

Staff Presentation

Lee (116)

1936-65

CONFIDENTIAL

Army War College MAY 1 - 1936

195-7-4

JOINT OPERATIONS IN THE DARDANELLES 1915

by

Colonel Eugene Santschi, Jr., Inf., U.S.A.

DECLASSIFIED IAW DOD MEMO OF 3 MAY 1972, SUBJ:
DECLASSIFICATION OF WWII RECORDS

DEPARTMENT OF OPERATIONS
Naval War College
Newport, R.I.

**TO BE RETURNED TO THE
ARCHIVES, NAVAL WAR COLLEGE**

JOINT OPERATIONS IN THE DARDANELLES 1915

1. Suitability of British Government for conducting war.

a. The British Cabinet, whose responsibility to Parliament is collective rather than individual, was theoretically responsible for the conduct of war.

As this body comprised twenty two members, it was too unwieldy and delegated its war making powers to the War Council, which was established on November 25, 1914.

b. The War Council consisted of:

The Prime Minister -----	Mr. Asquith.
The Foreign Minister	Sir Edwin Grey.
The War Minister	Lord Kitchener.
The First Lord of the Admiralty	Mr. Churchill.
The Chancellor of the Exchequer	Mr. Lloyd George.
The Secretary of State for India	Lord Crewe.
The Lord Chancellor	Lord Haldane.

c. The Meetings of the War Council were also attended by

The Chief of the Imperial General Staff -	Sir James Wolfe Murray.
The First Sea Lord-----	Lord Fisher
Commander of the Fleet-----	Sir Arthur Wilson

d. While the War minister was also a soldier, he had little sympathy for the General Staff. He seldom asked advice of the staff and resented it when offered. While he dominated the War Council he was unwilling to impart full information to it.

The First Lord of the Admiralty was a civilian with no technical naval knowledge, but filled with enthusiasm and a belief in his own ability as a strategist.

While the first Sea Lord and the Chief of the General Staff attended all meetings of the War Council they took no part

in its deliberations, and did not share its collective responsibility. They conceived their duty to be to advise their respective ministers and answer any questions when asked.

e. The general state of mind of the War Council can best be illustrated by an enumeration of some of the plans proposed. The degree of support to any one conception depended largely on the enthusiasm of its proponent.

Lloyd George wanted to withdraw the BEF from France and send it to the Balkans to combine with Greece, Serbia, and Roumania against Austria.

Sir John French, commanding the BEF, proposed a joint operation to clear the enemy out of Zeebrugge and Ostend.

Lord Fisher advocated a combined military and naval attack on the coast of Schleswig-Holstein.

Mr. Churchill continuously advocated a naval attack on the Dardenelles.

Lord Kitchener's primary interest was on the Western Front.

In addition to these projects the government of India had started operations at the head of the Persian Gulf.

f. It thus appears that a committee of seven members (civil) one of them an army officer, were charged with the conduct of the war with no military or naval expert sharing the responsibility.

Practically no use was made of the technical staffs of the War Office or the Admiralty and there is no indication

that any detailed study was made of the means available for the various projects considered.

Evidence indicates that the War Council meetings were characterized by vagueness and want of precision. The Chief of the General Staff and the First Sea Lord have since stated that they sometimes left the council with no clear idea of what had been decided. And these were the effect.

g. It seems hardly necessary to say that the War organization of the British government was unsuited for carrying on military and naval operations. A comparison of this organization with that of the United States is interesting.

h. While the President of the United States cannot declare war, once it has been declared, his position as commander-in-chief of the Army and Navy greatly facilitates the conduct of war.

2. Relations of Statesman, Soldier, and Sailor.

a. When the positions of statesman and soldier are held by one person, as Cromwell, Frederick the Great, and Napoleon, the direction of war is relatively simple. This, however, is seldom the case, and while the closest cooperation is necessary between the statesman and the leaders of the armed forces, each has a well defined sphere of activity.

b. Briefly, the declaration of war and the conclusion of peace are the statesman's business, together with any proposed operations which may have political effects. The soldier and

sailor should say whether or not the proposed operations are practicable and to them should be left the conduct of the operations decided upon unless some change has occurred in the political situation.

c. It appears that the British Cabinet, and especially the War Council, being collectively rather than individually responsible should have constituted the Statesman; the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Sir Wolfe Murray, the Soldier; and the First Sea Lord, Lord Fisher the Sailor.

d. In the United States government the individual responsibility of Cabinet officers, combined with the unlikelihood of having military or naval officers in the Cabinet, and the increasing technicality of war, makes the chances of confusing the functions of Statesman, Soldier and Sailor, almost negligible.

3. Considerations of Dardanelles prior to the World War.

a. It had been recognized for over a hundred years by British naval and military authorities that any attack on the Dardanelles would be an operation which presented great difficulties.

The first comparatively modern attempt to force the Straits was made by Admiral Duckworth of the British Navy in 1807 with ships alone. With seven ships of the line, Duckworth ran the batteries, but was forced to retire on account of fear for his communications when within eight miles of Constantinople.

This led to the belief that ships alone could not be expected to command decisions on shore without the assistance of troops.

Successive governments continue to hope, in spite of many reports to the contrary that ships alone might be able to open and keep open the Dardanelles.

b. In 1878, following the Russo Turkish War, the British Fleet was ordered to the Marmora, and remained near Constantinople until peace was finally signed. Admiral Hornby was nervous as to the safety of his communications even with a Turkish garrison in occupation of the Bulair Isthmus, and wrote to the First Lord: "There seems to be an idea that the Fleet can keep the Dardanelles and Bosphorous open. Nothing can be more visionary. Not all the fleets in the world can keep them open for unarmored ships."

c. In 1906 a dispute arose between Turkey and Britain over the Turco-Egyptian boundary. At this time the General Staff concurred in the opinion of the Naval Intelligence Department that an attempt to force the Dardanelles with ships alone was unlikely to attain any useful purpose, and that such an operation "was much to be deprecated".

d. The General Staff examined the question of a combined naval and military operation on a large scale, and concluded that however brilliant and fruitful such an operation would be, if successful, it was not prepared to recommend its being attempted on account of the risks involved. The Navy agreed as to the risks involved, but stated that the General Staff underrated the

value of naval artillery support; that the attack could succeed if the government was prepared to use a force and face heavy casualties.

e. The operation was again considered by the War Office in 1908, with 20,000 troops in conjunction with the Navy.

f. Finally in 1911, the question was again reviewed by the General Staff and the opinion of 1906 was confirmed, that is, since it was impossible to effect a surprise, an attempt to disembark an Army on Gallipoli would be too hazardous to recommend.

4. Political Situation (See Map No.)

In order to arrive at the political reasons for the Dardanelles Expedition, a brief outline of national policies, affiliations and ambitions in existence at the outbreak of the World War may be of assistance. A glance at the map shows the importance of the Dardanelles to any situation in which Russia might be involved. As early as 1808 Napoleon regarded the possession of Constantinople as the crux of the entire European situation.

a. Russia had always wanted a warm water port on the Mediterranean and coveted Constantinople. She had a defensive alliance with France and considered Serbia her protege.

b. France, since 1870, had been living in constantly increasing fear of Germany and had never been reconciled to the loss of Alsace Lorraine. She had a defensive alliance with Great Britain and was interested in the Near East.

c. Germany, desiring to expand eastward, started years before to cultivate Turkey, having all ready founded an alliance with Austria. The Berlin-Bagdad railway was constructed in furtherance of the Mittel-Europa idea.

d. Great Britain, on account of India and her sea interests, had always wanted to keep Constantinople from any of the Great Powers, and her major policy was to maintain the status quo. Hence she entered into a defensive alliance with France, and later, in 1907, with Russia.

e. Austria desired to expand and had annexed the Serbian provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1909, making an enemy of Russia. She was a member of the Triple Alliance with Germany and Italy.

f. Italy feared and hated France and resented Austria's advance to the Adriatic. She was a member of the Triple Alliance but loath to side in with Austria.

g. Turkey had always feared Russia. She had a secret alliance with Germany and wanted territory she had lost in the Balkans.

h. Serbia had been attacked by Austria and was closely allied to Russia.

i. Roumania had no alliances but leaned towards Russia, who had supported her against Bulgaria. She wanted more territory and was waiting to join the winning side.

j. Bulgaria had no alliances. She wanted territory in Macedonia and was waiting to join the winning side. She was

resentful towards Greece and Serbia.

k. Greece had no alliances. She wanted the Aegean Island and Constantinople but Russia opposed this. She was willing to join either side that was willing to give her Constantinople.

The four neutral countries, Italy, Roumania, Bulgaria, Greece were each in a position to influence the outcome of the conflict. The political problem confronting the Entente was to secure them as allies or at least to preserve their neutrality.

5. Military Situation

Slide No. ___

a. Army

Deadlock in west.

Russians in front of Warsaw and along Carpathians.

Serbia and Montenegro had drawn Austrians from Serbia and were guarding that border.

Turkey's Army under German officers. Had garrisons in Dardanelles; in Sinai Peninsula threatening Suez Canal; at Bagdad to operate against ports of Persian Gulf; a force opposed to the Russians in the Caucasus; and a strategic reserve near Constantinople.

b. Naval

By November Allies controlled outer seas and this control was undisputed in the Mediterranean.

Turkish Navy and Goeben and Breslau were in the Black Sea.

6. Consideration of Dardanelles prior to Jan. 3, 1915.

a. Turkey declared war on Oct. 31. British ships bombard outer forts for about ten minutes on Nov. 3d on orders from the Admiralty. War Council was not consulted.

b. On Nov. 25, Churchill suggests to War Council an attack on Gallipoli Peninsula. Some discussion but no definite conclusion.

c. On Dec. 23, Lloyd George discovers the deadlock on western

front and circulated a memorandum suggesting a blow at Germany by attacking Turkey.

d. Jan. 2, 1915, the Russians asked for a demonstration to relieve Turkish pressure against them in the Balkans, and on January 3d the Foreign Office replied assuring Russian government that a demonstration would be made, but that it would be unlikely to effect a serious withdrawal of enemy troops from the Caucasus. Gallipoli was chosen as the place for this demonstration, but the time and method were as yet wholly undecided. This ends the first phase of the Dardanelles campaign.

7. Actions taken by British government.

a. On Jan. 3, Admiralty wires Corden for opinion as to feasibility of forcing Dardanelles by ships alone. He replied to effect that they could not be rushed but might be forced by extended operations with a large number of ships. There is nothing to indicate that the War Council to date had asked or received any detailed staff estimates from navy or army in terms of munitions or men.

b. War Council discussed possible theaters of operations on Jan. 8. Kitchener recognized the suitability of Dardanelles as an objective for fleet, but estimated 150,000 troops would be required and desired further study. The Council decided that for the present the main effort of the British forces should be alongside the French, but that the possibili-

ities of pressing the war on other fronts should be studied. It neglected to direct the Army or Navy to make such studies. g. On Jan. 13, Mr. Churchill laid before the Council a plan submitted by Admiral Corden for a purely naval operation to reduce the forts at the Dardanelles. Kitchener thought plan worth trying with understanding that it could be broken off at any time. Lord Fisher said nothing. The Council decided that "The Admiralty should prepare for a naval expedition in February to bombard and take the Gallipoli Peninsula with Constantinople as its objective."

d Based on this decision Churchill took the following action:

- (1) Directed the Naval Staff to estimate enemy defenses in the Dardanelles and the naval strength required provided the project were approved.
- (2) With consent of the Council and the naval advisers, informed the French government of Admiral Corden's scheme and requested French cooperation.
- (3) Informed the Grand Duke Nicholas that the British government had decided to force the Dardanelles.
- (4) Suggested to Kitchener that troops be landed at Alexandretta simultaneously with the naval attack, but Kitchener stated that no troops were available at present.

e On Jan. 28th, the War Council agreed that the Admiralty should be definitely charged with carrying out the operation with the Fleet alone.

On Feb. 19 and 25, the Fleet bombarded the fortifications.

On Feb. 26th, the Council decided that some troops should be sent from Egypt.

March 5, General Birdwood telegraphed grave doubts as to ability of Navy to force the passage unaided, and by the 10th Kitchener released the 29th Division for duty in the Dardanelles.

Sir Ian Hamilton was appointed to command of the military part of the expedition on March 12.

Admiral Corden was obliged to resign because of ill health on March 16, and was succeeded by de Robeck, who on the 19th was informed by the War Council that "he could continue the naval operations against the Dardanelles if he thought fit."

After consulting with Hamilton, de Robeck changed his views, and on March 26th cabled that a combined major operation would be essential.

It was now clear that a commitment to a major combined operation on a large scale had been made.

f It appears then that up to this time the War Council constituted a superior strategical board and, though primarily occupied with political considerations, undertook the direction of military and naval operations without advice in council of the technical heads of the military and naval forces.

8. The British Navy at the Dardanelles and its Plans.

a Mudros Harbor, Lemnos, was selected as base, and Rear Admiral Wester Wemyss detailed to organize and develop it.

b The following ships were available:

<u>French</u>	<u>British</u>
Admiral Gueprette	11 BB (incl. new QUEEN ELIZABETH)
4 BB (old)	1 Battle cruiser
14 Minesweepers	4 Light cruisers
6 Destroyers	7 Submarines
1 Submarine	1 Aircraft carrier
1 Seaplane tender	1 Gunboat
	16 Destroyers plus 1 Depot ship
	21 Trawlers minesweeping

g No adequate landing force provided for first bombardment. Only two battalions of marines were sent to Mudros prior to second naval attack to be used after entrance forts were silenced to destroy torpedo tubes believed to be a part of the entrance defenses.

Slide No. ___

d Admiral Corden's plan:

- (1) Reduction of defenses at entrance to the Straits, in Basheka Bay and on the north coast of Gallipoli.
- (2) Sweeping mine fields and reducing defenses up to the narrows.
- (3) Reduction of narrows.
- (4) Sweeping main minefield (off Kephez)
- (5) Silencing forts above the narrows.
- (6) Passing fleet into the Maomora.
- (7) Operations in the Sea of Maomora and patrolling Dardanelles.

e In dealing with the forts, the general principle was to attack in 3 stages:

- (1) Long range 11,000 to 12,000 direct and indirect fire out of range of enemy's guns.
- (2) Medium range 5,000 to 10,000, using secondary batteries and direct fire.
- (3) Final reduction at decisive ranges 3,000 to 4,000 yards.

9. Defenses and Defensive Plans of the Turks at the Dardanelles.

a Forts at entrance (Prewar)

Sedd el Bahr and Helles on European side.

Kum Kale and Orkanie on Asiatic side.

Total 24 guns; 4 with range 14,800 meters

20 " " 7,500 " .

b At the Narrows (Prewar)

Total of 78 guns

5 (approx. 14 in.) range 16,900 met.

3 (approx. 13 in.) " 14,800 "

Remainder medium and short range guns.

c Between the Narrows and the entrance:

Total of seven guns 3 to 6 inch.

d As a result of the bombardment of November 3d the Turks had strengthened the defenses of the Straits at and below the Narrows as follows:

- (1) Added nine minefields.
- (2) Added eight searchlights.
- (3) Added one torpedo tube.
- (4) Installed eight six-inch howitzers.
- (5) Installed rapid fire batteries to protect the minefields.
- (6) Installed dummy batteries.
- (7) Provided additional emplacements for mortars.
- (8) Installed fire control system.
- (9) Provided six battalions of infantry to patrol from Xeros to Bashika Bay.

e Natural defensive features were:

- (1) Crooked strait, tapering to narrows, with a steady current always flowing seaward, facilitating use of floating mines.
- (2) Uncertain weather conditions.
- (3) Suitable depths and distance for fixed mines, nets and torpedo tubes.
- (4) High land on both sides, affording fine sites for emplacements and observation and dominating the passage.
- (5) A difficult terrain.

f The Turkish plan of defense contemplated.

- (1) Using entrance forts until they were destroyed.

(2) Stopping allied fleet before it reached the Narrows by gunfire, mortar fire, mines and mobile torpedo tubes.

(3) Protecting its minefields by day and night.

10. The First Naval Bombardment.

Slide No. —

a Began at 9:51 a.m. 19 February, and at 2:00 p.m. moved further in.

At 4:40 p.m. signal made "Cease firing and examine the forts."

When this signal was executed and the ships began to close in the forts opened fire "as though they had not been touched". Fire was resumed by the ships, and at 5:20 p.m., because the light was failing and because of silhouette, the fleet retired to the anchorage at Tenedos.

b No ships had been hit, but on the other hand the Turks had suffered little damage. Corden does not appear to have used his full force in this attack.

c The results seemed to indicate that:

(1) long range naval fire has little effect on modern earthworks,

(2) long range fire must be used to support ships firing at shorter ranges.

(3) land troops should be available to occupy forts that are subdued by naval bombardment.

11. The Second Attack.

Slide NO. ___

a Corden planned to renew the attack the next day, but was prevented from so doing by bad weather until Feb. 25th.

The plan was the same as on Feb. 19th except that ships at anchor at long range were to support attacking ships at medium and short ranges, while a third group, preceded by mine sweepers, were to take the forts from the rear by point blank range.

The Turks replied and Helles hit the Agamemnon 7 times in 10 minutes, and she shifted her berth. The Dublin was then forced to withdraw by the same fort. Helles then took on the Gaulois which was firing on Kum Kale. The Gaulois opened on Helles with her main battery, keeping her secondary guns on the original target. The Queen Elizabeth now began to register hits on Helles. By noon the entrance forts were silenced. The attacking ships now stood in, and by 4:00 p.m. Corden considered the work done when all ships except mine sweepers and supporting destroyers returned to Tenedos. During this and the following nights a channel was swept clear of mines for four miles within the Straits.

Landing parties were landed to complete the destruction of the guns; they had some success but were so small that they were soon driven off.

Stormy weather interfered with operations during next few days.

Slide No. ___

b On March 1st two battleships were sent in to engage the forts at the Narrows, while two others were detailed to keep down the fire of the mobile defenses between the Narrows and the Straits. So widely distributed and concealed were these guns that little could be done with them and they put up such stiff resistance that the attack on Dardanos, the principal fort, was abandoned.

Mine sweepers and supporting ships were badly punished at night and forced to desist in their operations off Kephez Point.

c On March 4th, two well organized landing parties of the Royal Naval Division landed under support of ship's guns at Sedd el Bahr and Kum Kale, but met determined resistance, which forced them to withdraw.

d Attempts were continued on Dardanos, but about March 8 Gorden decided that his plan, unassisted by sufficient troops, was not producing lasting results, and he therefore brought this phase of the naval effort to a close.

12. a In London the idea still prevailed that the fleet was to do the work of breaking through, and it was assumed that Admiral Carden would be in the Sea of Marmora by March 20th. By that time it was expected to have over 60,000 troops at Lemnos who were to be taken thru the Straits to the point fixed for operations against Constantinople to begin.

b The weak point in this arrangement, as General Birdwood pointed out in his cable to Kitchener, was that there was little chance of the fleet getting through alone and that even if it did the transports would be exposed to severe loss from the concealed guns which, as was now certain the ships could not be counted on to destroy.

c Hamilton was due to arrive on March 16 for a conference with Carden, but on that day the Admiral had to resign his command because of ill health. He was replaced by Vice Admiral de Robeck.

d The final attack was made on March 18th, weather clear, no wind, conditions perfect.

e The fleet was organized as follows:

Slide No. ___

Combined Fleet

Vice Admiral de Robeck (QUEEN ELIZABETH)

First Division

1st Sub Division

QUEEN ELIZABETH

INFLEXIBLE

2d Sub Division

AGAMEMNON

LORD NELSON

Second Division

Captain Hayes-Sadler (OCEAN)

3d Sub Division

OCEAN

IRRESISTIBLE

ALBION

VENGEANCE

4th Sub Division

SWIFTSURE

MAJESTIC

5th Sub Division

CANOPUS

CORNWALL

Third Division

Admiral Geopratte (SUFFERN)

6th Sub Division

SUFFERN

BOUVET

GAULOIS

CHARLEMAGNE

7th Sub Division

TRIUMPH

PRINCE GEORGE

Accompanying Mine Sweepers, Destroyers, Armed Picket Boats.

Slide No. ___

f The plan was to silence the defenses of the Narrows and mine fields simultaneously. The four most powerful ships would engage the forts at the Narrows at 14,000 yards (long range). When forts were sufficiently dominated four other ships were to pass through and engage at 8,000 to 10,000 yards. Two covering ships were to cover each flank. All available mine sweepers, including destroyers equipped with light sweeps, were to reduce the mine menace. Observation of fire was left entirely to the air men.

g At 10:30 a.m. March 18th AGAMEMNON led the First Division into the Straits. In position and opened fire about 11:30 a.m. At 12:06 French are signalled to come through. Batteries from ERENKEUI open on AGAMEMNON and INFLEXIBLE between 12:20 and 1:15. GUEPRATTE moves in to 10,000 yards. Intense duel for a time between ships and forts. Enemy fire having slackened by 1:45 de Robeck orders mine sweepers in to clear a passage for closing to decisive ranges. At same time 2d Division (Hayes-Sadler) is ordered to relieve French. At 2:00 p.m. Bouvet on way out struck a mine and sunk in less than five minutes. Hayes-Sadler opened fire at 2:39 with range of 12,000 yards and gradually closed to 10,600 yards. About 4:05 the INFLEXIBLE struck a mine and at 4:15 the IRRESISTIBLE did likewise, and the OCEAN went to her assistance, but at 5:50 it became necessary to abandon the IRRESISTIBLE and the Admiral hoisted the "General Recall" and began the return to TENEDOS for the night. At about 6:05 the

OCEAN, which had just left the IRRESISTIBLE, also hit a mine, and she was finally abandoned about 7:30 p.m. The INFLEXIBLE succeeded in reaching Tenedos. The SUFFERN and the GAULOIS were so badly injured that they would have to be docked before they were fit for further service. The real cause of the disaster was the Eren Keui minefield.

The great attempt to force the Narrows had resulted in a severe defeat. Sixteen capital ships were engaged. ⁷³ ~~These~~ ^{Three} were lost, and three more put out of action for an indefinite period. Though the mines themselves were of an inferior type, they had proved themselves capable of sinking old type battleships and of disabling a vessel so modern as the INFLEXIBLE.

So ended the purely naval attacks.

THE DARDANELLES EXPEDITION

1. a March 26 von Sanders was appointed Commander of recently formed Fifth Army with approximately 84,000 men. He was assisted by Dardanelles fortresses and mine fields. His garrison was responsible for defense of both the GALLIPOLI Peninsula and the ASIATIC shore of the Dardanelles. Communication between the two parts of his force and CONSTANTINOPLE was by water. Such interior communications as he had were inferior roads and poor railways. There were no railways on the Peninsula.

b von Sanders adopted a plan of defense based on small covering forces backed by local supports at most feasible landing places, patrolled remainder of the coast line and held out a reserve to reenforce threatened points. He spent much time and effort in making his force highly mobile.

c Slide

The Allied forces consisted of

<u>Troops</u>		<u>Navy</u>
29th Division	18,000	19 Battleships
Royal Naval Div.	11,000	2 Ar Cruisers 11 Light Cruisers
Anzac Corps	31,000	27 Destroyers
Fr Naval Division	18,000	29 Trawlers
		1 balloon ship
		1 carrier
		1 depot ship
<u>Total</u>	<u>78,000</u>	

d General Ian Hamilton commanded the British troops. Vice Admiral de Robeck the British Naval forces and General d'Amande the French troops.

2. The Plan.

a Strategic surprise being out of the question General Hamilton concentrated on tactical surprise. His plan was

Slide No.

to

(1) make a main attack with 29th Division landing at five beaches, Y, X, W, V and S, near Helles; objective Achi Baba

(2) Secondary attack at Avi Burnu by the Anzac Corps, objective Mal Tepe, (Lopez to cripple communications with Helles and force the evacuation of that entire region.

(3) Demonstration by the French against Kum Kale to attract Turkish batteries from main attack.

(4) Demonstration by the Royal Naval Division in Gulf of Xeros.

b 1st and 4th Squadrons (Wemyss) to land and support 29th Division.

2nd Squadron (Thursby) land and support Anzac Corps.

6th Squadron (Guepratte) would support and land French at Kum Kale.

3rd Squadron (Captain Grant) would escort Naval Division to Xeros Bay and demonstrate against that position.

The Navy was to place each army contingent opposite its landing beach in an armored vessel, provide small boats for the landing, support the landing parties with gun fire, and transport ammunition and stores.

3. The Landings

Slide No.

a Anzac 25th April. The 30 Australian Brigade left ships at 3:30 A.M. 12 tows of one launch and four pulling tows each landed 1/2 mile too far north after a twenty minute trip from the ship. Would have run into a prepared position.

During the day the artillery of the Turks assisted by the cruiser Torgad Reis firing across the peninsula delayed the transports.

Mustapha Kemal reenforced the 27th Regiment and counterattacked and by 4:00 P.M. had recaptured most of the ground (Battleship Hill and Baby 700) occupied by the Anzac.

After a full day of fighting the farthest point reached by any Anzac was only 1/3 of the way to the objective assigned by General Hamilton.

Slide No.

b. Y Beach. Two battalions made a surprise landing at this beach, climbed the cliff and dug in without loss. They attempted to connect up with X Beach and send scouts towards Krithia, but being attacked by the Turks they dug in hoping to hold on to what they had.

c. X Beach. Landing here took place at 4:00 A.M. and met a heavy fire from Turks. The Implacable stood in to 450 yards and quieted the Turks with result that the landing was made with comparatively few losses. The troops at X succeeded in connecting up with those at W Beach.

d. W Beach. The landing here was to be simultaneous with those at X and Y but there was a fifteen minute delay due to error in calculating the currents. The Turks did not open fire until just as troops landed. The losses were heavy as the landing was impeded by barbed wire to advance. At 9:00 A.M. the 2nd echelon of one battalion landed. Connection was made with X Beach and an attack was made on the high ground separating W Beach from the force at V Beach. The Turks repulsed every attack and then contraattacked so that by nightfall the British advance was very limited.

e. V Beach. About 6:40 A.M. five tows, each carrying a platoon and covered by fire from the ALBION headed for V Beach. They were met by a withering fire and the attack was completely broken up. The River Clyde, a converted collier,

Slide No.

was used in this landing. She carried 2500 men. Of 1000 men who left the CLYDE, 500 had been killed or wounded by 10:30 A.M. and by nightfall only 400 remained ashore who were not casualties. No attempt was made to land more troops until nightfall, when 1000 landed without interference. On landing an attempt was made to take Sedd el Bahr but it was easily repulsed.

f. S Beach. The landing at S Beach was most dreaded by the Navy because it was commanded by the Asiatic batteries and it was believed that Morte Bay was mined. The following plans were made:

The CORNWALLIS was to remain in support until the troops had landed.

The LORD NELSON and the VENGEANCE were to support the attack.

The PRINCE GEORGE was to do counter battery against the ASIATIC batteries.

The AGAMEMNON covered eight destroyers and five mine sweepers. It entered Morte Bay in advance, swept and netted the Bay. Troops brought over on the CORNWALLIS transhipped outside the straits into trawlers. By 7:50 A.M. all soldiers were ashore. By 8:30 A.M. de Tott's battery which had been the target of two battleships was captured and with it the ridges above.

Slide No.

g. French Landing and Demonstration April 25th. This landing at Kum Kale was intended primarily to keep two Turkish

Divisions (3rd and 11th) occupied and distract the attention of the Asiatic batteries from the 29th Division.

The first echelon was scheduled to leave the transports at 6:30 but it was 9:00 A.M. before they shoved off. The covering ships quickly silenced the forts and the landing was made with comparatively slight losses. The French advanced rapidly but was stopped outside Yeni Shes. Meanwhile the rest of the French Division carried out a demonstration off Bashika Bay. This did not deceive von Sanders who on the night April 25/26 ferried part of the 11th Division across from Chanak to Maidos.

h Demonstration at Xeros Bay April 25th. At 4:30 A.M. the demonstrating ships began their bombardment of the Bulair lines and trawlers swept Bakla Bay. News of the landing at Gaba Tepe reached von Sanders at Gallipoli at 6:00 A.M. and shortly afterwards came news of the action at Xeros. He ordered the 7th Division to prepare itself to move immediately on further orders and sent Essad Paha to take command of the defense of Gaba Tepe and Helles: Essad on arriving at Maidos and ascertaining the situation placed Mustopha Kemal in command of the defense of the Gaba Tepe sector and himself went to Krithia and took personal charge of the defenses of the southern part of the peninsula. For this work he had only two regiments, the 25th and 26th. The net result of the

Xeros Bay demonstration was to hold up the dispatch of the 5th and 7th Divisions for 24 hours, but Hamilton gained nothing thereby because the prompt action of the 19th Division in opposing the landing of the Anzacs gave von Sanders sufficient time to move the reserves to the most threatened points.

i. April 26-30. The Turks moved two regiments to Helles. Y Beach was attacked and the troops forced to re-embark. Three French battalions landed at V Beach, connected up with S Beach and the Allied line was now continuous from X Beach to S Beach. The line was sufficiently advanced to permit landing of stores and ammunition.

The 27th and 28th were characterized by Turkish counter-attacks and by the Allied attempt to capture Krithia. Both were unsuccessful.

k. May - June - July.

May 1st Turks made an all day attack on Anzac position. Night of May 1/2 they made an attack against southern lines. This was broken up and at daylight the fleet drove the Turks back. The Turks tried it again on the night of May 3/4 with some results.

May 5-6-7- The Allies tried to capture Krithia without success, being held up by two redoubts skillfully concealed and supplied with machine guns which the fleet could not reach.

May 12th Coliath was torpedoed and lost 570 officers and men.

The attacks by the Allies and some counterattacks by the Turks continued during the remainder of May and during June and July. All these were costly without definite results and the positions both in the Helles and Anzac regions had become stabilized.

1. Joint Army and Navy Action.

The period March 18 - July 31 was characterized by the excellent cooperation between the two services, and it must be remembered in this respect that there were Naval and Army forces of British and French nationality involved. There was not the slightest friction. Prior to each operation beginning with the first landings, the plans for the joint efforts were decided upon only after a conference between the senior officers of the troops and the naval forces. Any weakness in plans or failure in execution was never chargeable to lack of mutual support.

4. Discussion of Operations.

a. Plans.

(1) The operations during the period 18 March - 31 July, 1915, embrace the first great landing and subsequent attempts to improve the positions. Many of these operations were on a large scale and supported by naval gunfire.

(2) The plan for landing with a main effort at Helles, a secondary attack at Anzac, and demonstrations at Kum Kale and Xeros is believed to have been basically sound. Alternative plans offer opportunity for speculation which are tempting but which will be passed over in this presentation.

b. Comments on the Operations and the Principles of War.

(1) The principle of surprise was violated by:

(a) warnings given by early naval attacks; newspaper notices of troops assembling in Egypt; premature rendezvous at Mudros; purchase of floating equipment in Greece.

(b) Landing at Helles in broad daylight.

(c) Failing to make the feint in Gulf of Xeros sufficiently realistic by actually landing troops (was partially successful).

(2) The principle of movement was violated by:

(a) Lack of flexibility in plan so as to exploit immediately the successful landings at soft spots

(X, Y, S beaches) instead of pressure against the toughest spot (V beach).

(b) Lack of celerity in advance of troops at X and S beaches to advance to covering positions without delay.

(c) Landing on too narrow a front at V beach. Sending men through a battle neck (River Clyde).

(d) Landing at wrong place, thereby disarranging previously prepared plan (Anzac landing).

(3) Principle of mass was violated by:

(a) Failure to place the troops in Egypt under command of Sir Ian Hamilton.

(b) Under-estimation throughout of force (men, guns, munitions) required to obtain relative superiority necessary to success.

(c) A poor replacement system.

(d) Lack of sufficient reserves in men and artillery ammunition to prepare and support general actions after the first landings.

(e) Failure to appraise the fighting quality of the Turkish soldier.

(4) The principle of cooperation was splendidly illustrated in the excellent cooperation existing at all times between the army and navy forces of both the British and French.

b. Observation.

Landing operations are not the normal operations of either the army or the navy. Landing operations against a determined, worthy foe, today, more than ever, are the most difficult known to the combined services. Success depends on surprise and celerity. If real surprise is gained the operation is generally easy. Normally the defender will know that an attack is coming but will not know where it will strike. The operation thereupon develops into a race in which the attacker attempts to accomplish decisive results before he is stopped by enemy reserves. Therefore celerity is the utter essential of the landing force. It is believed that successful landing operations demand trained troops and ability to land large waves of trained troops under cover of darkness.

JOINT OPERATIONS IN THE DARDANELLES AUGUST 1, 1915. TO WITHDRAWAL

1. By late July, 1915, Hamilton could dispose of 110,000 bayonets and 194 guns. This force was supplemented by the fire of the fleet. There were available 50 active observation planes.

Von Sanders had 120,000 men on hand, located in groups at Helles, Buldir ^{Bulair(?)} and Anzac. The bulk of this force was mobile and ready to move to any threatened point.

-Slide No. ____

2. The Plan. Hamilton planned to attack early in August as follows:

- (a) Strong containing attacks at Helles and southeastern Anzac fronts.
- (b) Demonstration against north shore of Xeros, with landing at Mitylene.
- (c) Demonstration by French fleet against coast of Anatalia.
- (d) Main effort from Anzac position striking Sari Bari from the Northwest.
- (e) Land troops at Suvla Bay, secure that place and keep the attack from the northwest.

To deceive the Turks false intelligence reports were allowed to be spread and soundings were taken off Gabe Tepe. Proposed operations were kept secret from regimental commanders and their men.

The objectives were three in number and designed to obtain the high ridges dominating the Straits and the Sea of Marmora.

The greatest stress was laid on surprise. Moonless nights were a requisite. The Navy agreed to put the soldiers ashore during hours of darkness. During the period July 31 - August 30 between 7,000 and 8,000 replacements for the Anzacs were secretly landed.

-Slide No. ___

3. (a) Helles. The attack at Helles was launched at 3:30 p.m. supported by 1 battleship, 6 destroyers, 1 bulge ship, 1 balloon ship and 5 monitors. There was bitter fighting, but the allies made no material advance. However, the attack held Turkish reinforcements from Sari Bari until August 8th.

-Slide No. ___

(b) Anzac. This attack was launched at 5:30 p.m. on the Anzac right and bitter fighting ensued. The main attack moved out in two columns at 9:00 a.m., and by 1:00 a.m. the covering and flank forces were in position. The assaulting columns were delayed by Turkish resistance and difficult terrain. A coordinated attack was launched at 9:30 a.m., August 7th, but was repulsed by the Turks and by noon the attack was over.

At 4:15 a.m., August 8th the attack was renewed after a short bombardment by the fleet and resulted in slight gains. Similar results followed the attack on August 9th, the net result being that the British had secured a foothold on the heights of Sari Bari. The Turks counterattacked on August 10th and, though suffering heavy casualties, drove the British off Sari Bari. The British casualties in this Anzac operation were about 12,000.

(c) Suvla Bay.

-Slide No. ---

On the night August 6th the IX Corps, General Stopford, which was to be landed at Suvla Bay, was located as follows:

At Imbros - 11th Division,

At Mudros - 10th Division Hq and 3 battalions,

At Mitylene - Remainder of 10th Division.

Corps mission was to land and secure Suvla Bay and assist the attack on Sari Bari.

Turks had 4 battalions and 4 batteries in Suvla Bay area to delay pending arrival of reinforcements.

The landing operations had been carefully planned and coordinated with the Navy.

-Slide No. ---

night under cover of darkness, and supporting troops some from a distance of 120 miles were arriving at dawn.

After daylight and by 8:00 a.m., the supporting division had been landed at Nibrunesi Beach and on the north shore of Suvla Bay at beaches later called A East and A West.

No general advance was made from the beach before 3:00 p.m. This can be attributed to poor leadership of brigade and higher commanders, lack of disciplined troops and so much secrecy that regimental and lower commanders had no idea of the plan. By dark the advance had reached a line about two miles east of A West, Chocolate Hill.

On August 8th there was practically no advance. Exhaustion of troops and lack of water (the water had been landed early on the 7th by the Navy, but the Army had neglected to provide means for its distribution) were the reasons given.

On the afternoon of the 8th General Hamilton visited Corps Hdqrs (on a boat in the Bay) but got so little satisfaction that he went ashore to the 11th Division Hdqrs. He ordered an immediate attack, but this went wrong and did not get off until 4:00 a.m. By that time the Turks had occupied the Anaforta Ridge. The opportunity had passed.

The next few days were characterized by fierce fighting with attacks and counterattacks, culminating in a combined attack on the Suvla and Anzac fronts on August 21st. It was repulsed with heavy losses.

Between August 6-22 the British losses were:

Suvla	22,000
Anzac	14,000
Helles	6,000

On August 17th Hamilton asked for 95,000 additional reinforcements.

The final Dardanelles British attack was made on August 27, and the next day the Turks counterattacked. No further reinforcements seemed to be forthcoming.

In October Sir Ian Hamilton was replaced by General Munro. The latter recommended a withdrawal which was ordered by Kitchener on Dec. 7th. By 9 January, 1916, the last troops had been withdrawn. The Dardanelles campaign had passed into history.

CONCLUSIONS

(a) The final blow which discouraged naval attacks was due to mine barrages. These were defended by the intermediate defenses which in turn were defended by the forts. The fleet, unassisted by land forces, was unable to break up this defensive system.

(b) That the failure of the first landing was due to:

(1) Lack of secrecy which prevented surprise.

(2) Underestimation of Turkish strength and combat efficiency.

(3) Anzac landing at wrong place.

(4) Inflexibility of plan and lack of reserve strength to exploit soft spots.

(c) That the failure of the Suvla Bay landing was due to:

(1) Lack of aggressive leadership.

(2) Orders not thoroughly understood.

(3) Use of untrained troops.

(4) Lack of water.

(d) That politically and strategically the seizure of the Gallipoli Peninsula and controlling the Dardanelles were sound, but their execution from the inception should have been left to a joint operation of the two services.

(e) That the failure of the campaign as a whole was due to:

(1) Failure of highest civil, military and naval au-

thorities to understand and exercise their proper functions.

(2) Loss of surprise occasioned by:

a. Failure to foresee need for an amphibious expedition.

b. Lack of initial joint plan.

c. Premature naval attack.

(f) That the plan of cooperation used at the Dardanelles worked excellently.

(g) That landings made by daylight suffered greater losses than did those made under cover of darkness.

SUGGESTED PROCEDURE FOR FUTURE AMERICAN JOINT OPERATIONS

(a) Have Army and Navy officers charged with joint operations prepare their plans jointly.

(b) Select the Army and Navy commanders for joint operations who have a knowledge of the capabilities and limitations of the other service and who are of the type that will cooperate.

(c) Initial landings if at all possible should be made under cover of darkness.

(d) Have a plan with sufficient elasticity to obviate disruption of project by failure to land at place selected.

(e) Provide special landing equipment.