Unclassified
(Classification)

II-17

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE

Newport, R.I.

TERM PAPER

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2 May 1955

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(Classification)

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THE DARDANELLES - A PROBLEM OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

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INTRODUCTION

The control of the Dardanelles, more properly called the Turkish Straits, has been the cause of war for centuries. Giving access to or egress from the Black Sea, the control of these Straits has been for three hundred years the object of Russian ambition. They seem to have been closed when Russia needed them open; or they were open to Russia's enemies, giving them access by water to the heart of the Russian homeland.

For a century the Straits have been in theory controlled by international treaty agreements. The present regime of the Straits is established by the Montreux Convention, drawn up in 1936, and with but two years of effectiveness remaining whenever a signatory to the convention elects to denounce it. This convention established Turkey as the actual controlling power, subject to the tenuous authority of the now defunct League of Nations. Among the signatories are ex-Axis powers, members of the communist bloc, and nations of the NATO alliance. The United States is not a signatory, yet has indicated willingness to participate in a new regime of the Straits.

This paper will examine the historical background of the Straits, will discuss the factors which today condition the attitudes of nations toward the Straits, and will indicate what position might serve the best interests of the United States and its allies of the free world.

THE DARDANELLES - A PROBLEM OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

On 10 November, 1922, the Senior Member Present of the General Board, Department of the Navy, signed a letter addressed to the Secretary of the Navy. Paragraph one of that letter read as follows:

> Having in view the present and prospective Near East situation and the present and prospective interests of the United States in the Near East, what should be the American policy regarding the control and Navigation of the Dardanelles?

It is probable that the Dardanelles has been the object of this type of inquiry more than has any other geographical feature of the earth. The Dardanelles, with the Sea of Marmara and the Bosporus, form a 190 mile waterway connecting the Aegean and Black Seas, important to man for thousands of years. Economic historians, with less romance but probably with more accuracy than Homer, tell us that in the 13th century B.C., Agamemnon and his co-heroes studied this problem. As a result of their findings they embarked on an amphibious expedition against Troy, the success of which opened the Dardanelles for free passage.

Today the Dardanelles, often called the Turkish Straits, are high on the list of potential causes of war. Both a gate and a barrier to the Black Sea, the Straits have for centuries been a Russian objective. Today they are controlled by Turkey, whose integrity is underwritten by NATO and hence is also a commitment of the United States. Today, the regime of the Straits is regulated by the Montreux Convention, a convention generally agreed to be outmoded and subject to denunciation by any of the signatory powers, with a two-year life after such a denunciation.

The Straits do not play a really significant part in history until the partition of the Roman Empire in the Third Century. In 330 the capital of the eastern empire was fixed

at Constantinople. That city remained the capital for over 1100 years by virtue of its walls and its fleet. It fended off Saracens in the 7th and 8th centuries, and Italian city states in the 11th, 12th, and 13th centuries.

With the expansion of the Ottoman Turks, commencing in the 14th century, the area controlled by Constantinople was gradually reduced. For some years before the actual fall of the city in 1453, the Bosporus had been closed by the Turks. With this act, their control of trade to the Black Sea was assured. Turkish power spread rapidly to the north and around the perimeter of the Black Sea, being complete by 1475.

This Turkish control of the Black Sea and its littoral became the objective of an expanding Russia. Under Peter the Great Russia achieved a toe-hold on the Black Sea in 1691, but his gains were quickly lost, and by the time of the Treaty of Belgrad in 1739, Russia was forbidden to have ships in the Black Sea. All Russian commerce was required to use Turkish bottoms. By 1774 Catherine the Great had secured for Russia control of the north shore of the Black Sea and the opening of that sea and the Straits to Russian vessels. These rights were contained in the Treaty of Kutchuk-Kainardji, which also preserved to the Turks the right to prohibit the use of the straits by warships.

Napoleon's Egyptian campaign brought the Russian fleet into the Bosporus in September, 1798, in consequence of a British-Russian-Turkish alliance. With Napoleon's failure in Egypt and the accession of Alexander I to the Russian throne, this power alignment was broken. The terms of the 1807 alliance between Napoleon and Alexander included a general agreement on the division of the Middle East between France and Russia (although it must be noted that they failed

to reach agreement on the control of Constantinople and the Straits). The possible consequences of the situation impelled England to sign with Turkey the Treaty of Constantinople, which was the first formal international treaty to contain the principle of the closure to warships of the Straits in time of peace "in accordance with the ancient rule of the Ottoman Empire."[2]

With the conclusion of the Napoleonic Wars and the establishment of a stable balance of power in Europe, the principal factor which influenced the relationship of the great powers in regard to the Straits was the growing weakness of the Turkish Empire; the gradual dismemberment of that empire was in turn hastened and retarded by the interference of these powers.

The Greek War of Independence (1821-1829), supported in varying degrees by England, France, and Russia, resulted in the detachment of Greece from the Ottoman Empire. At the same time, Russia, by her military adventures in the Balkans, secured the freedom of all Turkish waters for her merchant shipping.

In 1832 the Turkish Empire was threatened by the revolt of Mehemet Ali, who established Egypt as an independent state. Russia and Turkey concluded in 1833 the Treaty of Unkiar-Slelessi, by which Russia undertook the protection of Turkey and the defense of Constantinople. This brought Russian troops and ships to the Bosporus, and represents the closest approach to Russian control of the Straits that the Czars were able to achieve.

When in 1839 Mehemet Ali again threatened Turkey, the European powers not only took concerted diplomatic action to guarantee the integrity of Turkey, but used to occasion to force Russia to disavow any intention of establishing a protectorate over Turkey, and to agree to a revision of the

terms of the Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi. The result was the Treaty of London (1840) and an attendant Straits Convention, concluded in 1841. By this treaty, England, Austria, Prussia, and Russia (with France concurring in 1842) agreed upon the "ancient rule" that the Straits would be closed to warships in time of peace. "So long as the Porte is at peace, His Highness will admit no Foreign Ships of War into the Said Straits."[3] Thus the rule became an accepted part of European international law.

Russian dissatisfaction with the Straits Convention of 1841 found an excuse for action in 1853, when Nicholas I invaded Turkey over the matter of Russian prerogatives as the protector of Orthodox clergy in Turkey. France and England reacted promptly, sending naval forces into the Sea of Marmara. The Crimean War resulted. The Treaty of Paris, imposed on a defeated Russia in 1856, reaffirmed the Straits Convention of 1841, with an added proviso that each signatory Power might send two light warships through the Straits for duties off the mouths of the Danube. More significant to Russia, however, was the enforced neutralization of the Black Sea. Russia had again to agree to maintain no naval forces in that sea, and further, to agree to maintain no "Military-Maritime Arsenals" on its coast. By this unique measure, the European powers hoped to prevent future complications in the area. As a measure of naval strategy it disarmed Russia in the Black Sea, yet provided for easy access thereto by the European Fleets in time of war, once the concurrence of the Sultan could be secured.

The treaty also provided for the regulation of navigation of the Danube, and admitted Turkey "to participate in the public law and system of Europe".[4]

The Treaty of Paris in effect placed the security of Russia's southern frontier in continual jeopardy, and Russia moved to rectify the situation at the first moment that, in the opinion of the Czar, it could be accomplished without risk of war. This opportunity was provided in 1870 by the Franco-Prussian War, when Western Europe was preoccupied by the tensions resulting from this conflict.

There was little opposition on the part of the powers. England insisted on maintaining the position that Russia, or any nation, could not unilaterally obtain release from treaty obligations. Yet agreement was ultimately reached, on 13 March, 1871, in the Treaty of London. In effect, the "neutralization" of the Black Sea was terminated. Russia's right to maintain a fleet and bases there was restored. Freedom of passage of merchant vessels through the Straits was continued, and the principle of the closing of the Straits to warships, as stated in the 1856 treaty, was maintained, except that the Sultan was empowered to open the Straits to warships of friendly and allied powers in order to secure the execution of those stipulations of the Treaty of Paris that remained effective.

In 1877 Russia declared war on Turkey, ostensibly because of disorders arising from insurrections in the Turkish Balkan provinces. Of the great powers, England alone reacted to the Russian move. With each Russian military success, the British fleet sailed closer to the Straits. When in late January 1878 the Russians took Adrianople and advanced toward Gallipoli, the British fleet was ordered to proceed to Constantinople, but the orders were countermanded pending the outcome of peace negotiations. The terms of the armistice became known to the British in February; they included a provision for the settlement of the Straits question by the Czar and the Sultan. This was unacceptable to the British,

and the Fleet was immediately dispatched to Constantinople "to protect British life and property." Russia threatened to place troops in Constantinople, and war was imminent, only to be averted when Russia agreed not to occupy Gallipoli or Constantinople, and England agreed not to land troops.

In March, 1878, the preliminary Russo-Turkish peace treaty was signed at San Stefano. Providing for great Russian influence in the Balkans by the establishment of a "Greater Bulgaria", its terms aroused doubts among the European powers, especially Austria-Hungary. Accordingly, the Council of Berlin was arranged, with an agenda that included an item to settle "affairs in the East". Shortly before the Congress met in June, 1878, England concluded a defensive alliance with Turkey, promising military assistance if Russia attempted to take any Turkish territory in Asia beyond the boundaries to be established by the final treaty. To enable England to discharge this commitment, Turkey agreed "to assign the Island of Cyprus to be occupied and administered by England."[5] The Comgress proved to be a victory for British diplomacy and the undoing of the Russian military victory over Turkey. British control over Cyprus was affirmed by the ensuing Treaty of Berlin. Austri-Hungary was given the occupation and administration of the Balkan provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the "Greater Bulgaria" project of Russia was killed off, with Russian gains limited to minor areas in eastern Turkey. So far as the Straits were concerned, the treaty simply reaffirmed the status as defined in the Treaties of 1856 and 1871.

The Status of the Straits remained unchanged from the time of the Treaty of Berlin until the post-World War I treaties were written. Unsettled conditions in the Balkans and the continuing weakness of Turkey gave rise to constant maneuvering among the powers for greater control and influence in

in the area. The appearance of German influence in Turkey and German plans for economic expansion in Turkey and the Middle East conflicted with both French and British interests on the one hand, and with Russian interests on the other. Germany reassured Russia in 1894 that she had no intention of interfering with Russia so far as the Straits were concerned; yet she declined to subscribe to a formal agreement on the subject.

The Russo-Japanese War, 1904-5, brought home to Russia the disadvantage of having the Straits closed to warships, for she was unable to move units of the Black Sea Fleet to the Far East. In 1912 Turkey closed the Straits to all shipping following an Italian attack on the Dardanelles during the Italo-Turkish War. This closure severely affected the Russian commerce, and syrengthened further her desire to obtain a more advantageous position in the Straits. During these years Russia attempted on many occasions to bring about a general revision of the regime of the Straits, but could never get the enthusiastic support of any of the great powers. In consequence of this, Russia adopted a polich wihch would continue the Turkish position intact until Russia might be in a better position to take over the Straits herself. It was with this in mind that, during the course of the Balkan Wars of 1912-13, she was unreceptive to a British proposal that Constantinople might be internationalized and neutralized.

The outbreak of World War I in 1914 found Turkey technically neutral, but secretly committed to the Central Powers. Her rapprochement with Germany probably resulted from many motives. Among these were the real economic advantages arising from German railroad and other construction projects, and possibly from the fact that she feared Germany less than Russia. Certainly her regard for England had diminished as a result of the British occupation of Cyprus and Egypt, and

further from Britain's refusal to deliver to Turkey two warships built for her in British yards.

On 10 August, 1914, Turkey permitted the German warships Goeben and Breslau to enter the Straits and anchor at Constantinople. This act, together with Turkey's failure to require the ships to depart within 24 hours, was not only a violation of her obligations as a neutralm but was a violation of the Straits Convention. The allies did no more than issue protests, in the hope that Turkey might not become an actual belligerent. But Turkey closed the Straits on 27 September, 1914, and with her entry into the war on 4 November, following an attack on Russian ports in which the German ships, then ostensibly a part of the Turkish Navy, participated, the Straits remained closed to the allies for the duration of the war.

These actions again brought home to Russia the desirability of assured control of the Straits, and her desires in the matter were of great moment. She suggested a Dardanelles campaign to England and France in January, 1915, primarily as a device to relieve Turkish pressure in the Caucasus. As the plan was developed by England and France, it was intended to accomplish much more; it was aimed at the occupation of the Straits and reestablishment of the sea line of communication with Russia. This, together with proposed Greek participation, aroused considerable distrust in Russia. Accordingly, she force from her allies as a price for her continued participation and cooperation an agreement that Russia might outright annex Constantinople, the European area of Turkey, and certain parts of the Asian shres of the Bosporus. The Allies were freed from this commitment only by the Bolshevik denunciation of secret treaties and affirmations that the Straits should remain under Turkish sovereignty.

As victory in World War I came into the grasp of the Allies, the disposition of the Straits was one of the many problems in which a position had to be reached. In January of 1918 both England and the United States publicly declared for complete freedom of passage for all ships, with the Straits under international control. Indeed, the twelfth of President Wilson's fourteen points stated that "the Dardanelles should be permanently opened as a free passage to the ships and commerce of all nations under international guarantees."

On 30 October, 1918, an armistice was signed with Turkey which provided for allied occupation of Constantinople and other key points along the Straits, together with the opening of that waterway. Various proposals for the final disposition of the Straits, including one that the United States should exercise a mandate over the are (and rejected by that country) were made. None of the European powers was agreeable to any plan which would give one of them a mandate over the region, and common agreement was reached only on a plan to let Turkey retain sovereignty over the area, with an international commission regulating the commerce of a demilitarized Straits. Occupation of the area pending the formal adoption of such arrangements was largely carried out by the British.

On 10 August, 1920 the Treaty of Sevres was agreed upon; it incorporated control of the Straits as outlined above. The treaty was never ratified, for in the face of a Greek military adventure in Asia Minor, the Turkish government was reorganized and revitalized. The new nationalist Turkey was completely victorious over the Greeks, and refused to accede to the Treaty.

Allied backing of the Greeks, plus Allied use of the Straits in the launching of military intervention in Russia against the Bolsheviks, drove Russia and Turkey together.

They resolved their differences and on 16 March 1921 signed a treaty of friendship. In this treaty Russia formally acknowledged Turkish sovereignty over Kars and Ardahan, territories which Czarist Russia had taken in the war of 1877. Russia also supported with material aid the Turkish war with Greece.

The Allied powers convened at Lausanne in November, 1922, for the purpose of rewriting the Turkish peace treaty. The Straits question was significant. Turkey accepted the principle of freedom of passage. The United States, not having been at war with Turkey, was not a prospective signatory. As usual the greatest interest in the Straits was displayed by England and the USSR. The former, with overwhelmingly heavy naval superiority over the USSR, was in favor of free passage of warships, with the Straits under international control. The latter, in this state of affairs, reversed the long-time policy of the Czars, and pressed for complete closure of the Straits to all warships at all times.

As ultimately agreed, the Convention on the Regime of the Straits, as signed at Lausanne on 24 July, 1923, provided for, in the broadest terms, the following:

a. Complete freedom of passage for merchant vessels; and, in time of war with Turkey a belligerent, freedom of passage for neutral merchantmen.

b. Free passage for warships in time of peace, subject to the limitation that each power could send through the Straits a force no larger than the largest fleet of a Black Sea power, with a further proviso that each power might always send into that sea three ships of 10,000 tons or less each.

c. The Straits and certain islands were to be demilitarized.

d. An International Straits Commission was established under the auspices of the League of Nations, composed of representatives of Turkey, Great Britain, Italy, Japan Bulgaria, Greece, Rumania, Russia, and Jugoslavia (and the United States, should that nation ultimately accede to the convention).

This solution to the Straits question was naturally unsatisfactory to Russia in view of the existing naval situation. Turkey, too, could not be expected to be satisfied with the demilitarization of the area and her own largest city. The USSR apparently felt that a friendly Turkey was the best interim solution to be had. The two countries concluded a treaty of neutrality and non-aggression on 17 December, 1925.

The failure of the League of Nations effectively to prevent wars and halt aggression, the rise of totalitarian governments, and the general world malaise of the times prompted Turkey to act to secure a revision of the Lausanne Convention. She shrewdly initiated her move in April of 1936, during the Italo-Abyssinian War, and shortly after the remilitarization of the Rhineland by Hitler's Germany. There was little reluctance on the part of any of the signatory powers. The initial Turkish proposals would have been quite favorable to Russia, and would have given Turkey herself virtually total control. Britain resisted such extreme changes. The resulting Convention of Montreux, which entered into force on 9 November, 1936, was a compromise. Its terms included:

a. The abolition of the International Straits Commission, with Turkey assuming its functions and duties.

b. Remilitarization of the Straits area.

c. The customary passage of merchant ships (excepting those of belligerents when Turkey might be at war).

d. In time of war, Turkey not being a belligerent, vessels of war belonging to belligerents might not pass through the Straits except to act in assistance of a State victim of aggression as recognized under the Covenant of the League of Nations.

e. Turkey might close the Straits to all warships when a belligerent.

f. The total tonnage of warships which all non-Black Sea powers might send into that sea in time of peace was limited to 30,000 tons, with certain auxiliaries. Such movement of warships was limited to a stay of 21 days in the waters concerned, and subject to 15 days advance notice. A clause provided that if the Navy of a Black Sea power were to be increased by 10,000 tons above its strength on 20 July, 1936, the 30,000 tonnage figure could be raised to 45,000 tons.

g. Black Sea powers were given, in effect, unlimited transit rights.[6]

Italy did not attend the Montreux Conference, but subsequently indicated her formal adherence to the terms of the convention.

During the years leading to World War II, Turkey was involved in the attempts of Germany on the one hand, and England and France on the other, more directly to align her with one or another of the power blocs. In line with England's abandonment of her appeasement policy in early 1939, she undertook, together with France, to provide assistance to Poland, Greece, and Rumania in the event of aggression against these countries. In an effort to bolster these commitments, England and France attempted to arrive at supporting agreements with Turkey and the USSR. They were not completely successful. Russia surprised the world by her signing of the German-Soviet non-aggression pact on

24 August, 1939. Allied efforts with Turkey did bear fruit, however, and on 19 October, England, France and Turkey signed a fifteen year treaty of mutual assistance. This pact had significant reservations on the part of Turkey which removed any obligation for her to go to war with Russia in consequence of the pact.

During the period of the drafting and signing of the German-Soviet pact, both Germany and the USSR were carrying on conversations with Turkey in an effort to assure Turkish neutrality in the forthcoming situation. Russia's true aims in the area of Turkey are indicated in the following exerpts from the Soviet terms on which a Four Power Pact with the Axis powers would be acceptable (November, 1940):

> 2. Provided that within the next few months the security of the Soviet Union in the Straits is assured by the conclusion of a mutual assistance pact between the Soviet Union and Bulgaria, which geographically is situated inside the security zone of the Black Sea boundaries of the Soviet Union, and by the establishment of a base for land and naval forces of the USSR within range of the Bosporus and the Dardanelles by means of a long-term lease.
>
> "Likewise, the draft of the protocol or agreement between Germany, Italy, and the Soviet Union with respect to Turkey should be amended so as to guarantee a base for light naval and land forces of the USSR on the Bosporus and the Dardanelles by means of a long-term lease. . . "[7]

Again in January, 1941, the Soviet Ambassador in Berlin found it necessary to remind the German Government that:

> The Soviet Government has stated repeatedly that it considers Bulgaria and the Straits as the security zone of the USSR and that it cannot be indifferent to events which threaten those security interests."[8]

Turkey remained neutral until late in the war. In January, 1945, she opened the Straits to allied shipping, and declared war on Germany on 23 February (thereby qualifying herself for a charter membership in the United Nations). During this period, however, the Straits had been effectively closed to the Allies for much of the time by the Axis occupation of Greece and the Aegean Islands. Turkish administration of the Straits during the war years gave rise to few

valid objections on the part of the belligerents. Incidents that did arise stemmed mostly from difficulties in applying Montreux Convention definitions of naval auxiliaries to the types of shipping employed by the Axix powers.

It is at this point of time, 1945, that the United States became specifically committed to actions which caused her to adopt a positive position with regard to the Straits. It may be well to review briefly the history of United States interests in the Straits.

These interest must be viewed in the light of American concepts of foreign policy. Among these traditional concepts, held from the time of the founding of the Republic at least until the post-World War II years, are:

a. Abstention from alliances and commitments with European powers.

b. Freedom of international trade.

c. Freedom of the seas for neutral shipping in time of war, and freedom of international waterways.[9]

In consonance with these concepts, the United States habitually attempted only to obtain for her commerce the rights and privileged accorded to all. Thus we find the first formal treaty between the United States and the Ottoman Empire to be one of Commerce and Navigation, concluded on 7 May, 1830. Article VII of this treaty states in part "The merchant vessels of the United States . . . may pass from the waters of the Imperial Residence and go and come in the Black Sea like the aforesaid nations (most favored nations)."[10]

In another such Treaty concluded on 25 February, 1862, it was

> "expressly stipulated that all rights, privileges, or immunities, which the Sublime Porte now grants, or may hereafter grant to, or suffer to be enjoyed by the subjects, ships, commerce, or navigation of any other foreign Power, shall be equally granted to and exercised and enjoyed by the citizens, vessels, commerce, and navigation of the United States of America."[11]

As has been previously indicated, the United States rejected a proposal made at the close of World War I that she accept a mandate over the Straits area. The Straits conventions drawn up in connection with the Treaties of Sevres and Lausanne both contained provisions for the United States to have membership on the International Straits Commission should she accede to the conventions. The considerations of the General Board of the Navy, cited in the opening paragraph of this paper, resulted in a set of views as to the United States position to be taken on the Straits question. The complete text of the Board's paper is given in Appendix A; its summary is quoted herewith:

> The General Board os of the opinion that American interests demand:
>
> (a) That if an international commission of control of the Straits is set up, the United States have representation on the international commission of control and in all positions subordinate to that commission, equal to that of any other foreign power.
>
> (b) That the Straits, including the Dardanelles, the Sea of Marmara, and the Bosphorus, be open to the free navigation of the merchant ships of all flags without distinction or preference.
>
> (c) That the United States and its nationals have the same rights and privileges within and adjacent to the waters above mentioned as are possessed or may be granted to any other foreign power or to its nationals. These privileges to include all such matters as the erection and operation of fuel depots and storehouses, the use of cables, pilotage, lighterage, wharfage, towage, inspection, clearance, etc., and the use without discrimination of public commercial facilities.
>
> (d) That the Straits, including the Dardanelles, the Sea of Marmora, and the Bosphorus, be open to the free navigation of the vessels of war of all flags.
>
> (e) That no belligerent right be exercised and no hostile act committed within the Straits, including the Dardanelles, the Sea of Marmora, and the Bosphorus.
>
> (f) That all fortifications commanding these waters be razed and that no new fortifications be erected.

The Board also had this to say:

> There is no parallel between the necessary status of the Dardanelles and that of the Panama Canal. In the Dardanelles the history of instability, of conflicting interes, of discriminatory treatment, of sole access of powers to the sea and so forth, in addition to the fact that nature provided the Dardanelles while America provided the Panama Canal should separate very effectively the two questions in all their aspects.[12]

Despite the opinions of the General Board, Secretary of State Hughes sent to the United States representatives (non-participating) at Lausanne the following instructions:

> 4. It should be agreed that all fortifications be removed and none built in the future. There is no proper comparison with the Panama Canal in this matter. We have the right to fortify the Panama Canal as an artificial waterway which requires protection as such.
>
> 5. President Harding authorizes you to make statement at your discretion, as occasion may demand, to the following effect with respect to American membership on an international board of control for demilitarized or neutralized zones or for participation in the enforcement of such a status:
>
> 'The American representatives do not wish to make any agreement unless it is very likely to be fulfilled. In view of the traditional American policy, there can be no assurance that an undertaking for such membership or participation with the resulting involvement of the country would be given the necessary approval by the United States.'
>
> For your confidential guidance. Probably the Senate would not give its consent to a treaty with such a commitment. You should not place the United States in a position of asking for an international board of control in which the American Government would not be able to participate.[13]

The positions taken in these citations indicate unmistakably the subordination to traditional American foreign policy of a policy deemed desirable from a naval point of view. Further along traditional lines, the United States in 1929 concluded a treaty with Turkey by which the United States received most-favored nation treatment for her interests in Turkish waters.

When in 1936 Turkey proposed a revision of the Lausanne Convention, resulting in the Conference at Montreux, the United States declined even to send observers, as indicated in the following instruction sent by the Secretary of

State to the American Ambassador in Turkey:

> The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Turkey, 22 June, 1936.
>
> After giving full consideration to the questions raised in your despatch No. 22 of April 23, the Navy Department reaffirms its view with respect to the desirability of a bilateral agreement between the United States and Turkey for the purpose of safeguarding American rights in the navigation of the Straits, as expressed in its letter of August 17, 1935 . . .
>
> This Department and the Navy Department concur in your view regarding the inadvisability of American representation at the Montreux Conference. Accordingly you may in your discretion advise the Turkish authorities that this Government has no intention of sending an observer to the Conference but that it would appreciate being kept informed of the progress of the negotiations.[14]

It would appear that by 1935 the Navy Department had become quite reconciled to the traditional American policy of non-involvement in European affairs. In this instance, the safeguarding of American rights was achieved in 1939 by a reciprocal trade agreement between the United States and Turkey which established mutual unconditional most-favored-nation treatment. It is interesting to note that this agreement was not the subject of the customary treaty, but of an Executive Agreement.

At the outset of the war, American interest in the Mediterranean and it littoral was mostly commercial, and of considerable, but not significant importance to the American economy. To this might be added American religious interest in the Holy Land, and a cultural interest as manifested by the American schools in Turkey and other states of the Middle East.

The balance of power in the Mediterranean and Middle East had been held principally by the British, who had large economic and political interests; and to a lesser degree by the French, who had interests in North Africa, Syria and the Lebanon. The course of the war virtually eliminated French influence in the Eastern Mediterranean and severely

restricted that of the British. It was only with the arrival of American forces that the tide was turned.

As allied forces reoccupied the Mediterranean countries, they became involved in economic, administrative and political affairs. By 1944-45 they could not have withdrawn from this position without a resultant utter collapse of the states under occupation. While efforts were made to restore local governments as soon as practicable, the destruction of the economic and political fabrics, and the devastation of war, required continuing participation in all governmental fields by both Americans and British. The great bulk of material assistance was of American origin. The United States came to recognize that if the Mediterranean area were to participate successfully in a stable post-war world, this American effort would have to be a continuing one.

Yet there was on the part of the United States a reluctance to face up to the situation. Even before the end of the war, spheres of influence were being formed in the Balkans and Eastern Mediterranean. The USSR "liberated" Rumania and Bulgaria, and saw her aegis extended by the establishment of pro-Soviet regimes in Jugoslavia and Albania. England was recognized as having prime interest in Greece and Turkey. She also set about aligning the Arab states by assisting in the formation of the Arab League. In Italy, the United States was virtually forced into a position of primary interest by the sheer size of the relief and economic problems to be faced.

These lines were being drawn at the time of the Yalta meeting in February, 1945, although they were no the subject of formal agreement. So far as the Straits question was concerned, the Yalta protocol includes as Article XIV the following:

> The Montreux Convention and the Straits. It was agreed that at the next meeting of the three Foreign Secretaries to be held in London, they should consider proposals which it was understood the Soviet Government would put forward in relation to the Montreux Convention, and report to their governments.[15]

The three Foreign Secretaries having failed to reach any agreement in the matter, it was again considered at Potsdam in August, 1945. The situation was beclouded by the fact that on 19 March, 1945, the Soviet Union had announced her denunciation of her treaty of neutrality and non-aggression with Turkey, and had followd this act with a continuing series of demands for the return of the areas of Kars and Ardahan (ceded by Turkey to Russia in 1878, but returned to the Turks by the Soviets in 1921), and for the right to establish a Russian naval base in the Straits. At Potsdam, according to the account of Mr James F. Byrnes in his book "Speaking Frankly", both the United States and England again agreed tha the Straits convention required amendment. They could not, however, agree with Stalin that, in view of Turkish weakness either Russia, or Russia and Turkey together should regulate the Straits. This would constitute, they held, an unacceptable infringement of Turkish sovereignty. They preferred at that time to see the navigation of the Straits under the aegis of the United Nations. The United States position was basically her historic one, that of freedom of the seas and international waterways, but America was willing to go much farther to achieve this than was politically possible in the days of Harding. In reporting on the conference, President Truman said:

> One of the persistent causes for wars in Europe in the last two centuries has been the selfish control of the waterways of Europe. I mean the Danube, the Black Sea Straits, the Rhine, the Kiel Canal, and all the inland waterways of Europe which border on two or more states.

The United States proposed at Berlin that there be free and unrestricted navigation of these inland waterways. We think this is important to the future peace and security of the world. We proposed that regulations for such navigation be provided by international authorities.

The functions of the agencies would be to develop the use of the waterways and assure equal treatment on them for all nations. Membership on the agencies would include the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and France, plus those states which border on the waterways.[16]

There was no final solution reached at Potsdam:

Article XVI. The Black Sea Straits. The three governments recognize that the convention concluded at Montreux should be revised as failing to meet the present day conditions.

It was agreed that as the next step the matter should be the subject of direct conversations between each of the three Governments and the Turkish Government.[17]

The Soviet version of this paragraph read as follows, in part:

The three governments agreed that as the proper course the said question would be the subject of direct negotiations between the three powers and the Turkish Government.[18]

In accordance with the Potsdam agreement, the United States on 2 November, 1945, transmitted to the Turkish Government her views on the modification of the Montreux Convention. They included:

1. The Straits to be open to the merchant vessels of all nations at all times;

2. The Straits to be open to the transit of the warships of Black Sea powers at all times;

3. Save for an agreed limited tonnage in time of peace, passage through the Straits to be denied to the warships of non-Black Sea powers at all times, except with the specific consent of the Black Sea powers or except when acting under the authority of the United Nations; and

4. Certain changes to modernize the Montreux Convention; such as the substitution of the United Nations system for that of the League of Nations and the elimination of Japan as a signatory.[19]

The note also stated that "The United States, if invited, would be pleased to participate in such a conference."

The British Government concurred with these views, and on 6 December, 1945, the Turkish Government indicated approval of the United States note as a basis for discussion, and stated that it was willing to participate in an international conference on the Dardanelles, and that it would accept any decision reached provided there was no infringement of Turkey's independence, sovereignty, or territorial integrity.

The proposals of the Soviet Union did not appear until August, 1946, and they touched off what has been termed the "Great Debate" - really a multiple exchange of notes. In its note to Turkey the USSR recited a long list of alleged violations of the Montreux Convention during the war years, and advanced the following proposals:

> For its own part the Soviet Government proposes to establish a new regime, proceeding from the following principles:
>
> 1. The Straits should be always open to the passage of merchant vessels of all countries.
>
> 2. The Straits should be always open to the passage of warships of the Black Sea powers.
>
> 3. Passage through the Straits for warships not belonging to the Black Sea powers shall not be permitted except in cases specially provided for.
>
> 4. The establishment of a regime of the Straits, as the sole sea passage, leading from the Black Sea and to the Black Sea, should come under the competence of Turkey and other Black Sea powers.
>
> 5. Turkey and the Soviet Union, as the powers most interested and capable of guaranteeing freedom to commercial navigation and security on the Straits, shall organize joint means of defense of the Straits for the prevention of the utilization of the Straits by other countries for aims hostile to the Black Sea powers.[20]

It will be noted that the first three proposals are in close, though not absolute, agreement with the earlier proposals of the United States. In a note dated 19 August, 1946, the United States took exception to the fourth Soviet

proposal, stating that it apparently did not envisage a revision of the Montreux Convention, and that the United States could not agree that "the regime of the Straits should come under the competence of the Black Sea powers to the exclusion of other powers."[21] The note also disagreed with the fifth Soviet proposal, stating

> . . . Turkey should continue to be primarily responsible for the defense of the Straits. . . . Should the Straits become the object of attack or threat of attack by an aggressor the resulting situation would clearly be a matter for action on the part of the Security Council of the United Nations. . . . It is observed that the note of the Soviet Government contains no reference to the United Nations. The position of the Government of the United States is that the regime of the Straits should be brought into appropriate relationship with the United Nations and should function in a manner entirely consistent with the principles and aims of the United Nations. The Government of the United States reaffirms its willingness to participate in a conference called to revise the Montreux Convention.

The British Government originated a note setting forth views similar to those of the United States. On 22 August the Turkish Government indicated that Turkey could not accept the fourth and fifth Soviet proposals, declared that shae had acted in good faith during the war years, admitted that the Montreux Convention required revisions, and indicated her willingness to achieve such a revised convention through an international conference which would include the Montreux signatories and the United States.

This gave rise to another round of notes, all elaborating on the original themes. On 26 October the Soviets indicated that direct conversations should not be regarded as completed, but that they considered a conference to be premature. This ended the formal exchange of notes comprising the "Great Debate".

The position of England, Turkey, and the United States was the conventional one, envisaging a continuation of the basic provisions of the Montreux, but with technical amend-

ments and political changes responsives to current conditions. The United States, while maintaining her traditional stand on freedom of international waterways, now indicated her readiness to become an active participant in the establishment of a new regime. This shift from the 1922 position was in consonance with the changed sentiment in America which accepted and welcomed participation in the United Nations and other international commitments, after having rejected the League of Nations some 25 years earlier.

The Soviet position was not inconsistent with traditional Russian ambitions. Not since the short-lived treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi in 1833 had she gained the right to put military forces along the Straits, and then only for the ostensible purpose of protecting the Turkish Empire. Her Czarist aims during World War I and the Soviet aims of 1940 seem clearly directed at the achievement of permanent control of the Straits. The position in 1946 was based on the concept of the Black Sea as a mare clausum, with only the Black Sea littoral powers exercising control.

In one of her notes on the subject of the Straits the USSR stated:

> It would be unjust to forget that the Soviet Black Sea shores, extending 2100 kilometers, give access to the most important regions of the country, wherefore the necessity for assuring their security with direct participation of the Soviet Union in the defense of the Straits, has its origin in the vital interests of the U.S.S.R. All this explains why the Soviet Government considers it necessary that the defense of the Straits should be carried out by the joint efforts of Turkey and the Soviet Union and have for its objective the assuring of the security of all the Black Sea States.[22]

In the same note the Soviet Government stated:

> The destination of these Straits, leading to the Black Sea, which is a closed sea, differs from that of world seaways such as, for example, Gibraltar or the Suez Canal, giving access not to a limited number of States, and which, as is known, are seaways of world importance.

The Soviet Government agreed that international water-

ways warranted international control, but stressed the contention that the Black Sea Straits should be regulated only by the Black Sea powers.

The view that the Black Sea is a closed sea has been advanced frequently by the USSR since the time of the Lausanne conference in 1922. The Soviets have attempted to provide historical proof of this contention, going as far back as the Treaty of Kutchuck-Kainardji of 1774. The Soviet position is, however, not supported by any reasonable interpretation of international law and precedent. The Black Sea is generally considered to be an international body of water similar to the Baltic. That access to the former has come under international regulation, while access to the latter has not, can be attributed to vastly different historical background of the two. A complicating factor in the case of the Black Sea is that the riverine nations of the Danube have a legitimate interest in Black Sea affairs. The Danube is an important international waterway, and constitutes the only water route to the sea for both Austria and Hungary. This situation further discredits the closed sea theory as applied to the Black Sea.[23]

The "Great Debate" has not been reopened since 1946, and the Straits question has only occasionally been the subject of open discussion. In April, 1950, the United States Secretary of State was queried with regard to an article appearing in "Red Fleet", the Journal of the Soviet Navy Ministry, which demanded that the Soviet Union receive specific rights in the Straits. The Secretary reiterated the United States position as set forth in it note of 19 August, 1946 to the USSR, and stated that the establishment of a regime of the Straits was not the exclusive concern of the Bleack Sea powers; he declared that Turkey should remain primarily

responsible for the defense of the Straits. He added that the United States was aware of no formal Soviet proposals since 1946.[24]

In retrospect, it seems quite obvious that the USSR in 1945 and 1946, while paying verbal tribute to the principles of the United Nations, was in fact extending her sphere of influence as far as she could without risking an open break with her erstwhile co-belligerents. Her attempts to secure Libya as a colony, to obtain certain of the Dodecanese Islands, and to secure territorial acquisitions in Turkey are a matter of record. Unsuccessful in these, the Soviets sought to reach the Mediterranean and outflank the Straits by instigating and supporting the Greek Civil War.

The inability of England further to support Greece and Turkey led in March 1947 to the enunciation of the Truman Doctrine, wherein the President declared that

> . . .it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures. . . . Should we fail to aid Greece and Turkey in this fateful hour, the effect will be far-reaching to the West as well as to the East.[25]

The President asked for $400,000,00 in economic and military assistance for Greece and Turkey, which was granted by the Congress in May, 1947.

This American action provided the means for the undoing of Russian designs on the two countries, and for a start toward their attaining a firm economic and military position. When on 15 February, 1952, Greece and Turkey formally joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the situation of the Straits altered once again to the disadvantage of the USSR. With Turkey committed to a belligerent status in the event of a war involving NATO, the Straits are effectively closed to the Soviets. Furthermore, they are by the same token available to the NATO forces. The Straits became in-

volved in yet another alliance when on 28 February, 1953, the Jugoslav-Greek-Turkish Tripartite Pact was signed.

During this period the USSR and its satellite states continually denounced Nato and verbally attack Greece and Turkey as well as the United States. But the Soviet fulminations had no significant effect.

The last noteworthy attempt on the part of the USSR to alienate Turkey from the western powers occurred in 1953. Following by a few days a visit to Turkey by Secretary of State Dulles, the Soviet Government addressed a not to Turkey on 30 May, in which the Soviets stated that it was now deemed possible "to ensure the security of the Soviet Union in the area of the Straits under conditions which would be equally acceptable both to the Soviet Union and to Turkey." In consequence, the Soviet Union had "no territorial claims against Turkey."[26] Then followed an exchange of notes, which accomplished nothing, as Turkey adhered to its 1946 position and to its western partners. That the Straits area remains a tender spot for the Russians is indicated by a speech of Premier Malenkov on 8 August, 1953, in which he said:

> In everybody's memory is the statement made by the Soviet Government to the Government of Turkey. This statement establishes essential prerequisites for the development of good-neighborly relations if, of course, the Turkish sied is to show in its turn due efforts in this direction. The improvement of relations between Turkey and the Soviet Union would undoubtedly serve the interests of both sides and make an important contribution to the strengthening of security in the Black Sea area.[27]

Whether the new premier of the USSR will attempt a new approach to the problem of the Straits remains to be seen. We may be sure, however, that Russian objectives in the area have not changed. It is well to note that control of the Turkish Straits is virtually the only specific traditional Russian goal which has not as yet been attained by the Soviets.

It seems patent that Soviet expansion in Greece and Turkey has been halted, at least for the time being, by the United States policies which provided immediate assistance to those countries in 1947, and which led to the formation of NATO and its extension to include the two nations. That these policies are based on a clear recognition of the importance of the area to the security and well-being of the United States and her allies is indicated by the following statements. On 15 January, 1952, General of the Army Omar Bradley, Then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, stated to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee:

> From the Military viewpoint, it is impossible to exaggerate the importance of these two countries. . . . Greece and Turkey occupy strategic locations alongone of the major eas-west axes. . . Located as they are - and allied with free nations - they serve as powerful deterrents to any aggression directed toward Southern Europe, the Middle East, or North Africa. The successful defense of those areas - any or all of them - is dependent upon control of the Mediterranean Sea. Greece and Turkey block two avenues to the Mediterranean which an aggressor might endeavor to use should they decide upon a thrust there. . . . Greece . . . presents a barrier along the overland route from the Balkan States located to her north. Turkey, astride the Bosporus and Dardanelles, guards the approach by water from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean and to the Suez Canal and Egypt farther south. Turkey, too, flanks the land routes from the north to the strategically important oil fields of the Middle East.[28]

Further, Mr. Henry A. Byroade, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs, in the course of a speech on 5 December, 1952, quoted General Eisenhower as follows: "As far as sheer value of territory is concerned, there is no more strategically important area in the world." Mr. Byroade went on to say that the Near East contained approximately one half of the world's proved oil reserves, and some 65 million people in whose welfare we are interested. He stated that (as a result of these considerations) American policy objectives in the Near East are:

1. A desire to see governmental stability and the maintenance of law and order;

2. The promotion of peace in the area among the Middle Eastern states themselves as well as better understanding between them and the Western Powers;

3. The creation of conditions which would bring about a rise in the general economic welfare;

4. The preservation and strengthening of democracy's growth - not necessarily in our own pattern - but at least in a form which recognizes the same basic principles as the democracy in which we believe;

5. The encouragement of regional defense measures against aggression from the Soviet world.[29]

Let us now examine the NATO interest in the Straits area. On 22 February, 1953, the New York Times, in reporting the Lisbon meeting of the NATO Foreign Ministers, stated that the Foreign Ministers had received a report from the NATO Council Deputies listing the principal immediate objectives of Soviet foreign policy as attempted within the framework of a cold war. Among these objectives was: "Efforts to sap Western influence in the Middle Eastern countries of Turkey, Iran and Pakistan and eventually to gain control of the Dardanelles and the Hellespont Straits to the Black Sea."[30]

Greece and Turkey have been organized into the NATO Allied Land Forces Southeastern Europe, under an American general, and with headquarters at Izmir. While official NATO plans for the area are not a matter of public information, it is possible to get some information from the press. One of the earliest NATO exercises to be held there was Exercise "Weldfast", reported by the New York Times in October, 1953, as designed to test radar defenses in the Straits area.[31] In the same month, while commenting on United States views concerning the possible acquisition of a cruiser by the Turkish Navy, the Times said:

> According to the frequently stated United States view, which is shared by North Atlantic Treaty Organization planners in Europe, the Turkish Navy's role in a future conflict should consist primarily of maintaining

a clear passage through the Dardanelles Straits for the United States Sixth Fleet and the British Mediterranean Fleet.

NATO plans also call for Turkish destroyers to escort trans-Aegean and coastwise shipping while Turkish submarines cooperate with Allied hunter-killer teams in tracking down enemy vessels in the Black Sea and Mediterranean.[32]

In March of 1955 the New York Times published as facts the following:

a. There are eleven NATO airfields under construction in Turkey, in addition to the Adana airbase with its 12,000 foot runways and which Turkey "shares with the United States Strategic Air Command".

b. The Iskenderun naval base is being enlarged and a pipeline network is being constructed to supply fuel to ten jet airbases scattered throughout southern and eastern Turkey.

c. Americans are manning radar stations along the Black Sea coast.

d. The Turkish First and Third Armies, American-equipped, are stationed in Thrace and the Caucasus respectively, and are committed to NATO.

e. Four Turkish air wings, with F-84G fighter bombers, with a fifth F-86 wing to be added, will be under NATO command.

The Times also indicated that, with the Turkish-Iraq Defense Cooperation Agreement of March, 1955, the problem of supply to eastern Turkey will be simplified, since "men, material and tactical air power can now move to Turkey's assistance from Iraq, thus supplementing the over-taxed supply lanes through the Mediterranean." The Times further stated "It is an open secret that Turkey, which is fourteen minutes by jet plane from the Soviet Crimea, would be used as an offensive base in a future war."[33]

From a military point of view, the ability of Turkey to

resist Soviet bloc military aggression has been increased many times since 1946. Her security is further insured by the NATO alliance. It seems improbable that so long as the present situation obtains, aggressive action against Turkey will be military in nature.

The Soviet concern over the control of the Black Sea is based on considerations as important as they are of long standing. The Black Sea has provided to Russia's enemies a convenient avenue of approach on repeated occasions. When her enemies had free access to the Black Sea, they were able to place ground forces far behind the Russian western frontiers, to the decided disadvantage of Russian arms.

On the other hand, Russia has also suffered because she did not control the Straits. In this century, she could not get forces out of the Black Sea to participate in her war with Japan. During World War I Turkish control of the Straits kept badly needed help from the Russian forces. After the war, the westen powers sent counter-revolutionary forces through the Black Sea in an attempt that failed by little of putting down the Soviet regime.

The advantage conferred by control of the Straits was pointed up during World War II. The fact that Germany was unable to suppoly her armies in southern Russia by water from Italy and Greece, and the skillful and effective use made of the few naval forces the Germans managed to operate in the Black Sea, cannot but have caused the Soviets to consider the consequences of a German control of the Straits during 1942-43.

While the USSR failed in her post-war attempts to obtain control, outright or shared, of the Straits, one meed but look at the map to see that she is in a position to challenge their effective usedby an enemy. With Bulgaria as a satellite, Russia is closer to the Straits than she

has ever been on a continuing basis. The Bulgarian frontier is but 85 miles from Istanbul.

Secretary of State Byrnes stated in 1947 that "the thinking of the Soviet leaders in connection with the Dardanelles is unrealistic. For a hundred years Russia has coveted this section of its neighbor's territory. A hundred years ago the fortifications they seek would have been of great military value. Today, without complete air superiority, their fortifications in the Straits would be of little value." Mr. Byrnes rightly points up the effect of modern air power, but he does not take note of the fact that Russian air power will similarly aggect the use of the Straits by her enemies.

Excluding the Sea of Marmara, there are some 65 miles of confined waters in the Straits, where maneuvering to avoid air attack in impossible. Most of the Straits area is mineable. Ships sunk by mine or bomb could block the Straits in several places. Finally, it requires little imagination to visualize the effect of one properly placed thermo-nuclear weapon in or beside the narrowest reaches of the Bosporus, lined as it is with rocky cliffs.

The Turkish shores of the Black Sea afford no good harbors, and no significan oil storage or repair facilities. The risk assumed in operating naval forces of any appreciable size in the Black Sea, until the integrity of the Straits can be guaranteed, is almost prohibitive. It is quite apparent that befor major forces are sent into the Black Sea, considerable advance preparation must be made. At a minimum this would include: a sustained and effective air attack on the Russian and satellite air potential in the area; the provision of an efficient air defense of the Straits; and a limited offensive in the Balkans which will make most of the Bulgarian coast line available for the

development of base facilities and oil storage. The advantages accruing to him who has free use of the Black Sea during a campaign against Russian territory are such that these operations would be well worth while. Indeed they might be mandatory if the manpower deficiency of the Western allies is to be made good by the superior mobility of their sea power.

It should always be kept in mind that to be of real use to the Russians, control of the Straits must be accompanied by control of the Aegean Sea and enough of the littoral areas of Greece and Turkey adequately to provide for security in this region. Only then can they readily make use of their Black Sea naval forces in an offensive rather than a defensive role. Only then will they have a base suitable for gaining control of the Eastern Mediterranean and for the exploitation of the Middle East. Conversely, NATO must retain control of this area for any successful drive in the Balkans and as a prerequisite for eventual military operations in Southern Russia. Useful as the Straits may be, the impact of modern aircraft and modern weapons has greatly expanded the defensive periphery required for their protection and exploitation.

It is obvious that military considerations dictate that the NATO position in the Straits area continue strong. It is equally clear that the anomalous position of the Montreux Convention, and its patent inapplicability to present conditions in many of its details, cannot but give rise to international tensions. It might be well therefore to consider such revisions as would remove some at least of the tensions in the area. To satisfy the USSR would entail virtual Soviet control of the Straits. This the West is committed to resist. To satisfy the West, the Straits must

not be used for aggressive purposes by any power or combination of powers. Since the definition of aggression as applied to any specific case has been and will be a matter for endless debate, the USSR can be expected to resist any regime of the Straits which would restrict the movement of her forces under any circumstances.

Under present circumstances it is not practicable to establish a regime of the Straits which will resolve the situation in a permanent and equitable manner. As in the case of previous regimes, the conventions drawn up cannot but reflect a balance of the conflicting interests of the times, and will be no more than a modus vivendi. Until the basic causes of friction between the two power blocs are removed, the Straits will continue to represent a spot where the rub is constantly felt.

If this attitude be accepted, then all that can be done at present is to revise the Montreux Convention so that it does reflect the present situation rather than that which existed in 1936. It is submitted that the following constitute the only practicable revisions that might be acceptable to all parties:

a. Effect a change in signatories. The Montreux Convention was signed by Bulgaria, France, Great Britain, Greece, Japan, Jugoslavia, Rumania, Turkey, and the USSR. The Potsdam powers agreed that Japan should be dropped. Great Britain and Turkey have agreed that the United States should become a signatory. The remaining powers, by virtue of geography or of membership on the Security Council of the United Nations, might well continue.

b. Bring the convention under the United Nations. This step is necessary in order to delete references to the League of Nations, and to provide for adjudication of cases of aggression under which passage of warships should be authorized.

c. Continue Turkey as the executive agent of the convention. This is necessary in order that the sovereignty of Turkey over its own waters may be preserved. It is also desirable as a means of avoiding the problems which would arise from a mixed committee.

d. Continue the present provisions for the passage of merchant vessels, with a redefinition of naval auxiliaries to avoid misinterpretations. This would continue presently agreed policies and also clear up one cause of argument.

e. Continue the provision that the warships of Black Sea powers will have unlimited transit rights in time of peace. This is a matter of simple justice, and involves no change.

f. Deny access of warships of non-Black Sea powers to that sea in time of peace. This is a departure from the Montreux Convention and from the United States proposals of 1945. Yet it involves no sacrifices of real military advantage. It might tend to decrease tensions in the area.

g. Empower Turkey to close the Straits to warships as she may see fit when at war, and when directed by the United Nations. This is substantially a continuation of present provisions. The present orientation of Turkey makes it compatible with the policies of the West.

h. Require Turkey, when at peace, to permit the transit of belligerent warships only on approval of the United Nations. This is in part a continuation of present provisions. Its inclusion should help materially to enhance the position of the United Nations.

i. Agree that Turkey may establish any defense she may deem necessary for her own safety and for the carrying out of obligations imposed on her by the convention. This is a continuation of the present position.

There appear to be two ways by which the Montreux Convention can be changed. One is by a denunciation as prescribed in Article 28:

> . . .If, two years prior to the expiry of the said period of twenty years, no High Contracting Party shall have given notice of denunciation to the French Government the present Convention shall continue in force until two years after such notice shall have been given. Any such notice shall be communicated by the French Government to the High Contracting Parties.
>
> In the event of the present Convention being denounced in accordance with the provisions of the present article, the High Contracting Parties agree to be represented at a conference for the purpose of concluding a new Convention.

Since the convention has not been denounced as of this writing, it continues in effect indefinitely. There remains therefore the prospect of a revision at on of the five year opportunities for review as provided for in Article 29:

> At the expiry of each period of five years from the date of the entry into force of the present Convention each of the High Contracting Parties shall be entitled to initiate a proposal for amending one or more of the provisions of the present Convention.
>
> . . . . . .
>
> Such a conference may only take decisions by a unanimous vote, except as regards cases of revision involving Articles 14 and 18(dealing with transit of warships and tonnages involved), for which a majority of three-quarters of the High Contracting Parties shall be sufficient.
>
> The said majority shall include three-quarters of the High Contracting Parties which are Black Sea Powers, including Turkey. . . .

With the present composition of signatories, the outlook for unanimous votes is uncertain.

The United States could probably influence one or another of the signatory powers to denounce the convention. But she would have to be quite sure that agreement along the lines indicated could be reached, or a state of no convention at all would prevail. Probably she could similarly arrange a meeting in revision. Again, she should be quite certain of the probable results. But in this case, if re-

visions fail, the original provisions still hold.

Clearly, any attempt to revise or replace the Montreux Convention must be the subject of careful and competent prior arrangements, lest the attempt merely create additional tension and misunderstanding. In view of this, the United States might very well decide that it is in her best interest to continue the status quo for so long a time as the Soviet bloc will abide with it.

It is admitted that the foregoing proposals will not provide a final answer to the question of the Straits. So long as their control remains an objective of the USSR, the question remains unresolved. The final answer can come only when the USSR renounces her ambitions in the area or when she achieves permanent control for herself. An attempt at the latter will, under present conditions, be resisted by NATO. To achieve the former may very well require the use of force. But it might also be attained at some future, probably distant, date when a strong United Nations merits and enjoys the confidence of its members.

In the meantime, the strategic interests of the United States in the Straits area depend upon the continuing friendship and good faith of a vigorous Turkey, on the strength of NATO, and on the maintenance of an American position of constructive leadership in the United Nations. These must remain continuing American policy objectives.

NOTES

1. Complete text contained in Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1923, Vol.II, pp. 893-897. Washington: GPO, 1938.

2. Shotwell and Deak, Turkey at the Straits, p. 27. New York: Macmillan, 1940.

3. Ibid. p. 38.

4. Ibid. p. 40-43.

5. Ibid. p. 61.

6. Text consulted was that contained in Heald and Wheeler-Bennett, Documents on International Affairs 1936. Oxford Univ. Press, London.
Text less annexes is contained in U.S. Department of State Publication 2752, The Problem of the Turkish Straits. Washington: GPO, 1947.

7. NAZI-SOVIET Relations, 1939-1941, U.S.Department of State. Washington: GPO, 1948.

8. Ibid.

9. Palmer and Perkins, International Relations, p. 962. New York: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1953.

10. The Problem of the Turkish Straits, p. 15.

11. Ibid. p. 18.

12. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1923, Vol.II. pp. 893-897.

13. Ibid. p. 912.

14. Foreign Relations of the United States. Diplomatic Papers 1936, Vol.III. p. 521-522. Washington : GPO, 1953.

15. Text as contained in The New York Times, 24 March, 1947, p. 1.

16. The Problem of the Turkish Straits, p. 36.

17. Ibid. p. 36.

18. Ibid. p. 36.

19. Ibid. p. 47.

20. Ibid. p. 47.

21. Ibid. p. 49.

22. Ibid. p. 58.

23. See Kazimierz Grzybowski, The Soviet Doctrine of Mare Clausum and Policies in Black and Baltic Seas, in The Journal of Central European Affairs, Vol.XIV, No. 4, January, 1955, pp. 338-353, for an account of Russian attempts to establish a juridicial justification for the mare clausum theory and of concurrent actions taken to make a reality of the theory.

24. The New York Times, 22 April, 1950, p. 1.

25. Department of State Publication 4446, The Development of United States Policy in the Near East, 1945-1951. p. 812. GPO: January, 1952.

26. Department of State Publication 5432, The Development Of United States Policy in the Near East, South Asia, and Africa during 1953. p. 277. Washington: GPO, April, 1954.

27. Ibid. p. 278.

28. The statement as quoted in Department of State Publication 4820, State Department Bulletin of 15 December, 1952.

29. Ibid.

30. The New York Times, 22 February, 1952, p. 1.

31. The New York Times, 2 October, 1953, p. 2.

32. The New York Times, 16 October, 1953, p. 9.

33. The New York Times, 13 March, 1955, p. 22, and 27 March 1955, p. 16.

34. James F. Byrnes, Speaking Frankly. p. 78. New York: Harper, 1947.

APPENDIX A

The following is the complete text of a study made by the General Board of the Department of the Navy in 1922 on the subject of the Dardanelles, as contained in Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1923, Vol. II . pp. 893-897. Washington: GPO, 1938.

The Senior Member Present of the General Board, Department of the Navy to the Secretary of the Navy, Washington, 10 November, 1922.

The General Board has considered the following question in accordance with instructions contained in reference (a):-

> Having in view the present and prospective Near East situation and the present and prospective interests of the United States in the Near East, what should be the American policy regarding the control and navigation of the Dardanelles?

2. The vicinity of the Dardanelles has always been one of international tension incident to the centering of ethnological conflicts and of highly important international trade routes - both land and sea.- American interest in the Near East, as else where, is closely allied with any arrangements that will promote world-peace. That solution of the Dardanelles question which will give the greatest prospect of lasting peace in the Near East is likely to accord best with American interests.

3. Certain features of the Dardanelles question change but little from decade to decade. The permanency of these features indicate them as the basis of arrangements concerning the Dardanelles. These features will be discussed briefly.

4. The Dardanelles is a great public highway provided by nature leading to a sea that washes the shores of Turkey, Russia, Roumania, Bulgaria, and some lesser states, and that receives the waters of five great navigable rivers. This sea in consequence does not belong to a single power as it once did, but belongs to all the world as a part of the highway of trade. Any and every attempt to block or impede the access of sea-borne commerce to this sea, - the Black Sea, - is subversive of wrold organization and contrary to world interests, as it will set up international pressures and tensions that will lead inevitably to renewed wars.

5. Russia, potentially one of the greatest of world powers, exports in normal times one-half of all her products via the Black Sea. Russia has no other sea outlet comparable in importance with that through the Dardanelles. The importance to Russia of this outlet will increase greatly with the growth of Russian population, and, especially, with the improvement of Russia's means of internal transportation. No solution that imposes an artificial barrier between so great a power and the sea can contain within it the elements of permanency, - of stability.

6. A large part of the commerce of Austria, Czecho-Slovakia, Hungary, Jugo-Slavia, Roumania and Bulgaria finds its way to the high seas via the Danube and the Dardanelles. This commerce too requires freedom of exit. The necessity for equal freedom of transit in both directions needs no argument.

7. The considerations briefly outlined above have led to a general acceptance by the powers and by Turkey of the principle of freedom of passage through the straits for the merchant vessels of all nations. Experience in many places throughout the world has shown that the acceptance of a principle is not always sufficient to secure its impartial execution. The administration of affairs that follows, and is supposedly based upon, the acceptance of the principle is fully as important as the acceptance of the principle itself in determining the course of events. Until conditions in the Near East are stabilized equality of opportunity is best secured by equal participation in administration by the interested parties.

8. The granting of freedom of passage through the Dardanelles is not in itself sufficient to secure for American ships the same opportunities as may be enjoyed by the merchant ships of other powers. We must secure by agreement equality of rights and the same privileges as other foreign powers in all that relates to commercial and naval operations. With no attempt at enumeration we may mention the dependence of successful maritime commerce on radio, cable, fuel, wharfage, lighterage, pilotage, anchorage, towage, and inspection facilities. The insidious effect of discriminatory treatment in these respects may handicap our ships so badly as to drive them out of business.

9. Attention is particularly invited to the fact that, due to the present political and economic condition of all territories tributary to the Black Sea, the general situation is that of a new and as yet unorganized market of prodigious size offering the greatest opportunity to trade enterprise; and that steps taken and arrangements made now may influence profoundly our commercial life in the future. We can not claim special rights, but we can with full justice insist on equal rights.

10. The question of freedom of navigation of the Dardanelles for vessels of war is more complex and less capable of permanent settlement than the questions relating to merchant vessels. Whatever rights of navigation of the Straits are granted to other than Black Sea powers must of necessity be granted to the Black Sea powers themselves. When there are no naval powers bordering on the Black Sea that maintain fleets of importance in that sea it is to the interest of other powers, as especially to those powers that have political or economic ambitions in the Black Sea to have the navigation of the Dardanelles open to their vessels of war. They are thus able to use at least the show of force to further their interests. When there is a fleet of importance based within the Black Sea the interest of other powers regarding freedom of navigation of the Straits for vessels of wat is reversed and they then desire that no force may issue from the Black Sea to interfere with or to be in a position to threaten their interests elsewhere. They are then willing to forego the advantages of access for themselves to gain the security that comes from a virtual internment of Black Sea fleets. The destruction of the Russian Black Sea

fleet entirely changed the policy of Great Britain in relation to the Dardanelles. The General Board believes that the natural solution of the question, as well as the one most favorable to American interest and influence in world affairs is complete freedom of navigation of the Straits for all vessels of war.

11. There is no parallel between the necessary status of the Dardanelles and that of the Panama Canal. In the Dardanelles the history of instability, of conflicting interests, of discriminatory, of sole access of powers to the sea and so forth, in addition to the fact that nature provided the Dardanelles while America provided the Panam Canal should separate very effectively the two questions in all their aspects.

12. The Straits are natural water ways that in equity belong not to one power but to all. Furthermore, every solution of their control so far attempted that has been based on the rights of one power as against other powers has been a provocative solution. The question has never been settled because all solutions have been partial to the power at the time dominant.

13. Regardless of the principles that may be adopted nothing but superiority of force, either on the spot or available, will be adequate to amintain, against the vital interest of a great power or against the vital interest of Turkey, freedom of navigation of the Straits in time of war. If the fortifications are razed, the potential control of the Straits in war will be shifted to the British fleet. The demilitarization of Mitylene, Lemnos, Imbro, and Samothraki, if proposed, would be distinctly in line with the future control of the Straits by naval forces instead of by fixed fortifications. This would mean British control because at present the British fleet with its outlying bases is strongest of all fleets.

14. No law or treaty is likely to prevent blockade in time of war if the blockading nation is sufficiently powerful on the sea.

15. Experience has shown that control of the Straits by Turkey has been neither impartial nor stable, and that Turkey is unavoidably susceptible to outside pressure. This fact indicates that, under present conditions, international control of the Straits is less open to objection than control by Turkey. No single foreign power could be expected to do otherwis than favor unduly its own commerce were it placed in control of the navigation of the Straits.

SUMMARY

16. The General Board is of the opinion that American interests demand:

(a) That if an international commission of control of the Straits is set up, the United States have representation on the international commission of control and in all positions subordinate to that commission, equal to that of any other foreign power.

(b) That the Straits, including the Dardanelles, the Sea of Marmora, and the Bosphorus, be open to the free navigation of the merchant ships of all flags without distinction or preference.

(c) That the United States and its nationals have the same rights and privileges within and adjacent to the waters above mentioned as are possessed or may be granted to any other foreign power or to its nationals. These privileges to include all such matters as the erection and operation of fuel depots and storehouses, the use of cables, pilotage, lighterage, wharfage, towage, inspection, clearance, etc., and the use without discrimination of public commercial facilities.

(d) That the Straits including the Dardanelles, the Sea of Marmora, and the Bosphorus, be open to the free navigation of the vessels of war of all flags.

(e) That no belligerent right be exercised and no hostile act committed within the Straits including the Dardanelles, the Sea of Marmora, and the Bosphorus.

(f) That all fortifications commanding these waters be razed and that no new fortifications be erected.

W. L. Rodgers.

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