

Ritey, William

*for*  
DUPLICATE

THE GALLIPOLI CAMPAIGN

STAFF PRESENTATION

Naval War College  
Newport, R.I.  
11 January 1940

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by

Lt. Col. William E. Riley, U.S.M.C.

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## THE GALLIPOLI CAMPAIGN

The Gallipoli Campaign, as originally conceived, was much more comprehensive in scope than most people realize.

Buzzer. Slide (1) B39-170.

By those responsible for setting the campaign in motion, the conquest of the Dardanelles was regarded merely as a preliminary to further combinations of war, the real objectives being Constantinople and the Bosphorus, especially the latter. But any contemplated operations against these two, were dependent on the successful forcing of the Dardanelles, which body of water was the key to the entire situation.

That Napoleon was aware of the importance of this waterway was evident in 1808 when he wrote:

"Who is to have Constantinople? That is always the crux of the problem."

In the same letter he explained:

"If Russia should hold the Dardanelles, she would be at the gates of Toulon, Naples, and Corfu."

In 1914, Constantinople and the Dardanelles still remained the "crux of the problem". If the Allies had secured control of the Dardanelles, Constantinople and the Bosphorus, the severing of the Turkish Empire would have kept the Near East and India quiet. This, in all probability, would have brought the Balkan States into the war on the side of the Allies, which would have permitted direct operations against the southern flank of the



Central Powers. This, in turn, would have brought the war to a speedy close. Admiral von Tirpitz in March, 1915, said:

"Should the Dardanelles fall, then the World War has been decided against us."

Buzzer. Slide (2) B40-342.

Germany had naval control of the Baltic Sea at the outbreak of the war and with Turkey as an Ally and in control of the Dardanelles, the Russians were shut off from sea communications with her Allies, Great Britain and France. Thus Russia was forced to depend almost entirely on the single track Trans-Siberian railroad for her supply of munitions and guns, furnished by Japan, in order to maintain her troops at the front.

Great Britain realized from the outset of the war that more direct means of communication with her Ally, Russia, was essential; but saw no way of effecting it. Churchill advocated an attack on the Dardanelles to safeguard the Suez Canal; Fisher advanced the idea of an attack on the German littoral by a Russian army supported by the British Fleet; other plans were suggested and then dropped as unfeasible.

Military and naval experts opposed plans put forth by Churchill which did not include an expeditionary force, as all were agreed that the Dardanelles was a military rather than a naval problem. Kitchener insisted that he had no troops to spare for such an operation; he feared an invasion and would release none



of the large garrison maintained for home defense. The nearness of the German army to London and Paris, with the ever present fear of a forthcoming drive on the Western Front, precluded the possibility of sending troops elsewhere than to France; while the danger of a Turkish attack on the Suez Canal forced him to retain some 70,000 men in that area. It may be said that the "fog of war" had descended on Kitchener and he failed, therefore, to perceive the far-reaching effects a successful operation in the vicinity of the Dardanelles would have had on the outcome of the War.

Buzzer. Slide (1) B40-341.

Turkey was astride one of the waterways through which Russia was able to maintain communications with her allies and hence with the outside world.

The Dardanelles, the Sea of Marmora, and the Bosphorus separate Asia Minor from the Balkan Peninsula and connect the Black Sea with the Aegean and the Mediterranean. The Sea of Marmora stretches some 130 miles from the town of Gallipoli to Constantinople, while its width north and south is close to 50 miles.

The factors which decisively affect the naval problems are the Dardanelles, and the Narrows. The Dardanelles is 40 miles long, with an average breadth of 2 miles. The width of the Narrows is 1600 yards between the two forts, Chanak Kale and



Kilid Bahr. The maximum width is 8,000 yards in Eren Keui Bay, 4 miles from the toe of the Peninsula.

Buzzer. Slide (3) B34-594.

The Gallipoli Peninsula, which extends along the European side of the Dardanelles and on which the main battles were fought, runs in a southwesterly direction. From Cape Helles, at the toe of the Peninsula, to the Bulair lines, the distance is 52 miles. Its greatest width is 12 miles, and it tapers to 3 miles at Bulair. The most direct route to the Narrows across the Peninsula is about 5 miles. The Greek Islands of Imbros, Rabbit, Tenedos, Lemnos, Mytilene, and Skyros, all played a part in the operations.

The coast from Cape Helles to Suvla, where the landing operations took place, is extremely rocky. The cliffs range from one hundred to three hundred feet in height. The slide on the right gives a general picture of the ruggedness of the terrain on the Peninsula. The slides on the left will show in more detail the nature of the terrain in the vicinity where the landings occurred.

Buzzer. Slide (4) B35-277 L (Terrain inland from Suvla).

This slide shows high ground which dominated the landing beaches at Suvla Bay.

Buzzer. Slide (5) B34-587 L (Anzac Cove and Ari Burnu).

The slide on the left is a picture of the beach where the Anzac Corps made its landing.



Buzzer. Slide (6) B34-588 L (Inland from Anzac Cove).

Note the difficult terrain inland from Anzac Cove.

Buzzer. Slide (7) B35-258 L (Y Beach).

This slide depicts the nature of the terrain in the vicinity of "Y" Beach.

Buzzer. Slide (8) B34-427 L (W Beach).

This slide gives a general idea of the terrain inland from "W" Beach.

Buzzer. Slide (9) B34-591 L (X Beach).

This slide gives some idea of what the troops landing at "X" Beach had to contend with.

Buzzer. Slide (10) B34-529 R (Gallipoli Peninsula).

There were three main terrain features on the Peninsula; the first, Achi Baba Ridge (709') which dominated the beaches on the toe of the Peninsula; the second, the Kilid Bahr Plateau (669') which dominated the Narrows; and third, the Sari Bahr Ridge (971') which dominated landing areas to the north of Gaba Tepe.

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Buzzer. Slide (11) B35-193.

Great Britain declared war on Turkey the 31st of October, 1914. On the 3rd of November, two days after the British Ambassador left Constantinople, two battle cruisers, under the instructions of the British Admiralty, carried out a short bombardment of the out forts, (Helles and Orkanieh). The War Minister



was not consulted. The bombardment resulted in hastening the efforts for improving the defense installations in the Straits. The operation formed no part of any settled plan for an attack on the Straits. Its sole object was to test existing information regarding the armament of the forts.

In January, 1915, Grand Duke Nicholas, through official channels, requested Lord Kitchener, the British War Minister, to arrange for a demonstration either naval or military against the Turks in order to relieve the pressure on the Russian front in the Caucasus.

Still of the opinion that no troops were available, Lord Kitchener discussed with Mr. Churchill the possibility of a purely naval demonstration against the Turks. No definite plan was decided upon, but in view of the necessity of helping a hard-pressed Ally, Lord Kitchener replied that a demonstration would be made.

Buzzer. Blank.

Churchill, restless and pertinacious, and with small knowledge of military and naval affairs, but believing implicitly that even a naval attack on the Dardanelles would have far-reaching effects, took matters into his own hands.

On the 3rd of January he cabled Admiral Carden, Commanding the British naval forces in the Eastern Mediterranean, inquiring whether the Dardanelles could be forced by ships alone, even at serious loss.



Carden replied that the Straits could not be rushed, but might be forced by extended operations. Churchill then proceeded to convince the other members of the War Council as to the practicability of the plan and, also, secured the cooperation and approval of the French Government. Later, he overcame all opposition to the Dardanelles Expedition except that offered by the Turks. The French ordered a squadron to join Admiral Carden's flag.

Churchill, on the 6th of January, 1915, requested Carden to submit a plan of attack. This Carden did on the 11th, and the plan, with few changes, was placed in operation in February.

The opinion of all experts at this time was to the effect that a combined operation was preferable, but the decision for the Navy to go it alone was because troops were not available.

The feeling of the War Council members seemed to be that no great harm would ensue, even if the naval operation failed. If satisfactory progress were not made, the bombardment could be broken off and the Fleet could steam away.

Buzzer. Slide (1) B39-170.

On the 16th of January, though the operation was not on this occasion finally approved, it was decided that the Admiralty should at once complete the necessary arrangements. Taken in its literal sense, the official wording of the decision contemplated a strange task for the Fleet. The Admiralty was ordered:



"To prepare for a naval expedition in February, to bombard and take the Gallipoli Peninsula, with Constantinople as its objective."

The die was cast and the Allies launched upon an undertaking that naval and military experts had put aside as unfeasible. Before the Campaign drew to a close, it passed through four distinct stages. These stages were:

- (1) The purely naval attacks, 19 February to 18 March.
- (2) Assembling of troops at Lemnos in readiness to exploit the success of the naval attack. This decision was reached on 16 February, three days before the first naval attack was launched.
- (3) The landing attack on the Peninsula in April. Its function was to assist the Fleet to get the forts at the Narrows under control.
- (4) The major military operation which was undertaken on the Peninsula itself in order to guarantee to the Navy an absolutely safe passage through the Straits.

Buzzer. Blank.



As time passed, Admiralty opinion inclined more and more to the belief that no real success could be achieved at the Dardanelles without the aid of troops.

The memorandum on this subject submitted by Admiral Jackson on the 15th of February had the desired effect on the War Council meeting of the 16th. The subject was discussed at an informal meeting of Ministers. So important was the matter considered that other Ministers were summoned; the meeting resolved itself into an impromptu session of the War Council; and it was then and there decided to prepare large military forces for the Dardanelles. The actual decisions were as follows:

1. The 29th Division was to be despatched to Mudros at the earliest possible date. (This division expected to sail within ten days).

2. Arrangements to be made for a force to be despatched from Egypt, if necessary.

3. All these forces, together with two battalions of marines already despatched, to support the naval attack in the Dardanelles.

4. Horse Boats to be taken out with the 29th Division. The Admiralty was charged with the task of collecting small craft, tugs and lighters in the area.

This decision did not in any way affect the forthcoming naval attack on the Dardanelles. The bombardment of the outer forts



was to be executed as planned. Even though the troops made available for transfer to the area would not arrive for at least a month, the Admiralty submitted no request for a change of plan, or for a postponement of the naval attack until military forces could arrive. The belief was current that the troops would not be necessary until after the Fleet had made a passage into the sea of Marmora. A combined operation was not even considered at the time the troops were made available.

Buzzer. Slide (11) B35-193. Turkish Plan of Defense.

At the outbreak of the war in August 1914, the first line of defense of the Dardanelles, known as the "outer Defenses" consisted of two forts on the European side and two forts on the Asiatic side. The forts on the European side were Helles and Sedd el Bahr and on the Asiatic side, Kum Kale and Orkanieh. These four forts contained some 24 guns, ranging in caliber from 3"4 to 11", only four of which guns were serviceable. The range of the 11" guns was some 16,000 yards; the others had a range of only 6,000 to 8,000 yards.

In the neighborhood of Kephez Point, there were four works, with a fifth on the European side. The principal object of these works, known as the "Intermediate Defenses" was to protect the minefields, which on the 3rd of August consisted of one line of mines laid between Kephez Point and the European side.

The "Inner Defenses", situated at the Narrows, consisted of five forts on the European side and six forts on the Asiatic



shore, with a total armament of some 72 guns ranging in caliber from 5"9 to 14".

Out of the total of over 100 guns of heavy and medium caliber, mounted in the defenses of the Straits at the beginning of the war, only 14 were modern long range weapons.

Buzzer. Slide (12) B39-171.

As a result of the bombardment of 3 November, the Turks had strengthened the defense as follows:

1. Added 9 minefields;
2. Added 8 searchlights;
3. Added one torpedo tube;
4. Installed 8-6" Howitzers;
5. Installed rapid fire batteries to protect  
the minefields;
6. Installed dummy batteries;
7. Provided for additional replacements for  
mortars;
8. Installed a fire control system;
9. Provided 6 battalions of infantry to  
patrol the coast from Xeros to  
Bashika Bay.

The garrison of the forts had among them 5 German officers and 160 men. The guns were mostly old models in obsolete earthworks, while the forts at the Narrows had but 12 shells for each heavy gun.



The collection of mines was most amusing. Among them were Russian mines recovered from in front of Trapezung, some the French fished up in front of Smyrna, and even Bulgarian mines left over from the last war. The total number of mines in the 9 fields was about 300, thanks to the activities of the German torpedo captain who restored them to use.

The Turkish defense plan contemplated that: The guns at the entrance would cause some delay before being destroyed by the ships' gunfire. Then to stop the Allied fleet before it reached the Narrows by means of gunfire, mortar fire, mines, floating and fixed, and mobile torpedo tubes. To protect the minefields with necessary searchlights; to protect the intermediate defense guns and batteries by the guns of the forts at the Narrows and various concealed batteries, fixed and mobile, between the Narrows and the entrance.

Buzzer. Slide (13) B39-172..

The British plan for forcing the Straits by naval action alone was as follows:

(1) Reduction of defenses at the entrance of the Straits, in Bashika Bay, and on the north coast of Gallipoli.

(2) Sweeping minefields and reducing defenses up to the Narrows.

(3) Reduction of the forts at the Narrows.

(4) Sweeping minefields.

(5) Silencing the forts above the Narrows.



(6) Passing the Fleet into the Sea of Marmora.

(7) Patrolling the Dardanelles and operations  
in the Sea of Marmora.

Estimated time to carry out the operation, about one month.

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Before taking up the naval attack, it may be of interest  
to look over the characters who played the leading roles in this  
Campaign.

Buzzer. Slide (14) B36-370.

Vice Admiral Carden who commanded the naval forces at  
Gallipoli.

Buzzer. Slide (15) B36-358.

Rear Admiral Keyes, Chief of Staff to Admiral Carden and  
later to Admiral DeRobeck.

Buzzer. Slide (16) B36-355.

Vice Admiral DeRobeck who relieved Admiral Carden when the  
latter was ordered home due to illness, and General Sir Ian  
Hamilton who commanded the Army forces until relieved by General  
Monro.

Buzzer. Slide (17) B36-374.

Lieut.General The Honorable Sir F. Stopford, who commanded  
the Ninth Army Corps at Suvla Bay. He was a man of great kind-  
ness and charm, who had never commanded troops in war, and so  
enfeebled in health that he was unable to lift his own despatch



case into the train when he left London for the Peninsula.

Buzzer. Slide (18) B36-354.

Marshall Liman von Sanders, a general in the German Army and assigned to command the Turkish troops on the Gallipoli Peninsula.

Buzzer. Slide (19) B36-357.

Major Willmar, who was the antithesis of General Stopford. He had neither kindness nor charm, but he was a spark plug in von Sanders' scheme of defense against the landing in Suvla Bay.

Buzzer. Blank.

The first step in Carden's plan, the reduction of the forts at the entrance, was undertaken on 19 February 1915.

Buzzer. Slide (20) B40-343.

The attack was divided into three phases:

1. Long range bombardment outside effective range of Turkish guns.
2. Bombardment at medium ranges (5,000 to 10,000 yards).
3. The final reduction of the forts by an overwhelming concentration of fire at 3,000 to 5,000 yards.

The battle cruiser INFLEXIBLE was to engage Seddel Bahr and furnish indirect spot for the battleship TRIUMPH firing on Fort Helles. The battleship AGAMEMNON, which arrived late, and the battleship CORNWALLIS were to engage Orkanieh while the Battle-



ship VENGEANCE was to observe the fire. The battleship ALBION was to support the minesweepers. The French ship, SUFFREN, engaged Kum Kale with indirect spots by the BOUVET. The GAULOIS engaged the shore batteries near Yeni Shehr.

The early morning sun delayed the attack until 0951 and at first the forts did not reply. At 1100, the ships anchored to improve their fire, which was slow and deliberate. At 1400, Carden ordered the second step, the bombardment at medium ranges. The forts made no reply. At 1600, the ships were ordered to close the range.

Kum Kale remained silent. Sedd el Bahr fired a few badly aimed shots. A hot fire was received from Orkanieh and Helles. Helles was quieted by a heavy concentration. Fire from Orkanieh was greatly reduced. Recall was hoisted at 1720. Carden dreaded a torpedo attack and was fearful of his ammunition supply.

During the action some sweeping operations were conducted toward the entrance and along the north coast of Gallipoli. The attack was characterized by poor staff work, failure to employ all vessels available, with some confusion and misunderstanding of signals. Results: little on either side.

Buzzer. Blank.

Carden intended to renew the attack on the 20th of February, but bad weather kept his ships idle until the 25th.



He profited by the mistakes made on the 19th, and used all available fire power at his disposal. He divided his force into three groups: Supporting ships; Attacking ships; and Demolishing ships.

Buzzer. Slide (21) B39-173.

The supporting ships, at anchor out of range of shore batteries would keep the forts under a continuous fire to prevent the crews manning the guns.

The attacking ships, when the supporting ships dominated the forts, would steam toward the entrance and engage the forts with secondary batteries until the range was reduced to 3,000 yards, bringing all fire power to bear on the forts, and then to withdraw.

The demolishing ships, when the attacking ships had completed their tasks, preceded by minesweepers, would enter the Straits and complete the destruction of the forts from the rear and support the minesweepers in clearing the entrance.

The attack proceeded substantially as planned. Helles, in particular, returned the fire at first, but the QUEEN ELIZABETH eventually found the range and quieted the fort.

The Turks report that all guns of the forts were knocked out and the magazines destroyed by the attacks of the 19th, and 25th. The AGAMEMNON was the only battleship that suffered any superficial damage, having been hit seven times by the fire from Fort Helles.



The attack began at 0945 and at 1600, the forts, having been silenced, the demolishing ships preceded by minesweepers entered the Straits. The objective of the demolishing ships was to complete the destruction of the forts from the rear and to support the minesweepers in their task of clearing the entrance to the Dardanelles.

Buzzer. Slide (20) B40-343.

Following the attack of 25 February, Admiral Carden made every attempt to complete his program. When weather permitted, ships entered the Straits and landed demolition parties. The landing parties succeeded in destroying most of the guns at the entrance to the Straits. Of unheeded significance was the growing resistance of the Turks to these landings.

Coincident with and frequently in conjunction with the activities of the demolition parties, naval gunfire attacks were made daily weather permitting, on the intermediate defenses. Dardanos on the Asiatic side and Messudieh on the European shore were the key forts of their respective groups; but the real resistance was offered by the mobile and skillfully concealed howitzers and field batteries. These were engaged daily by various battleships; but, instead of gradually destroying these defenses, the vessels encountered a growing resistance. The Turks were alert and constantly increased the effectiveness of the batteries by building more emplacements, increasing the roads



and trails over which the guns were moved, and repeatedly shifting the batteries.

Admiral Sir Roger Keyes, Chief of Staff for Admiral Carden, describes the effect of the concealed batteries and howitzers as follows:

"It is so annoying being fired at by guns one can't see, and can only approximately locate - and can't attack."

and then comparing his position with the activities on the Western front, continued,

"and here are we, held up from day to day, reporting with painful reiteration our failure to make progress in the face of heavy fire -- which inflicted neither casualties to the personnel nor damage to the ships."

In 1878 Lord Derby, British Foreign Secretary described the situation that confronted Carden in 1914 as follows:

"If the European shore (Gallipoli Peninsula) was held by hostile troops, mobile guns would be used to defend the waterway, and it would be most difficult for 'men of war' to silence them."

During the entire period Carden attempted to employ the same tactics in the reduction of the forts at the Narrows as he used so successfully in the reduction of the forts at the entrance;



namely, supporting ships, covering the attacking ships as they closed the forts.

But the concealed batteries and howitzers in the intermediate defense zone frustrated his attempts, as they forced the supporting ships to keep moving, which interfered materially with the accuracy of their fire.

The QUEEN ELIZABETH from a berth two and a half miles southwest of Gaba Tepe attempted to attack the forts by indirect fire across the Peninsula. Little was accomplished, as the value of this method of attack depended entirely on spotting. On account of the concealed guns it was necessary for the observing ships in the Straits to keep underway, and on this account the observation from the ships was very unsatisfactory. Keyes said the "sea-plane spotting was abortive".

On 7 March, the LORD NELSON and AGAMEMNON, under cover of supporting ships, which engaged the intermediate batteries, attempted to silence the forts at the Narrows by direct fire from within the Straits. Despite the covering ships, the intermediate batteries compelled them to continue underway which interfered with the accuracy of their fire. The ships gradually closed the range. At 1300 the forts at the Narrows opened with well-directed salvos, one 14" shell striking the AGAMEMNON on the quarterdeck. At 1430 the forts were silenced, and the ships withdrew.



On the 8th the QUEEN ELIZABETH was brought within the Straits; but as the intermediate batteries kept her on the move, the effect of her fire was nil.

Sweeping operations were conducted nightly, weather permitting. The trawlers were inadequate in numbers and speed, and could not sweep against the current, which forced them to stand in until they were above the minefields, then sweep with the current.

The Turks were alert, their searchlights would pick up the trawlers and, in spite of the fire of the covering ships, their shore batteries would force the trawlers to withdraw. Some difficulty was experienced by the British with the crews of the trawlers who were North Sea fishermen. These men would not sweep long under gunfire, and it was necessary to replace them with naval personnel. Still it was found impossible to clear the Channel.

The failure of these attempts to clear the mine fields convinced Carden that night sweeping could not accomplish the desired results. A message from Churchill, who was becoming worried over the delays at the Dardanelles, spurred Carden to attempt the attack on 18 March.

Buzzer. Blank.



Attack of 18 March.

It must be remembered that coincident with all these events, there was gathering in this theater of war a British Army expeditionary force at Mudros and Egypt. The idea behind this force was to exploit naval success in passing through the Straits, rather than to operate jointly with the Navy in forcing the passage.

Buzzer. Slide (20) B40-343.

After correspondence with the Admiralty, Carden planned to attack the Dardanelles defenses with the full force of his Fleet and force a passage into the Sea of Marmora. As to the reasoning behind this decision, the following is quoted from Sir Roger Keyes:

"The general idea is to silence the defenses of the Narrows and of the mine fields simultaneously, so as to enable sweepers to clear a passage through the Kephez mine field; if this is successful, the attack is to be at once continued on the remaining defenses until the Fleet has passed through the Dardanelles."

Before the plan could be placed in operation, Carden was invalided home and de Robeck assumed command. The scheme of attack was based very much on the method employed in the destruction of the Entrance Forts. The supporting ships to engage the forts and when their fire dominated that of the forts, the attacking



ships were to pass through the supporting ships and engage the forts at ranges between 9,000 and 8,000 yards. It was not expected that this fire would complete the destruction of the forts, but it was believed that it would dominate them sufficiently to permit sweeping operations to proceed without interference.

Buzzer. Slide (22) B40-344.

At 1030, 18 March, the Fleet entered the Straits preceded by minesweepers. Arriving at the 14,000 yard line, the QUEEN ELIZABETH, AGAMEMNON, LORD NELSON and INFLEXIBLE, took station abreast and engaged the forts at the Narrows. The PRINCE GEORGE, MAJESTIC, TRIUMPH and SUFFREN, on the flanks, engaged the Intermediate Defenses. The French battleships, GAULOIS, CHARLESMAGNE, BOUVET and SUFFREN took station on the 16,000 yard line and awaited orders. Other ships stood by further out.

The forts were hit repeatedly. They returned the fire initially but soon ceased due to the extreme range. The intermediate defense fire forced the ships to keep underway which interfered with the accuracy of their fire.

Buzzer. Slide (23) B40-345.

At noon, de Robeck signalled the French division to close the forts. They steamed through the English line and closed to 9,000 yards concentrating their fire on the Narrows and receiving a heavy fire in return. The GAULOIS was badly holed forward.



The AGAMEMNON and INFLEXIBLE, supporting ships, were hit several times by 6-inch shells from the Intermediate defense.

However, the eight battleships gradually mastered the fire of the forts. At 1345, de Robeck ordered the minesweepers to clear the way for the fleet to enter Sari Sighler Bay, and directed six fresh British battleships to replace the French ships and the two flanking ships which had been severely handled.

A Turkish General Staff account of the situation at this moment is as follows:

"By 2 p.m., the situation had become very critical. All telephone wires were out, all communications with the forts were interrupted, and some of the guns had been knocked out, others were half buried, others again were out of action with their breech mechanisms jammed; in consequence, the artillery fire of the defense had slackened considerably."

In accordance with orders, the French ships retired around the flanks, the GAULOIS, down by the head and with a heavy list to starboard, made her way out.

Buzzer. Slide (24) B40-345.

The slide on the left shows the BOUVET after it struck a mine on the Asiatic side and sank in three minutes with great loss of life.

Buzzer. L. Blank.



The Second Attack Group, consisting of British ships, came on station and opened fire on the Narrows at 11,000 yards, using their secondary batteries on the guns of the intermediate defenses. The fire of the forts was generally ineffective, except from a German manned battery which concentrated its fire on the IRRESISTABLE, causing some damage. The range was opened slightly, which relieved the pressure on this ship. The sweepers passed through the line of ships and picked up some mines. The supporting ships had to go astern from time to time to avoid mines which the sweepers set adrift well below the Kephez mine fields.

Allied Impressions at 1600.

At 1600 de Robeck's impressions were that the forts at the Narrows were practically silenced, the mine field battery defense crews driven from their guns, and the situation most favorable for clearing the mine fields.

Situation Changed Rapidly.

The situation, however, changed almost immediately. At 1606 the INFLEXIBLE hit one of the mines laid on the night of 7-8 March, but was able to proceed to Tenedos under her own power. The IRRESISTABLE, at 1616 struck another of the mines in this field and sank. The OCEAN, which had been standing by, also struck a mine and went to the bottom later on that night. At 1750, when de Robeck learned for the first time that the ships had been mined, he ordered the Fleet to withdraw.



Buzzer. Slide (20) B40-343.

Results, British.

The Official History sums up the situation of the 18th of March as follows:

"Thanks to the extraordinary and shattering success of that simple line of unexpected mines, the day so auspiciously begun ended in complete failure. Three battleships, the BOUVET, OCEAN and IRRESISTABLE, were lost on the 18th. Three others - the INFLEXIBLE, GAULOIS and SUFFREN (the latter two as a result of gunfire) were so badly damaged that they had to be docked. Thus the total strength of the Battle fleet had been reduced by one-third as the result of the day's action. Of these six casualties, four had been caused by the unknown row of mines, laid on the night of 7-8 March, in an area which the Allied ships always passed.

"The effect of these twenty mines on the fortunes of the campaign can scarcely be measured. Suffice to say that, from that day onwards, the Fleet was allowed to make no further attempts, either single-handed or in cooperation with the Army, to force the Dardanelles, and the great



combined operation eventually decided upon was fated to develop into a land campaign supported by the guns of the Fleet."

Admiral Keyes maintains that the Allied losses were due in a large measure to the timid and inefficient work of the mine sweepers.

He also speaks of the fire effect of the intermediate defense on the sweepers, as follows:

"Before 2:00 p.m., I did not think the fire from concealed howitzers and field guns would ever be a decisive factor. The fear of their fire was actually the deciding factor of the fortunes of that day. For five hours, the Wear and picket boats had experienced, quite unperturbed and without any loss, a far more intense fire from them than the sweepers encountered when they entered the Straits, but the latter could not be induced to face it, and sweep ahead of the attacking ships."

"Two pairs of trawlers got out their sweeps immediately ahead of the supporting ships and commenced to sweep upstream; they exploded three mines, which were evidently in the Nousret line (laid 7-8 March). But coming under fire abreast of Whitecliffs, they turned and ran out of the Straits, in spite of all



the efforts of the Commander in the picket boat leading them to drive them back. The other pair left earlier in the proceedings without sweeping."

Results, Turkish.

On the Turkish side, the forts at the Narrows had suffered heavily, but, with a breathing spell, they would soon be again formidable antagonists. The forts of the Intermediate Defenses had suffered, but the mobile guns and howitzers were practically unharmed. The shortage of larger caliber ammunition was the greatest problem the Turks had to overcome.

Materially, the defenses were stronger relatively at end of the engagement than they were at the beginning. Still greater was the increased morale of the Turkish forces. During the battle, the Allied Fleet had not reached the deadline set by the defense; beyond that line were 10 rows of mines staggered across the Channel, and containing some 372 mines. The fire of the concealed howitzers and gun batteries of the intermediate defenses not only prevented the minesweepers from operating effectively in the Straits, but inflicted severe damage on two of the battle-ships - the SUFFREN and the GAULOIS. In addition, the intermediate defenses, by their plunging fire, forced the supporting ships to keep underway, which materially reduced the effectiveness and accuracy of their gunnery.



DRIFT TO THE THIRD STAGE - COMBINED OPERATIONS

The experiences undergone point to the following argument: the battleships could not force the Straits until the minefields had been cleared; the minefields could not be cleared until the concealed guns which defended them were destroyed; these could not be destroyed until the Gallipoli Peninsula was in Allied hands. Hence, further operations were postponed until such time as preparations for a combined attack could be made.

Buzzer. Blank.

Military Situation.

The original scheme of a naval attack had completely failed, and no provision had been made in time to meet the new conditions.

The extraordinary situation existed that some 50,000 men were assembled in the area, but in such condition of readiness as to preclude even the possibility of a joint operation. This force was there with only the vague mission of following up an expected naval victory.

Even the commander of the Expeditionary Force, Sir Ian Hamilton, did not arrive on the scene until the 17th of March, having been dispatched from England on the 13th, without instructions, or a Staff.

The day before Hamilton departed for Gallipoli, Lord Kitchener said:

Quote:



"We soldiers are to understand we are string No. 2. The sailors are sure they can force the Dardanelles on their own and the whole enterprise has been framed on that basis; we are to lie low and to bear in mind the Cabinet does not want to hear anything of the Army until it sails through the Straits. But if the Admiral fails, then we will have to go in."

Hamilton adds:

"The Dardanelles and Bosphorus might be in the moon for all the military information I have got to go on."

Turkish Plan of Defense.

Limon von Sanders. Head of the German Military Mission to Turkey stated:

"18 March. The Allies now probably recognized that the road to Constantinople could not be opened by action on the water alone. It is equally clear to me that they would not relinquish such a high prize without further effort. It would not have been in keeping with British tenacity or energy. Hence, a large landing had to be counted upon."

"On 25 March I was requested to take command of the Fifth Army, to be organized for the defense of



the Dardanelles. I assented at once."

"After making a reconnaissance of the Peninsula, I said, 'If the English will only give me eight days to improve the defenses of the Peninsula!'" They allowed him four weeks.

Buzzer. Slide (25) B39-340.

General von Sanders disposed of his 84,000 men so as to cover a 60 mile front as follows: Three Divisions, three battalions of Gendarmes and a Cavalry Brigade on the European side, and two Divisions on the Asiatic side.

He constructed roads and trails, and organized the defensive positions. His army was made mobile by marching and maneuvers. The units were concentrated and only the principal beaches, where a landing could be effected, were guarded, the remainder of the coast line being patrolled. Thus he changed the defense from the rigid to the elastic system. All units were given a mission, and by maneuvers made familiar with the task assigned, as well as the terrain. He did wonders during the month in which the British were planning their attack.

Buzzer. Blank.

Allied Plan of Attack.

It is instructive to compare the meager information placed at Sir Ian Hamilton's disposal with that which, in accordance with British Field Service Regulations, should be handed to a Commander-



in-Chief on appointment;

"As soon as the C-in-C of the forces in the field is appointed, he will be furnished with the approved plan of campaign, and with the appreciation of the military situation, including detailed information of the following points:

1. The forces to be placed at his disposal and their state of mobilization.
2. The armed forces and military resources of allied and hostile powers, with their special characteristics.
3. The theater of war.
4. Any other information which may be of use to him."

Due to the utter disregard of these regulations by Kitchener, General Hamilton was forced to draw up his plan of campaign after arriving on the scene of operations.

Buzzer. Slide (20) B40-343.

In drawing up a military plan of campaign for the ensuring operations, two points demanded particular attention. First, the primary task of the Army, on which every effort must be concentrated, was to assist the Fleet in forcing the Dardanelles. Secondly, the plan had to be not only within the capacity of the available troops, but so arranged, especially with regard to the



various beaches to be used, that the successive stages of disembarkation would be within the capacity of the available resources of the fleet.

The primary objective of the whole enterprise being the forcing of the Dardanelles, the essence of the operations was held to be the reduction of the batteries at the Narrows. To achieve this immediate objective, two alternative courses of action had to be considered:

(a) A landing on the Asiatic side of the Straits.

(b) A landing on, or to the northwest of, the Peninsula.

Many objections were put forth against the landing on the Asiatic side of the Straits, but the main one seems to have been that Lord Kitchener had impressed upon Hamilton that the occupation of the Asiatic side was "Strongly to be deprecated". All factors considered, the General Staff was of the opinion that "The capture of the Kilid Bahr Plateau would fulfill the main object of the landing."

Buzzer. Blank.

ALLIED TROOPS AVAILABLE.

The Allies had the following troops in the Area:

29th Division	18,000
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Royal Naval Division	11,000
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Anzac Corps	31,000
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French Colonial Div.	<u>18,000</u>
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Total of	78,000 officers and men.
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Only three months earlier, Kitchener stated that 150,000 men would be required in the seizure of the Peninsula.

The 29th Division was the last British Division of regular troops brought up to war strength by the addition of some territorials. Originally destined for France, it was diverted to the Dardanelles, with a string attached that it was loaned for a short period only and would have to be returned.

On the arrival of the Division at the base at Mudros, it was found to be "commercially loaded", that is, so loaded that it could not execute a forced landing. A soldier on one transport might have his ammunition on another. As facilities for unloading and reloading were lacking at Mudros, the entire outfit had to be sent to Egypt for reloading - a fatally time-consuming operation. One unit came equipped with motor trucks, although the War Office had been informed that trucks would be useless, and pack transport necessary.

The Royal Naval Division had been formed originally from sailors not needed to man the Fleet. It was without artillery or the usual Army supply service. Its personnel were poorly equipped and unused to fighting ashore.

The Anzac Corps was composed of units organized in Australia and New Zealand. When they sailed from Australia, they were destined for England to continue their training, which had not been completed prior to sailing. The congestion of soldiers



training in England caused them to be left in Egypt, where they were on hand to assist in the defense of the Suez Canal and, as events unfolded, conveniently located for service at the Dardanelles.

The French Division was a Colonial Division composed of one-third French and two-thirds Senegalese. It was equipped completely with artillery and engineers and adequately supplied with ammunition.

The Royal Naval Division was transferred to Hamilton's command. This division, having been under the command of de Robeck, was still at Skyros.

At the time of the landing, the Allied Fleet consisted of 19 battleships, 2 armored cruisers, 11 light cruisers, 27 DDs, 5 torpedo boats, 29 sweepers, a depot ship, a balloon ship, and an aircraft carrier.

The attacker in an amphibious operation has the advantage over the defender, in that his force is mobile and can be moved to any point or points along the entire shore line. Further, he has the advantage of selecting the time of his attack, dependent, of course, on the weather. Hamilton had all these advantages over the defender, but due to lack of small boats, he was not able to throw his troops ashore as rapidly as the situation demanded.



Hamilton could not hope for a strategic surprise, inasmuch as the Turks had ample warning that an attack was imminent; tactical surprise alone remained, as von Sanders could not move his reserves to any definite point until the landing actually took place.

Considering all courses of action open to him, Hamilton decided that his only hope of success lay in landing his entire force on the Gallipoli Peninsula utilizing all available landing points, and in securing possession of the main terrain features on the Peninsula before von Sanders could bring his reserves into action.

Buzzer. Slide (26) B34-422.

PLAN FOR LANDING, 25 APRIL.

The 29th Division, making the main effort, was to land on beaches S, V, W, X and Y, push on rapidly and seize first the Achi Baba Ridge and then the Kilid Bahr Plateau, in order to assist the Navy in getting through the Straits.

The Anzac Corps making the Secondary Attack was to effect a landing north of Gaba Tepe and, after securing its left flank, to push eastwards towards Maidos and seize the high ground with a view of cutting the Turkish north and south communications.

With the Royal Naval Division making a feint in the Gulf of Xeros, the French were to make a demonstration against Bashika Bay, accompanied by a landing at Kum Kale in order to divert the



fire of the Asiatic batteries from the main attack at Helles and to detail the Turkish troops on the Asiatic side from augmenting those already on the Peninsula.

The Navy was to land the units at their designated beaches, support the landing with gunfire, and bring up and land supplies and ammunition.

Hamilton's plan did not hold out a general reserve.

The Anzac Landing.

Although called a secondary attack, the objective assigned - Mal Tepe - was  $3\frac{1}{2}$  miles inland. Had this objective been reached, the entire Turkish defenses to the south would have been untenable. The Anzacs were scheduled to land one mile north of Gaba Tepe. A northern flanking force was to cover the northern flank from the Turks who were in position on the Sari Bahr Ridge, while the main attack poured across the lower foothills toward Mal Tepe. The Plan was carefully worked out and every battalion knew its objective.

Buzzer. Slide (27) B33-687.

The covering force of three battalions landed in the darkness preceding dawn in 12 tows of one steam launch and four pulling boats each. In the confusion of a night landing the tows became hopelessly mixed, the left battalion landing on the right - the slide on the left shows they were landed a good mile north of their scheduled beach - and instead of attacking the lower



foothills, they found themselves up against the main defenses of Sari Bahr itself. Actually, they did not know for a long time just where they were. All they knew was that something had gone wrong. The mistake in landing made the capture of Mal Tepe impossible.

Buzzer. L. Blank.

Desperate fighting ensued. The artillery of the Turks, assisted by a Turkish cruiser firing across the peninsula, delayed the transports. The BACCHANTE closed and anchored close in and, in half an hour, had silenced the guns. Confusion reigned among the troops. The wounded being returned in empty landing boats, further delayed the disembarkation. Mustapha Kemal, commanding the Turkish 19th Division, counter-attacked. At nightfall the exhausted Anzacs held a crescent-shaped position three-fourths of a mile deep and one and one-half miles wide, a position overlooked by the Turks who held the heights commanding it. The advocates of a night landing might note that this one achieved what is the great advantage of a night landing. Surprise was complete, so was confusion.

In passing, it is interesting to note that the naval orders alone for this landing covered 27 typewritten pages.

Buzzer. Slide (28) B39-344.

Y Beach Landing.

Two and one-half battalions made a surprise landing at Y



Beach without a casualty. After gaining the heights immediately commanding the beach, this force contented itself with a little reconnaissance. Each of the two battalion commanders supposed himself to be in command which naturally resulted in considerable confusion. There this force sat all day, unopposed, inactive, superior in strength to all the Turks on the toe of the Peninsula. Some twelve hours later, the Turks counter-attacked, but were repulsed in spite of the disorganization in the British Command.

X Beach Landing.

The Official History describes the action of the supporting ship at X Beach as follows:

"At 0400 the IMPLACABLE stood in with the tows. Since there was no chance of surprise, everything depended in the first instance on the IMPLACABLE's preparatory fire. As she stood in at 5 knots with the tows, a heavy fire was opened on them from the cliffs from both sides of the beach. He, Captain Lockyer, therefore held on until close to the fire fathom line and anchored. And there, with very little to spare under his keel he brought his broadsides to bear no more than 450 yards from the shore. From this close range he developed over the tows as they advanced an intense fire from his 4-12", six of his 6", and his 8-12 pdrs. The troops were able to leap



ashore and form up with nothing but distant rifle fire to annoy them."

After the troops had landed, the IMPLACABLE raised its barrage and kept up fire on the hills in the rear until its overs were reported falling close to the troops landed on the beaches to the southward. The Turks counter-attacked but the attack was repulsed. Later, this force succeeded in joining hands with the troops who had landed on W Beach.

#### W Beach Landing.

W Beach was covered with obstacles. In spite of a preliminary naval bombardment, the Turks here opened heavy machine gun and rifle fire at point blank range on the landing troops. Luckily, some boats on the northern flank sheered off and landed their troops on the rocky and supposedly inaccessible point which was unfortified. These troops scrambled up the heights and took the defenses of W Beach in flank. The Turks contested every foot of ground and made several counter-attacks. By nightfall the troops here had a bare foothold on the heights commanding the beach.

#### V Beach Landing.

About 0649, five tows, each carrying a platoon and covered by fire from the Albion, headed for V Beach. They were met by a withering fire. The sober British Official History states that "Hell broke loose" and "Hell Yawned". The attack was completely broken up. The RIVER CLYDE, a converted collier, was also used in this landing. She carried about 2500 men. It was planned to



run her into the beach. Then, through specially cut ports, the assaulting troops were to dash across a ramp to shore. A steam hopper and some towed barges accompanied the RIVER CLYDE for the purpose of forming this connecting ramp to shore. The steamer grounded as planned. Some difficulty was experienced in getting the steam hopper and barges into place, and Commander Unwin, the father of the RIVER CLYDE brain-child, earned undying fame when he, accompanied by a handful of midshipmen and seamen, jumped into the bullet-lashed waters and held the barges in place. Of 1,000 men who left the RIVER CLYDE over the ramp toward shore, 500 had been killed or wounded by 1030, and by nightfall only 400 remained ashore who were not casualties, and these were pinned to the shelter of a narrow ledge fringing the shore line. Machine guns mounted in the bow of the RIVER CLYDE served to keep down some of the Turkish fire and prevented a counter-attack.

Buzzer. Slide (29) B40-339.

This slide shows the RIVER CLYDE at the Beach with troops disembarking over the improvised ramp.

Buzzer. Slide (30) B40-333.

This slide gives a view of V Beach on the morning of the 26th. Note the artillery piece emplaced so as to support the advance of troops inland. There is grave doubt as to whether there was ammunition for this piece at this time. The RIVER CLYDE shows up in the background.



Buzzer. Slide (28) B39-344.

Let us look for a moment at the Turkish side. The Turkish Commander at V Beach sent the following message to his commander at Krithia. QUOTE:

"My Captain, either you must send up reenforcements and drive the enemy into the sea or let us evacuate this place because it is absolutely certain that they will land more troops tonight. Send the doctors to carry off my wounded. Alas, Captain, for the sake of Allah send me reenforcements because hundreds of soldiers are landing. Hurry up. What on earth will happen, My Captain?"

That night, the British landed reenforcements, assistance came from W Beach, and the heights immediately commanding the beach were captured next morning.

S Beach Landing.

The landing at S Beach was especially feared because the Asiatic batteries commanded it. The Navy put down a heavy covering fire on the Asiatic batteries and on De Tott's battery on the heights. Three companies of soldiers were landed here. Captain Davidson, commanding the CORNWALLIS, a supporting ship for this force, liberally interpreted his orders and added a company of his own Marines to the soldiers scheduled to land here. Then Captain Davidson left his ship at the head of a small force of sailors and personally led the assault on the capture of



De Tott's battery. This inspiring but overly enthusiastic action caused the CORNWALLIS to be late in carrying out the remainder of its orders, which was to lend sorely needed support to the landing at V Beach.

French Landing.

Buzzer. Slide (25) B39-340.

The landing at Kum Kale was intended primarily to keep two Turkish Divisions occupied, and to distract the attention of the Asiatic batteries from the landing of the 29th Division at the toe of the Peninsula. The covering ships quickly silenced the forts and the landing was made with little loss; but Turkish reinforcements stopped the French advance outside Yeni Shehr. Meanwhile, the rest of the French Division carried out a demonstration off Bashika Bay. This did not deceive von Sanders, who, on the night of April 25-26, ferried part of the 11th Division across from Chanak to Maidos.

Buzzer. Slide (26) B34-422.

The demonstration in Xeros Bay was successful in that it prevented von Sanders releasing any troops from Bulair to the Peninsula until that night, and it was not until the following morning, 26 April, that he was sure that it was only a demonstration and released any large body of troops to the south.

Buzzer. Slide (32) B37-149.



This slide, shows the naval gunfire support at the different beaches, and brings out an interesting point. The strongest attacking force was thrown against the strongest defenses, yet was given the weakest fire support - note Beach V. The weakest effort, a secondary attack at S Beach, was given the strongest fire support. If Hamilton had held out a general reserve to exploit the success at S Beach, this might have been a satisfactory disposition of naval supporting ships. If he had had a reserve immediately available to exploit the successful landings at either Y, or at S Beach, the Turkish southern defenses might have been turned and the History of the Dardanelles entirely changed.

Having no general reserve of his own, Hamilton suggested to General Hunter-Weston, commanding the 29th Division, that his local (Weston's) reserves be landed at Y Beach.

Buzzer. Slide (33) B39-346.

This slide shows the approximate location of Weston's floating reserve, well located for use on any of the beaches at the toe of the peninsula. However, Hunter-Weston, a true British bull-dog, threw his reserves into the hard fighting at W Beach. Thus was a golden opportunity lost.

Buzzer. Blank.

Hunter-Weston had no conception of what we call the "soft spot" landing - namely, to land where the going is easiest. In the afternoon, Hunter-Weston joined Hamilton on board the QUEEN



ELIZABETH for tea.

The Anzacs, who suffered considerable losses during the 25th of April, were badly shaken by nightfall. Their Commander, General Birdwood, proposed that his troops be withdrawn. However, de Roebeck stated that it would take three days to re-embark the troops. So Hamilton told Birdwood to hold on and dig in. During the course of the night of 25th-26th, the units were straightened out, the position consolidated, and thereafter the Anzacs fought gallantly.

Buzzer. Slide (28) B39-344.

One of the commanders of the successful landings at Y Beach had orders to join "in the advance of the troops from W Beach". He had no orders as to what to do if the troops landing at W Beach failed to advance; so he dug in, in the vicinity of the beach and sat tight. During the night the Turks attacked, but were driven off with severe losses. The next morning the commander, (the question of command, had been straightened out, due to the death of one of the battalion commanders), in the absence of orders, re-embarked his troops in transports lying off the beach, and Y Beach was abandoned, much to the surprise and consternation of Hunter-Weston and Hamilton.

Referring to the X Beach, W Beach front during the night following the landing, the British Official History states:  
QUOTE:



"Apart from occasional sniping, all opposition on this front had disappeared. But the inertia of the afternoon still paralyzed the British line; there had been little or no patrolling, and touch with the enemy was lost. The night's casualties did not exceed a dozen. Thus in the southern zone, as at Anzac, the morning's promise of victory had not been fulfilled.... Three of the five selected beaches had been captured soon after day-break. A fourth had been taken without opposition. Throughout the day the Turks were unable to array more than two battalions against 12 1/2 battalions of British troops ashore. Yet at nightfall, the 29th Division held only the fringe of the peninsula."

The French landing at Kum Kale, having served its purpose, the troops were reembarked just as the now demoralized Turks were beginning to surrender in numbers. The French were then landed on the southern toe of the Gallipoli Peninsula and thenceforth, fought side by side with the British.

Buzzer. Blank.

During May, June, and July, numerous attacks were made by the Allies and by the Turks. Both sides poured in reinforcements. Desperate fighting took place for the capture of Krithia, which the Allies never reached. Both sides dug in, and trench warfare



ensued. The Turks advanced their trenches to within a few yards of the British so as to escape the naval gunfire.

The British suffered from lack of ammunition, replacements, and sickness. The whole command suffered severely during the summer from dysentery, carried by the swarms of black flies. John North, in his book "Gallipoli The Fading Vision" states, QUOTE:

"A man had three foes to fight - the enemy, lack of water, and dysentery. Dysentery was so rife in all the ranks that, 'A man might go into battle holding his rifle in one hand and his trousers up with the other!."

As to the efficacy of naval gunfire, we will let von Sanders speak:

Quote:

"It must be stated here that the artillery effect of the hostile battleships constituted a support of extraordinary power for the landing army. No heavy land artillery can so easily change position and direct its fire on the enemy's flank and rear as was possible to the guns of the ships."

Lieutenant Boltz, commanding a German naval machine gun detachment ashore, states:



"The battle field presented a grand and awful spectacle. The point of the peninsula was surrounded by a circle of warships and transports. The ships' guns, assisted by great searchlights, maintained a terrible fire against the Turkish lines."

The German Major-General Hans Kannengiesser, serving with the Turkish Army states:

"Even later, in August 1917, in the battle of Flanders, I did not have the same overwhelming impression of concentrated shelling as during this period. Although in Flanders the effect of the individual shell was much more destructive, due to more sensitive fuses and improved methods of shell manufacture, yet the total moral effect was, in this case, much greater."

Speaking of a Turkish night attack, this same officer says:

"As soon as the light was sufficient to allow the ships to shoot at the Turkish line, an attempt to stay forward was equivalent to suicide..... Any attempt at movement, any sign of life during the day was impossible, because whoever showed himself was immediately shelled from the ships."



Captain Puleston, in his study of the Dardanelles Campaign refers to the naval gunfire as follows:

"The guns of the fleet failed to meet the expectations of the British, partly due to their flat trajectories which made them ineffective in the rugged broken country, but also due to the lack of an efficient method of fire control. The best British gunnery talent worked assiduously to develop an efficient system to coordinate the guns of the fleet with the artillery ashore and towards the end of the campaign they succeeded."

It is believed that much of the failure to meet expectations was due to lack of training for this type of enterprise. After the landing and during the desperate fighting of the first day, shore signal stations maintained communications with ships but were often unable to get in touch with anyone in authority on shore. An idea of the confusion of the ships is given by some of the questions the ships' captains asked each other: "Are any of our troops dressed in blue?", or "Have we landed any cavalry?". At other times, the ships were asked to "open fire at once", but were given no targets.

On 12 May, the GOLIATH was sunk within the entrance to the Straits by a Turkish destroyer.



A German submarine sank the TRIUMPH on May 25th, and the MAJESTIC on May 27th. This action caused the larger ships to be withdrawn to the protected waters of Mudros, leaving the gunfire support of the troops to the lighter craft.

Buzzer. Slide (34) B39-339.

British Submarines.

One of the most gallant parts of the Campaign was that played by French and British submarines. These submarines forced their way through the mine fields and nets in the Dardanelles and in spite of the loss of four, practically dominated the Sea of Marmora. A Turkish battleship and five gunboats were sunk, as were numerous transports and supply ships. The Turkish water supply system was reduced to numerous small coastal vessels which sheltered in the small bays during the day, and crept along the coast at night. It is reported one submarine attacked a railroad train. Another fired upon and delayed troops marching across the Bulair Isthmus, and was driven off by Turkish Cavalry.

The Turkish supply system was further complicated by the fact that transportation from the nearest railroad station, Uzun Keupri, to Bulair, was limited to animal-drawn carts and camel trains, no motor vehicles being available. That they managed to maintain an army on the Peninsula under these conditions was due to splendid organization, and to the simple wants of the Anatolian soldier.

Buzzer. Blank.



By desperate attacks at Helles and Anzac, Hamilton strove vainly to extract himself from the growing impasse. The Turks resisted stubbornly and counter-attacked desperately; they continued to improve their trench system, and learned the value of reverse slopes which naval guns could not reach. Hamilton's replacements came slowly and he was greatly handicapped by lack of artillery ammunition and grenades.

Base and Line of Communications.

Troops in the line are absolutely dependent on the lines of communication for food, clothing, medicine, and ammunition. If there is a breakdown in the daily flow of essential materials towards the front, then disaster and failure will follow.

Admiral Wester Wemyss was sent out in February to organize a base at Mudros but was denied the requisites essential for carrying out the assigned task. As time passed, the situation at the base seemed to grow worse instead of better. The British Official History describes the situation in July, 5 months after the base was established, as follows:

"At the beginning of July, the situation at the advanced base at Mudros was already so nearly out of hand that there was risk of a complete breakdown."

As late as September, 1915, General Monash summed up the situation at Mudros as follows:



"Here at Mudros the watchwords for everything and everyone are 'inefficiency', and 'muddle' and 'red tape run mad'."

With a situation such as this, is it any wonder that Sir Ian Hamilton wrote when he was halfway through the campaign:

"I worry just as much over things behind me as I do over the enemy in front of me."

#### THE FOURTH AND LAST STAGE

##### AUGUST ATTACK.

By late July, 1915, Hamilton could dispose of 110,000 bayonets and 194 guns, supplemented by the fire of the fleet. There were available 50 active observation planes.

Buzzer. Slide (35) B39-349.

Von Sanders had 120,000 men on hand, located in groups at Helles, Bulair, Anzac and on the Asiatic side of the Dardanelles. The bulk of this force was mobile and ready to move to any threatened point.

Buzzer. Slide (10) B34-529. Slide (36) B40-350.

Hamilton, in an attempt to break out of the trench warfare deadlock, planned a new landing and attack as follows:

(a) A strong holding attack at Helles and southeastern Anzac to immobilize the Turkish reserves.



(b) A demonstration against the north shore of Xeros. To land troops at Mitylene, without consulting Greece, to deceive the Turks.

(c) A demonstration by the French Fleet against the coast of Anatolia (Asia Minor).

(d) Main effort from Anzac position striking Sari Bair from the northwest.

(e) A landing of troops at Suvla Bay, securing the heights commanding that Bay, and cooperating with the Main Anzac attack.

The objectives were designed to secure the high ridges commanding the Straits and the Sea of Marmora.

The greatest stress was laid on surprise. Moonless nights were a requisite. The Navy reluctantly agreed to put the soldiers ashore at Suvla during hours of darkness. During the period July 31-August 3, between 7,000 and 8,000 reinforcements for the Anzacs were secretly landed.

#### The Attack.

The holding attack at Helles was launched at 1530, August 6th, supported by naval gunfire. There was severe fighting but the Allied made no material advance. However, they held Turkish reinforcements from being dispatched from this front until August 8th.

#### Anzac.

The Anzac attack was launched at 1730, August 6th on the



Anzac right and bitter fighting ensued. The main attack on the left moved out in two columns early that evening. These columns were delayed by Turkish resistance and difficult terrain. A coordinated attack was launched on August 7th but was repulsed. The British attacked again on the 8th and on the 9th. Under naval gunfire support a few gallant men succeeded in securing a foothold on Sari Bair, the key to the entire position. Hopeless confusion and poor staff work prevented the reenforcement of these men. The Turks under Mustapha Kemal counter-attacked and drove the British off their objective.

The Australian official historian writes:

"The vital objective, the actual crest of Chunuk Bair (Hill 971), was for several days within Birdwood's reach, and for a few hours actually within his hands. An opportunity was presented to him by fighting which was never surpassed, for securing results perhaps unattainable in any other land battles of the war; that opportunity passed, never to return."

The British casualties in this one operation were 12,000 men.

#### Suvla.

On the night of August 6/7, the British landed the IX Corps of 20,000 new untried troops under General Stopford at Suvla Bay with slight losses.



In the entire Suvla area there were only four companies of Turks, and four field batteries, under the command of the German Major Willmer, to oppose the landing and advance. Stopford, in his anxiety to retain secrecy, landed regimental and battalion commanders who had only the vaguest ideas as to what they were supposed to do, some not even knowing what part of the peninsula they were landing on, some were even issued maps of another section of the peninsula. In the confusion of the night many units were landed at the wrong beach. Indecision and confusion reigned. Another night landing. Results: complete surprise, complete confusion. Rear waves suffered heavy losses, when landing, from Turkish artillery fire. The Turkish infantry retreated slowly and in good order. Due to poor staff work the British troops suffered from lack of drinking water. Their advance was slow, uncoordinated and spasmodic. Communication between units completely broke down. Orders were either lacking or conflicting. Some troops stopped to bathe on the beach. Some of the troops had been given a cholera injection the day before, and then had been so tightly packed in landing boats that they were actually 17 hours continuously on their feet before they were landed.

It was essential that the heights commanding the Suvla Plain be seized before the Turkish reinforcements coming up from Bulair could arrive. On the afternoon of the 7th, General Stopford appealed to his division commanders to continue the advance. They



replied that their troops were exhausted. The inaction continued on the morning of the 8th. I quote from a German officer who fought against the Anzacs and who watched the Suvla landing through his field glasses:

"During the whole of the 8th of August, the goddess of victory held the door to success wide open for Stopford, but he would not enter. .... The British ashore cooked and smoked and bathed in the beautiful cool sea. Thirst was heavy in the heat of those cloudless August days. But nobody advanced. In short, a peaceful picture almost like a boy scout's field day."

"At the same time under this same sun on the other side of the Peninsula the panting Turks of the 7th and 12th Divisions were straining forward over the hills from Bulair. Will they arrive in time?"

A British staff officer from GHQ at Suvla sent Hamilton the following message on the 8th:

Just been ashore where I found all quiet. No rifle fire and apparently no Turks. IXth Corps resting. Feel confident that golden opportunities are being lost and look upon the situation as serious."



At 1700, on the 8th, Hamilton, alarmed by the apparent inaction, arrived on the scene. He found the Corps Commander on shipboard and too tired to accompany him ashore. Hamilton went ashore and ordered one of the divisions to attack. This division commander, in his confusion, withdrew his most advanced battalion from the key position on Hill 971 in order to form up his troops for the attack. The key position vacated by this battalion was at once reoccupied by the Turks and never after taken by the British.

The British attack finally got off at 0400 on the 9th. Too late for, one-half hour before, the Turkish reserves had arrived on Anafarta Ridge. The British were repulsed. It was said that their commander had "orders all over his breast, with disorder all over his command".

The British inactivity and lack of drive is in violent contrast with the ruthless drive of von Sanders. When one of his division commanders claimed that his troops were too tired for further marching, he was at once relieved of command - and the troops marched. When the Turkish commander on the southern front recommended a retirement, he was retired to Constantinople - and the troops held their position.

The next few days were characterized by fierce fighting, with attacks and counter-attacks, culminating in a combined allied attack on the Suvla and Anzac fronts on August 21. It was repulsed with heavy losses.



On August 17, Hamilton asked for 95,000 additional replacements.

The final futile British attack was made on August 27. The Turks counter-attacked the next day. No reenforcements for the British were forthcoming. The British had definitely failed.

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At this time Sir Roger Keyes, Chief of Staff to the Admiral, submitted a proposal for the forcing of the Straits with the navy regardless of losses, and placing a portion of the Fleet in the Sea of Marmora where it would sever Turkish communications and force evacuation of the Peninsula. The plan was not accepted. Britain felt that its margin of ship superiority over Germany was so small that she could not accept the risks involved.

The Turkish official account points out that the British originally had the choice of two alternative methods of forcing the Straits - purely naval action or a combined naval and military attack, and states:

"The fact that the naval action was limited to only one attempt, on the 18th of March, particularly merits reflection. To shrink from incurring insignificant losses is not the way to win big stakes. It is most probable that the objective could have been achieved by naval action alone had the attempt been pushed with greater vigour and



repeated several times. To win big stakes one must not shrink from big risks, or even from risking all at a crisis. The second alternative was naturally preferable and more certain. But the way to do it was not as was actually done - to start with a small force and then reinforce it by dribblets. The probable requirements of the situation should have been most carefully worked out, and the necessary force decided on; sufficient strength should have been employed right from the very start."

On a later page it adds that if at the outset Sir Ian Hamilton had been given six divisions instead of four, the invading troops ".... could have won a decisive success at the very beginning, for they might have forced the Straits before the defenders could bring up reinforcements, and thus influenced the political situation as regards Bulgaria and Rumania."

In October, Sir Ian Hamilton was replaced by General Munroe. Bulgaria entered the war on the side of Germany. The Berlin-Constantinople railroad was opened and German guns and ammunition began to arrive in Turkey. Approaching winter gales threatened to interfere seriously with supply. Troops were badly needed on the Western front. German submarines became increasingly active



against the British communications through the Mediterranean. Munroe recommended a withdrawal.

Buzzer. Slide (37) B40-351.

By 9 January, 1916, the last troops had been withdrawn from the Dardanelles in an evacuation that was a model in planning and execution. And so this campaign "of heroic bravery and senseless sacrifice" passed into history. The British had lost 120,000 men, the French 27,000, and the Turks 218,000 killed, wounded and missing.

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#### CONCLUSIONS.

What lessons can we gather from this campaign of "muddle, mismanagement and useless sacrifice"? The danger of deducing lessons from one operation is well known, but the following would seem to be indicated:

(1) The value of mines in base defense was demonstrated. Mine fields should be covered by artillery fire, especially quick firing guns effective against minesweepers.

(2) The value of searchlights in the defense of mine fields was demonstrated. Ships' fire was singularly ineffective against them.

(3) The airplane was not sufficiently tested here to point to any conclusions as to its value in landing operations or in coast defense.



(4) Submarines clearly demonstrated their value, both in the attack and defense. A few old type submarines attached to the defense would greatly handicap the work of the attacker.

(5) In the Helles and Anzac landings, British soldiers landed in pulling boats against machine gunfire. That any ever got ashore is a tribute to the bravery of the British soldier and sailor.

(6) The ships succeeded in silencing temporarily, but did not destroy the forts. However, it must be remembered that the forts were old. Their armament was generally antiquated and there was a shortage of heavier ammunition. Also the old forts were plainly visible and the British used direct fire. Modern defenses could not permit this.

(7) The ships were most ineffective against mobile field artillery. At the same time, the heavier armored ships suffered only superficial damage from these guns.

(8) Ships' guns were unsuccessful, except where the ship steamed in to point blank range, in silencing machine guns manned by determined troops.

(9) Naval gunfire can render valuable support to attacking troops, especially on forward slopes, but its efficiency in this regard on reverse slopes is not to be compared to that of land artillery which is especially designed for this type of work.



(10) Initial landings should generally be on a broad front in an attempt to find a soft spot in the defenses. General reserves must be immediately available, and there must be flexibility in planning, in order to exploit immediately this "soft spot" prior to the arrival of the hostile general reserves. Time is the essence of success in the landing attack.

(11) The dangers of lack of planning and lack of training were clearly demonstrated.

(12) British Official History:

"Many reasons combined to frustrate an enterprise the success of which in 1915 would have altered the course of the war. But every reason will be found to spring from one fundamental cause - an utter lack of preparation before the campaign began."

(13) You cannot extemporize a landing attack.

Many reasons have been given for the failure of the British:- lack of planning, lack of training, stupidity of the high command, lack of experience and initiative on the part of subordinate leaders, and others too numerous to mention.

One story seems to sum up admirably the Turkish idea of Hamilton's staff. A Turkish sniper, on being asked why the British Staff always appeared to be immune from his attentions, obligingly explained:



"Oh well, you see, I get five shillings for every private I shoot, ten shillings for every sergeant, and a pound for every officer; but if I were to shoot a staff officer I'd be shot myself."

Lieutenant General Sir George MacMunn, Royal Artillery, aptly describes the cause of the British failure at Gallipoli in the following words:

"It should be written in letters of fire before every War Cabinet and before every General Staff:

(Buzzer. Slide (38) B29-371.)

'HE WHO WILLS THE END MUST WILL THE MEANS'."

Buzzer. Lights.



# GALLIPOLI CAMPAIGN

Given by Lt. Col. W.E. Riley, USMC

Date 11 January 1940.

## LEFT SCREEN (FACING STAGE)

## RIGHT SCREEN (FACING STAGE)

Box No.	FILE No.	TITLE OF SLIDE	Box No.	FILE No.	TITLE OF SLIDE
		BLANK	1	B39-170	Mil. Geog. - Dardanelles
		BLANK	2	B40-342	Situation on all fronts.
		BLANK	1	B39-170	REPEAT
		BLANK	3	B34-594	Gallipoli Peninsula
4	B35-277	Suvla Bay	3	B34-594	REPEAT
5	B34-587	Anzac Cove	3	"	REPEAT
6	B34-588	Inland from Anzac	3	"	REPEAT
7	B35-358	Y Beach	3	"	REPEAT
8	B34-427	W Beach	3	"	REPEAT
9	B34-591	X Beach	3	"	REPEAT
		BLANK	10	B34-529	Gallipoli Peninsula
		BLANK			BLANK
		BLANK	1	B39-170	REPEAT
		BLANK			BLANK
		BLANK	11	B35-193	The Dardanelles Def.
		BLANK	12	B39-171	Turk Defenses
		BLANK	13	B39-172	Brit. Plan - Naval
		BLANK			BLANK
		BLANK	14	B36-370	Vice Admiral Carden
		BLANK	15	B36-358	Rear Admiral Keyes
		BLANK	16	B36-355	De Robeck Hamilton
		BLANK	17	B36-374	Stopford



## GALLIPOLI CAMPAIGN

TITLE OF THE PRESENTATION

Given by Lt. Col. W. E. Riley, USMC

Date 11 Jan. 1940...

## LEFT SCREEN (FACING STAGE)

## RIGHT SCREEN (FACING STAGE)

Box No.	FILE No.	TITLE OF SLIDE	Box No.	FILE No.	TITLE OF SLIDE
		BLANK	18	B36-354	Liman Von Sanders
		BLANK	19	B36-357	Major Willmer
		BLANK			BLANK
		BLANK	20	B40-343	Peninsula
		BLANK			BLANK
		BLANK	21	B39-173	Nav.Op. 25 Feb. 1915
		BLANK	20	B40-343	REPEAT
		BLANK			BLANK
		BLANK	20	B40-343	REPEAT
		BLANK	22	B40-344	Nav.Op. 1000 to 1206
		BLANK	23	B40-345	Nav.Op. 1206 to 1700
24	B40-327	Bouvet sinking	23	B40-345	REPEAT
		BLANK	23	B40-345	REPEAT
		BLANK	20	B40-343	REPEAT
		BLANK			BLANK
		BLANK	25	B39-340	Turk Plan of Defense
		BLANK - INTERMISSION			- BLANK
		BLANK	20	B40-343	REPEAT
		BLANK			BLANK
		BLANK	26	B34-422	25 April. Beaches - Landing/
27	B33-687	Anzac Landings	26	B34-422	REPEAT
		BLANK	26	B34-422	REPEAT



GALLIPOLI CAMPAIGN

Given by Lt. Col. W.E. Riley, USMC

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RIGHT SCREEN (FACING STAGE)

Box No.	FILE No.	TITLE OF SLIDE	Box No.	FILE No.	TITLE OF SLIDE
		BLANK	28	B39-344	Top. Toe of Peninsula
		BLANK	29	B40-339	River Clyde
		BLANK	30	B40-333	Clyde. Another view of River/
		BLANK	28	B39-344	REPEAT
		BLANK	25	B39-340	REPEAT
		BLANK	26	B34-422	REPEAT
			32	B37-149	Naval Gunfire
			33	B39-346	Anzac Landing
		BLANK			BLANK
			28	B39-344	REPEAT
		BLANK			BLANK
		BLANK	34	B39-339	Theatre of Operations
		BLANK			BLANK
		BLANK	35	B39-349	Sit., 6 Aug. 1915
36	B40-350	3-7 August	10	B34-529	REPEAT
		BLANK			BLANK
		BLANK	37	B40-351	Evacuation
		BLANK			BLANK
		(38) B39-371			
		Buzzer.			Lights.



