous stimuli. Many of the factors working on them are related to state nationalism and local area and regional problems. Several Southeast Asian nations are reluctant to admit to minority problems, racial problems and the degree to which they have accomplished assimilation of minorities. For this reason, statistical documentation must of necessity be scientific projections of the most recent census data published.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The Problem. For over five hundred years, Chinese emigrants have been leaving their homeland and taking up residence around the world.¹ The bulk of the emigration has been to that part of the world known as Nan-yang*, Southeast Asia. Initially, the number of emigrants was small and the need for emigrants as laborers was great. These two factors combined to make the presence of an overseas Chinese community desirable.

Since the late nineteenth century, the numbers of Chinese emigrants have increased substantially. The overseas Chinese communities were becoming prominent. The colonial governments of England, France and Holland recognized the problem of nationality status for overseas Chinese and made special arrangements to accommodate their situation. These accommodations frequently gave the Chinese a special type of recognition short of new citizenship.² The colonial laws for determining citizenship established a regional precedent for the establishment of overseas Chinese citizenship which persists to some degree today.

*"Nan-yang" Chinese for the "South Seas." Used by Chinese scholars to mean what is now referred to as Southeast Asia.

Chinese residents, the overseas Chinese--the hua-ch'iao*--are the most influential minority groups in South-east Asia. Overseas Chinese proprietors own nearly half of Malaya's tin mines, which produce 30% of the world's tin. Directly or indirectly, they control 90% of the world's natural rubber production. Overseas Chinese, whose ancestors were coolies, hold sway over coastal shipping in Malaya, Thailand, Burma, Vietnam and, until 1968, Indonesia. The overseas Chinese influence in the retail and wholesale trades, and printing and communications media (radio, newspapers, movies) is such that, if they desired, could reduce the economic life of an area to an alarming standstill.³

The issue at stake for the new nations of Southeast Asia is the national loyalty of the estimated 14 million overseas Chinese, vis-a-vis their loyalty to one of the Chinas.⁴ Although the situation in Southeast Asia has grown ominous through neglect, there is an active potential for change. To what extent the cultural revolution** enticed or repelled the overseas Chinese communities toward the People's Republic is difficult to evaluate and the

*Hua-ch'iao, "Chinese for sojourning abroad."

**The Cultural Revolution is the approximate period between 1965-1968 during which Communist China was wracked with disorder and political turmoil. Mao Tse-tung is credited with starting the revolution to instill revolutionary spirit in the youth of China. This period in China's history is still not clearly understood by China watchers.

result of which can influence regional and international diplomatic relations. To what extent the overseas Chinese are friends or foes of their respective host governments is the problem which this study addresses.

CHAPTER II

BACKGROUND ISSUES

Citizenship.

Chinese nationality has always been as binding as the coils of mortality: death alone can dissolve the individual's compact with nature and death alone can release the Chinese from his obligations to the motherland. Since China is the world, no Chinese can break his ties with the motherland without first breaking his ties with humanity. As long as he thinks of himself as Chinese no power can release the sojourner abroad from service to China. Despite Revolutions and Republics, Communism and Capitalism, the bond today remains as it was in the past.¹

In the year 1907, the Chung Hsing Daily of Singapore first used the term "Overseas Chinese" to describe a person of Chinese nationality who was not native born or naturalized in his present country of residence.² Prior to this time, these Chinese immigrants had been called "Chinese Subjects," "Chinese Laborers," "Chinese Traders," "Chinks," "Chinamen" or "The Yellow Peril." In all cases, the intent of the name given was primarily derogatory and demeaning of the Chinese national. Therefore, the term "Overseas Chinese" was not only a more palliative term, but it was more descriptive of the unique position of a Chinese national when residing outside of China. This term better exemplifies the dual citizenship and strong cultural tie of the overseas Chinese to China. Dual citizenship is a theory of law promulgated in 1909 by the Chinese Imperial Court as the

Chinese Nationality Law of 1909.

The law is based upon the principle of parent-age pure and simple. A child takes the nationality of the father. The law as pointed out by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was to keep natural-born Chinese from falling under foreign domination. The law aims at two points, (1) to define the status of nationality and (2) to minimize the abuse of the lax naturalization laws of some foreign countries as applied in their colonies near China.³

The law set forth the doctrine "that once a Chinese always a Chinese," or in more legal terms, "lex sanguinis," the claim that citizenship was acquired by racial or ethnic origin, not by place of birth.

National citizenship has always been a matter of law, but normally the law of the country of ultimate residence, not the country of origin. As a general rule, in most nation states, citizenship accrues to anyone born within the territorial boundaries of that nation.⁴ China's claim to the loyalty of the overseas Chinese, by reason of dual nationality, has long irritated the nations of Southeast Asia. However, despite their irritation, the nations concerned either passed their own strict nationality laws or did nothing to offer the overseas Chinese a citizenship or an opportunity to opt for citizenship.

Countries under colonial rule or later self-governing themselves contrived so many obstacles to Chinese acquiring citizenship, that they acceded in effect to the principle of 'jus sanguinis' promulgated by Imperial China in 1909. This tacit acceptance of the proposition that blood rather

than place of birth determines citizenship further isolated the Chinese from the people among whom they live.⁵

The lack of definitive laws plus the Chinese claim to dual nationality combined to allow many unusual citizenship situations. When the laws of nationality do not provide for transfer or adoption of local citizenship, children of succeeding generations retain their ancestors' nationality ad infinitum.⁶

This anomaly presented to the Chinese resulted in their choosing to cling to ancestral citizenship, though they had been residents abroad for many generations. Deprived of any real sense of security as persons, and rejected by local governments, the Chinese looked to China for legal protection.

Relating to the old saying: "Beauty is found in the eye of the beholder," a high percentage of overseas Chinese see themselves as Chinese regardless of their place of residence or birthright claim to nationality.

In the eyes of the Chinese governments, the Republic of China and the People's Republic of China (PRC), the term "overseas Chinese" is interpreted to mean: "Chinese immigrants and their descendants in a foreign country." When the overseas Chinese return to either China, they are called "returned overseas Chinese"; their dependents who remain in China are called "overseas Chinese dependents."

In the People's Republic of China, this system of identification is carried one step further. The areas of South China from which most overseas Chinese originally emigrated are called "overseas Chinese home districts."⁷

Although determination of nationality can be made under law, no determination of cultural nationality can be so identified. It is in the cultural area that individuals realize a more meaningful relationship to nationality. This is particularly so in the case of the Chinese and Chinese culture.

Chinese Culture. For thousands of years, the Chinese have lived without an organized religion with which to identify. Their spiritual sustenance derives from identification with a nation and a race which, to the Chinese, occupied the most splendid and lofty position in the world. It will, they believe, occupy that position indefinitely. China's resurgence as a world power, even as a Communist power, has renewed that faith in the hearts of the overseas Chinese. In a cultural sense, the overseas Chinese are not alarmed at Communist excesses because they know the desired results are in tune with the world's most noble purpose, China, "The Middle Kingdom," the center of the world. They are sustained in their belief by the absolute faith that quintessential China will survive even her present benefactors.⁸

For a Chinese of any education, the idea of stopping being Chinese, or of his descendants

doing so, is rather worse than for a Frenchman to stop being French. The Chinese is conscious that he is the heir of thousands of years of history, tradition, and social refinement. He knows that when the West was lived in by a handful of cavemen China was an ordered empire. The Chinese not only believes in the past superiority of his country but also in its present superiority. To many Chinese China is still 'The Middle Kingdom,' the center of the world, with outside it only barbarians.⁹

Chinese society strongly ties those who are fully immersed in it to the idea of China and being Chinese. It is not necessarily a political or an economic association. It is a cultural bond to the China of his heart. It is a blood relationship to the culture of his ancestors.

From the Chinese viewpoint, this cultural bond to China results in Chinese food to be the very best; Chinese beauty to be without parallel; and Chinese social customs beyond compare. Add to these cultural ties the conviction of an overseas Chinese male that his life after death depends upon the continuation of his Chinese family, and his male descendants worshipping his tablets at his family's ancestral home. The result can only be an intense desire to remain Chinese, and to remain bonded to the Chinese motherland.

In Hong Kong, there is a hotel called the Corpses Hotel. It has the appearance of an old-fashioned Chinese country house with whitewashed walls, red tiled roofs, the traditional moon-viewing pavilion, and rooms arranged around several open courtyards.

The point of the hotel is to house temporarily the bodies of the overseas Chinese who have died outside China but still want to be buried in the villages their families came from. The coffins come from Chinese communities around the world, London, San Francisco, Singapore, Manila, Bangkok, and more.¹⁰

That a Chinese should want to be buried in his homeland, even if he had never been there while alive, is a natural part of Chinese tradition and culture.

We can see why the adherence to this ancient culture is vital to the overseas Chinese and how it also motivates the individual Chinese to retain Chinese identity and nationality. Generally, the Chinese, as a matter of basic conviction, regard their culture as superior to all others and see no clear reason to adopt an inferior culture. Chinese specifically view other Asians as cultural inferiors, and physically and socially slightly obnoxious. There is also considerable contempt for Westerners, who, according to the Chinese, never fully interpreted or understood Chinese civilization.¹¹ To many overseas Chinese, the Chinese cultural tie can be as great a nationality determinant as blood or place of birth.

Early Chinese immigrants found that being of Chinese origin was no real comfort to them. They were exploited and abused by most of the countries in which they attempted residence. Exploitation of the overseas Chinese continued until 1926, when the Government of China finally acknowledged

the necessity for dispatching diplomatic representatives to protect the overseas Chinese. The failure to provide for earlier diplomatic representation was attributed to the historic Chinese attitude toward emigration. The Ch'ing Dynasty (1644-1911) prohibited emigration, and violators were considered to be "pirates," "fleeing criminals" or as "one of base character seeking after small gains." The Chinese emigrant was treated as an outlaw by his own government.¹²

Western shippers and planters facilitated the nineteenth-century migration of Chinese coolie labor but the response of the Ch'ing government was simply to renew its ban on Chinese going abroad. Consequently, overseas Chinese communities in Manila, Cholon, Bangkok, Singapore, or Batavia were on their own and never expected or received Chinese government acknowledgment or support until the very last years of the dynasty. Even then it was ineffective.¹³

This laissez faire attitude persisted until the sheer numbers of Chinese residing outside of China became so large, and their treatment so prejudicial, the Chinese government had to acquiesce and provide protection to its citizens residing in foreign lands.

Prior to the establishment of this diplomatic representation, the Chinese who departed from China knew they could not expect protection from their motherland and that they were somewhat at the mercy of the host governments. To provide a measure of group protection, the overseas Chinese organized themselves into Chinese Societies. These Chinese

societies served two purposes: Not only did they afford protection against local governments, but they did much to foster the Chinese culture and nurture ties to the motherland.¹⁴

The Chinese community was organized by the Chinese leadership to form an "imperium in imperio," a group owing allegiance to a foreign power and in effect paying taxes to that government. The term "paying taxes" must be qualified as paying monies to the motherland in the form of remittances sent by the overseas Chinese to their families remaining in China.

Since the host countries did little to encourage assimilation and acculturation during the early days, and since motherland China did little to protect its citizens "sojourning abroad," it is little wonder that the overseas Chinese established, through local societies, small replicas of the China they remembered. Understanding this imparts meaning to the term, "Chinatown", which is commonly utilized by Westerners when referring to local Chinese communities. Within the overseas Chinese community, cultural ties to China grow stronger through isolation of the minority from the majority.

Outdated social customs linger on among the Southeast Asian communities a generation after they have gone in China itself. It is partly loyalty to the memory of 'the old country'; a memory that is based on social conditions when

the immigrant as a very young man left his Chinese home; and partly, insulation from political and other changes affecting social and religious life in China itself.¹⁵

By birth and culture, the overseas Chinese tends to remain Chinese. A major aspect of the nationality question arises when attempting to determine what kind of Chinese are the overseas Chinese; are they Chinese-Chinese, Communist-Chinese, or local-Chinese? The term local-Chinese means, Thai-Chinese, Malayan-Chinese, Indonesian-Chinese, etc. This hyphenated nationality description is akin to the same connotation as Irish-American, Italian-American, or German-American. Is a citizen of any country, identified in this manner, ever able to lose a priority consideration for his country of origin? This question of course applies to the overseas Chinese.

The stronger China is, the greater respect she will inspire among the overseas Chinese and the greater her influence over their actions. But cultural dependence on the motherland assures that even a weak China would command the loyalties of the hua-ch'iao. Intellectual and social changes in China will inevitably be reflected in South Seas Communities, not primarily because they are new and vital, but because they are Chinese. When political, economic, and social reforms in China are touted as the solution of the common problems of Asia, their impact on Chinese abroad is overwhelming.¹⁶

The overseas Chinese were industrious and enterprising which resulted in financial well being from which the colonial governments derived considerable tax revenue. The overseas Chinese did not participate in local politics unless their

economic interests were threatened, and as long as the Chinese national government was weak, the overseas Chinese were not a political threat. In some ways, as viewed by the colonial governments, the overseas Chinese were almost ideal subjects.¹⁷

Colonial governments preferred to have their subjects divided into rival nationalities, or rival groups. The government could more easily manage affairs by playing off one nationality, or group, against the others.

The affairs of the overseas Chinese community have in some way entered into the politics of almost every Southeast Asian country. The overseas Chinese; as a large, economically influential, minority with an alien cultural background, constitutes a very difficult situation for an emerging nationalist government.

The problem posed by the overseas Chinese is a problem of divided loyalties. Local opinion concerning these loyalties is sharply divided. The hua-ch'iao are sometimes seen as most valuable members of their communities, law abiding, hard working and intelligent; or they can be seen as China's "fifth column," loyal to China only and not to the countries of residence, potential traitors to these countries in any future struggle in Asia. Just where the loyalties of the overseas Chinese lie is the challenge of this study.

CHAPTER III

CHINA'S INTEREST IN THE OVERSEAS CHINESE

In many respects China's resurgence in recent years can be viewed as the latest of many periods over the centuries in which a strong authoritarian government has aroused and harnessed the energies of the Chinese people and reasserted China's power and influence in the entire region around China. Previous periods of dynamism have always been both creative and destructive, and they have invariably had a profound impact upon China's neighbors. China has almost invariably been expansionist whenever it has had a strong government. In the past its expansionism has taken many forms: the spread of cultural influence, the inexorable pressure of population movements, and in many periods, territorial conquest.¹

With two governments of China, each claiming to be the true government, it is necessary to look into the interests of each of these governments with respect to the overseas Chinese.

The interest of either Peking or Taipei in the overseas Chinese stems from objectives they can accomplish through and with the overseas Chinese. The objectives of both Chinas are similar: They are simply political and economic influence on and control over the overseas Chinese communities. The political interest is both internal and external to the host country. The economic interest also has internal and external aspects, but can be divided into two major areas: the area of business economics within the host country and the area of remittances returned and investments

made in one of the Chinas.

Political interests have led to many comments regarding a "fifth column" residing in Southeast Asia,² and is discussed later in this chapter. Control of the economic wealth of the overseas Chinese within any of the Southeast Asian countries would give the controller a major advantage in any contest of national interests.³

The remittances sent to China by the overseas Chinese have long been a major source of income for the governments of China. When viewed by individual amounts remitted, the amount may seem insignificant, but the total of these small amounts arriving from millions of overseas Chinese is a substantial figure. This source has provided a large portion of the hard cash needed by both Chinas for their international trade.

The average receipt of overseas remittances each year between 1929 and 1941 was approximately 80 million to 100 million U.S. dollars.⁴ The latest estimate for 1967 was 20 million dollars to the People's Republic of China.⁵ In 1967 the Chinese Nationalist Government on Taiwan received 10.5 million dollars.⁶ The sum received by both China's is considerably below the prewar period, and can be accounted for by the lack of information relative to the security of overseas Chinese dependents during the Cultural Revolution on mainland China.⁷

When a remittance is made by an overseas Chinese to his relatives, the money goes to the individual family member, not to the government. The remittance becomes income for the government by taxation, forced bond purchases and bank deposits. The recipient may not retain the remittance nor spend it. Many who had tried to hide the funds or convert them into gold were exposed and "re-educated" during the Cultural Revolution.

Despite the recent decreases in remittances, the overseas Chinese have obviously been and are still a source of income for both Chinas. It can be deduced that the government controlling the mainland is the government that can acquire the most income. This is, of course, based on the observation that most overseas Chinese claim mainland China as their home. They migrated from mainland China, not the Island of Taiwan.

The decline of remittance monies to both Chinas, although more specifically that to the People's Republic of China, is one of the indicators that can be used to determine the breakdown of Chinese family ties and to some degree the loyalty of the overseas Chinese to the Motherland. This is discussed later in this paper.

Length of residence outside of China affects the influence that can be exerted on the overseas Chinese. The last period of Chinese immigration ended in 1949 when the

Chinese Communists completed their occupation of mainland China. Almost all immigration into the overseas Chinese communities of Southeast Asia occurred prior to 1941. What little increase the overseas communities have acquired since has come by way of those Chinese able to flee mainland China or relocate from Indonesia. Therefore, in order to exercise control and influence over the overseas Chinese communities, loyalty must be developed in Chinese who have not returned to China for twenty years or more, and in most cases have never been in either China.

The Chinese Nationalist Government residing on Taiwan looks upon the overseas Chinese as a source of income, but more importantly it looks to overseas support as a significant economic and psychological backing to the announced intention of regaining the mainland. Mr. C.M. Chang of the Institute of Ethnic Studies, Georgetown University, in his paper of 26 April 1958 said:

The Republic of China, does not stand for Taiwan as such; it stands as a symbol of free Chinese nationalism. It keeps alive the hope for a free China among the Chinese everywhere, including those on the mainland. It would be a sad day indeed should that hope be allowed to fade away. The overseas Chinese are overwhelmingly loyal to the cause of a free China. They look to Taiwan for China's deliverance. If they should be compelled to transfer their allegiance to Peiping, Communist China would be given a powerful weapon for infiltration and subversion, and would be well on its way toward dominating Southeast Asia.⁸

Mr. Chang's statement probably does not represent the majority of overseas Chinese expression on loyalties. By 1947-48 it was already clear to the overseas Chinese and to much of the world that Nationalist China was facing defeat. By 1949 that defeat was complete; there remained only the remnant withdrawn to Taiwan.⁹

The Chinese have never been supporters of lost causes. Their traditional view of the political world was based on the belief that a dynasty gained the "Mandate of Heaven" by virtue of which it had the right to rule, as long as that rule was effective and strong. When it began to falter, it was thought that the dynasty was losing the "Mandate of Heaven"; defeat meant that the mandate had passed to the victor. There was thus no virtue in supporting a falling regime, for it was the will of heaven that it should fall. Thus, a defeated regime, such as the one on Taiwan, cannot be expected to draw the allegiance of the younger generation among the overseas Chinese.¹⁰

Chinese Communists began working underground in Southeast Asia in 1924 or 1925. Their efforts increased during World War II; and after the establishment of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, Peking's influence became increasingly apparent. The Chinese Communists hoped to exploit the Chinese who were residing in other Asian countries.¹¹

In the first few years after the Communists gained control of the mainland, their policies toward the overseas Chinese were primarily keyed to Chinese nationalism. Heavy stress was placed on gaining support through promising strong backing to Chinese abroad in their difficulties with native governments. Chinese culture was respected outside of the mainland, efforts were made to attract overseas Chinese investment, and overseas Chinese students were urged to study in mainland China.

Behind the Communist appeal to the overseas Chinese; behind the picture of a glorious new life at home; behind the glamour of a 'Liberated' and resurgent China; behind the seduction of students and cajoling of investors; behind the promises and lies, lay the threat. Everywhere in Southeast Asia, the overseas Chinese are concluding that the Communists will win. No one wants to be on the losing side or to offend the winning side, least of all the intensely practical hua-chiao. The threat of formal retaliation after 'liberation' is therefore almost as effective as the danger of assassination now in forcing the bourgeoisie of Southeast Asia to collaborate with the Communists, even in their own destruction. It becomes easier every day for a desperate man, hearing Peking's message, to convince himself that the picture has been painted too black by the anti-communists, that he, at least, can make a deal.¹²

The Chinese Communist government's concern for the overseas Chinese reflected an interest in establishing political controls over the Chinese minorities in Southeast Asia. The efforts to gain control proceeded with little hindrance in the countries which opened diplomatic relations with the new Chinese Regime. The elements of control over the overseas

Chinese in Burma, Indonesia and, later, Cambodia were easily established. Control in countries which avoided official links with the Chinese Communist authorities, such as Thailand and the Philippines, progressed very slowly.¹³

In Southeast Asia particularly, contact with the overseas Chinese within a country is a prime task of the People's Republic of China's diplomatic mission. The job of direct contact with the resident overseas Chinese probably falls specifically on the shoulders of the cultural attache. "The mission is particularly interested in fostering the return to the mainland of skilled overseas Chinese, inducing their offspring to return to China for higher education, where they receive preferential treatment, and continuing the supply of overseas remittances to relatives on the mainland."¹⁴

The character of the overseas Chinese communities in Southeast Asia appears at first look strongly anti-communist. There appeared nothing likely to attract the overseas Chinese to the cause of Peking's Communism. The hua-ch'iao are capitalistically oriented; they have grown up and succeeded in a free trade world. Their lot is considerably better than that of their brothers on the mainland. It is none the less clear that it was from the affluent and educated class, especially the younger members, the Chinese high school students, and/or ex-students, that the Communist movement drew its main support, and to a great extent, still does.¹⁵

The Chinese influence, communist or otherwise, on the children of the overseas community is greatly magnified by attendance at a Chinese school. In Malaya, where the overseas Chinese problem is probably most obvious, the use of the Chinese language school systems to foster Peking-style communist loyalties has been documented.

By Autumn 1954 the Communist controlled the Chinese-language school, and the students were the only dynamic force in the city. The alliance, students and labor, dominated the richest city of the South Seas, its people eight percent Chinese and half the population under twenty-one, a city with two hundred fifty thousand students, a shade more than half attending Chinese schools. Quiet youths commanded the 'Killer-squads' which shot down political enemies in the streets. Young strong-arm squads terrorized workers. And student armorers laid up stocks of hand grenades, ammunition, and firearms. They felt no blood-lust, only the quiet satisfaction of just deeds competently performed.¹⁶

When the high command of the Communist Party in Singapore was broken by mass arrests in 1955, students assumed most of the executive positions in the party. Except for the party's legislative spokesman, none of the men who forged the People's Action Party and its left-wing unions into Singapore's strongest political weapon was over thirty years of age and most were under twenty-five years of age.¹⁷

Another instrument of the People's Republic of China in foreign affairs is The Bank of China. "The Bank of China has been a principal weapon of the Chinese Communists in forcing the overseas Chinese to cooperate with Peking."¹⁸

The control of the bank is retained in Peking, and there are branches in London, Singapore, Kuala Lumpur, Penang, Bombay, Karachi, Kedah, Rangoon, Djakarta, Surabaya and Hong Kong. The bank operates to handle all remittances, investments in China, and trade economics for the People's Republic of China.¹⁹ It also makes local loans to overseas Chinese at interest rates very favorable to those who assert loyalty to the "correct" motherland government. In the absence of a nearby diplomatic mission, the bank acts unofficially as a diplomatic and cultural contact with the overseas Chinese.²⁰

In broad terms, important changes have taken place over the last decades in the manner in which the People's Republic of China uses the instruments of foreign policy.

In the first years after 1949 Peking placed its major reliance on military force and revolutionary subversion. More recently it has increasingly emphasized political action, diplomacy, psychological warfare, and economic competition; between 1955 and 1957 Peking made every attempt to minimize any outward show of military pressure and subversion. But since late 1957 its posture has once again become more militant, and now it seems increasingly prone to use pressures to achieve certain aims.²¹

The Southeast Asian countries which were developing neutral foreign policies were disposed, because of geography, to seek Red China's good will; but for some years the Chinese Communist government did not reciprocate. Instead, Red China openly encouraged revolutionary action by the communist movements in Southeast Asia in line with the strategy of

armed revolt, which had been called for by the Cominform in 1947.²² In these revolts, the overseas Chinese were encouraged by Peking to assist the local communist parties with funds first, then manpower, if required. In 1954 however, Red China began to seek the good will of the Southeast Asian governments, advancing the slogan "peaceful-coexistence."* By this time it was evident to Peking that the armed struggles of the various Asian Communist movements were having limited success, with the one exception of Indochina.²³

The new diplomacy of "peaceful co-existence" obliged the Chinese Communist government to de-emphasize the role of the overseas Chinese as extensions of the motherland's authority. In late 1954, the Chinese Communist authorities stressed a willingness to encourage the overseas Chinese to become loyal citizens of their adopted countries and declared a readiness to settle overseas Chinese dual nationality. Nevertheless, it was still clear that the Chinese Communist authorities expected the overseas Chinese to play a valuable

*Peaceful-coexistence is defined by the five principles set out by Chou En-lai at the Bandung Conference in 1955.

1. Mutual respect of each others territory and sovereignty.
2. Non-aggression.
3. Non-interference in internal affairs.
4. Equality and mutual benefit.
5. Peaceful co-existence.

role in the spread of communism in Asia, especially by promoting friendship for the People's Republic of China.²⁴

From 1954 to 1959, the policy of friendship and reason was emphasized. In 1955 the People's Republic of China was invited to participate in the Afro-Asian Conference sponsored by the Colombo Powers at Bandung, Indonesia. Premier Chou En-lai attended the conference as Peking's representative, and was the star performer. He strongly emphasized his regime's desire for peaceful cooperation with other Asian nations.²⁵ While at this conference, Chou concluded an agreement between Indonesia and Red China. After considerable delay and strain, the draft treaty was finally ratified by each government in 1958 as the Sino-Indonesian Treaty on Dual Citizenship.* The treaty was to be implemented during 1960. This agreement to settle the dispute over Chinese nationals in Indonesia signaled a turning point in relations between the two governments. The agreement led many Asian nations to believe that Red China was now ready to accept a "live and let live" approach to foreign affairs. This was, of course, what Peking wanted.

*The treaty established the right of the individual overseas Chinese to select a citizenship and declare that choice to both governments. The treaty had a two year period during which the choice had to be made. Failure to declare a choice made the individual a citizen of his country of birth regardless of his place of residence.

Peking may piously condemn 'great power Chauvinism,' especially as practiced by others, and may pay regular lip-service to the Bandung Principles supposed to govern the conduct of the participating states vis-a-vis each other; but in practice it acts very much in the pattern of the ancient Middle Kingdom. There is what Mao would call an 'antagonistic contradiction' between Peking's professions and its practices. Practices which follow the pattern of China's ancient traditions. Its strategy follows more the modes of Sun Tzu than the conventions of the Occident.²⁶

In 1959, something approaching a "hard line" was reinstated in Red Chinese foreign policy. An example of the strain this hard line approach caused came up in Indonesia. The strong relationship Peking had been developing with Indonesia was almost destroyed by the sudden eruption in 1959 of a major dispute over the status of the overseas Chinese who were not yet covered by the Treaty of 1958. Two incidents that triggered the dispute were Indonesia's banning of "aliens" from retail trade in rural areas, and an Indonesian Army decree ordering all "aliens" to terminate residence in West Java. The "aliens," of course, were primarily the overseas Chinese. Taking a conciliatory reaction to the anti-Chinese decrees involved risks for Peking. Red China's standing in the eyes of all the overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia was at stake. Since 1949 Peking had boasted loudly that she could and would protect the overseas Chinese from discrimination by local governments.

On the credibility of this pledge rested much of her (Peking's) ability to appeal to them

(overseas Chinese) for remittances and political action in their adopted countries. Peking had held up the 1955 settlement with Indonesia as a model of the kind of protection that Chinese strength could guarantee. In 1959 if China was to submit to the Indonesian decrees, she would in effect acknowledge that she was unable to protect the overseas Chinese. As a consequence, her influence over them would be sharply reduced.²⁷

The Indonesian Case

The overseas Chinese in Indonesia had come to be resented by many Indonesians for their cultural separatism, for the special privileges they gained while under Dutch colonial status, and for their dominant position in the secondary industry and the retail sector of the economy. In 1949 Chinese immigration to Indonesia had been checked by the imposition of an annual quota of four thousand. Since 1949 the overseas Chinese in Indonesia had been caught in the issue of dual citizenship and an identity problem concerning which China would receive their loyalty. Indonesia settled this problem for the overseas Chinese living in Indonesia by recognizing the People's Republic of China as the one government of China.

In 1959, consistent with the dual citizenship treaty, Indonesian-born Chinese were given a chance to opt for Indonesian citizenship. Over 390,000 rejected citizenship; another 600,000 thought they had become citizens by not registering. Peking claimed that Indonesian-born Chinese who had not rejected citizenship were loyal citizens of both

Indonesia and China.

To resolve the issue, Indonesia and Peking worked out the system for implementation of the Dual Nationality Treaty, which provided that dual nationals could obtain Indonesian citizenship by registering at a local court from 1960 to 1962. Those who failed to register lost their claim to Indonesian citizenship. Of the estimated 1.1 million who held dual citizenship, approximately 750,000 applied for the Indonesian citizenship.²⁸

The overseas Chinese position with respect to the government of Indonesia hit an all time low in October 1964 with the abortive coup. The coup was led by the Indonesian Communist Party and supported by Peking and a good portion of the local Chinese social and political groups. Throughout the period and into 1968 the resident Chinese were warned not to endanger their positions further by any activities against the government. Indonesian government action closed down or disbanded Chinese schools, newspapers and social organizations.

The cost of the coup to the overseas Chinese in Indonesia is beyond estimate and has not terminated as of this writing. Several thousand Chinese lost their lives and an estimated 900 thousand Chinese were forcibly repatriated.²⁹ The losses to Peking in Chinese lives, material, and prestige can only be considered a severe set back to its aspirations

to international cooperation. The effect on the other nations of Southeast Asia and their attitudes toward their resident overseas Chinese is obvious.

The Indonesian Government took steps to annul the Sino-Indonesian Citizenship Agreement, and during October 1967 a de facto break in diplomatic relations occurred between Indonesia and the People's Republic of China. The strain in relations, based primarily on the overseas Chinese problem, persisted. The Suharto government took steps to re-examine relations with both Chinas. The result was the reopening of informal relations with the Nationalist Chinese on Taiwan, relations which had been cut off since 1950. Despite the renewed relations with Taipei, official Indonesian government policy is to officially recognize only one China-- Communist China.³⁰

The end of the Sino-Indonesian dispute over the overseas Chinese marked a decisive turning point in Peking's attempts to maintain relations with the overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia. Peking essentially abandoned her objective of attempting to maintain an important political foothold in Asia through its ties to the overseas Chinese. The Indonesian Communist Party was defeated and nearly eliminated as a political and military threat to the security of Indonesia. The rest of Asia took a hard look at their overseas Chinese communities to determine their potential threat to local

security. The overseas Chinese examined their position and saw what could happen when they became involved at Peking's direction and came out on the bottom.

While it must be emphasized that not all overseas Chinese were strong supporters of the Peking government, a great many were. Before 1949 and certainly from 1949 on, it was evident that the Chinese in "Nan-yang" took very little interest in the Nationalist Government of China and had little confidence in its ultimate survival, still less in the possibility that it would regain control of the mainland.

The overseas Chinese had no belief in the future or the influence of the Nationalist Regime in Taiwan. Those who fail in China fail forever: it is not and never has been a land of restorations. This attitude was perfectly evident to any unbiased observer of Chinese opinion yet it continued to escape the notice or the credence of policy makers in the U.S.A.³¹

The overseas Chinese who felt drawn to the China represented by the Peking Government were attracted by a nationalistic pride in Communist China's political and military accomplishments and not to any rapport with Communist ideology. In line with the traditional Chinese attitude which "permits ambivalences to be intellectually respectable," many Chinese are known to retain ties with the Chinese mainland.³²

The Thai Case

The Nationalist Government of China was able to exert considerable influence over the overseas Chinese in countries where they had diplomatic relations.³³ In Thailand, the Embassy of the Republic of China cooperated with the government to encourage assimilation and to suppress Communist penetration into the overseas Chinese communities. This counter-Peking activity has met with some success.

Presenting themselves as the protectors of traditional Chinese culture, the Nationalists have attempted to enhance their stature among the older generations of overseas Chinese. To attract the youth Taiwan has expanded its educational facilities. In 1964-65, 25 percent of the student body of National Taiwan University comprised overseas Chinese students.³⁴

Undoubtedly some portion of the local Thai Chinese minority still possess strong emotional and sometimes political bonds to mainland China. Thus there is a fear in Thai Government circles that the Chinese Communists may concentrate on exploiting local Chinese grievances in an attempt to wield the overseas Chinese into a "fifth column."³⁵

There is cause to wonder if the limited success of the Nationalist Government working with the Thai Government has not been because of logic and persuasion, but a result of a shift in Peking's strategy.

The shift of the theatre of people's war in China's thinking from town to countryside is probably the biggest factor in concentrating subversion on Thai and minority peasants rather than on the overseas Chinese of Thailand in recent years; as in Indonesia the use of the latter is to provide

money and services for native guerrillas, not to furnish combatants.³⁶

Notwithstanding the official and periodic encouragement by the Peking government for the overseas Chinese to become good citizens of the countries in which they reside, Communist Chinese propaganda has often given the opposite impression. It is also suggested that official Chinese Communist policies in this regard are expediently determined by the prevailing conditions within each country.³⁷ Since 1911, the governments of China have been actively seeking the affluence and influence of the overseas Chinese. In supporting the revolutionary movement of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, it was thought strange that a people like the overseas Chinese who had for so long remained outside any political activity should then support a new political program in the motherland. To understand this one must keep in mind that the overseas Chinese are imbued with an old and strong tradition and cultural tie to China. The rise of the Chinese Revolutionary Party gave them an opportunity and a cause.

The fact that they could have no political life in the countries where they had no political rights induced them to engage in a political movement to which the foreign rulers could take no real exception, a program to reform and restore the government of the home country, China. The effect of this movement was to emphasize the detachment of the Chinese in Southeast Asia from the affairs of the countries in which they lived. The view which saw the Chinese as alien sojourners in foreign lands was strengthened by the obvious

fact that the Chinese were politically interested only in the affairs of Chinese.³⁸

This naive view of the interests of the overseas Chinese may have been accurate in 1911 or in 1927, but it was not the case from 1949 to 1965. The competition for the loyalty of the overseas Chinese came from three sources, Red China, Nationalist China, and the country of residence. The Chinese governments, Peking and Taipei, sought to get the money and influence of the overseas Chinese. The host country was at first not concerned with its Chinese minority until that minority became a major threat by reason of relationship with their immense, ancient and now once more powerful homeland, China. From the point of view of the overseas Chinese, they have two possible authorities to which, as Chinese, they can give allegiance, the Nationalist or the Communist government of China.

That there is still a certain amount of Nationalist organization and influence presents the Peking government with a difficult problem. On the one hand Peking wants to organize the overseas Chinese and use them to expand Chinese Communist influence. On the other hand, the overseas Chinese practically all belong to the classes which have been dissolved in mainland China. Obviously they have a problem. To win support with the overseas Chinese, the Communist Chinese must play down their actions in China. When they do this, they sacrifice what is most important to boast

about outside of China. It is this dichotomy that has caused Peking's policies to fluctuate.³⁹

In 1965 the start of the cultural revolution in Communist China brought new changes to Peking's policy toward the overseas Chinese. In 1965 the nations of Southeast Asia saw the results of the abortive Indonesian coup and they too made some new changes concerning the overseas Chinese.

CHAPTER IV

THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION AND THE OVERSEAS CHINESE

The Cultural Revolution in mainland China, which began in 1965, has made inroads into every phase of Chinese life. Its impact on the rest of Asia has been considerable. The Revolution advocates: opposition to old thought, culture, customs and habits; the establishment of new thought, culture, customs and habits; an end to imperialism and revisionism.¹

The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution as an activity directed by Mao Tse-tung began in late 1955, but the formal declaration of political struggle and reform first appeared in the "Decision of the Chinese Communist Party (C.C.P.) Central Committee Concerning the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution," which was proclaimed on 8 August 1966, by the 11th Plenum of the Eighth Central Committee.² Once the control of order and direction was eased, events transpired which even Chairman Mao did not anticipate. This paper does not attempt to study the Cultural Revolution in its entirety; only the effects of the Cultural Revolution on the overseas Chinese are examined.

To better understand the changes to the overseas Chinese situation which did occur during the Cultural Revolution, it is necessary to understand the treatment of overseas Chinese dependents residing in mainland China prior to 1966. Overseas Chinese resident dependents have had a special or privileged position in China. This position accrued to

them by reason of the income that China has acquired and desires to continue acquiring from the overseas Chinese. The same favorable treatment was also extended to overseas Chinese students studying at mainland schools and universities. When the Red Guard movement was launched in the fall of 1966, all favorable treatment for recipients of overseas remittances was cancelled.³

Many returned overseas Chinese and overseas Chinese families suffered miseries in living rather than asking for remittances from abroad. In order to avoid persecution, they therefore wrote to their kinsmen abroad advising them against further remittances. The overseas Chinese heard of their families plight and refrained from remitting money to their family members in China.⁴

There were reports of Red Guards writing to overseas Chinese informing them that their houses and property in China had been "donated" to the state.⁵ In the last half of 1966 there were also reports that "overseas Chinese dependents and visiting overseas Chinese students were being insulted, humiliated and physically assaulted by Red Guards."⁶

Because of the excesses toward the overseas Chinese and their families, the participants in the Cultural Revolution accomplished two things within China. They induced a state of paralysis in the Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission* (OCAC)

* The Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission (OCAC) is the official government organization of the People's Republic of China established to handle all exterior and domestic problems of the overseas Chinese, their families, returned students and all remittance matters.

and brought about the near extinction of the overseas Chinese dependent status. Those resident dependents that could, allowed themselves to be assimilated into the main stream of Communist China. They did not wish to become targets for attack by the Red Guard.

Reacting to the Cultural Revolution, the overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia became much less sympathetic to Peking. One measure used by the overseas Chinese to demonstrate this dissatisfaction from 1966 to 1968 was decreasing the amount of money sent to their families inside China.

As evidence, China-watchers report that the money sent back to China by overseas Chinese, normally an indicator of their cultural attachment to the homeland, dropped off by nearly 75 percent in a six-month period ending December 1966.⁷ This reduction in remittances was caused by the fear that the money might not reach its intended destination and might cause further troubles for their kin.⁸ The fact that sending remittances back to China would no longer gain special consideration or comfort, and might bring harm to his dependents in China, caused the overseas Chinese to examine his position vis-a-vis the Communist Government of China.⁹

An aspect of the Cultural Revolution that attracted attention in Southeast Asia was Peking's lack of an expressed external policy. The many incidents in support of the

Cultural Revolution occurring within the overseas Chinese communities had the initial appearance of a new policy designed to engage all overseas Chinese in the cause of the Revolution. The appearance, however, was deceptive. One cannot argue that there was no connection between the Cultural Revolution in China and the incidents which occurred in Burma, Malaysia, Cambodia and Indonesia. However, no source of proof that direction was sent out from Peking can be offered. It is possible to deduce that if Peking had planned these incidents to incite the overseas Chinese, they would have done more to insure their success. There is in fact very little evidence that the Peking Government made any decisions on overseas Chinese affairs that would have instigated any incidents. The few incidents that did occur did not have Peking's personal direction. These incidents were the product of the Cultural Revolution reaching the countries of South Asia where Peking had diplomatic or other representation. Those incidents that did transpire were products of zeal and independent action by the mission representatives working in the overseas Chinese communities. There is, however, one exception, the case of Burma.¹⁰

The Burmese Cultural Revolution incident followed the same pattern as the others with the exception that the first clash, in June 1966, was preceded with rallies among the overseas Chinese Community by Red Guards who were fresh from

Peking.¹¹ General Ne Win of Burma took no chances. He resolutely commenced an all-out drive to purge Chinese influence in Burma. He conducted a grinding campaign against the Chinese Communist Guerrillas in the hills and southern jungles of Burma. Because of his fear of the overseas Chinese, he forced them out of business by nationalizing commerce and industry and by a series of sanctions against all resident foreigners. In forcing the overseas Chinese businessmen out, the Government of Burma had to pay a heavy price in economic disruption.¹²

The cultural revolutionary action in Burma was costly to China in both prestige and Communist Party power. If we may take the Burmese experience, as an example, the Communist Party of Burma lost more in the period when the Cultural Revolution was being exported--in less than a year--than the Burmese government had been able to accomplish since the end of World War II. Not only was the power structure shattered, but the confidence of the voluntary Chinese supporters was so shaken that they turned to the Burmese Army for protection.¹³

In Singapore, the only predominantly Chinese state outside of China, "mystification, repulsion and a sense of shame have been the general reaction of the 1.4 million Singapore overseas Chinese to the Cultural Revolution."¹⁴ The overseas Chinese in Singapore look on the mainland upheaval as a reversal of all previous progress. They believe that the Cultural Revolution and the Red Guard movement have damaged Red China's reputation more than anything

else that has happened since 1949 when the Communists achieved power.¹⁵

In Indonesia, where the Peking government was already in disrespect because of the abortive coup of 1964 and its after effects, the following statement of a Chinese businessman sums up the attitude of the overseas Chinese in Indonesia.

The tension that has grown up in Jakarta's relations with Peking has made life difficult for all Chinese in Indonesia. The publicity given to the Cultural Revolution in China has made the situation worse by giving the impression that the Chinese want to overrun the world. I wish China would somehow disappear.¹⁶

In Malaysia, the government fears its own Chinese population more than it fears China. The effects of the Cultural Revolution seemed only to add a new intensity to the Chinese-Malayan problem. The Malaysian government has reported no noticeable activity that could be related to the Cultural Revolution.

Stephen FitzGerald in his article "Overseas Chinese Affairs and the Cultural Revolution" presents a new view on the overseas Chinese problem.¹⁷ He bases his ideas on the verbal attacks against Liao Ch'eng-chih that were printed in several Peking papers. Liao Ch'eng-chih was the top party man in the Central Commission for Overseas Chinese Affairs for eighteen years. The attacks are based on the premise that the pre-revolutionary philosophy for the external policy

of the Peking government toward the overseas Chinese was a live-and-let-live philosophy of survival and that it should not have been. The Red Guard spokesmen felt that the approach toward the overseas Chinese should have been one of use and manipulation for the good of Peking. Mr. FitzGerald's contention is that in 1949 policy was to let the overseas Chinese survive in the countries of their choice. In 1955 at Bandung this policy was reaffirmed again by Chou En-lai. Liao is quoted as saying in 1959 in collaboration with Chang Wen-t'ien, Wang Chia-hsiang, and Li Wei-han:*

Overseas Chinese are overseas Chinese and cannot be regarded as a minority nationality of a place. Overseas Chinese should not interfere with the local internal affairs and should under no circumstances take part in the local civil struggle. Overseas Chinese affairs must be strictly distinguished from the local revolution.¹⁸

Liao is also quoted in 1959 as saying, "The solution for the overseas Chinese was for some 600,000 Indonesian Chinese to be repatriated to China."¹⁹

Mr. FitzGerald offers a good argument, but his thesis breaks down with his lack of source data dated after 1959. His only post-1959 reference is the series of verbal attacks reported in 1967 during the Cultural Revolution. There can

* Chang and Wang were Vice Ministers of Foreign Affairs until 1959, Li is a former Director of the Chinese Communist Party United Work Department. All of these men were in positions that could have had influence on overseas Chinese policy matters.

be no dispute with the interpretation of policy statements made prior to the 1959-60 Indonesian flare-up. The publicly expressed attitude of the Peking Government from 1955-1960 and again at various times during 1960-1965 was one of "peaceful co-existence." Numerous violations of this policy have already been cited in this chapter and in Chapter III. The form and time of the attacks on Liao, and through him on former Polit Bureau member Liu Shao-ch'i, are directly related to the Red Guard's attacks on most members of the Foreign Ministry and in particular the Central Commission for Overseas Chinese Affairs. These attacks expressed displeasure of favored treatment.²⁰ The Commission was finally put out of business and has not been reported as active since 1966-67. Peking's policy attitude, made public for diplomatic reasons, and Peking's demonstrated use and attempted use of the overseas Chinese from 1959 on, are not compatible and do not support Mr. FitzGerald's contentions.

The overseas Chinese were trapped by the Cultural Revolution between local harassment and their own antagonism to the new trends in China. The attitude of many overseas Chinese toward the dilemma they must have felt might be summed-up as follows.

Some overseas Chinese who put out Chinese Nationalist flags do so not in allegiance to Taiwan, which has never been a popular alternative, but in disapproval of the 'Cultural Revolution' in China.²¹

When Mao Tse-tung looks back over the impact of the Cultural Revolution, he should be able to see the great loss caused to the 14 million overseas Chinese. But more important, he should see that the impact of China's cultural revolutionary image on foreign policy in Southeast Asia might be such that he has nearly negated his possible use of a prime potential instrument of that policy, the overseas Chinese.

CHAPTER V

ASSIMILATION AND NATURALIZATION

Can the overseas Chinese be assimilated in the countries where they are living? Have the measures already taken by Southeast Asian countries helped or hindered assimilation? The Chinese have been held together in Southeast Asia and elsewhere by a powerfully integrated cultural tradition. Pride in language, loyalty to family, and devotion to custom worked against assimilation of the overseas Chinese into foreign cultures regarded as inferior.¹ Chinese cohesiveness and the preservation of Chinese customs were, until 1949, reinforced in Southeast Asia by the steady stream of new immigrants from mainland China. Cohesiveness and preservation of Chinese culture were assisted by the hostile attitude of the resident ethnic majority, who frequently felt exploited by the commercially proficient overseas Chinese community.

Identification of the true overseas Chinese population is complicated by the interplay of ethnic, cultural and legal definitions of citizenship or nationality. The nations of Southeast Asia make little distinction between Chinese immigrants and locally born overseas Chinese. This lack of distinction between Chinese is further compounded by the progeny of mixed parentage, Chinese-local, who generally


continue to be identified as Chinese. This identity usually continues even when the mixed Chinese can not speak Chinese and has fully adopted the culture of the host country.

It is not desirable to generalize or lump the problem or degrees of assimilation into one big Southeast Asian pot. Each country has its own "melting pot."

Assimilation is a process in which persons of diverse ethnic and racial backgrounds come to interact, free of these constraints, in the life of the larger community. Whenever representatives of different racial and cultural groups live together, some individuals of subordinate status (whether or not they constitute a numerical minority) become assimilated. Complete assimilation would mean that no separate social structures based on racial or ethnic concepts remained.²

Assimilation should be distinguished from accommodation and acculturation. Accommodation is the process of compromise characterized by the word toleration. Acculturation is the cultural change resulting from the conjunction of two or more cultural systems or the transference of individuals from their original societies and cultural settings to new sociocultural environments. Assimilation should also be distinguished from biological fusion. Total assimilation will include accommodation, acculturation and biological fusion. Complete segregation and total assimilation are opposite ends of a continuum along which may be scaled increasing degrees of desegregation. See Chart, Figure 1. I have placed the countries of Southeast Asia along the

continuum according to their relative position in the process of total assimilation. Singapore is most advanced toward assimilation by reason of the continuity of the population, 90 percent overseas Chinese. The nations adhering to the Islamic faith are the least progressive with regard to complete assimilation. This brings into view some of the variable factors that affect the process of assimilation. These variables are: demographic, ecological, racial, structural, psychological and cultural.



The Continuum of Assimilation

Figure 1

By taking each of these variables and extracting descriptive terms identifiable as elements of each, a rating scale can be developed to measure the effect each variable plays in assisting assimilation. See Chart, Figure 2.

Nations of Southeast Asia	Racial	Cultural islands	Security against racism	Group bias	Marriages outside of group	Family structure	Religious compatibility	Independent education	Enduring culture	Cultural similarity
Malaya	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Singapore	+	o	o	o	o	+	o	+	o	+
Indonesia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Philippines	-	-	-	+	+	-	+	o	-	-
Thailand	+	+	+	-	+	+	+	o	-	+
South Vietnam	-	-	-	+	+	+	+	-	-	+
Cambodia	-	-	+	o	+	+	+	-	o	+
Laos	-	-	+	o	+	+	+	-	o	+
Burma	-	-	-	-	+	-	+	-	-	-

Elements of Variables Assisting Assimilation

- + Assists assimilation of overseas Chinese
- Deters assimilation of overseas Chinese
- o Not a factor in assimilation of overseas Chinese in this country.

Figure 2

It is possible to derive several elements of the variables which, in the case of Southeast Asia and the overseas Chinese, appear to be significant. They are the development of cultural islands, religion, intermarriage, channels of education, strength of opponent cultures and similarity of opponent cultures.

Muslims do not normally intermarry with non-Muslims. If a Muslim male took a Chinese girl into his family, harem, she was treated as a convert and not as a Chinese. In predominately Buddhist countries intermarriage encountered no religious prejudice, and was frequent and widespread.³

Thailand being a Buddhist country, although of a different Buddhism from that of China, has greatly facilitated assimilation. Many of the basic elements of daily life, such as the prevalence of the pig in both China and Thailand, are acceptable to both races. A similar case of assimilation exists in the mainly Christian Philippines; and many of the elite in both countries, including the Thai Royal family, are of mixed Chinese and local blood. Assimilation in Islamic Malaysia and Indonesia is on the other hand largely impossible because to the Muslim the pig is unclean.⁴

In Southeast Asia structural separation and cultural differences prevent intermarriage from promoting further group assimilation. The indigenous women who marry Chinese in Indonesia contribute Chinese children to a Chinese subsociety, but they do not form a bridge from one subsociety to another. Likewise although intermediate social and cultural types have been produced by intermarriage in Thailand and Indochina (Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia), a Chinese subsociety has continued in these countries.⁵

Until 1950, the colonial governments of Southeast Asia intermittently recognize that the crux of the "Chinese

problem" was not political but cultural and occasionally attempted to control the Chinese-language schools. Only the Thais, who were never colonized, attacked the problem with the vigor of a free people defending their own institutions. Thailand simply banned Chinese education. The original policy was later modified to require using the Thai language through the fourth grade, except for two hours a day.

In every country which has attempted to assimilate large foreign groups, the chief obstacle has not been the home but the school which taught the second generation the language and customs of their parents' country.⁶

The Chinese influence on the children is greatly magnified by attendance at a Chinese school. Dr. William Skinner found in Thailand that the only fourth-generation Chinese who think of themselves as completely Chinese are those with a Chinese education. They have been taught in Chinese by Chinese teachers, about Chinese subjects. Throughout Southeast Asia the history and geography studied in the Chinese schools are those of China, not those of the countries where the pupils actually live. The teachers, even when they avoid politics, are expected to teach patriotism for China. One well-known reading book for children starting school begins 'I am Chinese. I love my country. I live in Nan-yang'.⁷

Cultural and racial factors will probably be more than incidental in influencing the long-range calculations of Peking and the nations of Southeast Asia. Both sets of interested parties are fully aware that the antipathy

between the Malay and Chinese is very profound. This estrangement tends to survive, perhaps to become stronger, where members of both races share a common nationality and is scarcely affected by political ideologies, both comparatively recent phenomena to Southeast Asia.⁸ With the growth of Asian nationalism, which influences Communist and non-Communist elites equally, it has become very difficult to impose unwanted foreign dominated rule on peoples whose awareness of different traditions predisposes them to resist outside, Chinese domination.

Nationalism is very recent to most of the nations in Southeast Asia. Only Thailand had any major indications of nationalism prior to the 1940's.

The notions of nationalism emanated from an anti-colonialism theme. When freedom was acquired, most of the nations of Southeast Asia had to commence the structuring of a national spirit. The foundation was premised upon the ethnic culture of the majority in power. Thus in Indonesia a national spirit started with the base of Indonesian-Malaysian culture. The minority culture of the overseas Chinese in Indonesia was expected to be absorbed. This did not happen because of the strength of the Chinese culture.

Once there is a local national government, with strong nationalist feelings, you very naturally get resentment against a minority which still proclaims its allegiance to another culture-country which controls a very large part of your economy.⁹

The problem of the overseas Chinese in Indonesia and nationalism has repeated itself in most of the countries of Southeast Asia with two exceptions, Thailand and Singapore. In each of these two countries, nationalism and Chinese racial and cultural problems were depreciated for different reasons. In Thailand, Thai nationalism existed prior to the major influx of the overseas Chinese. In Thailand the Chinese culture survives by coexisting and adapting to Thai culture and traditions. Considerable intermarriage has taken place and the Chinese was not mistreated under the law to the extent that they resisted assimilation.

Four million people in the country were described as Chinese, but at least a million were regarded as Sino-Thais as a result of intermarriage, and another million or so had been born in Thailand. Of the remainder who were Chinese-born, perhaps a quarter of a million were believed to be pro-Peking, and the rest, though Chauvinistically "pro Chinese," were essentially apolitical. Many of the Chinese regularly sent remittances to their relatives in China, but the great majority seemed to have fully adjusted themselves to the Thai way of life. A sizeable number, especially those with their own business, had adopted Thai names. All in all, the Chinese in Thailand had done well, and had been more successfully assimilated than anywhere else in Southeast Asia.¹⁰

In the case of Singapore, it being a nearly all-Chinese country, there is no requirement for a minority culture to resist existing nationalism. In Singapore, the Chinese culture is predominant and nationalism had its struggle with externally oriented loyalties, those directed toward the Chinas.

One of Southeast Asia's most distinguishing characteristics is basic racism aimed at the local overseas Chinese over nationalism. "This strong ethnic resentment means that there are 'two Chinas' in the minds of Southeast Asians: 'China' the great and perhaps fearsome nation, and "China" the source of the despised and economically dominating alien group at home. The two mental images are probably mutually reinforcing."¹¹

It is an easy mental transfer to see the menace of Red China in the Chinese of local origin when looking through lenses that are coated with a treatment of nationalism.

In most of the nations of Southeast Asia, the overseas Chinese are viewed in a perpetual state of suspended nationality. This can not remain so forever. The overseas Chinese recognize this. Several times they have been offered a choice of accepting a local nationality under law or being repatriated to China. The overseas Chinese have chosen to remain in place but they did not opt for the new nationality. New laws are needed throughout Southeast Asia which will give this choice of citizenship more meaning. Also new legal processes are needed to assist the process of assimilation by breaking down the strength of China's culture.

In the United States, third and fourth-generation Chinese, like their contemporaries of European extraction, have forgotten all but a few words of their mother tongues. Their cultures have been absorbed and depreciated. This has been

accomplished by a strong native culture and complementary laws which support that culture i.e. education in English, naturalization laws, etc.¹²

In Southeast Asia where no such powerful opposing native culture flourishes and naturalization laws are almost nonexistent, the overseas Chinese have not been cut loose from the umbilical cord dependence on dual nationality and Chinese culture.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

The complex problem of the overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia is a synthesis of historical relationships, demographic factors, geographical propinquity, cultural divergence, economic astuteness, and immediate political or military power. The loyalty of the overseas Chinese to a host government vis-a-vis loyalty to a China is not one problem, but many problems. There can be no absolute answer to the question of friend or foe. The problem of the overseas Chinese is not one of a united front against all of Southeast Asia, but rather of individual Chinese communities resolving their peculiar problems with their respective adopted countries.

Assimilation is progressing at differing paces in each country. Thailand is the most advanced in its assimilation of the overseas Chinese. Malaysia and Indonesia are the least advanced. Thailand's customs, religion and legal approach account for its advanced status of assimilation. Malaysia and Indonesia have been deterred in the assimilation process by the presence of differing religious and legal customs. These issues are of such magnitude that Malaysia and Indonesia will not, in the foreseeable future, progress much beyond the point of toleration on the continuum of

assimilation.

The fears of the late 1940's and 1950's that the overseas Chinese would serve as Mao's "fifth column" have not matured. In nation after nation throughout Southeast Asia, nationalism has proven itself a barrier to Chinese expansion, both in theory and in practice.¹ The effectiveness of any "fifth column" activity depends upon the solidarity of the overseas Chinese with the Peking government. The many accomplishments of the People's Republic of China have given Chinese people the world over a greater sense of pride and have boosted Chinese prestige. But this does not imply that a majority of the overseas Chinese have been reborn as Chinese communists or converted to the ideology of communism. Those individual overseas Chinese who have been attracted to communism were attracted by the theoretical aspects. "The Chinese Communist theory of the solidarity of classes formed by economic circumstances and building upon the common interest of the underprivileged social classes to establish world equality under Socialism and Communism."²

The overwhelming interests of the overseas Chinese merchant and small family businessman, as capitalists functioning in a capitalist framework, with their interests interwoven in the economic fabric of the country in which they live, have been a major deterrent to communism.

The Cultural Revolution has had an impact on Asian communism no less significant than the Soviet Russian invasion of Czechoslovakia had on the Russian brand in Europe. The communist parties in the nations of Asia were given great pause concerning the ultimate aims of communism; especially in Burma, Laos and the Philippines. The communist parties of the smaller Asian nations appear to be interested in a communism that appears tied to the spirit of nationalism in those nations not to communism as an international organization.³

The Cultural Revolution had an adverse impact on Southeast Asian communist parties, and a divisive effect on the individual overseas Chinese and national governments of Southeast Asia. The individual overseas Chinese, isolated from China by distance and cultural illusion, took several years to react fully to Peking's perverse treatment of the Chinese masses. The long held image of a benevolent motherland began to look like an ogre. The traditional family of China was disappearing. The privileged position of the overseas Chinese dependents on the mainland was removed. The loss of remittances, from a high of 110 million dollars in 1964 to 20 million dollars in 1967, clearly illustrates the unfavorable reaction by many overseas Chinese to the Cultural Revolution.

The prospect of a future increase, above normal birth rates, in the numbers of overseas Chinese in the nations of Southeast Asia is negligible because of restricted migration from China. If the density of overseas Chinese will not increase significantly over the present national percentages,

what then are the prospects of assimilation in reducing the number of "Chinese-Chinese" and increasing the number of "hyphenated Chinese"? The goal--total assimilation of the overseas Chinese--is not yet in sight. Assimilation is taking place and has been accelerated by the passage of time and the actions of Peking. Where conditions have been favorable, as in Thailand, the trend is clearly apparent. In 1959, Mr. G. William Skinner wrote:

The very definition of a Chinese becomes intricate in the overseas context, for neither ancestry nor legal citizenship is a realistic criterion of Chineseness in Southeast Asia. Millions of Chinese in this region neither claim nor exercise prerogatives of Chinese citizenship and, because of widespread miscegenation and assimilation untold thousands of persons descended from Chinese immigrants are identified completely as Southeast Asians.⁴

In 1959 few agreed with Mr. Skinner, but in 1970 his farsighted observations were shared by many students of the overseas Chinese.⁵

Has Red China's interest in the hua-ch'iao changed? Yes, it has perceptibly changed. Peking probably regards it as inevitable that the overseas Chinese will come to terms with their adopted countries, and they are therefore unreliable as instruments of foreign policy.⁶ The failure of the Peking Government to aid the overseas Chinese during the Indonesian coup demonstrated to the world the new look in Peking's policy toward overseas Chinese.

There are a number of permanently operating factors which cause Communist China to limit her involvement abroad. One of these factors is the existence of the 14 million overseas Chinese in the countries of Southeast Asia.

Far from being available for fifth column use, their in-between nationality status places them in jeopardy with the local population, and communist China has felt it necessary at times to make its state policy toward the local government dependent upon the latter's attitude toward its Chinese minority. This has caused breaks or near-breaks in relations with several governments, including Malaysia, Burma, and Indonesia. The overseas Chinese situation causes problems with Mao's revolutionary strategy, for it has come more and more to contain a national and not a class bias.⁷

The overseas Chinese are now beginning to realize they have been used as a tool of convenience by China. Impelled equally by disgust at Taiwan's futility and revulsion from Peking's brutality, they are now seeing for the first time that the motherland--Communist or Nationalist--has been more interested in exploitation than in protection. The overseas Chinese are concluding that they must adjust to the inevitable and become an integral part of their adopted country. Although they will be very slow to minimize their Chinese culture, they will move positively toward assimilation. Their loyalty to their adopted countries in Southeast Asia will be of a singular nature antipodal to the dualism of the past.

NOTES

CHAPTER I

1. Robert S. Elegant, The Dragon's Seed (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1959), p. 4.
2. Ibid, p. 54-62.
3. Louis Barron, "Asia and Australasia," Worldmark Encyclopedia of Nations 3d ed. (New York: Worldmark Press, Harper and Row, 1967), p. 274-281.
4. Europa Publications Limited, The Far East and Australasia 1970, 2d ed, (London: 1970), passim., see also, Shih-chi Chen, et al. eds., China Yearbook 1967-68 (Taipei, Taiwan, China: China Publishing Co., 1969), p. 373. "Chinese settlers and their dependents are found all over the world. As of June 1967, overseas Chinese, including those with dual nationality, totaled 17,991,484. An overwhelming 96.29 per cent live in Asia, 2.87 in the Americas, 0.3 in Europe, 0.28 in Oceania, and 0.26 in Africa."

CHAPTER II

1. Elegant, p. 14.
2. Lu Yu-sun, EC 12, Programs of Communist China for Overseas Chinese (Hong Kong: Union Research Institute, 1956), p. 1.
3. Tsai Chutung, "The Chinese Nationality 1909," American Journal of International Law IV, 1910, p. 407. "The Law is based upon the principle of parentage pure and simple. A child takes the nationality of the father. The law as pointed out by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was to keep natural-born Chinese from falling under foreign domination. The law aims at two points, (1) to define the status of nationality and (2) to minimize the abuse of the lax naturalization laws of some foreign countries as applied in their colonies near China." The real heart of the law is the part that deals with expatriation, which reads, "any Chinese intending to acquire an alien character must first obtain a discharge." The law declares in unmistakable language that, "all persons who have become naturalized as aliens without permission

from the Chinese authorities shall be deemed Chinese, regardless of circumstances." This consent-clause necessarily gives rise to double nationality.

4. N.A. Simoniya, Overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia--A Russian Study (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, December 1961), p. 14. Gives a very good discussion of "jus sanguinis", (the principle of blood) and "jus soli", (the principle of soil).
5. Elegant, p. 38.
6. Lois Mitchison, The Overseas Chinese (Chester Springs, Penn: Dufour Editions, 1961), p. 42. "In the Philippines, a child takes his father's nationality wherever he was born, and theoretically the grandchildren and great grandchildren of Chinese immigrants who had married Filipino women stayed Chinese."
7. Lu, p. 15.
8. Elegant, p. 11.
9. Mitchison, p. 30.
10. Ibid, p. 9.
11. Department of the Army, Minority Groups in Thailand, Dept. of the Army No. 550-107 (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., February 1970), p. 118.
12. John K. Fairbank, "China's Foreign Policy in Historical Perspective," Foreign Affairs, April 1969, p. 279.
13. Ibid, p. 277-291.
14. C.P. FitzGerald, The Third China (Vancouver: University of British Columbia, 1965), p. 12-13. The Chinese by the mid 17th Century knew that when they left China under the Manchus they could not expect any support. "They knew that the home government would do nothing for him but would harm him if it could. His recourse was to band together with his fellow immigrants in a Secret Society. Such societies already existed in South China, originating as anti-Manchu Resistance Movements. 'Drive out the Ch'ing, Restore the Ming' was the adopted slogan of the overseas Chinese Triad (Secret Society) and remained until modern times." Thus the early overseas Chinese were involved in politics in China and not in the host countries.

15. Mitchison, p. 31.
16. Elegant, p. 11.
17. Michael Lindsay, "China and Her Neighbors," The Challenge of Communist China; (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1960), p. 30-31.

CHAPTER III

1. Doak A. Barnett, "The Roots of Mao's Strategy." Devere E. Pentony, ed., China the Emerging Red Giant (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Company, 1962), p. 87.
2. Lyman M. Tonel Jr., ed., The International Position of Communist China (Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Oceana Publications, 1965), p. 12.
3. C.P. FitzGerald, "China in Asia," Current History, September 1967, p. 130.
4. Union Research Institute, Communist China 1966, Vol. I, (Hong Kong: Union Research Institute, March 1968), p. 234, 251. The average receipt of overseas remittances each year 1929 through 1941 was approximately 80 million to 100 million dollars. "This amount came down a little between 1942 and 1945, but still reached a high of 40 million dollars. It rose to 130 million dollars in 1946. It was 80 million dollars in 1947 and moved down to 66 million dollars in 1948.
5. Communist China 1966 Vol. 1, p. 237.
6. Chen Shih-chi, et al., China Yearbook 1967-68 (Taipei, Taiwan, China: China Publishing Co., 1969), p. 377.
7. Communist China 1966 Vol. 1, p. 236-237.
8. C.M. Chang, Communist China in Asian Affairs (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University, 26 April 1958), p. 22.
9. FitzGerald, The Third China, p. 62.
10. Ibid, p. 62-63.
11. Stephen C.Y. Pan, "China and Southeast Asia," Current History, September 1969, p. 164.
12. Elegant, p. 40.

13. R.G. Boyd, Communist China's Foreign Policy (New York: Praeger, 1962), p. 22.
14. Donald W. Klein, "Peking's Evolving Ministry of Foreign Affairs," China Quarterly, October-December 1960, p. 38.
15. FitzGerald, p. 60.
16. Elegant, p. 137.
17. Ibid, p. 138.
18. D.P. Mozingo, "Sino-Indonesian Relations: An Overview, 1955-1965." RM-4641-PR, AF49(638)-700 (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand, July 1965), p. 66.
19. Lu, p. 58-59.
20. Klein, p. 131. "It is virtually certain that such overseas functionaries as officials of the Bank of China, Trading Companies, and the New China News Agency, though technically not attached to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, receive their instructions via the local Chinese diplomatic missions."
21. Barnett, p. 101.
22. D.G. Hall, A History of South-East Asia (New York: MacMillan, St. Martin's Press, 1968), p. 868.
23. Boyd, p. 6-7.
24. Ibid, p. 28. See also, Mozingo, p. 28-29, and Department of the Army, Minority Groups in Thailand, Dept. of the Army No. 550-1077 (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., February 1970), p. 199.
25. Bernard K. Gordon, "The Southeast Asian View of China," Current History, September 1968, p. 169, see also, Boyd, p. 27-28.
26. Tondel, p. 13.
27. Mozingo, p. 24.
28. John W. Henderson, et al., Area Handbook for Indonesia-1970 (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., March 1970), p. 104.

29. Ibid, p. 102-105.
30. Ibid, p. 324-326.
31. FitzGerald, The Third China, p. 58-59.
32. Ibid, p. 200.
33. Chen, p. 373. For the Nationalist Government the affairs of the overseas Chinese are handled by the Overseas Chinese Commission. "The Commission is devoted to the interest of Chinese nationals abroad. Under the Commission are departments of administration, education, research, and general affairs."
34. Minority Groups in Thailand, p. 198.
35. Ibid, p. 183.
36. Dennis J. Duncanson, China's Weight in South East Asia (London: The Current Affairs Research Service Centre, July 1970), p. 11.
37. Minority Groups in Thailand, p. 183-184.
38. FitzGerald, The Third China, p. 21-22.
39. See N. 17, ch. II, supra.

CHAPTER IV

1. Stephen C.Y. Pan, "China and Southeast Asia," Current History, September 1969, p. 164.
2. Angus M. Fraser, The Changing Role of the PLA Under The Impact of the Cultural Revolution (Arlington, Virginia: Institute for Defense Analysis, July 1969), p. 3-4.
3. Stephen FitzGerald, "Overseas Chinese Affairs and the Cultural Revolution," The China Quarterly, October-December 1969, p. 119.
4. Union Research Institute, Communist China 1966, Vol. 1. (Hong Kong: Union Research Institute, March 1968), p. 231-251.
5. "To Its Millions Overseas, China Remains a Dominant, If Uninviting, Presence," The New York Times, 16 April 1967,

- p. 17:3. "Chinese visitors from abroad were special targets. They were criticized and even assaulted for wearing 'bourgeois' clothing and hair styles. Overseas Chinese who had returned to the mainland to spend their retirement years were also denounced or paraded through the streets. In some cases they were robbed of their 'bourgeois' possessions."
6. FitzGerald, p. 118-121.
 7. Hedrick Smith, "Effect on the Overseas Chinese," The New York Times, 19 January 1967, p. 2:6.
 8. Pan, p. 164-165.
 9. Ibid, p. 103-105.
 10. Seymour Topping, "Violence and Bias Buffet the Chinese Alien in Southeast Asia," The New York Times, 24 April 1966, p. 9:1.
 11. Pan, p. 121-124.
 12. Harrison Salisbury, "Political Sympathies of Ethnic Chinese Pose Key Issue in Nations of Southeast Asia," The New York Times, 23 August 1966, p. 6:1. See also, Topping, p. 9:1.
 13. Joseph Lelyveld, "Communist Rebels in Burma Suffer a Setback After Purges Linked to China's Cultural Revolution," The New York Times, 1 November 1968, p. 5:1.
 14. "To Its Millions Overseas, - - - Presence", p. 17:3.
 15. Max Frankel, "Prestige of Red China Plummets," The New York Times, 14 November 1966, p. 1:2.
 16. "To Its Millions Overseas, - - - Presence", p. 17:3.
 17. FitzGerald, p. 103-126.
 18. Ibid, p. 107.
 19. Ibid, p. 110.
 20. Ch'iao Chien-shen, "The Overseas Chinese Affairs Work in Communist China", 1966, Communist China 1966 Vol. 1. (Hong Kong: Union Research Institute, March 1968), p. 234.

21. "Home is Different Now for Overseas Chinese," The New York Times, 8 January 1967, p. IV, 4:1.

CHAPTER V

1. Henderson, p. 103.
2. David L. Sills, ed., International Encyclopedia of The Social Sciences Vol. 1. (New York: MacMillian, 1968), p. 438.
3. FitzGerald, The Third China, p. 43.
4. Richard Allen, A Short Introduction to the History and Politics of Southeast Asia (New York: Oxford Press, 1970), p. 17.
5. Sills, p. 442.
6. Elegant, p. 277.
7. Mitchison, p. 43.
8. Mazingo, p. 83.
9. Lindsay, p. 30.
10. Robert Shaplen, Time Out of Hand: Revolution and Reaction in Southeast Asia (New York: Harper and Row, 1969), p. 297-298.
11. Gordon, p. 169.
12. Elegant, p. 278.

CHAPTER VI

1. John K. Fairbank, "China's Foreign Policy in Historical Perspective," Foreign Affairs, April 1969, p. 463.
2. C.P. FitzGerald, The Third China, p. 63.
3. John Eppstein, "The Chinese People's Republic," British Survey, April 1968, p. 6-7.
4. G. William Skinner, "Overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social

Science, Vol. 321, January 1959, p. 137.

5. Lea E. Williams, The Future of the Overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia (New York: McGraw Hill, 1966), p. 74, see also, Wang Gungwu, "Chinese Politics in Malaya," The China Quarterly, July-September 1970, p. 7-10, and Stephen FitzGerald, "China and the Overseas Chinese: Perceptions and Policies," The China Quarterly, October-December 1970, p. 13-14.
6. Stephen C.Y. Pan, "China and Southeast Asia," Current History, September 1969, p. 164.
7. Thomas W. Robinson, Peking's Revolutionary Strategy in the Developing World: The Failures of Success (Santa Monica, California: Rand Corporation, August 1969), p. 31.

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