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THE DARDANEILLES CAMPAIGN

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The attempt by the Allies in 1915 to wrest control of the DARDANELLES from the Turks developed into combined land and sea operations which were in a technical sense independent of other operations of the World War. This campaign is of peculiar interest to us because it is the only combined or amphibious operation of that war which corresponds in any degree to the conduct of an overseas campaign which our own country might some day be obliged to conduct against a distant enemy. From it we may learn important lessons.

It is the purpose of this paper to derive some of the lessons which experience in the campaign points out. We will proceed with a short historical sketch of the operations and discuss such points as may bear on the conduct of an overseas campaign by our own country.

The strategic conception of the allied control of the entrance to the BLACK SEA with relation to the World War belonged to Mr. Churchill, First Lord of the Admiralty, who brought this before the Chief of the Imperial General Staff in September, 1914 when it became evident that TURKEY might declare war on the Allies at any time. Mr. Churchill's original idea was that a Greek army of adequate strength would seize the GALLIPOLI PENINSULA with a view to admitting the British Fleet to the SEA OF MARMORA. This proposition was impracticable from several points of view, not the least being the objection of RUSSIA toward a possible GREEK occupation of CONSTANTINOPLE and the European side of the Straits.

TURKEY declared war on 31 October and on 25 November Mr. Churchill again brought forth his idea of attacking the DARDANELLES, this time laying his scheme before the War Council. Lord Kitchener, Secretary of State for War, had not the forces at his disposal at this time to consider the suggestion and Mr. Churchill put the project to one side.

Early in 1915, however, RUSSIA being hard pressed in the CAUCASSUS called for a demonstration against the Turks in some other quarter and Britain promised to make such a demonstration.

A glance at the map of Europe on which is indicated the general strategic situation early in 1915 will serve to illustrate the brilliancy of Mr. Churchill's conception. This map represents the actual condition in Europe at the time and no hindsight was needed to show the immense possibilities of allied control of the Straits the only excuse for the lack of realization being that the dangerous condition of the western front so near to PARIS and to LONDON must have distorted the perspective of the whole. Certainly with such a map before their eyes the strategists of the great war could hardly fail to note the following points:

1. Even as early as 1915 the western front was assuming the conditions of deadlock.

2. The drive of the Russians through GALICIA and Northern AUSTRIA-HUNGARY was in full swing but already a shortage of munitions, military equipment and transport was beginning to slow up the Russian advance.

3. The Balkan States, the most important of which was Bulgaria, were neutral and successful pressure in that quarter would swing them to the side of the Allies, thus forging an iron ring around the Central Powers which, with uninterrupted and all-year-round connection with RUSSIA through the BLACK SEA, would have undoubtedly ended the war much earlier. The release of Russian wheat to the Allies and the supply of munitions to the Russians were the greatest positive benefits to be derived, while the elimination of TURKEY and the cutting off of German access to supplies from the southeast was also an important strategical feature.

In the War Council there were serious objections to Mr. Churchill's idea. The vital trouble was that in January, 1915, Lord Kitchener would not spare the men. He was anxious about

home defenses, anxious about EGYPT and most anxious not to diminish the fighting strength in FRANCE. He estimated that 150,000 troops would be required for the landing in GALIPOLI and, therefore, would not consider the scheme except as a demonstration on the part of the navy from which the Allies could easily withdraw. Mr. Churchill also had opposition from the Admiralty particularly with regard to the purely naval operation; it being pointed out in memoranda that while it might be possible to rush the Straits with considerable loss, the SEA OF MAMORA would be untenable without a large force to occupy the Peninsula. The bombardment of CONSTANTINOPLE alone would not be worth the loss involved and the city could not be occupied without troops. Lord Fisher, First Sea Lord of the Admiralty, was strongly against the operation, although he and other officers in the sessions of the War Council sat mute when the project was discussed, only replying to questions asked him. In his memoirs Lord Fisher states that he regarded himself and other technical men at the War Council as "voice tubes" which the civilian members of the Council would use when they needed information or issued orders.

In spite of being thus opposed, Mr. Churchill communicated with Vice Admiral Carden, in command of the MEDITERRANEAN, as follows:

"Do you think that it is a practicable operation to force the DARDANELLES by the use of ships alone? The important results would justify a severe loss".

Admiral Carden replied that he thought that the DARDANELLES might be forced by extended operations by a large number of ships but that in his opinion they could not be rushed. Admiral Carden was later called upon to submit a detailed plan for such an operation. This was submitted to the War Council and was discussed freely therein and despite the rather negative opposition of the naval members and with the delusive belief that the operation could be halted at any time, the War Council arrived at this decision:

"The Admiralty should prepare for a naval expedition in February to bombard and attack the GALLIPO-LI PENINSULA, with CONSTANTINOPLE as its objective".

We see here that in spite of the tremendous strategic significance and in face of logical objections from naval experts to a purely naval demonstration and in spite of the fact that Kitchener did not see his way clear to furnish adequate troops to cooperate, that the War Council launched as a subsidiary operation -- a side issue -- a campaign that could have been the deciding factor in the establishment of an early peace.

In accordance with orders from the Admiralty a powerful fleet began to assemble in the AEGEAN for the proposed operations. It included the QUEEN ELIZABETH with her 8 - 15" guns and the INFLEXIBLE with 8 - 12" guns. The remainder were battleships of the pre-dreadnaught class. As this was an allied operation a squadron of French battleships and a Russian cruiser arrived during the operations. The islands of TENEDOS, IMBROS and LEMNOS were occupied with principal base in the great landlocked harbor of MUDROS on the Island of LEMNOS.

Admiral Carden's plan was divided into three general stages:

1. The reduction of the batteries at the entrance to the DARDANELLES.
2. Clearing away of interior batteries and mine fields.
3. The reduction of the batteries in the narrows and further clearing away of mines preliminary to entering the SEA OF MARMORA.

A previous bombardment of the batteries at the mouth of the DARDANELLES had been made by a combined British and French squadron on 3 November, 1914. Firing was at very long range and only met with a feeble response from the shore batteries. This bombardment gave very little useful information as to the strength which might be expected and formed a very bad precedent, which was continued almost throughout the whole campaign, of informing the Turks by preliminary but ineffective operations what they might expect at a later date in force, thus giving them opportunities to prepare which they were quick to take advantage of.

The first attempt of unsupported naval force commenced on 19 February, 1915, when a fleet of eight battleships -- five British and three French -- bombarded the batteries at the entrance to the DARDANELLES, at CAPE HELLES on the European side and KUM KALE on the Asiatic. The bombardment started at long range in the morning and apparently considerable damage was done. In the afternoon, however, when the battleships steamed into closer range, it was found as might have been expected that the damage was not as great as had been assumed. No ships were hit, however, as the gunnery of the Turks at that time was extremely wild and inaccurate. The next morning the bombardment was continued but heavy weather set in and operations were suspended until the 25th. The experience of these bombardments has borne out the truth of previous experiments; that is, while a bombardment with ships may temporarily silence shore batteries and on occasions drive the personnel away, yet actual damage is very hard to achieve and the batteries can usually be re-occupied when the bombardment is over.

On 25 February when the bombardment was resumed it took practically all day to again silence the guns and it was noted that the gunnery of the Turks had made considerable improvement. On the night of the 25th the straits were swept for a distance about four miles from the entrance and on the following morning three battleships entered the lower reaches of the DARDANELLES and engaged local batteries on the Asiatic shore while landing parties were sent ashore to complete the destruction of the forts on the European side (CAPE HELLES).

The significance of the above statement cannot be appreciated until we have further discussed the subsequent landings and the terrific opposition which they encountered. I will repeat -- "landing parties were sent ashore to complete the destruction of the forts on the European side". These landing parties met with no opposition. They blew up the ammunition and demolished the guns. There were but a few Turkish troops on the Peninsula.

Up until 4 March ships each day steamed into the Straits and bombarded the batteries inside without result, the sweepers from day to day clearing additional area of mines. The operations of night sweeping, however, became increasingly difficult as the Turks began operating mobile artillery from the gullies ashore and had mounted and were using some very effective searchlights. As Turkish activity in the land defenses was observed, landing parties were again employed on the European and Asiatic sides.

New plans for bombardment were put into effect on the 5th of March when the QUEEN ELIZABETH and two battleships bombarded KHILID BAHR from across the GALLIPOLI PENINSULA using indirect fire which was controlled by observing airplanes. Two days were taken up with this type of bombardment on KHILID BAHR and CHANAK. Though spectacular the results were negligible.

On the 7th a concerted attack was taken up again from within the narrows. The batteries as usual replied in a spirited fashion and showed still further improvement in their gunnery. In addition to the fixed defenses numerous field guns and howitzers were firing at the ships from gullies on either shore and it was becoming apparent that the complete destruction of the defenses by gunfire alone must form an exceedingly troublesome operation if indeed practicable at all.

It was at this time that the naval authorities on the spot came to the conclusion that some form of military assistance was indispensable as the fire of concealed artillery which was increasing in volume was not affecting the sweeping operations at night but was having its affect on the armored ships themselves. By this time troops were arriving in considerable numbers at the island of LEMNOS and, owing to the failure of the Turkish attack in Egypt more were known to be available there. The necessity of supporting naval attack with troops was beginning to be realized at the War Office and, in the interval elapsing up to the final naval attack on 18 March, preparations were

made for the assignment of a not inconsiderable expeditionary force under the command of Sir Ian Hamilton. This decision, as was subsequently proved, was arrived at too late - the time of unopposed, easy landings on the peninsula had passed.

Sir Ian Hamilton, commander of the Expeditionary Force, arrived at Lemnos the day preceding the final naval attack which took place on the 18th of March, at which time a general attack on the narrows in full force was made.

On the forenoon of that day four powerful battleships engaged the batteries at the narrows while two others from a shorter range opened on the forts near KEPHEZ POINT on the opposite shore. Four French battleships then passed through this group to within 4000 yards of KEPHEZ POINT and brought a heavy fire to bear upon the forts within short range. After about an hour the batteries were silenced and a fresh squadron of six British ships moved up to relieve the French. During the interchange of positions the fire was suspended temporarily whereupon the shore batteries broke out afresh and inflicted a very considerable damage. It was at this time also that the Turks chose to release their floating mines and with so many ships maneuvering in the close waters it was inevitable that much damage would be done. Four battleships were sunk and three were severely damaged, and although the bombardment was continued for the remainder of the day the ships were obliged to steam back out of the Straits at evening having failed to establish a decided superiority over the defenses they had attempted to crush.

Although the losses sustained would have been replaced within a few days and the attack continued it was realized at that time that in the end it was doomed to fail unless supported from the shore by troops. We have reports at hand now, which are denied in some quarters, that the Turks themselves were making their last stand and that, in a few more days, this attack would have been pushed home to successful completion and would have resulted in consequent occupation of the SEA OF MARMORA and domination of CONSTANTINOPLE, but even if this had been accom-

plished it would have been impossible for the British to have maintained communications and lines of supplies through the DARDANELLES unless they had occupied and held the Peninsula.

After a conference with the naval authorities following the action of 18 March, Sir Ian Hamilton cabled to Lord Kitchener his opinion that the Straits were not likely to be forced by battleships and that if the troops took part it would not be in the subsidiary form previously anticipated. It must be a deliberate and progressive military operation carried out in full strength so as to open and hold open the passage for the navy.

Troops in considerable numbers were already on the spot and, in the opinion of many, landings should have been made at once. Here, however, we see the effect of hard and fast orders issued from a distance curbing the initiative of the commander on the spot. It had been distinctly laid down in LONDON that before any serious undertaking was carried out on the GALLIPOLI PENINSULA all forces should be assembled so that their full might could be thrown in. A golden opportunity lost.

On inspecting transports and storeships which had already arrived and which were daily arriving in MUDROS BAY, General Hamilton found that he would have to redistribute troops and reload the transports in order that they might be ready to disembark for immediate action. There was no wharfage available in MUDROS BAY for this and he was obliged to proceed with his whole force to ALEXANDRIA, 600 miles away. This involved serious delay and, as is usually the case, the delay was particularly unfortunate. The fleet had been bombarding the DARDANELLES for the past month and had failed. Transports in great numbers had been seen steaming in the direction of the islands of LEMNOS and TENEDOS. The Turks and their German advisers must be by now well aware of the combined operation afoot for the conquest of the DARDANELLES. Yet the force which had the initiative in theory lost it in fact and was obliged to steam away leaving their opponents to prepare defenses undisturbed at their leisure

A month elapsed before the redistribution was completed and all the forces assembled again in MUDROS BAY ready for the attack. The military forces at this time consisted of the Twenty-Ninth Division, Royal Naval Division, and the Forty-Seventh East Lancashire Division, an Australian Division, a combined Australian-New Zealand Division, two French Divisions and some Indian troops. Under normal conditions this force should have represented a total of between 135,000 and 140,000 men but a number of units were missing, they were very weak in artillery and some of the battalions were below war establishment when they started. As a consequence, the whole army numbered less than 100,000 officers and men, and Sir Ian Hamilton puts his force at this time at between 60,000 and 70,000 available for landing.

Russian assistance, both military and naval, to this operation was promised but would hardly be effective until the DARDANELLES was forced and operations against CONSTANTINOPLE had been begun. Suffice to say, however, that Russian assistance never materialized.

Of the troops assembled for the attack some remarks on the Royal Naval Division may prove interesting. This division was assembled at the outbreak of the war from the Royal Fleet Reserve and the Royal Naval Reserve. These men were automatically mobilized but were not needed immediately for sea service and the division was organized and put into training. It consisted of two seaman brigades and one brigade of marines all under command of a Major General of Royal Marine Artillery. After a short period of training the division was sent to ANTWERP where it was badly broken up in endeavoring to stem the German advance. Upon return to ENGLAND it was reorganized, training continued and was later sent to join the military operations for forcing the DARDANELLES. This division was particularly valuable during the landing operations although its records also show equally fine work in the purely military operations ashore on the peninsula.

In preparation for the landings General Hamilton and his staff had access to a rather complete set of maps of the peninsula and its vicinity and had augmented this information by reconnoitering from ships and by means of seaplanes attached to the fleet. His final plan of attack was reached through his appreciation or, as we call it, the Estimate of the Situation.

As the Estimate of the Situation went on the difficulties of his task were recognized as even greater than foreseen. Opinions as to methods of attack were at wide variance among his own generals. At first glance the logical point of attack was BULAIR, the neck of the peninsula; it is but three miles wide at this point and the enemy below might be cut off for want of supplies - but upon investigation it was found that the main route of supplies did not lead through the peninsula at all but came by water and was ferried across from the Asiatic side. A further disadvantage was that a force occupying BULAIR would immediately be subject to attack from both the front and rear and, in the face of the fortifications which were known to exist, this idea was rejected. Another course was a landing on the north shore of the GULF OF EROS. Here the landing would have been comparatively easy but the distance to the objective was too great. An army on the march around the head of the gulf would have the enemy on its flank and would be open to the same objections as previously outlined upon the arrival at BULAIR. An attack on the Asiatic side was also discussed, both abreast the island of TENEDOS and in the GULF OF ADRELYTI. Facilities for communications here were poor, land was low and in some cases marshy; besides the disadvantage that even if the southern side of the Straits was occupied it is dominated by the higher lands of the GALLIPOLI PENINSULA.

Nothing then seemed left but a direct attack upon the peninsula itself where reconnaissance showed that the Turks with their German officers had taken full advantage of the time generously allowed them by the Allies to prepare their defenses

During the interval while transports were being reloaded in Egypt Marshall Liman von Sanders, a German officer, was placed in charge of the defence of the DARDANELLES and with characteristic German thoroughness he lost no time in their preparation. Road communications in the interior of the peninsula were developed, entrenchments thrown up at probable landing places, wire entanglements and gun placements were located at strategic points and the telegraphic and telephonic communication established. Rapid progress was made in these plans by the immense amount of labor available which was furnished by Turkish troops.

As we have stated before, General Hamilton possessed reasonably good military maps of the peninsula and vicinity but his information as to the SUVLA area was vague and some doubts existed as to landing places there. The ground around SALT LAKE was known to be marshy during winter and the bay itself was fully twelve miles from the narrows and the plateau of KHILID BAHR which dominated them. A landing in this bay, moreover, entailed conducting operations from a basin dominated by hills which would put the attacking force at considerable disadvantage in case the enemy had occupied such an obviously advantageous position. General Hamilton's information regarding the shore line between SUVLA BAY and GABA TEPE was apparently as vague as it was regarding the SUVLA AREA and he consequently dismissed it in his appreciation with the remark that "the beach was supposed to be dangerous and difficult". The beach here was quite close aboard the Sari Bahr Range which forms an important preliminary objective to the eventual attacking of KHILID BAHR and the domination of the narrows. A fundamental objection of course to landing at any place on this shore of the peninsula lay in its exposure to the prevailing northwest wind, a matter of considerable importance when we consider the establishment of permanent landing places and bases of supply.

In this latter respect the toe of the peninsula which we will call the HELLES area was more fortunately situated and in addition the seizure of this area, would undoubtedly influence.

the naval operations within the DARDANELLES so that a further advance up the peninsula could be assisted on both sides by the fire of the battleships themselves. An objection to landing at this point is the fact that the beaches, while numerous, were of limited extent and were sure to be well defended. In addition they were within easy range from the forts on the Asiatic side which the ships themselves had previously found were difficult to silence.

Having rejected the landing at BULAIR and the coast between SUVLA and GABA TEPE, General Hamilton decided to strike at the several landings in the toe of the peninsula and at the same time make a landing in the nature of a strong feint in the region of GABA TEPE. I will quote from General Hamilton's diary his plan of landing and the reasons therefor:

"The more I pondered over the map and reflected upon the character, probable numbers and supposed positions of the enemy the more convinced had I become that the first and foremost step was to upset the equilibrium of Liman von Sanders, the enemy commander. I must try to move so that he should be unable to concentrate either his mind or his men against us. Here I was handicapped by having no knowledge of my opponent, whereas the German General Staff is certain to have transferred the "life-like picture" they had of me to CONSTANTINOPE. Still, sea power and the mobility it confers is a great help, and we ought to be able to rattle the enemy however imperturbable may be his nature. If we throw every man we can carry in our small craft in one simultaneous rush against selected points, whilst using all the balance in feints against other likely places. Several cautious proposals have been set before me but this is neither the time nor the place for paddling about the shore putting one foot onto the beaches with the idea of drawing it back again if it happens to alight on a land mine. No: we've got to take a good run at the peninsula and jump plump on -- both feet together. I would like to land my whole force in one, -- like a hammer stroke -- with the fullest violence of its mass effect - as close as I can to my objective, the KILID BAHR plateau, but, apart from lack of small craft, the thing cannot be done; the beach space is so cramped that the men and their stores could not be put ashore. I have to separate my forces and the effect of momentum, which cannot be produced by cohesion, must be reproduced by the simultaneous nature of the movement. From the South, Achi Baba mountain is our first point of attack. At the same time, also the Australian-New Zealand Corps will land near GABA TEPE to try and seize the high backbone of the Peninsula and cut the line of retreat of the enemy on the KILID BAHR plateau while interfering with the movements of Turkish reinforcements towards the toe of the Peninsula. While these real attacks are taking place upon the foot and at the waist of the Peninsula, the knife will be flourished at its neck.

Transports containing troops which cannot be landed during the first two days must sail up to BULAIR; make as much splash as they can to provide matter for alarm wires to CONSTANTINOPLE and the enemy's chief.

ASIA is forbidden but I hold myself free, as a measure of battle tactics, to land a French brigade at KUM KALE so as, first, to draw the fire of any enemy big guns which can range into MORTO BAY; second, to prevent Turkish troops being shipped across the narrows.

With luck, then, within the space of an hour, the enemy Chief will be beset by a series of S.O.S. signals over an area of one hundred miles, from five or six places; from ZIMITHIA and MORTO BAY; from GABA TEPE; from BULAIR; and from KUM KALE in ASIA as well."

The morning of the 25th of April was selected for the attack and the Allies enjoyed good fortune in respect to the weather. The sea was smooth, the temperature mild, and the weather clear. The ships assigned to the various undertakings -- both the men-of-war and troop ships -- steamed out of MUDROS BAY in time to arrive at their objectives at or before daylight of the 25th.

In view of the peculiar interest to the navy in this operation, i.e., the putting safely ashore of troops in the face of opposition, we will discuss the several landings in detail commencing with those in the HELLES area.

Here three main landings were to take place to be supplemented by minor landings on the flanks, the preliminary objective being ACHI BABA. These main disembarkations were undertaken at Beaches "V", "W" and "X" which were, apart from the opposition to be expected, favorable places. The minor landings on the flanks were made at Beach "S" and Beach "Y". "S" Beach was of limited extent and much exposed to the fire from KUM KALE. "Y" Beach, on the opposite flank, was situated at the foot of cliffs and was thus not well adapted to landing of troops other than infantry and mountain artillery.

The landing at Beach "V", which is considered the most important landing and had received elaborate attention both for attack and defense, will be discussed last. We will discuss the others in order beginning with Beach "Y".

Two transports convoyed by two cruisers and a battleship were allotted this task. As we have said before Beach "Y" was not considered particularly favorable for landing on account of the high cliffs rising directly from the beach and it developed that the enemy on that account had not given its defense any attention, and the troops having been landed in the ships' boats at the rate of about half a battalion a trip speedily breasted the slopes and established themselves at the top.

It should be noted here, as elsewhere, that in all these first landings, ships' boats which are notoriously illadapted for putting troops, artillery and stores ashore, were the only craft available and in many instances were the cause of severe and unnecessary losses, while the troops were in that very dangerous position of having one foot in the water and one foot on the beach. The later use of steel motor lighters of shallow draft which could rapidly throw men and artillery ashore and at the same time protect them from rifle fire up to the last minute are indispensable adjuncts to a landing in the face of modern weapons and under modern conditions.

So the force here at Beach "Y" while fortunately able to land unopposed were unable to land in such strength and numbers as to hold out against Turkish reserves which were quickly rushed from KRITHIA and finally, after a day's desperate fighting, this isolated force was withdrawn. Had larger forces with mountain artillery been allocated to this place and rushed ashore in properly designed motor lighters its doings might have played a very prominent part in the next few days operations.

In picking out a landing place then -- and those who land at least have the initiative in this respect combined with superior mobility -- we must consider the possibility of striking swiftly and in great force in places such as this which, though it may be unfavorable for a general landing, infantry may gain

a foothold practically unopposed. Once safely on dry land, if in sufficient strength, they may be able then to occupy a more suitable place for landing artillery and stores of all kinds.

Beach "X" was somewhat similar to Beach "Y" but the cliffs were in no sense as precipitous and rose only forty feet or so from the beach. The troops for this landing were brought over in a battleship and a couple of mine sweepers. The landing was preceded by a bombardment from the ships and the battleship steamed in slowly toward the landing place with her anchor slung in order to take up before the vessel grounded. The ship's boats were loaded and in the water, towed alongside, while the ship's fire from close range kept the Turks from showing themselves in their trenches which were then, being freshly constructed, plainly visible. In consequence of this the troops made good their landing with small loss, although it was soon found that the ship's fire had not appreciably damaged the trenches. It had, however, prevented their use by the enemy and thus successfully tided over the most dangerous part of any landing. After reaching the crest, however, the troops here as at Beach "Y" were subjected to a particularly vicious attack and were temporarily forced to dig in where they were. It was not until much later in the day when the insufficient boat capacity had permitted larger numbers of troops to come to their support was the consolidation effected with the troops that had disembarked at the adjoining beach ("W").

Beach "W". For the discussion of this landing place we will quote Sir Ian Hamilton's despatch:

"W Beach consists of a strip of deep, powdery sand some 350 yards long and from 15 to 40 yards wide, situated immediately south of Tekke Burnu, where a small gully running down to the open sea opens a break in the cliffs. On either flank of the beach the ground rises precipitately; but, in the centre, a number of sand dunes afford a more gradual access to the ridge overlooking the sea. Much time and ingenuity had been employed by the Turks in turning this landing place into a death-trap. Close to the water's edge a broad wire entanglement extended the whole length of the shore, and a supplementary barbed network lay concealed under the surface of the sea in the shallows. Land mines and sea mines had been laid. The high ground overlooking the beach was strongly fortified with trenches to which the gully afforded a natural covered approach.

A number of machine-guns were also cunningly tucked away into holes in the cliff so as to be immune from naval bombardment whilst they were converging their fire upon the wire entanglements."

Here troops convoyed by a cruiser were loaded into ship's cutters for the actual landing. In view of the difficulties that were foreseen here it was arranged to land a whole battalion in a single trip by means of eight tows of four cutters each, steaming for the beach in line. As the tows reached shallow water the steamers cast off and the cutters in general made straight for the beach. Those on the flanks however sheered off to the right and left and were able to land among the rocks rather more successfully than those who had gone direct.

The turks held their fire until just as the boats were grounding and then opened up a murderous fusilage from rifles, machine-guns and grenades. The men struggling ashore from their boats met with severe losses. Many were shot down in the water, some were hit while in the boats and some were drowned. The survivors, however, pushed ahead desperately to force their way through the barbed wire entanglements which they met at the water's edge. In this they were fortunately aided by those who had sheered off to the flanks and were able to land quickly, and soon, by making a flank attack on the defenses, relieved the situation from the heavy machine-gun crossfire which was sweeping the beach.

Reinforcements arriving slowly on account of the inadequate improperly designed boats were eventually able to render the positions here fairly secure and to branch out in a linking-up movement which was to consolidate with the troops from Beach "X" on their left and Beach "V" on their right.

Beach "S" was a narrow, shallow beach at the eastern part of MORTO BAY. It was not suitable for putting large forces ashore and there was risk of the boats grounding in the shallow water. There was no cliff at this point but the slopes rose up sharply from the beach which were covered by well-placed trenches.

The troops designated for this landing were brought over from TENEDOS in trawlers convoyed by a battleship and upon arrival in MORTO BAY transferred into ships' boats which were then towed by the trawlers -- six boats to a tow. Their arrival here was not well timed owing to lack of appreciation of the current and the troops did not begin to disembark until about 7:30 in the morning. The landing was supported by a vigorous fire from the ships and was accomplished without undue loss at the early stages. Ship's landing parties assisted in this operation and it was considered a most creditable performance and one which seems to prove that well-planned landings at selected points where undue opposition is not encountered can be successfully accomplished if sufficiently rehearsed and unhesitatingly executed. In this as in other landings, however, the use of ship's boats which are not primarily designed for landing purposes, was much delayed and to my mind gave over an absolutely unnecessary advantage to the defending forces, i.e., that of being able to defeat a stronger force because it can only attack in a number of weak detachments, thereby losing that most important factor of mass concentration.

Beach "V". In describing the landing place here I will again quote from General Hamilton:-

"V Beach is situated immediately to the west of Sedd-el-Bahr. Between the bluff on which stands the Sedd-el-Bahr village and that which is crowned by No. 1 Fort the ground forms a very regular amphitheatre of three or four hundred yards' radius. The slopes down to the beach are slightly concave, so that the whole area contained within the limits of this natural amphitheatre can be swept by the fire of the defender. The beach itself is a sandy strip some ten yards wide and 350 yards long, backed along almost the whole of its extent by a low sandy escarpment about 4 feet high, where the ground falls almost sheer down to the beach. The slight shelter afforded by this escarpment played no small part in the operations of the succeeding thirty-two hours. On the very margin of the beach a strong barbed-wire entanglement, made of heavier metal and longer barbs than I have ever seen elsewhere, ran right across from Sedd-el-Bahr to the foot of the north-western headland. Two-thirds of the way up the ridge a second and even stronger entanglement crossed the amphitheatre, passing in front of the old barrack and ending in the outskirts of the village. A third transverse entanglement, joining these two, ran up a hill near the eastern end of the beach and almost at right angles to it. Above the upper entanglement the ground was scored with the enemy's trenches".

In view of the fact that it was realized that the landing at Beach "V" was the most hazardous in the HELLES area, special precautions, plans and devices were employed with a view to overcoming the foreseen difficulties. The collier "River Clyde" was prepared for beaching at this point and she was also to carry the bulk of the troops that were destined to land here. Extra cargo ports were cut in her sides which were to give access to lighters and gangplanks which were to extend from ship to shore. Machine-guns protected by sand bags were installed forward and on the bridges. It was hoped by this device that the murderous fire from shore would be cut down to a minimum and that a large number of men could be landed with the desired rapidity without losing concentration.

As soon as dawn permitted a heavy bombardment of the objective was opened up by the escort and no reply was received. The hopes of the attack force rose high and the advance landing party from the mine sweepers headed for the beach in ships' boats towed by steamers. These tows and the "River Clyde" made simultaneously for the shore and both reached their objectives at about the same time. The lighters which the collier had been towing alongside shot forward and secured to the beach. Gang planks dropped and ports opened.

In this case, as at Beach "W" the Turks had withheld their fire until the men began to pour out on the gangways when an overwhelming outburst of rifle fire, machine-guns and grenades was opened. Few of the first troops were able to reach the beach unwounded. In the tows the boats were riddled with holes and the greater number destroyed. As succeeding troops poured out of the collier and rushed along the lighters over the dead bodies, the lighter nearest shore was torn loose by the current and drifted off into deep water. The men fell in masses and many, either to escape the bullets or in their eagerness to reach shore, attempted to swim to land but were dragged down by their own equipment and lay visible on the sands below.

By almost superhuman efforts sailors worked to reestablish the line to the beach and were able by means of reserve lighters to repair the break. Connection however was again broken when the weight of the fresh troops took the lighters and those already on the beach were absolutely cut off from assistance. There being about 400 unwounded spread out in the shelter of the beach escarpment.

By noon any further attempt at this landing was abandoned and it was not until after dark that connection with the beach was again established and those remaining ashore, who had not been previously massacred, were relieved by those who had remained in safety on board the "River Clyde".

By eight p.m. the landing was effected and positions solidified which were further improved the next morning and linked with Beach "W" on the left.

KUM KALE. The landing by the French at KUM KALE was successful and deserves no particular comment from naval point of view. Suffice to say that its purpose was accomplished and prevented the beaches at HELLES from being subjected to heavy fire from that quarter.

While the above landings were going on in the HELLES area the feint in the GULF OF EROS near BULAIR was taking place and actually succeeded in holding Turkish reserves from putting their weight against the allied troops to the southward for several days subsequent to the landing.

The ANZAC landing. As we have noted above, the landing of the Australian-New Zealand Corps was to have been carried out simultaneously with those in the HELLES area and was to have taken place a few hundred yards north of GABA TEPE. Reconnaissance had indicated this to be a favorable landing place. Fortunately for the forces, however, the current which sets north in this locality carried the flotilla with it so that the landing actually took place in a narrow concave strip of sand about 1000 yards in length just to the southward of ARIBURNAU which was thereafter known as ANZAC COVE.

The landing place at GABA TEPE had been well defended by the Turks and had the attempt been made there the results would have been undoubtedly as disastrous as those at beaches "W" and "V", but such was not the case. The landing in ANZAC COVE was practically unopposed and troops were able to occupy a small spur before the Turks could bring much opposition against them. Reinforcements were landed as rapidly as the inadequate boating facilities would permit and the troops were able to support themselves against the heavy fire of Turkish guns from GABA TEPE until some of their own mountain artillery could be brought up and afforded them much needed relief.

The losses during the day here were heavy and the problem of caring for the wounded, supplying water, stores and ammunition, was a very serious one. The situation indeed had become so serious that a withdrawal was considered but the troops were able to hold out until additional supplies and reinforcements could be forthcoming.

Thus we have seen that the landings planned by General Hamilton were actually accomplished in the face of determined opposition from scientifically constructed defenses but we must note that in no case was there heavy artillery to interfere with the attacking ships. They, on the other hand, were in many cases able to shell the shore without fear of damage during the period of landing.

The attacking forces were handicapped by the lack of adequate, properly designed small craft to throw them ashore rapidly and in great numbers. There was a lamentable shortage in artillery at this time which continued throughout the whole campaign. Portable artillery, such as mountain batteries, employed at the earliest possible moment after landing is usually able to give much needed support to the infantry while they are digging in and consolidating positions won.

The next three days were spent in strengthening the grip on the toe of the Peninsula, driving the enemy back so that the landing places would be clear of rifle and machine-gun fire and

preparing for a general advance. During this time the French troops were withdrawn from KUM KALE and added their strength to the eastern sector of the HELLES area. By 28 April, by a succession of determined though costly attacks the allied troops, aided by fire from the ships, succeeded in occupying the positions shown on the slide far short of the preliminary objectives of Achi Bahr to the south and Sari Bahr ridge to the north.

I will not go into the details of the next three months except to state that it soon became evident that victory by open movement could not be expected. Barbed wire and machine-guns, giving the defense such strength that open assault would cost many lives and was almost impossible of success without a barrage which the lack of artillery on the part of the allied troops prevented. During these three months an advance was made of about two miles on the northwest side of the HELLES area and a little more than a mile on the southeast side. Practically no advances were made in the ANZAC area but positions were greatly strengthened.

In both areas the landing facilities, though constantly under fire, were improved but the presence of enemy submarines during this time increased the difficulties of transport and drove the heavy ships back to the shelter of MUDROS, necessitating a greatly increased number of small craft for the communications with the Peninsula, fifty miles away.

Throughout this period the Allies were fatally hampered by a lack of artillery and ammunition. The diversion of additional ammunition from the Western Front was not approved by the War Council at home and, as a result, allied advances were accomplished with great and, I think, unnecessary loss by being obliged to meet the enemy shells with men. General Hamilton's troops suffered more severely in this respect after the arrival of the German submarines which caused the withdrawal of the battleships with their material and moral support.

The August Offensive.

As early as May it was realized that the allied forces at the DARDANELLES, even if kept up to strength, were inadequate for the task and strong representations were made to the War Council that the required reinforcements must be forthcoming or the Expeditionary Force withdrawn. After some delay the home government informed General Hamilton that his army would be augmented by three complete divisions and the infantry of two more, all to arrive before August. This actually gave him about 110,000 rifles as a maximum, although his force was considerably stronger on paper.

With the arrival of these troops, the supreme effort of the campaign was to be made and after a further "appreciation" or Estimate of the Situation, the following plan was decided upon:

Bearing in mind that the KHILID BAHR Plateau which dominated the Narrows and the Asiatic side was, throughout, the main objective, we can follow the plan through its three distinct yet interdependent features:

First, the ANZAC position was to be used for developing an attack in force on the SARI BAHR ridge as the first step towards a thrust eastward and southward against MAIDOS and KHILID BAHR.

Second, a fresh force was to be landed in the SUVLA area to link up on the ANZAC's left and aid in the general offensive by a turning movement toward the southward and eastward.

Third, a strong offensive was to be launched in the HELLES area to keep the enemy troops in that vicinity from sending any reinforcements at the risk of losing ACHI BABA, one of the preliminary allied objectives there.

The great offensive was started on the night of 6 August in the HELLES area but though the fighting was severe little ground was gained and the most that can be claimed for this phase of the offensive was that it held the Trukish troops and some reinforcements during the early stages.

The landing at SUVLA utilizing the reinforcements recently arrived, was planned and executed on a much more thorough and elaborate scale than those in April. Instead of ships' boats, a number of steel motor lighters, obviously called "Beetles" by the troops, designed for the very purpose of landing men, supplies and artillery, were employed. These would safely carry about 350 men or 50 horses, and their steel plates protected the troops from rifle fire until the time came to land.

A number of these lighters augmented by destroyers and sweepers brought the SUVLA Force to their landing on time but the lack of local familiarity, the grounding of many lighters and the lack of rehearsals on the part of the troops due to the secrecy of the expedition caused the landings to be much slower than was anticipated. The enemy, however, was not in strong force and the landings were attended with but little loss.

From the point of view of a landing the operation was a success but from there on it was a wasted effort. The troops struggling forward in the loose sand became exhausted. The water supply was holding them back and delay after delay was reported to General Hamilton during the precious hours when the Turkish opposition was at a minimum. The General commanding at SUVLA gave many good reasons why he had permitted the delays, but General Hamilton himself states: "Driving power was required and even a certain ruthlessness to brush aside pleas for respite for tired troops. The one fatal error was inertia, and inertia prevailed". By the time it was overcome it was too late. The Turkish reinforcements had arrived and occupied the heights above.

The attack on the SARI BAHR ridge from the ANZAC positions was to be made from the northwest up the steep slopes and sides of gulleys during the night and a sweep forward in an enveloping movement after dawn. Owing to the broken ground many columns were necessary and unfortunately some were seriously delayed and all did not reach the selected positions simultaneously. By early dawn, however, about 400 Gurkhas and two companies of

South Lancashires had climbed to a line about 150 yards below the crest of the range. A bombardment of the crest took place from the monitors and shortly after 5:00 a.m. it ceased, being switched to the flanks and reverse slopes. The troops struggled to the top and met the Turks in a hand to hand fight, but it was brief. The Turks, shaken by the bombardment and the daring of the active troops, suddenly turned and ran. I will quote from Nevinson's account:

"For a moment Major Allanson and his men paused to draw breath. They were standing on the saddle between CHUNUK BAIR and 'Hill Q.' The dead lay thick around them. But below ----- ran the sea, the Narrows, the DARDANELLES, and aim and object of these battles and sudden deaths. Never since Xenophon's Ten Thousand cried 'The sea! the sea!' had sight been more welcome to a soldier's eyes. There went the ships. There were the transports bringing new troops ^{down} over from ASIA. There ran the road to MAIDOS, though the ^{down} of MAIDOS was just hidden by the hill before it. There was the KRITHIA road. Motor-lorries moved along it carrying shells and supplies to ACHI BABA. So Sir Ian had been right. General Birdwood had been right. This was the path to victory. Only hold that summit and victory is ours. The Straits are opened. A conquered TURKEY and a friendly BULGARIA will bar the German path to the east. Peace will come back again, and the most brilliant strategic conception in the war will be justified.

"In triumphant enthusiasm, Gurkhas and Lancastrians raced and leapt down the reverse slope, pursuing the Turks as they scattered and ran. Major Allanson, though wounded, himself raced with them. They fired as they went. It was a moment of supreme exultation. Suddenly, before they had gone a hundred yards, crash into the midst of them fell five or six large shells and exploded.-----

"Where those fatal shells came from was at the time, and still remains, a cause for bitter controversy. All on the summit believed them British. This may have been a mistake. It is a common error for an advance line to suppose it is being shelled by its own side. But probably the shells were British.-----

"Whatever the cause, the effect was disaster irretrievable -- disaster leaving its lamentable mark upon the world's history. Amid the scattered limbs and shattered bodies of their comrades, the exultant pursuers stopped aghast. They began to stumble back. They scrambled to the crest and over it. Major Allanson with a small group stood firm, taking one last look upon that scene of dazzling hope. But the Turkish officers with the supports had observed the check. Seizing the moment, they urged their fresh companies upward, in turn pursuing. Against the gathering crowd a handful could not stand. Wounded and isolated, Major Allanson withdrew the last of his men. Down the face of the mountain they came upon a little trench from which they adventurously started less than half an hour before. They alone had witnessed and shared the crisis. They alone had watched the moment when the campaign swung upon the fateful hinge. No soldier in the army was ever to behold that triumphant prospect again".

The turning point was reached. Although much ground was gained during the month, the lines showing the allied positions by the end of August represent the maximum success and from then on it was but the beginning of the end.

Lack of time will not permit us to follow the subsequent operations though the hard fighting of the last few months, through the gales and storms of autumn, through General Hamilton's detachment and the subsequent realization of failure at home and the magnificently planned and executed evacuation early in January, 1916.

The causes of failure of the DARDANELLES Campaign which stand out most prominently are:

1. The lack of realization by the War Council in LONDON of its strategic importance.
2. The idea that a purely naval operation would suffice.
3. The mistaken idea of the War Council that the operation, once begun, could be discontinued by the Allies at any time.
4. The lack of properly digested and carefully prepared plans by the combined staff for an operation of this magnitude.
5. Lord Kitchener's delay in sending troops to support the navy after they had become available and when their necessity became apparent.
6. The preliminary but ineffective operations which were undertaken before the full expedition was assembled thus giving the Turks an opportunity to prepare defenses which had not previously existed.
7. The lack of secrecy of troop movements after the expedition was under way.
8. The lack of efficient craft for landing troops and the lack of air craft to assist in bombing prior to landing operations.
9. The serious lack of artillery and still more serious lack of artillery ammunition throughout the whole campaign.
10. The lack of driving power displayed by the commander at SUVLA in the August offensive thus permitting the Turks to rush reinforcements to occupy the heights which otherwise the Allies would have held and thus dominated the Narrows and the ZHILID BAHR PLATEAU.
11. The accidental shelling of their own troops at a moment when the British actually occupied one of the dominating ridges in the SARI BAHR range.

12. The underestimate on the part of General Hamilton as well as the authorities at home of the resistance which the Turks under their German advisers would be able to put up, and General Hamilton's own overestimate of the support that he expected to receive from the home government in his operation.

But what of the results of this Campaign? At the beginning we see BULGARIA and ROUMANIA neutral with Russian and Servian lines strongly held. At the end we see BULGARIA linking up TURKEY with the central powers, SERBIA crushed, RUSSIA isolated and the BERLIN to BAGDAD line a reality.

The ultimate burden of failure lies on the authorities in LONDON. Mr. Churchill has protested that "if there were any operations in the history of the world which, having been begun, it was worth while to carry through with the utmost vigor and fury" they were these. Far from vigor, let alone fury, the government apparently regarded the operation as a sort of a side-show; a nuisance which only received attention when it intruded. Wells states that "the GALLIPOLI campaign was finely imagined and disgracefully executed". ---- The story of GALLIPOLI from the side of the Allies is at once heroic and pitiful, a story of courage and incompetence, and of life, material and prestige wasted culminating in the withdrawal in January, 1916.

In the above campaign we have at our disposal the results of actual experience in the planning and conduct of overseas operations; experience that can become our own through the medium of study. How can we best apply it to our own problems?

Perhaps if we visualize the capture of an important overseas base we will be able to better plan the operation and design the special equipment found to be necessary.

We see the reconnaissance of available locations.

The seizing of a lightly defended point for a foothold.

The gaining control of the sea and cutting of enemy communications by our scouting and battle fleets.

The reconnaissance of selected objective by aircraft.

Detailed plans made from the pictures taken.

Preparation by the control fleet and marines for the landing.

Bombing by planes and shelling by ships' batteries.

Landing of marines with small tanks and tractor artillery by means of specially designed "beetles" supported by light craft, monitor submarines and aircraft.

Landing and occupation by the army.

Withdrawal of marines and preparation for next step.

(L.W.T./HIM 16 Nov. 1921.)