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NAVAL OPERATIONS IN THE CRIMEAN WAR

STAFF PRESENTATION

RESTRICTED

DECLASSIFIED IAW DOD MEMO OF 3 MAY 1972, SUBJ:
DECLASSIFICATION OF WWII RECORDS

Naval War College
Newport, R.I.
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Political and Military Situation at Beginning
of Period.

SLIDE 1: MAP OF EUROPE, 1851

For thirty-five years there had been peace between the Great Powers of Europe. The outbreaks of 1848 had been put down. Rulers declared their love of peace. Russia, however, coveted the European provinces of the Ottoman Empire, which, commanding the Bosphorous and the Dardanelles, gave access to the Mediterranean. Any encroachment by Russia upon European Turkey, however, was seen by Austria to expose her to a partial encirclement; and, as a representative of German interests, felt herself responsible for preventing the Lower Danube, the main outlet for the products of Central Europe, from falling under the Czar's control. The King of Prussia, though brother-in-law to the Czar and favorably disposed toward him, was also a leading member of the German Confederation and could be counted on to at least discourage any scheme for the disturbance of the Ottoman Empire. France did not appear to have any deep interest in the integrity of Turkey, since many of her statesmen were of the opinion that a new Power in the Levant might be a convenient Ally against England, rather than a dangerous one against France. England, however,

accustomed to insisting upon the maintenance of the Ottoman Empire, did not relish the possible effect of Russia's becoming a Mediterranean Power.

Such was the aspect of Europe in relation to the Eastern Question in 1851, when an ancient quarrel between the Monks of the Greek and Latin churches in Palestine over possession of the Holy Places began to endanger the peace of the world.

The Ottoman Porte appointed a Commission to examine into these differences. The Commission decided in favor of the Latin claims. Russia, championing the Greek Church, promptly protested, believing the time favorable to dismember the Turkish Empire and to annex as Russia's share a large and rich portion, including Constantinople. Russia had recently rendered Austria military assistance in suppressing the Hungarian uprising, and now counted on her gratitude. Germany, and especially Prussia, still suffered from the effects of the revolutionary crisis of 1848. France was having domestic troubles. Great Britain appeared to be the only Power that had to be reckoned with, and the Czar believed a satisfactory understanding could be reached with that country.

When the Czar's plans became known, however, both England and France refused cooperation. The Czar, nevertheless, was unwilling to give up his project and decided to act independently before the others could agree on a common action; and if possible to confound their opposition with an accomplished fact.

Accordingly, on May 5, 1853, Prince Menschikoff, the Russian Ambassador in Constantinople, demanded "substantial and permanent guarantees on behalf of the Orthodox Church" and that every Orthodox subject of the Sultan be placed under the Czar's protection. Turkey refused. To submit would be to surrender her independence. On May 18th, the two countries severed relations, and the Czar informed the Sultan that Russia would occupy the Danubian Principalities until the Russian ultimatum was accepted.

France in the meantime ordered her Toulon Fleet to Salamis. Great Britain ordered her Mediterranean Fleet under Admiral Dundas to assemble at Malta, and on June 8th it was ordered to proceed to Besika Bay on the coast of Asia Minor between Lemnos and Tenedos, where it arrived on the 13th and where it should have found the French Fleet. The French Commander, Vice-Admiral de Lassusse, however, under-rating the seriousness of the political situation, did not use his steamers to tow his sailing ships, but proceeded slowly under sail to the rendezvous. His late arrival, at a time when neither Great Britain nor France wholly trusted the good faith of the other, created such a bad impression that he was immediately replaced by Vice-Admiral Ferdinand Alphonse Hamelin.

The Allied Fleets when they finally joined up in Besika Bay consisted of: seven British, and nine French ships of the line; and eight British and four French frigates, besides a number of smaller vessels. Neither of the flagships was a steamer.

The mobilization of the British and French Fleets was a demonstration designed to forestall aggressive action by Russia.

In the meantime, the Ambassadors of Great Britain, France and Prussia meeting with the Austrian Minister of Foreign Affairs at Vienna tried in vain to bring about a friendly settlement between Russia and the Ottoman Empire. Austria and Prussia balked the efforts of the other Powers to secure fair play for Turkey. Russia, accordingly, was led to believe that, Austria and Prussia favoring her, Great Britain and France would hesitate to take an active part in the quarrel.

SLIDE 2: MAP OF BLACK SEA, 1853

The Russians now entered the Danubian Principalities at the end of July, and the Sultan, forced by public opinion, declared war on October 4th.

SLIDE 3: ALLIED FLEETS IN BEIKOS BAY

In view of the possibility that with a fair wind the Russian Fleet might hazard a raid from Sevastopol on Constantinople, the Allied Fleets, at the end of October, entered the Bosphorous and anchored off Beikos opposite Therapia.

DISASTER AT SINOPE

Turkey now had to consider what action to take with her Fleet. Unfortunately, it was decided to send a light squadron of frigates and corvettes into the Black Sea to winter at Sinope, the only roadstead in which the Turks considered vessels could safely lie as regards weather. The squadron sailed about the middle of November. It consisted of six frigates, two corvettes, and two smaller steamers under command of Vice-Admiral Osman Pasha. The force was poorly organized, and the majority of the officers had no great energy or experience. Orders were given the captains of the ships not to fire upon the enemy unless first attacked.

In sending this weak force to a port only 180 miles from Sevastopol where there lay several line-of-battle ships, Turkey no doubt relied on the previous Russian circular of October 31 to the Powers that Russia would not take the offensive as long as her dignity and interests would permit. The British and French Fleets probably thought that their presence at Constantinople, and the fear of precipitating events, would keep Russia from striking.

The sea defenses at Sinope consisted of but four small batteries armed with 20 and 14-pounder smooth bores firing solid shot. They could not render much support to a squadron at anchor.

Almost immediately after the Turkish Squadron under Osman Pasha arrived at Sinope, three of Vice-Admiral Nakimoff's vessels from Sevastopol reconnoitered the Turkish squadron, venturing well within range of the feeble batteries, then returned with all speed. The Turkish Commander should have been warned of his danger, and should have sought refuge elsewhere, but he, too, apparently trusted to the presence of the Allied Fleets in the neighborhood, and so remained where he was. Unfortunately for him, Admirals Dundas and Hamelin had orders only to defend Constantinople from an attack from seaward, and to prevent a Russian disembarkation anywhere in the vicinity.

On November 30th, Nakimoff appeared before Sinope with six ships-of-the-line, two frigates, and three steamers. He had left four other frigates in the offing and had stationed fast dispatch vessels at intervals in the direction of the Bosphorous to obtain news of any movement by the Allies. As the Russians stood in, it recalled the incident of Nelson similarly standing in the Bay of Aboukir to attack an anchored fleet. But then the opposing forces were fairly well matched; but not so here. A few frigates could not

hope to contend successfully against such a force of ships-of-the-line. The Russians had a broadside of about 11,600 pounds against the Turkish 4,000 pounds. The Turks had no guns firing shells; the Russians had over 200.

The Turks were the first to open fire. They fought doggedly, but few of their guns could penetrate the hulls of the Russian ships, and they were themselves soon annihilated, nearly all the officers and men perishing with their ships. One ship, however, did escape. Very little damage was done to the Russians.

This battle was considered at the time to have demonstrated the deadly effect of shell fire on wooden ships, and led to the introduction of armour on a considerable scale.

EFFECT OF SINOPE ON EUROPE

The disaster of Sinope startled Europe, discredited the Vienna Conference, which had restrained Turkey without holding back Russia, and brought on the active interference of Great Britain and France. Their Fleets were now directed to enter the Black Sea and prevent any further attacks by the Russian Navy against the Ottoman flag. Any Russian men-of-war encountered and refusing to return to their ports were to be forcibly dealt with. A paddle frigate of 28 guns was dispatched to communicate this decision to the Russian authorities at Sevastopol. This frigate arriving off that port in a

fog was able to enter undetected. She was ordered to shift berth clear of range of the sea batteries before any message would be received. While moving to the outer anchorage her officers made a fair plan of the harbor defenses. Russia was already at war with Turkey, and there was a strong possibility of war with Great Britain and France, yet Russia had stationed no lookout vessels or guard-boats off Sevastopol.

SLIDE 4: CHART OF BLACK SEA

The Allied Fleets now, in accordance with their instructions, entered the Black Sea on January 3, 1854, and proceeded to Sinope. From there a British division under Rear Admiral Sir Edward Lyons, and a French division under Rear Admiral Lebardier de Tinan convoyed a number of Turkish steamers carrying needed troops and supplies to the garrisons at Trebizond, Batoum and Fort St. Nicolas. On return of these divisions to Sinope, the Allied Fleets again withdrew to the Bosphorous, only the steamships being left to show the flags in the Black Sea, both Admirals Dundas and Hamelin considering it unwise to expose sailing vessels unnecessarily at that time of the year.

Since the beginning of the year there had been fighting on the Danube. It becoming evident that the Turks could not hold back Russia's 180,000 men, Great Britain and France now, on February 27, 1854, summoned Russia to evacuate the

invaded principalities, a refusal to be considered cause for war. Russia refusing, the Allied Fleets got under way and arrived off Kavarna March 26th to support the retreating Turks. War was declared against Russia on March 27th, the two Powers concluding with the Turks an offensive and defensive alliance. Thus diplomacy was superseded by war in continuation of Great Britain's and France's policy, which called for the maintenance of Turkish integrity, the absorption of European Turkey into the Russian Empire being regarded as fatal to their own positions and future development.

ACTION AT ODESSA

Before war had been declared, a boat from H.M.S. FURIOUS was fired on at Odessa while bringing off the British Consul. The Allied Fleet now moved from Kavarna Bay to Odessa, and on April 22d, in retaliation, attacked the works protecting the military port, inflicting considerable damage to the storehouse in the dockyard and to shipping. During the confusion, most of the British and French merchantmen which had lain within the Quarantine Mole escaped.

RECONNOITERING OF EUPATORIA AND SEVASTOPOL

The Allied Squadrons then put to sea, and after reconnoitering Eupatoria on April 28th appeared the following day

off Sevastopol. Ten ships-of-the-line, eight frigates or corvettes, and five steamers were seen at anchor in the roadstead, and four other ships of the line, besides small craft, could be distinguished in the harbor, basins, and docks. The Russians made no sign of movement.

OPERATIONS ALONG EASTERN SHORES OF BLACK SEA

Early in May a British and a French Division under Sir Edmund Lyons and Commodore Vicomte de Chabannes, respectively, were detached to the eastern shores of the Black Sea where they destroyed several Russian military stations and captured several Russian brigs bound for Kertch with men and munitions from some of the abandoned fortresses. The Russian ports at Anapa and Soujak Kaleh were, however, too strong for attack. These detached forces rejoined the fleets off Kavarna on May 28th, the main parts of the combined fleets having returned there on May 20th. The ships had had but few difficulties to contend with, except being hampered by thick fogs, which were responsible for the loss of the British steam frigate TIGER.

DANUBE BLOCKADED

On June 1st, Vice Admiral Dundas blockaded the mouths of the Danube. This was the first sound strategical move of the Allied Commanders in the Black Sea. The attack on

Odessa had been merely a punitive operation. The raid to the eastward was not a good move, since it was not preceded by a strong blockade of such ports as Sevastopol and Kertch to intercept the fugitive Russian garrisons, which actually were able to make their way there by sea; and from where those who remained at Anapa and Soujak Kaleh still could draw supplies.

The blockade of the Danube mouths, on the other hand, threatened the communications of the Russians, who had been advancing southward, and who were then held in check before Silistria by the Turks at Shumla.

ALLIED TROOPS MOVE TO VARNA

By the end of May, about 32,000 French troops under Marshal Saint Arnaud, and about 18,000 British troops under Lord Raglan had been disembarked at Gallipoli, selected as a base of operations for the defense of Adrianople and Constantinople. Since these cities appeared no longer in danger of sudden attack, the Army Commanders concluded that they could best be employed at Varna, and accordingly requested the Allied Naval Commanders to take measures to cover the troop movement. Consequently, the ships of the line were retained off Kavarna to cover the projected landing and to protect the base, while the steam frigates of the two squadrons were dispatched to the neighborhood of Sevastopol to prevent interference from that quarter.

The transfer of the Army to Varna was effected without much difficulty. One French division marched overland; the other divisions made their way to Constantinople and embarked there for their destination, going on board a French squadron which, toward the end of June, anchored off Kavarna and became part of Vice Admiral Hamelin's command. All the British troops were moved in chartered transports, under convoy of Admiral Dundas' squadron, which was thus left unencumbered and ready for action during the voyage.

RUSSIANS RETIRE

No sooner had the Allied Armies been assembled at Varna than they learned that the Russian Army had unexpectedly raised the siege of Silistria and had retired. The retirement had been brought about by the mobilization of Austrian troops on the Russian right rear. Austria did not declare war, but the threat was enough to attain the original objective of the Allies.

Once more the Allied troops found themselves in a position where they could be of little immediate use. Still the Czar showed no inclination to treat. To follow up the retreating Russians was not deemed wise with forces available. The Allies, however, were supreme afloat, and operations by the fleets promised comparative easy victories.

EXPEDITIONARY INVASION OF THE CRIMEA

Before leaving London the Commander of the British Army, Lord Raglan, had been told to get all important military information about the Crimea, with a view to an offensive against it. Similarly, the French Commander, Marshal St. Arnaud, was told by his Emperor to coordinate measures with Lord Raglan.

Apparently, very little plan-making toward an offensive against the Crimea was done, however, until the middle of July, about one month after the Russians retired northward, when Lord Raglan received a letter of instructions from London definitely directing the destruction of Sevastopol and the Russian Fleet unless it was thought by those on the spot that their forces were insufficient. The British and French Governments were plainly in agreement as to the objective for their forces - the destruction of the Russian sea power in the Black Sea.

The war which had started out as a defensive one on the part of the Allies was now to become an offensive one.

The LONDON TIMES, on June 15th, declared: "The grand political and military objects of the war could not be attained as long as Sevastopol and the Russian Fleet were in existence; but that, if that central position of the Russian power in the south of the Empire were annihilated, the whole fabric, which it had cost the Czars of Russia centuries to raise, must fall to the ground"; and, "that taking of Sevastopol

and the occupation of the Crimea were objects which would repay all the costs of the war, and would permanently settle in our favor the principal questions in dispute; and that it was equally clear that those objects were to be accomplished by no other means- because a peace which should leave Russia in possession of the same means of aggression would only enable her to re-commence the war at her pleasure." (1)

Most of the history of this invasion has to do with the land operations, notably the great battles and the actual siege of Sevastopol. We are interested here, however, with the naval operations, so we will mention those conducted by the armies only, as far as appears necessary to an understanding of the maritime operations.

At this period, navies and merchant shipping were changing from sail to steam. Small steamers such as tow-boats were becoming plentiful, but in most other types steam was auxiliary to sail power. There were battleships with steam power, but very few; the proportion of steam frigates was greater.

It should also be borne in mind that this invasion was carried out by the French and British at a distance of 3,000 miles from their homelands, their only source of most supplies; and passages then took about three times as long as now.

In view of Russia's national policy regarding Turkey, Sevastopol had been given strong coast defenses and made into

(1) Kinglake's Invasion of the Crimea (Student's Ed.), p.95.

a first-rate naval base. The lower part of the Crimean Peninsula had some local resources, but the upper part was a barren steppe. There were then no railroads and the land communications were long, over poor roads, via Perekop or to the eastward via Simferopol, the principal interior city. The routes down the neck of the Peninsula could not be approached closely from sea, because of shallow water. An even more important line of communications was that across the Sea of Azov to Kertch and then to Simferopol. This enclosed sea is entered by a narrow passage, also thru shoal water, and is itself quite shoal throughout. The water communication to Kertch could be cut by light naval forces, except perhaps in winter, when they would be uncertain, anyhow. The entire south coast of the Crimea is bold and steep. Sevastopol is the only secure harbor. All others are open anchorages, or small ones like Balaclava. A few miles north of Sevastopol the coast flattens out somewhat, and there are long sand beaches with fair depth of water close by.

The Russians had based on Sevastopol 14 sailing ships-of-the-line, some sailing frigates, and 12 war-steamers, of which two were powerful frigates. Since the beginning of the year (1854) the Allied Fleet had outmatched this force, particularly since some of the British and French battleships had steam power.

It might be well here to say something about the Commanders of the various forces and their relation to each other.

SLIDE 5: LORD RAGLAN

Lord Raglan, commanding the British Army, was a young staff officer during the Napoleonic Wars serving in important billets. Since then he had for 40 years been at Embassies and in Secretarial Posts. Now, at 66, with almost no experience in command, even during peace, he was in high command during war. He was, however, a strong man, very tactful, able to influence and even dominate others, and of high natural ability.

SLIDE 6: ADMIRAL SIR JAMES W.D. DUNDAS, G.C.B.

Admiral Dundas, commanding the British Fleet, aged 69, had had considerable political experience and influence. He was making his last cruise, for which he had chosen the quiet waters of the Mediterranean. He was a capable seaman, and seems to have had sound common sense and judgment, but his days of dash and enterprise had passed.

SLIDE 7: VICE ADMIRAL LORD LYONS, Bart., G.C.B., D.C.L.

The second in command, Vice-Admiral Lord Lyons, was a man of great ability and energy. He was said to look like

Nelson, and tried to live up to it. Lyons was in direct charge of the convoy and landing of the troops, and retained close personal relations with Lord Raglan.

Marshal St. Arnaud, Commander of the French Forces (both Army and Navy) was about 57. His military experience was largely that of a regimental officer in Algeria with the Foreign Legion. He owed his position to his part in the conspiracy which placed Louis Napoleon on his throne. St. Arnaud had much natural ability, but was uncertain in character and temperment. He was greatly hampered by ill-health, and was succeeded by General Canrobert, about 10 days after the landing in the Crimea. The French Fleet was commanded by Vice-Admiral Hamelin directly under the orders of the Commander of the French Army.

The Russian Forces in the Crimea, including their fleet, were commanded by Prince Mentschikoff, the same man who had been representing the Czar diplomatically at Constantinople. General Todleben was the Engineer Officer.

SLIDE 8: GENERAL TODLEBEN

The Russian Admiral Korniloff appears to have had ability and energy. Korniloff commanded afloat and ashore during the first month of the siege of Sevastopol, and showed high qualities as a leader.

The British and French Governments had instructed their Commanders to "act in concert". In general, they did so. In the end, Lord Raglan dominated St. Arnaud when great decisions were involved. As previously stated, St. Arnaud was in supreme command over the French Army and Squadrons (the Turkish contingent accepted his command also). The British forces were under their usual arrangement in which General and Admiral were co-equal and expected to cooperate. Admiral Dundas was usually in disagreement, but did comply with all direct requests made upon him. Under these arrangements, the British and French Admirals were called upon to act in cooperation. And, in the main, they did so, without serious conflict. But these conditions made for difficulties and involved danger, particularly while command of the sea was in dispute. Time was wasted when the situation called for quick decisions and rapid movement.

Upon receipt of the British Government's instructions to Lord Raglan, a Council of War met on 18 July 1854, attended by the Army and Navy Commanders of all Allied Forces at Varna. All brought out their instructions and such information of the enemy's situation as was available. It was the general opinion that this information was so meager and unreliable as to make an invasion of the Crimea inadvisable. Lord Raglan, however, in view of his instructions could not very well emphasize such a view. Admiral Dundas, however,

was decidedly opposed, basing his objection upon the risk to the British Army. He agreed to land it, but would not guarantee to be able to keep it supplied, or bring it back. The French Commander did not favor the expedition, but did not emphatically object. The seconds in command of the two fleets were the only ones wholly approving. Such was the state of mind when the Council decided to embark upon the invasion - because their Governments desired it.

Preparations were now started by the British - the French having already begun theirs. It was estimated all would be ready in 10 days.

SLIDE 9: PART OF WESTERN AND SOUTHERN COASTS OF THE CRIMEA

On July 25th the Allied Fleets sailed to reconnoiter the ground. The bulk of the Fleets lay off Sevastopol, while a small steamer with all the seconds in command of the allied armies and fleets deliberately examined the West Coast of the Crimea. The mouth of the Kacha River, about 6 miles north of Sevastopol, was tentatively chosen as the place to land. Little pains were taken at deception. No attempt apparently was made to gain information from the inhabitants or by landing their own agents.

The Allied Fleets now returned to Varna by 30 July. No attempt was made to blockade Sevastopol, or even keep it

under observation. The Russian Fleet was therefore left entirely free to move, and this condition lasted up to the time the expedition actually arrived to land.

The Allied preparations were not only not completed by the end of July but also took up all of August. A very severe outbreak of cholera, a fire at Varna, and an incursion in force which St. Arnaud insisted upon making into the Dobrudja as a diversion, all hampered these preparations. Talk of abandoning the project was continuous.

Another Council of War was held August 26th to decide the matter. Admiral Dundas repeated his objections, pointing out that the good weather would be nearly ended and that with no good ports from which to supply and assure support by the fleet it was hazardous to land the army against land forces of unknown composition. To go, however, was finally decided. The idea seems to have been to land, march upon Sevastopol, beat any troops encountered, seize and destroy the port and the Russian fleet - then to re-embark - all a matter of a few days.

The land forces that composed the expedition were about 60,000 Infantry and Field Artillery, with 130 guns, and 1200 Cavalry. Total number of horses being about 6,000. There were also in the ships' holds a large number of siege guns. These figures included 10 Battalions of Turks under St. Arnaud, otherwise the force was fairly equally divided between the French and British. All the Cavalry was British.

The Russian Army in the Crimea numbered about 50,000, four-fifths of which were under Mentschikoff's personal command in or near Sevastopol. Besides these, there were 6,000 fortress troops and 18,000 naval personnel who manned the defenses during the first few weeks. The information sent out by the Allied Governments proved to be not far from correct. Rumors, however, ran as high as 120,000 Russians.

The embarkation was made at Varna, a somewhat open harbor with no waterfront improvements except temporary piers built in preparation. The British had collected chartered merchant ships sufficient to carry their entire contingent; furthermore, a third of them were steam ships able to tow the remainder, which were sailing ships. The French (including the Turkish contingent) had agreed similarly to provide themselves, but did not succeed. They lacked transports for 20,000 men and had to fill all their own warships to absolute limit of capacity. Also, not all the French sailing ships could be towed, and they used such small ships that excessive numbers had to be included. All told, there were about 375 ships in the combined fleets and convoy. The French had provided 40 square-ended scows for handling troops, horses, and heavy equipment between ship and shore. During the passage these were lashed alongside the ships or towed. The British prepared 24 "gun-flats", which were platforms built over pairs of boats lashed together. Ordinary ships'

boats were depended upon for landing infantry; of these boats the British had 326.

Loading of heavy stores began 24 August, and after the Council of War of 26 August embarkation began in earnest. It was planned to assemble the entire fleet and convoy when loaded in Baljik Bay, just north of Varna, and to sail from there in company. The 2nd of September was set for sailing. The French were ready, but the English not until the 6th, giving their reason for their tardiness to the great number of horses they had to load and that for two days the harbor was too rough to handle them.

At any rate, by the 5th, St. Arnaud could contain his temper no longer and he put to sea with a part of his force all under sail. All the French (and Turkish) warships were so jammed with troops and baggage that they could not have fought with their guns. As a matter of fact, the only protection that the expedition ever had while enroute was in Admiral Dundas' squadron which, on paper, was weaker than the Russian Fleet. Yet, St. Arnaud was at sea until the 8th, covering one-fourth of the distance to the Crimea, with a mass of defenseless ships crowded with troops. He should not have gone out but, since he did, Admiral Dundas should have also gone out to cover the movement.

The remaining French and all the British finally sailed the morning of the 7th. The British had been slow, but they were well loaded and organized.

SLIDE 10: BRITISH PORTION OF ALLIED EXPEDITION
CROSSING BLACK SEA

SLIDE 4 : CHART OF BLACK SEA

The British convoy, under Admiral Lyons, was all in tow at about 4 knots, in six columns, so arranged as to keep the British Army organizations together and disposed for an orderly landing. Note that each steamer is towing two sailing ships. Personnel was mostly carried in the steam transports. Admiral Dundas detached himself from the convoy and with the remaining British Naval Forces acted on the "covering force" principle, though he seems to have covered only the British ships. The French and Turks, moreover, were largely under sail and were considerably scattered throughout the voyage. However, there was a juncture of kind on the 8th, and the expedition proceeded more or less in company toward a rendezvous 40 miles west of the landing point.

While enroute there St. Arnaud asked Lord Raglan and Admiral Dundas by signal to come aboard his ship, the Marshal being too ill to move, and hardly able to speak. St. Arnaud presented a paper pointing out great objections to landing on the west coast and recommending changing the destination to Kaffa, a port over 100 miles east of Sevastopol, but indicated his willingness to leave the decision to Lord Raglan. It was then decided that the theater should be further reconnoitered. Accordingly, on the 9th, the expedition anchored

in deep water 40 miles at sea and badly scattered. The British convoy, however, was anchored together and covered by its own fleet. The following morning Lord Raglan, accompanied by most of the seconds in command, examined the coast from Balaclava northward, with no attempt at concealment. Objections of a local nature were seen to the landing point first chosen, and a better place found at Old Fort, 20 miles farther north. Here was a longer and more open beach.

SLIDE 11: LANDING PLACES OF ALLIES

The ground in-shore was flatter and two shallow lakes would be in the way of any opposing forces. Decision was reached to follow the original plan, except with this modification. Yet delays continued. It took three more days - until September 13th, for the expedition to reach Eupatoria, a rendezvous near the landing point.

French transports were at sea for eight days, with practically no protection for two of them, and in large part vulnerable to Russian naval attack for the remaining six. The Russians could undoubtedly have inflicted severe losses by action of their best steam frigates alone. It is said that Admiral Korniloff wished to make some effort at keeping the sea but was held back by Prince Mentschikoff, who was in supreme command. In view, at least, of the French commander's attitude toward the invasion, had the venture been made, the

Russians might have lost their fleet, but their port might have been saved for a long time. By staying in harbor, both fleet and port were lost.

The Allies erred strategically when they failed to blockade Sevastopol during the passage of the military expedition, and they erred tactically when they left half the expeditionary forces without protection of the British covering-force. These errors might have been fatal had the Russian fleet been used as a fleet instead of as fortifications.

Also, in not doing all that could have been done toward surprising the enemy, the Allied leaders lost sight of one of the most important and valuable factors in naval warfare - rapid and unexpected movement.

The Russian fleet should have taken the strategic defensive, disputing control wherever chance offered. Its withdrawal into the fortified base of Sevastopol was a wrong conception of "a fleet in being" and left the Allied Fleets in control of the sea communications.

Mentschikoff had not foreseen the probability of an attack during 1854, though Prince Gortschakoff who commanded in the Dobrudja, having concluded that such were his enemy's intentions, had sent his Engineer Todleben to convey that information to Mentschikoff, and, incidentally, to make the best engineer of Russia available to Sevastopol. Todleben arrived on August 22d, but Mentschikoff would not

believe in any possible invasion so late in the season.

On 14 September the Allies made a feint at the mouth of the Kacha and the landing began at Old Fort under cover of the guns of the fleet.

The French were the prompter in beginning it and got along faster, being better equipped with boats and scows, and also having their naval forces to assist. On the other hand, most of the British fleet lay off toward Sevastopol to cover the landing. There was no opposition to the landing during the first day. By evening, 40,000 Infantry and 30 field guns were ashore. However, four additional days were required to complete the remainder of the landing, the horses and heavy equipment being handled with difficulty through the surf.

The armies now began the march south along the shore, carrying everything along, and fought the battle of Alma on the 20th. Mentschikoff's force of 35,000 was driven out of position, but the plan to attack Sevastopol from the north was abandoned, largely due to the uncertainty in the Allied communication line, and the British led a very dangerous march by the flank around the city. The remains of the Russian field army marched out just ahead of them, but did not attack. The British Fleet, upon receiving notice of the change in plans, sent a detachment around and attacked Balaclava. Its small garrison surrendered as the allied troops drew near.

SLIDE 12: H.M.S. AGAMEMNON ENTERING BALACLAVA HARBOR

SLIDE 13: BALACLAVA HARBOR, October, 1854

The French Fleet took over Kamiesch, and now the work of getting up the siege guns was started. It was slow work, and the batteries were not ready for a bombardment until 17 October.

All this time the Russian Fleet had made no move toward going to sea.

SLIDE 4: SEVASTOPOL, October 17, 1854

Instead, after Alma had been fought, they moved a line of heavy ships across the entrance of Sevastopol, and then sank them in place. This had the effect of locking the remaining Russian ships in and those of their enemy out. The Russian fleet's part was now directly in the siege. It landed guns and all of its 18,000 personnel, which was a considerable portion of the strength of the Russian lines; in fact, during the most critical time, over two-thirds of that strength. The Russian Fleet had lost its chance upon the landing of the invading force; having done so, the action which it subsequently took was probably the best thing open to it.

SLIDE 15: NAVAL ENGAGEMENT of 17 October 1854

SLIDE 16: BRITISH ATTACK ON NORTH FORTS

At the urgent request of the Allied Generals for co-operation, the Allied Fleets took part in the opening bombardment on 17 October. It is said that the primary object of the fleet's part was to oblige the Russians to man their sea-batteries, and thus reduce the number of artillerymen available for manning the works facing landwards. Admiral Dundas, however, did not approve of these operations, being strongly of the opinion "that it was not the business of wooden walls to pit themselves against stone ones." (1)

Under fire of 1100 ships' guns (two alone firing over 6,000 shots) no more than 138 Russians were killed or wounded. The Allies had two English ships so crippled that they had to be sent to Constantinople for repairs, and many others were badly damaged. The French Admiral's flagship, the VILLE de PARIS, received 50 shots in her hull, and 9 officers of the Admiral's staff were killed or wounded. In killed or wounded, the Allies lost 520 men (not including the Turks). No impression was made on the forts or shore batteries.

After the bombardment, Admiral Dundas wrote to Lord Raglan: "The action of the 17th was a false one, and which I decline to repeat. It is one that I accepted with reluctance, and with which as a naval commander I am dissatisfied." (2)

(1) The Royal Navy- A History, by Wm. Laird Clowes, p. 437.

(2) Kinglake's Invasion of the Crimea (Student's Ed.), p.259

SEVASTOPOL BESIEGED

The bombardment by the Allied Armies on the land forts also failed, and they now embarked on a long and costly siege which was to last a year.

During the siege, the Allied Naval Forces handled the overseas supply problems. Supplies finally became sufficient, but conditions were very unsatisfactory during the autumn and winter, particularly for the British.

SLIDE 17: ALLIED FLEET PERSONNEL AND MATERIAL LANDED AT SEVASTOPOL

Allied warships also landed personnel to assist with the siege batteries.

FLEETS DAMAGED BY HURRICANE

On November 14, 1854, a hurricane of great violence devastated the coasts of the Crimea. The British lost 34 transports and other vessels off Balaclava, many of the crews perishing. Fourteen transports were lost off the Kacha River, and two French line-of-battle ships were driven ashore.

OPERATIONS IN SEA OF AZOV

In the Spring of 1855, when it was seen that the Russian Fleet had no intention of putting to sea, it was decided that

the presence of Allied Naval Forces off Sevastopol was almost useless.

SLIDE 18: MAP OF SEA OF AZOV

Accordingly, it was decided to send an expedition through the Strait of Kertch into the Sea of Azov where the Russians had large stores of supplies that might be reached without much difficulty.

A joint expedition under Vice-Admirals Lyons and Bruat was made up and sailed from Kamiesch Bay on May 22d. Reaching a point a few miles below Kertch on the morning of May 24th, troops were thrown ashore, while some of the lighter vessels pushed on towards Kertch and Yenikale.

SLIDE 19: LANDING OF ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
NEAR KERTCH

The Russians, however, did not await the attack, but blew up the fortifications on both sides of the Strait, abandoned about 100 guns, and retired after destroying three steamers and several other heavily armed vessels, as well as large quantities of provisions, ammunition and stores. At Kertch and Yenikale about 12,000 tons of coal were taken by the Allies.

On the 25th, Lyons and Bruat despatched a squadron of light vessels under Captain Edmund Mowbray Lyons into the Sea of Azov with orders to take or sink as many as possible of the enemy's warships and merchantmen and to destroy such stores as might be useful to the Russian Army.

Four days after entering the Sea of Azov, Captain Lyons wrote: "The enemy has lost four steamers-of-war, 246 merchant vessels, also corn and flour magazines to the value of at least £150,000." He afterwards estimated the amount of corn destroyed as sufficient to supply 100,000 men for nearly four months.

Other expeditions were later despatched to the area during the summer of 1855, destroying large quantities of supplies in its ports and practically destroying the Russians' communications across the Sea of Azov.

SLIDE 20: DESTRUCTION OF GRAIN AND STORES
AT GENITCHI, May 29, 1855

SLIDE 21: ATTACK ON TAGANROG, June, 1855

According to some writers, France "forbade her cruisers to trouble the coast fisheries or seize any vessel or boat engaged therein, unless naval or military operations should make it necessary." Contemporaneous reports of British naval officers, however, state "that the destruction -- was part of

a military measure, conducted with the cooperation of the French ships." (1)

RUSSIAN WITHDRAWAL FROM SEVASTOPOL

During the night of September 8th, following a 3-day bombardment by the Allied Armies, the Russians withdrew from Sevastopol. Prior to their leaving they blew up their forts, destroyed their ships and dock-yard facilities.

CAPTURE OF KINBURN

SLIDE 22: CHART OF KHERSON BAY

On September 30th the Allied Naval and Military Commander-in-Chief determined to make an attack upon Kinburn. This fortress occupied the western extremity of the spit which forms the southern boundary of the basin into which flows the Dnieper, and the combined streams of the rivers Bug and Ingul. At the junction of these last two rivers was situated the important naval arsenal Nikolaev, while near the mouth of the Dnieper was Kherson, one of the richest commercial centers of Russia. Possession of Kinburn would completely close navigation to or from the Bug and Dnieper, and would also menace the communications and rear of the Russian Army still in the Crimea.

(1) International Law, Naval War College, 1904, p. 93.

A powerful joint expedition was fitted out under command of Admirals Lyons and Bruat, and on October 17, 1855, (mainly with the aid of three French ironclads known as floating batteries which had but recently arrived from Europe) caused the surrender of the fortress at Kinburn with but slight damage to themselves. These French ironclads of 1600 tons displacement, protected by $4\frac{1}{2}$ inch forged iron plates and armed with 16, 56-pounder smooth bore guns, were built as a result of the battle of Sinope, previously described. (1) They were the earliest armored steam-ships to appear in action, and operations at Kinburn were among the earliest operations on a large scale in which only steam vessels were employed. (2)

SLIDE 23: CAPTURE OF KINBURN AND BATTERIES ON SPIT

Kinburn was occupied by the Allies, and a division of ships, including the French floating batteries, was ordered to remain before it as long as the sea remained open. The remainder of the expedition returned to the neighborhood of Sevastopol, arriving there November 3d.

The occupation of Kinburn practically ended the campaign, as far as the Navy was concerned. From then on, the Allied Forces in the Black Sea confined themselves to holding such positions as they had won and to destroying captured works and public buildings.

(1) Battle-ships in Action - H.W. Wilson, p. 2.

(2) The Royal Navy, A History - by W.C. Cowles, p. 470.

The war actually ended with the ratifying of the Treaty of Paris, April 27, 1856. Its close was also marked by the famous Declaration of Paris of April 16, 1856, regarding privateering, enemy and neutral goods, and blockades.

GENERAL COMMENT

The Crimean War demonstrated the range and potential effectiveness of armies based on sea power.

The military policy of the Allies was at first defensive. After the Russians withdrew from the Danubian Principalities, however, it became offensive, the Allied Governments deciding to invade the Crimea. Limited isolation was possible by naval action, due to the length and difficulty of the enemy's land communications and to the Crimea's strategic situation. There, Russia was at great disadvantage in the matter of communications compared with the Allies. It was a war by contingent or war with a "disposal force", which Corbett says, "attains the highest success when it approaches most closely to a true limited war, where its object is to wrest or secure from the enemy a definite piece of territory that, to a greater or less extent, can be isolated by naval action." (1)

(1) Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, Corbett. p. 53.

No account has been given of naval operations elsewhere than in the Black Sea. Allied Fleets, however, operated throughout the war in the Baltic. The Allied offensive in the Black Sea uncovered the British Islands and the coasts of France. The Allies, therefore, supplemented their movement against their limited objective in the Crimea by sending their main fleets to hold the exits to the Baltic against the danger of an unlimited counter-stroke by the Russians. (1)

Russia's military policy was at first offensive, her army invading Turkey's European provinces and her fleet attacking the Turks at Sinope. But when Austria unexpectedly mobilized, her policy became defensive, and she withdrew her army from Silistria.

In conclusion:

Turkish strategy in sending a weak squadron to winter at Sinope within easy striking distance of Russia's Fleet at Sevastopol violated the principle of superiority. The Russian Fleet's failure to maintain guard vessels off Sevastopol, making it possible for the British despatch frigate to enter undetected, was a neglect of the principle of security. The early blockading of the Danube mouths by the Allied Fleet was a correct application of this principle - a threat against the communications of the Russian army before Silistria. It

(1) Some Principle of Maritime Strategy, p. 68.

was violated by the Allies when they did not do all they could to obtain information concerning the enemy's strength in the Crimea. Likewise, when the French and Turks failed to provide sufficient transports for carrying all their troops, but instead crowded their combatant ships to such an extent that their guns could not have been fought; and, when part of the French Force sailed from Varna for the Crimea with no covering force to protect it. Also, when the Allies did not blockade Sevastopol during the passage of the military expedition.

It has been said that perhaps Sevastopol was purposely *not* blockaded in order to induce the Russian Fleet to come out. This was hardly the reason, however, since the primary function of the Allied Fleets at that time was not to destroy the Russian Fleet but to prevent interference with the Expedition. The probable reason was that in using French and Turkish warships as transports the numerical superiority required for a close blockade was not available.

The Allies did not apply the principle of unity of command - at least not in the highest echelon. Instead, they relied on cooperation.

By not doing all that could have been done toward surprising the Russians by rapid and unexpected movement, the principles of surprise and of movement were neglected.

The Russians made no attempt at naval defense. Instead, they used their fleet as a fortress fleet, a wrong conception of the principle of "a fleet in being." By so doing, they gave undisputed control of the sea to the Allies - a clear passage for their troops to their objective, the Russian Army in the Crimea. Considering the encumbered condition of the French and Turkish squadrons, there was strong possibility that the Russian Fleet, with a fair wind and good officers, could, by boldly attacking, have inflicted havoc on the transports and troops. The only protection they had during the passage was in Admiral Dundas' squadron, which on paper was weaker than the Russian Fleet. By remaining in Sevastopol, no success was possible. If the superiority of the Allied Fleets could have been reduced, the Allied grip on the Crimea would have been lost. Or, had their troop strength been so reduced as to permit their later defeat by the Russian Army, the presence of the Allied Fleets would no longer have had any vital effect - at least not until more troops could have been sent out from Europe and another expedition made up.

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