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# THE STRATEGIC EMPLOYMENT OF THE FLEET

STAFF PRESENTATION
Naval War College
Newport, R. I.
28 October, 1937

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# THE STRATEGIC EMPLOYMENT OF THE FLEET.

TITLE OF THE PRESENTATION

Given by Captain R.K.Turner, U.S.Navy.

Date 28 October, 1937, at 1330

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| | 38238 | Same | | B3863 | Naval Dispositions, &c. |
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| | 38145 | West Ind. Station | | 38146 | North Atlantic Ocean |
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Synopsis of Staff Presentation

"THE STRATEGIC EMPLOYMENT OF THE FLEET"

delivered 28 October, 1937

by

Captain R.K. Turner, U.S.Navy.

Introduction.

1. Previous staff presentations have dealt with the general forms and the objectives of naval warfare.

2. The correct objective for our greatest naval effort is the hostile fleet; but in attaining this, other and more immediate objectives may appear, such as enemy territory, naval communications, or trade.

3. This presentation is the first of a new series which deals with the technique of the employment of the fleet and its components.

Categories of Naval Forces.

4. Categories of forces available to the Navy are coastal defense forces, the control forces, the battle fleet, and land components required for capturing and defending bases. Compare these with Corbett's "flotilla", "cruisers", and "battle fleet".

The Strategic Function of the Battle Fleet.

5. Our principal concern is to be able to destroy the hostile fleet; if we are not strong enough to destroy it, we will be unable to contain it.

6. Success of naval strategic plans finally rests upon battle power; the battle fleet is formed for the sole purpose of providing strong battle power where needed.

7. The chief strategic function of the fleet is the creation of situations that will bring about decisive battle, and to provide sufficient battle power to ensure the defeat of the enemy.

The Theater of War.

8. The major portion of the fleet is assigned to the principal theater, because there the major portion of the fighting is expected to develop. Smaller naval forces are assigned to secondary theaters.

9. The location of the principal theaters, and the areas of strategic action, are determined by the belligerent able to sustain the most powerful offensive.

10. It is important during peace to decide upon the most probable future war theater, in order that adequate material preparation may be made for giving our forces favorable operating conditions in that theater.

Material Conditions That Influence Strategic Success.

11. The successful strategic employment of the fleet depends first of all upon the availability of vessels suitable in design for use in the principal theater, and adequate in number; and upon bases appropriately located, and having sufficient strength and resources.

Initial Strategic Deployment of the Fleet.

12. The initial deployment should provide for the security of weakly defended vital territory, vital naval communications, and vital trade. It should also protect from enemy interference the assembly and preparation of forces required for a nation's war effort.

13. The strategic deployment of the fleet is the basis for future strategic operations. The underlying idea of a sound deployment is that of mutual support between its parts, and effective arrangements for their timely concentration in mass.

14. Naval strategic deployment, in sum, is constituted by the character and size of the various separated parts of the fleet, their proposed operating areas, the positions of their

bases, and the relative location of the strong with respect to the weak parts.

Strategic Operations of the Fleet.

15. Strategic operations are scouting, patrolling, screening, escorting, raiding, supporting, and covering. These operations are carried on by the parts of the fleet for the performance of the fleet's task.

16. The battle fleet has the duty of supporting and covering not only its own detachments, but also the coastal naval defense forces, and the control force.

17. Deployment and operations are affected by the relative positions and strengths of enemy units.

18. Examples of British deployments during the World War. Future deployments near the enemy will probably be greatly affected by the recently developed attack power of submarines, coastal torpedo boats, and aircraft.

19. Example of American naval deployment in the Atlantic theater of the Spanish American War.

Overseas Naval Deployments.

20. Secondary deployments are similar in character to that of the main deployment. Usually both are more or less fixed in scope, and are capable of expansion only through the acquisition of additional bases.

21. Naval campaigns have usually been conducted from fixed deployments, and seldom by an overseas movement of the entire major deployment. Compare the movements of naval and military deployments.

Mobile Naval Deployments.

22. Strategical operations of mobile deployments are similar to those of fixed deployments; the major and minor movements constitute strategic maneuvers.

23. The design of strategic dispositions must be fitted to conditions as they exist. Two criteria of the design of strategic deployments are: 1st, strategic distribution is effective only in proportion to available tactical power; 2d, the parts must be mutually supporting, and so distributed as to facilitate timely concentration in mass.

J.W. WILCOX, Jr.,
Captain, U.S.Navy,
Chief of Staff

# THE STRATEGIC EMPLOYMENT OF THE FLEET.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS



## LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS.

3556-1845
10-20-37

# THE STRATEGIC EMPLOYMENT OF THE FLEET

## 1. Introduction.

Most of the staff lectures given so far this year have dealt with the general forms and the objectives of naval warfare. These subjects have been treated along broad lines; your naval reading and the solution of hypothetical problems has had the purpose of giving you a more detailed insight into the underlying nature of war on the sea. We have indicated that containing and destroying the naval forces of the enemy usually are the correct objectives for our greatest naval effort, and that we are more likely to be able to carry out our war aims after these objectives have been attained. However, there may be many other objectives that it will be to our interest to attain immediately, either for the general purposes of the war, or in the creation of situations that will facilitate a more direct action against the enemy. Thus, from the outset of the war, we probably will be under the necessity of providing for the defense of our own coasts, of protecting our maritime communications and attacking those of the enemy, of transporting our land forces to positions where they can operate effectively, and possibly of capturing positions from which to support such operations or to attack the hostile fleet.

Regardless of what our operations are directed against: enemy fleet, trade, or land forces, we must have a reasonably secure control over the sea in the operating area for a time sufficiently long to permit us to accomplish our objective. Securing control, defending control, and exercising control, always will provide strong motives in the arrangement of the lines of naval strategy. It is in connection with control of the sea that the major

naval operations of a war, both strategical and tactical, are carried out.

The technique of the actual strategical and tactical employment of naval forces will be discussed in a new series of staff lectures of which this is the first. Concerned heretofore with the objectives and the forms of naval warfare as a whole, now we are interested in how naval operations may be carried on, first, by the fleet as a unit, and second, by the various types of vessels and other fighting forces that constitute the fleet.

2. Categories of Naval Forces.

You will recall that Corbett, in "Some Principles of Maritime Warfare", traced the gradual standardization of naval craft into three categories: battleships, cruisers, and the flotilla. In Corbett's conception, the flotilla was made up of gunboats, sloops, and small frigates, and was used almost exclusively for coast defense and attack, and for despatch carrying. The primary duty of the cruisers lay with the exercise of control at sea, although a part of them were needed with the battleships for scouting. The battleships were concentrated into squadrons which formed the central reservoirs of naval strength.

Existing instructions of the United States Navy require that, in war, the operating naval forces be divided into two categories:

The Naval Local Defense Forces, and
The naval forces assigned to the various theaters of operation.

The local defense forces are concerned with the defense of coastal positions and the control of coastal waters. These are analogous to Corbett's flotilla. The forces assigned to the various war theaters are concerned

with naval matters in the open sea. The latter are further subdivided by the character of the duties that they perform. One group of duties has to do with attack on and the defense of trade and naval communications. These are similar to Corbett's "cruisers", and the assigned vessels may deploy widely in small groups to perform their tasks. The technical name that Americans have applied to this group is the "Control Force." The other class of duties is concerned with the security of the command of the sea, and these duties are performed by the concentrated "battle fleet".

Thus, essentially, we recognize that Corbett's classification of naval vessels still remains sound. But we must recognize that recent years have brought changes in the composition, and the scope of the duties, of the three groups. To the local defense force, the flotilla, have been added coastal torpedo boats, small submarines, minelayers, and shore based aircraft. The flotilla has seen its radius of action extended a great distance to sea, and now is able to exercise a protective influence over the operations of both the fleet and the control force. The control force has been strengthened by the addition of long range submarines and long range aircraft operating from mobile bases. The battle fleet no longer consists solely of battleships and cruisers, but its power has been increased by the addition of sea-going destroyers, fast submarines, mine layers, and numerous airplanes.

Corbett failed to mention one category of force which, to the Navy, is as essential as either the battle fleet, the control force, or the local naval defense forces. To operate successfully, the Navy requires secure bases.

A defensive naval campaign may be projected from secure bases already in our possession, but an offensive campaign may require new bases, located possibly even in enemy territory. The fleet alone cannot seize these new positions, and, if it is to do its proper work at sea, it can not be tied down to their passive defense. The additional category to which I refer comprises the land forces required for the capture and for the defense of naval bases, at home or abroad.

Under the American system the Army is responsible for the defense of permanent naval bases, and the Navy is responsible for the seizure and the defense of advanced bases until the responsibility can be taken over by the Army. At home, a close cooperation is required between Army and naval forces; overseas, the troops themselves, whether Army or Marine Corps, form an essential category which is an integral part of the Fleet itself.

3. The Strategic Function of the Battle Fleet.

Today's discussion is concerned with the more important strategic aspects of the employment of the battle fleet, the major category of naval force whose sphere lies in the open sea.

We may commence the discussion by inquiring "What is the chief strategic function of the battle fleet?"

Corbett says:

"The object of naval warfare is to control maritime communications. In order to exercise that control effectively we must have a numerous class of vessels specially designed for pursuit. But their power of exercising control is in proportion to our own degree of command, that is, to our power of preventing their operations from being

interfered with by the enemy. ---- The true function of the battle fleet is to protect cruisers and flotilla at their work. The best means of doing this is of course to destroy the enemy's power of resistance."

Mahan said:

"In war the proper main objective of the navy is the enemy's navy. As the latter is essential to maintain the connection between scattered strategic points, it follows that a blow at it is the surest blow at them. ---- We may safely coin for ourselves the strategic aphorism, that in naval war the fleet itself is the key position of the whole."

The French writer Darrieus remarked:

"To maintain formidable forces, to discern the vulnerable point of the adversary, to carry there rapidly the maximum possible effort to attain at that point superiority: such is the role of strategy".

We can all agree that, so long as the enemy naval forces are able to operate against us, our principal concern is to destroy them. If we do not have the power to destroy them, we will be unable to contain them, and therefore will be unable to prevent them from nullifying our efforts.

To destroy the enemy fleet, it will be necessary to fight; finally, therefore, the success of our naval plans must depend upon our power in battle. The fleet, the central reservoir of fighting strength, is built for no other reason than battle; it is only by successful fighting, or the threat of successful fighting, that the fleet can justify its existence. Success in

battle is the major tactical duty of the fleet, but in order to ensure tactical success, it is necessary for strategy to collect the requisite fighting strength at the appropriate time and place.

The only reason for the formation of a fleet is to provide battle power. Therefore, the chief strategic function of the fleet is the creation of situations that will bring about decisive battle, and under conditions that will ensure the defeat of the enemy.

4. The Theater of War.

On the outbreak of war the Navy Department plans to designate one general geographic area as the principal naval theater, and to assign to that theater the major portion of the fleet under the command of the Commander in Chief, because in that theater the major portion of the fighting is expected to develop. Secondary theaters are also to be designated, and smaller forces assigned to them under independent commanders.

A similar practice has long been followed by other navies. In the World War the Commander in Chief of the German High Seas Fleet exercised command only in the North Sea and in the Atlantic to the westward of Great Britain and France. A separate Commander in Chief had command of the German naval forces in the Baltic; the Commander of the Naval Corps controlled the forces based on the Belgian coast; and the Admiralty Staff exercised direct command over the submarines in the Mediterranean and the surface vessels operating on distant stations. Your study of Cruiser Warfare has indicated the subdivision of the British naval command system, which was along

lines that had remained much the same for two hundred years.

The sizes of the various theaters have little relation to their importance. The North Sea and English Channel with their approaches, a relatively small area on the globe, forms a theater wherein the bitterest and the most prolonged naval wars in history have occurred. But in wars between nations separated from each other by greater distances, the principal theater may be much larger, and at one time or another may even include most of the entire sea that lies between the two opponents. In the struggle to destroy or to contain enemy naval forces, there may be involved the attainment of a succession of intermediate objectives, such as the destruction of enemy trade, the occupation of enemy territory, or the establishment of advanced bases. In such cases, from time to time the opposing operations may be expected to be localized in a comparatively small strategic area of the whole theater.

At the beginning of a war, sometimes only one side will attempt to operate on the offensive, while the other assumes an attitude of defense. At other times, both opponents begin to operate on the offensive, usually in different directions. But such a condition will not persist for very long, because one side will be forced to drop his offensive, and to devote himself almost solely to the defense. The belligerent who sustains the strongest offensive, will force his enemy to take up the defensive, and thus determine the location of the principal theater and the active strategic area.

At the outset of the World War, both the French and the German Armies started offensives. The direction of effort of the French was toward Metz and the upper Rhine, but the elastic German defense was soon able to bring the French to a halt. The direction of effort of the Germans was toward Paris, and their offensive was so strong that the French were soon forced to subordinate all other projects to the defense of their central base of operations. Throughout the war the principal western land theater remained the northeastern part of France, that is, the region occupied by the belligerent who was able to sustain the most powerful offensive.

The ultimate objective of the war, as has already been pointed out, is always properly a matter for state policy to select. Frequently, from the start of a war, the military effort is directed toward the final physical objective as designated by policy. Probably this is usually the case in a limited war, which is often characteristic of a contest principally naval in character.

As an example, in the Spanish-American War the political objective was the expulsion of Spain from the Caribbean. This area, which enclosed the Spanish possessions of Cuba and Puerto Rico, became the principal theater because the American offensive toward those points soon forced the Spanish Fleet to come over to contest the command of the Caribbean.

But sometimes the location of the final physical objective does not determine the location of the principal naval theater, even in limited warfare.

In the Seven Years' War the policy of Great Britain aimed at the conquest of Canada. Nevertheless, the British

exerted their chief naval effort not in Canadian, but in European waters in attempts to contain and to destroy the French navy, for the purpose of gaining freedom of action on the coast of Canada. The Atlantic and Channel coastal waters of France comprised the principal theater in this war, although the final physical objective of the war was overseas.

The reason for so prolonging this subject is to lead up to the statement that it is well worth the trouble during peace to determine the most probable principal theaters of future wars, in order that material preparations may be made, as far in advance as possible, for giving our forces favorable operating conditions in those theaters.

5. Material Conditions that Influence Strategic Success.

The most important material preparation that a nation may make for naval warfare is the construction of naval vessels and aircraft suitable for effective service in its future wars. In order that these vessels can give effective service their material design ought to be particularly adapted for successful operation in the most probable and most important future war theaters.

We know that the German pre-war fleet was constructed almost solely with a view to operation in the North Sea and the Baltic. Most German vessels had a very limited endurance. It was unnecessary for living quarters to be suitable for long occupancy, because the crews could live ashore in barracks the greater part of the time. Much was sacrificed to structural integrity. The ships had numerous guns, whose small caliber was no particular handicap in the usual conditions of limited visibility. Designed along these lines German vessels as a whole gave a good account of themselves during the war.

Similarly, the British designed the vessels of their battle fleet chiefly for service in the North Sea, the European Atlantic Coast, and the Mediterranean.

For the past several years Italy has been building very fast cruisers, numerous destroyers and submarines, flotillas of coastal torpedo boats, and many long range bombing airplanes, of which a considerable number are seaplanes. For the special conditions that exist in the Adriatic and the Mediterranean, and particularly the narrow sea between Sicily and Africa, the Italians now have a very formidable fleet. Except for their submarines, the Italian Fleet would be less suited to conditions that obtain in the Atlantic, but they seem at present to have little inclination to venture beyond Gibraltar.

Would either the German or the Italian design conception be suitable for the United States Fleet? A glance at the great area enclosed within the naval frontiers of the Western Hemisphere brings a negative answer, and this becomes more emphatic when we consider the possibility that our fleet may be called upon for war service in the great spaces and the varied weather of the Central and Western Pacific.

Also of major interest in connection with the design of naval vessels are the numbers and the design of naval craft that the enemy will, during future wars, actually employ in the principal theater.

For the past century France has had to devote most of her available resources to preparations for war on land, and has not been financially able to maintain a strong navy. She has not attempted to compete with her ancient enemy, Great Britain, in numbers of vessels designed for operation

in the battle fleet, and wisely has centered her effort toward the production of types that might successfully engage the British sea power in more limited fields. Her battleships have not been entirely suitable for use against British battleships, but rather, her battleships have been designed for use against other European powers. But France has constructed numerous surface and submarine torpedo vessels in order to prevent the British fleet from approaching her coasts; and in order to be able to strike at British maritime communications, she has produced fast cruisers and long range submarines. With respect to opposing the British Fleet, the material design of the French fleet has thus been based on the conception of an inferior fleet operating defensively in home waters, and with a fast, elusive detachment, operating offensively in the open sea against what has been demonstrated to be the weakest feature of British sea power.

For any particular class or type of naval vessel, there are five principal variables which enter into the question of design. These are: fire power, defensive strength, seaworthiness (or airworthiness), speed, and radius. It is beyond the scope of this paper to attempt the evaluation of these characteristics. It is sufficient here to remark that naval vessels ought to be designed with such a combination of these variables as will be most appropriate for:

(a) Operations in the most important and the most probable theaters of future naval wars, and,

(b) Operations against enemy naval vessels and aircraft which will, during <u>future</u> war, <u>actually be found</u> in such theaters.

For example, vessels with small endurance are unsuitable for general use in large theaters where the bases are widely separated. Small, fast, lightly constructed ships will not be very useful in regions where heavy seas prevail. If the weaker of two opponents is to continue to be active at sea, which requires that he have the choice of accepting or refusing action with hostile detachments, his vessels necessarily must have high speed.

One very bad combination of the three qualities of speed, defensive strength, and fire power would be for a weaker fleet to sacrifice speed and resistance in order to obtain heavy fire power. An inferior fleet with these qualities can not take the offensive, and since it can not escape from superior detachments it is even doubtful if it can long remain above the surface of the water. Such was the Russian fleet in the Russo-Japanese War.

Warship design appropriate for a probable war theater and for meeting the ships the enemy will probably have there forms the primary basis for the successful strategic employment of the fleet.

A second important consideration has to do with the relative numbers of naval craft that the two opponents may be able to operate continuously in the theater. In this question, first of all, are involved the peace-time appropriations that will be made available for building up the fleet to an adequate strength. Next are the resources, strength, and distribution of naval bases relative to those of the enemy; the availability of war material, and the security of the lines of naval communication.

Since naval vessels can not long remain at sea, the total time that they can operate in a given area depends upon the distance to their bases. If they are to be safe while in port,

their bases must be reasonably secure against all forms of attack. If they are to be able to deploy promptly in a manner that will facilitate profitable operations, the bases must be distributed in such a manner as will support the desired operations.

The numbers of vessels that are able to operate also depends upon the number of vessels laid up for repairs, the detachments made to other theaters, and the detachments made from the main concentration for use in the same theater for the defense of fixed positions and lines of communication. These considerations are determined by the character and the size of the theater, the availability of secure and adequately equipped bases, and their position relative to the enemy.

During the World War the British found it necessary to detach the INVINCIBLE and the INFLEXIBLE to the Falkland Islands, and the PRINCESS ROYAL to Halifax, all to operate against von Spee. At various periods while these vessels were absent as many as four more of the latest capital ships were simultaneously laid up for repairs. As a result, sometimes the number of British dreadnaughts and battle cruisers in the North Sea was actually less than the number available to the Germans, who were also superior in destroyers. Had the Germans only known it, they might have been able to take action that would have jeopardized the continued command of the sea by the British.

The very important question of the training of personnel is a matter that will not be touched upon in this paper.

Thus we conclude that the successful strategic employment of the fleet depends first of all upon the availability of vessels suitable in design and adequate in number, and upon bases appropriately located, and with sufficient strength and resources.

We may now turn to an examination of the usual strategic operating methods of the battle fleet.

6. Initial Strategic Deployment of the Fleet.

It may be recalled that, in a previous presentation, it was pointed out that a decisive naval action can seldom be arranged by invitation. Each of the opposing fleets will seek to fight only when and where it is the superior, but both may endeavor, through the use of maneuver, to form an unexpected and decisive combination that will force the enemy to fight even though definitely inferior. Mention also was made that to make an unwilling enemy fight, it may be necessary to attack something whose possession by the enemy is vital to his further continuation of the war. We may classify vital things under one of three headings:

(a) Fixed positions or territory,

(b) Naval communications (including those necessary to support the operations of land forces),

(c) Trade.

Of course, this statement is merely a broad generalization. The problem is not so simple as the statement. Neither we nor the enemy may be able to prophesy whether or not any particular feature may prove vital. A decisive naval engagement may occur even though vital points have not been attacked. Such things as prestige, pride, an incorrect evaluation of own and enemy power and ability, unsound strategic ideas or dispositions, or even mere chance, may bring about a battle.

But, in the large sense, offensive action aimed either at the occupation of important positions, the establishment of control over a sea area which the enemy requires for his naval communications, or the threatened complete destruction

of his seaborne trade, are the operations most likely to produce a strong reaction from the opponent. What is important for one belligerent to attack, is also important for the other to protect.

Therefore, when a fleet executes its strategic deployment at the outset of war, the deployment should, so far as possible, provide for the security of weakly defended vital territory, vital naval communications, and vital trade. You may say that this statement indicates that the initial naval deployment ought to be defensive in character. And so it ought, unless a navy finds itself so strong that it can undertake immediately an offensive so compelling that the enemy will be unable to afford the energy to strike back at a fatally weak spot.

This does not imply that the naval forces are in any respect to be considered as a "fortress fleet", committed indefinitely to the defense of territory. But we ought to recognize the duty of the fleet to cover the mobilization of the army, and of the naval district forces, until such time as these become capable of protecting really vital positions or areas against a possibly overwhelming overseas attack. It is as true with a fleet as with an army, that its first duty, on the outbreak of war, is as assume a disposition that will protect from enemy interference the assembly and preparation of the additional forces that the nation will require for its maximum war effort.

A nation is fortunate if its geographic situation facilitates a strategic deployment that is suitable both for defense and offense, and if its excess naval strength is great enough to permit it to launch an immediate naval attack against the

enemy. Germany is in this situation with respect to Russia, and Great Britain has similar advantages over Germany, the Netherlands, and France.

Other nations are not so fortunate. The United States could readily make a sound defensive deployment, but has neither the geographic position nor the requisite strength for an offensive deployment that would be immediately effective beyond the limits of the Western Hemisphere. Both France and Italy occupy positions with respect to each other that would give certain advantages for launching a naval offensive, but neither of them would find it easy to effect an entirely secure defensive deployment.

Since the strategic deployment of the fleet is the basis for its operations against the enemy, it may be of interest to investigate the subject of naval strategic deployments, to see if we can determine some of the essential features. First of all, we can do no better than to recall one of Mahan's remarks:

> "The essential underlying idea is that of mutual support; that the entire force, however distributed at the moment, is acting in such wise that each part is relieved by the others of a part of its own burden; that it also does the same for them; while the disposition in the allotted stations facilitates also timely concentration in mass."

The ability to concentrate effectively requires that the major strength elements be able to support the detached groups in time to forestall the infliction of serious damage upon them. To accomplish this, the strong elements should occupy a central position, and thus be able to operate on interior lines. The simplest way to ensure concentration is to keep the entire fleet together in one spot. But this is not

satisfactory, because, if it is kept concentrated, its parts will be unable to accomplish anything very useful either for defense or offense. To get results, the fleet must exert its strength at sea, and throughout the entire area that it has taken upon itself to control. Therefore, detachments must be sent out in various directions for the performance of the strategic operations that the situation requires. In sum, the naval strategic deployment is constituted by the character and the size of these different detachments, the sea areas in which they are to be active, the positions of their bases, and the relative location of the strong elements of the fleet.

7. Strategic Operations of the Fleet.

Exactly what are the strategic operations that the various parts of the fleet may be called upon to perform? The term "operations" is ordinarily used to describe any arrangement or series of connected military acts. It is not desirable to reject this broad use of a very convenient word; nevertheless, it may also be given a more restricted sense when used as a class name for the detailed strategic movements of the fleet.

Keeping in mind that strategy is related to the larger movements of armed forces, we find that the various strategic operations are rather simple in character and few in number. They are:

Scouting,
Patrolling,
Screening,
Escorting,
Raiding,
Supporting,
Covering.

Scouting visualizes a rather wide distribution of weak forces for the purpose of gathering information of the enemy. It may have a purpose that is either offensive or defensive. It may be either sporadic or continuous.

Patrolling is carried on continuously in particular areas for defensive purposes. It aims at the detection of enemy forces as soon as they enter the area, and should have sufficient strength to overcome weak enemy detachments. It is also the usual method for managing seaborne trade in controlled areas.

Screening is the shielding of a force from danger by the use of dispersed units so arranged as to deny to an enemy passage across a particular line. Its task may be to prevent the enemy from gaining information, or to protect another force against minor interference or surprise, thus giving the latter time to develop its full defensive strength. Usually screening implies observation of a line, the prompt destruction of minor enemy forces approaching it, and the delay of strong enemy forces. A screen may consist of an outer line of pickets and one or two inner lines of stronger supporting groups. Although our official literature speaks of offensive and defensive screening, strategically a screen is always defensive. When the purpose is offensive, the operation might more properly be spoken of as a raid. Screens may be composed of air, surface, or subsurface units, or a combination of such forces. Screening may also be effected through the use of minefields as the supports for patrolling pickets. The German patrols and minefields in the Helgoland Bight, and the Dover Patrol and minefields constituted highly effective screens for the naval movements that were carried on in their rear.

Escorting is the direct protection of a weak convoy by a force designated to be strong enough to repel any probable enemy attack. Its purpose is purely defensive.

Raiding is invariably an offensive movement, though it may have a defensive purpose. It consists of the unexpected entry into an area of a force designed to be stronger than the enemy forces immediately available. It is always temporary; it should be designed to inflict serious damage or to gain important information; and usually should carry the threat of permanency or future repetition. Although raiding is the customary manner in which submarines and aircraft operate, and while the laying of strategic minefields may constitute raiding, it is also a frequent method of operation for surface forces varying in strength from a few vessels to an entire fleet. The composition and dispositions of a raiding force may vary widely, and must be adapted to the existing situation. While all of the other strategic operations may be involved in raiding, it is convenient to consider it as a distinct type of operation. Raiding occupies a tremendously important place in naval warfare, 1st, because it may frequently seem to be the only way in which damage can be inflicted, or enemy naval energy be absorbed; and, 2nd, because of the speed and secrecy with which naval movements can be effected.

Weak detached forces engaged in scouting, screening, escorting, and raiding are enabled to perform their duties only through the operations of strong supporting or covering forces. Support is given from the rear in such proximity that concentration can be effected before serious loss has been incurred. Covering is done by a strong force operating to the front or flanks in such a manner that an approaching enemy can be intercepted before he can reach the force covered.

Even though the control force and the naval district forces may not be attached to the fleet itself, the fleet is likely to have the duty of protecting them through supporting or covering operations.

The control force has the task of intercepting and capturing vessels engaged in enemy trade, and of protecting friendly trade against hostile attack. The strategic operations of the control force are the patrol of important trade areas, and the escort of merchant vessels requiring direct protection. If it operates at a great distance, the fleet can do little for it except to prevent enemy raiders from leaving port to attack it. It usually is necessary for distant control forces to have their own strength elements which support the dispersed cruiser operations along the trade routes.

The naval district forces defend the waters near the home coasts and control the trade in those waters. Their strategic tasks are to patrol, to escort trade or military convoys, and to screen inshore naval movements. They also may need help from the battle fleet.

The task organization of the battle fleet should be based upon the normal need for carrying on those various strategic operations.

It is usually necessary to get information of the enemy through scouting; therefore, a permanent scouting force may sometimes be required. Scouting may take the form of watching off the enemy ports, continuous search or observation of certain areas or certain lines, or an occasional widespread sweep or reconnaissance. Since scouting lines are always seeking to contact the enemy, they are in constant danger of meeting a stronger concentration, particularly of raiders on the surface or in the air. Scouting lines are such tempting bait that even with

rather strong support, it is seldom that surface scouts can go out at frequent intervals in the same area. In the future, aircraft alone, or in conjunction with surface vessels, will doubtless be employed for scouting whenever possible. Submarines are not entirely suitable scouts, but it will probably be necessary to use them when the area to be observed is close to permanent enemy positions. Here, where they do not have to move rapidly to get their information, submarines may be successful and, at least, they have a better chance of escaping destruction.

Jellicoe discovered soon after the beginning of the war that he could not continuously maintain surface scouts throughout the North Sea, both because he didn't have enough cruisers, and because those he sent out were in constant danger from submarines and surface detachments. When he wished to scout the southern portion of the North Sea, he conducted what he called a "sweep", using cruisers and destroyers supported by heavy concentrations, and sometimes by the entire Grand Fleet.

In areas near the fleet bases it may be necessary to constitute a patrol force for driving out enemy scouts, raiding groups and submarines, and for maintaining a clear space that will permit the fleet to sortie safely. As with scouting, patrolling operations are subject to raids. Patrols can seldom remain near enemy bases, and if they are to be continuous, prompt support must be available. The Germans found that British raiders frequently attacked their patrols even near Helgoland. Therefore, the Germans laid extensive minefields, and used small fishing craft in the outer lines with submarines in close support; aircraft patrols when the weather was favorable; and placed their cruiser and destroyer supports well to the rear. Finally, by 1916, one-half of the entire fleet was kept in the mouth of the Jade constantly ready to assist in repelling British raiders.

Raiding groups are likely to be made up only for temporary duty, and are too varied in character to permit of specific description.

In the strategic deployment of the fleet, we thus have as the mobile elements the naval district forces, the control force, the permanent scouts and patrols, the raiding groups, and the major strength units of the fleet. As the fixed elements we have the operating areas of these forces, and the ports upon which they are to base. The sea areas in which the dispersed detachments can operate will depend upon the positions, the strength, and the adequacy of their bases; upon the usual position of the main body; and upon the positions and the strength of the enemy naval forces. If enough bases are available, and if the enemy fleet is at a considerable distance, a wide deployment may be possible. If the bases are few or badly located, and the enemy fleet is near, the deployment must be more restricted in space.

8. World War British Deployment in Home Waters.

The British deployment in home waters at the beginning of the war provided for the operation, from defended bases, of the battle fleet, a control force, and the local defense forces. The deployment had the distinctive feature that there were really two battle fleets, each operating in its own strategic theater, one the North Sea and one the English Channel. A glance at a chart of this deployment (Figure 1) will disclose the inter-relationship of the seven types of strategic operations that we have described, and the relative positions occupied by the permanent naval subdivisions

In the North Sea the Grand Fleet, composed of new battleships, cruisers, and destroyers, had its operating bases at Scapa Flow and Cromarty, and an operating and repair base in




FIG. 1
WORLD WAR
INITIAL BRITISH NAVAL DEPLOYMENT
IN HOME WATERS

the Firth of Forth. A strong advanced force was permanently based at Rosyth to guard against raids and to prevent invasion. Directly in front of these bases was the Grand Fleet Cruiser Patrol Area, where both patrol and screening operations were carried on. From time to time scouting sweeps were made toward the German positions, the scouting lines being supported by one or more of the battle squadrons, in the manner indicated in Figure 2, for the sweep of 8-11 September, 1914. The usual position of the Grand Fleet was such as to cover all of the open sea control operations, and to support the patrols in their various areas, and the escorts for the Norwegian convoys.

Based on Harwich was the Southern Force of cruisers, destroyers, and overseas submarines. At first, this force was a part of the Grand Fleet, but very soon became a separate command. Its duties were to patrol the southern part of the North Sea, to raid German patrol and scouting lines, to repel minor hostile raids, and to cover the operations of the local defense forces.

In the Narrow Seas the Channel Fleet, made up of old battleships, cruisers, and destroyers, based at Portland, Plymouth and Portsmouth. It covered the military communication lines to France and the control areas to the westward, and supported the coastal patrols.

The control force in home waters was composed of the 9th Cruiser Squadron operating west of the Continent, the 11th Cruiser Squadron to the westward of Ireland, and the 10th Cruiser Squadron in the area between Scotland and Ireland.

The local naval forces were in two separate categories: the offshore groups called the Patrol Flotillas, and the inshore groups called the Local Defense Flotillas. The Patrol




FIG. 2

GRAND FLEET

OFFENSIVE SCOUTING SWEEP

9-10 SEPT., 1914.

Flotillas were composed of one or two light cruisers, (the Western Patrol had nothing but cruisers), eighteen to thirty-four late destroyers, moderate sized submarines, naval aircraft, and later, trawlers and drifters. There were five of these groups based in the Firth of Forth, the Tyne, the Humber, Dover, and Falmouth, and they patrolled at sea against the approach of small raiding groups, and screened coastwise shipping, Later, the work of these patrols was facilitated by large, off-shore minefields. Local defense Flotillas patrolled in front of all of the important naval and commercial ports, and also regulated the movement of trade. Included in this group were the oldest destroyers, torpedo boats and submarines, as well as numerous trawlers and motor boats. At Scapa Flow, the Humber, and the Tyne were from one to four old battleships, which acted as guardships for the support of the local flotillas.

All of the permanent naval bases, and most of the important commercial ports were defended by emplaced guns and small garrisons of troops.

This example illustrates what may be called a normal fixed strategic deployment, in which minor forces operate continuously, and the heavy forces remain in readiness for eventualities. From time to time the arrangement may be temporarily changed to a special deployment designed to promote some particular purpose. An example of a special covering deployment is shown by Jellicoe's dispositions during October, 1914, while the Canadian Army was being transported across the Atlantic. This is shown in Figure 3. The Canadian convoy also had a fairly strong escort. This covering deployment was purely defensive, and was designed chiefly to intercept and destroy any strong German raiding force which might seek to escape to




FIG. 3

GRAND FLEET DEPLOYMENT

TO COVER

CANADIAN ARMY CONVOY

3-11 OCT., 1914.

the Atlantic.

An example of a special deployment having not only a defensive, but also a strong offensive tone was the complicated arrangement of forces in the middle of August while the British Expeditionary Force was passing over to France as shown in Figure 4. This deployment was designed to protect the troop transports, but the British hoped that the Germans would come out to attack. Jellicoe had in mind that the transports might act as bait, and he placed himself where he could punish the German Fleet severely if it should expose itself. An examination of this deployment shows that all of the usual strategic operations were carried on, with the exception of escorting. Particular attention is invited to the arrangement of forces in the vicinity of the Straits of Dover. Considered as a whole, the deployment of the Dover Patrol is an excellent example of screening, in a very effective relation to the Main Body, the Channel Fleet. This fleet was in position to provide the ultimate support for the screen, while the Grand Fleet was in a position where it could effectively cover the screen.

We will recall that it was in the course of the usual strategic operations of scouting, patrolling, raiding, etc., from the normal fixed deployments of the British and Germans, that all of the principal naval tactical actions of the World War occurred. Strategy endeavored, through movement, to create conditions favorable to success in battle; tactics endeavored to exploit these conditions in a manner that would promote the strategic purpose.

We may pause to express the view that it is doubtful if so many naval surface units in the future will find it possible to operate so continuously in close proximity to enemy territory,


FIG. 4

NAVAL DISPOSITIONS FOR PROTECTION OF PASSAGE OF EXPEDITIONARY FORCE AUGUST 1914

because of the development of the attacking power of submarines, coastal torpedo boats, and airplanes. Elements which expect to remain constantly in advanced areas should possess the power to evade or to repel a multitude of attacks from these new types. Vulnerable types will probably remain at considerably greater distances. As a result, the types employed in the advanced areas in future naval deployments, and the distances between these and their supports, may be quite different from the practice of the past.

The British strategic deployment in home waters was essentially defensive. While it later was modified in many of its details, it retained the same general character and remained more or less fixed in position throughout the war.

We may now turn to history for an example of a deployment which was both offensive and defensive at the start, but was converted to a wholly offensive deployment before the close of the war.

9. American Naval Deployment of the Spanish War, Atlantic Theater.

The American naval deployment in the Atlantic at the start of the Spanish-American War was much criticized by Corbett and other Europeans. The Americans certainly made several mistakes, but I believe that the deployment itself, and the principal strategic moves of the fleet were not only sound, but brilliant. Under the same circumstances, it is doubtful if a better general plan could have been made by anyone. Figure 5 shows this deployment and the important moves from 29 April to 26 May, 1898.

The entire American Army at the start of the war numbered but 28,000. There were 200,000 Spanish troops in Cuba. Furthermore, the Atlantic Coast had practically no fixed defenses.

The American Navy was more than twice as strong as the Spanish. The naval deployment provided not only for covering the Atlantic and Gulf Coasts defensively against either raids or expeditions, but also for a major naval offensive against Cuba.


SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR
AMERICAN STRATEGIC DEPLOYMENT
AND
NAVAL MOVEMENTS
FROM 29 APRIL TO 26 MAY
PATROL SQUADRON
1 CL
4 XCL
SCHLEY
FLYING SQUADRON
DEPARTED NORFOLK 13 MAY
ARRIVED SANTIAGO 26 MAY
2 BB
1 CA
2 CL
NORFOLK
MAIN AMERICAN
NORTHERN BASE
CHARLESTON
SECONDARY
AMERICAN BASE
NEW ORLEANS
SCHLEY
15 MAY
SCHLEY
SAMPSON
NORTH ATLANTIC SQUADRON
DEPARTED KEY WEST 4 MAY
RETURNED " 19 MAY
2 BB
2 MONITORS
1 CA
2 CL
1-ODD
OREGON-24 MAY
JUPITER
MAIN AMERICAN
SOUTHERN BASE
KEY WEST
SCHLEY-18 MAY
MAIN SPANISH BASE
HAVANA
CIENFUEGOS
SAMPSON
NIPE BAY
SCHLEY
21 MAY
SANTIAGO
OREGON
BLOCKADE LIMITS
BLOCKADING FORCE
1 MONITOR
2 CL
9 PG
3-ODD
SCHLEY
26 MAY
SAMPSON
8 MAY
CERVERA
19 MAY
SAMPSON ARR. 12 MAY
" DEPART 13 MAY
SAN JUAN
ST. THOMAS
1 SCOUT
(XCL)
CERVERA
SPANISH FLEET SAILED
FROM CAPE VERDE IS.
29 APRIL
1 BB (ERROR)
4 CA
3 DD
2 SCOUTS
(XCL)
GUADELOUPE
MARTINIQUE
CERVERA
CERVERA
12 MAY
BARBADOS
OREGON-18 MAY
SPANISH VESSELS IN
WEST INDIES
2 CL
1-XCL
3-ODD
12 PG
CERVERA
15 MAY
CURACAO
OREGON

The main defensive base was at Norfolk, with secondary bases in New York and Charleston. The Northern Patrol Squadron patrolled the Atlantic Coast, and was supported by the Flying Squadron, under Schley, based at Norfolk. This latter squadron, though composed of less than half the large American fighting vessels, and slow, was stronger in gun and defensive power than the entire Spanish Fleet. The task of the naval vessels in northern waters was to prevent raids, and, in the undefended state of the country, this task seems to have been essential. However, even from the beginning Schley had preparatory orders to reenforce Sampson as soon as the Spanish Fleet should enter the West Indies.

The major fleet base at Key West provided a position for covering Florida and the Gulf Coast defensively, and was well located for an offensive aganist Havana, the chief Spanish base. Here the bulk of the fleet under Sampson supported the smaller craft engaged in blockade and patrol operations along the Cuban Coast. Available light forces were so few in number that Sampson was able to blockade only that part of Cuba which was in rail communication with Havana. No attempt was made to blockade Santiago, Matanzas, nor Puerto Rico, because of the lack of ships and the distance of those ports from the base at Key West.

Cervera left the Cape Verde Islands 29 April. The Navy Department believed that his destination was San Juan, which, indeed, would have been an excellent place for him had he contemplated actively raiding the American deployment or the Atlantic Coast. Upon learning of this movement, the Navy Department provided against as many contingencies as it reasonably could. Schley was left in the north, Sampson was sent to the

Windward Passage to cover the operations of the blockading force and the approaches to the north and south coasts of Cuba, and three cruisers were sent to the eastward to scout against Cervera's arrival in the West Indies. Three cruisers seem very few, but no more long range vessels were available except in the Northern Patrol Squadron.

Before Sampson had been in the Windward Passage a single day, he became convinced that the Spanish Fleet was in San Juan, so he proceeded there and bombarded the port. In reality, this was a raid, made for the purpose of gaining information. The Spanish Fleet was not there. Then, as over two weeks had elapsed without word of the enemy, Sampson retired to the Windward Passage. But the Navy Department feared that in Sampson's absence Cervera might have slipped through the Windward Passage or around the western end of Cuba, and, very properly, sent him back to Key West to be in position to prevent Cervera from raising the blockade of Havana, the main Spanish base.

When Cervera got to Martinique on 13 May he learned that Sampson was near San Juan, and that Santiago was not under blockade. An expected supply of coal failed him at both Martinique and Curacao, and he was compelled to go to Santiago to wait for it.

The American scouts immediately ascertained Cervera's presence at Martinique. The Navy Department sent Schley to Key West and thence to Cienfuegos, the port considered next in importance to Havana for use as a Spanish Fleet base. In front of both Havana and Cienfuegos there then were American squadrons, each stronger than the Spanish Fleet.

News was received on 20 May that Cervera was in Santiago, and Schley blockaded him there on the 26th.

This example illustrates:

(a) The use of a combined defensive and offensive deployment in a very large theater, the deployment being sound in every particular.

(b) A prompt reenforcement of the offensive by the entire available naval force, as soon as the enemy's direction of effort was found to be defensive.

(c) American adherence to the primary naval objective: the destruction of the enemy fleet.

(d) Detailed strategic operations such as scouting, patrolling, raiding, supporting, and covering.

(e) The futility of changing a sound plan without due reason. Sampson's impatience led him to raid San Juan, thus uncovering vulnerable positions and forces which he had been sent to the Windward Passage to guard. As a result, he was compelled to return to his starting point, Key West, thus losing several days that might have been invaluable except for the poor logistic arrangements of the Spanish. But had Cervera been at San Juan, Sampson's move would have been hailed as the inspiration of genius.

10. Overseas Naval Deployments.

The deployment in the principal theater usually does not cover all areas of naval action. Secondary deployments may be made in distant areas. During past wars the French and British made secondary deployments in the Caribbean and the Indian ocean having arrangements of forces generally similar to those adopted in home waters. The only connection between the home and the secondary deployments were the lines of communication, and one or the other groups was responsible for the protection of parts pf these lines. Where two theaters are entirely separated, as when the United States makes war im two oceans, the two deployments may have no connection with each other.

The major British deployment in the World War was a normal defensive deployment. It remained fixed in scope, neither expanding nor contracting during the entire war. Had the British wished to expand it, they would have found it necessary to obtain new bases that could have supported operations in the new area, since naval power can not be exerted except in the sea areas near adequate and properly located bases. In the Mediterranean, the Allied Fleet could not prosecute the Gallipoli campaign until after it had established advanced bases at Imbros and Mudros. In the Spanish War, the American Fleet was able to continue the blockade of Santiago only because it established an advanced base at Guantanamo.

There have been several occasions in history where a nation has endeavored to push its entire fleet away from its fixed deployment in home waters, and across the ocean to a new deployment close to the hostile territory. One such instance is the movement of the Spanish Armada, which left its bases in home territory to go to new bases in the Spanish Netherlands. It aimed at establishing control of the English Channel in order to permit the Spanish Army to invade England. The movements of Cervera's squadron and Rosjestwensky's Baltic Fleet are other

examples. In all of these cases, as also in those where England and France sent strong squadrons to America and India, the advancing fleets already possessed secure bases in the new operating areas. There is only one modern historical instance where a naval squadron has found it necessary to defeat the enemy fleet before it could seize and establish any base whatever, and that instance was the comparatively minor movement of Dewey from Mirs Bay to Manila during the Spanish War.

For the past thirty years American naval officers have studied the problem of moving a great fleet overseas to and through areas where it has no bases, in spite of strong enemy resistance. Theoretical studies have indicated the many difficulties of such a campaign. The whole problem is novel, because we look in vain to history to supply us with precepts drawn from past experience.

In the past, naval campaigns have been conducted from deployments that may have expanded or contracted to a limited extent, but have seldom advanced bodily. Armies, on the contrary, customarily make war by advancing their major deployments directly into enemy territory, against the enemy's strongest opposition. Whether or not navies are capable of advancing their full strength in a similar manner remains to be demonstrated.

By no means should we at once conclude that such an overseas naval advance is an impossibility. We must admit that no satisfactory solution for the problem has yet been evolved, and that there may be chances of incurring a disaster fully as great as that which befell the Spanish Armada.

11. Mobile Naval Deployments.

The strategic operations of a fleet are similar in character, whether its deployment remains stationary or moves forward into new areas. The dispositions assumed in a major movement of the fleet may be looked upon as a mobile strategic deployment. Part of the fleet will scout to obtain information of the enemy. Patrolling will be necessary for the close protection of important units. The fleet may employ a screen to conceal its route, and to prevent interruption of its plan by minor hostile forces. Its train will require a strong escort. The movement of the train, or the operations required for the capture of bases, will need to be covered by the main fleet, and the activities of dispersed elements will need to be supported, against strong enemy attack. Frequently the fleet will employ raids to wipe out part of the hostile resistance, or for purposes of diversion. The complete distribution, and the operating areas of the various parts of the fleet will need to form a coordinated whole, that will be effective in attaining the objective of the movement. The movement itself, as well as the various shifts of the deployment en route, constitute strategical maneuvers, that is, redistributions of forces for the purpose of effecting aganist the enemy unforeseen concentrations, designed to be decisively superior in each particular situation.

No wartime examples of a modern mobile deployment seem to be available. Some interesting examples of peacetime mobile strategical deployments appropriate for modern conditions may be found in the reports of fleet problems conducted by our fleet during the past few years. You will have some practice in designing hypothetical mobile deployments in the two major strategic problems that will be played as chart maneuvers later in the year.

Merely for the purpose of illustrating some of the relation-

ships between the various parts of a fleet while it is carrying on its strategic operations, and without asserting that the general design may not have many faults, a description will be given of a mobile deployment that might have been used in a situation such as occurred in Operations Problem II of the Senior Class during the movement of the Control Force to the Caribbean.

The chief feature of the situation is the movement of the Expeditionary Force from Norfolk to Puerto Rico. The protection of this movement is the sole reason for the strategic deployment of the Blue Fleet.

Figure 6 illustrates the dispositions that might have been adopted on the third day of the movement. The convoy is escorted by battleships, cruisers, and destroyers. The areas to the front and flanks of the convoy are scouted by long range shore-based airplanes. The convoy has moved beyond the support previously available from shore-based bombers, but its advance is covered by a mobile screen of heavy cruisers and carriers. In this screen the cruiser planes do the scouting and picket work, and the carriers support the cruisers. When it approaches its destination, the convoy will be covered by a fixed aircraft screen based at San Juan, whose scouting elements are long range patrol planes and whose support are fighters and bombers, submarines, and the mobile screen. The passes are scouted by short range airplane scouts and destroyers, while patrol planes scout the entire Caribbean from their base in the Canal Zone. Before the movement started, the mobile aircraft screen, supported by airplanes at Guantanamo, raided the enemy air bases in Jamaica.

The movement of the convoy is also covered by a southerly movement of the Main Body of the Blue Fleet. So far as possible, the Main Body remains within the sea area scouted by shore-based patrol planes. In its vicinity and also near the Blue ports, are aircraft and surface patrols to drive off enemy submarines.




FIG. 6

HYPOTHETICAL
MOBILE DEPLOYMENT
MOVEMENT OF EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
TO PUERTO RICO

In advance of the Main Body, but supported by it, is a screen similar to the one ahead of the Control Force.

But the Main Body has also another task; it must prevent RED from gaining a foothold in CRIMSON, and, therefore, can not venture so far south that it can not continue to cover CRIMSON ports against the approach of a strong RED Expeditionary Force. To detect such a movement as early as possible, the Commander-in-Chief has sent scouting submarines to the English Channel and near Milford Haven. Patrol planes based in Maine, Boston and Newport scout the approaches to CRIMSON as far to seaward as possible. Bad weather is expected that will interrupt the northern scouting flights; therefore surface vessels, the least valuable units of the Fleet because they can not be strongly supported, are posted to the southeastward of Cape Race ready to take up the scouting duties when planes cannot fly. A group of submarines extend the length of the surface scouting line, and also are in position to raid the RED disposition as it passes. Fixed screens of mines have been laid in Belle Isle and Cabot Straits, and to seaward of Halifax and the northern fleet bases.

In this hypothetical deployment are illustrations of all of the usual strategical operations. The task of the fleet as a whole is to prevent the RED Fleet from seizing bases on the Western side of the Atlantic, preparatory to effecting a naval deployment designed to defeat BLUE.

In the General Tactical Instructions are type patterns for carrying out some of the strategical operations of the fleet. Distances, strengths, and geometrical arrangements of units are illustrated. Some of these arrangements are suitable for one situation, and some for other situations. They do not cover the entire field of strategic operations; therefore the commander in any enterprise will usually find it necessary to design his own dispositions to meet the con-

ditions as they actually exist at the moment. Definite rules cannot be drawn up governing the distribution of forces on all occasions. However, we may say that the first consideration is to take as a guide the major task of the fleet. Next to consider is that the various subdivisions of the fleet should be given tasks such that the accomplishment of all will produce the complete effect on the military situation required by the major task. Forces are so apportioned to the individual groups that each is strong enough to accomplish its task, and , when properly supported b the other groups, will suffer only such losses as are acceptable for the fleet as a whole. To permit co-operation and mutual support, task groups will be assigned positions relative to each other adapted to the geographic features of the theater, and with due regard to the relative positions occupied by units of the enemy. The direction of effort of each group, and of the fleet itself should be toward its appropriate physical objective. Finally, the arrangement of the complete deployment is such as to give the major strength elements the freedom of action necessary to produce the desired effect, that is, to accomplish the assigned task.

In making the detailed distribution and arrangements that constitute a naval deployment, one will do well to remember two criteria:

1st. That a strategic distribution can be effective only in proportion to the <u>tactical power</u> given to its subdivisions and to the various minor and major concentrations that can be made against the enemy.

2nd. Mahan's advice that the essential underlying idea of a sound deployment is one whose parts mutually support each other, and are so distributed as to facilitate timely concentration in mass.

12. Summary.

In conclusion, we may briefly summarize the principal points that have been developed:

1. The chief categories of force available to the Navy are the Coastal Defense Force, the Control Force, the Battle Force, and the land components available for capturing and protecting the fleet bases.

2. The chief strategic function of the Battle Fleet is the creation of situations that will bring about decisive battle, and under conditions that will ensure the defeat of the enemy.

3. The successful strategical employment of the Fleet depends upon the availability of naval vessels suitable in design and adequate in number, and upon the availability of bases appropriately located, and having sufficient strength and resources.

4. An inferior enemy can be forced to decisive action only through attack upon territory, naval communications, or trade, vital to him for the further prosecution of the war. Success in battle can be assured only through strategic maneuver which has successfully established superiority in strength.

5. The strategic deployment of a fleet should provide for the security of weakly defended vital territory, vital naval communications, and vital trade; furthermore, the initial deployment should cover the mobilization of the fighting elements required for the prosecution of the war.

6. The usual strategic operations of the Fleet are scouting, patrolling, screening, escorting, raiding, supporting, and covering; whether the deployment is fixed or mobile.

7. Future naval deployments, to be effective, must be designed with due regard to the recent advent of submarines, coastal torpedo boats, and aircraft.

8. The basis for effective strategic deployment is the provision of tactical power adequate for the performance of minor tasks by the distributed units, and for the performance of the major task of the Fleet as a whole; and a distribution that will provide for mutual support between distributed units, and for their concentration in superior strength at the decisive time and place.