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THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR

"7 December, 1941"

STAFF PRESENTATION

DECLASSIFIED IAW DOD MEMO OF 3 MAY 1972, SUBJ:
DECLASSIFICATION OF WWII RECORDS

Naval War College
Newport, R.I.
28 February, 1944

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THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR

2 February, 1944

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
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H.H. CROSBY,
Captain, U.S.N.
Chief of Staff.

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FOREWORD

I realize fully that figures, times, dates have little place in any narrative designed to be entertaining, but these figures and times that I will relate are so historically important that I feel impelled to include them in this presentation.

THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR

7 December, 1941.

I. INTRODUCTION.

"From lightening and tempest, from plague persilence and famine, from battle and murder and from sudden death....Good Lord deliver us". On the second Sunday in Advent, the seventh day of December, in the year 1941, this prayer, from the Litany, went up from thousands of churches and congregations throughout our broad and happy land. After years of peace and security this plea for protection had become routine and most of/^{us}subconsciously felt that "it could not happen here". But even as these litanies were being intoned, Japanese war planes were warming up on carriers approaching the Hawaiian Islands, masses of troops of the Empire were taking action stations and Japan in its entirety was poised to strike. Little did we know how desperately we needed divine intercession and protection on that dark day. We can all remember our first reactions of incredulity and disbelief when the Sunday radio broadcasts broke in with the news that Pearl Harbor had been attacked. It just could not be----but it was. The Japs had taken us on and "this was it". The "date which will live in infamy" had dawned. Mr. and Mrs. America had had a last peaceful Sunday for a long, long time.

II. WORLD EVENTS LEADING UP TO THE ATTACK.

We are familiar with Japan's march of Empire. The Liuchius and the Bonins in the seventies; Formosa and the Pescadores in 1895----loot from the Chinese War; Dairen, Port Arthur, Korea and

South Sakhalin---spoils of the Russian War of 1904-5; and finally, in 1919, that great windfall from the World War 1----the Mandates. All these gains, ill gotten as we may regard them, were obtained by force. Can we blame Japan so much for thinking that the sword of the samurai is all powerful? Certainly her success in Manchuria and Inner Mongolia in 1931 and the China "incident", that commenced at Marco Polo Bridge in 1937 showed her nothing to disprove that "might makes right".

But in this march there was always some one in the way---some one to protest---some one to insist on the principles of fair play and equal opportunity for all in the Far East. That some one was Uncle Sam. According to Japanese thought, the United States prevented the payment of well earned indemnities to Japan by Russia--the tribute of the vanquished to the victor. We thwarted Japanese ambitions in Eastern Siberia immediately following World War 1. We prevented the permanent Japanese occupation of Shantung in the same period. We even undertook, by means of the Washington Disarmament Conference and succeeding meetings of a like nature, to force the proud Japanese nation into second place in the family of nations. We inflicted a lasting injury to Japanese national pride by our exclusion acts involving great loss of face----the ultimate in insult to an Oriental. And all the time we were tiresomely insistent on the maintenance of the territorial integrity of China and of the Open Door. Wherever Japan turned, she faced the tall old gentleman with the whiskers and striped trousers--effectively blocking the road of Japanese "manifest destiny". So inevitably the United States, in the Japanese mind, changed from the benefactor

who opened the land to the light of civilization and the friend who cheered them on to victory over Russia, to the monster that threatened to checkmate all moves toward the Japanese goal of complete control over Eastern Asia and the Western Pacific.

The Mukden "incident" of September 18th, 1941, involving a bent rail and fishplate on the South Manchurian Railroad, set in motion the events of the last and continuing phase of Japan's drive for the hegemony of the Far East and eventual world domination. This incident abruptly terminated an era of good feeling growing out of the Washington Conference and the period of Japanese industrial well being that followed World War 1. Since the "incident" Japan has been continually on the march. The occupation of Jehol and Inner Mongolia, the attacks on Shanghai, increasing economic and military penetration of China, wide spread smuggling, debasement of the populace through the sale of narcotics-----all these were parts of the pattern for the complete domination of China by the Japanese. Concession after concession was made by a fearful China but each such brought on more Japanese demands. The fantastic happening in Sian, involving the Generalissimo and the Young Marshal was the Oriental prelude to the Marco Polo Bridge attack, the sinking of the Panay, the occupation of Eastern China, which in turn were but forerunners of the attack on Pearl Harbor and the cataclysmic events to follow. And always, in these times, Japan was opposed by a strong and firm United States---staunch in its opposition to the domination of China and the closing of the Open Door. Our attempt to get England to join us in the invocation of the Nine Power Treaty regarding Manchuria and against Japan, our

great loans to China, our abrogation of the 1911 Commercial Treaty and our hostile attitude to Japanese aims increased the tension in American--Japanese relations. Japan, in her part, by her brutalities in China, by her denunciation, in 1934, of the Five Power Treaty limiting naval armaments, by her bombing of the Panay, by her declaration of the establishment of the "Co-prosperity Sphere of Greater East Asia" did her strong bit in paving the road to war. But even with all this aggravation, it is doubtful if our nation would have gone to war over these issues. It remained for the explosions at Pearl Harbor on Black Sunday to shake us out of our lethargy and make us realize that at last we had a fight on our hands.

"Sound Military Decision" states "The primary function of the armed forces is to support and, within the sphere of military effort, to enforce the policies of the State, if necessary, by war". I wish to point out here how well our opponent has carried this out in the decade prior to 1941. Japan's military, economic and diplomatic frontiers were identical. Thus the whole nation, as a well drilled team, was able to proceed towards the shining goal of the "New Order". And this is a thought for the future--perhaps, if in 1931, our armed forces had been strong and ready enough to "support and enforce the policies of the State" and our home front had been alive to the consequences to us of the Japanese seizure of Manchuria, Mr. Stimson would not have been a "voice crying in the wilderness" in his denunciation of Japan. We would not now be facing the greatest crisis in our national existence. Theodore Roosevelt was not far wrong in his Big Stick Formula--at least as far as Japan is concerned.

Our increasing preoccupation in the fate of the Allies during 1940 and 1941 gave Japan a welcome clear field in her activities in the Far East. The drain on our production powers by the Lend Lease program seriously interfered with the much needed rapid expansion and equipment of our armed forces.

Fifteen months before Pearl Harbor, Japan launched a "white war", utilizing full diplomatic and military powers against the English speaking nations and the Dutch with the domination of Eastern Asia as the objective. Japan's pay for joining the Axis in 1940 was the assurance of freedom of action, in so far as Germany and Italy were concerned, in South East Asia and the South Pacific. Some writers claim also that the happenings of December 7th, 1941, were implicit in the Tokyo-Berlin bargain of September 1940. As an earnest of this deal, Tonkin in northern Indo-China was delivered to Japan by the Laval dominated government of Vichy. Matsuoka, Japan's Foreign Minister, tells newsmen at this time that "if U.S. desired to retain the status quo in the Far East, they would have to fight for it". Our President retaliated by clamping down on shipments of scrap iron to any points outside the Western Hemisphere or the British Empire. This embargo became effective in October, 1940.

With a foothold in Indo China, with Hitler's blessing over Japanese activities in Southeast Asia, with Germany's assurance that Russia would remain neutral in a Pacific War, with a divided India, with an unprepared Australia, with a United States both unprepared and preoccupied with Britain's dire plight, Japan appeared to have a clear road to the South towards the "wealth of

the Indies". But her way was not completely cleared of obstacles. There existed a Singapore and there was a United States Fleet at Pearl Harbor advanced 2200 miles from the mainland!

As 1940 gave way to 1941, tension increased in the Pacific. Our far Eastern policy at this time appeared to be one of "holding" based on the President's assurance to Mr. Churchill at the Atlantic Conference that he could baby the Japs along for three months. He actually succeeded for four months. Our policy towards Japan at this time is well expressed in the book "How War Came" (available in the War College Library) which states; "In the President's opinion, the Far Eastern policy should be formed along these simple basic lines:

1. We pick no quarrels with Japan.
2. We back down from no issue with her.
3. We reserve the right to use economic pressure in the hope of bringing Japan to reason.
4. The door, meanwhile, is to be left wide open for discussion and accommodation within the framework of our historic position in the Far East".

At the same time Japan was doing some "babying" on her own behalf. She was not quite ready for the kill.

Commencing in March, 1941, and lasting almost unbrokenly until the following December 7th a series of conversations over sixty in number took place between Mr. Hull and Admiral Nomura in Washington. Japan at this time was beginning to feel the weight of our economic warfare. Whether these talks deferred war for nine months to permit Tokyo to mass military power for the conquest of

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the Pacific is an open question which will not be settled until this weary war is over. In this time our aims were clear----to strive for a peaceful settlement of the Pacific question and failing that to stave off Japanese military action as long as she was willing to talk.

In April of 1941 Japan secured her back door through a five year non-aggression pact with Russia. Hitler's sudden attack on Russia, launched in the latter part of the following June, though entirely unexpected by the Japanese, further eliminated the Soviets as a bar to the freedom of action of the Rising Sun in the Western Pacific. Japan speedily capitalized on this development by striking a new bargain with Germany involving the agreement by Germany to the undisguised occupation of Indo-China in entirety, in exchange for repudiation of the April non aggression agreement with Moscow. Japan has not yet carried out her part of the trade that is - a break with Russia - electing first to move to the south, the direction of effort that had been firmly established by the Imperial Council.

The diplomatic sparring between Washington and Tokyo continued barren of result during the summer and fall of 1941. On 25 July, Japanese assets in the United States were frozen. On 17 October, the Konoye Cabinet fell and Tojo rose to power and now it was quite evident to all that peaceful settlement of the difficulties was more than ever remote. Japan was now experiencing increasing pressure from Berlin to attack America and England under the terms of the tri-partite agreement.

SHOW SLIDE 1 - B44-849

Special Ambassador Saburo Kurusu arrived in Washington on 17 November, ostensibly to assist Admiral Nomura in clearing the way of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere and in persuading the United States to withdraw support of China. Frederic Moore states that Kurusu had instructions to make it plain to the

American Government that the economic blockade must be lifted or Japan would break it. Fighting words these. On the 18th of November the Japanese diplomats presented to Mr. Hull a five point formula which, when boiled down, proposed that we abandon China, lift our "freezing" order, supply Japan with whatever oil she needed, and assist her in acquiring more raw materials from the East Indies. In return Japan undertook not to press further south than Indo China and to pull out of that colony altogether when peace was restored between Japan and China or (and I quote) "an equitable peace in the Pacific Area" had been established.

OFF SLIDE

There were now few sands left in the glass and time was short. By this time the Jap Government had clearly made the decision to give us one more chance, the five point formula, to meet their terms and, if it were refused, to proceed to the use of force. Mr. Hull was fully alert to the seriousness of the situation, for, five weeks before the arrival of Kurusu, he had informed the heads of our Army and Navy that the Far Eastern crisis had passed beyond the bounds of diplomacy and was definitely their "pidgin". On 21 November, Mr. Hull indicated that as far as his department was concerned all hope for peace was lost and he advised that we had better take care that the Japanese did not "stampede the hell out of our scattered forces in the Pacific". On 26 November, our answer in the negative to the preposterous "five points" was delivered to Nomura. We had reached the end of the diplomatic road. War with Japan, in Mr. Hull's eyes was now a certainty. The President sent a message directly to Hirohito on 5 December in a last minute effort to prevent an abrupt

termination of the negotiations.

In spite of the evident gravity of the situation at this time, the first week in December, the attention of the responsible officers of our government was diverted from the peril to the Philippines and Hawaii to the situation regarding Siam. All eyes were on Thailand where Japan had massed troops on the Indo-China-Siamese border. Though Japan's moves against Siam were genuine enough, yet they served the purpose of a gigantic ruse, blinding the United States to the danger to our strong points in the Pacific. The few remaining days of grace in Washington were featured by a futile interchange of notes in which the United States inquired the portent of extensive troop movements to the south to be answered by an "evasive and specious" Japanese reply.

The news of the attack on Pearl Harbor reached the White House at 1:47 p.m. Eastern Standard Time, 7 December. By coincidence Nomura and Kurusu were to deliver Japan's reply to our note of the 26th of November at the State Department that afternoon. At 2:20 the Japanese envoys were admitted to Mr. Hull,

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and delivered the 2500 word note from Tokyo. The note was couched in such insolent and bellicose words that Mr. Hull, already cognizant of the tragedy at Pearl Harbor, and white with anger, dismissed the Japanese in this scathing and historic indictment:

"I must say that in all my conversations with you during the last nine months I have never uttered one word of untruth. This is borne out absolutely by the record. In all my fifty

years of public service I have never seen a document that was more crowded with infamous falsehoods and distortions -- infamous falsehoods and distortions on a scale so huge that I never imagined until today that any government on this planet was capable of uttering them".

The interview lasted exactly twelve minutes.

OFF SLIDE

III. BEFORE REVEILLE

In April, 1940, the Pacific Fleet, under the cover of Fleet Problem XXI, shifted its base and training operations to the Hawaiian area. A strenuous program of gunnery, tactics and material upkeep and modernization continued throughout 1940 and 1941. I can say this in all truth and sincerity that the Fleet, on 7 December, 1941 was, within the limitations of personnel and materiel established by the Congress, well prepared for war -- as well prepared as any naval force has been at the outbreak of hostilities. That makes the blow at Pearl Harbor all the more heart breaking. The opinion of officers of high rank was divided as to the advisability of having our precious battleline so far advanced and the State Department was far from happy at the yapping of the Japanese over this "unfriendly" gesture of the United States. But, nevertheless, the Fleet stayed there with individual ships making "morale" cruises to the mainland periodically.

In mid-summer 1940, following the fall of France, a Navy building program was launched with a "Two Ocean Navy" as the goal.

In September, 1940, Conscription went into effect and our small professional army began slowly to grow. It was realized in Washington that, in this worst of all possible worlds, the United States was sadly unprotected and something had to be done.

During the summer and fall of 1941, the United States reinforced the Philippines and other outlying Stations with all too small amounts of personnel and equipment. Belated projects to fortify Wake. Midway and Johnston Island were taken in hand.

Due to the threat to our Atlantic lines of communication with Britain, exerted by the Tirpitz and Bismarck, we were forced to divide the Fleet, in the spring of 1941. Three ships of our twelve ship Pacific battleline - the Idaho, New Mexico and Mississippi - , the Carrier Yorktown, plus four six inch 10,000 ton cruisers with two squadrons of destroyers were sent to the East Coast. If we concede that the basic strength of fleets is that of the battleline, we can see that we were now inferior in the Pacific to the ten battleship fleet of Japan. This diversion could not have **happ**ened at a worse time for it emboldened Japan and high lighted our own battleline as the one logical physical objective for the opening attack.

On the morning of the attack, then, our battleship strength was divided as follows: Nine BBs in the Pacific with eight of them at Pearl Harbor; eight in the Atlantic---three New Yorks, three Idahos and two North Carolinas. The Japanese battleline could deliver a 91 ton main battery broadside as against our 73 tons. We had lost our naval superiority in the Pacific.

Our Army, at this time, had expanded to one million eight hundred thousand men in various stages of training. About ten thousand of these were in the Philippines.

Our industry, thanks to the Lend Lease program, was well into the war gear. We, as a nation, were readier for war than we have ever before been at the outbreak of hostilities---except for one thing---our state of mind. We were far from ready in the psychological field. In retrospect it is hard to see how we could have been so nationally blind.

Unfortunately, we did not realize that Japan would not live up to the terms of the 1907 Hague Convention, of which she was a solemn signatory, that "The contracting powers recognize that hostilities between themselves must not commence without previous and explicit warning, in the form either of a reasoned declaration of war or an ultimatum with conditional declaration of war." Japan was to demonstrate that she had not changed from the days when she assaulted the Chinese over Korea and surprised the Russians at Port Arthur and Chemulpo. She believed in capitalizing to the utmost the element of surprise, be it ethical or otherwise.

On the other hand, in all this preliminary period, the

War, State and Navy Departments maintained close liason regarding the world situation and particularly regarding that in the Pacific. As early as 24 January, 1941, Secretary of the Navy wrote the Secretary of War that "If war eventuates with Japan, it is believed easily possible that hostilities would be initiated by a surprise attack upon the fleet or the naval base at Pearl Harbor. This opinion never reached the High Command of either service in Hawaii. A Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan and subsidiary plans were drawn up by Admiral Kimmel, the Commander in Chief, Pacific, and General Short, Commanding the Hawaiian Department, for protection of the Fleet and the base and frequent drills and exercises were conducted throughout 1941 to ensure that measures under the plans would be effective. On the 16th of October, 1941, the Army and Navy heads in the Hawaiian area were advised by their respective Secretaries of the changes in the Japanese cabinet, of the probability of war between Russia and Japan and of the possibility of an attack by Japan on Great Britain and the United States. In the same communications both commanders were warned to take precautions and to make preparatory dispositions which would not disclose their strategic dispositions or constitute provocation against Japan. A trifle over a month later, on 24 November, the Chief of Naval Operations sent a message to Admiral Kimmel in which it was stated that it was the opinion of the Department that a surprise aggressive movement in any direction by the Japanese was a possibility. On 27 November, (and this date is important), several messages were sent from Washington to the

high commands in the Hawaiian theater. The Chief of Staff of the Army informed General Short that negotiations with Japan had practically ceased, that hostilities with Japan were momentarily possible, that , if hostilities could not be avoided, it was desired that this nation be not the first to commit an overt act, but that the addressee was not to be restricted to any course that would jeopardize his defense. The same day, the Chief of Naval Operations sent a despatch to Admiral Kimmel to the effect that said despatch was to be regarded as a "war warning" and also directed the execution of a "defensive deployment" in preparation for carrying out war tasks. The message also carried information similar to that contained in the Army despatch together with the statement that it was expected that Japan would move against the Philippines, Thai or the Kra Peninsula. Both messages contained injunctions to take anti-sabotage measures. Also the same day the Chief of Military Intelligence communicated directly with G-2 of the Hawaiian Department that subversive activities might be expected in Hawaii. The next day, the Adjutant General of the Army sent the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department a message stating that the critical situation required every precaution against subversive activities and that necessary measures should be taken to protect military establishments and property. This latter message further disclaimed ordering any illegal measures and warned that protective measures should be confined "to those essential to security, so as to avoid unnecessary publicity and alarm".

On 29 November, General Short answered this last despatch out-

lining his anti-sabotage measures. No reply was received to this from the War Department which led General Short to believe that the Department approved of all that he had done. The same day, the Navy Department sent a despatch to Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, similar in content to that sent General Short on the 27th. On the 30th, the Navy Department echoed the Army's guess regarding the attack against the Kra Isthmus. Admiral Kimmel testified before the Roberts commission that this message led him to believe that the Navy Department was not expecting a Japanese attack on Hawaii. On 3 December, and again on 4 and 6 December, the Navy Department sent messages to the Commander-in-Chief concerning the retention or destruction of certain classified matter in the Fleet and at outlying stations in the Pacific. The message of the 6th evidently was the last that arrived before the crash, though reports mentioned "warnings" being sent to commanders in the field timed to arrive in Hawaii at 7 a.m. on the 7th. The findings of the Roberts Commission go on to state that (and I quote) "The foregoing messages did not create in the minds of the responsible officers in the Hawaiian area apprehension as to probable imminence of air raids. On the contrary, they only served to emphasize in their minds the danger from sabotage and surprise submarine attack. The necessity for taking a state-of-war readiness which would have been required to avert or meet an air raid attack was not considered". As a sidelight, Admiral Kimmel had also been advised by his war plans officer that surprise air attack on Oahu was not probable. The report of the Commission also states that Admiral Kimmel and General Short,

though conferring frequently on joint plans and procedure did not, on or subsequent to 27 November, hold any conference specifically directed to the meaning of the series of messages received from Washington and the action required pursuant to them. The replies of Admiral Kimmel and General Short to these messages were simply in the nature of reports of action taken.

In all this exchange of despatches Washington's preoccupation with the Siamese situation is quite evident. The attention of both Washington and the high commands in the Hawaiian field were also focused on the dangers of sabotage and other Fifth Column activities on Oahu. The fear of "starting something" sticks out in each message from the nation's capital. In the period following the "war warning" message of the 27th both Admiral Kimmel and General Short took what they considered to be appropriate action but did so independently without informing the other of the steps taken. This lack of interchange of information between the two high commanders was to prove a great factor among those leading to our disaster. General Short thought that the Navy was conducting long range air reconnaissance from Oahu daily--which it was not. Admiral Kimmel thought the Army was conducting inshore air patrol and manning radar continuously ---which it was not. As we all/^{now}know the radar was manned from 4 to 7 a.m. daily for training. Shore radar in those days was still a new thing and in the early development and training stage. Though radar had been installed in ships some time prior to this, shore radar on Oahu was then in a state of construction and test.

A survey of the pre-attack conditions on Oahu would not be complete without a short reference to spy and counter-spy

SHOW SLIDE #3 - B44-876

activities. It was well known to Army and Navy Intelligence activities and to the F.B.I. that over 200 professional Japanese agents were at work on the island under the direction and pay of the Japanese consul. Captured maps and other data pay tribute to the excellence of their efforts. Evidently these agents were well located, for the Navy brought up the question of the arrest of the whole list in the summer of 1941. Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, objected, giving as his reason that said agents should be given a chance to register and also that any abrupt action would create bad feeling towards the United States by the Japanese aliens resident in Hawaii. Result--- no action taken.

OFF SLIDE

IV. THE RUDE AWAKENING.

On the morning of 7 December, 1941, the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, under the terms of "Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935, was responsible for the joint defense of the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier. The Roberts Commission also finds Admiral Kimmel sharing the responsibility through his subordinate, Admiral Bloch, Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District. It is further stressed in the Report that the Fleet as such was not charged with the defense of PEARL HARBOR and was expected only to contribute in the way of self defense gunfire. This command and responsibility set up is, as we see it, an extremely strong argument for unity of command. Happily that unity now obtains in the Hawaiian zone where Admiral Nimitz reigns supreme.

On the same morning, important units of the Pacific Fleet not in PEARL HARBOR were disposed as follows. Task Force Eight consisting of the ENTERPRISE, NORTHAMPTON, SALT LAKE CITY, CHESTER and DESRON 6 was 200 miles west of OAHU returning from WAKE. Task Force 12, consisting of the LEXINGTON, CHICAGO, PORTLAND and DESRON 5 was en route MIDWAY ferrying planes. The INDIANAPOLIS and 5 DMs were at JOHNSTON ISLAND conducting landing exercises. The MINNEAPOLIS plus 4 DMs were exercising in the drill areas south of OAHU. The LOUISVILLE, BOISE and PENSACOLA were on escort duty to the Asiatic Station. The submarines of Task Force 7 were scattered from WAKE to SAN DIEGO.

Now, for the benefit of my listeners who have never visited

the "Pearl of the Pacific," I show here slides of PEARL HARBOR and the single entrance thereto.

SHOW SLIDE #4 - B44-857
#5 - B36-1041

On the morning of the attack an anti-torpedo net was installed across the entrance. This net was opened at 0458 and was not closed until 0840.

OFF SLIDE #5

Present in PEARL HARBOR on the tragic Sunday morning were 86 craft of the U.S. Navy. The berthing of the heavier vessels is here shown.

SHOW SLIDE #6 - B44-840

Though regular week end leave and liberty had been granted, sixty per cent of the officers and ninety-six per cent of the men were aboard at the time of the attack. The Army reported an average of eighty-eight per cent present at the various posts. Battleships had ready ammunition in the chests for the 5" and .50 calibre batteries but no battery "condition" watches were set.

Ships, in accordance with existing instructions were in material condition of readiness XRAY or AFIRM or higher classification. It had been customary at night to provide full closure of ships below the water line.

The Navy had 202 aircraft and the Army, 273 aircraft available on OAHU that day. The state of readiness for the Army aircraft required them to be ready on four hours notice and that they be concentrated to facilitate protection against sabotage.

As I have remarked before, the so called aircraft warning system (radar) was only manned habitually from 0400 to 0700 for training.

The Roberts Commission finds that the security measures taken by the responsible commanders in the field were, in view of the warnings from Washington, entirely inadequate.

On the morning of 7 December, six patrol planes were searching south to southeast from MIDWAY. Three patrol planes were working with subs south of OAHU. Three planes searched 375 miles to the south of OAHU. Eighteen planes from Task Force Eight scouted in advance of the Force towards OAHU. But, God help us, there were no organized air searches to the North or Northwest from which direction the strike was coming. Our state of preparedness precluded a 24 hour 360 degree air search from OAHU.

The weather at PEARL HARBOR on this Sunday morning was logged: Partly cloudy with cumulus clouds mostly over the mountains. Cloud base 3500 feet. Visibility good. Wind North-ten knots.

The first enemy contact was made by the Coast Guard Cutter Condor which was sweeping in the defensive sea area off the PEARL HARBOR Channel Entrance. The Condor immediately reported to the U.S.S. WARD on inshore patrol that she had sighted a periscope and the WARD in conjunction with a Navy Patrol Plane commenced a vigorous search under a "shoot to kill" standing of Admiral Kimmel's applicable to the defensive sea area off the PEARL HARBOR entrance. At 0640, the WARD attacked a sub-

marine trailing the ANTARES into the harbor and is presumed to have sunk it. This contact and attack were reported at 0712 by voice to the Commandant, Fourteenth. The Commandant immediately issued orders for the ready duty destroyer to put to sea and for the net gate to be closed. Gilbert Cant in "America's Navy in World War II" writes of a complete harbor reconnaissance made by a Jap midget submarine between 0400 and 0600. There is no official verification of this yarn.

It might be well to remark here that the Fleet had been subjected to many alarms regarding possibly hostile submarines in this area over a period as far back as the preceeding April. This may partly explain the seeming apathy regarding the happenings I have just mentioned.

The Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, was notified at 0720 and again at 0732 that a hostile submarine had been sunk off the channel entrance. At 0720, Private Lockard reported radar contact with large number of planes: due north, distant about 132 miles. The duty officer took them for a group of Fortresses due from California and told Lockard to "shut the darn thing off", without considering that the reported contact would put the expected Fortresses about two hundred miles off course from the route from California.

These happenings did not bring on extra alerts in the few remaining minutes of grace either in the moored fleet or at the military airfields and stations throughout the Island for, at 0748, the Japanese opened their air attack with a twelve plane bombing and strafing onslaught on the Navy's seaplane

base at KANEHOE BAY, on the northeastern shore of OAHU. No word of this got through, doubtless due to severed lines of communication. This preliminary to the "main event", from the Japanese viewpoint was highly successful. A second attack twenty-five minutes later completely demolished this station and the planes on the water.

At 0755, the signalmen on the PEARL HARBOR Signal Tower displayed emergency signals and telephoned the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, that the Japanese were attacking in force by air. All ships in the Hawaiian area and Washington were promptly advised that there was an air raid in progress on PEARL HARBOR and that it was "no drill". The war was on.

The official report of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, divides the attack into five phases and I will so treat it in this presentation. The report emphasizes that the primary targets were the heavy ships and aircraft and with the light forces and industrial area as secondary objectives. Phase I-----from 0755 to 0825. In this period a series of dive bombing and strafing attacks were launched on HICKAM FIELD and FORD ISLAND with eighteen planes on the former and nine on the latter target. Four separate torpedo plane attacks were pushed home in this phase against the battleships moored to the East of FORD ISLAND, against the HELENA and OGLALA and against the UTAH and the OCLs moored West of FORD ISLAND. The major and most effective torpedo plane effort was carried out by a twelve plane strike that came in over MERRY POINT from Southeast to Northwest, when all of the outboard battleships were each

effectively hit by one or more torpedoes. The torpedoes carried 1000 pound charges and were fitted with special wooden fins for shallow water runs. The torpedo planes launched at point blank range pulling up just in time to clear the masts and superstructures of the battleship targets. This initial attack was also featured by eight coordinated dive bomber attacks which went after the hangars of Ford Island, the ships in the Ford Island berths, the ships moored at the Yard, the Downes, Cassin and Pennsylvania in drydock, and the Shaw in the floating dock as shown. Twenty-one torpedo planes and thirty- dive bombers are estimated to have participated in this phase. High altitude horizontal bombers made runs over the ships and the industrial area in this phase but they did not have good practice until Phase III, which I will discuss later.

OFF SLIDES

The damage done in this initial attack was terrific.

The Oklahoma hit,,on the port side by five torpedoes, heeled over and turned on her side in ten minutes. The Arizona hit by a dive bomber blew up.

SHOW SLIDE #7 - B44-882
#8 - B44-879

Burning oil from the shattered Arizona spread throughout the harbor endangering adjacent ships.

OFF SLIDES

The Utah and Raleigh in the Western berths were hit by torpedoes. The former hit by two, speedily turned turtle. It was only by excellent jettisoning and counterflooding that the Raleigh was kept on an even keel and saved for the future. A freak hit on the Helena not only opened up the side of that vessel but did

likewise to that of the aged neighbor, Oglala, which rolled over on her side a half hour later. Meanwhile other Jap air groups were savagely attacking Hick and Wheeler Fields and Ford Island in a few short minutes wiping out our ability to resist in the air. No ship movements occurred in the first phase.

The second phase from 0825 is described as a lull only by way of comparison, for fifteen dive bombers were still active bombing and strafing our burning ships. In this period the Monaghan rammed and sank a midget submarine which was being fired on by the Curtiss and Tangier.

Phase III from 0840 to 0915 opened with horizontal bombing from 12,000 feet as the feature. Damage done in this phase was serious. Bombs dropped were converted 15" or 16" AP shells with modified body taper and increased burster charge giving low order detonation with little flame. The heavy ships, particularly the

SHOW SLIDE #9 - B44-888

California bore the brunt of these attacks made by thirty horizontal and eighteen dive bombers. In this phase, as directed, the Nevada cleared her

OFF SLIDE

berth and proceeded down South Channel toward the sea to sortie. She was heavily attacked and damaged as she proceeded. She grounded to the south of Ford Island, was cleared by tugs and beached on order of Commander Battle Force on the west side of the channel across from Hospital Point. There was danger that a sinking Nevada would block the channel.

SHOW SLIDE #10 - B44-887

It is reported that at this point dive bombers set fire to the

OFF SLIDE

Cassin and Downes in the big drydock and the Shaw in the floating dock.

SHOW SLIDE #11 - B42-1302
#12 - B44-881

It is hard to believe that any ship could survive this and be sent back to the war. The Cassin and Downes burned so fiercely that the Pennsylvania, in the same dock was threatened and the

OFF SLIDE

dock was flooded.

SHOW SLIDE #13 - B44-880

OFF SLIDE

At this time the gallant Captain Young, having been blown overboard from his ship, the Vestal, by the Arizona's explosion in the first phase, clambered back aboard, cleared the Arizona, and beached his ship, in the upper reaches of the harbor.

Destroyers began to sortie in this phase.

Phase IV lasted from 0915 to 0945 with dive bombing attacks predominating. Twenty-seven dive bombers were thus employed. No further damage other than further demolition of targets already hit is reported. Ships in increasing number, including the St. Louis and Detroit are now clearing and proceeding to sea. The cruisers and destroyers that escaped from Pearl Harbor joined up later with those of Task Force Eight to conduct an abortive sweep to the Southwest that night.

Phase V marks the waning of the raid and the final retirement of

the enemy planes at about 0945. In the space of one hour and forty minutes our enemy, Japan, had destroyed the backbone of our sea power in the Pacific, had wiped out the air protection of Oahu, and had removed the remaining great obstacle to their occupation of the Philippines. The United States was not to oppose seriously the way of Japanese conquest to the South. The afternoon of the seventh presented a scene of horror like this.

SHOW SLIDE #14 - B44-878

In this short time, by well coordinated, well timed and courageous air attacks the Japanese Navy had killed 3303 officers and men of the Army and Navy and had wounded 1272 others, had made total losses of the Arizona, the Utah, the Cassin and Downes, had heavily damaged the Oklahoma, California, West Virginia, Nevada, Oglala, Helena, and Raleigh, had inflicted less but sufficiently serious damage on the Pennsylvania, Maryland, Tennessee, the Curtiss and the Vestal, had destroyed a large part of the Army and Navy air forces present and had rendered Ford Island, Hickam and Wheeler Fields and Kaneohe Bay temporarily inoperative. The quite acceptable costs to Japan were twenty eight planes and three submarines with 68 air personnel killed.

OFF SLIDE

V. THE AFTERMATH.

The studious avoidance by the Japanese attackers of tempting targets in the industrial area led many to believe that the Japs were saving the facilities for their own use and there was every expectation that they would be back and this time with amphibious forces for the occupation of Oahu. The carrier task forces entered during the succeeding few days, replenished and speedily put to sea---more to get out of the way of possible attack than to intercept the three to four enemy carriers that are supposed to have launched the 105 plane strike against the heart of our naval power.

Many naval officers feel that the Japs selected the wrong physical objective and that, if the Pearl Harbor shops, drydocks and fuel storages had been knocked out, followed by a seizure of the Island, we would have been defeated in the Pacific before the war ever started. I, personally, have wondered why a Japanese Hobson did not block the channel entrance and thereby immobilize our Task Forces at sea.

Be that as it may, the Japanese capitalized to the utmost on the element of surprise and on their knowledge of the psychological factors involved. They removed the United States Navy as an obstacle for the period required to conquer and consolidate positions in the Netherlands East Indies. Cold bloodedly, we must admit that the attack on Pearl Harbor was well conceived, effectively planned and brilliantly executed by the Japanese Navy. In its attainment of the effect desired, the elimination of the United States Fleet as a factor in the Pacific, it was well nigh perfect.

Let us, however, take pride in the courage of our people who went through the hell at Pearl Harbor, in the ingenuity and devotion of our salvagers who converted the wrecks of that day to living, fighting ships now back in the fray, and in the ready response of the nation to the peril that faced us. The tragedy at Pearl Harbor did more to stifle dissident talk and to rally our people for the war than anything that could have happened. Who knows but what we might have been arguing and debating the question of war or peace until the enemy was at our very doors? It is admitted that we made many errors of commission and omission and that the loss of life and ships is distressing, but we were rudely shaken out of our national sense of sufficiency which was a blessing in itself.

SHOW SLIDE #15 - B44-890

Admiral Spruance says: "Sure we've made mistakes and we have learned from them. The Japs have made mistakes too. The biggest one they ever made was not military but political. That was the attack on Pearl Harbor."

OFF SLIDE

END OF PRESENTATION

The Attack on Pearl Harbor

TITLE OF THE PRESENTATION

Given by

Date 2 Feb., 1944

LEFT SCREEN (FACING STAGE)

RIGHT SCREEN (FACING STAGE)

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2	B44-877	Mr. Hull			BLANK
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3	B44-876	The Honorable Tourist			BLANK
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4	B44-857	Pearl Harbor	5	B36-1041	Air view Pearl Harbor Channel
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7	B44-882	U.S.S. Arizona	8	B44-879	Burning Oil-Pearl Harbor
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9	B44-888	U.S.S. California			BLANK
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10	B44-887	U.S.S. Nevada			BLANK
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11	B42-1302	U.S.S. Shaw	12	B44-881	U.S.S. Shaw after attack
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13	B44-880	Drydock #1			BLANK
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14	B44-878	Pearl Harbor at Height of Attack			BLANK
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15	B44-890	Vice Admiral Spruance			BLANK

