



6566-6066
24/Sept/47mgm

Serial No. 214

DECLASSIFIED BY *M.P. Ryke* ON *10-30-74* LAW DOD MEMO OF
4/12/74, SUBJ: DOWNGRADING/DECLASS OF HISTORICAL RECORDS

RUSSIA

Lecture delivered

by

William B. Ballis

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport, R. I.
23 September, 1947

CONFIDENTIAL

Not to pass out of the custody of commissioned officers of the War College Staff, civilian personnel designated to handle classified information, or personnel ordered to duty under instruction at the Naval War College.

This document should be returned to the Academic Section, Room 206, after it has served its purpose.

6566-6066
24/Sept/47mgm

Serial No. _____

RUSSIA

Lecture delivered

by

William B. Ballis

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport, R. I.
23 September, 1947

CONFIDENTIAL

Not to pass out of the custody of commissioned officers of the War College Staff, civilian personnel designated to handle classified information, or personnel ordered to duty under instruction at the Naval War College.

This document should be returned to the Academic Section, Room 206, after it has served its purpose.

Lecture on Russia to be delivered 23 September 1947 by
William B. Ballis, Department of State.

I. Introduction

A. Problem of understanding the USSR

1. Difficulty of applying our own standards of comparison.
2. Neither an oriental nor an occidental country but a combination of each.

B. The land - geographical factors to be considered for an understanding of the USSR.

1. Vastness of the country

- a. One-sixth of the land surface of the earth.
- b. 6000 miles from the Danube to the Bering Straits.
- c. 2,500 miles from the Arctic to the southern frontier.

2. Social implications from geographical factors.

- a. Heartland theory - Mackinder - Haushofer.
- b. Flat country - open to land attack.
- c. Absence of sea routes unlike Western Europe which is a peninsula.
- d. Possibility of maximum dispersion of industry.

3. Topography.

- a. Low land plain - 3,000 miles - western frontier to Yenisei.
- b. River country.

4. Climate

- a. Continental in most of country.
 - (1) Extremes of temperature
 - (2) Moderate precipitation - short growing season.
- b. Sub-tropical in southern parts.

C. The People

1. Population

- a. Present population - 193,000,000.
Prewar population - 202,000,000.
1950 estimate - 208,000,000
1970 estimate - 250,000,000

CONFIDENTIAL

b. Distribution

- (1) Present ages 18-38 - 29,000,000
- (2) Present ages 17-49 - 42,000,000
- (3) 1950 ages 18-38 - 31,000,000
- (4) 1950 ages 17-49 - 47,000,000

c. Significance of a young country.

- (1) Military standpoint
- (2) Economic standpoint
- (3) Propaganda standpoint

2. Ethnic groups - about 170 (of which only 50 number more than 20,000 people)

a. Slavs - composing three-fourths of the people.

- (1) Great Russians - one-half of the people.
- (2) Ukrainians - 30,000,000
- (3) Byelorussians - 10,000,000

b. Georgians, Armenians, Kazakhs, etc.

c. Soviet political technique of handling nationality problem.

II. The Soviet System

A. Historical sketch -

"State of confusion comparable to a spring thaw on a great Siberian river, when its smooth surface becomes overnight a crashing medley of ice floes. Comparison is apt because the floes continue to churn and clash thunderously for day or even weeks, but are moved irresistibly in a common direction."
- Walter Duranty

1. Marx - The Communist Manifesto, 1848.

- A. Materialistic interpretation of history.
- b. Labor theory of value.
- c. Class struggle.

2. The Paris Commune, 1871.

On basis of his analysis of reasons for the failure of Paris Commune, because of improper leadership, Lenin insisted on the setting up of the type of organization which the Bolshevik faction of the Russian Social Democrats became from 1903 on.

3. Revolution of 1905.

a. Produced conditions which seemed to offer opportunity for action.

- (1) General strike in October.
- (2) Moscow Armed uprising in December.

CONFIDENTIAL

6566/6066
9/23/47:RBK

CONFIDENTIAL

(b) Despite failure of uprising, Lenin would not admit that it had been a mistake.

(1) Inadequacy of preparation of the revolutionary group for leadership and support from masses.

(2) Considered by Bolsheviks a useful rehearsal.

4. World War I

Bolshevik leaders headed by Lenin went into voluntary exile in Switzerland and issued an appeal "to convert the imperialist war into civil war in all countries."

5. February Revolution of 1917.

a. Eight months from February to October became period of the widest propaganda and agitation of the Bolsheviks for their program and tactics.

b. Bolsheviks numbered only 200,000.

c. "All Power to the Soviets"; "Peace, Land and Bread".

6. October (November) Revolution of 1917.

a. Three years of participation in the World War precipitated the collapse of the Russian Empire and saw the rise of Bolshevism.

b. Lenin's conditions for social revolution:

(1) That the great majority of the people is thoroughly dissatisfied and finds its life intolerable.

(2) That it has lost confidence in its rulers.

(3) That the rulers have lost confidence in themselves.

(4) That the rulers' strongest weapon, the army and the police force, has been broken.

c. Institutions through which the Revolution was actuated were Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies produced by the February Revolution on the model of the 1905 revolution.

7. Seizure of Power

a. Took place first in Petrograd, by Congress of Soviets issuing orders to the soldiers of the capital to seize the government buildings and arrest the members of the Provisional Government.

6566/6066
9/23/47:RBK

CONFIDENTIAL

- b. Civil War
 - (1) Opposition ruthlessly suppressed.
 - (2) White Armies driven out.
- 8. War Communism - Final Phase
 - a. All means of production nationalized.
 - b. Private trade forbidden.
 - c. Rationing introduced.
 - d. Cheka - Liquidation of the bourgeoisie.
- 9. First Soviet Constitution - June 1918
 - a. Class rule.
 - b. Occupational representation.
 - c. Federalism.
- 10. NEP - Second Phase.
 - a. Concessions to private business.
 - b. Concessions to peasants.
- 11. Resumption of the Socialist Offensive, 1928 - Third Phase
 - a. First five-year plan, 1928-32 (completed in four years).
 - (1) Rapid industrialization of the country.
 - (2) Collectivization of the country and liquidation of the "kulaks".
 - (3) "Dizziness from success" - Stalin.
 - b. Sharpening of class struggle.
 - (1) Suspicion of old intelligentsia.
 - (2) "Healthy suspicion" to "baiting"
- 12. Second Five-Year Plan, 1933-37 - Fourth Phase
 - a. Easing of the strain.
 - b. Increase in living standards.
 - c. Purgas
- 13. Stalin Constitution, 1936.
- 14. Third Five-Year Plan, 1938 - not completed.
- 15. Fourth Five-Year Plan, 1946-50

B. Backwardness of Russia

1. Stalin's statement of 1931:

"Old Russia was beaten by the Mongol khans. She was beaten by the Turkish boys. She was beaten by the Swedish feudal lords. She was beaten by the Polish and Lithuanian gentry. She was beaten by the British and French capitalists. She was beaten by the Japanese barons. All beat her - for her backwardness, for military backwardness for cultural backwardness, for political backwardness, for industrial backwardness, for agricultural backwardness."

CONFIDENTIAL

2. Importance of this thesis in the conduct and thought of Soviet leaders.
3. Insecurity feeling of Kromlin.
 - a. Originally insecurity of a peaceful agricultural people trying to live on a vast exposed plain inhabited also by fierce nomadic peoples.
 - b. As Russia came more into contact with economically advanced west, her rulers feared the more competent, more powerful, more highly organized states.
 - c. Fear by Russian rulers of foreign penetration.
 - (1) Fear of what would happen if Russians learned truth about outside world.
 - (2) Fear of what would happen if foreigners learned truth about Russia.
4. Marxist dogma - a perfect vehicle for this sense of insecurity with which Bolsheviks, even more than previous Russian rulers had been afflicted.

C. Ideological Characteristics of the Soviet State System

1. Marxism

- a. Economic Materialism - exchange of goods.
- b. Capitalism - the exploitation of the working class.
- c. Capitalism carries with it seeds of its own destruction.
- d. Imperialism, final phase of capitalism; leads directly to war and revolution.

2. Adaptation of Marxism by Russian Revolutionaries

- a. Communists more interested in methods of revolution than in the overall end except
 - (1) Nationalization of industry.
 - (2) Expropriation of large capital holdings.
- b. Communist Doctrines

(1) Capitalist encirclement

(a) Stalin's statement to a delegation of American workers in 1927: "In the course of further development of international revolution, there emerge two centers of world significance: a socialist center, drawing to itself the countries which tend toward socialism, and a capitalist center drawing to itself the countries that incline to capitalism. Battle between these two centers for command of world economy will decide the fate of capitalism and communism in entire world."

CONFIDENTIAL

- (b) "Survivals of capitalism" - domestic counterpart of capitalist encirclement: examples given by Soviet writers.
 - (x) Immorality of Soviet citizens due to survival of capitalism.
 - (y) Anti-Semitism.
- (c) Justified need for secret police.
- (d) Justified dictatorial authority.

Pursuit of unlimited authority domestically accompanied by cultivation of belief of unreconcilable foreign hostility has helped to shape machinery of Soviet power.

- (x) Iron disciplined party.
- (y) Secret police.
- (z) Economic monopolism of the State.
- (e) Russian in a constant state of siege.
- (2) Infallibility of the Kremlin and the Party.

In 1929 Stalin announced that decisions of the Politburo were being taken unanimously.
- (3) Fluidity in tactics.
 - (a) Leadership can advance for tactical purposes any thesis.
 - (b) Under no compulsion to move in a hurry.
 - (c) Under no compulsion to retreat.

D. The Structure of Soviet Politics.

1. Party Organization.

- a. Pyramidal structure.
- b. Politburo.

2. Governmental Organization.

- a. Pyramidal structure.
- b. Soviet of the Union : Supreme Soviet
- c. Soviet of Nationalities :
- d. Presidium of Supreme Soviet and Chairman.
- e. Council of Ministers and Chairman.

3. Government by decree.

4. Administration by Ministries.

E. Weaknesses of Soviet State System.

- 1. Problem of succession to Stalin: "Directory" or one man.

6566/6066
9/23/47:RBK

CONFIDENTIAL

a. Party situation.

- (1) No party Congress since 1939.
- (2) While party membership more than doubled since then, over 2/3 came in since then.

b. Politburo situation.

c. Present character of people - physically and mentally tired.

- (1) Ill-will among various Soviet social and national groups.
- (2) Soviet inferiority feelings toward the West.

2. Fear as the controlling factor.

- a. Fear of the police.
- b. Fear of party.
- c. Fear of everyone.

III. Current Aspects of the Soviet System.

A. Internal -

1. Political: recent intellectual "purge."

- a. Impact of the West.
- b. Necessity for constant unsettlement of people.
- c. Apparent that Soviet conditions do not of themselves generate positive attitude towards Soviet system.
- d. Party forced to mobilize its resources, to compel intellectuals and entire people to think and feel as Party wants them to do.

2. Economic -

- a. Rehabilitation of industry, housing, agriculture, transportation, etc.
- b. Aim of reaching pre-war level of output by 1948.
- c. Stalin's statement of necessity of three more five-year plans to handle any eventuality.

Stalin's address on Fourth Five-Year Plan, February 1946: "I have no doubt that if we render the necessary assistance to our scientists they will be able not only to overtake, but also in the very near future to surpass the achievements of science outside the boundaries of our country. As far as plans for a longer period are concerned, the party intends to organize a new mighty upsurge of national economy which will enable us to increase the level of our production, for instance,

CONFIDENTIAL

three-fold as compared with the prewar level.

"To achieve this we must endeavor to see that our industry produces 50,000,000 tons of pig iron per year, 60,000,000 tons of steel, 500,000,000 tons of coal, and 60,000,000 tons of oil.

"Only under such conditions will our country be insured against any eventuality. Perhaps three or four five-year plans will be required to achieve this, if not more. But it can be done and we must do it."

d. Examples of production of basic commodities:

Ingot Steel (mil.net.tons)			Crude Oil (mil.net.tons)				
	USSR	US		USSR	US		
1928	4.3	1929	56.4	1928/29	13.7	1944	226.7
1940	18.3			1940	31.1	1945	231.2
1947	14.8	1944	81.5	1947	28.8		
1950	25.4	1946	60	1950	35.4		
1962?	60			1962?	60		

e. Consumer goods.

B. Foreign

1. Strategy -

- a. Determined in part by Marxist ideology.
- b. Determined also in part by geographical factors.

2. Tactics -

- a. Obstruct all efforts not in accord with Soviet interests.
- b. Promote chaos abroad.
- c. Evade a real showdown with the West.

3. Apparent intentions:

- a. Consolidation of Soviet-dominated Eastern European bloc.
- b. Prevention or retarding formation of any Western European, Scandinavian, or Near Eastern bloc of States.
- c. Draw Great Britain away from its close partnership with the US, prevent France from making common cause with US and UK and create confusion in Italy.
- d. Keep Japan weak, China divided and Germany partitioned as long as pro-Soviet forces are unable to gain a predominant or at least equal position in these countries.

CONFIDENTIAL

6566/6066
9/23/47:RBK

CONFIDENTIAL

- e. Seek to integrate Austria into the Eastern-European bloc, to gain a decisive voice for the USSR in the control of the Turkish Straits, to regain a dominant influence in Northern Iran and to neutralize Greece as a currently Western oriented country.
- f. To augment the prestige of the USSR among colonial and backward peoples through strong Soviet support for speedy emancipation of colonial areas.
- g. To use the United Nations as a forum for advancing Soviet views and policies but not as an instrument for the permanent adjustment and solution of world problems.

CONFIDENTIAL