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THESIS

THE RELATIONSHIP IN WAR OF NAVAL STRATEGY, TACTICS, AND COMMAND,

With Special Reference to Aircraft And Submarines

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The nature of war, considered with its origins, is such that it cannot always be said to be a mathematical continuation of National Policy. In general essence, war may be the result of policy or its continuance by forceful means, but the variants, the unpredictable, and for that matter, unknowable, factors that bring it about are such that we cannot accurately forsee and provide for the specific direction it may take. We are dealing with uncertainties that pertain not only to those nations with which we may be in conflict but to ourselves. Our national policies change and our willingness to accept armed dispute may be spurred or retarded by such fortuitous and whimsical causes as to defy a most searching pre-estimate.

Basically war is brought about by the urge of peoples to the perpetuation of a prosperous posterity of the nation and its institutions. A fundamental element is the inherent combativeness of the disputants. This varies with peoples and nations, and varies widely from time to time in any individual nation. At times the will to power, the will to subject or destroy alien nations, may rise to tremendous heights. At other times the spirit of combativeness may be insufficient to bring to a rational completion a comparatively just war. This is a factor that must be considered not only in our strategical preparation for possible wars, but in our employment of the armed forces after war is started.

We may, by the process of dispassionate analysis, determine that war in certain areas and in support of certain policies would be unwise and unwarranted, that the game would not be worth the candle, and while this situation would probably make war in such an area less probable, it cannot insure against its occurrence. The demagogic assurance to the public that wars are brought about by wicked governments despite the peaceful inclinations of the helpless people has been so often disproved by the existence of the reverse situation that it is trite and unnecessary to cite cases. Public clamor may precipitate war, precipitate hasty offensive action, or precipitate peace,- public clamor in our own country, in that of an enemy, or both. We may reach deliberate decisions that our economic and political security point to our acceptance of war only in certain areas or under certain conditions, and while it may be true that these accepted wars include all necessary for the defense of vital interests, it would be insufficient for us to confine our strategic investigation to such a restricted basis.

The Navy of the United States exists to defend (1) the national integrity and the national possessions, (2) the national government, (3) vital interests in the Western Hemisphere, including the Monroe Doctrine, and (4) our over seas trade, including the Open Door policy of China. To these there probably should be added a fifth, maintenance of peace in general. It is with (4) and with the defense of distant possessions such as the Philippines, Guam, and Samoa, that our strategy particularly faces uncertainties and difficulties.

The strength needed to defend an interest depends upon the value of the thing defended, and on the strength that an enemy may bring against it. Where the interests are vital we need to be in a position to provide defense equal to or greater than that of a potential enemy in threat against these vital interests,- if it is within our capacity to do so. Where the interests are less vital to us and of limited value to the enemy, the enemy government will weigh the desirability of exerting and expending his strength in overcoming our resistance even though the latter is limited.

In the case of the Philippines, Guam, and the Open Door policy in China the value to Japan exceeds the value to us. The power made possible by Japan's position that can be used for opposing our interests exceeds, of course, that which we could or would provide for immediate defense. This does not mean, however, that the inferior degree of defense, both actual and potential, is ineffective. A threat against our interests also threatens interests of other nations, more vital to them than ours to us,- England, Holland, France, and Russia. The ability of each to provide the necessary

protective power is probably insufficient, but the potential aggregate is sufficient to give pause to Japanese aggression.

Our position should be proportional to our interests, which does not necessarily mean withdrawal. The more we maintain our power, the more will the others be inclined to neglect, or rather fail to proportion, their own defense. Whereas on the other hand the more we withdraw the more Japanese aggression will be encouraged. It would seem that the maintenance of peace is best promoted by a considered compromise between adequate defense and complete withdrawal. It should be added, or repeated, that the maintenance of world peace appears to be at the present time one of our primary policies.

In providing our protection of our interests in the Far East, we have, first, some forces and bases already there, and second, the potential striking effect of our fleet and expeditionary forces. The first is small, almost negligible. Upon the second rests the potency of our capacity to protect our interests in the Western Pacific. It is to some of the aspects of this problem that our investigation of the subject should be directed. For in the maintenance of peace, the potency of a naval offensive in the Western Pacific must be real and not theoretical, and in case of a war precipitated by enemy aggression, or by home clamor, the effectiveness of the fleet will depend on our ability to project its offensive strength across the Pacific.

The strategy, tactics, and command considerations pertaining to this problem have engaged our attention and study for a number of years,- on the whole without resulting in an accepted solution,- to the extent that many feel no such dangerous undertaking would be carried out. But if our

interests are trampled and our rights compromised we will be confronted with the necessity of justifying the existence of the United States Fleet. In our study of this problem we are faced with the modifications in tactics, in geographical strategy and in command brought about by the development of new weapons.

Wars have grown from the coastal operations of the ancient Greeks, through the close offshore operations of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, toward the wide expanse of the Pacific and the complete envelope of the air. In recent times we have seen the introduction of armored, steam driven ships in the Civil and Spanish American wars, of torpedoes and torpedo craft in the Russo-Japanese war, and of submarines in the World War. Each of these innovations in naval warfare has had a profound effect on tactical and strategic operations, but it cannot be said that any has caused a reversal of the probable outcome that would have resulted without such new agencies. As a rule the accomplishments of new agencies, both on land and sea, fall short of the expectations and claims of those who introduce them and advocate their use. Part of the trouble seems to be that the reformers, the introducers, do not in the beginning adequately weigh and consider the dynamic resistance to change which permeates the physical, mental, and moral worlds. They do not carry to its logical end a consideration of the counter measures to the new agencies that will in the end be evolved. They thus fail to provide in advance for, or at least give consideration in advance to, the further steps or tactics on the part of the new agencies that may to a greater or lesser extent balance the counter measures. This failure seems to modify the revolutionary effect of the new agencies.

In the last war the use of aircraft was developed sufficiently to exercise a decided effect, especially on land. On the sea it barely got started. In a future naval war it bids fair to have a tremendous effect. At the present time its power of attack is felt to be so strong that it would appear that its tactical offensive cannot be resisted. This in turn makes the strategic offensive more difficult. Here aircraft tends to parallel the status of guns. A ship is a vulnerable gun platform and is of course at a tremendous disadvantage compared with a gun platform on the invulnerable land with an equal number of guns. A gun's projectiles cannot be stopped in flight. The extent to which a massed air offensive can be stopped in flight is a mooted point, the general idea being that it can be somewhat reduced but not sufficiently to prevent the substantial accomplishment of its objective.

If this is true and remains unchanged we would find that the bringing of fleets within the radius of ~~the~~ enemy shore-based aircraft was a distinctly rash undertaking, even when the fleet carried a superiority in numbers of aircraft.

When we consider numbers the inability of fleets to remain within striking distance of land-based aircraft appears to be even more certain. For while fixed land defences can be reenforced with mobile artillery, the speed of concentration at the point of attack is limited in time and may be impossible because of the nature of the terrain, whereas aircraft mobilizations are rapid and flexible,- limited only by weather, and possibly by absence of air fields.

This latter factor, the factor of numbers, of the ability of aircraft to concentrate on land, causes a modification in naval operations that time and development ~~has not~~

are not apt seriously to change. The ability of an air offensive to accomplish its objective in spite of anti-aircraft gunnery and an opposing aircraft in approximately equal numbers seems to rest on a more uncertain foundation. Historically, counter measures against new agencies go far toward modifying the first promise of the irresistible effect of these agencies,- sometimes by the counter use of the agencies themselves.

Tactically, the effect of counter air attack against bombing units is to force them to provide a concentrated defense by close formation, while the effect of anti-aircraft gunnery is to force them to disperse. From the point of view of the defense against bombing attack this is the wrong order of events, for when the anti-aircraft guns force dispersion it is too late to use counter air attack for protection purposes. This would point to the development of agencies or measures to force dispersion before the bombing formation comes in range of the anti-aircraft guns, possibly a combination of fighters and fast bombers armed with light time fused bombs.

Whatever the means, it seems not improbable that development will enable superior air power, supported by anti-aircraft gun fire, to ward off a concentrated bombing attack, given sufficient warning. If this should be the case, a strategical offensive against Japan will have, of course, greater flexibility than if it should not. The direction of approach, the possibility of feints and diversions, are greatly facilitated. The strategic offensive can be directed against either end or the center of the long line of Japanese possessions. A feint attack, for instance, at one point can draw air forces that way while the main attack is driving in another to occupy positions that

can be held.

If an effective tactical air ~~defensive~~ defensive for protection of fleet units cannot be developed the strategical offensive becomes much more difficult and hazardous. We will have to be prepared to expend units freely in order to capture positions. We will be confronted with the probability of such frontal attacks going forward by step by step land supported approaches, along the Marshall-Carolines, or along the northern route over the Aleutians, or both, in order that large long range planes can be moved with the fleet. This of course may be modified by a further increase in the size, radius and seaworthiness of large seaplanes.

In conducting offensive operations under either of the foregoing conditions, we will be confronted at the outset with the need for immediate additions of converted merchantmen to our available naval strength. Especially important for our consideration in this phase of the influence of tactics on strategy is that of additional vessels for carrying aircraft. We will need a number of vessels for this purpose, vessels that will be of restricted capacity perhaps, but that will carry sufficient air power to draw out the air attack of enemy base and carriers. They will constitute units that we may have to be prepared to expend for the capture of positions.

A type of ship that would be pattioularly suitable for conversion into long radius, fairly fast, carriers or air tenders is a diesel driven ship. This point is one that should receive special emphasis in our government subsidy to merchant shipping. As a nation we are well behind in our ability to build diesel power units, a deficiency that will require years to remedy, years of experience, of training of expert artificers and expert operators. Here

~~point~~

is a point in our national strategy of preparation in which the future needs of tactical operations, as well as these strategic requirements, should be brought into contact with other Government agencies which direct the support to our merchant shipping.

Each of the three great naval powers of the world is practically immune from attack by land. Of the three, Japan and England are open to air attack, by powerful neighbors, but can of course attack the neighbors in return. Of the three the United States has an economic self-sufficiency that would permit it to continue to resist even after a successful naval strategic offensive against its sea communications. Japan and England are not self-sufficient. This tends to draw operations in a war with either of these powers to their waters. This forces long radius actions by the American Fleet, not only because of the distant areas of operations but because of the absence of bases.

The long radius can be obtained by the use of train units, and by long radius of the combatant units themselves. This long radius is obtained at the expense of armor, armament, or speed, so that ton for ton Japanese and English units should be somewhat superior to our units. This necessitates a slight superiority in number of our units at the point of contact. This in turn adds to train requirements.

So again we arrive at the need for suitable train units adequate in numbers, adequately trained and indoctrinated. Long radius will be facilitated by diesel propulsion, which will permit a combination of speed and radius that will be essential to celerity of movement.

The question of diesel engines is particularly stressed because in war a great expansion in their construction, and improvement in their quality, in order to provide for a war submarine program , would be inaugurated. In order to provide for this a peace time commercial construction should be insisted upon. The part to be played by submarines in war and particularly in a Pacific war, with the effect of the employment of this arm on our strategical and tactical operations, is the second phase of this part of the limited scope of this discussion. Before taking it up, however, some additional consideration of the effect of the air arm will be given.

As previously stated the carrier is a new weapon. The part that it will play in war rests upon speculation and experimental analysis. Ideas as to its importance in naval operations range from those that consider the carrier useless to those that consider it the primary arm in the determination of results in naval battle. The body of informed opinion undoubtedly considers it to be a very important arm. But even among these, controversial ideas as to the methods of employment remain unsettled.

The majority current idea assumes the impossibility of stopping a bombing attack, and the extreme vulnerability of the carrier. If the carrier cannot be defended against air attack it will seek protection in evasion. This will separate them from the battle line when contact is imminent, perhaps beforehand. This separation has two important disadvantages, among others. It may subject the carrier to destruction by superior surface attack,- especially to be feared during low visibility,- and it delays the air attack on the enemy. This separation may cause us to lose the

initiative and to accept a tactical disadvantage from the start.

This has reference to a separation sufficiently great to make discovery by enemy bombing attack groups improbable. A certain degree of separation is of course necessary to provide for launching and landing planes into the wind. This necessity will of itself cause separation, and still may cause the carrier to be subjected to destruction by surface attack,- cruisers or destroyers.

The carrier must of course be prepared to maneuver at high speed against wind and sea. Protective forces, probably cruisers, that can maintain the high speeds against wind and sea will be required as escort. Whether or not the carrier's position will be such that these cruiser units can be used to support the battle line during engagement, or in repelling enemy destroyer attacks, will have a bearing on the dispositions of the carrier.

Offensively the carrier would, of course, seek a position from which air attacks against enemy objectives can anticipate those of the enemy. This demand for offensive readiness is in conflict with the maintenance of the integrity of the plane platform of the carrier's decks, but neither of the two procedures will necessarily completely exclude the other.

We will suppose two opposing fleets are at sea, one of which has its light forces forming its advance screen thirty miles in advance of the battleships, with carrier units disposed well in the rear of the battle line,- about fifty miles. The other force has a similar advance screen with carrier units between the light force screen and the battleships. We will further assume that the first force is not maintaining

an air patrol or screen in advance of the light forces, and the second force is maintaining such a patrol,- or if the first is maintaining an air patrol thirty miles in advance of its surface screen that the second force is maintaining one a hundred miles in front. Then the second force will be in position to locate the screen of the first and direct against it an air attack before the first force can oppose it or take similar action.

Now if both forces decide to place carriers in support of their advance surface screening units, the carrier units find themselves in hazardous positions. If fortune is impartial and opposing carriers are located by air patrols simultaneously, both become subject to damage or destruction by bombing attack and we have a game of "swap out." If our light forces are not supported by air they run the risk of destruction by air attack; if they are supported by carriers, the carriers themselves run the risk of loss by air attack.

It is not the purpose of this thesis to attempt to determine what the correct tactics should be, or even to attempt to mention more than a few of the conceptions of the problems involved,- only enough of them to point toward the relationship of strategy, tactics and command in naval war under present conditions, and to point to the problems that confront naval officers in general.

It is unnecessary to go further with the discussion of aircraft to demonstrate the added need for an advance screen that can give adequate warning and timely information without being itself subject to destruction by opposing air attack. This can be provided by submarines capable of cruising with the fleet. Such a screen can be hampered, but it cannot be destroyed nor can it be driven off. A hole

cannot be driven in it, though it may be hampered by being kept down by aircraft. But first contact would have been made by such a time and reported, and submarines would have to submerge anyhow in order to develop the contact. If the enemy contacted is an isolated unit nothing much will happen anyway. If the contact is on the edge of important enemy forces the action of our forces will be initially guided. Further, as a submarine can and will operate unsupported, the enemy cannot know whether the submarine forced down is an isolated unit or one operating with the fleet.

If two opposing fleets are approaching each other at a speed of twelve knots each, they will make contact at daylight if their positions were two hundred and forty miles apart at the beginning of the preceding ten hour darkness. During darkness nothing but a screen of closely placed units would be able to provide effective denial of enemy approach undetected.. Such a close screen on a large radius is impractible. Therefore if we want adequate warning of the enemy approach we would require a screen at least two hundred and forty miles in advance of the main body. If we want a warning at least sixty miles in advance of contact this interval to the outer screen would be extended to three hundred miles in advance of the main body.

Assuming that this first line had been passed during darkness, a second line would be needed the distance of the dark approach, two hundred and forty miles, in rear of the first line, or sixty miles in advance of the main body. Since this position would be in the probable area of our own air patrol it might be pushed out to at least one hundred miles instead of sixty. These distances are of course not claimed to be correct estimates, nor would they in any case be

fixities. They are given to provide concrete illustration of the problem presented by the wide distribution of forces that will be found tactically necessary.

If the advanced line covers a one hundred and twenty degree sector and the second line a hundred and eighty degree sector, about twenty four submarines would be required,- a need which could not be met with suitable units at the present time. In fact it could be met with difficulty under our present treaty limitations even if all of our submarines were of a late type. The fifty three thousand ton limitation permits about forty-three submarines of the smallest usable type.

The important uses of submarines are familiar to most,- the defense of our own territories and bases, attack on enemy units, the threat of attack, forcing the enemy to tremendous expenditure of effort, the employment of forces for anti-submarine measures whether submarines are actually present or their presence just feared, watching enemy bases, reconnoitering enemy areas, and concentrated attack on enemy fleet during fleet action. Of all these it is not improbable that the advance screen of the fleet will, for us, be found the most important. At the same time it appears not to enter adequately into the concepts of most officers in the employment of this arm. Even if the enemy main fleet is not opposing us, and our immediate objectives are temporary bases, we will need protection against enemy raiding forces.

Of the other uses of submarines their concentration is indicated only in focal areas,- off our own outlying bases, such as Panama or Hawaii, off enemy bases or prospective bases, in narrow channels, or in the vicinity of our own fleet. Of these, the concentration in the vicinity of the fleet for

concentrated torpedo attack on the enemy, in co-ordination with the fleet engagement, seems the most improbable. Greater need exists for submarines off our bases and off those of the enemy. It may be possible to concentrate for the engagement those submarines forming soreens about the fleet, but their primary mission would normally be information, and the ability to form them for a concentrated attack on the enemy fleet would be unlikely.

The number needed with the fleet would be about twenty-four. The number needed for other purposes would be at least twenty-four more. To maintain forty-eight in operation, a minimum of eighty submarines would be required.

In our participation in the London Naval Conference of 1930, we included in our expert naval advisers specialists for special arms, except for submarines. In the conference we surrendered as against Japan our 10 to 6 superiority that we maintained for other classes. This action did not of itself necessarily affect our submarine building program, but it is indicative of the attitude of those responsible for our strategic preparation toward the employment of this arm. This, added to the pacifistic apathy of the country, has resulted in a submarine navy not more than 60% as potent as that of Japan.

If we are called upon to make good this deficiency rapidly and suddenly, we will find ourselves especially handicapped in turning out diesel propulsion units, which, as stated before, adds to the necessity of so directing our merchant ship subsidies as to build up in this country diesel engine manufacture.

Our present day policies are not aggressive. They tend to maintain the status quo. Japanese policies are aggressive, probably necessarily so. They tend to change the status quo. They constitute a political offensive. With respect to us Japan's strategy, except at the outset, would be essentially defensive. Ours would have to be strategically offensive. The offensive is recognized as the best defense. Much more is the potentiality of the offensive power to be emphasized then if we are to carry on and project the offensive. So this offensive power should be our guiding thought in the strategy of our preparation and training.

Tactics is described as the tool or servant of strategy. Strategy determines the reason for combat, and tactics accomplishes the purposes of strategy. Strategy must have due regard for the limitations of its tool or servant, and must so provide for tactics as to furnish a proper degree of prospect of success.

The differentiation between the two tends, however, to become less marked. Tactics is usually defined as covering those operations that take place after contact has occurred. With airoraft and submarines, opposing fleets may each cover a circle of say 300 miles radius. Contact could take place with the fleets 600 apart,- a greater area than the entire World War vital area of operations in the North Sea. Strategical dispositions will be similarly expanded and may be spread over 5000 miles of Pacific Ocean.

All of these forces are, or should be, animated by a single objective. Their individual missions give strategical support to this objective. Tactically, units in a spread out formation with a diameter of perhaps 600 miles

are, or should be, disposed in mutual support. The Principle of Mutual Support is perhaps a mixture of the Principles of the Objective, of Security, and of Co-operation. In a fleet movement such as we have visualized, it becomes almost our guiding principle. Herein is indicated the problem of command that has grown with the expansion of our tactical dispositions, and the addition of new agencies or types.

The commanding officer of a submarine 300 miles in front of his main body must know not only his own function, what action to take on contacts, on changes of visibility, etc., but he must be familiar with the plans, problems, and reactions of the various type and task groups, as to how they will support him and how he can support them. The pilot of each plane may be called on to exercise vital decisions in the Commander in Chief's disseminated command. Analogies are incomplete and often misleading, but the whole structure may be likened to a complicated bridge girder. Each member is designed to take the stresses that may fall on it. Each member supports the general structure, and the general structure supports it.

But our tactical structure is flexible and dynamic in its nature. The widely separated commanders constantly evaluate the situation and move to meet and command it. In doing this they are animated and guided by the strength and direction of purpose of the Commander in Chief. This flows through his subordinate commanders like magnetic current through loosely spread iron filings, and points them into the orderly directions of the common purpose.

In order that this can effectively be done there are two essential preparatory processes. First, the selection of personnel with the proper qualities, qualities that can be attuned to those that should exist in the Commander in Chief, and second, the training and indoctrination of this personnel in coordinated concepts of strategy and tactics. Of these two the first is the more important.

Primarily our navy should be prepared for offensive strategy. It may not be called upon to so function, but its readiness to act offensively in the situations that may arise is the measure of its effectiveness, both potentially and actually. Anything less than this should be rejected. In selecting our personnel, we have to provide qualities that, first, will prepare the naval instrument for use in war, and, second, will wield the instrument prepared. The measure of success of our getting the first set of qualities is largely measured in peace time. For the second we are on more uncertain ground. We do not have available daily yardsticks to measure the qualities that will be needed to infuse life and vigor into our widespread units and convert them into thunderbolts of war. For this reason this second attribute tends in peace time to be overshadowed by the first, and while the two are by no means mutually exclusive, the second must be kept thrust upon our attention if our strategy of preparation is to be successful.

A strategical offensive supported by bold tactics will not be successful unless it is directed by a bold and skilful high command. He in turn must support and be supported by similar qualities down through the many echelons of command. The institutions of our country have in the past promoted the bold enterprise of individualism. As long

as this remains the case the supply of good officer material will be ample for a proper selective process.

Having selected our proper material in officer personnel, there remain training and indoctrination. Here again we meet the requisite of preparation of the instrument, and that of its operation and coordination into the effort of the whole. Our fleet has a combination organization,- by type groups, and by task groups. The type grouping facilitates development of the type, obtains uniformity of methods, tactical operations, etc. It tends to preclude familiarization of its personnel with other types, and those of other types with it. This lack is overcome somewhat by a degree of rotation of officer personnel from type to type. But there are many types to be covered, and the indoctrination of the high command as as necessary as that of the subordinate command.

In the ready recognition of the needs of type development, there is, probably, a tendency to neglect the need for task group operations. Both forms of group operations are essential to peace time development. Type grouping tends however to be emphasized. Even when task group exercises are carried out, types will usually function together and the indoctrinal process must be stressed to be effective. Task group commanders are frequently of a seniority that prevents their first hand experience with new types of recent development. Such a commander fortifies his indoctrination and provides for his command function by including the type specialists in his staff. But he himself must have sufficient indoctrinated understanding to coordinate and make effective their specialized knowledge.

In war, knowledge of the situation is vastly restricted at best. We cannot assume that we will be informed of the enemy's plans, dispositions, actions. Our knowledge even of our own is limited and inacourate. But we do require the knowledge of the probable actions of the commanders of the separated units,- that they will be guided by a coordinated doctrine, and will pull their own weight in giving impetus to our effort. Without this assurance the Commander in Chief will not be ready to step forth with confidence into the hazards to be encountered by a projected offensive.

The power and effectiveness of his offensive effort is measured by its momentum. Momentum is equal to mass times velocity. Velocity is acquired by subjecting mass to acceleration. This acceleration, as we know from physics, is generated by force,- force is equal to mass times acceleration. The mass is our fleet, the force is the directive power and energy of the high command supported by the integrated directive efforts of subordinate commanders spread out in space, and coordinated in time to fulfil the demands of modern strategy and tactics. Strategy provides the structure; tactics the points of contact with the enemy structure; command vitalizes the structure with spirit and power. The structure of strategy must be commensurate to the potentiality of the vitalizing force, of command is to give action to its possibilities. On the other hand if the structure is too great for the capacities of the available command our strategy will collapse.

In evidence of the second case, is the French failure to realize the possibilities of its strategy in the War of American Independence. Their political and strategical objectives failed of accomplishment because of the failure of

command. The energy of command was insufficient to vitalize the structure of strategy. The failure to achieve objectives well within reach was the failure of command.

In evidence of the first case we may look to the alternative possibilities of the World War. The Germans found themselves in a war with oversea trade completely dominated by the superior strategic position of Great Britain. The maintenance of this position by Great Britain meant the maintenance of the status quo, or her continuance on the strategical defensive.

This consideration forced Germany, or should have done so, to undertake the strategical offensive. This imperative was not recognized by Germany,- except later to a modified extent in the submarine warfare. A strategic offensive would have been bold strategy, but there is now reason to believe that if it had been undertaken at the beginning of the war it would have held forth much promise of success to the well constructed and well trained German fleet. A bolder strategy, one with a larger structure, would have carried with it bolder tactics. Jutland would have been fought sooner, and with a different and more potent objective.

There is reason to believe that in the spirit of command that permeated the German Fleet, there pulsed a latent power that would have filled the larger structure of a strategy determined to challenge British sea supremacy,- a power of command and efficiency built up by the energy of a virile people only to be stifled by a restricted strategic structure.

Of the two cases of faulty adjustment the restrictive is the one to be most deplored. Our first problem is to develop and maintain a power of command that will fit into the strategic demands of the maintenance of our national policy. Having this, it is essential that our strategic conceptions should tend to extend rather than restrict the power and vitality of such an apotheosis of the national will.