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3578-1674  
11-19-37

# POLICY AND NAVAL WARFARE

## STAFF PRESENTATION



DECLASSIFIED IAW DOD MEMO OF 3 MAY 1972, SUBJ:  
DECLASSIFICATION OF WWII RECORDS

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE

Newport, R. I.

11 November, 1937

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Presentation delivered by  
Captain H.M. Jensen, U.S.N.  
11 November, 1937

## POLICY AND NAVAL WARFARE

### INTRODUCTION

The object of this presentation on POLICY AND NAVAL WARFARE is to show the student of naval strategy the importance of a complete and up-to-date knowledge of international policies and their connection with military and naval strategy in both peace and war. The War College has recognized the importance of this relation by the large amount of time assigned in the latter half of the year to the preparation of a Thesis on this subject.

In your studies for the preparation of this thesis on the subject of the foreign policies of the United States, the connection between policy and strategy should constantly be kept in mind, in order to have a clear picture of this relationship. The success or failure of grand national strategy as the result of coordination, or lack of coordination, of policy and military or naval strategy in peace and in war should be carefully noted.

The naval officer, through his training in the fleet, in which gunnery, tactics, and strategy are stressed, naturally comes to consider the fleet engagement as the culminating act in war. It is essential, however, that he broaden his view of war to a full understanding of the parts played in our international relations by the forces which determine our national policies and the effect of the resulting policies on the political and military objectives sought by the nation

in war. It will be evident that under certain circumstances the major effort of the nation will be directed at other naval objectives than the destruction of the enemy's fleet. These objectives may be the seizure of bases so as to deny areas to the enemy, the destruction of enemy's overseas commerce, or similar activities. Such diversion of the naval objective from the enemy fleet will occur only when geographic situations and comparative naval strength are favorable and the political objective may be obtained and retained without a complete naval victory. In a war where it is evident that political objectives can be obtained only when the enemy has been totally defeated, the political objective becomes submerged in the military, and this latter becomes the guiding factor in the campaign.

Relation of Policy and Warfare

War is a political act, the result of a clash in policies or of interests. It is a real political instrument to be used when diplomacy fails. National interests conflict. Diplomacy takes up the problem. It is settled peacefully, or a point is reached where either one or both parties feel that they can concede no more without irreparable damage to themselves and their standing as a nation. Then war comes, called into being by policies. This relationship of policy and war has been covered by many authorities. However, I will quote from one only.

Clausewitz says: "War is not merely a political act, but also a real political instrument, a continuation of policy carried out by other means". Again he says: "War is nothing but a continuation of policy with an admixture of other means".

This viewpoint of the relation of war and policy may be considered to be that of the "have-not" nations, as contrasted with the viewpoint of the "have" nations expressed in the Kellogg-Briand Pact for the renunciation of war as an instrument of policy. Although this pact was signed by a number of the "have-not" nations, the developments of the past few years have shown that their adherence to this pact has not stopped their use of war in carrying out their policies. Italy in Ethiopia, and Japan in China, show only too clearly that the "have not" nations will proceed as before.

National policies originate primarily as the result of the necessity for security of the national territory and of

the persons and property of its citizens abroad, for the promotion of the prosperity and welfare of its citizens, and for the attainment of desirable ethnic and social conditions.

National policies may be divided into two general classes, (a) foreign or external, and (b) domestic or internal. The latter are fully determined within the nation itself without diplomatic exchanges with other nations. However, these policies must not be overlooked in considering relations with other states, as certain of them may seriously affect such other nations. A self-sufficiency policy, as the result of which a nation undertakes the manufacture of articles formerly imported, may readily cause disaster to a foreign industry based on supplying this demand. Subsidizing the development of substitutes for foreign products, changing the price of gold and silver, and similar domestic acts, all seriously affect the economic conditions of foreign countries. Legislation based on race prejudice or religion will cause great resentment in the countries whose nationals appear to be discriminated against, and may lead to diplomatic protests or even to legislative retaliation. For this reason, domestic policies which may influence other nations must be carefully considered in national strategy, as they may be the determining cause of alliances with or against a state.

Foreign, or external, policies are determined by the government acting for the people. Such conflicts as develop under them are settled by diplomacy, if possible, otherwise by war. A nation must protect its vital interests. To do

this, it may have to impose its will upon another nation. It endeavors to achieve this objective by employing part or all of the means of persuasion at its command. These means include diplomacy, economic influence applied in the form of financial and commercial restrictions, and, in last resort, the use of armed forces at sea, on land, or in the air. Nations, being essentially selfish in their aims, pay little heed to the diplomatic protests of another nation, in the case of a clash of policies, unless such protests are backed by sufficient force to render the winning of the objective of the policy too costly.

The competence or efficiency of a government in relation to world affairs lies in a clear conception of its own policies affecting foreign nations, the definite establishment of the political objectives of such policies, a definite decision as to which objectives are vital and must be attained even at the cost of war, and which are subordinate and incidental, and a careful program of preparation of the means necessary to ensure the successful carrying out of the policies. Democracies are generally weak as compared with autocracies in these particulars, especially in the continuity of personnel in diplomacy and planning, and in the determination of the importance to be placed upon each policy. This lack of continuity leads to uncertainty in the preparations for the force necessary to uphold the policies and to difficulties in arranging foreign alliances and agreements which will support them. A dictatorship, on the other hand,

enables the deliberate planning of foreign policies, the careful determination of political and military objectives, definite creation and training of the forces necessary to enforce the policies, and the arrangement of either open or secret alliances or agreements which will ensure the success of the policy.

Government policies are often of more importance in connection with peace-time strategy than with war-time strategy. This is exemplified in the British acquisition of bases controlling the most important sea lanes of the world, these bases being of equal importance with its powerful navy in the security of its world-wide empire. Our building of the Panama Canal and our acquisition of Hawaii with the subsequent development of Pearl Harbor as a naval base were important steps in peace-time strategy.

Grand strategy is concerned with the planning of the war so that the cooperation of all the forces which make up the strength of the nation is secured and that every element of national strength is directed towards securing the objective of the national policies. In war we must maintain a proper balance between the fighting forces and those other services which furnish the means for fighting. Plans must be made so that the maximum of munitions and of ships will be available when needed, while the nation still maintains a proper standard of living and the trade necessary to maintain this standard. It is only by knowledge of the probable enemy in war, and of the armed resistance that may be met,



that proper plans can be made to ensure full cooperation and balance. Among the instruments of policy which may be used both in peace and in war are the following: Economic pressure such as tariffs, boycotts and embargoes; financial pressure through subsidies and bounties, devalued currency, foreign loans, and particularly loans or subsidies to a state in return for political and military advantage; political pressure through alliances, recognition or non-recognition of new states, and diplomatic protest and international conferences; and, finally, the acquisition and development of naval operating bases and defenses in important areas, and the peaceful display of strength of the army, navy, and air forces, culminating, if necessary, in their actual use in war.

The grand strategy of a nation, both in peace and in war, is determined by the political objectives of its policies. This political objective, in turn, determines the military strategy of the nation. It is because of this close relationship between policy and military strategy that the military and naval leaders of a nation must be fully conversant with the policies stressed by the diplomatic branch of the government and with the extent to which the policies will be enforced. With this knowledge of the diplomatic situation, the high command must determine the military objective of a possible war, the grand military and naval strategy to attain this objective, and the military and naval forces necessary for reasonable certainty of success.

Having determined the military needs for the carrying out of policies of the nation, the high command should strive to make provision for the necessary military forces or, if this is not possible because of the political situation, to advise the modification or abandonment of the policies.

I have pointed out the direct connection between policy and grand military strategy. In the strategy of the various minor campaigns or operations of a war there are comparatively few occasions in which policy is involved, the military objective having been determined in the grand strategy of the war and the task commander being primarily concerned with the accomplishment of the task assigned.

The above may be summed up in the statement that the high command must be guided by circumstances and events, but the unit commander should always fight in nearly the same way, according to the material and tactical developments of the time.

However, there are many occasions outside of war when a knowledge of a nation's policies are essential to the more junior officers. Officers of the Army and Navy are frequently employed in the realm of diplomacy. They are consulted in the formulation of policy and the choice of methods. They are employed in embassies and legations as attaches. At times they are assigned special diplomatic tasks and as delegates or technical advisers at important international conferences. It is important, therefore, that every officer, regardless of rank, maintain a full and up-to-date knowledge

of the policies of the nation, in order to be ready for any task or situation that may occur.

#### Policy and Preparation for War

While it is the duty of the military and naval forces to be at all times prepared for war, such preparedness cannot reach its maximum effectiveness unless it is based upon a full knowledge of the most probable enemy, his strength and weakness, possible allies for either or both sides, and the probable political objectives of each in peace and war. The high command of both military and naval forces, as well as the government, must have prepared a complete analysis not only of their own nation but also of all other nations which may be possible enemies or which may be drawn into war on either side. This analysis should consist of a complete study of each nation, its people, its geographic, economic, and political status, its military characteristics and effectiveness, the forces operating to develop the national policies, the conflicts between the several nations' policies, and the political objectives which each nation seeks in peace and in war.

Where conflicts indicate that the aims of the nation's policy cannot be secured without recourse to force, the political head of the nation must decide whether or not the objective is sufficiently vital to involve the nation in war. If the decision is affirmative, it becomes the duty of the high command of the armed forces to advise the political head

concerning the necessary increases of the armed forces to insure the successful accomplishment of the military objectives. It then becomes the task of the political head to see that the necessary means are provided.

History shows that in practically every war, that nation has been successful whose rulers have recognized that a policy is useless unless the means for carrying it out are provided. An example is the policy of Russia for the control of the Northwestern Pacific, with little or no preparation to enforce it, being overcome by Japan whose policy for the control of that area was assured by years of systematic preparation of the means for its accomplishment. In 1904, the Czar, in a message to Admiral Alexeiff, then in supreme command in the Far East, said: "This struggle must definitely assure our preponderance on the coast of the Pacific. To attain this end it is indispensable to conquer Japan completely, to force her to submit definitely, and to deprive her of the desire for embarking on dangerous military enterprises for several years to come. If we do not do this we shall lose all our prestige in the East. The present war is summed up in the question - Who will have the supremacy on the Asiatic Coasts of the Pacific, Russia or Japan?"

This clearly defined policy and objective failed for two reasons -- Russia had not prepared to enforce it and Japan had been preparing every day for ten years to defeat it.

Great successes are found most frequently where the statesman and the military leader are one and the same person, or,

failing that, where the statesman and the military commander are, during peace, in constant intercourse with each other, so that policy and preparation for war go hand-in-hand.

Great Britain has recognized the importance to the success of its foreign policies of collaboration and mutual understanding between military and civil officials of the government, by the organization of the College of Imperial Defense. A Committee of Imperial Defense was formed by Balfour in 1904-05 and has continued ever since. During the World War this committee functioned very imperfectly, as few of its members had any conception of their duties. The British Government wisely concluded that civil and military officials who might be called upon to serve on this committee would require preliminary training, for which purpose the College of Imperial Defense was organized.

The College includes among its students future leaders in (a) statecraft; (b) industry and economics; (c) Navy; (d) Army; (e) Air; and suitable representatives from the Dominions and India. Its curriculum covers all the present and foreseeable future problems of the Empire. While having no direct connection with the Committee of Imperial Defense, the graduates of the College, if successful in later life, naturally gravitate to positions on the Committee. Great stress is laid on the economic features of the course, not only as to the direct connection between industry and warfare, but also as to the material costs of war in comparison to the material gains if successful.

When a statesman perceives that the international question he is about to raise may possibly lead to the use of force, he

will, if he be prudent, avoid pressing the issue until he is assured that for the war that may result there is, as far as can be foreseen, a certainty of success. He must assume that the other side, fighting for an objective which it considers of vital importance, will exert itself to the utmost of its resources. If comparison shows a proper preponderance of strength to allow for all contingencies, the statesman may press the question; if not, he must avoid it until prepared, or drop it if its cost is likely to be out of proportion to the gain.

One great sovereign principle of strategy is - to secure at the outset every possible advantage of time, place, armament, numbers and morale. In modern war, due to the increased rapidity of action, frequently more depends upon what has been accomplished before the commencement of hostilities than what is done after the first shot is fired, and this preparation rests largely with the statesmen, and not with the military leaders who are limited in their preparations by what is provided by the political element. This is particularly true in the case of the Navy due to the length of time necessary to build major units of the fleet, to provide bases with the necessary drydocks and repair facilities, and to train the high technical operating personnel in their duties.

Every nation has its military and naval frontiers, or lines, which define roughly the limits of the areas over which it can exercise dominating control by means of force. These frontiers will vary with the expansion and contraction of its own military and naval forces and of those of possible opponents of its

policies, and will definitely shrink in cases of coalitions of powers against it. Each nation's diplomacy, likewise, has its frontiers marking the extent of the areas covered by the objectives of the nation's policies. It is probable that a nation can safely proceed with its policies without serious threat of disaster as long as its diplomatic frontier is kept within its military and naval frontiers. However, when the objectives of policy lie outside of these frontiers, a challenge is probable if any other nation is seriously affected and is prepared to resist that policy by armed force.

The United States may be said to have a naval frontier extending down the middle of the Atlantic Ocean to the northeastern coast of Brazil and from the Bering Sea south to a point roughly 2,000 miles west of Honolulu, then swinging eastward to a point near the southern boundary of Peru. At the present time, Great Britain is the only possible challenger to the Eastern and South American boundaries, while Japan challenges that in the Western Pacific. Our diplomatic frontier in the Monroe Doctrine is projected to cover all of South America. Fortunately, the only nation prepared to challenge this policy in any part of South America is Great Britain, already provided with surplus colonial territory and raw materials, and in sympathy with the United States aims in this area. The situation here could be quickly changed if a combination of European nations, with Japan as a possible ally, were to challenge our policy. Such a coalition would force back our naval frontier to the vicinity of the Caribbean and the Panama Canal, and could successfully challenge

the Monroe Doctrine in South America.

In our Far Eastern policies of The Open Door and the Integrity of China we have thrust our diplomatic frontier well beyond our naval frontier, with the result that this policy is definitely challenged by Japan, leaving the United States with little else to do but make futile protests, unless our naval frontier should be extended by alliance or association with other powers who could provide the necessary base and operating facilities for projecting our naval operations into that area. Preparation for the enforcement of this policy by provision of well defended bases in Guam and the Philippines would have placed the United States in a position where her policies in this area could have a reasonable possibility of enforcement without too great a sacrifice.

In our policy of non-interference in European affairs we have drawn a diplomatic frontier in the Atlantic midway between the United States and Europe.

Policy and its effect on the nature of Naval Warfare.

War being a political act, the political objective established by national policy must govern the military and naval objectives of the war. The attainment of the political objective may require the complete conquest of the enemy, or it may be attained when the enemy, although not completely conquered, is compelled to sue for peace on terms satisfactory to the opposing government. The objective may be either to induce other powers to join as allies or, in other ways, to cause the enemy to



abandon the purpose for which he went to war. The nature of the objective influences variously the amount of force required to accomplish it and the method of employing that force. It is important, therefore, that the political objective be determined correctly and at as early a date as possible.

Where political objectives are directed at the sovereign rights of another nation, it may be expected that the war will take on an unlimited nature. A war whose objective is territorial conquest of a nation, or which seeks to impose upon another people a new social or political order or religious restriction, will always be met by all the man-power and by every resource that such a people are capable of mobilizing. A nation undertaking a war with such an objective must be prepared to meet the strongest resistance. If the nation attacked is not prepared to offer strong resistance at the moment, it may be expected that, even though defeated, its people, if numerically large enough, will later strive to regain the lost rights, either by their own efforts or by some alliance with other powers.

The Civil War is an example of the great difference in the nature of the warfare conducted by each opponent as the result of different political objectives. The political objective of the Northern States was the retention of the Southern States in the Union, an objective which should have been recognized as one probably necessitating an unlimited war. The political objective of the Southern States was independence - an objective which always produces the strongest support from a people united in purpose. The military objectives of both were determined by the

political. The North could obtain its objective only by defeating the Southern armies and by occupying a great part of the Southern territory. The South, much weaker in men and resources, could not hope for complete defeat of the North, but hoped to obtain its political objectives by prolonged resistance, hoping thus either to force the North to abandon its purpose, or to bring about foreign intervention in favor of the South. England, which found the South a good customer and the North a commercial rival, had much to gain by Southern success, and was a possible ally. Such offensives as were undertaken were for the purpose of obtaining sufficient military advantages to induce the North to make peace, and were not aimed at a complete conquest of Northern territory.

The naval forces of the North, in supporting the military objective, took as their objective the cutting of the lines of foreign military supplies to the South, while such naval forces as the South could organize sought primarily the destruction of Northern commerce, with some attempts at the destruction of Northern naval forces in order to raise the blockade.

In the Crimean War of 1854-55, the British political objective was to stop Russian aggression against Turkey, and to prevent the development of Russian naval power in the Black Sea. The military and naval objectives resulting from this political objective were, naturally, the destruction of Russian military and naval power in the Black Sea area, without any attempt at the general destruction of her forces in other areas. British sea power made possible the successful attack by the Franco-

British Expeditionary Force, a force much inferior to the military forces of Russia which were unable to participate effectively because of the long and difficult line of communications.

In a nation where there is active coordination between the diplomatic and the war-making departments of the government, there should be a proper determination of the probable nature of the warfare which will result in the case of a clash of policies. The relative strength of armies and navies of the countries involved may be studied and the proper relative strength necessary to ensure success determined and provided. The political objectives of the two nations should indicate the probable area of operations and whether the war will be offensive or defensive, limited or unlimited. Great Britain may be mentioned as an example of a nation whose policies have been coordinated with her military plans, so that the nature of the naval warfare in any probable conflict is known in advance. Her policies of naval supremacy for the defense of the Empire, of a leading position in world transportation and markets, and of opposition to the domination of Europe by any other power, have led to the development of a powerful fleet for their enforcement, which, together with its numerous bases well placed for any emergency, ensures Great Britain that it will not be reduced to a defensive role in naval war, that it can operate its fleet in any area most effective for obtaining its political objective, and that every nation will hesitate to challenge any vital policy in any part of the world. The recent challenge of Italy in the Mediterranean is being countered by intensive preparation.

The United States Fleet, created as a consequence of the War with Spain, of the obligations assumed with the acquisition of outlying possessions, and of a realization that the country had other responsibilities and interests other than those within its borders, was not developed by deliberate planning to meet the requirements of our foreign policies. As a result, we find ourselves in the embarrassing position of inability to definitely support all of the government's policies, and with the necessity of assuming the defensive in important areas for at least a very considerable period of preparation. In the World War, the unbalance of types necessitated an active building program to make it effective in the war area. A war in the Pacific will show a similar lack of preparation and balance in our shortage of naval bases in areas where most needed and of auxiliary vessels for the logistic support of the fleet.

The true measure of the violence of a war, of the energy which a nation will devote to it, is to be found in the degree to which the population is stirred by the cause of the conflict. Where the deep feelings of a whole nation are excited by a dispute with another nation, the nation so stirred will throw its whole energies, its whole resources, the lives and goods of its citizens into the conflict, and will employ the best intelligence in the direction of the operations, so that plans commensurate with the greatness of the issue at stake will be devised and put into execution. In a civil war, the issues usually are better understood by the personnel on both sides than in international wars, with resulting bitterness and violence in the struggle.

The general trend of a nation's policies largely determine the nature of the warfare it will probably conduct. A vigorous expanding nation with need for greater space for its population, for markets and for resources, and for the raw materials of industry will have policies of an imperialistic trend, with its people schooled by necessity for aggression and ready for sacrifices to ensure to posterity a place in the sun. Such a nation prepares for war to ensure success of its objectives, it initiates war when the time is opportune, and maintains the offensive until its goal is reached. In contrast to this, a nation fully satisfied with the status quo, with large land areas, and ample resources for its people, and no incentive to drive its people to aggression, naturally drifts to policies for the retention of its present status, it arms itself only for defense and its people display little or no interest in military and naval matters. As a result, its objectives in war will be defensive, and the general nature of its war operations will be limited accordingly.

Policy and the Probability of War

The question of whether or not a nation is able to avoid war by policy is one which is at present engaging the attention of the peoples of many nations, particularly of those nations fully satisfied with the political status quo and of those not possessing the means of making a proper defense against aggression. To answer this question we must first look into the more probable causes of war.

Jomini, in his book on the ART OF WAR, says: "A government goes to war: To reclaim certain rights or to defend them; to protect and maintain the great interests of the state, as commerce, manufacture, or agriculture; to uphold neighboring states whose existence is necessary, either to the safety of the government or the balance of power; to fulfill the obligations of offensive and defensive alliances; to propagate political or religious theories, to crush them out or to defend them; to increase the influence and power of the state by acquisition of territory; to defend the threatened independence of the state; to avenge insulted honor; or from a mania for conquest". In this very complete outline Jomini has named practically all of the points in a nation's policies and in the policies of other nations that must be considered by the high command in order to anticipate and guard against the eventuality of war.

It will be noted that many of the causes of war listed by Jomini are such that a weak nation cannot avoid a clash unless it is to surrender completely its sovereign rights. Where a nation is rich in resources essential to the economic well-being of another, or holds a geographic position that is vital to the safety of another or to that nation's control of vital sea areas or lanes, no policy can prevent a clash if such other nation is imperialistic in its policy and is ready for the consequences as to cost necessary to attain its ends.

In a recent interview, Mr. Birchall, Hague correspondent of THE NEW YORK TIMES, speaking of the danger of another war in Europe, said: "Danger is a relative term. There has been danger of war in Europe throughout the past four years, but, as I have said in my dispatches to THE NEW YORK TIMES, barring some unforeseen incident (and please note the qualification, because it is important), I don't believe we are likely to have a war in the immediate future. The reason is that the only nations which might expect to benefit from such a war are not prepared militarily or economically to undertake it. Moreover, other nations which fear war are getting ready in earnest to defend themselves. That has changed the whole picture and lessened the danger."

The only safeguard, then, to the nation desiring peace is the development of armed forces sufficient to render attack too expensive to any probable enemy, or, if too weak

to do this unaided, to make alliances with other nations whose aims are similar.

In considering the probability of war, it is necessary, therefore, for the high command to study carefully the readiness of each nation for military action and the characteristics of its population, as well as the conflicts of its policies with those of his own nation, in order to arrive at a conclusion which is correct. Even after such a study, special incidents may arise which will cause the precipitation of a war not otherwise considered probable.

The initiation of warfare will usually result from an act of the aggressor nation. Such a nation fully prepared and ready for any eventuality, and with much to gain by warfare will seize upon minor incidents, or, if necessary to gain its ends, will create such incidents to inflame its population to a war fever. The declaration of war will come simultaneously with an armed force attack, to gain the advantage of surprise.



Policy during War

War policy is a temporary thing pertaining to each war and has to do with such matters as the formation of alliances, pacifying neutrals, etc. Such policies may have a marked effect upon the actual war operations.

During the World War, policy in regard to neutrals was frequently a deciding factor. Germany, in its submarine warfare, was constantly faced with question of its policy towards neutrals, and its failure to fully understand and meet their demands was one of the major causes of her final defeat. In the earlier stages of the war, Germany, by her policies, had drawn Bulgaria and Turkey to her colors, while President Wilson, in his invitation to neutrals to join the United States in a declaration of war against Germany, brought a large following to the allied side. Wilson's announcement of the Fourteen Points was an act of war policy which had a marked effect upon the later war activities and upon the peace negotiations.

It is of the utmost importance that the commander of detached units of the armed forces be at all times fully informed as to the war policy of the government, particularly as to possible allies, or probable future enemies. Admiral Dewey, after the Battle of Manila Bay, was left in an embarrassing position with regard to his relation with the Philippine Insurgents. No instructions had been received

from Washington as to whether or not the United States would support them in securing their freedom from Spain, or whether we would take the Philippines as a United States possession. The decision that the United States would take possession changed the insurgents from prospective allies to enemies, with the necessity for a protracted campaign for their subjection.

Uncertainty of a government as to its war policy or of the war policy of the enemy may permit the enemy to gain great advantage. For example, the escape of the GOEBEN and BRESLAU into the Dardanelles could have been prevented if the British command in the Mediterranean had been fully informed as to the attitude of Italy and also of Turkey and its place in the German war policy. The failure to block the movement of these ships had lasting consequences in the later stages of the war, particularly the part played in ensuring Turkey's adherence to the German cause.

Much can be done by policy in war to maintain friendly relations with neutrals and even to obtain allies. Shrewd diplomacy may convince the neutral of advantages to be gained by adherence to one nation at war as compared to the other, such advantages being in forms such as favorable trade agreements, loans, or territorial concessions. It was through such diplomacy that Italy was persuaded to break her alliance with the Central Powers, and to finally enter the war on the side of the Allies.

Policy and the Naval Objective in War

It is improbable that the nations engaging in war will be so balanced in military or naval forces that both will seek the armed forces of the enemy as their primary objective. Usually one nation or the other will be appreciably stronger in total armed force strength. This stronger nation will be prepared to seek the complete defeat of the armed forces of the enemy and will make this the military objective, if it is necessary, in order to obtain and maintain its political aim. The weaker nation, on the other hand, must restrict the objectives of its armed forces to strategic areas or against minor forces of the enemy where it has a reasonable chance of success. For much weaker nations, the main forces of the enemy will become the objective only when they are so strategically placed that detachments may be attacked, when the fortunes of war have weakened them to such an extent that there is a reasonable chance for their defeat, or when the war has progressed to a point where the political objective can be attained only by the long chance of a victory by the inferior force.

The weaker nation must normally seek to gain its political objective by an attack on smaller units of the armed forces or on strategic points whose capture will render such weaker forces capable of prolonged resistance, or it may simply rely on a defensive campaign, when geographic or other

strategic conditions are favorable, with the hope that it may make the cost of victory too great, and thus force the enemy to abandon his objective.

Japan, in its war with Russia, may be taken as an example of the weaker nation in conflict with a stronger one. The political objective of both nations was the domination of the Pacific Coast of Asia. Russia, far stronger in potential strength, took as its military and naval objective the complete defeat of the Japanese army and navy, in order to remove the threat of Japan for many years to come. Japan, knowing the impossibility of a complete victory over all Russian armed forces, took for its task the elimination of Russian military and naval strength in the Far East. Owing to the lack of foresight and preparation of Russia, the Japanese were able to gain their objective with comparative ease, the naval forces of Russia being defeated in detachments, and its army in Manchuria by the superior force which could be concentrated against this isolated unit of the Russian forces. While Russia with its superior resources and man-power could possibly have continued the war to a successful conclusion, the cost, after her severe reverses, appeared too great when the strategic strength of the Japanese position was considered.

In the World War, Germany, with a fleet greatly inferior in numbers to that of the Allies, was forced to take as her naval objectives, first, the destruction of and interference with allied overseas shipping, and second, the maintenance of a fleet-in-being as a constant threat to allied interests. A victory over the main fleet of the allied naval forces could not be hoped for, but local successes and submarine activities against shipping could cause such diversion of effort, loss of wealth and means for maintaining industry, that the allies might be forced to abandon their objectives. As the political objective of the allies was the complete destruction of German military power, the objective of the Allied Fleet naturally became the enemy's main fleet. The allied naval forces, in contrast to the German, were sufficiently strong to seek a major engagement and, even though the fortunes of battle were such as to cause a much greater loss than that inflicted on the enemy, were capable of retaining definite surface control of the sea. A major fleet engagement, therefore, was their naval objective throughout the war.

American Policies and Naval Warfare

The American nation, organized as a democracy and having no long term personnel in charge of national planning, has, generally, failed to coordinate its policies with preparation for their successful accomplishment. Throughout the life of the nation there has been no neighboring power that has constituted a military threat apparent to the mass of the people. Primary national policies, while fairly consistently adhered to by succeeding administrations, have not, as a rule, been so clearly enunciated as to interest the mass of the people, whose attention and effort was primarily directed at the economic development of their country. Until recent years, it has only been in cases of threat to economic interests that the people generally could be brought to interest themselves in foreign policies.

Washington, with his wide experience and clear understanding of national affairs, the result of his experience as both soldier and statesman, naturally recognized that the defense of the nation and of its vital interests is one of the primary functions of government. In regard to the necessity for a nation to be constantly on its guard, he said: "It is a maxim, founded on the universal experience of mankind, that no nation is to be trusted further than it

is bound by its own interest; and no prudent statesman or politician will venture to depart from it."

During Washington's administration the foundation stones of our foreign policy were laid, and in our foreign relations since his time we find little variation from the principles then laid down. The doctrines then established were:

(a) impregnable independence and equal sovereignty with any and all other nations; (b) neutrality - forbidding us to meddle in Europe; (c) Americanism - forbidding Europe to meddle or interfere with our affairs; (d) freedom of the seas and the application to naval warfare of a measure of international law which prevailed in war on land; and (e) arbitration of international disputes. To these must be added the basic policy of every nation; that is - Prosperity and well-being of the people. Since Washington's time, these principles have been consistently adhered to, with the possible exception of our entrance into the World War, which ended a period of isolation from European affairs for well over one hundred years. This isolation was again restored with the refusal to join the League of Nations.

Our primary policy - the maintenance of an impregnable national defense - notwithstanding the emphasis placed upon it by Washington, has probably been the policy most consistently disregarded by the government. The greater mass of the people, with neither the time nor the inclination

to study the requirements of military science, look upon our final success in each war as proof of our invincibility and confuse military resources with military strength. As a result of this failure to prepare adequately our armed forces, our nation during its infancy received little respect from the European Powers. Neither England nor France regarded the United States as having any rights which they were bound to respect, and American commerce was bombarded by French decrees and British orders in council. There was not much more reason why we should have fought England than France in the defense of our rights at sea, but England, with her naval supremacy, was able to interfere more effectively with our commerce on the sea, this interference being accompanied by the impressment of American sailors into the British service. As a result, we declared war against her.

Although lacking an adequate defensive armed force, the Navy gained successes in a number of single-ship victories, and also succeeded in its objectives on Lake Erie and Lake Champlain, so that finally a satisfactory peace was arranged, despite our utter failures in land campaigns and the absolute sweeping of our commerce from the sea.

Prior to the war, the Army had been organized on the basis of 36,700 total, but this organization was on paper only, there being but 6,744 men actually with the standing



army. The army was based on quotas of volunteers to be raised by the various states who failed to raise their quotas, and in some cases actually refused to do so. The navy, fortunately, was established as a federal organization, and, in so far as its numbers permitted, was disciplined and skillful, and officered by men of professional experience and training.

Fortunately for us, there has been no other serious challenge to our defense policy, and it is particularly fortunate that no such challenge was made during our early years as a nation when we lacked both the resources and the planned preparation and unity for defense.

The United States policy of Freedom of the Seas has been challenged on a number of occasions, but most of these disputes have been settled by diplomacy. In the case of the Barbary Coast pirates, naval operations were undertaken, with the objective of inflicting sufficient punishment to force them to cease their attacks on our commerce. This limited naval warfare was successful, although our naval forces were extremely few in number and lacked preparation.

The War of 1812, as previously mentioned, was largely the result of violation of this principle. In the World War, we again find this policy a primary cause of disputes with both Great Britain and Germany, with the United States

finally associating itself on the side of the Allies. The status of the war at the time of the entrance of the United States was such that the military objectives could in no way be determined by United States policies. An unlimited war was being conducted against the Central Powers, leaving the United States no choice but to assist in the complete defeat of the enemy military and naval forces. In the negotiations for the Peace Treaty, President Wilson attempted to gain and permanently assure the United States objectives.

The Monroe Doctrine has never been challenged by a foreign state to such a degree as to involve a war with this country. The most serious strain to which it was ever subjected was the attempt of Louis Napoleon, during the American Civil War, to establish the empire of Maximilian in Mexico under French auspices. England and Spain were persuaded by him in 1861 to go in, for the avowed purpose of collecting claims of their subjects against the government of Mexico. These two soon withdrew their forces, suspecting Napoleon of ulterior designs. Napoleon's venture, which was deliberately calculated on the success of the Southern Confederacy, was protested by the United States, the protests becoming more vigorous as the war drew to a successful conclusion. These protests culminated in an ultimatum to the French Emperor, with the result that withdrawal was decided upon. Two reasons

appear to have had a deciding effect in this case: first, the powerful army and navy that had been developed by the United States during the Civil War, relatively more powerful than our armed forces have been at any other time, which was now available for use against any foreign nation; and, second, the situation in Europe where Napoleon was informed of Bismark's determination to force a war with Austria over the Schleswig-Holstein controversy.

It is seldom that an American thinks of the Monroe Doctrine in relation to the balance of power in Europe. It is, however, of vital importance to us that this balance of power be maintained and particularly that the "have not" nations do not attain a complete ascendancy. If such an event should occur, these nations with their imperialistic policies, with their people indoctrinated in the thought that might makes right, would not hesitate to challenge our policy and could successfully enforce their challenge, particularly in the more distant parts of the South American continent.

A second challenge to this policy occurred in the Venezuelan Boundary disputes, in 1895. In this case, President Cleveland's bold and unqualified defiance of England was effective, even though the United States was inadequately prepared to attain its objective by naval force. Here again European events intervened in favor of

the United States, England being diverted from the American dispute by the German Kaiser's telegram of congratulations to Paul Kruger. England wished to be free to deal with questions affecting its much greater interests in South Africa.

Again in 1902, Germany made a carefully planned and determined effort to test out the Monroe Doctrine and see whether we would fight for it. A naval demonstration was made against Venezuela by Germany, England, and Italy. Through the mediation of the American Minister, Venezuela agreed to recognize in principle the claims of the foreign powers and to arbitrate the amount. England and Italy accepted this offer and withdrew their squadrons. Germany, however, remained for a time obdurate. The entire American fleet, under Admiral Dewey, assembled at this time in Puerto Rican waters, ready to move at a moment's notice.

The exact version of the Roosevelt-Holleben interview is not available, but it is amply established that Germany withdrew from Venezuela under pressure. On this occasion, again, the status of affairs in Europe was probably a determining factor, as the German fleet was at least the equal of ours, but Germany, with English support withdrawn, and probably friendly to the United States, did not dare to attack.

Our policies in relation to the situation in the Far East probably have caused more concern to the Department of

State than those in any other part of the world. In this area we have departed from our general policy of isolation, beginning with Perry's expedition to Japan in 1852. The remarkable military and political development of Japan, with its imperialistic policies looking towards domination of Eastern Asia and the Western Pacific has created a situation which is full of dangers to the Western Powers unless they withdraw from the area, or make adequate military and naval preparations to support their objectives.

The United States in its policies of the "Open Door" and the "Integrity of China" is directly in conflict with the policies of Japan. In the Philippine situation we also find many dangers of a clash due to rapid economic penetration of Japan throughout the islands and to uncertainty as to the attitude **this** country may take as to a moral obligation to protect the political independence of the islands, even after the United States has withdrawn from them.

While no armed conflict over our policies in the Far East has occurred or is probable in the near future, we are again faced with a situation in which there has been lack of coordination between the political objective and preparations of the armed forces. While the dangers of the situation have been recognized, and to a certain degree have been provided for by the building of a large navy, we have been embarrassed in the practical enforcement of our policies

by lack of provision for the operation of this fleet in the Western Pacific area. As a result, Japan holds the naval domination of the Western Pacific and can proceed with her policies with little fear of interruption, unless a combination of Western Powers should oppose her.

The foregoing is a brief review of the more important conflicts evoked by American foreign policy. Many other policies of the United States have in them the elements of controversy, but probably not of sufficient seriousness by themselves to involve the danger of war. Any preparation of the armed forces to meet the needs of the more probable causes of war will be sufficient preparation for the other lesser clashes of policy.

In summarizing, we may say that American policies and political objectives have, with a few exceptions, lacked sufficient backing by armed force to ensure their successful attainment.

In the wars with foreign nations in which the United States has been involved, the freedom of the seas has been the primary political objective. The naval objectives of the wars have only to a limited extent been governed by the political, due to the unusual geographic situation of the country and to our lack of naval preparation; also to the special political and military situations that have existed

in other parts of the world at the time.

Although at times the United States has been imperialistic in its policies towards the adjacent land areas in North America, at the present time our policies may be said to be non-aggressive, and our political objectives, with the exception of those in the Far East, are such that they will not require offensive strategy to secure them. It is probable that the nature of any future war in which this nation may be involved, unless the war is a general one into which we are drawn by force of circumstances, will be determined by the political objectives of our policies.