

AcS 1916

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GALLIPOLI

STAFF PRESENTATION

Naval War College
Newport, R.I.
6-7 December 1937

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I. Geographical Description.

The Dardanelles, the Sea of Marmora, and the Bosphorus, lie here, separating Asia Minor from the Balkan Peninsula and connecting the Black Sea with the Aegean and the Mediterranean.

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The Sea of Marmora stretches about 130 miles from the town of Gallipoli to Constantinople. Its width north and south is close to 50 miles.

The Dardanelles extends for 40 miles from the town of Gallipoli to the entrance and separates the Gallipoli peninsula from Asia Minor. At its narrowest point it is about 1 mile wide.

The Gallipoli Peninsula at its widest point is about 13 miles across. It is roughly triangular in shape with a narrow neck, At Bulair, connecting it to the mainland of Thrace.

Communications from Constantinople with Gallipoli is by water, and also via the Oriental railway, and this dirt road 100 miles long.

The Gallipoli Peninsula itself is mainly a hilly country, unfertile, deeply cleft and torn with sharp valleys, steep hills and stony cliffs. The flora of the country is very poor and limited - short coarse grass, low oak and thorn bushes, crippled fir trees which here and there form small woods; single trees clinging to the stony heights and, in the valleys,

scattered cypress and groups of olive trees.

The climate in May is ideal for campaigning, but later it varies from tropical heat in July and August to such intense cold in the autumn that in one instance 16,000 cases of frostbite and exposure had to be evacuated in one day.

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(c) World War Situation.

The situation at the end of 1914 was as follows:

Deadlock in the West.

Russia in front of Warsaw and along the Carpathians, and Caucasus.

Serbia and Montenegro had driven the Austrians from Serbia and were guarding that border.

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Turkey's Army under German officers, had garrisons in the Dardanelles; in Sinai Peninsula threatening the Suez Canal; at Bagdad to operate against ports of the Persian Gulf; a force opposed to the Russians in the Caucasus; and a strategic reserve near Constantinople. Turkey had approximately 400,000 troops available, and she was capable of raising and maintaining a total force of approximately 500,000 men.

The Allies controlled the outer seas and the Mediterranean. The Turkish navy reinforced by the Goeben and Breslau was in the Black Sea under command of Admiral Souchon (German).

III. Decision to Attack.

On August 10, 1914, the German cruisers Goeben and Breslau

eluded the British Mediterranean fleet, steamed into the Dardanelles, and shortly afterwards were welcomed into the Turkish Navy.

Great Britain, on October 31, 1914, declared war on Turkey, and on November 3, under instructions from the Admiralty, two battle cruisers bombarded the forts at the entrance to the Straits.

In January, 1915, Grand Duke Nicholas, through appropriate channels, requested Lord Kitchener, the British War Minister, to demonstrate against Turkey in order to relieve the pressure on the Russian Army in the Caucasus.

Gratitude for Russia's loyal, premature, and costly attacks on the Germans, when France was reeling under German blows, and the necessity of maintaining Russia's western front, dictated Kitchener's affirmative answer.

Kitchener, informed Churchill, First Lord of the Admiralty, of this commitment, and further stated that, as the British Army could not spare any men, the British Navy would have to make the demonstration.

Churchill, brilliant, restless and pertinacious, and with small knowledge of military and naval affairs, had long advocated an attack on Constantinople as the best defense of Egypt and the Suez Canal, and because of the prospects of opening up a route to Russia by which Russian grain could be exchanged for Allied munitions, and success here would cause the Balkans and Greece to throw in their lot with the Allies.

British naval and army opinion both condemned an unsupported

naval attack on forts or guns mounted ashore, and had prevented Churchill's first proposed attack on the Dardanelles. But Russia's extremity gave the sanguine Churchill a new opportunity; and on January 3, he cabled to Admiral Carden,

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commanding in the Eastern Mediterranean, inquiring whether the Dardanelles could be forced by ships alone even at serious loss. Carden replied that the Straits could not be rushed but might be forced by extended operations. Churchill then proceeded to convince other members of the War Council as to the practicability of the plan, and also secured the cooperation and approval of the French Government. "Churchill overcame all opposition to the Dardanelles expedition except that offered by the Turks".

A French squadron was ordered to join Admiral Carden's flag.

The opinion of all experts at this time undoubtedly was to the effect that a combined operation was preferable, but the decision for the Navy to go it alone was because troops were not available.

Sometime prior to the bombardment of February 19, the idea of a purely naval operation was gradually dropped, and at an informal meeting of some of the Ministers, on February 16, the following decisions were arrived at:

1. The 29th Division to remove at earliest date. (It had been destined for France). Hoped to sail in 9 or 10 days.
2. Arrangements to be made for the despatch of a force from Egypt if necessary.

3. The above forces and the Royal Marines all ready despatched to be available to support the naval attack on the Dardanelles if necessary.

On this same date, 16 February, Churchill informed Rear Admiral Wester-Wemyss

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of the decision to attack the Dardanelles, and sent him, without information, instructions, or means, to establish a naval supporting base on the Greek Island of Lemnos, an arid almost uninhabited island, 2,850 miles from England.

In the same nonchalant manner, Kitchener despatched Sir Ian Hamilton on March 12th to capture Constantinople, also denying him information, airplanes, or a suitable staff.

There was no unity of command in the Dardanelles, but cooperation. Hamilton responsible to Kitchener, the War Minister; and Carden responsible to Churchill, the First Lord of the Admiralty.

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IV. Naval Action.

(a) Plans.

The Turkish General Staff officially describes the defenses existing at the declaration of war as follows:

Forts at Entrance: Sedd el Bahr (main fort) and Helles (support) on European side; Kum Kale (main fort) and Orkanie (support) on Asiatic side, contained 24 guns, four of which had

a range of 14,800 meters, the remainder a range of 7,500 meters.

At the Narrows: There were a total of 78 guns; five (about 14-inch) had a range of 16,900 meters, three (about 13-inch) had a range of 14,800 meters, and the remainder were medium or short-range guns.

Between the Narrows and the Entrance: A total of 7 guns, 3" to 6".

As a result of the bombardment of November 3d, the Turks had strengthened the defenses as follows:

- (1) Added 9 minefields.
- (2) Added 8 searchlights.
- (3) Added 1 torpedo tube.
- (4) Installed 8-6" howitzers.
- (5) Installed rapid fire batteries to protect mine fields.
- (6) Installed dummy batteries.
- (7) Provided additional emplacements for mortars.
- (8) Installed a fire control system.
- (9) Provided 6 battalions of infantry to patrol the coast from Xeros to Bashika Bay.

The garrison of the forts had among them 5 German officers and 160 men. The guns were mostly old models in obsolete earth-works. The forts at Tchanake Kale, for example, had only 12 shells for each heavy gun.

The collection of mines was most amusing. Among them were Russian mines recovered from in front of Trapezunt, French fished

up in front of Smyrna, and even Bulgarian mines left over from the last war. Total mines in 10 fields was about 400,, thanks to the activities of the German torpedo captain.

The Turkish Defense Plan contemplated:

(a) The eventual, perhaps rapid, destruction of the entrance forts.

(b) Stopping the Allied Fleet before it reached the Narrows by means of (1) gunfire (2) mortar fire (3) mines, floating and fixed (4) mobile torpedo tubes.

(c) Protection of its minefields day and night by field batteries with necessary searchlights; protection of the field batteries by the forts at the Narrows and various concealed batteries, fixed and mobile, between the Narrows and the Entrance.

The British Plan (Admiral Carden's) for a purely Naval forcing of the Straits was:

(a) Reduction of defenses at Entrance, in Basheka Bay and on the north coast of Gallipoli.

(b) Sweeping minefields and reducing defenses at the Narrows.

(c) Reduction of the Narrows.

(d) Sweeping minefields (off Kephez).

(e) Silencing forts above the Narrows.

(f) Passing Fleet into the Marmora.

(g) Operations in the Sea of Marmora and patrolling the Dardanelles.

It was estimated that it would take a month to carry out these operations.

(b) The Battle of 19 February.

The first step in the above plan, the reduction of the Entrance forts, was undertaken on 19 February 1915.

The attack was divided into 3 phases:

(1) A long-range bombardment out of effective range or bearing of the Turkish guns.

(2) A bombardment at medium ranges (5,000-10,000 yards).

(3) The final reduction of the forts by an overwhelming fire at 3,000 to 5,000 yards.

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Attacking Force (Vice Admiral Carden)	Assigned Targets.
CA - Inflexible (8 12", 16 4")	Sedd el Bahr
BB - Agamemnon (4 12", 10 9.2")	Arrived later - attacked Orkanie.
BB - Vengeance (4 12", 12 6")	Observe fire
BB - Cornwallis (4 12", 12 6")	Orkanie
BB - Triumph (4 10", 14 7.5")	Helles, indirect, spot by Inflexible.
BB - Albium (4 12", 12 6")	Support mine- sweepers.
French:	
Suffren (4 12", 12 5.9")	Kum Kale, indirect, spot by Bouvet.
Bouvet (4 12", 12 5.9")	Spot for Suffren.
Gaulois (4 12", 12 5/9")	Shore batteries near Yeni Keui.

The early morning sun delayed the attack until 0915. The forts at first did not reply. At 1100 the ships anchored to improve their fire, which was slow and deliberate. At 1400 Carden ordered the second step, the bombardment at medium ranges. The forts made no reply. At 1600 the ships were ordered to close the range.

Kum Kale remained silent. Sedd el Bahr fired a few badly-aimed shots. A hot fire was received from Orkanie and Helles. Helles was quieted by a heavy concentration. Fire from Orkanie was greatly reduced.

At 1720 recall was hoisted. Carden dreaded a torpedo attack and was fearful of his ammunition supply.

During the action some sweeping operations were conducted toward the entrance and along the north coast of Gallipoli.

The attack was characterized by poor staff work, failure to employ all vessels available, some confusion and misunderstanding of signals.

Results: little on either side.

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(c) The Battle of 25 February.

Carden intended to renew the attack next day but bad weather kept his ships idle until 25 February.

For this attack, Carden divided his force into three groups:

Supporting ships, at anchor would keep the forts under

a continuous fire to prevent gun crews manning their guns.

Attacking ships, when supporting ships dominated the forts, the Attacking Ships would steam toward entrance and engage the forts with secondary batteries until range reduced to 3,000 yards, then withdraw.

Demolishing ships, when Attacking ships had completed their task, the Demolishing ships, preceded by mine sweepers, would enter the Straits and complete the destruction of the forts from the rear and support the mine sweepers in clearing the entrance.

The attack proceeded substantially as planned.

Helles, in particular, at first replied hotly, but the Queen Elizabeth eventually found the range and quieted the fort.

The Turks report that all guns of the forts were knocked out and the magazines destroyed by the attacks of 19, 25 February. One British battleship received superficial damage. Agamemnon hit 7 times by Helles.

The major part of Phase One of the General Plan had been successfully executed.

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(d) Operations 25 February to 18 March.

For three weeks after 25 February, the Allied Fleets with grim determination vainly sought a weak point in the Turkish defense through which they could break.

Landing parties succeeded in landing at the entrance

forts from time to time, and most of the guns were blown up. Of unheeded significance was the growing resistance of the Turks to these landings.

Coincident with and frequently in conjunction with demolition parties, naval gunfire attacks were made daily on the intermediate defenses. Dardanos on the Asiatic coast and Messudieh on the European shore were the key forts of their respective groups, but the real resistance was offered by the mobile and skillfully concealed howitzers and field batteries. These were engaged daily by various battleships but instead of gradually destroying these defenses, the vessels encountered a daily increasing resistance. The Turks were alert and constantly increased the effectiveness of the batteries by building more emplacements, increasing the roads and trails over which the guns were moved, and repeatedly shifting the batteries. The Turks were short of ammunition and did not indulge in fire unless the target was tempting.

Actual damage to the ships by the intermediate defenses was small but the defense was increasing in efficiency and the howitzers were always a menace due to their plunging fire. The real mission of the intermediate defenses was (1) to prevent the battleships, which outranged the forts at The Narrows, from dominating those forts with deliberate fire under cover of which other battleships to close the forts; in other words, to prevent a repetition of the tactics which subdued the forts at the entrance; and (2) to prevent the battleships from destroying the field batteries protecting minefields, thus preventing the trawlers from sweeping the minefields with impunity at night. The intermediate batteries successfully accomplished both these tasks by forcing the battleships to keep moving, thus preventing the deliberate fire essential to accuracy.

An attempt was made on the forts at The Narrows by indirect fire from the Queen Elizabeth stationed near Gaba Tepe, spotted by ships inside the Straits. Some hits were made.

On March 7, the Lord Nelson and Agamemnon, protected against the intermediate batteries by the fire of other ships, attempted to silence the forts at the Narrows by direct fire from within the Straits. In spite of the covering ships, the fire of the intermediate forts compelled them to continually change their course and interfered with the accuracy of their fire. The ships

gradually closed the range. At 1300 the forts at the Narrows opened with well-directed salvos which fell close aboard, one 14" shell striking the Agamemnon on the quarterdeck. At 1430 the forts were silenced, and the ships withdrew. On March 8, the Queen Elizabeth was brought within the straits. The intermediate batteries kept her on the move and the effect of her fire was nil.

Sweeping operations were conducted nightly, weather permitting. The trawlers were inadequate in numbers and speed, and could not sweep against the current, which forced them to stand in until they were above the minefields, then put over their sweeps and sweep with the current.

The Turks were alert, their searchlights would pick up the trawlers and, in spite of the fire of covering ships, their shore batteries would force the trawlers to withdraw. Some difficulty was experienced by the British with the crews of the trawlers who were North Sea fishermen. These men would not sweep long under gunfire, and it was necessary to replace them with naval personnel. Still it was found impossible to sweep the channel.

The failure of these attempts to clear the minefields convinced Carden that night sweeping could not accomplish the desired results. A message from Churchill, who was becoming worried over the delays at the Dardanelles, spurred Carden to attempt the attack of March 18.

(e) The Battle of 18 March.

It must be remembered that coincident with all these events was the gathering in this theater of war of a British army expeditionary force at Mudros and in Egypt. The idea behind this force was to exploit naval success in passing through the Straits, rather than to operate jointly with the Navy in forcing the passage.

After correspondence with the Admiralty, Carden planned to attack the Dardanelles defenses with the full force of his fleet and force a passage into the Sea of Marmora. As to the reasoning behind this decision, I quote from Sir Roger Keyes, Chief of Staff to Carden:

"The general idea is to silence the defenses of the Narrows and of the minefields simultaneously, so as to enable sweepers to clear a passage through the Kephez minefield; if this is successful the attack is to be at once continued on the remaining defenses until the Fleet has passed through the Dardanelles.

"The only object we sailors had in view at that time was to get into the Marmora with sufficient force to defeat the Turko-German fleet if it came out of the Bosphorus to fight us.

"That was the task with which we were charged by the Government. What happened afterwards was not our concern. We presumed that the Government had good reason for their belief that our

arrival off Constantinople would greatly effect the political situation, help Russia, bring Neutrals in on our side, bring about the downfall of Turkey in Europe, and cut off Turkey in Asia from its munitions and supplies.

"If the Government wished to transport troops and munitions through the Straits, it would be necessary to occupy the Gallipoli Peninsula.

"If we succeeded in getting into the Marmora, we knew we could greatly assist military operations by cutting the sea communications of the Turkish armies in Gallipoli and Asia Minor - which were dependent on sea transport - and seriously interfere with reinforcements and transport which might attempt to cross the Bulair Isthmus into Gallipoli.

"If, on the other hand, the Government's anticipations were not realized, and the Fleet was at a deadlock in the Marmora with dwindling ammunition and fuel; without British or Russian troops or those of potential allies to exploit the situation, and we were forced to withdraw; we knew we could do so without undue risk, whenever we wished."

Carden planned to silence the defenses of the Narrows and of the minefields simultaneously and the method he selected was very similar to the one successfully employed to reduce the entrance forts on 25 February. The four most powerful ships would engage the forts at The Narrows at 14,000 yards where their

superior range would give them the advantage, and when they had sufficiently dominated the forts, four other battleships would close the forts and overwhelm them at 8,000 to 10,000 yards. Covering ships would protect these attacking ships from the intermediate defenses. All available minesweepers, including destroyers equipped with light sweeps were employed to reduce the mine menace.

On 17 March Carden was invalided home and de Robeck

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assumed command. He was prepared to carry out Carden's plan.

The Allied Fleet consisted of three modern and ten old British battleships, one battle cruiser, and four old French battleships.

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At 1000, 18 March, the Fleet entered the Straits, preceded by sweepers. Arriving at the 14,000 yard line, the Queen Elizabeth, Agamemnon, Lord Nelson and Inflexible, took station abreast and engaged the forts at The Narrows. The Prince George and Triumph on the flanks engaged the Intermediate Defenses. The French battleships, Gaulois, Charlemagne, Bouvet, and Suffren took station on the 16,000 yard line and awaited orders. Other ships stood by further out.

The forts were repeatedly hit. They at first replied but soon ceased fire due to the extreme range. The intermediate defenses, howitzers and field guns fired heavily.

At noon de Robeck signaled the French division to close the forts. They steamed through the English line and closed to 9,000 yards concentrating their fire on The Narrows and receiving a heavy fire in return. The Gaulois was badly holed forward.

The Agamemnon and Inflexible were hit several times by 6-inch howitzers of the Intermediate Defenses.

The eight battleships gradually mastered the fire of the forts. At 1345 de Robeck ordered up the mine sweepers to clear the way for the fleet to enter Sari Sighler Bay, and ordered up six fresh British battleships to replace the French ships and the two flanking ships which had been severely handled.

A Turkish General Staff account of the situation at this moment is as follows:

"By 2 p.m. the situation had become very critical. All telephone wires were cut, all communications with the forts were interrupted, some of the guns had been knocked out, others were half buried, others again were out of action with their breech mechanisms jammed; in consequence, the artillery fire of the defense had slackened considerably."

In accordance with orders the French ships retired around the flanks, The Gaulois, down by the head and with a heavy list to starboard, made her way safely out. The Bouvet struck a mine on the Asiatic side and sank in two minutes with great loss of life.

The fresh British battleships came on station and opened fire on The Narrows at 12,000 yards, using their secondary batteries on guns of the Intermediate Defenses. The fire of the forts was generally ineffective, except from a German-manned battery which concentrated on the Irresistible, giving it a slight list. The attack ships opened the range to take pressure off the Irresistible.

The sweepers passed through the line of ships and picked up some mines. The supporting ships had to go astern from time to time to avoid mines which the sweepers set adrift well below the Kephez minefield.

At about 1606 the Inflexible, near the Asiatic coast struck a mine, began to settle by the head, and retired to Tenedos in safety. At 1615, the Irresistible struck a mine and sunk. The Ocean, which had been standing by the Irresistible also struck a mine and sunk. De Robeck signaled the Fleet to withdraw.

Results: Of the sixteen capital ships which began the fight, three were sunk and three were so badly damaged that they were out of the fight indefinitely. Except for the damage to the Gaulois, all the serious damage received by the fleet resulted from a mine field planted in Eren Keui Bay on the night of March 8. This contained only 20 mines but it was planted in the waters in which the Turks had noted that the British Fleet maneuvered during its attacks on the Intermediate Defenses.

On the Turkish side, the forts at The Narrows had suffered heavily, but with a breathing spell they would soon be again formidable antagonists. The forts of the Intermediate Defenses had suffered, but the mobile guns and howitzers were practically unharmed. The Turks had a serious shortage in the larger caliber ammunition.

Materially, the defenses were stronger relatively at the end of the engagement than they were at the beginning; still greater was the increased morale of the Turkish forces. During the battle the Allied Fleet had not reached the deadline set by the defense; beyond that line were ten rows of mines staggered across the channel and containing 372 mines.

Sir Roger Keyes claims that the Allied losses were mostly directly due to the timid and inefficient work of the mine sweepers.

V. Landing Attacks.

The experiences undergone pointed to the following argument: the battleships could not force the Straits until the mine fields had been cleared - the mine fields could not be cleared until the concealed guns which defended them were destroyed - these could not be destroyed until the Gallipoli Peninsula was in Allied hands. Hence, further operations were postponed until such time as preparations for a combined attack could be made.

(a) Turkish Plan of Defense.

I quote extracts from Limon von Sanders, head of the German Military Mission to Turkey:

"18 March. The allies now probably recognized that the road to Constantinople could not be opened by action on the water alone. It was equally clear to me that they would not relinquish such a high prize without further effort. It would not have been in keeping with British tenacity or energy. Hence, a large landing had to be counted upon.

"On 25 March I was requested to take command of the Fifth Army to be organized for the defense of the Dardanelles. I assented at once.

"The British gave me four full weeks before their great landing. The time was just sufficient to complete the most indispensable arrangements."

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Von Sanders disposed of 84,000 men and he had to defend a sixty mile front; his command was separated into two unequal parts by the Dardanelles with only precarious water communication between; his interior communications and his lines of communication, except the water route to Constantinople, were inferior roads and railways.

When he assumed command von Sanders found the "cordon system" of defense in effect which he immediately changed to the "elastic system". And instead of attempting the defense of the entire shore line at the water's edge, placed small covering forces backed by local supports to defend the principal beaches where landing was manifestly feasible; patrolled the remainder of the coast where the terrain made landing on a large scale difficult; and held reserves in readiness to reenforce his forward elements. His plan of defense was conventional and sound.

Von Sanders in his estimate of the probable landing place of the Allies, considered the following places feasible:

(1) Bashika Bay and vicinity, because of its proximity to Tenedos, an Allied base, the many good landing beaches, the few permanent defenses, the good road communication in the interior, and the chances offered for maneuver. This he considered the spot of most likely landing and placed here two divisions.

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(2) The southern tip of the Gallipoli peninsula, because here the terrain could be covered by the ships' guns, and a short advance would secure Achi Baba, a ridge commanding a large part of the Turkish batteries in the Straits.

(3) The coast on both sides of Gaba Tepe because from here a broad plain led directly to Maidos on the Straits. The heights on both sides of Maidos commanded the forts in the Straits. Two

divisions covered this and the toe of the peninsula.

(4) In the Gulf of Saros near Bulair. A landing here would sever the defender's land communications, and guns from here would threaten his sea communications, forcing evacuation of the entire Peninsula. Two divisions were located here, with cavalry in observation of the northern coast of Seros.

To facilitate the execution of this plan, he energetically constructed defensive positions; improved the roads and trails; provided ferry service to connect the European and Asiatic ports; and devoted much time to increasing the marching ability of his troops; for the success of his plan depended in large measure on the mobility of his army.

(b) The Allied Plan of Attack.

The Allied troops available were:

XXIX Division - - - - -	18,000
Royal Naval Division - - - - -	11,000
Anzac Corps - - - - -	31,000
French Colonial Division - - - - -	<u>18,000</u>
	78,000

In January, Kitchener had stated that 150,000 men would be necessary to seize Gallipoli.

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The XXIX Division was the last British division of regular troops, brought up to war strength by the addition of some Territorials. Originally destined for service in France, it was at the last moment diverted to the Dardanelles. On arrival of this Division at the base at Mudros, it was found that it was commercially loaded - i.e., as loaded it could not execute a forced landing. A soldier on one transport might have his ammunition in another. As facilities for loading and reloading were lacking at Mudros, the entire outfit had to be sent to Egypt for reloading. A fatally time-consuming operation. One unit came equipped with motor trucks, although the War Office had been informed that trucks would be useless, and pack transport necessary.

The Royal Naval Division had been formed from sailors not needed to man the fleet. It was without artillery or the usual army supply services. No provision had been made for its replacements. Its personnel were poorly equipped and unused to fighting ashore.

The Anzac Corps was composed of units organized in Australia and New Zealand. When they sailed from Australia they were destined for England to continue their training preparatory to service on the Western Front. The congestion of soldiers training in England caused them to be left in Egypt

where they were on hand to assist in the defense of the Suez Canal, and as events unfolded conveniently placed for service at the Dardanelles.

The French Division was a colonial division composed of one-third French and two-thirds Senegals. It was equipped completely with artillery and engineers and adequately supplied with ammunition.

Prior to the landing, the Royal Naval Division, which had previously been attached to the de Roebeck's command, was in the island of Skyros. The remainder of the force was at port Mudros in the island of Lemnos.

At the time of landing, the Allied fleet consisted of 19 battleships, 2 armored cruisers, 11 light cruisers, 27 destroyers, 5 torpedo boats, 29 sweepers, a depot ship, a balloon ship, and an airplane carrier.

Hamilton could launch his force of 78,000 men against any point or points along a sixty mile front. He possessed great mobility while his troops were embarked on transports; he could select the time of attack unless bad weather intervened; he had enormous naval support; he had fairly accurate information of the enemy strength and knew that many strongly prepared positions awaited him; he was handicapped by the small number and the slow speed of the small boats available for

landing his army; he knew it was hopeless to attempt a strategic surprise and he concentrated his efforts on securing a tactical surprise. Having considered all these factors, Hamilton determined to deliver a smashing blow with his entire force. His plan was as follows:

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To attack on 25 April.

(a) Main attack by the 29th Division, landing at beaches S, V, W, X and Y near Helles, objective Achi Baba. Of these landings, the main effort to be made on W and V.

(b) Secondary attack at Ari Burnu by the Anzac Corps, objective Mal Tepe; it was hoped that this attack might develop into a real menace to the Turkish communication with Helles and force the evacuation of the entire region.

(c) Demonstration by the French against Bashika Bay accompanied by a landing at Kum Kale, designed to attract the Asiatic batteries away from the main attack on Helles and to detain the Turkish troops known to be in that region.

(d) Demonstration by the Royal Naval Division in the Gulf of Xeros, for the purpose of pinning von Sander's reserves to the Bulair region.

The Navy to land the units at their designated beaches, support the landing with gunfire, and bring up and land supplies and ammunition.

It is to be noted here that Hamilton did not hold out a general reserve. Hamilton's plan, except for his lack of a reserve was very similar to the plan worked out by the Greek General Staff.

(c) The attack.

Let us weigh Hamilton's plan briefly in the light of our estimate form.

The effect desired was to silence the Turkish guns in order to assist the Navy through the Dardanelles.

The means available, 78,000 men with limited land transport, a serious shortage of field artillery, practically no air force, and powerful fire support furnished by the Navy but with the limitations inherent in naval gunfire. No training in joint operations. Considerable maneuverability while in transports.

The means opposed, 84,000 men in the Dardanelles area divided into three groups - Asiatic side, on Gallipoli, and with the main reserves at Bulair. Hamilton was well informed of the general Turkish dispositions.

Character of the Theatre. Defenses split in half by the Straits. On the Asiatic side, good landing beaches near Kum Kale and in Basika Bay; unlimited maneuver room in the interior and a fair road system. However, the very extent of the ground here might force a development into a war of unlimited size, which was not wanted. Also, Hamilton's means available (a limited supply of land transport and of artillery)

did not lend itself to inland fighting. Also, on the shores of the Dardanelles, the heights of Gallipoli dominated the Asiatic shore. Possession of the Asiatic shore would not silence the guns on Gallipoli. And, not least, Kitchener had expressly told Hamilton to keep out of Asia.

At Bulair, success by cutting the Turkish communications might force an evacuation of the peninsula. But shallow water would force transports and supporting ships to lie far off shore. Reconnaissance showed the Turkish positions here to be very strong and here the attack would run into the main Turkish reserves.

At the toe of the Peninsula there were a few beaches, and the ground, although difficult, sheltered the beaches from observation once the first heights inshore were seized. Here the navy could fire in support from several different angles and range clear across the peninsula. The shore defenses seemed not too difficult and the hostile reserves were distant.

Consequences as to cost. Success meant Constantinople. Russia assisted. Italy, Greece and the Balkans probably joining the allies. The threat on Egypt and the Suez removed, and a probable early termination of the war.

Failure meant the loss of the best part of 85,000 men - a large loss but not overly serious in modern warfare. The loss of prestige, so valuable in the Near East, would be serious.

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With the above factors in mind, it is hard to criticize Hamilton's choice of initial physical objectives. A successful landing at the toe of the Peninsula and a rapid advance and seizure of the Achi Baba ridge, might be accomplished prior to the arrival of the Turkish reserves from Bulair. This would give Hamilton a beachhead behind which he could build up his strength preparatory for further advance, thus placing him in a favorable relative position.

As to apportionment of fighting strength, Hamilton placed his main effort at the toe of the Peninsula, where the opposed means was weakest and where the character of the theatre permitted of the best naval gunfire support. This cannot be criticised.

The French landing at Kum Kale, an operation in direct assistance of the main effort, and the Anzac landing which promised fruitful results on its own and also directly assisted the main effort by pinning down the local reserves, were neither of them too strong as proven by the fighting, both furthered the main effort and hence were sound, and not, as has been claimed, an undue dispersion of strength.

The big weakness in Hamilton's plan was his failure to retain a general reserve immediately available for action and thus rendering himself powerless to influence the course of action. It was this failure to retain a reserve, this lack of any measure to retain his freedom of action, that was di-

directly responsible for the failure of the attack to reach its assigned objectives.

Slide B34-422 plus B33-687

The Anzac Landing.

Although called a secondary attack, the objective assigned, Mal Tepe, was three and one-half miles inland. Had this objective been reached, the entire Turkish defenses to the south would have been untenable. The Anzacs were scheduled to land one mile north of Gaba Tepe. A northern flanking force was to cover the northern flank from Turks in position on the Sari Bahr ridge, while the main attack poured across the lower foothills toward Mal Tepe. The plan was carefully worked out and every battalion knew its objective.

The covering force of three battalions landed in the darkness preceding dawn in twelve tows of one steam launch and four pulling boats each. In the confusion of a night landing the tows became hopelessly mixed, the left battalion landed on the right. They were landed a good mile north of their scheduled beach, and instead of attacking the lower foothills, they found themselves up against the main defenses of Sari Bahr itself. Actually, they didn't know for a long time just where they were. All they knew was that something had gone wrong. The mistake in landing made the capture of Mal Tepe impossible.

Slide B34-587

Here is where they actually landed. Note the difficult terrain, and

Slide B34-425

Note the nature of the ground inland.

Slide B34-588

Desperate fighting ensued. The artillery of the Turks, assisted by a Turkish cruiser firing across the peninsula, delayed the transports. The Bacchante closed and anchored close in and in half an hour had silenced the guns. Confusion reigned among the troops. The wounded returning in empty landing boats further delayed the disembarkation. Mustapha Kemal, commanding the Turkish 19th Division, counter-attacked. At nightfall the exhausted Anzacs held a crescent-shaped position three-fourths of a mile deep and one and one-half miles wide, a position overlooked by the Turks who held the heights commanding it. The advocates of a night landing might note that this one achieved what is the great advantage of a night landing. Surprise was complete. So was confusion.

In passing, it is interesting to note that the naval orders alone for this landing covered 27 typewritten pages.

Slide B35-258 plus B34-422Y Beach Landing.

Two and one-half battalions made a surprise landing at Y

Beach without a casualty. After gaining the heights immediately commanding the beach, this force contented itself with a little reconnaissance. Each of the two battalion commanders supposed himself to be in command. There this force sat, all day, unopposed, inactive, superior in strength to all the Turks on the toe of the Peninsula. Some 12 hours after landing, it was heavily counter-attacked by the Turks, and it repulsed this attack with difficulty.

Slide B34-591 plus B34-422

X Beach Landing.

The action of the supporting ship on this landing is especially interesting:

"At 0400 the Implacable stood in with the tows. Since there was no chance of surprise everything depended in the first instance on the Implacable's preparatory fire. As she stood in at 5 knots with the tows a heavy fire was opened on them from the cliffs from both sides of the beach. He, Captain Lockyer, therefore held on until close to the five fathom line and anchored. And there with very little to spare under his keel he brought his broadsides to bear no more than 450 yards from the shore. From this close range he developed over the tows as they advanced an intense fire from his 4-12", six of his 6", and his 8-12 pdrs. The troops were able to leap ashore and form up with nothing but distant rifle fire to annoy them."

After the troops had landed, the Implacable raised its barrage and kept up fire on the hills in rear until its overs were reported falling close to the troops landed on the beaches to the southward. The Turks counter-attacked strongly, but were repulsed. Later this force succeeded in joining hands with the troops who had landed on W Beach.

Slides B34-426

B34-427

W Beach Landing.

W Beach was covered with obstacles. In spite of a preliminary naval bombardment, the Turks here opened a heavy machine gun and rifle fire at point blank range on the landing troops. Luckily some boats on the northern flank sheered off and landed their troops on the rocky and supposedly inaccessible point which was unfortified. These troops scrambled up the heights and took the defenses of W Beach in flank. The Turks contested every foot of ground and counter-attacked strongly. By nightfall the troops here had a bare foothold on the heights commanding the beach.

Slides B34-428

B34-426

V Beach Landing.

About 0649 five tows, each carrying a platoon and covered by fire from the Albion headed for V Beach. They were met by a withering fire. The sober Official History states that "Hell broke loose", and "Hell yawned". The attack was completely broken up. The River Clyde, a converted collier, was also used in this landing. She carried 2500 men. It was planned to run the River Clyde onto the beach. Then, through specially cut ports, the assaulting troops were to dash across a ramp to shore. A steam hopper and some towed barges accompanied

the River Clyde for the purpose of forming this connecting ramp to shore. The steamer grounded as planned. Some difficulty was experienced in getting the steam hopper and barges into place, and Commander Unwin, the father of the River Clyde brain-child, earned undying fame when he, accompanied by a handful of midshipment and seamen, jumped into the bullet-lashed waters and held the barges in place. Of 1000 men who left the River Clyde over the ramp toward shore, 500 had been killed or wounded by 1030 and by nightfall only 400 remained ashore who were not casualties, and these were pinned to shelter of a narrow ledge fringing the shore line. Machine guns mounted in the bow of the River Clyde served to keep down some of the Turkish fire and prevented a counter-attack. Let us look for a moment at the Turkish side. The Turkish commander at V Beach sent the following message to his commander at Krithia:

"My Captain, either you must send up reenforcements and drive the enemy into the sea or let us evacuate this place because it is absolutely certain that they will land more troops tonight. Send the doctors to carry off my wounded. Alas, my Captain, for the sake of Allah send me reenforcements because hundreds of soldiers are landing. Hurry up. What on earth will happen, my Captain?"

That night, the British landed reenforcements, assistance came from W Beach, and the heights immediately commanding the beach were captured next morning.

Slide B34-426S Beach Landing.

The landing at S Beach was especially feared because the Asiatic batteries commanded it. The navy put down a heavy covering fire on the Asiatic batteries and on de Trott's battery on the heights. Three companies of soldiers were landed here. Captain Davidson, commanding the Cornwallis, a supporting ship for this force, liberally interpreted his orders and added a company of his own marines to the soldiers scheduled to land here. Then Captain Davidson left his ship at the head of a small force of sailors and personally led the assault on and capture of de Trott's battery. This inspiring but overly enthusiastic action caused the Cornwallis to be late in carrying out the remainder of its orders, which was to lend sorely needed support to the landing at V Beach.

SLIDE B34-422

French Landing - This landing at Kum Kale was intended primarily to keep two Turkish Divisions occupied, and to distract the attention of the Asiatic batteries from the landing of the 29th Division at the toe of the Peninsula. The covering ships quickly silenced the forts and the landing was made with little loss. Turkish reinforcements stopped the French advance outside Yeni Shes. Meanwhile the rest of the French Division carried out a demonstration off Bashika Bay. This did not deceive von Sanders, who on the night of April 25-26 ferried part of the 11th Division across from Chanak to Maidos.

SLIDE

Demonstration At Xeros Bay. This demonstration was successful in that it prevented von Sanders releasing any troops from Bulair to the Peninsula until that night, and it was not until the following morning that he was sure that it was only a demonstration and released any large body to the south.

SLIDE B37-149

General. This slide of the landings and fire support at Helles brings out an interesting point. The strongest attacking force was thrown against the strongest defenses, yet was given the weakest fire support - note V Beach. The weakest effort, a secondary attack at S Beach, was given the strongest fire support, Is that sound? Remember that there were no reserves available to exploit any success at S Beach.

Had reserves been immediately available to exploit the successful landing at Y Beach, or S Beach, the Turkish southern

defenses would have been turned and the history of the Dardanelles probably entirely changed. However, Ian Hamilton had no general reserves immediately available. He suggested to General Hunter-Weston,

SLIDE B36-352 plus B37-149

commanding the 29th Division, that his local (Weston's) reserves be landed at Y Beach. However, Hunter-Weston, a true British bull dog, threw in his reserves into the hard fighting at W Beach. Thus was a golden opportunity lost. Hunter-Weston had no conception of what we call the "soft spot" landing - i.e., to go where the going is easiest. In the afternoon Hunter-Weston joined Hamilton on board the Queen Elizabeth for tea. One has to admire these British.

SLIDE B34-430

Night 25-26 May.

The Anzacs, who had been so badly used here, were badly shaken by nightfall. Their commander, Birdwood,

SLIDE B36-369 plus B34-430

proposed that they be withdrawn. However, de Roebeck stated that it would take three days to reembark them. So Hamilton told Birdwood to hold on and dig. During the course of the night, units were straightened out, the position consolidated, and thereafter the Anzacs fought gallantly.

One of the commanders of the successful landing at Y Beach had orders to join "in the advance of the troops from W Beach". He had no orders as to what to do if the troops landing at W Beach failed to advance; so he dug in in the vicinity of the

beach and sat tight. During the night the Turks attacked but were beaten off with severe losses. The next morning the commander (the question of command had now been straightened out due to the death of one of the battalion commanders), in the absence of orders, reembarked his troops in transports lying off the beach, and Y Beach was abandoned much to the surprise and consternation of Hunter-Weston and Hamilton.

Referring to the X-Beach - W-Beach front during the night following the landing, the British Official History states, quote: Apart from occasional sniping, all opposition on this front had disappeared. But the inertia of the afternoon still paralyzed the British line; there had been little or no patrolling, and touch with the enemy was lost. - - - After midnight a few bold parties of Turks pushed up to the British lines, but nothing in the nature of a counter-attack was attempted. - - - The night's casualties did not exceed half a dozen. Thus in the southern zone, as at Anzac, the morning's promise of victory had not been fulfilled. The actual "coup" of the landing had come off. Three of the five selected beaches had been captured soon after daybreak. A fourth had been taken without opposition. Throughout the day the Turks had been unable to array more than two battalions against $12\frac{1}{2}$ battalions of British troops ashore. Yet at nightfall the 29th Division held only the fringe of the peninsula. Unquote.

The French landing at Kum Kale, having served its purpose, the troops were reembarked just as the now demoralized Turks were beginning to surrender in numbers. The French were then landed on the southern toe of Gallipoli and thenceforth fought

side by side with the British.

SLIDE B34-592

(d) May-June-July.

During May, June and July the Allies gradually enlarged their toehold on the peninsula and secured sufficient ground to permit the landing of stores and artillery. Both sides poured in reinforcements. Desperate fighting took place for the capture of Krithia, which the Allies never succeeded in reaching. Both sides dug in, and trench warfare ensued. The Turks advanced their trenches to within a few yards of the British so as to escape the naval gun fire.

SLIDES B34-661 B34-590

B34-663 B36-372

As to the efficacy of naval gunfire, we will let von Sanders speak:

"It must be stated here that the artillery effect of the hostile battleships constituted a support of extraordinary power for the landing army. No heavy land artillery can so easily change position and direct its fire on the enemy's flank and rear as was possible to the guns of the ships."

German Lieutenant Boltz, commanding a German naval machine gun detachment ashore states:

"The battle field presented a grand and awful spectacle. The point of the peninsula was surrounded by a circle of war-ships and transports. The ships' guns, assisted by great search-lights, maintained a terrible fire against the Turkish lines."

The German Major-General Hans Kannengiesser, serving with the Turkish Army states:

"Even later, in August 1917, in the battles in Flanders, I did not have the same overwhelming impression of concentrated shelling as during this period. Although in Flanders the effect of the individual shell was much more destructive, due to more sensitive fuses and improved methods of shell manufacture, yet the total moral effect was in this case much greater."

Speaking of a Turkish night attack, this same officer says:

"As soon as the light was sufficient to allow the ships to shoot at the Turkish line, an attempt to stay forward was equivalent to suicide. * * * Any attempt at movement, any sign of life during the day was impossible, because whoever showed himself was immediately shelled from the ships."

Captain Puleston states: "The guns of the fleet failed to meet the expectations of the British, partly due to their flat trajectories which made them ineffective in the rugged broken country, but also due to the lack of an efficient method of fire control. The best British gunnery talent worked assiduously to develop an efficient system to coordinate the guns of the fleet with the artillery ashore and towards the end of the campaign they succeeded."

It is believed that much of the failure to meet expectations was due to lack of training for this type of enterprise. After the landing and during the desperate fighting of the first day, shore signal stations maintained communications with ships but were often unable to get in touch with anyone in

authority on shore. An idea of the confusion of the ships is given by some of the questions the ships' captains asked each other: "Are any of our troops dressed in blue?", or "Have we landed any cavalry?". At other times the ships were asked to "Open fire at once", but were given no targets.

On 12 May, the Goliath was sunk within the entrance to the Straits by a Turkish destroyer.

A German submarine sank the Triumph on May 25, and the Majestic on May 27. This action caused the larger ships to be withdrawn to the protected waters of Mudros, leaving the gunfire support of the troops to the lighter craft.

SLIDE B34-594

British Submarines.

One of the most gallant parts in the Campaign was that played by French and British submarines. These submarines forced their way through the mine fields and nets, and in spite of the loss of four, practically dominated the Sea of Marmora. A Turkish battleship and five gunboats were sunk, as were numerous transports and supply ships. The Turkish supply system was reduced to numerous small coastal vessels which sheltered in the small bays during the day, and crept along the coast at night. One submarine attacked a railroad train. Another fired upon and delayed troops marching across the Bulair isthmus, and was driven off by Turkish cavalry. The Turkish supply system was further complicated by the fact that transportation from the nearest railroad station, Uzunkeupri, to Bulair, was limited to animal drawn carts and camel trains, no motor vehicles being

available. That they managed to maintain an army in Gallipoli under these conditions was due to splendid organization, and to the simple wants of the Anatolian soldier.

By desperate attacks at Helles and Anzac, Hamilton strove vainly to extract himself from the growing impasse. The Turks resisted stubbornly and counter-attacked desperately; they continued to improve their trench system, and learned the value of reverse slopes which naval guns could not reach. Hamilton's replacements came slowly and he was greatly handicapped by lack of artillery ammunition and grenades.

The Base at Mudros.

During the entire operation, men, ships, and supplies based on Mudros. I quote abstracts from the book of Admiral Lord Rosslyn Erskine Wester-Wemyss, B.C.B., who commanded there:

"On the 12th the Franconia, the first of the transports carrying the Royal Naval Division, arrived. Major-General Paris, R.M.A. commanding, told me that his troops had been embarked in such a manner that it was sufficient for a man to be in one transport to be certain that his greatcoat was in another. His whole force would have to be disembarked, reorganized, and re-embarked again before they would be ready for service. ---- We had neither wharves, nor cranes, nor piers, and an insufficiency of boats. ---- And so this fleet of transports, supposed to be in a state of readiness for disembarking their cargoes, human and material, on the scene of operations, had to turn back and be reorganized and re-stored elsewhere.

"The officer commanding the Greek garrison at Kastro paid

me an official visit. ---- After an extra big glass of brandy and an extra large cigar I managed to wheedle out permission to take care of the guns at the mouth of the harbor. ----

(None but a Britisher would think of placing a naval base on a neutral island, in a harbor whose defenses were manned by a neutral.)

"I settled the differences between a voluble and excited French Colonel and a stolid and obstinate English Major, both of whom wanted to pitch their tents on the same piece of ground.

"The harbor was now crowded with vessels of every description, men of war, hospital ships, tugs, lighters and pontoons. ---- The average number of arrivals and departures was fifty a day - one of the busiest ports in the world."

The August Attack.

SLIDE B34-529

By late July, 1915, Hamilton could dispose of 110,000 bayonets and 194 guns, supplemented by the fire of the fleet. There were available 50 active observation planes.

Von Sanders had 120,000 men on hand, located in groups at Helles, Bulair and Anzac. The bulk of this force was mobile and ready to move to any threatened point.

Hamilton, in an attempt to break out of the trench warfare deadlock, planned a new landing and attack as follows:

(a) A strong containing attack at Helles and southeastern Anzac to immobilize the Turkish reserves.

(b) A demonstration against the north shore of Xeros, with a landing at Mitylene.

(c) A demonstration by the French fleet against the coast of Anatalia.

(d) Main effort from Anzac position striking Sari Bair from the Northwest.

(e) A landing of troops at Suvla Bay, securing the heights commanding that Bay, and cooperating with the Main Anzac attack.

The objectives were designed to secure the high ridges dominating the Straits and the Sea of Mamora.

The greatest stress was laid on surprise. Moonless nights were a requisite. The Navy reluctantly agreed to put the soldiers ashore at Suvla during hours of darkness. During the period July 31-August 3, between 7,000 and 8,000 reenforcements for the Anzacs were secretly landed.

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The Attack

The holding attack at Helles was launched at 1530, August 6th, supported by naval gun fire. There was bitter fighting but the Allies made no material advance. However, they held Turkish reinforcements from being dispatched from this front until August 8th.

Anzac. This attack was launched on 1730, August 6th on the Anzac right and bitter fighting ensued. The main attack on the left moved out in two columns early that evening. These columns were delayed by Turkish resistance and difficult terrain. A coordinated attack was launched on August 7th but was repulsed. The British attacked again on the 8th and on the 9th. Under naval gunfire support a few gallant men succeeded in securing a foothold on Sari Bair, the key to the entire position. Hopeless confusion and poor staffwork prevented the reenforcement of these men. The Turks under Mustapha Kemal counterattacked and drove the British off their objective.

The Australian official historian writes: "The vital objective, the actual crest of Chumuk Bair, was for several days within Birdwood's reach, and for a few hours actually within his hands. An opportunity was presented to him by fighting which was never surpassed, for securing results perhaps unattainable in any other land battles of the war; that opportunity passed, never to return.

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The British casualties in this one operation were 12,000 men.

Suvla. On the night of August 6-7, the British landed the IX Corps of 20,000 new untried troops, at Suvla Bay with slight losses. Their commander, General Stopford was a man

Slide B36-374 plus B34-529

of great kindness and charm, who had never commanded troops in war, and so enfeebled in health that he was unable to lift his own dispatch case into the train when he left London for the Peninsula.

In the entire Suvla area there were only four companies

Slide B36-357 plus B34-529

of Turks, and four field batteries, under the command of the German Major Willmer (who had neither kindness nor charm), to oppose the landing and advance. Here Hamilton had given Stopford conflicting orders as to the objective. Stopford, in his anxiety to retain secrecy, landed regimental and battalion commanders who had only the vaguest ideas as to what they were supposed to do, some not even knowing what part of the peninsula they were landing on. Some were even issued maps of another section of the peninsula. In the confusion of the night many units were landed at the wrong beach. Indecision and confusion reigned. Another night landing. Results: complete surprise, complete confusion. Rear waves lost considerably at the beaches from Turkish artillery fire. The Turkish infantry retreated

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slowly and in good order. Due to poor staff work the British troops suffered from lack of drinking water. Their advance was slow, uncoordinated and spasmodic. Communication between units completely broke down. Orders were either lacking or conflicting. Some troops stopped to bath on the beach. Some of the troops had been given a cholera injection the day before, and then had been so tightly packed in landing boats that they were actually 17 hours continuously on their feet before they were landed. It is little wonder they were tired.

Slide B34-594 plus B34-529

It was essential that the heights commanding the Suvla plain be seized before Turkish reinforcements coming up from Bulair could arrive. On the afternoon of the 7th, General Stopford appealed to his division commanders to continue the advance. They replied that their troops were exhausted. The inaction continued on the morning of the 8th. I quote from a German officer who fought against the Anzacs and who watched the Suvla landing through his field glasses:

"During the whole of the 8th August the goddess of victory held the door to success wide open for Stopford, but he would not enter. ** The British ashore cooked and smoked and bathed in the beautiful cool sea. Thirst was heavy in the heat of those cloudless August days. But nobody advanced. In short, a peaceful picture almost like a boy scout's field day.

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"At the same time under this same sun on the other side of the peninsula the panting Turks of the 7th and 12th Divisions were straining forward over the hills from Bulair. Will they arrive in time?"

A British staff officer from GHQ sent Hamilton the following message on the 8th: "Just been ashore where I found all quiet. No rifle fire and apparently no Turks. IXth Corps resting. Feel confident that golden opportunities are being lost and look upon the situation as serious.

At 1700, on the 8th, Hamilton, alarmed by the apparent inaction, arrived on the scene. He found the Corps Commander on shipboard and too tired to accompany him ashore. Hamilton went ashore and ordered one of the divisions to attack. This division commander, in his confusion, withdrew his most advanced battalion in order to form up his troops for the attack. The key position vacated by this battalion was at once reoccupied by the Turks and never after taken by the British.

The British attack finally got off at 0400 on the 9th. Too late. One-half hour before the Turkish reserves had arrived on Anafarta Ridge. The British were repulsed. It was said that their commander had "orders all over his breast, with disorder all over his command."

The British inactivity and lack of drive is in violent contrast with the ruthless drive of von Sanders. When one of his division commanders claimed that his troops were too tired for further marching, he was at once relieved of command - and

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the troops marched. When the Turkish commander on the southern front recommended a retirement, he was retired to Constantinople - and the troops held their position.

The next few days were characterized by fierce fighting with attacks and counterattacks, culminating in a combined allied attack on the Suvla and Anzac fronts on August 21. It was repulsed with heavy losses.

On August 17, Hamilton asked for 95,000 additional replacements.

The final futile British attack was made on August 27. The Turks counterattacked the next day. No reinforcements for the British were forthcoming. The British had definitely failed.

Slide B36-358 plus B34-594

Sir Roger Keyes, Chief of Staff to the Admiral, at this time submitted a proposal for the forcing of the Straits with the navy regardless of losses, and placing a portion of the Fleet in the Sea of Marmora where it would sever Turkish communications and force evacuation of the Peninsula. The plan was not accepted. Britain felt that its margin of ship superiority over Germany was so small that she could not accept the risks involved.

The Turkish official account points out that the British originally had the choice of two alternative methods of forcing the Straits - purely naval action or a combined naval and military attack, and states:

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"The fact that the naval action was limited to only one attempt, on the 18th March, particularly merits reflection. To shrink from incurring insignificant losses is not the way to win big stakes. It is most probable that the objective could have been achieved by naval action alone had the attempt been pushed with greater vigour and repeated several times. To win big stakes one must not shrink from big risks, or even from risking all at a crisis. The second alternative was naturally preferable and more certain. But the way to do it was not as was actually done - to start with a small force and then reinforce it by driblets. The probable requirements of the situation should have been most carefully worked out, and the necessary force decided on; sufficient strength should have been employed right from the very start." On a later page it adds that if at the outset Sir Ian Hamilton had been given six divisions instead of four, the invading troops "could have won a decisive success at the very beginning, for they might have forced the Straits before the defenders could bring up reinforcements, and thus influenced the political situation as regards Bulgaria and Rumania". (Page 480, Book 2, British Official History).

In October Sir Ian Hamilton was replaced by General Munroe. Bulgaria entered the war on the side of Germany. The Berlin-Constantinople railroad was now open and German guns and ammunition began to arrive in Turkey. Approaching winter gales

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threatened to interfere seriously with supply. Troops were badly needed on the Western front. German submarines became increasingly active against the British communications through the Mediterranean. Monroe recommened a withdrawal. By 9 January, 1916, the last troops had been withdrawn from the Dardanelles in an evacuation that was a model in planning and execution. And so this campaign "of heroic bravery and senseless sacrifice" passed into history. The British had lost 120,000 men, the French 27,000, and the Turks 218,000 killed, wounded and missing.

VI. Conclusions.

What lessons can we gather from this campaign of "muddle, mismanagement and useless sacrifice"? The danger of deducing lessons from one operation is well known, but the following would seem to be indicated:

(1) The value of mines in base defense was demonstrated. Mine fields should be covered by artillery fire, especially quick firing guns effective against minesweepers.

(2) The value of searchlights in the defense of mine fields was demonstrated. Ships' fire was singularly ineffective against them.

(3) The airplane was not sufficiently tested here to point to any conclusions as to its value in landing operations or in coast defense.

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(4) Submarines clearly demonstrated their value, both in the attack and defense. A few old type submarines attached to the defense would greatly handicap the work of the attacker.

(5) In the Helles and Anzac landings, British soldiers landed in pulling boats against machine gunfire. That any ever got ashore is a tribute to the bravery of the British soldier and sailor.

(6) The ships succeeded in silencing temporarily, but did not destroy the forts. But it must be remembered that the forts were old. Kale Sultanie was built in 1463. Their armament was generally antiquated and there was a shortage of the heavier ammunition. Also the old forts were plainly visible and the British used direct fire. Modern defenses would not permit of this.

(7) The ships were most ineffective against mobile field artillery. At the same time, the heavier armored ships suffered only superficial damage from these guns.

(8) Ships' guns were unsuccessful, except where the accompanying ship steamed in to point blank range, in silencing machine guns manned by determined troops.

(9) Naval gunfire can render valuable support to attacking troops, especially on forward slopes, but its efficiency in this regard is not to be compared to that of land artillery which is especially designed for this type of work.

(10) Initial landings should generally be on a broad front in an attempt to find a soft spot in the defenses. Gen-

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eral reserves must be immediately available, and there must be flexibility in planning, in order to exploit immediately this soft spot prior to the arrival of the hostile general reserves. Time is the essence of success in the landing attack.

(11) The dangers of lack of planning and lack of training were clearly demonstrated.

(12) British Official History: "Many reasons combined to frustrate an enterprise the success of which in 1915 would have altered the course of the war. But every reason will be found to spring from one fundamental cause - an utter lack of preparation before the campaign began."

(13) You cannot extemprize a landing attack.

Many reasons have been given for the failure of the British: lack of planning, lack of training, stupidity of the high command, lack of experience and initiative on the part of subordinate leaders, etc. I wish to give here three other reasons of the British failure:

Slide B36-354

First: Limon von Sanders Pasha.

Tall, stern, military-looking, very self-contained, quick in decision, clear in his orders, scanty of praise, sharp in reprimand, ruthless in following up a decision once taken.

Slide B30-930

Second: Mustapha Kemal Pasha, now President of the Turkish Republic.

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Clear-thinking, active, quiet, self-reliant, reticent, retiring, quick in decision stubborn, energetic.

On the morning of the first landing, he was watching the drilling of a reserve regiment. A runner came panting that the English were landing. Mustapha Kemal turned to the Regimental Commander: "Have your troops ball ammunition?" The answer was: "Yes". Mustapha Kemal said: "Follow me", and led to the counter attack that almost succeeded in driving the Anzacs into the sea. Had General Stopford at Suvla had some of this drive and decision, history would have been differently written.

Slide B30-934

And thirdly, I give you the simple Turkish soldier from Anatolia, the Askar, whose bare breast stopped so many a British attack.

One day six Turks deserted from a reserve regiment on the Gulf of Seros, marched to the Peninsula and reported in to Limon von Sanders, requesting a share in the fighting. He sent them to the front line. Three were killed. The following letter from one of the wounded survivors gives a better understanding of the man who defeated the British soldier than anything I can say:

"My revered Father and dear Mother,

"Mehmed Mustapha Tschausch, official letter writer, writes you this letter because he comes from our town.

He is to write that I am well and that I pary to Allah the all-powerful, that you, my highly revered parents, my brothers and sisters and our whole village are in good health and that you have been spared sickness and hunger.

I received your last letter -- and read with pride that two more of your sons, my brothers, have become soldiers.

We left Stamboul in the spring, and have now entered the holy war and have been sent to the town of Gallipoli which lies on the sea.

As we lay in our tents at night we saw the flash of the enemy's guns who had many great ships lying out at sea, and whether by day or night we heard continuously the thunder of the cannons and the rattle of small arms and our hearts were very sad. Our officers told us, however, that we must remain in our positions, far behind the lines, to protect the backs

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of our fighting comrades. We dreamt, however, of fighting and war.

One hot summer evening a cavalryman came to our tent. He told us of the fame of our comrades and the heavy fighting for a castle named Sed-el-Bahr. He told us of the victories of ours and his, and as he left us we could not sleep.

Mehmed Tschausch, the man, greatly revered Father, who writes you this letter, jumped up and shouted: 'Truly my Mother did not bear me that I should die here in this tent while my comrades outside take part in the greatest blessing of Allah. Who is a man amongst you, follow me.'

***Before the dawn broke we were marching with our weapons and our equipment in the direction from which stronger and stronger came the thunder of the cannon. So we marched for many hours along the road, and toward evening we came to a spring and slept there. As dawn broke came many men with camels, horses and mules, and we found one who was ready to show us the way to the tent of the German Liman Pasha. The march was heavier than the first day and we had no more bread or olives.

"We found the Pasha, he was kind to us as a father, gave us food and said to us: 'You have behaved badly because you have left your company without permission of your officers, but you have behaved like brave soldiers because you do not wish to remain idle while your comrades fought. Stay tonight by my tent and tomorrow I will send you against the enemy.'

"So we came to a regiment and found that the most of our comrades came from the district of Konia. They were big, strong men, and although they talked our language it was hard for us to understand it. Still, they gave us all we needed and showed us the trenches with the barbed wire in front, but our wish to see the enemy was not fulfilled. And as we peered we saw now and again the quick flash from similar trenches opposite us showing where the dogs lay who dared to tread on the land of our Caliph without his permission.

"Then came a night during which the earth trembled from the thunder of our rifles, and our hold Hodja, who had previously prayed with us, sprang from the trenches like a youngster although his hair was white, and he certainly was more than one hundred years old, and we stormed forwards behind him and what showed itself before us was killed without mercy.

"Apart from this I can only write you, my highly revered Father and dear Mother, that all goes well with me. For many days I have lain with many of our brothers in a big room and nurses in white clothing, who look after us like mothers or sisters, walk between our beds and tend to our slightest wish.

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"I shall soon be with you again and help you to bring in the harvest, because the old doctor has decided that I am not to fight again this year ***.

"Mehmed Tschausch, who writes you this letter, sends you, most revered Father and dear Mother, his greetings. He was himself wounded, and when he recovers he will come to visit us in our village.

"I kiss your hands and greet you, as well as my brothers and sisters.

Your devoted son,
Ismail."