

26

Crosley, P.

6370-5870
15/Jan/47ga

Serial No. 2

STAFF PRESENTATION

JUTLAND STRATEGY

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport, R.I.
16 December, 1946

This document should be returned to the Academic Section, Room 206,
after it has served its purpose.

OUTLINE OF STAFF PRESENTATION

JUTLAND STRATEGY

By

Captain P.C. Crosley, U.S.N.

16 December 1946 - 1100

I INTRODUCTION

II THE WORLD SITUATION 1916

A. Events leading up to early 1916

1. British Naval Policy

2. German retaliation

B. Submarine warfare

C. The strategy of 1915-16

D. Reorganization of the Fleets

III THE EUROPEAN SITUATION 1916

A. Mittel Europa

IV EVENTS LEADING DIRECTLY TO THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND

A. Germany takes the initiative

B. Change in German plans

C. British retain original plans

D. Distribution of forces

V THE SORTIE

VI CONCLUSION

Allan E. Smith

ALLAN E. SMITH
Rear Admiral, USN
Chief of Staff

PRESENTATION
ON
JUTLAND STRATEGY
(16 December 1946)

I - INTRODUCTION

The preparation of this presentation has interested me very much due to its strategic scope which constitutes a review of world events which many of us have forgotten due to the importance of current war studies.

The strategical study of JUTLAND could easily be expanded into an historical account of World War I; its condensation into fifty minutes is difficult and naturally will result in the omission of many important details. The overall condensed picture, nevertheless, is interesting and is of particular importance to our Army, Navy, and State Department representatives. The conditions leading up to, and subsequent to JUTLAND will convince you that "History repeats itself" many times. It is from such occasions that we learn.

"Hindsight is earlier than foresight"; consequently the criticisms of JUTLAND are numerous. This presentation strives to avoid the controversial issues and sticks to what are recognized as facts.

II - THE WORLD SITUATION - 1916

A - Events leading up to early 1916:

SHOW SLIDE #1A

1 - British Naval Policy.

During World War I the North Sea was the critical area of operations. England's naval policy was to establish control of all the great ocean areas. This could be accomplished at that time only by destroying enemy ships, stopping German trade, and blockading Germany herself.

At the outbreak of the war, the British Grand Fleet was based at SCAPA FLOW in order to remove it from submarine and destroyer menace, thus giving it a greater freedom of action. This concentration however, had one disadvantage in that it made difficult an efficient distribution of equitable forces in other parts of the world. For example, it left the British PACIFIC force so weak that the Germans were able to defeat it in the battle of CORONEL. It also permitted more widespread enemy raider operations than were considered acceptable at that time. Finally, it left the southeast coast of England open to raids, and this disadvantage the Germans were quick to seize. Later, these raids were responsible for redistribution of British home units but the redistribution was not completed prior to the battle of JUTLAND because of the inadequate submarine defenses then existing.

2. German Retaliation.

The control of the seas by the Entente had placed great resources at their disposal and had imposed considerable trade restrictions on the Central Powers. The resultant hardships in GERMANY were the important factors toward initiating the U-boat campaign. To increase the strangle hold on German trade, ENGLAND declared the waters between SCOTLAND and NORWAY as part of the war zone, and that those waters were closed to commerce except for a specified lane. Such a restriction, plus the increasingly long list of contraband goods, caused the antagonism of the neutrals and particularly the United States, who felt the freedom of the seas was being usurped by the BRITISH. This is an important point to note because it had a bearing at a later date, on the battle of JUTLAND.

GERMANY, in retaliation for ENGLAND's sea area declaration, prescribed a war zone around the BRITISH ISLES and stated that any ship found therein would be destroyed. By this proclamation GERMANY defied public opinion again, just as she had done in the BELGIAN invasion. A general world-wide resentment was caused by GERMANY in this act. Her consequent submarine warfare policy, ultimately resulted in alienating the friendship of the neutrals and in the UNITED STATES finally entering the war.

While these retaliatory measures were being exchanged the GERMAN cruiser and raiders were operating fairly successful and in some cases spectacularly. Eventually though, they were

practically all destroyed or shut up in various neutral ports. Actually, their operations had little effect on the outcome of the war.

REMOVE SLIDE #1a

II - B - Submarine Warfare:

Eventually the results of the GERMAN U-boat campaign began to be felt by the Entente. As the sinkings mounted more complaints were registered by the neutral nations. These were climaxed by the sinking of the LUSITANIA in May of 1915. Even from the view point of the GERMAN Government's material strategy, there was nothing that their U-boat campaign could accomplish that would have off-set the strategic harm done when they thus aligned neutral public opinion against themselves. In commenting on the protest of the United States regarding this sinking, the GERMAN Chief of Staff reported to the GERMAN Government that: the UNITED STATES was not in a position to aid ENGLAND against the U-boat campaign because the UNITED STATES could not provide adequate maritime tonnage nor could she, with financial aid, compensate ENGLAND for the loss of essential goods being created by the U-boats.

II - C - The Strategy of 1915-16

In early 1915 the strategic decision of the ALLIES had been: "To press the siege".

The local Naval decision resulting therefrom was:

"To continue the blockade at sea, control the DARDANELLES and the BALTIC."

During this period the Allies had made a serious mistake in their conception of the overall GERMAN strategy for 1915. The GERMANS had instituted their new military strategy by a concentration of power on the RUSSIAN front. Shortly afterwards, this was justified when the RUSSIAN front collapsed, and BULGARIA jointed the Central Powers. Then SERBIA was overthrown, and the Allied attempt at the DARDANELLES failed.

These reverses, plus the GERMAN submarine and sporadic raider successes, the blockade of RUSSIA by the GERMANS, and the raids on the ENGLISH coast were contributing much towards dissatisfaction in the Allied ranks. By early 1916, the war from the Allied viewpoint, was not progressing satisfactorily.

On the other hand, from the GERMAN viewpoint the general 1915 situation also was not entirely satisfactory. In spite of noteworthy GERMAN successes in Central EUROPE, and in their submarine and raider operations, RUSSIA still remained a potential enemy. The fighting on the Western Front was deadlocked and the Austro-Hungarians were being hard pressed in the East. The early victory anticipated had not materialized, and the Allied sea blockade was beginning to take effect. Due to the fact that GERMANY was not yet ready to break with the United States, she had restricted her submarine operations as the result of frequent protests by the UNITED STATES against unlawful sinkings. In early 1915 the Central Powers had lost their offensive and GERMANY was cut off from her ally TURKEY. The hostility of ITALY towards her old enemy AUSTRIA was mounting, and eventually was leading those two

Nations to war the following year.

The strategic decision of the Central Powers thus became: "To break through", and their Naval Decision became: "To break through the blockade and through RUSSIA". This strategy itself, showed the inherent GERMAN weakness. Their General Staff had been so obsessed with the concepts of a continental land warfare that they had failed to realize that BRITISH sea power was their most formidable foe. They did not recognize the importance of mutual interdependence of political power, land power, and sea power. There had been no evidence in GERMAN history of any unified plan to coordinate all these powers towards the accomplishment of their mission. As a result of the situation then existing, the GERMAN people became dissatisfied and began to demand more action out of their navy. Even the navy itself, was disappointed with the new submarine warfare restrictions that had been placed upon it and was seeking other means of increased activity.

II-D-Reorganization of the Fleets; new measures taken.

The GERMAN High Command finally decided that the solution was to wage more aggressive action at sea. Admiral Scheer, a staunch advocate of bolder strategy, was made the new Commander-in-Chief of the GERMAN Navy. It was his conviction that BRITISH sea power was the real menace to GERMANY and therefore BRITAIN must be punished in such a way as to deprive her speedily of the desire to wage war. He believed that this could be accomplished only by successful blows against her seapower and financial life,

Scheer realized that there were insufficient GERMAN submarines to operate against both the BRITISH fleet and her merchant marine. Previous experience had indicated that submarine operations against the fleet had not been very successful. Accordingly, he advocated, and it was decided, that by March 1916 the GERMANS would commence waging unrestricted submarine warfare against allied commerce. Admiral Scheer then proceeded to reorganize his fleet for that purpose. His first act was to reorganize the GERMAN light forces. Then the mobile sea defenses along the coast were reorganized and alerted. Night raids on the ENGLISH coast were instituted as a means of keeping the GERMAN Fleet in the proper state of tension and ready for eventualities. The end in view was to inflict a blow against BRITISH sea power.

The BRITISH in the meantime, had not been idle. The Admiralty announced that they had taken adequate anti-raid measures and that if the GERMAN ships ventured to show themselves off the ENGLISH coast it would be a very dangerous operation for them. New Fleet construction was initiated and a redistribution of the BRITISH Fleet commenced. A new Fleet base was planned for the Firth of Forth, and a secondary base at the Humber. SCAPA FLOW was to be retained for training purposes and to serve the North Sea blockading squadron. The lack of submarine defenses as remarked before, delayed the real progress of this plan until after JUTLAND.

SLIDE #1B

III - EUROPEAN SITUATION OF 1916. A - Mittel Europa:

The year 1916 began with the European situation as indicated on the accompanying slide. Meanwhile, in order to lift the blockade on RUSSIA, the Entente realized that it would be necessary to bring the GERMAN Fleet to action. Therefore the month of April 1916, found both sides preparing for more active naval operations.

IV - EVENTS LEADING DIRECTLY TO THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND:

A - GERMANY takes the initiative.

The one serious complication in the GERMAN plan for increased submarine warfare in March, was that it had to be postponed for a more suitable diplomatic situation. Admiral Scheer therefore was obliged to change his plans accordingly and so he decided to actuate more raids on the ENGLISH coast.

OFF SLIDE 1B

SHOW SLIDE #2

Thus it was that on 24 April the GERMAN fleet sortied to carry out a mission in the Hoofden. It left with the expectation of forcing the BRITISH out of port and engaging their smaller detachments successfully. Previous information had indicated that strong allied forces were in the North Sea, south of the Norwegian coast. ENGLISH forces had been sighted in the Hoofden, and others on parts of the ENGLISH coast. It was hoped that an opportunity would occur for the GERMANS to push between two of these forces and attack with equal strength, the first section encountered. The most suitable direction for attack appeared to be towards the

English coast. Then if the British wished to cut off the German Fleet's return home, they would have to move into the neighborhood of TERSCHILLING Bank where the waters favored a German victory.

Remove Slide #2

SHOW SLIDE #3 and 4 in succession

During the sortie, the cruiser SEYDLITZ was disabled by a mine and returned to port. However, this did not prevent the Germans bombarding LOWESTOFT and YARMOUTH with their surface forces according to plan. British light forces were encountered, but all opposing forces then returned home without any noteworthy occurrences.

Remove Slide #4

SHOW SLIDE #5 and #6

Submarine Warfare:

It was during these operations that Admiral Scheer received word concerning the latest United States ultimatum to the German government. It was to the effect that severance of diplomatic

OFF #5

ON #6

relations would be the only remaining choice if Germany did not abandon its present submarine warfare in which innocent neutrals were being lost.

Remove Slide #6

SHOW SLIDE #7

The Germans decided to accede to the demand of the United States

Remove Slide #7

and accordingly the fleet was instructed to wage submarine warfare in accordance with the international prize Law.

B - Change in German Plans:

Admiral Scheer on receiving these new instructions, realized that to operate his submarines under such conditions would expose them to the gravest dangers. He therefore recalled his U-boats to Germany and announced that the campaign against British commerce had terminated. Thus the first phase of the strategic situation ended.

The 2nd phase which then began, marked the Allied naval forces as the first, or primary, objective in the German plan. Commerce was the secondary consideration. In this phase a new German plan was drawn up for an elaborate combined operation including air, surface, and underwater craft. The final objective was to bring about a naval engagement favorable to the German fleet. These operations were planned for the period 23 May to 1 June 1916. During this period of planning, subsequent to the 24 April operations, the German Fleet remained behind HELIGOLAND in the BIGHT. The new German operation plan provided for two contingencies: "fair weather", and "foul weather". The "fair weather" plan was to bombard SUNDERLAND, which was the nearest port to ROSYTH (where the Germans had been informed the British Battle Cruisers were based).

SHOW SLIDE #2

The German 1st and 2nd scouting divisions were to effect the bombardment while 16 U-boats would be stationed off the English bases

to attack the British as they left port.

OFF SLIDE #2

ON SLIDE #10

Any British forces that escaped the submarines were then to be led towards the German High Seas Fleet which would cut off and destroy these British units. Visibility permitting, aircraft would be used for scouting and observation to prevent surprise. German submarine mine layers would also lay mines off ROSYTH, MORAY FIRTH, and West of the ORKNEYS.

OFF #10

The alternate German plan (for "unfavorable weather") provided for sending a detachment to strike at British merchantmen in the Skaggerak. Any British forces sent against this detachment then could be cut off and destroyed by the High Seas Fleet. Everything was now ready for the execution of the German plans.

C- British Plans unchanged:

It seemed a strange coincidence that also at this same time the British were planning more active operations. Their redistribution of their units (not yet completed) had resulted in an outpost detachment of light cruisers, destroyers, and submarines operating from HARWICH, the nearest suitable port to HELIGOLAND. The DOVER patrol covered the straits of that name. These two

SHOW SLIDE #8

forces were supported by BEATTY's Battle Cruiser force at ROSYTH. The Third Battle Squadron of eight pre-dreadnaughts and four cruisers, was stationed at SHEERNESS, at the river THAMES. The 5th Battle Squadron was sent temporarily to ROSYTH. The submarines

6370-5870
13/Jan/47lmf

were moved from ROSYTH to YARMOUTH for reinforcing the southeast English coast against invasions or surprise raids. It will be noted here that this Invasion idea continued to affect British Naval strategy, yet all developments indicated there was no such possibility. Also against such an invasion possibility were the new changes in weapons and tactics of naval warfare; particularly torpedoes, submarines, and mines which were of more use against a fleet. These weapons had forced, therefore, upon the Grand Fleet, a defensive role which restricted greatly any advances it might make.

OFF SLIDE #8

ON SLIDE #9

On the other hand, the stationing of the British units along the English coast with the major part of the Fleet at SCAPA, subjected the Germans to the risk of being intercepted by superior British detachments. It forced an offensive-defensive role on the part of the Germans.

OFF SLIDE #9

SHOW SLIDE #1b

The geographic coast line of Germany gave her the advantage in having to defend only two strategic locations, the CATTEGAT and SKAGGERAK (including the HELIGOLAND BIGHT). With the interior advantage of the KIEL CANAL, her naval forces could concentrate easily and readily. It therefore became the object of the Germans to: keep the Allied forces at a distance from the German shores, in order to safeguard the northern and western frontiers

joining the army flanks in Russia and Belgium, blockade the Russian BALTIC sea ports, and at the same time maintain sea communications with all possible neutrals. Germany, in recognizing British naval supremacy, desired to keep the German Fleet as "One in being", and as a continual menace.

Eventually by attrition the Germans hoped to obtain an opportunity for a small but superior German force to destroy a small British unit and thus reduce the Grand Fleet to a size that would permit a successful German engagement. German strategists realized as the war dragged on, that submarines and mines were the only effective means to lift the pressure of the sea blockade against them. Thus it was that their U-boat campaign became their counter-offensive. The Germans were able to release their submarines to prey on the Allies because of the strategical advantage their fleet possessed behind HELIGOLAND, as a potential threat against the British. Again we come back to the importance of the NORTH SEA area where two of the most powerful fleets in the world were continually engaged in a strategic contest for control of that area. On this hinged the issue of the war.

While the Germans were thus planning their campaign, the British likewise were intensifying their preparations which had already commenced. They realized that the threat of the High Seas Fleet must be removed. Accordingly, their plans revolved around the purpose of drawing the German fleet into combat. It was planned for two British squadrons of light cruisers to proceed to the SKAW to reach there by dawn on 2nd June.

6370-5870
13/Jan/47lmf

Thence they were to sweep down the KATTEGAT as far as the great belt and the Sound; meanwhile, a battle squadron would push into the SKAGGERAK in support.

OFF SLIDE 1b

Such a bait, it was hoped, could scarcely fail to draw a strong force from HELIGOLAND and lure it in to the trap. Also for this purpose three of the HARWICH submarines were to be in position by 1 June to the westward of Vyl light vessel and just south of HORN Reefs.

SHOW SLIDE #3

South of the submarine locations the British would extend their minefield to the westward. The seaplane carrier Engadine escorted by a light cruiser squadron and destroyers, would be off the reefs on the lookout for Zeppelins. East of the Dogger Bank would be two submarines from BLYTH. North of the mined area the British Battle and Cruiser Fleets would be cruising, waiting to move south and attack as soon as information was received that enemy forces had sortied.

OFF SLIDE #3

It is of interest at this point to note the similarity in the German and British plans. This feature, especially the similar dates of execution, deprived the Germans of one important strategic effect; for, instead of catching the British unawares, or under unfavorable circumstances, the Germans had selected a time when the British, too, were planning for action, and seeking an engagement.

The German plans materialized first, and the battle of JUTLAND occurred two days before the British plans were scheduled to go into effect. On the 15th of May, the German submarines sortied to take up their assigned stations.

SHOW SLIDE #10

On 22 May, the British Admiralty heard of large scale German submarine movements in the North Sea. Accordingly the British blockading squadron was withdrawn to the westward and immediate steps were taken to protect shipping. On 28 May, Admiral Scheer ordered all units of his Fleet then behind HELIGOLAND, ready for sea.

OFF #10

At that time the British dispositions were as shown on the accompanying Slide #9.

SHOW #9

V- THE SORTIE

On 30 May with visibility still poor, Scheer decided to use his alternate plan (for bad weather) and ordered Admiral Hipper with the Battle cruisers to proceed to the skaggerak. Scheer was to follow with the High Seas Fleet. On the morning of 30 May, the British Admiralty received information indicating early activity of the German fleet. That noon the Admiralty informed Admirals Jellicoe and Beatty that the German fleet was expected to sortie the next morning and that 16 German submarines were already out. At 1700 on 30 May, information was received that the German Fleet had received an important operation order. At 1740 this information was retransmitted to Admirals Jellicoe

6370-5870
13/Jan/47lmf

and Beatty and the former was ordered to "concentrate to eastward of the Long Forties ready for eventualities". (Note: this is the area at sea 60 to 100 miles east of Kinnaird Head).

OFF #9

The wording of this order has been the subject of much criticism. Students of warfare have stated that the message should have been interpreted to mean: "Concentrate to eastward of the Long Forties in order to destroy the German Fleet". This opinion is based on the knowledge that for many months the British had tried to draw out the Germans for that very purpose. Also the British knew that the Germans were coming out, and they knew the German submarines being out, meant business.

Jellicoe in his account states that the "Grand Fleet put to sea on 30 May for the purpose of carrying out one of its periodical sweeps in the NORTH SEA". It was, during that period, part of the British strategy to make periodic sweeps through the NORTH SEA. On the early morning of 31 May the German Fleet sailed as anticipated. At that time the Germans had no information as to the movements of the British Fleet, which in the meantime, had sortied commencing at 2130 on 30 May 1916.

SHOW SLIDE #12

At 0530 on 31 May, Admiral Scheer received word from Submarine U-32 (70 miles East of ROSYTH) that 2 Battleships, 2 cruisers, and several destroyers were taking a southwesterly course. At 0630 the same submarine reported she had intercepted an English radio message stating that 2 battleships and groups of destroyers

6370-5870
13/Jan/47lmf

had departed SCAPA FLOW. At 0648 the U-66 (60 miles east of Kinnaird Head) reported 8 battleships, light cruisers, and numerous destroyers had been sighted on a north-easterly course. Admiral Scheer later wrote that: "These reports gave no enlightenment as to the enemy's purpose".

C- STRATEGICAL CONSIDERATIONS:

Here we should note that the British had the strategal advantage. They wanted to meet the Germans and defeat their fleet decisively, whereas the Germans being inferior in force, did not want a Fleet engagement but wished to fight small detachments. This strategical set-up was to have an important bearing later on in the tactics of the battle.

OFF SLIDE #12

Let us now examine other strategical considerations just preceding the battle of JUTLAND:

SHOW SLIDE #11

This gives a rough comparison as to numbers of ships and types on the two sides. To what extent was it justifiable to risk the British Grand Fleet? The full consequences of this could not be foreseen owing to the new conditions of naval warfare. This fleet included almost the whole of the British capital ships; there was very little reserve behind it. A consideration of the strengths of the opposing fleets shows to what extent the danger of intelligent use of submarines, mines, and torpedoes (as newly developed by the Germans), would involve the Grand Fleet before, and during a fleet action. These marked comparisons were:

The Germans had: (a) greater armor protection
(b) better fire control
(c) heavier torpedo armament
(d) better underwater damage control
(e) trained in night actions

The British had: (a) better speed
(b) greater number of ships
(c) serious preconceived caution of closing
a withdrawing enemy

It will be noted that the necessity of protecting the superior British Fleet from impairment due to lack of a sufficient "reserve", motivated the entire British strategy prior to JUTLAND, and affected their tactics accordingly. In comparing this "reserve" situation, however, it would have been well to have mentioned the more serious lack of reserves on the German side.

OFF SLIDE #11

Upon his assuming command of the British Fleet, Admiral Jellicoe had transmitted to the Admiralty an outline defining his proposed method of conducting the Fleet in case of action. He pointed out the superiority of the Germans in torpedoes, mines, and submarines. He stated in part: "If for instance, the enemy battle fleet were to turn away from an advancing fleet I should assume that it was to lead us over mines and submarines, and I would decline to be so drawn..... This may seem like a refusal of battle and might result in failure to bring the enemy to action..."

The Admiralty in its reply to his letter, approved his views as stated and assured him of their confidence in his contemplated

conduct of the fleet in action. When we read Jellicoe's complete letter to the Admiralty, and his account of the difficulties which the Commander-in-Chief of the first great Battle Fleet in history was compelled to face, regarding the new dangers of naval warfare, it is possible then to understand the so-called defensive attitude of which he and the Admiralty were accused.

VI- CONCLUSION

A- Results of the Battle:

1. Central Powers

The Battle of JUTLAND was not decisive and it had no immediate conclusive effect or influence on the naval situation or the general course of the war other than as stated herein. The battle was unique in that it was the only major fleet engagement in World War I. In view of the units and the power involved it has been considered with the magnitude of the issue at stake, and ranks with the great battles of history.

The strategical results of this battle became more and more apparent to the Allies as the war progressed. If the Germans had been defeated the whole international picture would have changed. German mine fields could have been swept, and the British ones enlarged into German waters thus decreasing the effectiveness of the U-boats. A way would have been opened to Russian ports and that country possibly saved to the Allies. Many workers would have been released from Naval activities ashore in England and allocated to other important war industries and essentials. On the other hand, the German announcement of a victory resulted in

greatly increased morale at home and in the German fleet. It gave the advocates of unrestricted submarine warfare a powerful weapon to force the government to adopt that type of warfare in spite of protests from the neutral nations. The power of their fleet still retained for Germany the Baltic as a German lake, and permitted unrestricted trade with the Northern neutrals.

2. Allies

From the British viewpoint the battle was a success. It served as a convincing demonstration that the British Fleet could not be defeated and that its naval supremacy was retained. It permitted the Allies to continue the North Sea blockade of Germany and restricted German sea power to its ultimate effect against Russia alone, whereas the Allies still controlled the High Seas. However, the British purpose in preserving their Naval supremacy without risking serious losses resulted in a cautionary policy that dominated the future operations of the Grand Fleet. One reason given for this was the necessity of preserving the Fleet in readiness to meet any larger naval situation at the time. The inference was that the British High Command considered it possible that some other new enemy fleet might be added to the array against her. Irrespective as to whether such a contingency might have developed, it hardly seems to have been a sound policy for what happened at JUTLAND.

It is the usual aim of strategy to overwhelm a fraction of the enemy before reinforcements can arrive. Therefore, to have defeated the German Fleet before it could have been augmented by

another country would seem to have been the desirable objective. Another reason given for caution was the necessity of retaining Allied control of the seas. This is quite true, but the defeat of the German fleet would have secured this and at the same time intensified their hardships, struck a blow at their morale, and ultimately ensured a speedier victory over the Central Powers. Irrespective as to the underlying motives back of the British plans, it is important that we at the War College study such problems and train ourselves to arrive at sound decisions in future occasions of this nature, particularly when risk is to be avoided or accepted.

The engagement of JUTLAND was actually so closely drawn that a final conclusion as to which side won would require a different yardstick for each person's opinion. It seems to me after studying this battle strategically, that the Germans won a moral victory, but the British attained their aim of maintaining control of the seas. It might be said therefore, that the final success of Britain's strategy shows that their initial concept of the situation was based on sound principles even though the margin between victory and defeat was very close at times. JUTLAND was, therefore, paradoxically the climax and the anti-climax of World War I.

JUTLAND STRATEGY

TITLE OF THE PRESENTATION

Given by

Date 16 December, 1946

LEFT SCREEN (FACING STAGE)

RIGHT SCREEN (FACING STAGE)

Box No.	FILE No.	TITLE OF SLIDE	Box No.	FILE No.	TITLE OF SLIDE
47	825	(1a) World Situation 1916			
		BLANK			
	824	(1b) European Situation			
	826	(2) Operations 21-22 Apr.			
	827	(3) " 22-23 "			
		23-24 "			
	828	(4) " 1200			
		" " "			
	829	(5) " 2000			
	830	(6) " 24-25 Apr.			
	831	(7) " 25 Apr.			
		BLANK			
	826	(2) " 21-22 Apr.			
	833	(10) Positions Subs 31 May			
		BLANK			
	838	(8) Distribution Forces			
	832	(9) British Forces 30 May			
	824	(1b) European Situation			
		BLANK			
	827	(3) Operations 22-23 Apr.			
		BLANK			
	833	(10) Positions Subs 31 May			
	832	(9) British Forces 30 May			
		BLANK			
	834	(12) Advance British & German Forces			
	839	(11) Comparison number ships			