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ANALYSIS OF SOVIET COMMAND & CONTROL

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From: Director, Center for Advanced Research, Naval War College
To: Commander, Naval Intelligence Command, Washington, DC
Commanding Officer, Naval Field Operational Intelligence
Office, Fort Mead, Maryland

Subj: Advanced Research Papers by CDR E.P. POMMER, USN
321-30-1146/1630; forwarding of

Encl: (1) Soviet Command and Control, Report of Findings (S)
(2) The U.S. War Game Scenario; Fact or Fiction? (U)

1. Enclosures (1) and (2), partial results of the efforts of subject officer during a year's effort as a Naval War College Research Fellow, are forwarded for your information and retention.

2. Enclosure (1) discusses conclusions which were drawn from an extensive study of the Soviet Naval Exercise OKEAN '75. The paper's conclusions were extensively tested by subject officer while playing the Red Team Commander in a series of table-top war games in opposition to the HARPOON Tactical Study Team.

3. Enclosure (2) discusses CDR POMMER's conclusions about U.S. War Gaming; comments were derived partially from his experience as the Red Team Commander as noted above, and partially from his experience as the primary Intelligence Umpire in the LANTFLT Readiness War Game series held quarterly at the Center for War Gaming, Naval War College.

H.G. NOTT
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ANALYSIS OF SOVIET COMMAND & CONTROL

I. Introduction

A. Methodology

1. Initiating Hypothesis: A fundamental change in Soviet Naval Doctrine was demonstrated in the 1975 Soviet OKEAN Naval exercise. This change included suggestions that the Soviets are now prepared to:

- a. PROJECT their forces world-wide (expeditionary force).
- b. Conduct distant SLOC interdiction (mertankers).
- c. Allow the OTC great flexibility in responding to the tactical situation.

2. Research: Available information was researched on previous Soviet Naval exercises with a primary emphasis on OKEAN '70 and SOSSEX '74 in order to determine trends. The report prepared by NAVINTCOM on OKEAN '75 (a detailed accounting of the exercises; constructed without analysis in order to allow detailed analysis at any level in the U.S. Navy) was studied extensively. Study participants were selected to provide experience levels with U.S. Naval operations in the Atlantic, Mediterranean, and Pacific Fleets. The participants were Intelligence Specialists, both with an extensive knowledge of Soviet Naval matters as a result of their previous billets.

3. Conclusions: Conclusions were drawn with respect to the initiating hypothesis. Additionally, unexpected conclusions were formulated.

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4. ~~Testing Conclusions:~~ Conclusions drawn were tested extensively by applying them to the game play of the Red Team Commander in the HARPOON Tactical Employment table-top games recently completed.

II. Basic Conclusions

A. That changes observed in Soviet tactics and doctrine were evolutionary.

B. That the OKEAN '75 exercise was intended to exercise Soviet tactics designed to respond to the present and future threat presented by NATO/U.S. naval forces; the exercise was NOT a signal to the West of their intentions.

C. That a basic change has been observed in the employment of Soviet naval surface forces in response to the NATO/U.S. threat.

III. Specific Conclusions

A. Command and Control. Communications were streamlined and simplified in accordance with OKEAN '70 lessons learned. Changes included the ability of the NAVHQ, Moscow to exercise overall command via the Fleet Commanders. The hypothesis that each OTC was allowed greater flexibility to respond to the tactical situation cannot be disproved; greater flexibility however, is not in accord with the basic Soviet doctrine of centralized control. Any improvement in command and control communications evidenced which can be interpreted as giving greater flexibility to the OTC can also be interpreted as giving NAVHQ, Moscow greater control as well. It is not reasonable to expect the Soviets to be loosening control as they are expanding their operations to the

world ocean while we in the U.S. are developing methods to exercise greater control over individual units from the highest levels of our government.

B. In OKEAN '75, the EXERCISE SCENARIO was one of a NATO and U.S. threat as perceived by the Soviets. The Atlantic and Mediterranean portions of the exercise clearly consisted of Soviet surface task groups simulating NATO naval war plans in support of a general ground war in Europe:

1. Two convoy groups, one consisting of military vessels, the other containing Merships. The former, traveling from the mid-Atlantic toward the Bay of Biscay and then toward the English Channel simulated a resupply of NATO. The latter, proceeded from the Norwegian Sea toward the Kola Peninsula simulating an amphibious convoy.

2. A transiting CV group proceeding from the mid-Atlantic to the Kola Peninsula via the Giuk Gap and the Norwegian Sea.

3. An ASW-oriented task group conducting anti-SSBN operations in the Norwegian Sea.

4. A Task Group conducting anti-SLOC operations off the Hump of Africa.

5. In the Pacific, two convoys, one military, one consisting of Merships. The former an amphibious convoy heading toward the Soviet mainland/Korea area via the Tsushima Strait, and the latter, after a mid-ocean rendezvous, heading toward Japan.

6. An ASW-oriented group in the Philippine Sea which had minimal exercise participation (mainly involved in oceanographic research).

7. A reinforced Indian Ocean Contingent which conducted ASW operations in the Arabian Sea.

8. SOVMEDRON operating traditionally in the ACW role.

9. United normally deployed all had an active role. Task forces normally deployed OOA participated in the exercise to the extent that their normal deployment mission dictates (IOC, SOVMEDRON, HUMP OF AFRICA). No new roles were demonstrated.

10. Conducted Coordinated ASW Operations. No instance of single-capability forces was noted -- submarine barriers were supported by either surface ships (with AAW capabilities to deny aerial prosecution) or the locations of the barrier were within Tactical/SNA/LRA range from the Soviet mainland). This is an indication that in the future, ASW prosecution will always be conducted by two or more supporting forces.

11. Anti-SSBN ASW operations were stressed and continue to demonstrate the Soviet perception of the main threat to the Soviet mainland.

12. Convoy operations were not a portent of world-wide projection of an expeditionary force. They clearly were a manifestation of Soviet analysis of what the U.S. intends to do in the event of a war at sea. The four convoys were subjected during the exercise to extensive reconnaissance and air strike activity. They performed a valuable keying function for the operations of the SOSS. Rendezvous and convoy tactics (formation steaming and zig-zagging) were likely an organizational response -- a practical application of the Soviet Control of Shipping Doctrine.

13. SLOC Interdiction. A force normally deployed OOA would be expected to have the ability to perform this function. The character of the Soviet force normally deployed in the Conakry, Guinea/Hump of Africa area does not universally have an optimum SLOC interdiction capability against warships, but is capable of interdicting merchant shipping (including oil tankers). The use of submarines as a part of this group suggests that they were simulating the interdiction of a transferring CV from the Pacific Fleet as required by NATO War Plans. The fact that SLOC interdiction operations were not conducted by the IOC tends to support the anti-CV interdiction role in the Atlantic.

14. Logistics. Observation of committed logistics units yields a clear picture of Soviet intentions. In OKEAN '75, there was just enough fuel afloat to do the job. In contrast, in Angola they had virtually one oiler for each warship committed to the area -- a clear indication they had no precise idea of what or for how long their forces would be required to perform in the area. Logistics units were not escorted or convoyed to the area, making them vulnerable to interdiction.

15. Low Level of participation by SSM-equipped platforms is a most significant change to the tactics observed during OKEAN '70. NIC says this does not necessarily mean a change to their tactics. However, this could be a reflection of Gorshkov's point that engagements with parity forces will not be planned for in order to maintain an ability to surprise and overwhelm (the doctrine of mass). I firmly believe that the Soviets consider HARPOON-equipped

ships a parity weapon (or even worse, a weapon which out-ranges their SSMs on the majority of their forces), so that they will not enter into an engagement relying on their short range SSM to oppose the threatening force. Instead, they will rely on a coordinated submarine SSM/torpedo and air-launched ASMs where the doctrine of surprise and mass can still be brought to bear.

16. The location of submarine barriers in the Atlantic was a significant departure from past exercises. The main barrier was moved from the Giuk Gap to the north in the Norwegian Sea where they were within range of direct SNA support from the Murmansk area and also within tactical air range of airfields in Norway. Again, this supports Gorshkov's contention that submarines cannot operate successfully if they are not supported by either surface ships or aircraft to prevent ASW prosecution. This will be an important factor to consider in future exercises to determine if their strategy for defense has changed.

17. While impressive, the SOSS has evolved to the point where it can be relied upon to provide high confidence locating information. In fact, the SOSS operated without the traditional supporting tattletails in the exercise. A large number of units (larger than suspected) were capable of receiving realtime ELINT and RORSAT downlinks. The SOSS functioned not only in its design role of targeting HVU's, but additionally in targeting all threatening surface task groups. It is important to note that task groups simulating U.S. forces did not maintain an EMCON status which would deny the interception of unique emitters.

18. Strategy. In every case during the exercise, the players who represented U.S. and NATO forces were going to an area of vital interest to the Soviets. The Soviets were being threatened by actions (it could be a real threat on our part, or if we did not intend it as threatening, they perceived it as a threat) by the naval forces which required an action to prevent that threat from becoming a reality. In conformance with Gorshkov's interpretation of the writings of Lenin, in response to the threat they can select the time, the place, and the size of their force to defeat the forces threatening their vital interest. In all cases, their perception of the threat was tied to a specific objective to be defended -- a piece of their land. There was no indication they were moving out into the world ocean to intercept and do battle with a potentially threatening force; movement of U.S. and NATO forces creates the threat to which they have to respond. Simply, if we don't move, there is no threat to respond to, because they simply sit and wait the tripwire.

19. Strategic War at Sea. OKEAN '75 was not conceived as exercising a strategic war at sea. All actions exercised were tactical in nature, against the immediate threat. There was a strategic phase of the exercise wherein a full nuclear exchange became a part of the scenario (SSBN missile firing, the use of LRA against simulated U.S. task forces). But, the naval war at sea exercise did not have the long range strategic interdiction operations one would expect if they were aiming at the M+60 and beyond economic requirements of an enemy at war. Gaining control

of those portions of the sea from which they are threatened was exercised. Once gained, one could presume that continued control could be exercised by maintenance of a viable force in that area (generally backed up to their land areas), in response to movement of additional enemy forces which desired to use that sea area.

20. Vital National Interest on the World Ocean. Gorshkov's latest statement of the mission of the Soviet Navy, "Defense of the Homeland and Protection of State Interests at Sea", should be interpreted as applying to those areas which constitute a vital national interest. The Sea Power of the Soviet Union consists of four parts: Naval forces, merchant marine, fishing fleet, and oceanographic research fleet. State interests on the World Ocean include those portions of their sea power which contribute economically, but they do not constitute an immediate vital interest which has to be protected at all costs. Client states overseas also are not immediate vital interests to be protected at all costs. The philosophy of "adventurism rebuffed" -- a fatalistic belief that if they fail to achieve an objective, they will regroup and try again when the time seem propitious -- has been demonstrated in Cuba and Africa. It is therefore highly unlikely that the Soviet Union would risk a war at sea to protect these less than vital interests. I believe that in only one situation would they be forced to participate in a war at sea outside of those bordering waters from which their homeland could be threatened; where by posturing in the role of gunboat diplomacy, the U.S. incorrectly perceived their intentions, and initiates a conflict by striking at their vulnerable logistics train thereby

forcing those Soviet forces to fight their way back to home waters. This is a matter of survival of the force, and it then becomes a matter of national pride -- a form of vital national interest.

21. Lastly, the U.S. War Game Scenario for a conflict at sea. By limiting our scenarios to those of escalating tensions which develop into a conventional exchange at sea and culminating in a strategic nuclear strike (without a concomitant tactical nuclear exchange at sea), we are preparing for the wrong war. Because we are obligated to move toward the Soviet mainland to threaten the vital national interest of the Soviets, and the total illogical assumption that the use of conventional weapons will achieve acceptable levels of damage on their homeland, the only rational scenario is one in which the Soviets, expecting an ultimate nuclear exchange, initiate a war at sea with a preemptive nuclear strike, designed to fulfill the doctrinal aspects of their planning: Surprise, Mass, Time, and Place.

IV. Summary

A. OKEAN '75 was a window on current and future Soviet strategy and tactics. The exercise did not demonstrate their intent to project their forces world-wide through the use of an expeditionary force. Further, the character of the exercise indicated the foremost concern of the Soviet Navy -- their support to their main mission of Defense of the Homeland.

B. OKEAN '75 was a reaffirmation of Leninist Doctrine as interpreted by Admiral Gorshkov.

C. The basic study hypothesis for the most part is therefore erroneous. Distant SLOC interdiction is not a newly-demonstrated capability -- it is inherent in all forces normally deployed OOA for any other mission. In the Indian Ocean anti-SSBN operations were practiced, not SLOC interdiction (the character of the force deployed there and its exercises were ASW-oriented). On the Hump of Africa their mission is mainly one of presence, and that carried out by limited-capability ships. When a highly capable warship is deployed there, it has an AAW capability, and spends the majority of its time providing AAW protection for the port at Conakry. In the Mediterranean, forces deployed support the mission of Defense of the Homeland with their main target the CV with nuclear weapons in its magazines.

THE WAR AT SEA SCENARIO: FACT OR FICTION?

To accurately assess current Soviet strategy and tactics, it becomes necessary to postulate conceivable scenarios¹ and then analyze each subjectively as well as objectively. Of late, subjective analysis is often overlooked due to the convincing quantifiable nature of conclusions drawn by systems analysis. By overlooking deeper motives derived from the Russian and Communist -- (the two being often erroneously assumed to be synonymous) dialectic and culture, one tends to postulate scenarios of conflict at sea between the U.S. and the Soviets as what may be rational and possible from one viewpoint -- that of the U.S. Scenarios may be further affected by the technological influence (what we have, but even more importantly, what we will be able to produce) which further deletes some scenarios as being improbable. By not envisioning scenarios from the standpoint of both members of any future conflict at sea, the result is selection of those the one side is capable of fighting with the concomitant dismissal of any other possible forms of warfare as unreasonable. Ethno-centrism has long been a major American failing, and has, in this instance of selecting rational forms of at-sea warfare for study, limited the selection of scenarios which must be accommodated through prior planning to those which are rational from only the U.S. standpoint. Only through a re-examination of possible scenarios which include fully the opponent's viewpoint can the U.S. Navy appreciate that what may be an

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1. A more fundamental situation than one from which force level requirements are hypothesized -- a scenario which allows the use of all naval weapons in a war-at-sea situation.

irrational scenario to the U.S. military man, may in fact, be a primary selection by our potential opponent, the Soviet Union.

Taking Gorshkov at his word when he states that

"...the criterion of comparability of naval capabilities is the relative strength of their combat might calculated by the method of mathematical analysis, by solving a system of multicritical problems for various variants of the situation and different combination of heterogeneous forces and means. . ."

lends credence to the fact that a Soviet version of operations analysis is now used to determine Soviet strategy and tactics. Applying the same shortcomings created by ethno-centrism to the Soviets as applied to the U.S. Navy will have the same results: selection of their rational scenarios to accommodate through prior planning. The critical feature of this selection process is that just as the Soviets and the U.S. differ over a basic interpretation of the underlying rationale for their and their opponent's motivations, so might the two sides be planning for a basically different war at sea.*

In order to set a scenario of conflict, it is necessary to first establish a scenario and then modify it logically by placing it in a realistic setting and then including the following basic doctrinal aspects of Soviet planning:

- Selection of the time, place, and method of delivering the decisive blow.
- To be stronger than the enemy at the decisive moment at the decisive point.

* Football, by way of illustration, engenders the vision of the use of a sphere on the one hand (European soccer) and a spheroid on the other (American football).

- Use surprise attacks.
- Recognize the abstract possibility of defeat, but reduce the possibility through organization of the preparation of the battle.
- Defense of the homeland remains the primary mission of all military forces.

The scenario most often visualized in a U.S.-USSR war at sea is as follows:

A conventionally-armed U.S. task force versus Soviet submarines and aircraft equipped with SSMs and ASMs with conventional warheads. Surface ships are not required as a part of the Soviet force, but they may be used in the situation as a parity counter-force; in the majority of scenarios surface ships are included.

In this situation, if either side were to pre-empt conventionally, the low Pk of conventional SSMs will enable survival of some portion of the opposing surface force which would in turn retaliate with weapons which survive the initial strike (by using surface, air-launched, and subsurface-launched weapons). In this basic scenario you need not establish the lucrative target as the HVU of the U.S. task group -- all U.S. surface units will have to be targeted because of the possibility of tactical deception. Alternatively, all SSM-equipped Soviet ships will have to be targeted to preclude the initial and follow-on threat posed by the SSM weapon. The possibility also exists that both parties to the exchange may suffer identical damage resulting in no clear denial of either party's mission.

The approximate U.S. HVU location will essentially be known by the Soviets. An exact location is not necessary for two reasons:
(1) because of the targeting capabilities of the Soviet Ocean

Surveillance System, and (2) because the area of potential conflict can (and most likely will) be chosen by the Soviets.

Forces which are about to engage in a conflict at sea do not materialize miraculously from nowhere at the scene -- major threat forces start to the scene from somewhere -- from a port or from another deployment area. Given the capability of the SOSS to provide at a minimum approximate locations of high interest units, and their knowledge that a given force has been deployed (redeployed) in response to a situation of their creation, logic demands that the U.S. force will appear on the scene within a set of time. Movement of high value units is a signal of U.S. intentions, and depending upon the level of Soviet national interest involved, a prior decision can be made as to the level of Soviet response which will be applied.

The character of a Soviet sea denial force, a force which cannot allow a diminution of its strike capability, cannot absorb a conventional strike before striking back. This would entail the voluntary absorption of an unknown degradation of the force's capabilities -- even to the extent of permitting the surface force to be destroyed. It follows that the only option for a sea denial force in a defensive posture is to pre-empt.

It is well to keep in mind that whereas the Western Alliance is held together by the sea, the primary Soviet motive for sea power has been a desire to protect the maritime approaches of the Soviet Union." (From an unpublished paper by Norman Friedman)

If you can change "the Soviet Union" to "Russia", the result is a clear statement of mission for the naval arm of the Soviet military -- the *raison d'etre*. In fact, Ghorshkov's latest statement

of the mission of the Soviet Navy is: "Defense of the Homeland and protection of State interests at sea."

One would expect the platforms, weapons system, doctrine and strategy to reflect that mission. By applying existing Soviet naval forces to their primary mission only, it is clear that they have created in their ships and weapons systems a combination which is capable of carrying out this mission. The heavily armed, relatively short-legged ships with their high dash speeds are admirably suited for operating within what they perceive as the threat zone (not necessarily a static zone, but rather one capable of extension to accommodate increasing ranges of weapons threatening Russia) with a wide range of weapons to ensure destruction of a threatening force before it attains a position within range of it's weapons. Theirs is a force which is designed to deny their enemy the use of that portion of the sea from which they can be threatened. All other imputed missions -- projection, presence, the blue-water expansion of state interest -- which have been variously attributed to the changing character of the Soviet Navy, can be added to this basic mission after it's requirements are satisfied. Whatever the Soviet Navy may be, it is basically a sea denial force with the design features to successfully complete that one basic mission.

The SOSS and the family of SSMS are primarily designed to defeat the CV and deny it's operations in an areas from which Russia can be hurt. Even contemplating the employment of their new aircraft carrier, the Kiev, or any follow-on aircraft carrier in

the Western sense of the word, does not change this basic mission. Postulated missions do not remove the requirement for "defense of the homeland;" they are added only after the primary mission is accommodated. It is believed the SOSS is a clear indication of their readiness to carry out this mission. The SOSS is designed for the collection of a maximum amount of intelligence prior to a conflict which, in turn, allows optimum maneuver to defeat an attacking force with a combined, coordinated strike.

Planning for a pre-emptive strike increases the survivability of one's own forces; it's capability would be diminished under any other rules of engagement. Planning for a "responsive strike" in reply to a pre-emptive strike virtually ensures a degradation of the responding force.* Further, planning a limitation to conventional weaponry may give each party an equal change in an engagement but in reality, would leave the Soviets with a clear, tactical edge (the ability remains to commit additional missiles to the engagement from submarines and aircraft).

The scenario to this point basically envisions an exchange over a neutral part of the ocean. However, if the Soviets were placed in a defensive position with the U.S. threatening them by steaming a strike force, presently the CV and it's escorts (in the future a task group with SLCM-equipped ships) toward a point

* Such as gaming an effective strike capability from a CV with two or more hits -- this is where the U.S. gives away the tactical edge because they assume the initial exchange will be conventional while disallowing the fact of what a nuclear pre-emption would entail.

which enables a strike against the Russian land mass, it would call their primary mission into action.

To strike the Russian land mass from the sea becomes as great a threat as a strategic nuclear exchange against the Russian people, an act which cannot be permitted if the Soviet system is to survive; i.e., it becomes the basic vital interest of the Soviets to prevent it thereby ensuring survival of the State. From the Soviet viewpoint, it is logically incomprehensible to envision a U.S. task force steaming into the Soviet defensive perimeter, fighting the alerted defensive forces arrayed against it, surviving to launch a strike against the homeland, and then limit those strikes to conventional weapons. Given the flight distance, the expected attrition of an unsupported air strike, and expected damage levels from a concentrated conventional strike by U.S. forces, it is just not cost effective -- the only way to achieve an acceptable level of damage based on cost and risk would be to strike (when within range) using nuclear weapons.

The same logic can be applied to the NATO scenario of escorting an amphibious task force into the Norwegian Sea to regain Norwegian territory occupied by Soviet forces. If the Soviet occupation of Northern Norway was accomplished to procure a buffer zone as was done in Europe after the Second World War, it would prevent interdiction of their forces in the Barents Sea. Western Alliance occupation of Northern Norway creates a choke point over the Barents, completely closing access to the sea -- access required to perform their defensive mission (especially if the Baltic and

Black Sea exits were similarly denied to the Soviets in conjunction with a NATO conventional ground war in Europe).

If a Western landing force was successfully put ashore in northern Norway, the Soviet capability to move divisional-sized reaction forces supported by land-based tactical air assets may dictate the use of tactical nuclear weapons to defend Western forces committed. If nuclear weapons ultimately become necessary to defend committed forces, then it is necessary to prevent those forces from initially attaining their objective by any means possible, including the use of nuclear weapons with higher Pk's. The threatening forces have to be struck before they are capable of using nuclear weapons themselves. The movement of amphibious forces then is so great a threat to the primary interest of the Soviet, that permissible forms of warfare may be called for.

Thus, in order to preclude extensive damage to the homeland, all permissible measures of defense will have to be taken. Soviet dialectic differentiates between WAR (that is, a threat to the survival of the state with a loss of the proletariat) and other permissible forms of conflict, including a war at sea. WAR, in the larger sense of the word, cannot be permitted. In order to prevent the threat to the state by striking the nation (allowing WAR in the large sense of the word), the potential strike force has to be destroyed at any cost prior to reaching its objective. If it is thought that the strike force will ultimately be required to escalate to nuclear weapons to achieve an ultimate desired level of damage, the pre-emptive use of nuclear defensive weapons against the attacking force in the sea environment is reasonable.

Soviet doctrine accepts the fact that ". . . naval forces are more stable against the effects of nuclear weaponry than land forces," thus permitting a nuclear exchange to occur at sea which ultimately prevents a comparable exchange on land.

Thus, with a sea denial force, loaded with a mix of conventional and nuclear weapons, and unwilling to abide by a potentially fatal "Marquis of Queensbury" version of warfare (that is, limited to conventional weapons and only conducted at sea) which would inevitably result in the larger WAR, there remains no choice but to strike first in a defensive effort to neutralize the threatening force before they use nuclear weapons.

The Soviet sea denial force in essence disarms itself when it uses its weapons. ~~Re~~ Reload of weapons is possible in only a very limited number of ships. To use weapons selectively -- husbanding a dwindling weapons load -- does not agree with Soviet doctrine which calls for massive first strikes to overwhelm the enemy. Given a mix of conventional and nuclear weapons onboard each SSM-capable ship and submarine, and following the doctrine of massive strike, the Soviet combatant in a conventionally-limited exchange would soon be left with its nuclear loads, unable to continue the offensive portion of the conflict. This would leave the ships, if they had been unable to successfully attrite the attacking U.S. force, with the choice of becoming vulnerable to a U.S. second strike (the U.S. using recyclable weapons delivery platforms and capable of being resupplied at sea) or with a failure to carry out their mission. Faced with uncertainty that they would achieve acceptable levels of damage on the

U.S. force due to tactical deception, they would then have to use the remaining tactical nuclear capability to prevent the attacking U.S. force from continuing to threaten the Russian landmass.

Knowing their ships will be virtually disarmed at the first strike, it is probable that they would elect to use tactical weapons in a pre-emptive strike in order to achieve a maximum Pk while reserving their conventional loads for a second strike (this ensures survival of the force to continue the battle, where a conventional pre-emptive strike may result in an overall diminution of their strike capability as a result of action by surviving U.S. units).

That the Soviets may plan in this vein is further supported by the U.S. tactic of maintaining armed strike airborne in the vicinity of a Soviet SSM-capable ship within range of a U.S. HVU during times of high tension. Since the U.S. is limited to firing only when fired upon (demonstrated time and again in our exercises so that it becomes an identifiable part of U.S. doctrine), a Soviet SSM-capable ship can be sure of a clear, unopposed shot with only his first volley. The Soviet captain has to plan for a degraded capability for follow-on volleys even though he plans to attempt shooting down the aircraft using his SAM armament. Recognition of this potential for a degraded follow-on capability further argues for attaining the maximum Pk in the first volley.

The character of the Soviet sea denial force demands planning for the use of maximum Pk weapons at the outset. Further, because the U.S. can plan for that response, it may tend to raise the level of the U.S. response and increase the likelihood that the U.S. will

pre-empt in order to overcome that weakness. A spiraling level of trying to outguess the opponent on both sides then increases the probability of pre-empting earlier in the situation. In other words, the character of the Soviet surface force (only his first volley will count) is a destabilizing factor which demands a positive response sooner in a confrontation.

To assume the Russians accept the fact that the U.S. would limit its strikes against the homeland to conventional weapons flies in the face of an established fact in the Soviet mind: the U.S. has historically (since the Civil War)* fought a vicious war demanding unconditional surrender as the primary goal. Therefore, the ultimate and only goal of warfare between the U.S. and the Soviets may be perceived by the Russians as the destruction of the Soviet system -- the one basic and most vital interest of the Soviets. The system must survive so the messianic goal of Communism can be achieved. They may also feel that a destabilizing factor is the U.S.'s lack of success in the last two wars with the likelihood of a desire on the part of the U.S. military to return to the historical pattern of warfare via a must for emotional and less rational approach. That is, they may feel that the mental bent of the U.S. might be to not let it happen again (being against tradition), thus forcing a greater potential for all-out war.

By placing what the Soviets feel is an unbeatable force in the path of an attacking U.S. force, and seeing a U.S. determination to continue the offensive NO MATTER THE COST -- even extending to acceptance of the loss of the entire effective U.S. force -- is not a rational act to contemplate. Therefore, this irrational act has to be

* With the exception of Korea, a U.N. action, and Vietnam.

planned for in advance in order to destroy, with whatever means is available, what is sure to be a rabid, vicious, illogical attack by the U.S.

Logic dictates a war is fought which one is clearly capable of winning (in order to achieve the political objective through selection of military force as a means); to embark on a course of action which guarantees failure through loss of the means is logically incomprehensible! Therefore, options chosen have to be believable -- if only successful scenarios are postulated and selected, but the other side does not envision that selected scenario and therefore acts unexpectedly (outside of the chosen scenario) the results can be the loss of the entire force.

Accepting the fact that the U.S. doesn't want to go to a full, strategic exchange because both political systems may not survive, the Soviets may feel there is a chance that a tactical nuclear exchange at sea may not necessarily escalate to a strategic exchange. This may cause them to accept the philosophy of the hot-line for strategic purpose (which in their minds is a reasonable tool of deterrence to WAR in the large sense of the word), but afford it little application to other permissible forms of warfare. Attributing the philosophy (from their dialectic) that if adventurism on the part of the U.S. were to be severely rebuffed, the U.S. might accept a defeat as a temporary setback, thereby preventing an escalation to full nuclear war. That is, if the U.S. acted like the Soviets, they would accept the defeat at sea, withdraw, and try again at a time and/or place of their choosing sometime again in the future.

The lesson of OKEAN '75 (in comparison to OKEAN '70) is that surface-to-surface engagements with parity forces is no longer contemplated. The Soviets have become convinced that in the future, faced with parity (a nuclear-capable HARPOON) on the surface, they would not deploy their vulnerable surface forces to sea areas in which submarines and aircraft are still capable of maintaining a tactical advantage). This decision is strengthened if they plan to pre-empt -- there is absolutely no requirement to hazard their surface forces.

On the other hand, if they are to believe that the U.S. is totally committed to fighting a conventional war at sea, and the U.S. has achieved a conventional surface parity by deploying conventionally equipped HARPOON, for them to reply IN KIND would require them to withdraw nuclear weapons from their present afloat arsenal because this type of weapon would no longer be required. It is illogical to assume they would degrade a present system in order to meet the U.S. scenario! It is an unreasonable expectation on our part when we still load out nuclear weapons on the CVs!

U.S. Naval tradition has been one of seeking out the enemy and doing battle with him on neutral ground or on the enemy's "turf". To intellectually allow acceptance of an unviolable defensive zone which the United States will not penetrate for any reason (even to the extent that it may result in total loss of the force by doing so) flies in the face of U.S. Naval tradition and the Naval "can-do" attitude. Tacit acceptance of a denied area by the United States means acceptance of a fait accompli which could be extended further afield at the enemy's discretion -- a capitulation on the part of the United States, and not to be allowed under any circumstances.*

* Freedom of the seas and the problems of restricted passage of men-of-war through a 200-mile limit are manifestations of U.S. unwillingness to accept establishment of a limited freedom of maneuver -- albeit on a much less critical application.

Acceptance of this fait accompli by the United States would be equivalent to the Soviets accepting a United States demand to remove their tattletales from U.S. task groups because it gives them an "unfair" advantage in targeting surface forces. Both are beyond the realm of rational behavior.

It must be understood that just as Gorshkov's series "Navies in War and Peace" assessed the effect of the Soviet Navy's history and future without recourse to equivalent treatment of the other Soviet military forces, this analysis was accomplished by isolating the naval portion of what would be a larger war. Soviet Naval doctrine assumes that a war at sea will be a supporting part of a larger war wherein all military forces are employed in a coordinated effort to achieve a political end. Therefore, employment of either navy in a unilateral role in a war at sea is highly improbable (but by the rules stated previously, should not be completely discarded as irrational).

CONCLUSION

The single most vital national interest and the basic military objective of Soviet armed forces is defense of the homeland. To impute any other mission before defense of the homeland flies in the face of irrefutable evidence. Further, when determining naval capabilities for projection, presence, etc., one must first deduct those forces required for defense of the homeland before determining what weight of effort can be applied to any other mission.

Soviet doctrine does evolve, but only because they perceive a new threat to carrying out their basic military objective. Faced with parity weapons at sea, they are obligated to evolve a doctrine which enables satisfaction of the basic doctrinal aspects of their planning. If this conception dictates the withdrawal of surface ships in favor of coordinated air/subsurface attacks, it will be accomplished in order to conserve scarce assets.

Scenarios designed by the U.S. military to test naval doctrine and tactics are generally postulated either in an isolated part of the high seas or in an area where one or both of the protagonists have a limited national interest. U.S. scenarios are postulated exclusively on going somewhere to accomplish a mission away from our shores. On the other hand, Soviet scenarios require them to prevent the potential opponent from moving to a point where their vital national interests are threatened. Soviet scenarios therefore are one of static defense, selected to fulfill in all respects the basic doctrinal aspects of Soviet planning. Their assumption that a successful war at sea can never be waged without appropriate air cover dictates a static defense within range of supporting air bases.

Postulation of scenarios for conflict at sea without including areas of vital national interest for both sides results in an erroneous impression to every planner -- the same can be said for war gaming as well.

Finally, when faced with the use of parity weapons at sea (postulated above as both sides possessing and capable of using equivalent-capability SSMS), Soviet doctrine will evolve to preserve their vulnerable forces as long as the mission can be carried out by employment of less vulnerable forces.

If the United States were to limit its newly-introduced SSM weaponry to conventional warheads, the threat of parity weapons at sea would no longer be a critical planning factor for the Soviets. They clearly could afford to engage U.S. surface forces with their surface forces without giving away the tactical edge as long as all other considerations enumerated above pertain. If this U.S. limitation were actually believed by the Soviets, it is a certainty that their doctrine will revert to that displayed prior to 1975, because they would believe there was no threat to their forces when they can plan a nuclear pre-emptive option against a constrained, conventional option on the part of the United States.

The scenario the U.S. Navy should be planning for is:

A nuclear and conventionally-armed U.S. task force steaming to a point in the ocean from which Soviet vital national interests are threatened. Soviet forces arrayed against this force includes submarines and aircraft equipped with SSMS and ASMS with nuclear warheads. The Soviets are expected to pre-empt with nuclear weapons. Soviet surface ships involved will be limited to those with a long range SSM capability -- beyond the effective range of U.S. SSMS.