


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THE ORGANIZATION OF NAVAL COMMAND



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Newport, R. I.

November, 1937

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THE ORGANIZATION OF NAVAL COMMAND
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THE ORGANIZATION OF NAVAL COMMAND

I. THE NAVAL HIGH COMMAND

1. Command vs. Administration.

This paper on the subject of "The Organization of Naval Command" is designed to develop in somewhat greater detail the views on Command expressed in Chapters II and III of the pamphlet "Sound Military Decision". It proposes to set forth the manner in which the theory of military command has been given practical application in the case of the United States Navy.

We may note that there are two particular aspects of Command: 1st, the Organization of Command; and 2d, the Art of Command. The present discussion will not cover the Art of Command, which concerns itself principally with the attributes of the individual, but will confine itself to a discussion of the Organization of Command. The laws and customs relating to this aspect control the relationships between the various parts of the Naval Establishment, and, during war, will influence the effectiveness with which the naval effort may be directed toward the accomplishment of the War Task. But students of warfare will do well to study the personalities and characters of the great military commanders, and to establish for themselves a philosophic basis for successful leadership. There is already an abundant bibliography on the Art of Command, and the Library Index may be consulted for guidance in the selection of suitable expositions of that portion of this general subject.

Military literature makes frequent use of the two terms "Command" and "Administration". All are aware that there is a difference between the two, and probably few experienced officers would err in the correct classification of any particular act of a naval commander. But the difference between them, and their dependence upon one another, so closely affect our responsibilities as naval officers, that we may usefully spend a few moments in seeking exact definitions.

The New Oxford Dictionary defines "Command" as: "The exercise of authority, rule, control, (or) sway; (the) power of control, disposal, or direction". It defines "Administration" as the "Management (of any business);" "The control of the course of affairs". We find that the British Navy employs the term "business" to cover many of the activities which we include in the term "administration".

Major General McGlachlin of the United States Army has defined "Command" as: "That military agency which organizes, indoctrinates, plans, and executes". When used in the abstract sense, we can scarcely agree that "Command" is an "agency", but we can agree that it is essentially military. Besides noting that Command is military, Marshal Foch defined its relation to Administration by stating that: "The primary object of the War Organization is to facilitate Command -- that is, to ensure that every man in the force acts promptly in response to the will of the Commander. A secondary object of War Organization is to

facilitate Administration, or the supply of each individual in the force with all that he requires to make it possible for him not only to live, but to move and fight." Darrieus throws light on the nature of Command when he says: "The object of Command is to unite and concentrate all the scattered forces that are represented in each individuality, and to bind them together. It manifests itself in the subordination of all wills to the single will."

We might quote other authorities, but, though we might discover that opinions vary as to detail, we would find substantial agreement as to the essential nature of those two methods of control. Thus, Command is always military, though Administration need not be. Command relates always to the direction of military action, which is entirely in the world of ideas, whereas administration concerns the management of persons or things, which usually can be classified as relating to the material world. Finally, Command concerns the execution, for a particular and special purpose, of the definitely expressed will of a single, controlling head, while Administration is a more highly diversified control exercised by numerous agencies for more general purposes. Just where to draw the line between the two may sometimes be a matter of choice.

We choose to draw this line by saying that Command is the direction of organized forces in the performance of military acts, in compliance with superior will. In the military sphere,

Administration is the management of the material means required for the performance of military acts. In this paper we will employ these two terms in the sense of the definitions just stated. Other definitions might be acceptable, but those given will be found very convenient, and fully in accord with actual military practice, and with the conception of them found in the Navy Regulations. Essentially, our distinction between Command and Administration occurs at the line of demarkation between the control of the military action which is designed to bring pressure upon the enemy, and the management of the material objects, including persons, which make such action possible.

Historians point out that in the past Command has been organized in several different ways. Committees, both on the highest and on the more junior echelons, have sometimes exercised command, the several members of the committees having equal voice in all decisions. The results of this dispersion of authority have usually been disastrous. Another method has been for rulers, or highly placed civilians, to attempt the conduct of war with the assistance of several experienced military advisers but without giving a single adviser any personal responsibility. A variation of this system is the practice of holding Councils of War for the purpose of reaching decisions. Where the supreme commander himself lacks the experience and seasoned judgment to make correct military decisions, he is unlikely to distinguish sound from unsound advice, and therefore will usually be

unsuccessful when employing these methods. Jomini wrote:

"I have undergone a pitiable experience as prompter at headquarters, and no one has a better appreciation of the value of such services than myself; and it is particularly in a council of war that such a part is absurd. The greater the number and the higher the rank of the military officers who compose the council, the more difficult will it be to accomplish the triumph of truth and reason, however small be the amount of dissent."

Closely articulated amphibious campaigns have often been launched under the direction of a command divided between the commanders of the sea and the land forces. The British still favor this system. Where the leaders of both groups have cooperated unselfishly, or where one, through force of character, has dominated a reluctant colleague, success has sometimes been attained with a divided command of this nature. However, the American military services hold the view that difficult expeditions under a divided command are more likely to fail than to succeed.

We may also recall that, in operations between Allies of different nationality, unified command of all the military components of a force is the rare exception rather than the rule. Consequently, allied military operations have been notoriously ineffective. Both the expression of decisions and the direction of action have been confused, and the results have usually fallen short of expectations.

The system that has been the most successful has been where the supreme command has been entrusted to a single individual,

experienced in the practical direction of military operations, and having the character and ability to shoulder full responsibility for the acts of his subordinates. Only under this system can the will of the Commander be conveyed to his command as a clearly-defined, unswerving purpose, and thus give a firm foundation for satisfactory unified action.

It is equally necessary that administration be guided into clearly-defined channels, and that all individuals understand their positions in the administrative as well as in the command organizations. Foch mentioned the fact that responsible officers in the field are usually charged both with command duties and with administrative duties. We recognize this from our own experience, and know that a Commander will always expend much time and energy in maintaining his personnel and material in a condition suitable for performing the military action he contemplates.

Our definitions stated that administration is concerned primarily with the management of the material means of action, and that command concerns the direction of the military action itself. Aside from this difference there is, in the actual functioning of these two methods of control, a difference as regards the immediate consequences of lost time or of misdirected effort. In the case of Administration, for example, time may be available for composing differences or correcting errors. Where purely military action is concerned, however, wasted time may be the one cause of complete disaster. Therefore, it is necessary

that Command be organized in a manner that will provide a rapid and accurate control.

Nevertheless, to a Commander it is even more important during war than during peace that his available means of action are adequate for his task, and that they are ready for use when needed. While it is the province of his superiors to provide him with his weapon, it is his own daily concern to maintain, and even to increase, its effectiveness. To achieve satisfactory results, he must therefore discharge both his command and his administrative duties effectively.

The Navy Regulations recognize a difference between Command and Administration, and between the channels through which they are exercised. Some naval agencies are concerned solely with administration, a few solely with command, and many are concerned with both. Therefore, it seems important that we inquire rather closely into the organization and the operation of these two methods of control in our own Service. In this inquiry, we will commence with the Navy Department itself.

2. The Organization of the Navy Department.

Without tracing the history of the Navy Department in detail, we may recall that in 1798 it was established by Act of Congress, the Marine Corps becoming part of it during the same year. The Department passed through a period of control exercised by the Secretary in person, and through a period where he acted through the agency of the Navy Commissioners. In 1842 the Bureau system was set up by law. The enactments governing the

activities of the Navy which concern us for the moment are as follows:

"There shall be at the seat of the Government an Executive Department, to be known as the Department of the Navy, and a Secretary of the Navy, who shall be the head thereof."

The Secretary of the Navy "shall execute such orders as he shall receive from the President".

"The business of the Department of the Navy shall be distributed among the Bureaus in such manner as the Secretary of the Navy shall judge to be expedient and proper. All duties of said Bureaus shall be performed under the authority of the Secretary of the Navy, and their orders shall be considered as emanating from him, and shall have full force and effect as such."

The law has never clearly traced the line of Command from the President, through the various intervening agencies, to the forces at sea. With one or two important exceptions, Congress has refrained from legislating on the subject of Command, though it has passed numerous laws to regulate Administration. However, the line of command authority exists, whether or not we pass laws on the subject. This line derives from the President personally, who is, under the Constitution, the "Commander in Chief of the Army and the Navy of the United States, and of the militia of the several states, when called into the service of the United States". From the President, command authority passes to the Secretary of the Navy. Under the Bureau system, the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation gradually acquired the practical direction of naval command, acting always under the authority of the Secretary, but without any specific grant to do so.

But if the line of command was not well defined, certainly we can not say the same of the line of Administration, the "business of the Navy", which is subject to allocation by the Secretary. By Navy Regulations the Bureau of Navigation is charged with the "procurement, education, training, discipline, and distribution" of naval personnel; the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery with the "maintenance of the health of the Navy" and the "care of the sick and injured"; the Judge Advocate General with "all matters of law arising in the Navy Department"; the Bureau of Yards and Docks with all "public works and public utilities of the shore establishment"; the Bureau of Ordnance with the "design, manufacture, procurement, maintenance and issue of all offensive and defensive arms and armament"; the Bureau of Construction and Repair with the "general design, the structural strength, stability, and seaworthiness of all ships of the Navy"; the Bureau of Engineering with the "design, construction, installation, and maintenance of all propelling machinery", auxiliaries and electrical apparatus; the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts with the procurement, etc., of all supplies and fuel; the disbursement of funds and the keeping of accounts; the Bureau of Aeronautics with "all that relates to the design, construction, fitting out, testing, repair, and alteration of aircraft"; and Marine Corps Headquarters with the administration and general efficiency of that corps.

Because the Bureau Organization finally proved ineffective in the discharge of the functions of Command, after the turn of the century a movement began for the creation of a naval general staff. This movement was side-tracked when Secretary Meyer established the Aid system, under which the activities of the Department, aside from those purely civil, were grouped into four military divisions known as "Naval Operations", "Personnel", "Material", and "Inspection". This system was never satisfactory, and in 1915 it was abolished through the enactment of legislation establishing the Office of Naval Operations. We may remark, however, that three of the Aid Divisions occupied positions which corresponded approximately to three of the Divisions of the Army General Staff created at about the same time, viz., "Operations and Training", "Personnel", and "Supply".

The statutes and the Navy Regulations now give to the Chief of Naval Operations, "under the direction of the Secretary of the Navy", control over the "operations of the Fleet, and - - - the preparation and readiness of plans for its use in war". "His orders shall be considered as emanating from the Secretary". He is the executive authority in the Department next in succession to the Secretary and the Assistant Secretaries. He has cognizance over the Office of Naval Intelligence, the Division of Fleet Training, the Naval Communication Service, and the operations of the naval districts, the Marine Corps, and the Coast Guard (when attached to the Navy); is charged with the "direction of all strategic and tactical matters", the "organization of the

Fleet", the direction of the "movement and operations of vessels of the Navy", and the "coordination of effort" of all parts of the Navy Department in relation to the "war efficiency of the Fleet". He is required to keep records of the service of ships, advises the Secretary as to various military and foreign affairs, prepares and revises regulations and tactical instructions, and himself is entitled to the advice of the various bureaus concerning his action on matters under their direct cognizance. We recognize that this is a very wide field of activity, but emphasize that all of the actions of the Chief of Naval Operations are subject to "the direction of the Secretary", and that his orders acquire authority because they are to be considered as "emanating from the Secretary". He is in no sense independent of the Secretary, as in the case, for example, of the Chief of the General Staff of the German Army. There seems to be no provision in law which entitles the Chief of Naval Operations to by-pass the Secretary and to have direct access to the President. Any such direct relationship would therefore necessarily have to be initiated by the President himself, and not by the Chief of Naval Operations.

An important feature of the establishment of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations was that, for the first time, the national government recognized the propriety of entrusting to a naval officer, rather than to the civilian head of the Navy Department, full technical direction of the operations of naval





FIGURE I. ORGANIZATION OF THE NAVY DEPARTMENT

warfare, as distinguished from the management of the means of warfare. The President and the Secretary usually are experienced in politics, but inexperienced in naval matters, while naval officers are just the reverse. The civilian heads of the government can now reach the Fleet only through the Chief of Naval Operations, and his legal powers are sufficiently broad to ensure against any civilian control of the details of Fleet operation. Furthermore, the separation of naval officers from any direct relationship with the electorate is now more firmly established than ever. On the other hand, the Bureaus which administer the means of military action have remained subject to the same degree of civilian direction as before.

Figure 1 is a chart showing the organization of the Navy Department, as published in the current "Government Manual". A considerable number of advisory agencies are purposely omitted from this chart, such as the various examining boards, the Army and Navy Munitions Board, the Joint Economy and Merchant Vessel Boards, the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, etc.. This chart shows in simple form the organization as we are accustomed to consider it.

We may, however, attempt the rearrangement of this chart to indicate the separation of the agencies of the Navy Department into two groups, one primarily concerned with Command, and the other with Administration. In Figure 2 we show the President as the source of all authority. From him to the Secretary of



**FIGURE 2. COMMAND AND ADMINISTRATION
IN THE NAVAL ESTABLISHMENT**

the Navy lead the lines of Command and Administration, but in the Secretary's office these lines diverge. On the Administrative side, this diagram correctly shows the Judge Advocate General and the Budget Officer solely as advisers to the Secretary. These officials exercise no authority outside of their own offices.

The Chief of Naval Operations, occupying a predominant position among the Departmental offices, has direct charge of all military action, coordinates all matters which concern War Efficiency, and receives advice on the same subject from all of the other agencies of the Department. Between the Department and the armed naval forces there is but one line of Command Authority, and this leads out from the Chief of Naval Operations. With the wide discretion given to subordinates under the present system of Command, this line of control transmits nothing but military information, doctrine, and instructions as to action. Such items are comparatively few in number. Each Commander in the chain, with staff assistance, is able to consider them in detail, and to decide upon the action that his force will undertake.

The means of military action have their administrative control lodged in the Office of Naval Operations, the eight Bureaus, Headquarters of the Marine Corps, Headquarters of the Coast Guard, and the Shore Establishment Division. Each of these offices has full control over the particular means of military

action allocated to it by the Secretary, and make many rules as to its administration. There are thus twelve separate lines of Administrative Authority leading from the Navy Department to its agencies in the field. The amount of business transacted along each of these lines is tremendous during peace, and will be far greater during war. It is out of the question for the Commanders in the administrative chain to give personal attention to all of the details of this business. The custom has grown up therefore, of diverting most of these details so that they will pass through specialist groups, such as the Supply Bases, Receiving Ships, and Industrial Plants ashore, and through the Base Force and its various subdivisions in the Fleet. Short cuts have also become necessary between the lower echelons of the Fleet and the subordinate agencies ashore. This decentralization of the control of the means of military action has an essentially different pattern from the decentralization of the control of the military action itself. Nevertheless, as previously mentioned, every Commander is deeply concerned that the means of action entrusted to him are administered satisfactorily.

This diagram seems to show more clearly than the other one the nature of the distinction between the two methods of control employed in the Naval Establishment, and, to some extent, the difference in the character of an officer's Command and Administrative responsibility.




FIGURE 3. ORGANIZATION OF THE OFFICE OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

3. The Organization of the Office of Naval Operations.

We may throw further light on this difference of character by examining a diagram of the internal organization of the Office of Naval Operations, shown in Figure 3. This office is, in effect, the staff organization of the highest naval commander.

On the left side of the chart are shown those divisions whose primary duties are concerned with command, and on the right those which are almost entirely administrative. One exception is that the Fleet Training Division, besides supervising collective training, has a Command function through being charged with the preparation of publications relating to Doctrine, such as War Instructions, Tactical Instructions, etc., although this duty would fall equally well under War Plans. As a whole, the organization covers the full scope of Command. However, while all divisions, except War Plans, have certain administrative duties, these do not cover the full scope of Administration with which naval commanders afloat are charged. A large part of the administrative duties of the subordinate naval commanders have to do with the means of action that are under the control of the Bureaus.

All divisions of the Office of Naval Operations are called upon to contribute Information and Advice, and all have a hand in the formulation of Policy and Doctrine. The Naval Districts Division is the single medium for the exercise of both command and administrative control over the naval districts. We should




FIGURE 4. ORGANIZATION OF BRITISH ADMIRALTY NAVAL STAFF

note that the Chief of Naval Operations has cognizance of the administration of Naval Districts as military units, and not of the administration of navy yards and naval stations within the Districts, whose industrial management is under the direction of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy.

The Assistant to the Chief of Naval Operations occupies, with respect to the Chiefs of Division, a position similar to that of the Chief of Staff of the Commander-in-Chief in relation to the flag officers under him, but his is not a statutory office, and he has no authority over any other portion of the Navy Department. He is especially charged, also, with the supervision of the administrative details of the Office.

It may be of some interest to compare this chart with the chart (Figure 4) of the organization of the British Naval Staff. The "Naval Staff", of which the First Sea Lord is the Chief, is the authority in the British Admiralty which occupies a position corresponding to our Office of Naval Operations. There are many similarities between the two: we find in the British Admiralty the counterparts of our War Plans, Intelligence, Ships' Movement, Naval Districts, and Fleet Training Divisions. Their Operations Division has some control over maintenance, but possibly not as much as our Maintenance Division. The British Naval Staff appears to have no control over Communications nor Inspections. The First Sea Lord sets up requirements as to naval material, and advises as to its development, but does not seem to have the

power to "coordinate the effort" of the Admiralty for the promotion of the War Efficiency of the British Navy. On the other hand, he has under his direction the planning for attack on and defense of trade under the Planning Division, while the Operations Division has the power to direct trade movements during war.

The power of the Chief of Naval Operations to "coordinate the effort" of all the agencies of the Navy Department in relation to "war efficiency of the fleet", has an importance that can scarcely be overestimated. He does not have the power to inquire into the internal arrangements of the Bureaus or the Shore Establishment, nor to question their methods. He does have the authority, however, to control their final output in such a manner that, when fitted together, the individual parts will form an harmonious pattern of naval war efficiency.

4. Coordination of the National Command.

To obtain an understanding of the full scope of Naval Command, it seems necessary to touch upon its relationship to the National Command. By National Command we mean the direction of the complete national effort, whether exercised by the Army, the Navy, or by some special military group.

All military authority is derived from the person of the President. He has entrusted the direction of land operations to the Secretary of War, and the direction of sea operations to the Secretary of the Navy. But he has set up no permanent authority for the direction either of the combined operations of the two branches, or for the coordination of their separate activities in such a manner as to ensure covering the whole of the military portion of a National War Mission. The power finally to determine the grand lines of national strategy, and to fix the national objectives for the armed forces, now rests solely with the President in person. This statement merely points out the fact, without taking any position as to whether or not there is a need for the creation of any additional subsidiary authority having so broad a field.

We may assume that the National Mission, if stated in explicit terms, will be formulated by the President after receiving the advice of his Cabinet. While all Departments are deeply concerned in the prosecution of a war, those most directly interested are doubtless the Departments of State, Treasury, War and the Navy, and from these he will receive most of his advice. Aside from the Cabinet, the only legally established body with war advisory functions with respect to the President is the "United States Council of National Defense", which is composed of the Secretaries of War, Navy, Interior, Agriculture, Commerce and Labor. The Council is charged with the duty of advising the

President as to measures of coordination contributory to the successful prosecution of a war, such as those involved in transportation, the mobilization of resources, and the relations between the government and industry. In no respect does this body have any advisory duty as to the external national policy, nor as to war operations. The United States Council of National Defense has held no meetings since 1921.

By way of contrast, we may cite the Committee of Imperial Defense, established in 1904 as an advisory and consultative body to the British Cabinet, and the War Council, set up during the World War because its great numbers made the British Cabinet itself too unwieldy. The French and other governments at various times in the past several years have established temporary Ministries of National Defense, with supervisory powers over the Ministries of War, Marine and Air. The present German government seems to have permanently consolidated these three ministries. There is no reason to believe that these foreign schemes would be any more effective than Presidential action based upon the advice of the Cabinet, particularly of the Secretaries of War and Navy.

These two latter officials have by agreement set up three agencies for the coordination of the military efforts of the War and Navy Departments: The Army and Navy Munitions Board, the Aeronautical Board, and the Joint Army and Navy Board. All three are purely advisory to the Secretaries in person, and have

neither executive nor administrative authority. A short summary of the principal features of Joint Action between the Army and Navy may not be out of place, because of their relation to purely naval action.

The Munitions Board is concerned solely with the coordination of the procurement of material for the two branches of the armed forces. The Aeronautical Board is charged with the duty of advising upon all joint questions affecting the development of aeronautics, and concerns itself almost exclusively with material matters. Both of these Boards, therefore, cover purely administrative matters. The Joint Army and Navy Board is the body which is important from an operational standpoint; it is concerned with the "sufficiency and efficiency of cooperation and coordination of effort between the Army and Navy" "relative to the national defense". It is aided by a Joint Army and Navy Planning Committee. In actual practice, we expect the Joint Board to confine its action chiefly to the formulation of policies and missions, and the coordination of the broad strategical lines of effort by the Army and the Navy; and the Joint Planning Committee to concern itself with drawing up the actual directives that are given to the Chief of the General Staff of the Army and the Chief of Naval Operations for guiding the preparation of the operating plans which are to be issued to the field armies and the fleet.

Upon the recommendation of the Joint Board, the two Secretaries have agreed upon a system of policies and procedure which is enunciated in the pamphlet "Joint Action of the Army and Navy". Without examining the detailed methods described in that publication, we may briefly outline the principles governing coordination of the war operations of the Army and Navy.

The system adopted covers three different conditions:

- 1st, Where the operations of the two services are independent and coordination is unnecessary.
- 2nd, Where operations are tactically independent, but strategically interdependent, and in which a measure of coordination is required.
- 3rd, Where tactical coordination or, in other words, joint operations, is involved.

Three methods have been adopted for insuring that the Army and the Navy work in harmony for the accomplishment of the National Mission in its entirety:

- (a) The assignment of specific war missions to the Army and the Navy in the Joint Basic War Plans, which shall be contributory to the accomplishment of the National War Mission.
- (b) In the case of tactically independent operations in the same strategic theater, by close cooperation between the commanders of the Army and Naval Forces in the theater.

- (c) In joint operations involving tactical coordination, by entrusting unity of command, or limited unity of command, to the service having the paramount interest; that is, the service whose operations are of the greater importance for the accomplishment of the joint mission.

Where unity of command is established, the President appoints either an Army or a Naval officer to the supreme command over the operations; this officer, preferably not in command of either contingent, designates missions and exercises full control over the action of the commanders of the Army and Naval forces concerned. Where limited unity of command is deemed sufficient, the commander of the forces having the paramount interest designates missions for both the Army and the Navy, but does not exercise control over, nor is he responsible for, the operations of the assisting service. His appointment, therefore, is not made by the President.

Thus we see that, where unity of command over Army and Naval forces is established, the supreme commander is responsible directly to the President, and he and all the forces under his command are, in theory, entirely removed from under the jurisdiction of both the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy. In the case of limited unity of command, or of non-tactical coordination, commanders of the Army and Naval forces remain responsible solely to their respective superiors in the ordinary

chain of command. If coordination should not actually result from the use of these voluntary methods, no one but the President himself can intervene to assure it.

5. The American System of Naval Command.

The fundamental rule of command in the United States Navy is set forth in Articles 175 and 181 (a) of the Navy Regulations;

Art. 175. - "No officer can place himself on duty by virtue of his commission or warrant alone."

Art. 181(a). - "Officers entrusted with the command of vessels of war or naval stations, or with the command or direction of any military expedition or duty, whatever their rank, must, while properly in command or direction, have full command, authority, and precedence over all officers and persons, of whatever rank, serving in such vessel, station, or expedition, or in the execution of such duty."

Obviously it is impossible for any leader in person to direct all of the activities of a multitude of individuals who have been placed under his command. He is physically able to deal with no more than a few persons. If the forces entrusted to his direction are to be successfully employed for carrying out tasks assigned him, he must organize them in groups, delegate certain portions of his whole task to the leaders of the groups, and deal directly only with those leaders. In succession, these leaders then pass along portions of their own duties and responsibilities, until finally the entire mass is organized in a manner that will permit it to act quickly and effectively.

The Navy is organized with a view to accomplishing all of its work, but the Navy Regulations prescribe separate channels

for Command and Administrative authority.

Art. 656 (1). - "Command within a fleet or separate squadron shall normally be exercised as follows: By the Commander in Chief or the commander of a separate squadron, through the task force commanders under his command; by a task force commander, through the task group commanders under his command; by a task group commander, through his subordinate commanders."

Art. 656 (2). - "Administration within a fleet or separate squadron shall normally be exercised as follows, insofar as the agencies named exist within the organization or subdivision in question: By the commander in chief through the force commanders; by a force commander, through the commanders of the type organizations under his command; by such a type organization commander, through the flotilla or aircraft wing commanders under his command; by a flotilla or wing commander, through the squadron commanders under his command; and by a squadron commander, through the division commanders under his command. The operation of this normal administration shall be subject to such modification as may be necessary to adapt it to the actual organization and disposition of the naval forces concerned."

Art. 660. - "Nothing in these regulations shall be construed as limiting the discretion of a commander in chief or other naval commander in making at any time such disposition of his command, or such special temporary organization of the forces under his command, as he may deem appropriate for the accomplishment of a particular task or purpose."

Another important Departmental publication clearly defines command responsibility:

Art. 515. - "Each commander in the chain of command is responsible that the units under his command execute correctly the instructions or orders received from higher authority."

The first two paragraphs quoted seem specifically to divorce from each other Command and Administration; the first and third are authority for the employment of special organizations of task forces and groups for the accomplishment of military missions.

The first paragraph establishes the rule that a Commander exercises command only over those units which have been placed under him in a specific task organization; for their military action he is responsible only to the immediate superior who appointed him. An extension of this rule is given in the regulation concerning the authority of a senior officer present.

Art. 150 (4). - "At all times and places not specifically provided for in these regulations, where the exercise of military authority for the purpose of cooperation or otherwise is necessary, of which the responsible officer must be the judge, the senior line officer on the spot shall assume command and direct the movements and efforts of all persons in the Navy present, subject to the limitations of - - - specific orders."

Article 656 (2) would at first appear to make the rule that, even if units are attached to another temporary task force, their usual Commander continues to exercise administrative authority over them for all purposes. However, so simple a geometric arrangement seems adequate neither for war nor peace, and therefore a different interpretation must be sought.

The fact is that administrative action occurs along numerous lines, and administrative responsibility is very complex. For example, supply and disbursing officers transact a great part of their business direct with the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts, and even their commanding officers have only an indirect responsibility. Much of the other business of a ship is carried on directly between the commanding officer and the Bureaus of the Navy Department. As the Bureaus have no military

authority, commanding officers are not responsible to them, but to their own military superiors, for the satisfactory execution of the rules of the Bureaus.

During peace, most of the units of a permanent force remain concentrated in the same area for training, and are temporarily detached only for short periods, such as during Fleet Maneuvers. During a large part of a war somewhat similar conditions would prevail, and the Commanders of the major forces of the basic organization would rightly be responsible for the administrative preparation of their units for more active duty.

But when, as sometimes occurs, units of the Fleet are sent to the Atlantic for an extended period, it becomes impracticable for their superiors in the Pacific actually either to command or to administer them. These units properly look to the Chief of Naval Operations for operating orders. Sometimes Operations establishes a temporary command under the senior officer present in the Atlantic. In this ocean these vessels are in a different theater; necessarily their activities are unrelated to the units in the Pacific, and, practically they are detached from their normal organizations.

During war, temporary task forces may be organized that will take units away from their basic organizations for considerable periods, even though they remain in the same strategic area. They may also be detached to distant service in the same or another theater. Under these circumstances, if the temporary task force commander is to prepare and to maintain these units in condition to perform their military tasks, he must be able to

exercise not only Command, but also full Administrative Authority.

We thus perceive that there are several aspects of Naval Administration. First, there is the direct management by the Bureaus and other agencies of the means of action under their cognizance. For the correct administration of these means, officers are responsible to their immediate military superiors. Next, there is the management of naval forces during ordinary periods for purposes of training, maintenance, supply, and the like. Here the line of administration follows the line of permanent organization. Finally, there is the special management required in temporary task forces when units are detached from their permanent organizations for long periods of time, or for distant service. In this case, the line of administration of necessity shifts with the line of command.

It seems entirely proper to consider that the Navy Regulations contemplate the use of all of these separate lines of administration, and that they can be interpreted in this manner.

There are several additional features of our Command System that are very important.

One of these is the Rule established by the Navy Regulations specifically permitting any Commander to communicate directly with any unit under his command, (Art. 656(3)). On the other hand, the Regulations require that a Commander communicate with superiors only through his own immediate superior, (Arts. 2033,

2037, 2038).

Another feature concerns the initiative that may be granted to subordinates.

The Chief of Naval Operations, deriving authority from the President through the Secretary of the Navy, has control over the organization and the operations of the Fleet, and is charged with the direction of all strategic and tactical matters. His authority is very great, but he has himself curtailed it in such a manner as not to interfere with the independence and initiative of the subordinate officers to whom the Navy Department has entrusted the exercise of command at sea. The character of this self-imposed restriction of the authority of the Chief of Naval Operations is set forth in Article 500 of a certain Departmental publication:

"In war the Chief of Naval Operations will prescribe the basic policies and exercise broad strategic direction of the operating forces. He will assign strategic tasks, in broad terms, to the Commander in Chief of the Fleet and to the Commanders of Forces Independent of the Fleet. Both the planning and execution of all operations are distinctly the functions and the responsibilities of the commanders afloat."

This article enunciates one of the most important of the modern command policies, and clearly defines the relationship which should exist between all military superiors and subordinates. In former times, when armies and fleets were small, the supreme leader personally was able to regulate matters of minor as well as of major importance. When operations became more complicated, and armies and fleets grew larger, this direct personal

command became ineffective, and a system of rigid rules and maxims grew up intended to deal with distant strategical and tactical situations. For a long time this system of personal control remained the standard, but Frederick the Great, Napoleon, Nelson, and later the Prussians showed how ineffectual stereotyped rules became when opposed by a more flexible system based upon individual initiative. Henderson says: "The study of war (by Prussia) - - - led to the establishment of a sound system of command - - - based on the recognition of three facts: first, that an army cannot be effectively controlled by direct orders from headquarters; second, that the man on the spot is the best judge of the situation; and third, that intelligent cooperation is of infinitely more value than mechanical obedience. - - - It was understood in the Prussian armies - - - that no order was to be blindly obeyed unless the superior who issued it was actually present, (but) - - - the recipient was free to use his own judgment, and act as he believed his superior would have directed him to do had he been aware how matters stood". This feature of command has now been adopted by all of the modern military nations. Its philosophical basis has been stated as follows by Darrius: "(Command) can be exerted in two different manners. The first tends to bring all the machinery under the direct control of a single person who acts in stead and in place of the rest; the second bends all wills into a single one by impressing upon them a uniform conduct, while leaving to each the free

disposal of his means in his proper sphere. - - - It subjugates the wills that engender acts and not the acts themselves, in such a way that each acts as the leader would have acted".

While the Commander-in-Chief and the other independent commanders have supreme authority in their own fields, they are responsible to the Secretary of the Navy, through the Chief of Naval Operations, for the accomplishment of the orders and instructions which they receive. There seems to be no warrant, either in law or in custom, for these officers to have direct access on their own volition to the Secretary of the Navy or to the President, in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces.

Existing regulations provide that in war the Chief of Naval Operations shall coordinate all of the military activities of the Naval Establishment, considered as being divided into three categories:

Operating Forces,
Services,
Shore Establishment.

The Operating Forces are defined as all naval activities afloat, together with such shore activities and naval districts as may specifically be designated.

Only the Operating Forces in the principal theater are placed under the Commander-in-Chief; those in secondary theaters are under independent commanders, and the naval local defense




FIGURE 5. GERMAN ARMY COMMAND SYSTEM

forces are under the Commandants of Naval Districts or outlying naval stations.

The Services comprise the Naval Transportation, Communication, and Intelligence Services. Vessels of the Naval Transportation Service, while within the limits of any theater, automatically pass under the jurisdiction of the commander of that theater. The other two Services, so far as relates to the parts on shore and not assigned to the forces afloat, always remain under the supervision of the Chief of Naval Operations.

We have now indicated the chief features of the American system of naval command. We sometimes hear the assertion that all of the modern command systems are patterned on that developed by the Prussians. While it is true that many features of the Prussian system have been adopted generally, the lines of development in various other services have distinctive characteristics of their own. It may, therefore, be of interest to compare the organizations of the High Command of the German Army, the United States Army, the British Navy, and the United States Navy.

In the German Army, the Chief of the General Staff occupies, during peace, a position directly under the Head of the State. (This statement refers to his position previous to the present regime, but it is believed that no change has occurred in this respect). In war, he becomes the Chief of Staff to the Commander-in-Chief of all the armies, who himself has usually been the Head of State. The Chief of the General Staff operates the field grand headquarters. That portion of the General Staff organiza-

tion which remains at the capital is subordinate to the field headquarters. While theoretically the Chief of Staff has no authority over the generals in command of the field armies, actually during several wars he has been the virtual Commander-in-Chief, though always acting in the name of the King.

The War Minister was appointed by the Crown, but, unlike the American Secretary of War, was to some extent responsible not only to the Head of State but also to Parliament. His duties were largely political, and, if he had been the head of the army, the operations of the latter might possibly have become subjected to parliamentary interference. He therefore was placed in the position of acting simply as a member of the War Staff of the Head of State, and was even required to be present at important councils held by the Chief of Staff, so that he could meet any demands made in his own particular province.

Figure 5 is intended to show the relationships existing in the High Command of the German Army.

By law, the Chief of the General Staff of the United States Army prepares plans and policies for approval by the Secretary of War, and acts as the agent of the Secretary in supervising the execution of approved plans and policies. However, there seems to be a closer relationship between the President and the Chief of the General Staff than between the President and the Chief of Naval Operations. While the President, as Commander in Chief, theoretically has about the same relationship to both, the law




FIGURE 6. AMERICAN ARMY PEACE COMMAND SYSTEM

specifically recognizes that the President may assign to the Chief of the General Staff duties not already assigned by law to other agencies. However, the Chief of the General Staff invariably acts only in the name of the Secretary of War, whereas the Chief of Naval Operations signs orders in his own right.

In the United States military services it is unlikely that the President will ever follow the Prussian system and assume the active field command as Commanding General. The War Department has recognized the necessity of having an officer in command of all of the field forces, and recently has given to the Chief of the General Staff an additional office, that of the Commanding General of the field forces during peace. In war, he will continue to hold both offices until the President specifically directs otherwise. Whether or not he will act in both capacities, or will remain as Chief of the General Staff and arrange the appointment of another officer as the field commander, or will relinquish the office of Chief of the General Staff and retain that of Commanding General, doubtless will depend upon the location and the character of hostilities. War experience, however, has indicated the necessity for having, at the seat of government and in close contact with the President and the Secretary of War, a powerful military officer in close sympathy with the field commanders.

In Figure 6 is shown the system of High Command of the United States Army as it exists in peace.




FIGURE 7 BRITISH NAVY COMMAND SYSTEM

A remark sometimes heard concerning the British system of naval command is that the Commander at sea is ultimately subject to parliamentary direction. For example, at present the authority of the First Sea Lord of the British Admiralty is "Advice as to, and general direction of, operations of war". He gives this advice to the First Lord of the Admiralty, who is himself the ex-officio chairman of the Admiralty Operations Committee. The First Lord nominally receives his appointment from the king, but is responsible primarily to Parliament. The First Lord's direct authority over operations also appears actually to be exercised to a somewhat greater degree, (as witness the Antwerp and the Gallipoli adventures), than is now the practice in our own naval establishment.

The High Command of the British Admiralty is organized somewhat like that shown in the diagram in Figure 7.

We have already described the organization of the High Command of the United States Navy, but, in Figure 8, will show it in simplified form for comparison with the other organizations described. Two points seem to require emphasis: 1st, that in our own naval service the active direction of operations remains, during war as in peace, in the hands of the same officer at the seat of government; and 2d, that Congress does not appear in the line of Command in any manner whatsoever.




FIGURE 8. AMERICAN NAVAL COMMAND SYSTEM

6. Basic Fleet Organization.

We may note that the Navy at times applies the term "task force" to a permanent, as well as to a temporary, organization. The Navy Regulations require that, during peace, "The United States Fleet shall be divided into task forces so constituted as to pass with facility from peace to war". (Art. 649(3)). The present peace organization of the Fleet has been evolved to comply with this provision. In the Fleet we have the Battle Force, the Scouting Force, the Submarine Force, and the Base Force. We commonly say that the Fleet has a "Task Force Organization", as distinguished from the "Type Organization" within the present "Forces". The entire Fleet would have a "Type Organization" if, directly under the Commander-in-Chief, it were organized into type groups composed of all the Battleships, all the Cruisers, all the Destroyers, Submarines, Aircraft, Minecraft, and Train Vessels.

From time to time a movement has started with a view to abandoning the present "Task Force Organization" in favor of a Fleet "Type Organization". It is alleged that, at the outbreak of war, the Fleet would require immediate reorganization if it is to be successful in executing the highly diversified tasks of war; that better standards of training, maintenance, and doctrine would result from a type organization; and that the type organization would facilitate direct control by the Commander-in-Chief, and also the ease of organizing the temporary task forces of both

peace and war. Those opposing the change appear to believe that the existing "Task Force Organization" is, fundamentally, sound for the most important event of war, the Fleet Battle, and for the operations preliminary and subsequent to battle. They deny that the present organization is a real bar to the speedy formation of temporary task organizations, and state that coordination will always be better between units if they have been accustomed to a close personal association.

The War College will express no opinion as to the merits of these contentions, but will content itself merely with mentioning them, and with pointing out that these different methods of organization affect only the channels, and not the operation, of Command and Administration.

It may be well also to mention the fact that it will always be difficult to set up an organization that, without considerable modification, can pass directly from peace to war. No two wars will ever be alike, because of the differences that will exist between the various basic War Missions, between the relative strengths of the forces involved, and between the theaters in which the different wars will be waged. For example, the war tasks, and therefore the war task organization, of the United States Fleet, would be likely to be markedly different in the three cases of war against a European power, against an Asiatic power, and against both a European and an Asiatic power. Before we can expect to pass from peace to war without radical changes

in the Fleet organization, we should have known during peace the particular nation that we were to fight, the general nature of the war policy, the theater of the war, and the strategic objectives. A nation may have this knowledge if, like France, its war efforts for centuries have generally been expended in one certain direction. It is unlikely that the United States will ever have such information very long in advance.

It seems probable, therefore, that the basic war organization of the Fleet can not be considered finally established until after the reorganization that will take place after the actual outbreak of war. The basic peace organization of the Fleet seems important principally from the standpoint of Administration, rather than of Command.

7. Command Functions and Administrative Activities.

We have now examined the chains of naval command and administration as they lead from the President, through the Departmental agencies, to the principal naval forces and the technical services in the field. We have emphasized the fact that, while Administrative responsibility is divided according to the character of the means of action involved, and according to special operating conditions, Command responsibility follows but one line.

But while Command and Administration are essentially different from each other, each also has certain distinctive features of its own. Analysis will show that these features may be

subdivided into several characteristic groups under each heading. An understanding of the individual nature of these groups may assist a Commander in the organization of his forces and in the exercise of his authority.

In our definition of Command are mentioned two basic elements:

- (a) The Will of the Commander, and
- (b) Military action, in the execution of that will.

In order to facilitate the clear determination of the Commander's will, and to translate it into effective military action, we must arrange that the Command Organization discharge several distinct functions. The nature of these functions may be determined partly from theory, but chiefly from a study of the activities of actual military agencies, such as, for example, the activities of the Office of Naval Operations in relation to the Fleet.

A Commander in any echelon, from the highest to the lowest, has his field of action more or less clearly defined by the orders he has received from his immediate superior. His field includes the lesser fields of his subordinates, and in turn is included in the larger field of his immediate superior. He is expected to act only in his own field, and exclusively for the accomplishment of his assigned Mission. The Mission prescribes the full range of a Commander's will; Doctrine, which is the system of knowledge that guides future action in accordance with the lessons of the past, prescribes the broad technical lines

along which his will should find expression in action. The Mission, supplied from above, thus requires in each echelon the assistance of the special Doctrine applicable to that particular echelon. When political relations will in any way affect the military action that is to ensue, then the Commander will also naturally consider how Policy is likely to modify that action.

To express his will to action in a tangible, understandable form, the Commander requires the framework provided by a Plan. In order to draw up a Plan, he should have at hand a store of Information covering the special conditions of his problem. He will also usually desire to avail himself of the results of the mental processes of those with whom he is associated; that is, he will want Advice from his staff and possibly from his principal subordinates.

After considering available Information and Advice, the Commander is thus enabled to evolve a Plan, consistent with existing Doctrine. The Plan itself, which, of course, includes both the organization of forces and the assignment of tasks, will guide the military action which is designed to accomplish the Mission.

Marshal Foch once remarked: "The power to command had never meant the power to remain mysterious, but rather to communicate, at least to those who immediately execute our orders, the idea which animates our plan". The Commander's plan will therefore

need to be formulated in a Directive, and to be communicated to subordinates and to the next superior. Promulgation of the plan, subsequent developments of it, the revision of existing information, and cooperation between the different elements of a military force, all are of primary importance to the success of Command, which, therefore, requires the functioning of an efficient system of Communications.

No plan is likely to succeed without the active interest and occasional intervention of the directing head; that is, it is essential there be a careful Supervision of the execution of the military action which is required by the plan. This is not at all the same kind of a function as Inspection, which concerns itself solely with the condition of the means of action. Supervision is concerned with the action itself, rather than with material objects.

Finally, the plan, its details, and the manner of its execution, should be made a matter of Record. It may be thought that this function is administrative; rather, however, it seems necessary for completing and rounding out the full scope of Command, in order that the history of its accomplishments may be available for future use.

It may be noted that we make no mention of Training as an abstract function of Command. This omission is intentional. Training is the preparation of personnel for its action duties, and has nothing to do with its handling during action. Therefore it seems analogous to the preparation and maintenance of material in readiness for its use by personnel. Training, although always an immediate concern of the Commander, is by our definitions and by Navy Regulations, a matter of Administration. The United States Army includes training among the Command functions. The point is not very important, because, as we will see later, the personnel who operate forces are always the same ones who train them as units.




FIGURE 9.-FUNCTIONS OF COMMAND

To summarize the functions which a Command Organization should discharge to ensure satisfactory military action in the accomplishment of Mission, we may list:

Doctrine,
Information,
Advice,
Planning,
Communications,
Supervision,
Record-keeping.

The relation between these functions and the ensuing action, may be shown graphically as in Figure 9.

It should be noted that these are functions, and not duties. During their actual discharge, one individual, or one group of individuals, may be concerned with several of these functions; or, on the other hand, a single function, (such as Doctrine or Advice), may be divided among several groups.

The Means of Military Action comprise a very long list of objects and technical services. But it is not difficult to allocate all of them into a small number of general groups, each of which has a particular character. First, of course, we bring to mind all of the various kinds of Material that we require. Our minds then turn naturally to the subject of Personnel, which is divided into two distinct categories, naval and civil. Matters of Finance seem to form one characteristic group; Transport

**MEANS
OF
MILITARY ACTION**

NAVAL ADMINISTRATION

MATERIAL	PERSONNEL	FINANCE	TRANSPORT	INSPECTION	LAW	SHORE ESTABLISHMENT
SUPPLY MAINTENANCE TECHNICAL SERVICES	SUPPLY REGULATION TRAINING HEALTH	ESTIMATES DISBURSEMENT ACCOUNTS	CIVIL NAVAL TERMINAL FACILITIES	MATERIAL PERSONNEL	ENACTMENT INTERPRETATION ENFORCEMENT REVIEW	MATERIAL OPERATION

FIGURE 10-CHARACTERISTIC GROUPS OF THE MEANS OF MILITARY ACTION

is required for the movement of both Material and Personnel; and the value of Inspection by various independent agencies is universally recognized. In administrative work many Legal questions arise which seem to fall into a distinct classification. Finally we have a special group of administrative activities that can be placed only under the Shore Establishment, which is the organization of Material and Personnel operated for the collective benefit of all other portions of the Naval Establishment.

All of the Means of Military Action with which Naval Administration is concerned may thus be allocated to seven characteristic groups:

Material,
Personnel,
Finance,
Transport,
Inspection,
Law,
The Shore Establishment.

As in the case of the Command Functions, cognizance over these general groups may be scattered among numerous agencies. Furthermore, each group may have several aspects; that is, within each, occur certain specialized lines of administrative control. In Figure 10 we may see the various groups of the

means of military action broken down into their principal subdivisions.

It might be possible to indicate the relation of each of the Departmental agencies to these principal subdivisions, but the diagram would be very complicated. Drawing such a diagram does not seem essential, when all that we are attempting to give is a general understanding of the nature of the command and administrative activities of the Navy. However, a recognition of the existence, and an understanding of the character, of the different kinds of activity will be useful when analysing the practical exercise of the two methods of control, and when attempting to formulate sound ideas as to staff organization.

Existing instructions require that responsible commanders organize their commands into such task forces as may be appropriate for executing the various operating plans. When the Fleet is fully organized, it will consist of numerous task groups and sub-groups, each having duties of Command and Administration. All of the Commanders of these groups will be under the necessity of providing, either in their own persons, their staffs, or their subordinates, for the discharge of all of the Command Functions, and for the operation of all of the Administrative Groups, except only that of the shore Establishment.

8. Summary.

In concluding this portion of our subject, we may summarize our principal findings as follows:

- (a) Command is the direction of organized forces in the performance of military acts, in compliance with superior will. Administration is the management of the material means required for the performance of military acts.
- (b) The Administration of the Navy Department is distributed among a total of twelve principal offices and Bureaus. For each of these, a separate line of Administrative Authority leads direct, or through intervening offices, to permanent non-Departmental agencies. Necessarily, this authority has been greatly decentralized, and much of it is actually exercised by subordinate specialist groups. In the Fleet, administration of the means of action is for the purpose of preparing them for use. Commanders are responsible to their immediate superiors that this purpose is served, and also that their management is in accord with the rules established by the Departmental offices.
- (c) Naval Command is exercised through a single chain leading from the President, through the Secretary of the Navy, to the Chief of Naval Operations, who by law has been charged with the direction of all strategic and tactical action undertaken by the Navy. From the Chief of Naval Operations the chain of command leads

to the Commander-in-Chief, (or to Independent Commanders), and finally to temporary task force commanders appointed under the authority of the latter. Within his own sphere, a Commander has full discretion in the field delimited by his Mission and orders, and for his actions he is responsible solely to his immediate task superior. There is no legal authority for by-passing, from below, any of the links in this chain of command. The system does not contemplate civilian interference in the technical direction of military action.

- (d) Although governed by laws enacted by Congress, naval personnel owe responsibility for their actions solely to the Executive, and not to the Legislative, Branch of the Government.
- (e) The National Command has no permanent organization, but consists merely of the President's personal relationship to the Secretaries of War and the Navy. Coordination of the military efforts of the Army and the Navy is effected by agreement between the two organizations. When agreed upon, a temporary organization may be established under a designated commander, supreme in a particular field, and responsible directly to the President.

(f) Every Command Organization should provide both for discharging all of the Command Functions, and for operating the appropriate Administrative Activities. The functions of Command are: Doctrine, (and sometimes Policy), Information, Advice, Planning, Communications, Supervision, and Record-keeping. The characteristic groups of Naval Administration to which may be allocated all that pertains to the means of military action are: Material, Personnel, Finance, Transport, Inspection, Law, and the Shore Establishment.

II. THE COMMANDER, THE STAFF, AND THE COMMAND.

1. The Commander's Authority and Responsibility.

In exercising command, a Commander does not himself act; his part in the execution of the task assigned him is the direction of the action of his forces. Since a single individual can not effectively control many subordinates, he first organizes his forces into a convenient number of properly constituted groups, appoints a Commander over each, and assigns to each Commander a definite portion of his own task. These Commanders in turn follow a like process; the series of descending echelons extends finally to the lowest of all, such as a squad of men, a gun's crew, or a fire room watch. In the course of subdividing the task among successively smaller task groups, its various parts are assigned to those individuals most capable of performing them. In the lowest echelon, the original general task appears as a multitude of small, specialized tasks, each of which requires the performance of a few simple military acts.

Command is exercised, therefore, by transmitting the superior will through the numerous individuals in charge of task groups, in such a manner as ultimately to produce the military action necessary for the creation of the desired effect. The commanders of the task groups, and the units composing them,

are selected on the basis of their fitness for performing the tasks, and each task is amplified through special instructions and doctrine to adapt it to the operating technique of the group to which it is entrusted.

Each Commander through whom the superior will, or task, is transmitted, is endowed with the authority necessary for directing the action of those under his command. He is responsible for the results achieved by his group. It is the duty of each to exercise control over all the relationships between himself and the Commanders he has appointed, and to coordinate the action that any two or more of them undertake in common. For the execution of the action that the Commander assigns them, these subordinates owe loyalty only to him, but, in turn, should be granted the right to be free from his interference in the relations between themselves and their own subordinates.

This power to direct military action, and the responsibility for the results of such action, pertain to the person of the Commander so long as he holds his office. Except in emergency he is the sole member of his group empowered to receive orders from above, and may receive such orders from none but his own immediate superior. Only he can transmit orders to his subordinate Commanders. He occupies his position at the head of his group for the sole purpose of being obeyed. Within his own group, he is the personification of authority. He is the medium for the translation of superior will into military action,

and can never separate his own personality from the obligations of his position. In the words of the Navy Regulations, (Art.182(6)), "The command is his, and he can neither delegate the duties of it to another, nor avoid its burdens, nor escape its responsibilities".

When we pass upward from the lowest echelon, we find that the burdens of command become heavier, and the duties more complicated, in each successive echelon. When they become so numerous that a single individual is unable to care for them alone, the Commander of the group is provided with a staff to take over those parts of the work that he is, himself, unable to perform. The staff has no other purpose than to assist him in carrying out his duties.

In accepting the assistance of the staff the Commander loses none of his original authority nor responsibility. The members of the staff are responsible only to him for the performance of their assigned duties, and have no inherent authority of their own. When they direct one of his subordinates to perform a certain action, the authority that they exercise is that of the Commander, who becomes fully responsible for all the orders which they issue. Except when senior officer present, a staff officer is, himself, never in the chain of command. In theory, the Commander and his staff together form one person, who is the Commander himself.

This relation of the staff to the command is practically universal in modern military services. Von Schellendorf, the Prussian staff historian, said: "The actual leading of troops is not a part of the duties of the (Prussian) General Staff. The officers belonging to it are invested with no actual command." The United States Army conception of the General Staff is that: "Its true mission is to furnish detailed assistance to a commander. It is not to command, nor to operate services established by law and regulations". The United States Navy Regulations say: "The officer in command is not authorized to delegate his power except for the carrying out of the details of the general duties to be performed by his authority", and, "The chief of staff shall be subject to the orders of the Commander-in-Chief and to him only; the authority of the chief of staff is authority delegated by the Commander-in-Chief".

2. The Scope of Naval Staff Duties.

Although we are accustomed to consider the staff system a modern development, staff authority has existed for many years. Thus, the executive officer of a vessel, or the officer of the deck, acts through the delegated authority of the captain, in the same manner as a staff officer acts through the delegated authority of the flag officer.

In recent years, many military nations have, by law, established general staff systems on the pattern developed by the Prussian army. In the case of the United States Navy this has

not been done. Whether or not such a step might be desirable, the fact is, the same authority already appears to exist for the administrative detail of officers to staff duty, as to other specialist branches of the naval service. Furthermore, the right of naval staff officers to perform duty in the name of their commandor is legal because analogous to the power of the "aid or executive" on board a vessel. The pertinent parts of the law granting this power read as follows:

"The Secretary of the Navy may, in his discretion, detail a line officer to act as the aid or executive of the commanding officer of a vessel or war or naval station. - - - - All orders of such aid or executive shall be regarded as proceeding from the commanding officer, and the aid or executive shall have no independent authority in consequence of such detail." (U.S. Code, Title 84, Sec. 247)

Friction between officers attached to staffs and those in the line of command is sometimes mentioned by the historians of various military services. To avoid friction, officers of each category need to understand the important part that officers of the other category have in the general scheme. Fundamentally, the effort of line officers is directed toward the performance of military action in the execution of the Commander's will, while the effort of staff officers is directed toward coordinating and facilitating such action. Due to misunderstanding, line officers frequently question staff action that has been entirely correct. For the same reason, staff officers sometimes

are guilty of unwarranted interference in the affairs of line officers.

We have all seen instances of a resentful attitude when an officer has received an order from a member of the staff, issued in the name of the admiral, which the latter is known never to have originated. Staff officers themselves are sometimes so poorly informed as to their proper status as to refrain from using the authority of their Commander, in emergency, to correct an unsatisfactory situation, or even from keeping him fully informed as to the condition of the command. Unfortunately, we sometimes see cases where flag officers refuse to grant any authority whatever to their staff officers, but insist upon inquiring into every detail before permitting these assistants to take even the most trivial action.

It may be, due to the lack of a guide such as the statute establishing the Army General Staff, that not only many naval staff and other subordinate officers, but even some of the superior officers, are not quite certain in their own minds as to the proper limits of staff activity and authority.

The United States Navy has no law relating to staff authority, other than the one previously quoted regarding the aid or executive. Nor have any general instructions been issued covering this subject. Various commanders afloat have drawn up rules to regulate the activities of their own staffs; usually

these are similar to the instructions that govern the staff of the Commander in Chief. But all of them change from time to time; none are considered standard, and none have been widely circulated for the purpose of informing all officers as to duties customarily assigned to naval staff officers.

Succeeding paragraphs in this paper attempt to formulate general rules considered applicable to naval staffs. These are based upon ideas developed through analysis of the duties now performed by staffs in several of the principal military services, modified to bring them into accord with naval custom and Navy Regulations, and adapted to meet certain conditions peculiar to naval duty afloat.

One often hears the idea expressed that the Commander makes all of the decisions, while the staff prepare all details for his consideration, whether the matter is one of Command or Administration. Actually, however, naval staff officers themselves make numerous subsidiary decisions. Some of these decisions may be very important, when this is permitted by custom, or by the special authorization of the Commander. The staff issue many minor orders without prior reference to the Commander, and may properly even issue important orders when time does not permit specific approval in advance.

The scope of the duties assigned to the Prussian General Staff one hundred years ago was described by Clausewitz in the

following words: "The General Staff is intended to convert the ideas of the General commanding into orders, not only conveying the former to the troops, but also working out all matters of detail, thus relieving the General of a great amount of trouble." Gradually additional authority was granted, until fifty years later Von Schellendorf said: "The officers of the General Staff must be (the General's) devoted and confidential counsellors, (They) have to take, as a basis for carrying out their duties in all the branches that have been assigned them, the wish and determination of the General in command, in which, however, proposals by them are by no means excluded, but rather invited. (Furthermore), the General Staff is called upon to act as a directing and explaining body toward (the representatives of all branches of the service)." He then enumerates their war duties as making arrangements for quartering, security, marches and battle, communicating orders throughout the command, collecting and evaluating information, watching over the fighting condition of the troops, and performing various special duties such as reconnaissance.

By statute, General Staff officers of the United States Army with troops are required to "render professional aid and assistance to the general officers over them; to act as their agents in harmonizing the plans, duties, and operations of the various organizations and services under their jurisdiction,

in preparing detailed instructions for the execution of the plans of the commanding generals, and in supervising the execution of such instructions."

The duties mentioned by Von Schellendorf, and those enumerated in the American law, closely parallel the Command Functions listed in Part I of this paper. While General Staff officers have many administrative duties, their principal duty is, without question, to assist their Commanders in the discharge of the Command Functions. Although we know that, besides General Staff officers, there are numerous other officers on the staffs of the superior general officers of the Army, the duties of most of these are concerned primarily with Administration. It will be shown later that naval staffs are divided into two similar groups. As in the case of the organization of the Navy Department, the great division in the organization of staffs is thus seen to be related to the difference between Command and Administration.

We are justified in saying, therefore, that General Staffs were formed for the purpose of segregating Command duties, and providing separate bodies of officers qualified for assisting military Commanders in the discharge of the Command functions. Officers assigned to these corps are especially trained for staff duty, and therefore are to be considered as staff specialists; their training has the particular end in view of making them proficient in the "Art of the General".

In the Prussian Army, officers were selected at an early stage of their careers, and sent to the War Academy, where they received identical theoretical training with that given to the higher line officers. After designation to the General Staff Corps, they were usually attached to the headquarters of a command, or of the entire Army, except for the brief periods that they spent with troops. They were expected to be technical experts only in staff duty, while becoming generally familiar with the technique of the operation of troops of all categories. While American army general staff officers are selected later in their careers, the same general idea is followed. The theoretical training is started at the Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth and continued at the Army War College and by assignment to staff duty with troops or at headquarters in Washington.

The courses that are given by the United States Naval War College are designed to train officers for command duty, and, therefore, to a considerable degree give them training for staff work, since staff duty is the same in scope as command duty. Whether or not this amount of staff training suffices for the needs of the Navy is a question that need not be considered in this paper. It is, however, a fact that the Navy has no corps of staff specialists, and officers are often averse to having themselves considered as specialists in this duty.

The rule in the United States Army as to the practical exercise of the Commander's authority by members of his staff is that, while all policies, decisions, and basic plans are within the province only of the Commander, his General Staff officers hold general delegated authority to issue in his name supplementary orders, provided these are not contrary to, or in amendment of, the original decision, etc. Even without staff specialists especially trained to assist in the discharge of the Command functions, the Navy is justified in adopting this same rule, although in a modified form. It seems necessary to modify it, because, even if there were a naval General Staff Corps, the rule does not seem entirely applicable to a sound delegation of authority in the case of naval tactical and strategical movements.

The most important single responsibility of a Commander, army or naval, is the safety of the military force under his command. The military force under an Army Commander consists of troops. The military force under a Naval Commander consists of ships. Danger from many sources may threaten either troops or ships, but destruction because of erroneous tactical action seems unlikely to occur so quickly, and so completely, to troops as to ships.

Time is a factor of such importance in the handling of naval vessels, that an error which persists for only a few

seconds may result in a terrible disaster, not only because of action of the enemy, but even because of incorrect action by our own forces. Time for reflection or for conference may not be available to the Naval Commander. Frequently, his action must be instant and instinctive. It is possible that the Navy is inclined to undervalue theoretical training, because of a belief that in the handling of ships nothing can ever take the place of experience. It is unquestionably true that their safe operation depends upon the personal tactical skill and the quick decision of a single man to a very great extent. Under the circumstances, even if the Navy had a general staff corps, it seems probable that a naval Commander would hesitate to delegate to his staff authority to direct even minor tactical maneuvers of the vessels under his command, except to meet a sudden emergency.

Furthermore, there is an important difference in the circumstances under which army and naval staff officers perform their duties. When engaged in a strategic or even a tactical movement, army forces may often be beyond the direct observation of their Commander, and sometimes out of communication with him. Unless he leaves his headquarters, he may be unable to keep in touch with his forces except through personal visits by staff officers. It may frequently be necessary for these officers, when supervising operations that are not under the eye of the Commander, to issue important directions concerning troop movements. Therefore, the delegation to army staff officers of

general authority to supervise operations and to issue minor orders may often be essential to the satisfactory execution of the plan as a whole.

On the other hand, when naval forces are at sea, operations staffs are embarked upon the same vessels as their Commanders. Staff officers are thus physically unable personally to supervise operations at a distance. Therefore, it is seldom necessary to grant naval staff officers the authority to direct minor strategical action in advance of approval. Even in complicated operations, where the Commander is unable personally to go through the process of reaching a decision, and where he knows that he probably will accept the recommendations of the staff, he is unlikely to authorize the issuance of important orders without prior reference to himself.

There seem to be no similar reasons for failing to grant as much Administrative authority to naval staff officers as to army staff officers. This method of control involves a multitude of details, many of them of small importance, and highly technical. The Commander will often accept staff advice without question, even though, through the signature of papers, he will nominally make important decisions himself. Furthermore, Administrative staffs may frequently be separated from their Commanders, and, at such times, necessarily must be given a free hand in order that business may be kept moving. Therefore, naval

staff officers are usually granted considerably greater latitude in Administrative affairs than in those relating to Command. The Army rule, previously quoted, seems entirely applicable to staff action with respect to naval Administration.

The question in any case as to the action that a staff officer is permitted to take, without previous reference to his Commander, will sometimes depend upon the particular staff. The duties delegated to staff officers in the higher echelons may often be more important than those assigned to staff officers in the lower. The reasons are that, in the first place, the former may be officers of greater experience, or be recognized experts in certain specialities. In the second place, so many matters require the attention of the superior Commanders, that they are able to act personally on only a few, and, therefore, must rely upon the staff for action on the remainder. It may be said that the degree of discretion entrusted to a particular staff officer is likely to depend upon his experience, ability, and personal characteristics, and also upon the attitude and preoccupation of the individual Commander. In any case, the latter is the only proper judge as to the authority to be exercised by members of his staff, and, since they act only in his name, all of their orders are to be considered equally binding with those he issues personally. The only absolute rule is that staff officers shall never issue orders except directly to

the Commander of a subordinate echelon, or to a representative authorized to receive orders. Naturally, latitude granted to staff officers for exercising authority carries with it an obligation not to abuse such authority but to protect and to advance the Commander's interests at every point, and to act with tact and discretion.

To insure consistency, there is another sound rule that should be observed: although a staff officer may properly take action on a particular matter without the previous knowledge of the Commander, the latter should not act without the knowledge of his staff. This rule is reasonable enough; if the Commander were so familiar with all details that he could, in person, act intelligently upon every one, he would nullify the very reason for the existence of the staff, which is to relieve him of his lesser burdens, so that he may devote his attention to more weighty matters.

The great essential is that the action of the staff be so coordinated that, in the words of the Navy Regulations, "the authority (of the Commander is) used only to carry out his own views". To be certain that only his own views are carried out, the Commander should see that the staff is kept fully informed concerning them; on the other hand, in case of uncertainty as to his views, members of the staff are responsible for ascertaining them promptly.

Although oral instructions may sometimes be given to subordinates, the will of the Commander is customarily expressed in writing or in despatches. The question of staff authority to sign letters or to release despatches is an important one, when we contemplate the great number issued during peace, and the even greater number that will be necessary during war.

The Navy Regulations are not of much assistance in solving this problem, beyond saying that the formula "by direction" may only be used in forwarding endorsements. The Commander himself is the only person who has specific authority to sign papers, or even to release despatches. All are aware that it is impossible for one man to perform such a task.

The general practice in the Fleet during peace seems to be:

- (a) The Commander signs all except routine letters and despatches addressed to military superiors, other Commanders, or offices of the Navy Department, signs all policy letters and military directives, and releases especially important despatches addressed to the command.
- (b) The Chief of Staff signs purely routine letters addressed to superiors, other Commanders, or offices of the Navy Department, and ordinary administrative letters addressed to the command.
- (c) Any staff officer so authorized releases ordinary administrative despatches, no matter to whom addressed.

This procedure does not seem to be entirely sound, and at times may be unduly restrictive. It is an anomaly for officers to be able to release despatches, but to be unable to sign letters covering the same subject matter. In other words, when the Commander is absent from his flagship, members of the staff are able to carry on his business by despatch, but not by letter. Furthermore, circumstances may conceivably arise where it is desirable for the Chief of Staff, or even for other staff officers, to issue minor military directives, either by letter or by despatch.

The prevalent practice of requiring naval Commanders to sign all military directives may possibly have originated at the Naval War College, since the order form indicates that the Commander always signs it. But this practice is distinctly contrary to that employed in other military services.

Concerning the German Army, Von Schellendorf said: "The Chief of the General Staff is responsible for the due performance of all business, and should the General be absent or otherwise prevented from attending to the duty, he has the power to sign himself any orders or instructions of a pressing nature."

The "Staff Officers' Field Manual" of the United States Army says: "Field orders are signed by the Commander in person or by his principal assistant." "The (Administrative) order is signed by the Chief of Staff."

The practice in the British Navy in 1919, according to an Admiralty pamphlet, was as follows: "The Chief of the Staff is empowered to sign operations orders and instructions for the Command, and all operations orders will be issued through him."

It seems desirable for the Commander to sign all communications addressed to superiors, except those purely routine, and all policy letters and important directives addressed to the command. But the Chief of Staff should have full authority to sign all other letters, to sign such military directives addressed to the command as the Commander may designate, and to release all except the most important despatches. If the Chief of Staff is not present, then the next senior officer associated with the Command Functions should be able to release minor directives which do not involve the tactical maneuvering of ships. Any staff officer, if especially authorized, should be permitted to release ordinary administrative despatches, and even to sign ordinary administrative letters "by direction". At present, Navy Regulations appear to forbid the use of this method of signature, at least when the letters are to be sent beyond the limits of the command.

Staffs are employed to relieve the Commander of details. One of the most effective methods of performing this duty is to keep from him as many as possible of the multitude of unimportant and routine letters and despatches. In the larger staffs, the Chief of Staff also needs relief of this same character.

2/18/37

3. The Chief of Staff.

The foregoing remarks apply to the position and the action of the staff as a whole. We may now consider its individual members, and the general character of the duties that each is expected to perform.

In all military services the Chief of Staff is recognized as having an especially important position in his organization. It is generally admitted that the Commander should have considerable freedom in the selection of his Chief of Staff, in order that he may obtain a principal assistant in sympathy with his ideas, and from whom he may expect complete loyalty. An officer with even outstanding professional attainments may not be fitted for duty as Chief of Staff if he does not possess the Commander's full confidence. The official relationship between the two men is very close; they will make a better team if the personal relationship is also intimate. Von der Goltz said:


"The proper constitution of the headquarters, especially harmony between the commander in chief and the chief of his staff, can do much toward supplying the want of heaven-born military genius.Cooperation depends in the first place upon personal sympathy. ... A happy selection is of supreme importance. Bad relations between these two men must produce the worst possible effect upon the fortunes of the whole army. The public will seldom hear anything of the matter, and the cause of failure will be looked for elsewhere than at its real source."

The ideas of the United States Army on this subject, as given in a manual issued by the Command and General Staff School, are that:


"The Chief of Staff....must be the friend and confidant of the general, his counsellor when needed, and his main source of information."

In the armies which have the general staff system, an officer assigned to duty as Chief of Staff will almost invariably have been trained in the staff school, and have served on one or more staffs in subordinate capacities. In the United States Navy, which has no staff specialists, previous tours of staff duty and the Naval War College course may be very useful in fitting an officer to perform the duty of Chief of Staff in a satisfactory manner.


In any case, he usually will have had considerable experience in the particular command to which he is attached, and, being closer to the Commander than any of the subordinate commanders, is more likely to be more familiar with his intentions. He can discharge a useful function by cultivating close relations with subordinate commanders, and will usually be given more latitude than other members of the staff in informing these subordinates as to the Commander's intentions. Regardless of the seniority of the Chief of Staff, these subordinates should accept his decisions as readily as they do those of the Commander himself.




METHOD "A"



METHOD "B"



METHOD "C"



METHOD "D"

FIGURE II. BASIC METHODS OF STAFF ORGANIZATION

The Chief of Staff is usually given considerable latitude in guiding the work and the recommendations of the staff. As a general proposition, he is in somewhat the same position as the executive officer of a vessel, who is the mouthpiece of the captain, and in direct charge of all the activities internal to the ship. Navy Regulations charge the Chief of Staff with the duty of organizing and supervising the entire staff, and with full responsibility for the results of their work. The Regulations also make all staff officers, even the Commander's personal aides, subordinate to the Chief of Staff's orders.

This relationship of the Chief of Staff to the other members of the staff is somewhat different in the United States Navy than in several of the other military services of the world. In fact, there are four different basic methods of organizing staffs, as shown in Figure 11.

To a certain extent, these four methods indicate the history of staff development. Method A is the oldest form of all, and was in rather general use some two hundred years ago. In it, the Chief of Staff is in charge of Administration, but not of Operations. Frederick the Great was his own Chief of Staff; he carried on with the assistance of an administrative staff and a few aids, and did not even have an Operations Officer. This scheme was discarded because it did not give enough weight to the operations side, and led to delays when the Commander was not at hand to make decisions.

Method B is the one used in the United States Navy, and is also one of the older forms. In this, the Chief of Staff has direct charge of all staff activities. His attention, therefore, is divided between Command and Administration, and critics of the system believe that in war he will not be in position to advise the Commander effectively on operations, the most important side of his work. However, he doubtless takes more of the Administrative burden off the Commander's shoulders than in Methods C and D.

In Method C, the Chief of Staff is primarily concerned with operations, but has coordinating duties with respect to Administration. It is the system used in the United States Army and also in the British Navy. It was the organization employed in the German High Command, though not in the lower echelons.

The German lower echelons used Method D, in which the Chief of Staff is actually no more than an Operations Officer. The method is also used by the British Army at Field General Headquarters, where there are two chiefs of the Administrative Groups, the Adjutant General and the Quartermaster General. An inspection of Diagrams C and D gives rise to speculations as to what would be the effect of having one Chief of Staff in charge of the Command Groups, and one Chief of Administration, with the former having powers of coordination similar to those of the Chief of Naval Operations with respect to the Navy Department.

Doubtless the staff organization prescribed by the Navy Regulations is an excellent system during peace, when ease of administration is relatively very important. Whether it would permit the Chief of Staff to function as the principal operations assistant and adviser of the Commander in Chief during war is questionable. However, the United States Navy has adopted one device whereby a large part of the administrative work of the Commander in Chief is performed by a special administrative organization. This is the Fleet Base Force, whose Commander, not only is the head of an organization corresponding to the Army Service of Supply but, to all intents and purposes, is also at the head of an administrative staff group which performs many of the same duties that are assigned to the Supply (G-4) Section of the Army General Staff. Therefore, Method B, as applied in our own service, does not seem to be open to all of the objections that it would have were the staff to handle all of the administrative affairs.

4. Organization of the Staff.

That part of the staff principally concerned with Command duties is known by different names in different services. In most of the armies, and some of the navies, it is known as the General Staff. The British Navy call it the War Staff. In the United States Navy the Regulations speak of it as the Operations Division.

In the German Army staffs, Administration was carried on by about ten coordinate branches and departments. There was no generic term for this group as a whole. These branches included the Routine Staff, (Personnel), Artillery, Engineers, Air, Judge Advocate General's Department, Military Police, the Intendence, (Supply), Communications, (including transport), Medical Department, and the Chaplain's Department. Sometimes the heads of several of these branches were officers of the General Staff Corps, but this fact did not bring them under the control of the General Staff of the army. While the Chief of the General Staff coordinates all staff work, the General Staff was concerned solely with operations.

In United States field armies there are two staff branches, called the General Staff and the Special Staff; the latter includes the heads of the technical, supply, and administrative services, and the chiefs of artillery, engineers, air, etc.

In the British Navy, besides the War Staff, there are the Technical Staff and the Administrative Staff. These branches have the following sub-divisions:

WAR STAFF.

Operations Section,
Mercantile Movements,
Communications,
Intelligence,
Secretariat.

ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES.

Personnel Discipline,
Personnel Regulative,
Medical.

TECHNICAL SERVICES.

Sermanship, Navigation, Engineering,
Gunnery, Torpedoes, Electricity,
Signals and Wireless Telegraph
Sections,
Stores,
Base Administrative.

The operations branches of all staffs usually handle all questions relating to the training of units, though they usually do not control the training of individuals. This is logical: during peace, training is practically their entire work, while during war both the general features of training, and also the character of the special training given, may determine whether or not the operations projected may be successful.

The United States Navy Regulations require that the staff of the Commander in Chief be organized into "an operations division and such other divisions as may be prescribed by the department or found necessary by the commander in chief for the proper administration and operation of the fleet". They also require

a communications section, either separate or attached to the operations division. Colloquially, we speak of the two staff branches as the "Operations Staff", and the "Administrative Staff".

Usual present staff instructions prescribe no divisions of the staff, but allocate all work to the officers occupying the customary staff positions. A few of the subordinate staffs of the fleet are organized into divisions or sections.

A glance at the list of the Command Functions, (Doctrine, Information, Advice, Planning, Communications, Supervision, and Record-keeping), and the groups of Administrative Activities that come under the cognizance of Commanders afloat, (Material, Personnel, Finance, Transport, Inspection and Law), shows that it is possible to arrange these into a reasonable number of divisions somewhat similar to the divisions found useful in other naval and military services. We therefore propose to enumerate the divisions considered suitable for the staff of the High Command of the naval service. Whether or not the particular groups that are listed in the following pages are over employed for the organization of staffs in actual service is of small importance. It is important, however, that the work of a staff be so coordinated that its members will act as a team instead of as a number of separate individuals. It is believed that coordination will be promoted by a rational assignment of the details of staff duty

to staff divisions and sections, and then by establishing a definite control relation between these subdivisions. It may also be mentioned that such an organization is required by Navy Regulations.

As a first step, we may assign to the Operations Division all of the Command Functions except Record-keeping. For the sake of complying with the usual practice of having but one central secretariat, records both of Command and Administration may be allocated to a single division. In that division, however, we must have for the operations papers a separate set of files that may be easily moved when the Commander temporarily shifts his flagship. We may also follow the practice of the Navy Department and assign to the Operations Division the training of organized units, but not of individuals.

In Part I of this paper, the remark was made that a Commander may sometimes desire the advice of his subordinate commanders, as well as the advice of his staff. Since these subordinates are concerned only with a portion of the work of the command, their advice as to a complete plan, made without adequate knowledge of the entire situation, may not always be particularly helpful. Councils of War, the conference method of reaching decisions, have a notoriously bad reputation. The full operating plan, therefore, should be the work of the Commander and his staff. Nevertheless,

subordinate commanders are presumed to have a more accurate knowledge than the Commander of the condition of their own particular forces, and should have a more detailed acquaintance with their tactical capabilities. Some years ago, when the so-called "Type Command" system was instituted for the purpose of coordinating type tactics and training, the senior Type Commanders were given special advisory duties to the Commander in Chief. It may be pointed out that field army, corps, and division staffs are now so organized that the commanders of all special troops, except infantry, are members of the Special Staffs. They not only are the tactical and technical advisers in matters pertaining to their branches, but also prepare the detailed tactical plans for the employment of their units. The General Staff then include these plans in the complete scheme which they submit to the Commander.

It would appear to be an error to rely solely upon the advice of junior specialists attached to the staff, when we have experienced Type Commanders, each with a competent staff, available for consultation upon important technical and tactical matters pertaining to their particular types. Therefore, in any staff organization that we may adopt, we should recognize that, for matters that require technical and tactical advice, the Senior Type Commanders should be considered in the same category as the members of the staff.

The Command Functions, of Advice, Doctrine, Planning, and Supervision, plus Training, seem inter-related in many respects. This group of functions corresponds, roughly, to those discharged by the Operations Section of the German Army, the Operations and Training Section of the American Army, and the Operations Section of the War Staff Branch of the British Navy staffs. We may include all of these in one section of the Operations Division. To this subdivision we will apply the term "Plans and Training Section".

Two other sections of the Operations Division, the Intelligence Section and the Communications Section, may be assigned cognizance of the two remaining Command Functions. These sections will necessarily have close liaison with the Plans and Training Section. The Operations Officer will be in charge of the work of the entire division.

When we take up the Administrative Groups, we may recall that the Commander of the Base Force performs a large portion of the work of management that might reasonably be expected to concern the staff of the Commander in Chief. Although he now handles many he does not handle all, of the matters relating to material supply and maintenance; therefore, these two activities will require separate sections of a Material Division of the staff, although their business will not be very heavy. The Commander of the Base Force at present has exclusive jurisdiction

over naval shore patrols, technical services, naval transport, and the supply of personnel to major units of the Fleet; therefore, it will not usually be necessary to organize sections of the staff of the Commander in Chief to handle these activities.

The remaining Administrative Groups may be allocated to the following staff divisions: Legal, Personnel, Inspections, and Finance. The Personnel Division may be divided into two sections, one concerned with the Regulation of Personnel, and the other with its Health. The Inspection Division may also have two sections; one will handle Personnel and the other Material.

The various sections and divisions here suggested for the staff do not fit the titles of the officers usually ordered to staffs, nor does it seem necessary that they do so. Staff officers consist partly of line specialists; in the British Navy these officers seem to devote much of their attention to the Technical Services, but in the United States Navy they are chiefly concerned with Training and with Operations, although they do coordinate the administration of their special material. Also attached to the staff are members of the staff corps of the Navy. Other officers are assigned for purely operational duties. Although the titles of staff officers ordered to the larger staffs of the Navy sometimes vary, the following list will include the usual staff titles:

Chief of Staff,
Operations Officer (Assistant Chief of Staff),
Flag Secretary,
Flag Lieutenant,
Personnel Officer,
Aide,
Communication Officer,
Intelligence Officer,
Plans and Logistics Officer,
Gunnery Officer,
Aviation Officer,
Marine Officer,
Athletic and Welfare Officers,
Engineer Officer
Constructor,
Radio Material Officer,
Paymaster,
Supply Officer,
Surgeon,
Chaplain,
Various assistants to the above.




FIGURE 12-TYPE STAFF ORGANIZATION

All of these officers will have administrative duties, and, at one time or another, will be concerned with operational matters, particularly in the preparation of plans, and the training of units. To the Operations Officer, who by Navy Regulations is also the Assistant Chief of Staff, will naturally fall the task of coordinating all staff work that relates to Planning and Training. His principal assistants in this work will be those officers detailed by the Department to aid him in this work, but, as previously indicated, most of the work of the line specialists will also fall under the cognizance of this section.

Practically all staff officers will be concerned with inspections. The greater part of the work of several will be in connection with the maintenance of material, while others will have only a minor interest in this feature. An officer having duties in more than one section or division should be listed in all of them, in order that the full scope of his work, and the directions of all his lines of responsibility, may be known to the entire staff.

The staff organization as outlined is shown in Figure 12.

This diagram is drawn so as to apply to the staff of the Commander in Chief. In the subordinate echelons, there will usually be a smaller number of staff officers. While these will have fewer details to handle, nevertheless, the scope of staff work will be about the same, since all of the Command Functions

and Administrative Groups will need to be covered. Therefore, this diagram is so arranged that it may be applied to the organization of any staff afloat.

During peace, the entire staff of the Commander in Chief can usually be accommodated on the flagship. This will not be the case in war, even when the Base Force handles a large part of the work. In fact, where the Commander in Chief is charged with so many war duties as is the case in the United States Navy, the size of his staff will soon outgrow ships altogether. It seems probable that most of the Administrative Sections, and a portion of the Training, Intelligence, and Communications Sections will have to be established ashore. This feature is important in connection with the question of the control to be exercised by the Chief of Staff over the staff as a whole, and the establishment of a working relation between its parts.

As a final point of staff organization, we may mention that staff manuals usually include instructions concerning:

Assignment of detailed duties to the sections.

Office routine for handling letters, reports, despatches, and movements of vessels.

Relations with flagship.

Miscellaneous regulations.

Port Watches.

Sea Watches.

War Watches, Conditions One, Two, and Three.

Emergency Quarters.

It is not proposed, in this paper, to touch upon these matters. They will vary with different commands, and are adequately covered in existing staff manuals, and in various Departmental and Fleet publications. This discussion of the functional organization of the staff completes the subject of the Organization of Command.