

Monroe Doctrine.

129

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Year 1902.

No.

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Contents: Applications of the MONROE DOCTRINE.

~~3 lectures delivered session of 1902.~~

1. As a type of American diplomacy.
2. The M. D. and territorial expansion. p. 10.
3. " " " Isthmian Canal. p. 17.

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MONROE DOCTRINE.

outline of lectures delivered before the NAVAL WAR COLLEGE, June 30 - July 2, 1902.

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II.

LIST OF OFFICIAL STATEMENTS OF THE POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES TOWARD THE OTHER AMERICAN STATES SINCE 1823.

In citations marked by an asterisk (*) there is an unmistakable allusion to Monroe's Message.

I Contemporaries.

(Dec 2 1823) Monroe's Message; colonization; political system; interposition.
(Dec 7 1824) *Monroe's Message; separation from Europe.
(Mar 25 1825) *Clay to Poinsett: colonization and political system.
Oct 25 1825) Clay to Brown: no foreign annexation of Cuba.
(Dec 26 1825) *Adam's message: colonization.
Mar 15 1826 *Adam's message; colonization.
(April 20 1826) House resolutions; no alliance or joint declaration
(May 8 1826) *Clay's instructions to Panama envoys; colonization.

II Polk- Cass- Buchanan.

Mar 4 1845 Polk's inaugural Texas an American question.
Dec 2 1845, * Polk's Message; balance of power.
April 29, 1848, *Polk's Yucatan message; political system
Dec 4 1849 Taylor's message; mediation and assistance.
Dec 1 1852 Everett to Sartiges; political system.
Oct 12, 1853 * Cass to Dodge; no foreign political influence.
Sept 20 1860 *Cass to McLane; no European possession.
Dec 4 1860 *Buchanan's message; traditional policy.

III Seward - Fish- Evarts.

Dec 4 1861 Seward, traditional policy against alliance.
Sept 26 1863 Seward to Dayton; foreign attempts to control American civilization.
June 27 1864 Lincoln's letter; republican government of the western continent.
April 4 1865 House of Representatives: monarchical government.
Dec 4 1865 Johnson's message; defense of republicanism.
Dec 6 1865 Seward to Montholon; objections to French in Mexico.
April 25 1866 Seward to Adams; no foreign colonization by the United States.
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Mar 7 1867 House of Representatives; monarchical ~~xx~~ principles in ~~xxxxxx~~ Canada..
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Nov 5 1875 Fish to Gushing; Cuban intervention by United States and European powers.

Mar 8 1880 Evart's report; paramount interest in a canal
Mar 8 1880 Haye's message; a canal part of our coast line.

IV. Blaine - Frelinghuysen - Olney.

Mar 4 1881 * House report; European canal contrary to Monroe Doctrine
Mar 7 1881 *Blaine to Logan; no interposition for the purpose of
oppressing.
June 24 1881 *Blaine to Lowell; joint guaranty of a canal a political
system.
Nov 19 1881 Blaine to Lowell; priority in the American colonies;
canal strictly an American question.
Sept 5 1881, Blaine to Morton; no European intervention in Peru
Nov 29 1881 Blaine to Pan American powers : Authoritative alliance
May 8 1882 *Frelinghuysen to Lowell: Monroe Doctrine applies to canal
Jan 4 1883 Frelinghuysen to Reed: no arbitration by European
powers in American Matters.
Mar 4 1885 *Cleveland's inaugural; policy of neutrality.
Dec 8 1885 Cleveland's message: no paramount privileges.
Mar 4 1889 Harrison's inaugural; canal
July 20 1895 *Olney to Bayard: our fiat is law.
Dec 17 1895 *Cleveland's message: responsibility.

V Roosevelt - Hay.

Dec 3 1901 * Roosevelt's Message.

THE MONROE DOCTRINE as a TYPE of AMERICAN DIPLOMACY (1783-1826)

Lecture I.

By the Monroe Doctrine is commonly meant the policy of the United States with regard to the foreign relations of our American neighbors. The phrase has gone far beyond the original intention or statement of President Monroe, which was intended to suggest a doctrine to cover difficulties then immediately pressing, and had not distinct reference to future and unforeseen conditions. Throughout the discussion, therefore, we must distinguish between Monroe's Doctrine with the later appeals to his form of ~~will statement~~ statement, and the broader and more comprehensive idea of a permanent policy, applicable under modern conditions. To mark that distinction I shall speak sometimes of Monroe's Doctrine and sometimes of the doctrine of Paramount Interest.

Like every assertion of public policy, Monroe's Doctrine is to be understood only by a study of the political and international forces of the time; and first of those forces (which has been much neglected in discussions of the subject) is the personal equation of the men who furnished public despatches and formulated public principles in the first quarter of the nineteenth century. An important causative influence was that of Prince Metternich, practically the prime minister of the European coalition intended to prevent political revolution. Much more closely connected with the movement is George Canning, English Minister of Foreign Affairs, and the first statesman of his race to understand the importance of coming to an understanding with the United States. James Monroe, President of the United States and official author of the message of 1823, by a singular chance has forever associated his name with the though inspired by his great secretary of state, John Quincy Adams.

In the development of the broader doctrine of paramount interest, we have to deal with Clay's eagerness, Polk's aggressiveness, Clayton's peacefulness, Buchanan's duplicity, Seward's shrewdness, Blaine's impatience, Olney's feiriness, and Hay's unconquerable good temper. Behind all these men have rested forces of public opinion which in the long run they expressed.

A second element in the Monroe Doctrine was the national feeling about 1823 toward our American neighbors. A natural sympathy with republics, or supposed republics, a feeling both of jealousy and apprehension toward Great Britain, France, and Spain, the three foreign powers which had considerable American possessions, a feeling that ~~eventually~~ the United States might eventually assume the hegemony in a great American combination of states, and a desire to extend the national boundaries- these are the main currents of thought which brought the country up to the point of sustaining a vigorous declaration in 1823; and most of these forces still are strong.

We must also notice the geographical field of the states: the ~~United States of America; the~~ Monroe Doctrine. In 1823 there were five groups of American states; The United States of America; the English possessions in Canada and the West Indies, with ~~claims~~ of the Pacific Coast, the French Possessions in the West Indies, which have long since lost importance; the Spanish Possessions of Cuba and Porto Rico; and the New American States. The Monroe Doctrine practically grew out of the attempt to bring in a sixth territorial influence, namely, the combination of European states commonly called the Holy Alliance, which had entered upon a policy of control of the small European States, and showed a disposition to

extend the system to America. These geographic conditions have been essentially altered by the extension of the United States to and into the Pacific, by the exclusion of Spain and practical exclusion of France from America, by the rise of British Columbia; and by the extension of our territory into the West Indies; and by the impending construction of the Isthmus canal.

For an understanding of the Monroe Doctrine we must also notice the commercial forces at work, three quarters of a century ago. The colonial systems of those European powers, which still had American colonies, were maintained up to about 1830, giving preferences to the shipping and the merchants of the home country, and discriminating against the trade of the United States. These restrictions were especially felt with regard to the Cuban trade, and in many ways Cuba is the key to the whole Monroe Doctrine. The commercial question has since been much altered by the abandonment of the exclusive colonial system, by the development of the trade of Central America and Mexico, and by the projects for an Isthmus canal.

The Monroe Doctrine was further affected by a traditional policy toward Europe, commonly called the policy of isolation. The colonies had never been isolated from European politics, and had taken part in every naval war from 1620 to 1763. "Isolation" really begins with the wars of the French Revolution and Napoleonic period, from 1793 to 1815: during this period the United States had more active commercial, social and intellectual relations with Europe than in the quarter century following; but for the protection of our commerce and the perpetuity of our government, it was necessary to remain neutral. Isolation meant primarily that we would

not be drawn into European difficulties, and that sentiment was expressed by Hamilton in 1787, Washington in 1788 and 1796, Jefferson in 1791 and 1805, John Adams in 1797 and John Quincy Adams in 1820. Until about the time of the Monroe Doctrine, the United States had to accept the right of foreign powers to take part in American questions.

The two preliminaries to the Monroe Doctrine were long-accumulating difficulties with Spain, and the rise of Latin-American powers. From the end of the Revolution on, we were in hot water with Spain, partly over reciprocal trade and neutral rights, principally over territory. Most of the difficulties, transpired on the Mississippi, the West Florida question, the East Florida question, were adjusted by the treaty of 1819; but from the year 1809, when Jefferson seriously faced the question of annexation of Cuba, that island was a storm centre in American diplomacy.

The creation of Latin-America is ^a long and tangled story, Our own Revolution gave the example. The first revolt was the rising of the negroes in the French end of San Domingo, resulting in the creation of a negro state, which is still in existence. This was immediately followed by attempts to cause risings in Spanish colonies. Louisiana in 1793, Venezuela in 1806, a nearly successful attempt by the English to take the La Plata colonies in 1806; but after the subversion of the Spanish government by Napoleon the white Spaniards in America themselves arose, took possession of the local governments, and sympathized with the patriots in Spain. After the Restoration of 1814 all the Spanish colonies returned to their allegiance, except Buenos Ayres. From this centre spread a second series of revolts, and by 1822 every

continental Spanish province had become independent. In 1832 Brazil was separated from Portugal, and nine Latin American powers appeared on the map.

For five years, from 1816 to 1821, the condition and future of these powers was the subject of anxious thought among American statesmen. The new states were very feeble, very disorderly, and commissioned piratical craft, but they opened their ports to American trade, and appealed to the republican spirit in the United States. Commissioners were sent in 1818 to look into their conditions, and the question of receiving and sending ministers grew more acute, and threatened to prevent the ratification of the

Spanish treaty of 1819. In 1821, under strong pressure of Henry Clay, President Monroe was authorized to send ministers and by this recognition the United States committed itself both to the righteousness of the Latin-American cause and to the likelihood that the Latin-American powers would be permanent.

From 1821 to 1823 five different series of negotiations were going on: first, with the Latin-American powers; second, with Spain, on the transfer of Florida; third, with Russia on the northwestern seas and coasts; A claim of exclusive possession was made by Russia and manfully contested by John Quincy Adams. The Russians gave way at every contested point in the treaty of 1824. The fourth negotiation arose from a proposition fourtimes put forth by Canning in various forms that the United States and Great Britain unite in a protest against the threatening attitude of the European Alliance, which seemed disposed to send French expedition to recover the colonies for Spain; and it was strongly suspected that Cuba was to be the price for this assistance. In November, 1823, the

alternatives were to do nothing against what was a real danger; or to enter on a joint enterprise with England, contrary to the precedents and later practice of our government; or to make a single handed protest. Such a protest was made in the president's message of December, 1823, and it is ^{the} oft-quoted original Monroe Doctrine

Here it is necessary to point out a fact long suspected and by recent researches in the Adams Papers proved beyond a doubt, namely, that the author of the Monroe Doctrine in its principles and even the phrases of the presidential message was John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State. The ideas in the message were such as Adams had long held and repeatedly expressed, and recently published documents show that Monroe himself proposed a different and more aggressive message and at the same time leaned toward a joint declaration with England. The vigor, persistence, and irresistible logic of Adams so far prevailed that he actually wrote most of the phrases which the President used. The credit for sagacity, for a far sighted ~~understanding~~ understanding of the circumstances, and for a civil but unmistakable firmness in the message is due to John Quincy Adams. Without going into the details of the message the main doctrines to be found in it, or which have later been sought in it, are the following:

(1) The Doctrine of American isolation, which Adams carried beyond the previous idea that Americans had no part in European complications, to the obverse proposition that Europe had no inherent interest or right in American affairs. Improvements in transportation, the progress of commerce and intellectual world-citizenship have broken down the geographical isolation of America and go far to make political isolation impossible.

(2) The doctrine of the permanent independence of the American states was at the time founded on hope rather than on fact. Yet with the exception of the French conquest of Mexico in the sixties, and some Isthmus complications, no European power has ever attempted to subvert an American Government. The United States, however, has fought and conquered Mexico, and has sent or threatened military expeditions to Brazil, Paraguay, Chili, Venezuela, Colombia, and Hayti. On this point Monroe's Doctrine has never been religiously observed.

(3) The doctrine of colonization. A paragraph in the message of 1823 protests against "future colonization by any European power". This clause has frequently been taken to apply to the then existing English, French and Spanish colonies, most of which still exist, but John Quincy Adams, and many other statesmen, at the time declared positively that the doctrine had no reference to existing colonies. Since 1823 the Dominion of Canada has been formed, extending from ocean to ocean and no attempt has been made, or could be made without war, to destroy the British power in the West Indies. The colonization clause has, however, been applied effectively in Central America in the dispute over the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty in the fifties.

(4) The Doctrine of Intervention clearly protests against any attempt by third powers in Europe to interfere in America, for the restoration of Spanish rule, and that has been treated as a permanent principle, the only deviation being Mr. Fish's project of international intervention in Cuba in 1875.

(5) The Doctrine of the Two Spheres is at the bottom of the Monroe Declaration. It is a conception that meridians through the Atlantic and Pacific Ocean divide the world into two parts each of

which is to have a political and international life of its own. This doctrine was unwelcome to Monroe and even to John Quincy Adams, both of whom hoped that western democratic government would spread through Europe, as indeed has been the case. On the international side that doctrine ceased to have force from the conquest of the Philippines in 1898. The United States thus definitely took its place as an Asiatic power, and confirmed its position by its attitude in China. Asiatic questions, however, are world questions: the United States has made itself a member of the family of European nations and so far forth can no longer affirm that it lives in a separate world which is not entered by other powers.

(6) The Doctrine of an Hegemony of the United States in America is not distinctly set forth in Monroe's message, although Adams took the ground that inasmuch as we had recognized the independence of the Latin-American states, for others to deny it would be an assault upon us. The Mexican War and the steady unwillingness of the United States to make reciprocity treaties has so alarmed our American Neighbors that there is nothing they less desire than American protection. Mr. Blaine is the only recent Secretary of State who has set himself to conciliate the Latin-American powers, and he had no success.

(7) The doctrine of an Isthmus canal to be constructed by the United States is no part of Monroe's message, although a very important element in the doctrine of paramount interest. In 1823 when we had not an undisputed mile of water front on the Pacific, the Question was inchoate.

As President of the United States from 1825 to 1829, with an aggressive Secretary of State, who desired to inaugurate a brilliant

American policy, Adams seemed to have the opportunity to apply his own doctrines, and in the Panama Congress, both Adams and Clay endeavoured to go beyond the immediate questions which had brought about the Monroe Declaration, and to claim for the United States a stand as the leading American state. They were obliged to admit that ^{the} Monroe Doctrine did not apply to the then existing European colonies, but they had to face the question put to them by the Latin-American powers, whether the United States would fight if our neighbors were attacked contrary to the Monroe ~~xxxxxx~~ Declaration. A political opposition, personal and violent in its origin, but corresponding to a genuine public sentiment, forced them to reply that the United States would not promise any help or organized resistance. The Panama Congress, therefore, was a failure, and no policy of American coalition was realized. If our American relations since that time had for their foundation only the Monroe Doctrine, they would have a weak, temporary and outgrown basis.

THE MONROE DOCTRINE AND TERRITORIAL EXPANSION. - - - -(1826-1867)

Lecture II.

One reason why the Monroe Doctrine is insufficient, is that in the forty years following its enunciation, American conditions underwent such prodigious changes. The United States increased in population, in military and moral strength; our territory expanded to the Pacific; the Latin-American powers underwent many changes and the Isthmus question arose to present a new series of contested questions. As problems came up each president and Secretary of State settled them, not according to the Monroe Doctrine, but according to what they thought was reasonable for the time being; hence ~~it is~~ it is difficult to trace a consistent policy; still one principle appears throughout this period, namely, that in all American questions the United States has a greater prima facie influence than any other power: and that in many questions it has an exclusive interest.

Within ten years after Monroe's Declaration, five new American questions arose, for all of which the Monroe Doctrine had made no provision. These questions are Cuba; Texas; Latin-American claims; California; the Isthmus canal; and the Mexican War.

The Cuban question was primarily whether the island should pass to some European power, and secondarily, whether it should pass to the Cubans themselves. The United States took up and for thirty years consistently maintained the doctrine that Cuba must stay where it was, a Spanish colony, because Spain was plainly unable to make it a point of danger to us, while independence would mean the abolition of slavery, and might mean later annexation by some European Nation. Hence Clay, in 1825, notified European powers that

the United States would not consent to any transfer of Cuba, and at the same time put a pressure on Mexico and Colombia to prevent their aiding the Cubans to independence. This policy was consistently followed, when the Cuban question re-arose, by Van Buren and Tyler. It was in essence the doctrine that America had crystallized into an unalterable status.

(2) Our attitude toward, Texas, was, however, at the same moment a denial of that principle. From 1819 people began to go into Texas from the Southern states. Various attempts were made to buy it from Mexico and in 1836 Texas declared its independence, and thenceforward, to the great displeasure of our neighbor, Mexico, Texas was a part of the sphere of American influence.

(3) The claims of Americans for damage to persons and property in the Latin American countries began as soon as Latin-American governments were organized, and from that time to this have been a cause of friction and of an object lesson on the real character of the so called Latin-American republics. There is not a Latin-American power with which we have not had repeated diplomatic difficulties on this ground. With Mexico Jackson would have gone to war in 1831 on the issue of unadjusted claims. Diplomats on the ground, and naval officers, as well as statesmen at home have since ceased to have any real faith in any policy which assumes that the Latin-American powers can be depended on to fulfill the responsibilities either of republican states or of diplomatic units.

(4) The California question has been obscured by the annexation of Texas; that annexation^{accomplished} in 1845/ was simply the fruition of forces which had been at work for twenty years, and was in itself no cause for war with Mexico: but with President Polk we reach a statesman of great sagacity, great power, and great skill in con-

cealing his real motives and intentions. He came into the presidency with the firm purpose of annexing California, and thus giving to the United States a convenient Pacific sea-front. The purpose of the Mexican War was the conquest of California, and within three years the discovery of gold in California brought about a condition which must inevitably have led to annexation by the United States, through the same method as Texas, namely, by international revolution and independence, with a later incorporation into the Union. Polk's policy was, therefore, not only tortuous but unnecessary. It was proof positive to the Latin-American states that the doctrine of two spheres might mean only that nobody but the United States should be allowed to dispossess them.

In his astute combinations for interfering with the destinies of our neighbors, Polk had the courage to claim the support of the Monroe Doctrine. In his message of December, 1845, just preceding the Mexican War, he attempted to restate and amplify Monroe; he reiterated the doctrine of two Spheres, and apropos of the English claims to Oregon, proclaimed against the creation of new colonies, but he applied his Polk-Monroe Doctrine to North America only. John Quincy Adams, then alive, approved the doctrine, but Polk speedily took the pith out of the message which was intended for England, by compromising the Oregon territorial dispute. Polk nearly brought upon himself an undesired responsibility when in 1847 the Mexicans delayed making peace and a sentiment for the annexation of the whole of Mexico arose, fortunately the President had a subconscious conscience, which brought him out of that snare. In 1848 Polk in another message on the question of the annexation of Yucatan referred specifically to the Monroe Doctrine, and declared that it stood against the voluntary incorporation of any American people in

a foreign country.

(5) The real reason for Polk's anxiety about Yucatan was undoubtedly that he had become aware of the importance of the isthmus question. In the 17th century British pirates and adventurers had made a settlement at what is now called Belize, near the east coast of the isthmus of Nicaragua; and in despite of wars and treaties a permanent settlement was ~~xxxx~~ founded. In 1835 an agitation began in the United States for a canal, and in 1846 the annexation of California suddenly made clear the great importance of such a canal as a connection between our atlantic and Pacific coasts. Of all the conceivable routes, only two have seemed commercially practical, the Nicaragua and the Panama Isthmuses. The latter at the ~~xxxxxxxx~~ ~~of the~~ breakup of the Spanish power remained politically attached to the South-American continent. It was therefore an act of high diplomacy to negotiate in 1846 with New Grenada, (now the United States of Colombia) a treaty by which New Grenada guaranteed the neutrality of any form of transit across the isthmus of Panama, and the United States guaranteed the safety and protection of any means of transit. This is the first formal guaranty of outlying territory by the United States, and although the treaty is revocable on a year's notice, it practically has affixed the doctrine of paramount interest to that isthmus. Nine years later the panama railroad was completed, and the United States has repeatedly exercised its protective power over that stretch.

The isthmus of Nicaragua was, however on a different footing, because the English had a settlement in the neighborhood and put forward claims to a protectorate over the Mosquito coast, which flanked any possible canal. In 1849 three conventions were negotiated with Honduras and Nicaragua giving the United States special privilege

None ? of these were ratified, but they were held as weapons in a diplomatic contest with England. Geographically, established near the Isthmus, and determined to protect their future commerce, the British held ^a stronger diplomatic position than the United States, which had no near-by territory, and has just aroused to importance of the question. In 1850 the two powers came to an agreement in the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, which under the circumstances of the time was distinctly favorable to the United States. The English yielded their exclusive ~~xxxxxx~~ claim to the control of the canal, and agreed not to plant colonies in Central America. The two powers combined to assert the neutrality of any Nicaraguax canal, and the general principle that a canal elsewhere (that is, at Panama) ought to be held neutral.

At this time nobody thought that the treaty was contrary to the Monroe Doctrine, but ten years of hot dispute followed on the meaning of the treaty, in the course of which the Monrow Doctrine was sometimes invoked. Eventually Great Britain gave way by withdrawing from any territorial claims, which would give control of a canal, and thus ended the first period of isthmus diplomacy.

During the fifties, the question of Cuba revived, and President Pierce, like President Polk, made it too evident that a great part of Monroe's original doctrine was no longer in force. The main purpose of President Monroe was to keep peace in America; his doctrine was pacific: it aimed to relieve the weak from the oppression of the strong, to prevent violent changes in what he believed to be the normal conditions of America. President Pierce by his Cuban policy, attempted to disturb the existing adjustment

of powers? The Ostend Manifesto of 1854 marks a high water mark of boastful assertion in American diplomacy, though not intended to be a public document, it did describe as the proper and continuous policy of the United States the right to take the island of Cuba by force, if Spain would not sell it for a fair price, and this in the name of the Monroe Doctrine. Fortunately the country was now so intensely occupied with internal questions that neither Pierce nor Buchanan was able to commit the nation to the notion that the United States could safely protect Latin-American powers from aggression with one hand and commit like aggressions with the other. Buchanan's repeated efforts to get the sanction of Congress for schemes for dismembering Mexico and Central America all failed, and the Civil war speedily swept questions of Latin American relations into the background.

Advantage was taken, however, of the Civil War to raise precisely the issue to which Monroe's message had been addressed. In 1860 Mexico was in a desperate state, in large degree because the Mexican War had so broken up the authority of the Mexican government that the country was plunged into anarchy. Spain, Great Britain, and France agreed on a joint military expedition; the United States refused the invitation to join, and tried to suggest a basis of adjustment, but the expedition went on, and it speedily became apparent both to England and Spain that the real purpose of France was annexation or at least a protectorate. They withdrew, leaving the Mexicans to resist the French by fighting, and the United States to resist by diplomatic protest. Here was the precise opportunity to call the attention of the French government to Monroe's warning of forty years before, which as we have seen was really directed against French intervention. Secretary

Seward, however, while taking a part of Monroe's ground, saw that the Monroe Doctrine was too narrow. He might follow Monroe in protesting against the destruction of an American power by a European power, but the Monroe Doctrine had not been primarily intended to apply to wars begun presumptively for cause. Seward, therefore, adopted the bold and statesman-like course ~~not~~ of protesting not on Monroe's grounds, but on the broad and immediate basis of paramount interest. While our civil war lasted, and the troops were engaged, his protests produced no result; but when at the end of the war a large body of soldiers was directed towards ^{the} Mexican frontier, and when Seward announced that our friendship with France would be jeopardized if that government should overthrow the domestic republic and government of Mexico, the status of the United States was established as a protector of its American neighbors against European conquest, even in case of hostilities for which there had been some cause. The duplicity and greed of the Mexican War was atoned for by a calm and unselfish resolution of Seward's successful policy.

THE MONROE DOCTRINE AND THE ISTHMUS CANAL. (1867-1902)

LECTURE III.

Two other almost forgotten episodes emphasize the attitude of Seward toward foreign powers in America. A protest was lodged against the attempts of the Spaniards to reoccupy San Domingo, but the San Dominicans took care of that for themselves; and Congress in 1867 protested against the formation of the Dominion of Canada, nominally because it was monarchical, really because it looked premanent. In 1867 began a new era of annexations and attempted annexations, this time all with consent. Alaska was bought, partly as an offset to British Columbia, and thus Russia ceased to have any status as an American power. The people of San Domingo and the people of the Danish Islands were ready to become American, but the Senate refused to ratify either addition, and the attempt to get a foot-hold in the Gulf was thus frustrated;. The Cubans at last revolted in 1868, and since slavery had become odious to the United States, the Americans would have been glad to see the Cubans win their own independence. When that proved impossible the United States with great forbearance avoided opportunities for war with Spain and attempted to put a stop to the contest by a joint intervention of the United States and European powers. The suggestion was enough to bring Spain to terms with the colonists, and in 1878 Cuba returned to allegiance as a Spanish colony.

The Doctrine of Paramount Interest was now brought forward to cover a question not included in the Monroe Doctrine, the question of the Isthmus Canal. Secretary Seward, Secretary Fish, and Secretary Evarts in succession attempted to get a better vantage ground in the isthmus. Seward negotiated a treaty of 1846 with New Grenada. Fish at once began a series of negotiations with Colombia to secure a

a stronger treaty in place of that of 1846. The Colombian government every time held back ratification, because the treaties gave to the United States too much authority over Colombian territory. In any case, so long as the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty stood, no later negotiation with another power could deprive Great Britain of the advantage of a joint guaranty of the neutrality of an isthmus canal, whenever constructed. The controversy therefore, shifted to a discussion of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty. Since by that treaty England agreed not to establish colonies in Central America, and since the colony of Belize, or British Honduras was continued, it was argued that the British government had both broken the treaty and violated the principle of the Monroe Doctrine against European colonization. Mr. Fish in 1871 went so far as to lay down the principle that the present relation of European colonies must cease, and at the same time he claimed for the United States a leading voice", in American questions, including those affecting European colonies. This veiled threat is probably connected with an obscure movement for the annexation of Canada. In 1873 Mr Fish addressed himself to the Clayton-Bulwer treaty and intimated that it was no longer in force. Between 1869 and 1875 several surveying parties were sent out by the United States to collect information about the isthmus.

Meanwhile the two questions of the application of the Monroe Doctrine and the validity of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty came up together by the formation of a French Company in 1878 to construct a ~~canal~~ canal across the isthmus of Panama. Secretary Evarts backed up by President Hayes, protested vigorously on the ground what he called the "paramount interest of the United States"; and he attempted to show that the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty did not apply

to the Isthmus of Panama. President Hayes used the bold phrase that a canal would be "part of our coast line". It became evident that a canal constructed by foreign capital on/^aforeign charter must either constitute a foreign protectorate over the canal strip or must come under the joint guaranty of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, provided the United States did not maintain and make good a claim to exclusive control. The administration changed to Mr Garfield in 1881, and a few months later to Mr Arthur. There were serious doubts whether the French Company could finish the canal, and the Panama issue was for the time set aside.

Mr Blaine as Secretary of State for Mr Garfield wrote several despatches asserting the paramount interest of the United States and also trying by rather fine spun arguments to show that the building of a canal which was eagerly desired by the Latin-American states and which was not likely to destroy the political existence of any, was contrary to the spirit of the Monroe Doctrine. As for the Clayton - Bulwer treaty he first ignored it, then argued that it was not in force, and then proposed a series of modifications. His successor, Mr Frelinghuysen, returned to the doctrine that the treaty was obsolete. During this time the diggers were at work, and it was rumored that the canal could not be completed. In 1889 (?) the company went to a disgraceful and fraudulent smash, thus practically removing the issue of a French controlled canal, but again bringing up sharply the question of the relations of the United States to Great Britain on the canal which must somewhere be constructed.

We have already seen that the idea of a hegemony among American states was distinctly in John Quincy Adams' mind in 1823, and that

he attempted to establish it in 1826; and that when the crisis of the Mexican invasion came, in which our leadership might have been invoked, Seward claimed no primacy over our neighbors. The idea, however, has some attractive phases: if the United States could be considerate and the Latin-Americans patriotic, why should there not be a great American Empire, with the United States sitting at the centre, as the magnanimous dispenser of justice? Mr Blaine thought it possible, and he set himself to lay ~~gmk~~ the foundations for it in an impetuous, but genuinely patriotic spirit? In his few month's service as Secretary of State under Garfield and Arthur in 1881, he entered on three lines of influence upon our Latin American neighbors, intervention, reciprocity and international conference. A war between Chili and Peru, ending in the military collapse of the latter power, gave him an opportunity to urge mildness and justice on the conqueror. His well intended plea for moderation was by zealous subordinates somewhat enlarged into what the Chilians understood to be a threat, and Mr Blaine began to realize how serious would be the task of getting our neighbors to do right when they did not feel like it. His successor, Mr Frelinghuysen, in several despatches laid down the principle that Latin-American powers are not even to arbitrate their disputes through European jurists; but for the time being benevolent leadership was put aside.

Mr Blaine's second line of policy was to attach our Latin-American neighbors to us by reciprocal trade, and he became the apostle of a policy of commercial reciprocity. Congress was interested in the scheme, some treaties were negotiated, but this method of establishing influence has been practically blocked by the dis-~~xxxx~~

covery that the Latin Americans by reciprocity understood a system of "do ut des", which is to increase both their exports to and imports from, the United States. The American idea of reciprocity is to facilitate American exports without letting in more foreign goods.

Mr Blaine's third desire was a friendly understanding on the general commercial and political ~~xxxxxxx~~ relations of American countries, and to this end he issued invitation for a Pan~~xxx~~-American conference. Postponed for the time, when Mr Blaine returned to the Secretaryship of State in 1899, he carried out this desirable purpose in the Pan-American conference of 1890, which suggested many improvements in American international intercourse. Another conference of the same kind was held at the city of Mexico in 1902, and perhaps resulted in a better understanding between the American powers.

The conciliation of the Latin-American powers was not a part of the original Monroe Doctrine though undoubtedly a factor in the larger doctrine of paramount interest; but conciliation is hard to maintain in the face of the fierce controversies which from time to time arise with our neighbors. In 1890 the delay of the Chilean government to make suitable apologies for the attack on American sailors on the harbor of Valparaiso very nearly led to war. In 1894 Admiral Benham cleared his ship for action in the harbor of Rio Janeiro. In 1902, American troops, under the treaty of 1846, occupied the Isthmus of Panama. Permanent, friendly and gracious relations are hard to maintain with powers which we find it necessary from time to time to chastise or threaten.

In 1895 came out of a clear sky a difficulty in which Monroe was raised from his grave to be the patron saint of a policy which certainly would much have astonished him when living. A boundary dispute between Venezuela and British Guiana, represented by the British government, had been dragging on for years, and the United States had repeatedly offered its good offices, and attempted to bring about adjustment. Failing in this purpose, Secretary Olney in July, 1895, sent a despatch to Lord Salisbury, in which he demanded that the British government arbitrate with Venezuela the question at issue, on the ground that the controversy was one in which the honor and interest of the United States were involved; and ~~his~~ he distinctly threatened war. Mr. Olney deduced the right to intervent in this case from the Monroe Doctrine, because the British government, he said, was trying to establish a colony in the territory of Venezuela, and at the same time to deprive a part of that country of its right of self government. In the course of the despatch Mr Olney took occasion to say that "today the United States is practically sovereign on this continent, and its fiat is law upon the subjects to which it confines its interposition"; and that permanent European colonies in America are "unnatural and inexpedient". In December, 1895, the despatch was sent to Congress by President Cleveland, with a brief message in which he declared it the duty of the United States to resist the appropriation of the Venezuelan territory by England. The sound of this proclamation was louder throughout the world than the blowing up of Krakota. The president's suggestion of an American ex-parte commission to investigate the facts was at once taken up, but eventually another arbitration tribunal passed upon them and found that the British claims were substantially justified. The issue, however, was never the possession

of territory; it was really the attitude of the United States toward American questions. To appeal to the Monroe Doctrine weakened rather than strengthened the case of the United States. Probably John Quincy Adams~~x~~, had he been Secretary of State in 1895, would have taken something like Mr. Olney's position, but he would have based it on the doctrine of three quarters of a century earlier, intended to apply to a very different set of circumstances; he would have founded his argument on the direct and broad ground of Paramount interest; he would have asked for a settlement of the question, not because Monroe had convictions, but because he himself had convictions. Although it is still difficult to see how the interests of the United States were directly concerned in the Boundary controversy, the country warmly supports the principle that the United States is especially interested in every American question. The British government yielded to what seemed to be a profound and passionate national sentiment, and not to Mr Olney's method of argument, which was not very courteous and not very persuasive.

In bringing forward the Monroe Doctrine, which was not necessary to prove his case, Mr Olney made one significant admission; he repeated the doctrine of two spheres laid down by Monroe, insisting that because the United States kept out of European relations, therefore foreign powers must keep out of American relations. Less than three years later the United States had come out of its western hemispheres and so far forth had parted with any right to insist that foreign powers should keep in their hemisphere. The war of 1898 resulted in the annexation of Porto Rico and the protectorate of Cuba, both of which were in harmony with the previous territorial

history of the country, but by the annexation of the Philippines the United States asserted its place as a world power, and accepted the responsibilities of that position. Since isolation and the doctrine of the two spheres were fundamental parts of Monroe's Doctrine, it is plain that the present circumstances of the world make that doctrine inadequate.

It is time to formulate a new statement, and in the diplomacy of the last three years such a statement has been made. First of all the Isthmus question has been cleared up. The Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, which stood for fifty years must have been in consonance with the Monroe Doctrine of paramount interest, and after long negotiation the British Government agreed to withdraw from the joint guaranty, thus leaving the United States free to assume the sole control of a canal, because it is of paramount interest to us. The ground is thus cleared for negotiation with the Latin-American states and the possibility of a Nicaraguan Canal gives a useful competitive interest to the transaction. The whole subject of the canal which for half a century furnished so many danger points, is now removed from European diplomacy, to the advantage of mankind and to the peace of the world.

Throughout this discussion it has been evident that the term Monroe Doctrine has been often used in a meaning very different from Monroe's Doctrine. In the annual message of 1901 President Roosevelt defined the Monroe Doctrine to mean "No territorial aggrandizement by any non-American power at the expense of any American power on American ~~soil~~ soil * * * a step towards assuring the universal peace of the world by securing the possibility of permanent peace on this hemisphere".

This is a return to the first principles. In the minds of President Roosevelt and Secretary Hay as in the minds of President Monroe and Secretary John Quincy Adams, the fundamental and underlying purpose of the Monroe Doctrine was, and of the doctrine of paramount interest still is, the preservation of peace in the western hemisphere, not Mr Polk's idea of keeping peace by conquest, nor Mr Blaine's idea of keeping peace by duress, nor Mr Olney's threat of peace by the fiat of the United States; but peace preventing the rise of disturbing questions. Hence the understanding which has been plainly reached with Germany, by which that power seeks neither coaling stations nor colonies anywhere in the Americas. The fewer European establishments there are in America, the less the points of friction and the the opportunity for disturbance. President Roosevelt expressly disavows any intention to protect Latin-American states from the consequences of ill behaviour toward European governments, except that their territory must not be acquired. The nation enters on the twentieth century with a clearer, more definite and more logical understanding of the doctrine of Paramount interest.