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LECTURE

ON

STRATEGIC AND OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

DELIVERED BY CAPTAIN ESPE - 6 SEPT. 1946

AT NAVAL WAR COLLEGE, NEWPORT, R. I.

*Delivered to Capt. Hartung by
Capt. Espe on 6 Sept. 1946.*

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I. GENERAL REMARKS

Gentlemen: - Yesterday Admiral Inglis told you that the purpose of the Naval Intelligence course at the War College is to create an understanding of Intelligence and an appreciation of its capabilities on the staff and command levels. The subjects of my discussion for today are particularly important to staff and command since they include "Strategic and Operational Intelligence," the intelligence needed by naval commanders charged with the determination of naval policy and in planning and executing operations.

Intelligence in one form or another has been used as an aid to naval warfare for hundreds of years but its use in direct support of the operating forces didn't reach its maximum effectiveness until slightly over five years ago. The British, in order to provide better coordination in operational matters, married certain functions of Operations and Intelligence to

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provide an Operational Intelligence Center in the Admiralty. Till then the thought has been that intelligence was mainly of strategic value only and that it should concentrate in the fields of espionage and counter-intelligence. It is readily understandable that this concept should have existed when you consider that the two essential factors in operational intelligence - speedy communications and long-range reconnaissance, are relatively recent developments. In the Battle of Jutland, for example, intelligence regarding the composition, characteristics, and effectiveness of the High Seas Fleet and the individual units of the German Navy was obtained principally from agents in Germany and from German prisoners of war; there was no way of determining how nearly correct or up-to-date it was on the day of the battle. Analysis of the volume and characteristics of the German Naval Radio schedules served as a vital clue to the sortie of the Germans, because of the changes in communications organization which preceded each major movement of their fleet.

However, when it came to the tactical or combat phases of that historical battle, Intelligence was dependent on a few submarines, small surface craft, and the single small plane from HMS ENGADINE that was the germ of naval aerial reconnaissance. It would be interesting to know what Jellicoe might have accomplished with a Sugar George Radar and a PPI.

Contrast the intelligence furnished the Grand Fleet for the Battle of Jutland with that furnished Task Force Commanders in the Pacific during the past war. Fast communications, aerial reconnaissance, and radio-equipped coast watchers, furnished them with the very latest intelligence on enemy locations, dispositions, and, at times, even their intentions.

Thus have time and distance been reduced. Admiral King in 1943 knew more about what the Japanese Navy was doing eight thousand miles away than Admiral Beatty did, thirty years before, about his own boss less than eighty miles away!

Strategic and Operational Intelligence differ principally

as to range or scope. Sound Military Decision teaches that "strategy representing a larger, further, or more fundamental goal, is differentiated from tactics in that the latter is concerned with a more immediate or local aim, which should in turn permit strategy to accomplish its further objective Whether an operation is distinctly strategical or tactical will depend on the end in view." We can apply this same distinction to Strategic and Operational Intelligence; the former has to do with an over-all plan or long range objective, whereas the latter is concerned with a more specific objective or operation. Combat Intelligence further limits the field of Operational Intelligence and may be described as that needed by commanders actually engaging with enemy forces during the comparatively short time of battle as distinguished from a more extensive and time-consuming operation.

Although in actual practice no set limit or line of demarcation can be established between Strategical and Operational Intelligence, for purposes of analogy, we might liken Naval

Intelligence to a bow and arrow. The bow represents Strategic Intelligence and the arrow, Operational Intelligence. The shaft and feather which guide the arrow safely to its objective, and the arrowhead which strikes the target represent the tactical and combat phases of Operational Intelligence respectively.

Neither the arrow nor the bow can be used effectively without the other, nor might I add, are either of value without the force of a strong right arm to propel the arrow and the brain of an archer to aim it; -- in other words, the Operating Forces and their Commanders (supported by Intelligence).

II STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE

A Types

First, let us take up the subject of Strategic Intelligence.

Strategic Intelligence is composed of information collected and processed both in peace and war for use in long range planning.

Generally speaking it falls into eight main categories:

Political - Economic - Geographic - Naval Power - Sociological -

Technical and Scientific - Personalities - Counter Intelligence.

Various departments of the Government are interested in strategic intelligence and each department employs special techniques and trained personnel to supply itself with and evaluate the information which it requires. The Central Intelligence Group which was established during the past year under the National Intelligence Authority has for its main mission the coordination of this departmental effort and the collection and evaluation of information needed for the determination of national policy. This new Intelligence Agency was established primarily because of the imperfect coordination among existing agencies and their failure to meet intelligence requirements prior to and during the past war. Let me point out a few examples which cut across lines of departmental responsibility, wherein serious defects or uncertainties were noted in this respect:

German capabilities and intentions in the
Spring of 1940.

British-French capabilities in the Spring of 1940.

German capabilities in the Summer of 1940 after the fall of France.

Russian capabilities in the Summer of 1941.

Japanese capabilities and intentions prior to December 7, 1941.

British capabilities in the Far East in 1941.

Russian capabilities and intentions following the collapse of Germany.

The United States is a nation with vital world-wide interests and responsibilities. It should and must have the best intelligence available. Efficient and adequate intelligence is necessary to the formulation of a sound national policy and for our protection against surprise and the exploitation of opportunity.

As you know, the British have one of the finest intelligence services in the world -- dating back for several hundred years. I am firmly convinced that their remarkable

success in the field of diplomacy and at the conference table has been due in no small measure to the fact that they are well informed.

The Central Intelligence Group is still suffering from "growing pains" and the attendant difficulties in organizing a new agency but it is rapidly "coming of age." Eventually we expect it to attain the stature and prestige of the British counterpart -- MI-6.

While on the topic of the Central Intelligence Group or C.I.G. as it is known, I wish to point out that its directive specifically states that intelligence in the specialized fields must remain with the respective departments. This means that the Chief of Naval Intelligence is still responsible for intelligence peculiar to the naval establishment, both in regards to needs and to type.

B. Sources

The mission of providing strategic intelligence for naval use is primarily the function of the Foreign Branch of

ONI. THIS Branch collects the reports from our attaches, naval observers and other sources abroad who provide the bulk of specialized naval intelligence during peace time. Additional sources are the District Intelligence Officers, other government information agencies in Washington, reconnaissance, and undercover agents. Undercover agents are valuable in that they are in a position to obtain information that might not otherwise become available. However, the greater bulk, by far, of strategic intelligence is obtained by overt means; mostly by plain "pick and shovel" work. It has been properly said, I believe, that gathering intelligence is about 80% perspiration, 10% luck, and only 10% glamour.

C. How processed

Material in the strategic categories is collected, collated, and evaluated by groups of civilian and military specialists using appropriate critical techniques. It is then disseminated to those who need it and/or filed in such a manner

as to make it readily available for special study. It is from such source material that the strategic area studies in the form of JANIS publications are prepared by the Joint Intelligence Studies Board. The same material is used by the Joint Army-Navy Air Intelligence Division in the studies required by its mission.

The collection of intelligence is comparatively easy in normal times but when strained relations develop and events incline to war our sources begin to dry up and collection becomes difficult. Hostile or unfriendly nations, realizing the importance of intelligence, place every obstacle in the way of our collection agencies and force us to fall back on the body of intelligence which we have accumulated. Thus, you can see, our peace time activities from an intelligence standpoint are almost as important as those in time of war. The principal difference is, of course, in the type of intelligence needed and, to a degree, the methods by which it is obtained. During wartime our operational intelligence requirements increase a

thousand-fold while the vital need for strategic intelligence still remains. Also, I might add that the requirements for personnel increase accordingly. A misconception exists that officers performing duties in the strategic field can be catapulted into the operational field. Not only do the demands on strategic intelligence remain but officers assigned to the operational field must be specially trained for their assignments because of the varied and precise requirements of this duty.

III OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

A. Characteristics

Operational Intelligence, as its name implies, is that needed by the Operating Forces for the conduct of actual naval operations, including battle. I think a good short phrase to describe it is "Intelligence in action."

Although no sharp line of demarcation can be drawn between the two main categories of intelligence, there are certain essential characteristics that belong to this field:

First, it is directly concerned with the operating forces.

Second, it is intended for actual use by the Operating Forces in the near or immediate future, and is shaped for employment by every echelon of command.

Third, it is the practical application of intelligence from all available sources to solve a specific operational program.

A fourth characteristic is that it requires precise and detailed information about physical conditions and situations within restricted areas, primarily those areas within the assigned mission. Operational Intelligence in its most specialized forms, eliminates all intelligence that can be classed as non-essential, so that the Commander is not overburdened with extraneous details even though these may be intensely interesting. Hours of collection and research are quite often concentrated in a few short phrases, such as: "Between points X and Y, the coast of such-and-such Island is bordered by mangrove swamps backed

by abrupt limestone cliffs, which render amphibious operations impracticable."

B. Guiding Principles

In order for Operational Intelligence to be effective there are certain guiding principles that must be followed. Intelligence must anticipate the future needs of Commanders in order to provide them with adequate and timely intelligence regarding those external forces, conditions, and circumstances with which they might be confronted. Otherwise the Commander is unable to make an accurate appraisal of the factor of feasibility in his Estimate of the Situation. The failure to properly assess this factor proved costly in the operations at both Tarawa and Iwo Jima. In the one case, hydrographic information regarding the depth of water over the reefs was incorrect, and the effect of naval bombardment against well protected and fortified gun emplacements was over optimistic; in the other, the trafficability of volcanic ash was badly overestimated.

Another guiding principle is that Intelligence officers must thoroughly acquaint themselves with plans relating to assigned objectives and the forces available for achieving that objective. In other words they should be "walking encyclopedias" to their command.

As I mentioned previously, when combat operations have been decided, a Naval Theater or Task Force Commander must have exact and pin-pointed intelligence pertaining to the zone of combat in order to plan and execute operations to carry out his mission. This accurate data can only be obtained by direct reconnaissance which is the key to successful naval intelligence in the operational phase. The field includes: aerial reconnaissance, reconnaissance by submarines, underwater demolition teams, and reconnaissance by surface craft.

The report of the Joint Congressional Committee on Pearl Harbor is interesting in this respect since it indicated the necessity for establishing the principle that reconnaissance should be the primary source of operational intelligence and that

operating force units should be used for reconnaissance operations when necessary to obtain the required intelligence; also, that the appropriate Naval Intelligence unit should propose reconnaissance and collaborate with Operations in planning of and conducting same.

C. Opintel Branch - ONI

I do not wish to take up your time discussing matters of organization but since the Operational Intelligence Branch of ONI is relatively new and since the Operational Intelligence organization is centered on this Branch it might be worth while to take a few minutes to cover its activities. It is officially designated as Op-32Y but is more familiarly known as the Y-Branch. At the present time it is my particular domain. As with any new concept, Operational Intelligence had a difficult time getting started in life. As you probably know, its functions were scattered among the various sections of ONI and the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations until 1943 when a section was set

up in the Foreign Branch of ONI to coordinate these activities. After a series of wartime deaths, rebirths and reorganizations it finally attained Branch status in February of last year. That Branch, the Special Branch, and the Operational Information Section of Naval Operations were merged this year to form the Branch as it is now constituted.

The Y-Branch is responsible for ensuring the dissemination of all necessary intelligence including operational intelligence to the Operations Division of CNO and to the Commanders of the Operating Forces, and, also, for coordinating the intelligence activities of the Operating Forces with ONI. In addition, this Branch controls and coordinates such covert intelligence activities as may be directed.

In order to carry out its mission the Branch is divided into three sections:

Op-32Y-1 - Special Section

Op-32Y-2 - Operational Intelligence Section

Op-32Y-3 - Support Section

The Special Section, or Y-1, was organized for the purpose of conducting highly classified research and for liaison with certain activities furnishing information of particular interest to the Chief of Naval Operations; in other words covert and communication intelligence activities.

The Operational Intelligence Section, or Y-2, is responsible for the dissemination of intelligence to the Fleet and for maintaining current information regarding the strength, disposition, and movements of the naval and air fleets of foreign nations. It is divided into four sub-sections: Pacific Areas, Atlantic Areas, Top Secret Control, and the Operational Chart Room. The first two are presently skeletonized but their responsibilities include the collection of intelligence relative to the political activity and the naval air, surface, and ground forces of the countries in their respective areas. The Top Secret Control Section handles highly classified material used by the Office of Naval Intelligence. The Operational Chart Room maintains situation plots and folders of information of value to Operations and Planning personnel.

The Fleet Support Section has only recently been established. Its mission is to develop and implement operational intelligence techniques and procedures and to assist in the procurement, assignment and training of Operational Intelligence Officers. Just now this Section is busily engaged in writing an Operational Intelligence Manual for use by the Postgraduate School and in the Fleet. It will eventually comprise four subsections which will be concerned with liaison, planning, personnel, and training respectively.

IV PRACTICAL APPLICATION OF OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AT THE STAFF AND COMMAND LEVELS

Let us consider the practical application of Operational Intelligence in the field of naval operations. It contributes to each step in the solution of a naval problem, commencing with the Estimate of the Situation, through execution of the planned action to the post-operational phase. Sometimes, it is difficult to draw a fine line between the different phases of an operation. Of course, its execution normally begins with the issue of a Directive -- its completion sometimes cannot be so easily defined.

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I am sure you all remember Admiral Halsey's famous dispatch when operating off Japan a year ago. The war was supposed to be over but there was some uncertainty as to whether all Japs had gotten the word. Several Nips had taken to the air for a last joy ride, it seems. The Admiral directed that they be shot down "in a friendly sort of way."

Planning Operations

Operational Intelligence makes its first contribution in the Estimate of the Situation. As you know, the major factors entering into the Estimate are: (a) General characteristics of the theater; (b) Availability and ability of enemy forces to oppose; (c) Availability and ability of our own forces to achieve the objective; (d) Effect of achieving the objective on future operations; and (e) the Cost of achieving the objective in relation to the objective itself and in relation to future operational requirements.

All staff units contribute to the factors entering into the Estimate since the Commander must have complete and

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accurate information with its significance set forth; otherwise, the Estimate will be faulty and the weaknesses arising from such faults will be reflected in the subsequent Decision as well as all Plans and Operating Orders based thereon.

The necessary intelligence about the enemy - his intentions and capabilities, and other germane factors under foreign control which may affect the situation and its development - are the primary responsibility of the Intelligence Section of the Commander's staff. In fulfilling his duties the Intelligence Officer has, of course, the support of the entire Naval Intelligence Service and its facilities.

I will not go into further discussion of the Estimate of the Situation as you are, no doubt, far better acquainted with its details than I. However, I would like to point out that no less than fifteen of the major factors that must be considered by the Commander are of direct concern to Naval Intelligence because it is the responsibility of that Service to supply the basic data.

These factors are:

- (1) Means opposed to our force; which includes
resistance in addition to enemy combatant forces.
- (2) Objective.
- (3) Characteristics of the Theater of Operations.
- (4) Psychology of the Enemy.
- (5) Special potentialities of the enemy to oppose
or resist.
- (6) Endurance of the enemy; this includes a combination
of material power and the will or determination of
the enemy.
- (7) Enemy supply sources.
- (8) Political situation; this includes both that of
enemy and hostile nations or areas, and that of
neutrals.
- (9) External relations of enemy.
- (10) Economic factors of enemy nations.

- (11) Training and experience of personnel in enemy combatant forces, in service of supply, and in production of munitions.
- (12) Racial or nationalistic characteristics; this includes intelligence about dissident groups who may be persuaded to withhold active support or to oppose the enemy's war effort from within areas under enemy control.
- (13) Counter-intelligence; which covers the enemy's espionage, sabotage and subversive organizations which may adversely affect the execution of the mission.
- (14) Enemy capabilities.
- (15) Enemy intentions.

In addition, there are twenty-one major factors of indirect concern to Naval Intelligence since it must produce those parts relating to the enemy. They are: (1) Feasibility; (2) Correct objective; (3) Chain of objectives; (4) Relative positions;

- (5) Relative fighting strength; (6) Physical objectives;
- (7) Consequences as to cost; (8) Future action; (9) Technical capabilities and limitations of the Armed Forces; (10) Meteorological data; (11) Sun and moon data; (12) Adjustment of means to end;
- (13) Courses of action; (14) Freedom of action; (15) Capabilities of commanders and organization; (16) Mental and morale factors;
- (17) Dispersion and concentration; (18) Surprise; (19) Security;
- (20) Logistics; and (21) Combinations of Offensive and Defensive.

One of the major responsibilities of the Intelligence Section in the planning stage is the preparation of the Intelligence Annex to the Operation Plan. This must carry down to subordinate commanders all intelligence necessary to enable them to support the Commander's Plan and, also, to meet and solve unforeseen contingencies in a manner that will contribute the maximum effort towards the fulfillment of the mission.

Without such information it is difficult for the subordinate commander to do his job. I know of one case in which a Task Group Commander was directed to conduct a night bombardment

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of an enemy coastal airstrip about 100 miles west of Humboldt Bay, during the Hollandia operation. There were no up-to-date charts of the area and he had to rely on the sketchiest of data, collected by his own intelligence officer, for use in making up a bombardment chart. An old Dutch navigational chart showed the mouth of a river which might be used for radar navigation. It was called the WOSKEY. This chart didn't show the airfield, of course. The only definite positioning of the field was afforded by a single aerial photograph which showed a river, marked the WISKEY, (probably annotated by an Australian airman). The bombardment was accomplished however, and the results were later reported as having been satisfactory.

Sometimes, as in this case the Commander upon arriving at a decision and after resolving the required action into detailed plans finds that there is insufficient information available to afford a suitable basis for the detailed plans which must be made by his subordinates. Under such conditions an Intelligence Estimate

should be made in order to determine the essential elements of information required, and the means to obtain them. An Intelligence Plan is then prepared in which appropriate tasks are assigned for conducting preliminary operations to obtain the necessary information.

In Executing Operations

Once a planned action is set in motion by the issuance of the necessary directives, it becomes the responsibility of the Commander to supervise these operations. To properly do so the Intelligence Section must maintain that part of the Running Estimate of the Situation concerning enemy strength, disposition, movement, and capabilities. In addition, the Commander must be kept continuously informed of the enemy's reaction to our movements, his losses, and probable intentions. The standard methods for effecting this are:

- (1) Maintenance of situation plots and other graphic aids.
- (2) Conferences and oral reports as required, or as indicated by the urgency of the information received.

(3) Intelligence Summaries.

(4) Routine oral briefings.

The Commander is also responsible for the dissemination of intelligence which he collects or receives. Operational Intelligence is meant to be used and not hoarded, and to be useful it must reach all agencies concerned completely, clearly and quickly.

This authority is usually delegated to the Intelligence Officer who must determine to whom dissemination is to be made and effect the dissemination. Normally it includes:

- (1) Collateral and higher echelons, including CNO (CNI)
- (2) The Commander's subordinates.
- (3) To subordinate commanders of units attached to some other command but operating in the area of the disseminating command.

Every Intelligence Section should maintain files on the following subjects to facilitate carrying out its duties:

- (1) Directives from Commander's superior, such as Letters of Instruction, Operations Plans and Operation Orders.

- (2) Estimates of the Situation.
- (3) Operation Plans or Orders issued by own Commander.
- (4) Separate files of incoming and outgoing dispatches.

Also, for reference and to maintain continuity, intelligence received should be recorded in:

- (1) The Intelligence Journal.
- (2) Intelligence Work Sheets.
- (3) Intelligence Situation Charts.
- (4) The Intelligence Report.

POST-ACTION ACTIVITIES

This brings us to the post-operations phase. When the last shot has been fired, the last enemy has been rescued from the water, or the final enemy position is taken in any one operation, the Operational Intelligence Officer's duty is by no means completed. His responsibilities then lie in two directions. First, he must prepare, for the Commander, his particular portion of the Action Report, which in the light of future operations may be extremely vital. Ships are lost in warfare - men are killed - and plans

may be set back, but unless the full import of each tragedy of this sort is brought to light, our performance in future campaigns, or -- if you like -- in future wars, will not benefit.

Second, he must perform a searching analysis of the intelligence picture as it was at the start of the operation, its correctness or failings in the light of the experience, combined with an appreciation of the changes in the overall strategic picture wrought by the operation. This analysis will point the way to future techniques and methods which may mean the difference between failure and success.

I am sure you are all familiar with the comments made in reprints of our Action Reports in the Information Bulletins during the war (you may recollect that they were generally printed in capitals with exclamation points and question marks). Because of the press of circumstances these analyses necessarily had to be performed by "desk" experts.

One comment, I know, has long rankled in the heart of a certain Flag Officer (who, by the way, is NOT here today).

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Early in the war he commanded, with success and distinction, a heavy cruiser. His surface search radar, serial number one, or maybe two, was installed in haste at Pearl, just before he was sent out on a long and gruelling tour of duty through the early skirmishes in the Solomons to the Battle of Guadalcanal. The radar didn't work from the start. He did all that a skipper could do to get it fixed -- but all the technicians in the Hawaiian area, before he left, and all the experts in Noumea and Espiritu (there were two, I believe), failed to make it "perk" for more than a few minutes at a time.

Finally came the famous November 14th, in Iron Bottom Bay. He fought his ship beautifully. He saved her despite heavy damage from an enemy torpedo. He even did some freehand shooting the next morning, when he could only circle around at 12 knots, with his damaged stern acting as a rudder. Each time she "came around" he let fly at a damaged Jap destroyer some nine miles away - and he finally copped the brass ring, and sank the Jap.

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In his action report this officer mentioned how the dear old radar, as per usual, failed a few minutes before the action started. The experts' comments were more or less as follows:

APPARENTLY THERE WAS LITTLE
APPRECIATION IN THIS SHIP OF
THE CAPABILITIES AND VALUE OF
RADAR

So you can see that, in Intelligence as in electronics, the man on the spot is frequently the best one qualified to perform the post-mortem.

The value of the Operational Intelligence Section of a staff is to be judged primarily by the aid it renders to the Commander in planning, executing, and analyzing his missions. The specific methods used by the Intelligence Section in accomplishing this purpose will vary depending on the type and echelon of command, the size and composition of the staff, and the wishes and attitude of the Commander. But the functions are fundamentally the same, and can be described in general as applicable to all commands.

The Section, or on lower echelons of Command, the individual Intelligence Officer must examine all incoming information for its interest to the Command, and screen out those matters which are extraneous. Then all information of possible interest must be analyzed thoroughly, evaluated in the light of the general situation, and associated with other known factors before it can be fitted into its proper place in the intelligence picture and properly interpreted. After this has been done, there remains the important job of determining the significance of the information to the particular Commander in the carrying out of his mission.

Three important points must be understood by the Intelligence Officer if the processed intelligence is to properly serve its purpose. First, it must be presented in an easily assimilated form; second, it must arrive in time to be of use, and third, its particular significance must be pointed out.

GENERAL

Recent changes in Navy Regulations require the

Commander-in-Chief, or the Commander of any force or unit of the operating forces not operating under the Commander-in-Chief, to maintain an efficient intelligence organization within his command. I will not go into details regarding this directive, except to point out that it does indicate a greater appreciation of Intelligence and its accomplishments in the past war.

Intelligence is a product that Command can not do without.

The Joint Intelligence Center, Pacific Ocean Areas, which was in reality a glorified Intelligence Section for CincPac, had five hundred and fifty-four officers of the Army, Navy and Marine Corps and over twelve hundred enlisted personnel attached upon the cessation of hostilities. You can appreciate the expansion required in the operational intelligence field in wartime when you compare this with CincPac's post-war allowance of five officers. These include a Captain as Staff Intelligence Officer and four sub-section heads for ground, air and surface estimates and translation.

During the war JICPOA was composed of twenty-eight sections as follows:

1. Cartography
2. Enemy Air
3. Enemy Land
4. Interrogation
5. Hydrographic
6. Administrative
7. Geographic
8. Drafting
9. Bulletin
10. Psychological Warfare
11. Translation
12. Estimate
13. Publications
14. Reference
15. Target Analysis
16. Flak Intelligence
17. Enemy Shipping
18. Production
19. Photo Service
20. Editorial
21. Naval Technical Teams
22. Photo Interpreter Pool
23. Photo Lithographic
24. Terrain Model Unit
25. Escape and Evasion
26. Medical Intelligence
27. Photo Procurement Detachment
28. Operational Intelligence.

PRACTICAL WAYS IN WHICH BOTH STAFF AND COMMAND CAN IMPROVE THE QUALITY OF INTELLIGENCE AND INCREASE ITS EFFECTIVENESS

At the risk of being repetitious, I should like to bring out some of the practical ways in which both Staff and Command can help to improve the quality of intelligence, and increase its effective value to the Operating Forces.

First and foremost, Naval Commanders must maintain a clear conception of the vital part played by good intelligence in the successful planning and execution of Naval Operations. They should demand the best of performance on the part of their Staff Intelligence Sections; the Staff Intelligence Officer, on the other hand, must anticipate these demands, and carry them out in a thoroughly expert manner if Intelligence is to realize its full capabilities.

Next, these capabilities must be understood and recognized by Naval Commanders, if they are to obtain the maximum benefit from their Intelligence Organization. The limitations, also, of intelligence must be understood - it cannot function properly without the closest cooperation with Operations, Communications, CIC, and Flag Plot. Insofar as the Staff Intelligence Officer is concerned, a complete understanding of these relationships is essential.

An appreciation of the results obtained by intelligence in the past war has reduced the Intelligence Officer's problems

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somewhat. However, the tendency to make him "George" must be guarded against. He cannot function properly if he is made assistant to everyone else on the ship or assigned innumerable collateral duties. One of his greatest problems in the early days of the war was insufficient space in which to work, keep charts, and maintain his files.

To sum up the foregoing, the Commander can go far toward promoting good intelligence by support of the Operational Intelligence Officer assigned him, by understanding his problems and needs, and by letting him prepare in peace for war -- which, after all, is the basic reason why we are all here.

CONCLUSION

In closing this rather lengthy discussion there are a few points I wish to emphasize: First, in accordance with the now approved definition of Operational Intelligence, the logical conclusion drawn is that Operational Intelligence is a wartime function; in a sense this is correct -- but let us not overlook the fact that each Fleet exercise or War Game is

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a training operation that must utilize intelligence to keep it alert. The intelligence needed in a properly conducted amphibious exercise should be virtually as comprehensive as that required in a real war operation. Because of the emphasis placed upon Operational Intelligence as a wartime function, it is our duty to keep intelligence personnel alert and interested during peace time. This latter task should not be too difficult when we consider what is happening in the world today.

Lastly, unlike the ships we have built and the base facilities we have organized, there are certain human functions we cannot preserve with plastic covers and consol. We cannot stick intelligence back on the shelf, and dust it off occasionally, with a cheerful confidence that when the drums of war beat, we can drag it out, oil it, and start operating again at full power.