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TWO LECTURES DELIVERED BY

DR. HORACE N. ALLEN,

LATE AMERICAN MINISTER TO KOREA,

AT THE NAVAL WAR COLLEGE NEWPORT R.I.

July ~~JUNE~~ 19 & 20, 1906.

A RESUME OF THE CHIEF EVENTS RELATING TO KOREAN INDEPENDENCE AND THE RECENT LOSS OF THE SAME.

In order to better understand the sentiments now entertained by the Koreans for their present overlords, the Japanese, it will be well to briefly review the relations existing between those two peoples during the past twenty centuries by simply alluding to some of the chief historical notices thereof.

In the first century B.C. a boat load of unofficial residents of what is now known as Korea, reached Shimonoseki and went on to pay obeisance to the Japanese Emperor. Others followed from time to time, bringing with them presents of jade, mirrors, embroideries and fine glazed pottery, which articles were but little known in Japan.

From this time on, the Japanese seem to have profited much in such matters as education, in art, religion and ~~etiquette~~, from their intercourse with the peninsular people, who will be hereafter known simply as Koreans though their country has been called by varying names, ~~and has been~~ being known as Kauley by the Chinese in the time of Marco Polo, hence our name Korea. I may add that the Royal Geographical Society decided that the proper spelling of this name was by the use of K. and our own Government adopted that spelling while the British Government adheres to the old spelling with a C.

In the year 202 A.D. the Empress Jingo Kogo invaded Korea with a considerable army and compelled that country to submit to Japanese suzerainty. - A claim that has been persisted in through all these intervening centuries of more or less bloody warfare until in the year 1876 Japan made a treaty with Korea practically admitting the independence of the latter, only to again assert this ancient claim in November of 1905.

Poor Korea had little to say regarding her overlords however, as she was at times under the rule of Mongolians, Chinese, Manchus and for a time, by her own desire, Russian influence was paramount, only to be replaced by a Japanese protectorate.

In the year 1218 Genghis Khan compelled Korea to accept Mongolian supremacy and a Mongol envoy was despatched to Korea to represent that rule. He was murdered however by the natives and a second Mongol invasion resulted which the Koreans were obliged to meet alone without the assistance of their Japanese suzerain. On the contrary, Korea was obliged soon after to assist Kublai Khan in the latter's attempt to invade Japan during the years 1273 to 1281. The boats needed for this invasion were constructed on the island of Quelpart, and this assistance forced upon the Koreans by the Mongols, was repented by the Japanese after the attempted invasion failed.

After this failure of the Mongolians to land in Japan, Korea seems to have enjoyed nearly two centuries of comparative quiet during which Chinese influence grew apace and the Koreans drew more and more away from the despised inhabitants of the Japanese islands.

The advent of the 16th century was marked however by the greatest Japanese invasion Korea had yet experienced. Hideyoshi, the great regent opened up relations with Korea by despatching three separate envoys to that country in 1585, 1586 and 1591 respectively. He demanded that Korea should assist him in a proposed invasion of China,

of which purpose the Korean ruler promptly informed his Chinese "elder brother". The relations between China and her small neighbor had become quite intimate. A Chinese maid, said to be the daughter of the Nanking-Emperor Chinese Emperor, had become the Queen of Korea and the founder of the since famous Min Clan.

This act of disloyalty toward Japan induced Hideyoshi to invade and subjugate Korea first before attempting his invasion of China. It was during this great invasion that the Korean fleet of war junks defeated those of Japan by the use of a vessel covered with metal plates which gives Korea the claim of being one of the first if not the first, to use iron clads in naval warfare.

The invaders were hindered but not prevented from landing. A great army was landed therefore at Fusan under Taiko in two divisions, one commanded by Kato and the other by Konishi. These divisions were marched to Seoul by different routes capturing the strongholds on the way, and, finding the King had fled to Songdo and then to Pengyang, they took these places also in succession. 45,000 Chinese troops having arrived however and been joined by the Korean army, the allies destroyed Kato's division and Konishi fell back on Seoul which he largely destroyed as a measure of defense. After recuperating and collecting reinforcements Konishi sallied out toward the stronghold of the allies at Songdo and defeated them, causing them to fall back upon Pengyang. This was in 1592 and the Japanese forces then retreated in order to Fusan, which place they fortified and have ever since held.

In 1598 occurred the second invasion under Hideyoshi at which time the siege of the castle near Fusan was raised and the fortress at Chinchu was taken. This feat was accomplished it is said by sending soldiers concealed in carts covered with mailed leather close to the walls of the citadel, though it is not explained how the bulls that drew the carts were protected.

Hideyoshi died this year and his forces were withdrawn from Korea.

These invasions were destined to have a great effect upon Japan commercially from the act of General Nabeshima who seized the opportunity offered by the destruction of Seoul to gather up all the fine pottery produced by the government artisans and take it with him to his island of Satsuma together with all the potters. It was easy to collect these people since owing to the despotic rule in Korea all artisans of ability were compelled to work practically as slaves of the government and they and their families could easily be secured and probably were not greatly averse to a change. They were settled on the island of Satsuma where their descendants are still to be found, and from their work and teaching originated the fine ware so highly prized today and an item of such great commercial value to Japan.

From 1624 to 1637 occurred the Manchu invasion of Korea when the Koreans like the Chinese were obliged to yield to the overlordship of this new power. It speaks well for the Koreans that it took these forces thirteen years to subjugate them and when they had finally succeeded the conquerors seem to have had so much respect for their small enemy that they did not impose upon them the queue and bound feet which marked the subjugation of the Chinese.

During this invasion the Korean King was obliged to take refuge in various of his mountain fortresses and at the close of the war he was in the Kangwha fortress at the mouth of the Han river where we fought his descendants in 1871. His women were in the Nam Han castle beyond Seoul and they being secured by a ruse the King capitulated.

In testimony of Korea's subjection to the Manchus a great marble tablet was thereupon set up in the plains beyond Seoul leading to Nam Han, while a monumental arch was set up just outside the West Gate of Seoul at the Peking Pass on the road to China. You who have visited Seoul have surely seen this arch. It was demolished together with the Nam Han tablet, by the Japanese after their successful war with China in 1894, after standing over 250 years. By Japanese incentive a move was made to erect an arch commemorative of Korean Independence and near the still remaining columns of this old Manchu arch. Before the matter could be well started however Russia became the leader of Korean affairs and the triumphal gate was built by a Russian architect with a Byzantine hint and now stands rather as a monument to Russian predominance than-as-a-mark-of-Japanese made possible by the awful diplomatic blunders of Japan, than as a mark of the Japanese success over China or of Korean independence.

Korea was allowed to rest under Chinese or Manchu protection for the next 250 years and it seems to have been the most agreeable time to the ruling classes of which there is any mention in Korean history.

Annually a mission was sent to Peking overland with tribute and great quantities of articles for trade, a place on this mission being considered worth much money. Aside from this yearly visit the inhabitants of the two countries were not allowed in the others territory, and to make this the easier of accomplishment, a strip 20 leagues wide was staked off on the Manchurian side of the Yalu, while all would-be passers must go through the border city, Wiju. This strip remained as it was until 1875, when Li Hung Chang annexed it to China. During these years of quiet and of non-interference by China, the Koreans respect for the country whence came their knowledge of and education, increased so-greatly-that as-greatly as grew their dislike for the hated Japanese from whom they suffered so in the past and who seemed to them so uncouth and barbarous.

During this period Western ideas began to penetrate Korea, being introduced by shipwrecked people. In 1653 the Dutch ship "Sparwehr" was wrecked off Quelpart and 36 Dutchmen were taken care of as prisoners at large in Korea, where they found one of their own countrymen who had long been a more or less satisfied resident of the country, where he had raised a family and been the means of teaching the natives the manufacture of gunpowder and the arms. Eight of these Dutchmen finally made their escape and got back to their own land where one of them, Hendrick Hamel, wrote a narrative of their adventures.

Catholic missionaries also began to penetrate Korea about this time, though one had come over with the Japanese troops upon the invitation of the Christian general Konishi. This influence increasing and being greatly disliked and feared, numerous edicts were issued against it, and all visiting priests were killed on being apprehended. A great persecution and massacre of native and French christians took place in 1839 and again thereafter, the worst seeming to have been that of 1866.

The massacre of 1839 led to the despatch of a fleet of three French vessels in 1846 to demand satisfaction for the murder of French subjects. Two of these vessels, the "La Glorie" and "La Victorieuse",

were wrecked off Chulla-do, ^{being} and their guns ^{being} removed by the Koreans and mounted in the Kangwha forts where they were used against the French in their ineffectual attempt to take these forts in 1863, and they were also used against us in our attack of 1871.

The British operations in China and the report that the Chinese Emperor was fleeing to Korea, together with the news that a new neighbor had been given Korea on the north by the Russian treaty so adroitly obtained from China as a result of the British operations against Peking; as well as the fact that a new power, America, had compelled Japan to open her doors, so startled the Koreans that they began to look after the approaches to Seoul, and when we ventured up the river in 1871 our vessels were promptly fired upon.

Our own relations with Korea did not begin through Missionary complications as was the case with France, but rather through pilli-bustering and "body snatching" expeditions.

In 1866 an American schooner, the "Surprise" was wrecked off the North-west coast of Korea and the crew were succored and allowed to depart by way of Wiju. It is not known what this vessel was doing on that coast, but in the same year another vessel the "General Sherman", sailed from Chefoo on a reputed trading expedition about which there seems to have been some suspicion in the port whence she sailed. She entered the Tatong river at high tide during a most unusually severe rainy season about the last of June. She was enabled to cross the bar where sampans often ground at ordinary times and anchored off the walls of Pengyang. The next day the water fell and she was hopelessly aground.

I have never been able to secure any information in Korea as to what took place, but it is safe to infer that our people failed to realize their exact situation and were as usual overbearing to these yellow people. At any rate the natives destroyed the ship and killed all her people, nothing but the reputed anchor of the vessel has ever been found.

This led to the despatch of Commodore Shufeldt in the "Wachusett" in 1867 to demand an explanation. He mistook a bay near the Sir James Hall islands for the Tatong inlet and attempted to send a letter to the authorities. After waiting in vain ^{during the} for a month ^{of} in January for a reply to this letter he returned to Chefoo.

The "body-snatching" expedition occurred in the same year 1867, when a German-American, Ernest Oppert, made a voyage to Korea, sailing from Shanghai with two armed steamers, the "Greta" and the "China" flying the North German flag, and in search of buried treasure.

It has already been noted that General Nabeshima, at the time of the Japanese invasion had taken with him to Japan the potters of Korea as well as all the ware to be found in the sacking of Seoul. This ware was almost priceless in Japan where it was regarded highly for itself and as being the fore-runner of the ware they were then making in such perfection. There being no more of this ware to be had in Korea except that buried ^{abroad} with in the royal tombs some of these sepulchers had been opened and the pottery removed, to the great profit of the operator. The report spread about in the Chinese ports therefore, that Korean tombs were filled with treasure, golden coffins being mentioned as most filling the imagination of the marator. Hence Oppert's expedition to secure some of this buried wealth. He was driven off and the Koreans thereafter removed all samples of this

ware from the tombs lest it tempt other armed expeditions to their shores. (I may add that upon saving the life of a Prince in 1884, I was given one of these gray bowls and the value of it had to be explained to me as I could not imagine why such a modest present was given me. Since then I have accumulated the largest single collection of this white and gray ware, none of the pieces being less than five hundred years old).

Oppert's departure was probably facilitated by the arrival of Admiral Rowen on the U.S.S. "Shenandoah" to secure a reply to the letter of Commodore Shufeldt. A reply was obtained in which the Koreans admitted killing the crew of the "General Sherman" but claimed it was necessary as the Americans were the aggressors.

Failing to get satisfaction from the Koreans, and the Chinese ~~claiming that she could~~ refusing to accept responsibility for Korea's acts, it was decided that we must have a treaty with Korea, hence Mr. Low, our minister at Peking secured the promise of the Chinese that they would send a letter to the Korean court proposing a treaty, and in pursuance of the propositions made in this letter which may never have reached Seoul, Mr. Low ~~wat~~ went with Admiral Rogers and his Fleet of five ships, the "Alaska" "Benicia" "Colorado" "Monocacy" and "Palos" to ~~Chemulpo~~ ^{Myungwon} to open negotiations. The "Monocacy" and "Palos" being sent up the river they were fired upon by the Kangwha forts on June 2nd 1871 and the forces under Admiral Rogers captured the forts with great slaughter on June 11th, leaving Korea on July 3rd.

In 1880 Commodore Shufeldt came to Fusan on the "Ticonderoga" and made another unsuccessful attempt to open negotiations.

However he was soon to be successful for the Chinese began to fear they might be obliged to accept responsibility for Korea's wrong doing and they therefore advised the little country to enter into treaty relations with America. This was the more desirable on the part of China since Japan had gone to Seoul in 1876 and negotiated a treaty with that country. Commodore Shufeldt therefore returned to his task going to what is now Chemulpo in the "Swatara" where he concluded our treaty of May 22 1882.

Korean hatred for and contempt of the Japanese was such that when in 1868 the latter government informed the Korean government through the prince of the island of Tsushima, near Fusan, that of the restoration of the government and the intention to renew intercourse between the two governments, the letter was returned.

Fusan had been retained and occupied by the Japanese since their last invasion and a petty trade had been conducted there under great restrictions. In 1872 the Foreign Office of Japan sent an official to reside at Fusan but he seems to have been unable to do much of anything to promote intercourse between the two countries, and again Japan began to consider an invasion of Korea. This might have been the outcome had it not been for the Satsuma rebellion, which gave Japan ample occupation at home.

In 1875 some foreign dressed Japanese men-of-war's men from the "Unyo" engaged in surveying near Kangwha, were fired upon by the Koreans. Captain (later Admiral) Inouye ordered the destruction of these forts.

This resulted in the despatch of a force of two gunboats and three ~~cruisers~~ transports with troops in January 1876, which force was able to ascend the Han river in spite of the season, and anchor off Seoul,

prepared for peace or war. It-re The mission resulted peacefully, a treaty being concluded February 26, 1876.

Had it not been for the Satsuma rebellion Japan would probably have taken Korea in the seventies and the Japan)China war of 1894 would have been fought about twenty years earlier when Japan was not so well prepared for it. China might have then been shaken into a more wakeful state and whibd these two were fighting over the Korean bone, Russia might well have slipped in and extended her Amur possessions to include the harbor of Masampo. The war with Russia would not have been averted but japan might not have had the advantages that fell to her in 1904.

Koreas position is certainly an unfortunate one and the end has hardly been reached yet. The natives hate the Japanese and will only tolerate them so long as their is sufficient power in sight to compel obedience. The Chinese detest the Japanese whom they call monkeys among themselves. They are agast at Japan's recent successes and are willing to profit by her advice for the present, bjt let Japan go too far with China, as she is most liable to do, and there may be a new alliance that will make the one between England and Japan seem small.

Korea's position is a most unfortunate one. She has been the battle ground for her neighbors through the centuries past and she seems likely to feel the tread of armed feet in the future. She will welcome almost any sort of relief from the detested Japanese to whom she will be subservient only so long as there is sufficient force in sight to overawe and compel obedience. The Chinese also detest the Japanese whom they call "monkies" among themselves, and while they stand agast at Japan's successes and at the folly of China in not sooner putting herself in shape to do even better, and are willing to accept the assistance of Japan to make up the lost time; just let Japan go too far as she is pretty sure to do, and the giant she has awakened may prove too much for her, especially if at that time China has profited by her recent example and furthermore if there may be in existence a new alliance to counterbalance the one existing between England and Japan.

Having succeeded in 1876 in making the first treaty with Korea, the Japanese between that year and the year of our treaty, - 1882, concluded with Korea several commercial and maritime agreements and made arrangements for the opening of the ports Fusan, Gensan and Chemulpo, there being no town at the site of the last named port.

Mr. Y. Hanabusa was sent to Seoul as Chargé d'Affaires in 1877 and was later promoted to be Minister Resident. Several Korean embassies were despatched to Tokio during these years but it was not until 1886 that a Korean legation was regularly established in Japan.

In 1880 eighty Korean students were sent to China and twenty four to Japan, showing which form of education was then most prized by the Koreans.

The opening of the country was not without opposition. In 1880 700 petitioners memorialized the throne against the conclusion of treaties and the Japanese met with no welcome in Seoul. In fact just after our treaty had been concluded, namely on July 23rd 1882, a mob destroyed the Japanese Legation, killing seven Japanese and compelling Minister Hanabusa to flee to Chemulpo, losing five members of his party on the way. He and the survivors of his party were taken off by the British ship "Flying Fish" which was surveying near by.

You who have navigated the waters of the bay of Chemulpo will remember the "Flying fish channel" which was charted by this vessel.

Minister Hanabusa returned in force and was able on August 20 1882 to compel the Koreans to agree to arrest the insurgents within 20 days; to bury the dead Japanese; to pay Yen 50,000 to the families of the dead; to provide a new legation; to pay an indemnity to Japan of Yen 500,000; to send an embassy to Tokio with an apology and to extend new facilities for trade and travel.

The Queen of Korea had a narrow escape from this mob also. The mob having been inflamed by the King's father, the notorious and sturdy ex-regent, who was feared and respected and who was the bitter enemy of his powerful daughter-in-law, who being of Chinese extraction, of royal descent, and the head of the powerful Min Clan, had had much to do with clipping the old man of the power he had come to enjoy during the minority of his son, (who by the way, was not of royal descent but had been adopted by the late Queen as the result of the successful machinations of the Tai Won Khun or great prince who got the seal of the dying Queen and thus introduced his infant son as the future King of Korea.)

Summer 1882

As a result of this rioting and especially because of his conduct towards the Queen, the Tai Won Khun was invited to Chemulpo, to view a Chinese war vessel and while on board he was quietly taken to China where he was kept until 1886. On his return, the Queen in order to give him a little reminder of her power and a suggestion for good behavior, caused the execution of forty of his retainers on the hillside beyond the south gate of Seoul as the old man was entering on his way home. He never forgave this "welcome home" and afterwards assisted the Japanese in the brutal murder of this woman who was a strong character and had good intuitions even if she did pursue the long approved methods of the Orient.

On October 9 of the same year, 1882, General Yuan Shi Kai arrived in Seoul with 6000- 3000 Chinese troops with instructions to preserve order. These were placed in two camps, one inside the city on an eminence and the other was well located to guard the approaches to the river side of the city. Earthworks were completed that presented a fine appearance to one not versed in military matters and the men were well set up and under good control. I mention this since Yuan, now the Viceroy of Chili, has obtained quite a reputation for his recent organization of the present Chinese army. Yuan will be mentioned again as he became the Chinese representative in Korea and occupied the front place on the political stage of that stormy center until driven out by the Japan-China war of 1894.

China, while assenting for her own personal ends, to the conclusion of treaties, had no intention of letting go her control of Korea. Therefore with our treaty as well as with the others of that time, the King was obliged to forward a personal letter to the sovereign in which he explained and admitted the sovereign rights of China over his country.

The foreign customs service was established under the management of a German borrowed from the Chinese service who acted as adviser to the King until he magnified his powers too greatly and fell afool of Yuan Shi Kai, when he was gotten rid of and the service was taken over formally in 1886 by Sir Robert Hart as a branch of the Chinese service and lasted as such until the Japan-China war of 1894. *And under the same management until supplanted by the Japanese in 1905.*

Our Minister Foote arrived in Seoul in May 1883 and a Korean embassy headed by Prince Min Yong Ik, was despatched to Washington in September of the same year to exchange the ratifications of the treaty. This party returned on the U.S.S. "Trenton" in charge of Ensign George C. Foulk, who afterwards was left in charge of our legation for eighteen months and made one of the best representatives we have had in that country. On returning-~~to~~-arriving in Seoul, Captain Phythian and the officers of the "Trenton" were entertained by the King in a specially prepared building.

British, German and Russian treaties were concluded rapidly after our own and a French treaty followed in 1886. The Japanese had concluded a new and extensive legation building and a post-office had been established, *by the Koreans.*

Everything seemed to be moving on quietly at last and on December 4, 1884, a banquet was given in honor of the opening of the new post office, but this new innovation seemed to be particularly offensive to the conservative element as indicative of a dangerous departure from the non-intercourse with foreigners policy of the respected old Tai Won Khun.

The officials were sharply divided into two parties, the conservatives looking to China for guidance while the progressists leaned toward Japan and foreign intercourse.

The progressists could ill brook the interference of their more powerful antagonists and decided to attain their ends by a short cut and a resort to ancient methods, in which they seem to have been in full accord with the Japanese representative then in Seoul who placed his legation guard of 140 men at their disposal.

On the night of December 4th 1884 therefore, matters came to a climax and Japan made one of the blunders which blot her the record of her dealings with Korea in modern times. The opening of the post office, so much objected to by the conservatives, was seized upon as a good occasion for the progressives to begin operations, as likely to divert suspicion from them. A fire was started in a building near the one used for the banquet in honor of the opening of the post-office, and when the guests ran out to view the conflagration, Prince Min Yong Ik was cut down by ^{presumably} a Korean who had been educated in a military school in Japan and who has since and for years been an American citizen with an American wife. Other prominent conservatives were murdered in their homes and in the palace, whither the progressists with the guard of 140 Japanese troops ^{had} immediately went, gone.

Yuan could not let this pass however and on the 6th he marched to the palace with his 3000 Chinese troops and as many Korean allies. The plucky band of Japanese were barricaded behind the great gate of the palace enclosure and it is said they had laid a mine in front of the gate so that when it was exploded at the proper time the allies scattered and could not be immediately collected. Finding their schemes had become known however and realizing that so small a force could not hope to hold the position for long in a city of 300,000 angered people, the Japanese with their Korean protegeses marched out of the city leaving about forty of their dead to lie in the streets for weeks and be eaten by the dogs. They destroyed their handsome new legation building on their retreat and killed every one in sight, curiosity nearly causing me to be one of the killed.

For some time thereafter the city was in the hands of the mob and the buildings belonging to the refugee progressists were looted and burned so that the nights were well illuminated by these fires.

The little band of foreigners consisting of twelve men and three women together with some Japanese refugees, took-r collected at the American Legation where the men were put to guard duty under Ensign J.B. Bernadou, who was afterwards honored by the Japanese Government for his act in escorting to Chemulpo the band of Japanese refugees from the legation. Yuan Shi Kai, at the request of the foreign ministers, furnishing a guard of Chinese and Korean troops for this escort.

Chinese and Japanese embassies in force arrived in Korea on the 30th of December. Count Inouye accompanied by his American adviser, D.W. Stevens arrived at Chemulpo with 2500 troops while the Chinese commissioner with 3000 troops landed at Asan just below Chemulpo, - a favorite place with the Chinese and one that saw their deep humiliation ten years later.

It is suggestive that when these embassies entered Seoul the one from China was promptly admitted within the walls of the city and lodged in a palace while the Japanese were put up in the governor's quarters outside the walls. The Chinese persistently put these indignities upon the Japanese as well as upon other foreigners in Korea until they were defeated by the Japanese ^{armies} in 1894.

These missions accomplished little, the real negotiations were concluded at Tientsin between Li Hung Chang and Count (Now Marquis) Ito resulting in the Li-Ito Convention ^{of 1895} whereby China and Japan ^{each} agreed not to land troops in Korea thereafter without notifying the other and the Chinese troops were to be withdrawn from Seoul. The violation of this agreement by China brought on the war of 1894.

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It is at about this juncture that I began to take part in Korean affairs and I must ask you to pardon me if I seem to use the personal pronoun ~~too~~ frequently in what follows. Let me state briefly that I had gone to China in 1883 as a medical missionary and becoming somewhat disillusioned with finding that there was less real medical opportunity than I had expected, I found my affiliations largely with the excellent men who composed the Shanghai medical faculty and at their advice I decided to go to Korea and grow up with the country. Having lived there twenty one years I suppose I may have claim that I have gotten my growth. I wrote the mission authorities of this intention on my part and offered to either pay back to them the monies they had expended on my behalf or remain with them for the period agreed upon and hand over to them my earnings. This I did at their request and they were some thousands a year richer by the bargain while I have since sold for them property which I bought and turned over to them on which they cleared some \$30,000. I was appointed physician to the American Legation at once as well as later to the other legations for I brought good letters and a physician was needed. In 1887 I resigned my mission connection to take the first Korean Legation to Washington and returning in 1889 I was soon thereafter appointed Secretary of our Legation and after seven years of that service I was promoted in 1897 to be Minister Resident and Consul General and was again promoted in 1901 to be Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, being ~~removed-in-June~~ superceded in June 1905 just five months before the withdrawal of our Legation, thus--having thus been in Seoul practically all the short term of Korean independence.

The prince, Min Yong Ik, who was cut down at the post office banquet was not killed and I was promptly called and put in charge of the case after having to eject a lot of Korean so called doctors who would have soon made short work of him by removing the saving clots, for he was a very badly damaged piece of royalty. Western methods succeeded in saving him however after three months of great anxiety to me. Many Korean and Chinese wounded were placed in my hands also and most of them did me the honor of getting well.

As indicating the Oriental character of Yuan Shi Kai, on whom China seems now to depend for her regeneration and who is mentioned as the most likely candidate for Emperor or Regent in case the Dowager should die and the Chinese prevail against the Manchus, I may mention that among his wounded soldiers there was one so badly wounded in the forearm that I insisted upon amputation as I assured Yuan the man would die of lockjaw if the arm was not amputated. He flatly refused on the ground that a soldier with one arm would be useless. --As *He died in the manner predicted*

As showing the fortitude of the Chinese soldier I will mention two more cases. One was that of a Colonel who was shot through the groin, the bullet going through a natural opening or foramen there without splitting the bone. I found him with a poultice fore and aft consisting of the skin of a freshly killed dog. In three months he was on duty and riding his horse. Another man had been stabbed in the neck with one of the Japanese sword toothed bayonets and when the weapon was withdrawn it tore away most of that side of the mans neck. He made a good recovery though his beauty was badly marred. Yuan gave him employment for years as a gate keeper and would often speak to me in praise regarding this man. I could not but remark on such occasions that the one armed man would have done as well had he been saved.

It will doubtless interest you to know that in this little known battle where the modern troops of Japan first met their ancient enemy and tested their powers in preparation for the great conflict of ten years later, I found that according to the list of casualties as given me by the generals, the Chinese had a percentage of eighty killed to twenty wounded which I believe is a direct reverse of the usual statistics. This was due to the effects of the mine exploded under the Chinese troops and I may further add that most of the wounds were shown to be have been received at close quarters. I had a number of bayonet thrusts and to my amazement they all recovered even where the abdomen was punctured. A chinaman is an excellent surgical patient so long as his urethral canal is not interfered with. Probably this is due to a rice diet and it may be that in the next war the Japanese ~~may~~ suffer from their increasing ration of meat.

The close friendship of the Koreans with the Chinese seemed now to cool somewhat. Yuan Shi Kai was a brutal, overbearing Chinaman, much given to drink and sensual gratification and haughty beyond present belief.

The Koreans seemed not to like his domineering ways and the restrictions placed about their intercourse with the more pleasant ^{appearing} foreigners of other countries. They hated and feared the Japanese more than ever for their recent participation in the murder of so many officials and the occupation of the palace by Japanese troops. In this extremity they turned to America with whom they had concluded their first voluntary treaty. This was not a little due to the fact that I had been made court physician and was constantly in the palace where much of my work seemed to be to sooth their fears and sympathise with them, which naturally led to the enhancement of the virtues of my own country in their estimation. This led to the suggestion that the most speedy way of establishing Korean independence from Chinese rule would be, to despatch legations-to-re ministers ^{and} establish legations abroad. This advice was acted upon though having made the establishment the object seemed to them to have been obtained, and they were ^{so} neglected as to become a veritable nuisance in each capital that had the misfortune to be so honored.

But two missions were at first despatched, one was to all the treaty powers of Europe, while America was to have one all to herself. The one to Europe was stopped at Hongkong, ^{8 in 1894} but I was sent with the one to America and the Government learning of the opposition of the Chinese who had prevented the minister from starting at the time agreed upon, sent the "Omaha", Captain McNair, to take the Korean members of the mission across to Japan. On sailing out they met a fleet of six Chinese war vessels sent to stop them and it was greatly to the amusement and gratification of the Koreans that these ships had to salute their vessel rather than open fire upon them.

Our navy has had much to do with asserting and maintaining Korean independence and in assisting in giving to our people the foremost place we held in Korean commercial and development enterprises up to the beginning of the recent war. A ship has been stationed at Chemulpo much of the time during the past twenty years as some of you must know to your sorrow, and a marine guard has frequently been placed at the legation, in two instances remaining for two years at a time. X

Admiral John Lee Davis whom I had met in Asia was my chief counselor in Washington during the difficult ordeal of getting the Korean Legation established against the machinations of the Chinese who, when unable to prevent their departure announced to the Department of State that they would be introduced by the Chinese Minister as vassal envoys.

W. H. Wilmer and T. B. M. Mason were appointed joint ministers to the Korean government.

It may be needless to recount all the troubles we had in Washington where my charges were so overawed by the lordly Chinese Minister that they decided they must yeild to his demands, until I made use of some dire threats that might be properly considered "bluff" but which won the day with the childlike people, and they then did as directed, and after a week of suspense we were received and the trying time was over.

The Oriental always seems to have the faculty of coming back on the family ^{matter} so that an individual has not simply his own well being to consider. Although I took in writing, the whole blame for the successful out manouvering of the Chinese in this instance, Yuan made it very uncomfortable in Seoul for the King and for the family of the disobedient minister, who brooded over the situation until he became ill and had to return to his country. On his return in order to satisfy the Chinese Minister the Korean was banished by the King, that is he went out of the city for three days to his country place. The Chinaman had saved his face, punishment had been meted out and on the Korean side of the count they had been recognized as one of the brotherhood of nations.

The matter of the emeute of 1884 having been amicable settled the

troops, as per agreement, left Korea simultaneously, the Japanese embarking at Chemulpo on July 17th 1885 and the Chinese going from Asan on the 20th. Yuan Shi Kai was appointed the representative of Asan China in Korea at about the same time, taking up his duties in October and styling himself "Resident", in which capacity he claimed rights even greater than those of a British Resident in India and refused to attend meetings of the foreign diplomats or to be considered in the same class with these representatives from the other Powers. In order to obviate difficulties at Korean dinners where it was necessary he should be a guest, he was always made the visé-a-vis of the host. When attending an audience at the palace Yuan was always invited at an hour somewhat earlier than the others so that he might have his presentation in advance. It was most humilliating to meet this arrogant bully riding calmly in his chair over the dirty and often maddy half mile of road from the palace gates to the audience chamber, while the other represent^{atives} were obliged to walk and ^{they} were usually hustled by the horde of Chinese attendants who accompanied their masters chair. The Chinaman is like the proverbial mounted beggar, and no one can be more arrogant and insulting than a Chinaman who feels that it is his priviledge to be so and that no harm will come to him from exercising this prerogative.

I was well aware that this conduct of the Chinese representative was most distasteful to the King and it was intimated to me that it would not displease the latter if the rest of us insisted upon having the same right of entrance in our chairs as insisted upon by the Chinaman. While Charge d' Affaires for about a year in 1893-4 therefore, I induced my colleagues to protest against such treatment and insist on being allowed to ride into the palace. The French and Russian ^{Japanese} representatives agreed to join me, but the British acting Consul General feared to annoy the Chinese and declined. While the Koreans desired to yeild to our request Yuan flatly refused to allow them to do so, not caring to lose this opportunity for displaying his superior powers before the natives. We therefore announced that we would refrain from attending the new years audience unless-allowed-to-ride-if obliged to walk through the mud and snow. The matter was compromised by the erection of a carpeted and enclosed galery all the long distance from the gate to the audience hall and we both won our points in a way, while the Chinaman saved his face.

After the rediculous fall of this haughty Chinaman on the advent of the Japan-China war of 1894, one of the first things done was to grant permission for all the foreign representtives to ride into the palace. The Japanese minister had promptly seen to this however, for when he went to the palace with a large military escort to see the King, he rode right through the gates in a carriage drawn by horses, - a most unheard of thing but a great eye-opener to the people.

These incidents are of interest as showing how the Chinese forced upon the Japamese the war of 1894. The arrogance of Yuan became most unbearable. He had the power of life and death over his nationals and I have witnessed the decapitation of Chinese on the streets of Seoul. He seemed to think therefore that some such rights could be exercised by him over the natives. I have known him to arrest, beat and imprison a Korean official for refusing to sell him his ancestral home which Yuan desired to incorporate in his legation.

14

The matter of telegraph lines soon became a subject of disagreement in which the Japanese were obliged to yield to China pending the great and final settlement for which the Japanese were steadily preparing from the time of the emeute of 1884.

On January 7th ~~the Japan~~ 1883, the Japanese had obtained a telegraph monopoly in Korea with permission to lay a cable between Fusan and Shiminoseki. This cable was laid, and opened on February 28th 1884. In utter disregard of this previous convention however, ~~Yuan-secured-a-~~ the Chinese compelled the Koreans to grant to them a telegraph monopoly on July 17th 1885 and they erected the line connecting Seoul and Chemulpo, completing it on September 4th of the same year, while they completed a line connecting Seoul and Peking, overland, on November 20th 1885.

This opposition had prevented the Japanese from connecting Seoul and Fusan so that their cable line was of little use. While the Chinese hesitated somewhat in erecting a line from Seoul to connect with the Japanese cable, they did do it through the use of the Koreans the line being completed July 8th 1888, *asa Korean enterprise*.

Of course all this opposition disappeared after the Chinese bubble had been pricked in the war of 1894 when all agreements and treaties between Korea and China were abrogated by the Koreans at the instruction of Japan, the latter taking over the Fusan line of telegraph but leaving the Wiju line in the hands of the Koreans. Connection being cut off at Wiju with the Peking line though messages could be carried over the river and forwarded from there.

The Russians, soon after the fiasco made by the Japanese in Seoul following their successful war with China, made a firm and protracted but unsuccessful attempt to get control of this northern telegraph line from the Koreans. The steady and plucky resistance made by the Koreans in this matter is worthy of much praise, especially as they felt indebted to the Russians for rescuing them from the Japanese.

In 1902 the Russian Minister made a most absurd and futile attempt to secure a telegraph line from Vaadivostock down to Gensan where it would be connected with the overland line to Seoul. failing to get permission to erect this line he sent over and had poles erected in a few cases as a sort of "dare". The Korean minister for Foreign Affairs promptly sent over and had the poles cut down. This sort of play was repeated once or twice until it was understood instructions came from S t. Petersburg to stop that kind of diplomacy.

On the successful opening of the Russo-Japanese war, the latter promptly took over all telegraph lines in Korea and their original monopoly began to be enjoyed after three armed conflicts because of this and other matters, during at three decimal periods.

The emeute of 1884 brought Korea the temporary loss of a portion of her territory, that occasion being one that England seems to have been unable to resist. On April 15th 1885 news reached Seoul that the British had occupied the Korean island port Komanto or Port Hamilton.

I should not dismiss the subject of telegraphs in Korea without mentioning an amusing incident showing the difficulties the Japanese had to contend with.

In April 1901 the Japanese Minister applied to the Korean Foreign Office for permission for his Government to erect wireless telegraph stations along the coast of Korea. This was promptly refused on the grounds that the Korean Government was about to erect such stations itself. The subject had probably never been heard of by any Korean and of course they had no conception as to what wireless telegraphy might be except that it was something desirable to the Japanese.

When the Russian war broke out wireless telegraph stations were in operation at various points along the coast under Japanese operators but the apparatus had not been put in place by the Koreans who are still blissfully ignorant of what wireless may be.

At the opening of the recent war and before the Japanese were aware of the great successes that were coming to them and were therefore very conciliatory in making agreements and asking for things in Korea, they requested the use of a high hill at Chemulpo for the erection thereon of a meteorological observatory. This request the Koreans promptly refused on the ground that they were about to erect such an observatory themselves. Poor things, they had to make some protest against losing all their rights but the course they took was usually a laughable and silly one. Later the Japanese took all this hill and much more, in fact they now take what they please and even private rights are ruthlessly ignored, many Koreans having died in trying to prevent the seizing of their homes by Japanese, and in some cases these were official Japanese.

So much for the matter of telegraphs in Korea.

The emente of 1884 brought Korea the temporary loss of a portion of her territory, though no one of her three neighbors was the aggressor this time. It fell to the lot of Great Britain to slip in while everyone was engaged and take what was supposed to be a most excellent and well located port but one which afterwards proved of little value and therefore the relinquishment was the more easy. Instead of occupying the magnificent harbor of Masampo as she might as well have done if she could not refuse the opportunity to take some port in Korean waters, she chose the Korean island port Komunto known as Port Hamilton. News of the occupation of this port by the British reaching Seoul April 15th 1885 and occasioning great indignation and consternation. Remonstrances were addressed to the British through Peking and Tokio and as the place was of little use anyway it was evacuated on February 25th 1887 under an agreement with China that the port should never revert to any other power.

It must be borne in mind that up to the China-Japan war of 1894 when the British deserted China and at the same time angered Japan, they had been the backers of the Chinese Government with whom they seemed to exercise paramount influence. For this reason they had consistently supported Chinese actions in Korea and had opposed Japanese or Russian aggression. The seizure of Port Hamilton was simply a small manifestation of real English spirit and in giving the place back to their owners with a string attached, they scored one of their usual and clever triumphs in never giving up a thing without some exchange, for they made this restitution to China, compelling her to agree to protect the place from foreign occupation and thus gaining her the good will of China at the same time.

making of Korea,

We had a wonderful opportunity in Korea at about this time. The Korean Government recognizing its helplessness had asked that an adviser and some military instructors be sent to them by our Government. This request was unheeded for a long time, though Admiral Shufeldt did start for Seoul on a private intimation from the Government as he was then retired. He delayed too long however and when he ^{arrived} he found an American acting as adviser in Seoul under Chinese instruction, which meant that he was never asked for advice by the Koreans who wanted no advice with a Chinese bias. When I reached Washington with the Korean Legation, General Sheridan was about to send to Korea several American military officers not in active service, since the

Congress had refused to detail such and General Sheridan's action was unofficial and made at the suggestion of the Department of State in order to relieve them of the importunities of the Koreans. It should be mentioned that when Prince Min Yong Ik was in Washington in 1883 to exchange the treaty ratifications, Secretary Chandler of the Navy had laid particular stress upon the advisability of getting some such American instructors, hence the decision of the King of Korea to request such. The mandate of the ruler having been issued it was most awkward for the Korean Foreign Office who kept importuning Ensign Foulk at the Legation, who knew of the suggestions made in Washington but who could get no satisfaction from the Department of State.

The men sent to Korea by General Sheridan made a hopeless fizzle and put us in a very disgraceful position and made it more easy for the Koreans to take up with Japanese and later ^{with} Russian military instructors when the time came. The chief of this military commission was a most estimable old gentleman, a graduate of West Point with a record of service abroad since his early retirement. He was entirely too old and feeble for such duty and he had with him an ex-confederate whom he took out of mercy to the latter's family as he told me, while a militiaman from Penn. made a third and an ex-man-of-wars man who had become clerk of our consulate at Kobe made the ~~fourth~~. These men fell out bitterly among themselves and the militiaman and ex-confederate were dismissed for outrageous conduct, while the other two remained on and were acting as guard in the palace at the time of the murder of the Queen in 1895. They left soon after

Gen. Win
1882, 1890

In the summer of 1888 the rumor was circulated from the Chinese Legation, whether in jest or not could not be ascertained, ~~as~~ that the foreigners were given to eating Korean babies. This resulted in the only rioting directed distinctly towards the Western Foreigners, and it caused such excitement that ships were summoned to Chemulpo for the protection of foreigners, and guards were despatched to the various legations. You may recall the fact that it was a similar rumor that caused the awful Tientsin massacre of the early seventies.

Having made a treaty with Korea, the Russian Government seemed all along to be suspicious of Japanese designs upon the country. As an offset to the exclusive Japanese settlement at Fusan, the Russians therefore concluded trade regulations for the Tumen River, with the Korean Government and incidentally secured an exclusive port where Russians could live and trade as could the Japanese at Fusan. This was at Kiung Hong, in the Northeastern corner of Korea near the border, being about 20 - 30 miles on the Korean side and while it lay inland there was a port near by which was to be used in connection with the trade for which these regulations were provided.

The Japanese were just as suspicious of the Russians meantime, and it seemed that Russia had her eye particularly upon Port Lazareff, near Gensan, where the Japanese strove to build up quite a settlement. When therefore the Korean Government in October 1888 placed an embargo on the shipment of beans from this port, to the very great detriment of the Japanese who had made large purchases, the Japanese minister in Seoul, who was one of a rather fiery disposition, made such demands as to almost precipitate war. The situation was saved however by the Chinese Minister Yuan, who came to the rescue after having had it enforced upon him that this was really a serious crisis and would be one with large results if allowed to proceed. The matter is settled by the common salve - an indemnity, and the Japan-China war was again postponed to a more convenient season.

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While the bean incident indicated to foreigners a somewhat beligerent spirit on the part of the Japanese, or perhaps it should rather be called an indication of an intention to stop any such trifling on the part of the Koreans under Chinese incentive, it was not until May 1893 that the small indemnity of Yen 110,000 was agreed upon by the Korean Government.

In 1889 the Japanese secured a far reaching but little noticed agreement from Korea in the fishing regulations of that year, which gave to their hardy fishermen a lucrative business amounting it is said to from two to five million yen per annum. This agreement came to prominent notice when ten years later, namely in 1899, a Russian secured a concession for catching whales and curing them at stations on the Korean coast. This was regarded by the Japanese as infringing upon their rights and as being a great detriment to their fishing enterprises since the whale meat is a much used flesh in the dietary of the Japanese. Further, it gave the Russians exclusive rights over certain unopen ports, which rights it was feared might lead to some more definite claims in the future. The Japanese therefore secured similar whaling privileges in the same year and during the next year, 1900, they greatly elaborated their original fisheries convention.

To return to the narrative however, there was not much of great interest taking place between the year 1889 and the war of 1894.

The Japanese during these years were slowly gaining ground in a commercial way and whenever they secured an opportunity they never failed to fleece the Koreans most unmercifully. A government contract seemed to mean to them simply a chance to practise the well known Japanese trickery and thus to deepen the distrust of the Koreans.

I know of no such contract carried out in an honorable manner. All sorts of old discarded machinery was foisted upon the unsuspecting natives by Japanese merchants acting in collusion with corrupt Korean officials. The approaches to Seoul from the river Han are now dotted with specimens of this sort of trickery. Some of you may have seen the old paper mill brought from Japan and installed in a great blue frame building near the river, which building would have fallen to pieces if the machinery could have been started, which it fortunately could not. The brick rice cleaning mill that never cleaned any rice: The brick weights and measures bureau ^{buildings} which ^{shikims} amounted to nothing and never was intended to amount to anything: The great brick and stone mint under Japanese supervision which coined the useless and trouble-brewing nickles, which the recent Japanese financial official in charge of Korean finances had to retire, to the great loss of the natives: The glass works afterwards taken over by the Russians and later used as a Japanese barracks, as well as numerous other useless enterprises begotten for the enrichment of some Japanese and always stoutly protected by the Japanese Legation, to the great confusion of the Koreans who could only consider that they were being exploited for the benefit of the Japanese.

Before leaving this subject I must allude to a later and most glaring case of Japanese trickery which occurred at the time of the proposed celebration of the fortieth anniversary of the enthronement of the ruler of Korea. This celebration was to have taken place in 1902 and was suggested to the vanity of the Emperor of Korea by the coronation celebrations in St. Petersburg and London, to which he had sent envoys and from whose accounts he evidently decided that some such return courtesy was necessary on the part of Korea. (the King had made himself Emperor in 1897)

For the proper entertainment of visiting admirals on the occasion of this celebration, it was decided that Korea must have a navy, and an admiral for each of the visiting admirals. The amusing part of it was that all these Korean admirals of whom their might have been a dozen, ~~was~~ would have had to fly their flags and entertain their guests on ⁱⁿ one ship which was to constitute the Korean navy. Instead of ridiculing any such venture and dissuading the Koreans from attempting it, the great Japanese Mitsui firm which is closely allied to their government, and who at the time had control of the lucrative Korean ginseng farms, urged the scheme upon the Koreans and actually sold them a man-of-war so called. This proved to be a British collier which was purchased for a price said to be less than Yen 200,000 and after being painted and given some useless arms, she was sold to the Koreans for Yen 550,000 and the Japanese ^{legation} saw to it that the firm were allowed to take their pay from the ginseng revenues. When the Russian war broke out this vessel which had been lying in the Chemulpo harbor, was taken to Japan and made over into a transport, without asking the permission of the Koreans, who it is believed had long since paid all that was claimed to be due upon the ship.

With such dealings constantly in mind it is not to be wondered at that the Koreans have no faith in the Japanese commercially, while their diplomatic dealings have left less reason ~~to~~ for faith on that score, even if the Japanese Government itself usually ^{only} shifts the blame for any injustice upon individual Japanese working with corruptible Koreans.

The last great demonstration made by the Chinese in Korea occurred in 1890 on the occasion of the death of the Dowager Queen of Korea.

The old lady died on June 4, 1889 but was not buried until October 12, 1890 when the bear was accompanied by a guard of American marines to the great amusement of everyone. Probably our marines never participated in a more grotesque ceremony. The matter was arranged by a newly arrived minister, a kindly old gentleman, who wished to ingratiate himself with the ruling powers and to assist a newly arrived American adviser, General Legendre. Though I was secretary of Legation and should have been present at the interment I persuaded my chief that it would be well to leave someone at the legation in case of any disorder and thus was enabled to avoid being a participant in that comedy.

The warm feeling formerly existing between the Chinese and Koreans had cooled off considerably owing to the brutal and overbearing conduct of Yuan Shi Kai, and the Koreans hoped to prevent the Chinese from taking notice of this death, knowing full well the costly and onerous character of any such official notice. A mission was sent to Peking to acquaint the Court with the news of the death and to beg that in consideration of Korea's bad financial condition a return mission would not be sent. This was not agreed upon however though Peking did agree to send its mission by sea rather than overland and thus save Korea much expense.

The embassy arrived in two men-of-war ~~and the King met them~~ the month after the interment, and the King met them outside the city walls. So great was the occasion that a great bridge had to be built over the city walls on which the embassy entered the town. The very greatest humiliation was placed upon the Korean King in punishment for his recent establishment of a mission in Washington. He was compelled to go outside the city to meet the envoy to whom he had to bow, and after installing his guests in a detached palace he was obliged

to make the first call and when they left he had to escort them outside the city and make his farewell obeisance.

As usual the Chinese overdid things and everyone resented their arrogance, which was of course most offensive to the Japanese. From that time on it seemed that the Japanese were simply waiting for a suitable opportunity to try issues with the Chinese and test their claims to suzerainty.

The failure to settle the bean embargo matter of 1888 until 1893, came near offering the necessary excuse for war though it seems to have been considered rather too trivial a reason. This mission of condolence, while most offensive in itself was still somewhat in order since the Koreans had sent an envoy to Peking to announce the demise of the Dowager. The

The refugee matter came near furnishing the casus belli.

From the year 1586 down to the establishment of the recent Japanese protectorate, the chief subject of discussion between the two people had been the return of Korean refugees from Japan. Political suspects have all along fled to Japan as the most likely place to secure themselves and they seem to have chosen well, for they have never been given up against their will so far as I can learn.

During the decade following the emeute of 1884 the great desire of the Korean King was to get hold of the progressives who caused the trouble of that year. He spent probably a million yen in various missions having that end in view. Giving up all hope at last of inducing the chief rebel Kim Ok Kium to return or of persuading the Japanese Government to send him back, an unusually daring man agreed to go over and assassinate him. This man Hong, therefore being well supplied with funds but fearing the swift justice of Japanese law, persuaded Kim to go with him to Shanghai after having won the full confidence of the latter. Arrived in Shanghai where they were both stopping at an hotel, Hong murdered Kim in cold blood, and when the Chinese kindly forwarded the body to Seoul it was cut into eight pieces and paraded about through the eight provinces. Hong was given high rank after returning from Paris and during the Russian supremacy.

This murder occurred in the beginning of the year 1894, and as Kim had long been a protegee of Japan and had been entertained at the Government's expense, this act and the calm acquiescence in the same of the Chinese, was a great affront to Japan and hostilities were expected to result almost at any time. A better reason was found than this murder however, though active preparations were in progress in Japan for war, which might have resulted even had no better cause been found.

Under Chinese dominance the Korean officials were able to enjoy a period of unlimited squeeze in which Yuan was said to have participated to some extent and the oppressed people were often deprived of their last and only bull or pony so that I have seen women hitched to the plow in lieu of plow animals. Conditions became so severe that, with Koreans in the south, emulating somewhat the old Taiping rebels of China, assembled under the Tong Hak banner as a righteous army. After committing many depredations such as robbing and burning magistracy residences, killing the magistrate and dispensing his wealth among the starving people, their forces were so augmented that they became a source of great alarm to the Government. In the spring of 1894 these insurrectionaries defeated the royal troops and began to march on Seoul.

At this juncture the Japanese Legation through the Secretary did some very clever work. Magnifying the danger to Seoul from these

Sugimura

Whose death from apoplexy at Rio Janeiro where he was Minister, was reported in June 1906

insurgents, it was easy to suggest that outside assistance must be summoned and the Min who had been the chief oppressor during these times and who feared for his life, very naturally turned to the all powerful Chinese Minister. The Japanese Secretary also plied Yuan with reports of the approach of these rebels and so worked upon him that he actually summoned assistance from China. After ten years of quiet the haughty Chinese cared little for any agreement with Japan and openly violated the Li-Ito convention of 1885 by sending troops to Korea, Asan being the landing chosen.

In the meantime Japan had had a system of spies, or rather an intelligence bureau, working in China for years in preparation for the expected struggle and actually knew more about the condition of rotten old China than any Chinese official would have been capable of understanding had the intelligence been laid before him.

Of course they were promptly informed of this move of the Chinese and while 2000 Chinese troops were landed at Asan on June 8th, 500 Japanese marines were landed at Chemulpo on the 10th and marched direct to Seoul, only to be relieved on the 13th by 800 troops, while on June 25th 5000 more troops arrived at Seoul and threw up intrenchments on the surrounding hills.

Before we could realize what was really taking place and right on top of a telegram to Washington from Admiral Skerett that there would be no war and that 15,000 more Japanese troops accompanied by 3000 transport coolies arrived, and on July 23rd the Japanese occupied the Korean palace. The Japanese Minister had previously demanded a plain statement from the Korean King as to the question of Chinese suzerainty but received nothing satisfactory.

On July 25th the "Kowshing" loaded with Chinese reinforcements was sunk off Asan by the Japanese "Yoshina" and on July 28-29 occurred the battle of Asan in which the Japanese conquered the Chinese forces that had landed but did not capture them. The remnant of this force finally proceeded by a circuitous route to Pengyang.

In the meantime the legations had secured marine guards and we expected that when once the avalanche of China's millions should begin pouring over the border they would sweep the Japanese into the sea. The Chinese seemed to think so too and feared their own troops more than they did the Japanese, so that those who could not take refuge at one of the well guarded legations, fled with Yuan Shi Kai, who made a very undignified and precipitate adieu from the scene of his pompous stage strutting for the previous ten years. He went so quickly that he left his mother and concubines in Seoul, a most unfillial & *undignified* act for a Chinaman.

Japan declared war formally on August 1, 1894 and the two armies met at Pengyang September 15-17, 30,000 more of the Hiroshima army with 5000 coolies, having landed on August 6th and proceeded to Pengyang.

You are familiar with the incidents of this war. The Chinese army with jingals, teapots and umbrellas failed to frighten the Japanese from the high walls of Pengyang, by their savage noises. The latter though attacking strong walls soon put their enemy to route and the Chinese army was never wholly collected thereafter. In fleeing the Chinese destroyed life and property in the most wanton manner so that that part of Korea had not recovered from the devastation when a Japanese army ten years later passed over the same ground in pursuit of the Russians.

The battle of the Yalu on September 17th settled the question and China's bubble was effectually pricked, while Korea came out at last from under the long dominion of her great neighbor whom she began to insult and vilify at the instigation of the Japanese.

End of First Section

Yesterdays paper was devoted largely to indicating the ancient claims of Japan, which had been asserted through 20 centuries more or less vigorously, and offset by similar claims on the part of China.

It was shown how the conduct of China in asserting these claims, led to a test of strength between herself and her small island neighbor Japan, in which the mistaken policy of Yuan Shi Kai had a large effect. He seems to have profited by that lesson.

It now remains to show how Japan lost the fruits of her great victory, and forced Korea into the arms of Russia, thus necessitating the great conflict to which the events narrated in these two papers naturally led.

Having succeeded so brilliantly in war and having at last effectually eliminated all claim of Chinese suzerainty or even influence in Korea, the Japanese proceeded to nullify all their advantages and throw Korea into the arms of Russia by a succession of the most stupid diplomatic blunders.

They laid out a system of reforms which they obliged the Koreans to embark upon, which, had they been successful, would have caused Korea to make as much progress in fourteen weeks as had Japan in forty years.

Among these reforms were such trivial interference with the individual rights of the people as regulations governing the color of the clothes to be worn; the length of the sleeves; the length of the pipe and the wearing of the hair, which was to be cut short. Only priests wore short hair in Korea and the Manchus when they conquered Korea, as has been explained, allowed the people to wear their hair as before the conquest. In Korea the hair is worn in a braid down the back until betrothal when the young man has his hair done up in a neat knot on top of the head covering a shaved portion. So long has this coiffure been worn that it has become recognized as a mark of manly beauty and of manly estate. I have seen gray haired men with their hair worn in a braid for the reason that they were never married. Such men moreover, namely those without the top-knot, are treated with disrespect and to them even children use the language spoken to an inferior. Naturally this so called reform struck at the most cherished rights and customs of the people and was bitterly resented.

Foreigners were moreover annoyed and angered by the overbearing conduct of the Japanese, while it soon became known that the latter were about to obtain monopolistic rights covering everything worth having in Korea, and Japanese were being put into all government positions at such a rate that the foreign representatives met and joined in a protest to the Korean Government against the grant of monopolies to any one nation and against the employment of an undue number of foreigners from any one nationality. Thus were the foreign community more or less ranged with the Koreans as against the Japanese.

Another mistake was that the Japanese authorities soon fell into the hands of a very small clique of Koreans who chanced to speak the Japanese language, and happened moreover to be men of a very bad reputation in Korea. Being dependent upon these people for advice and information as well as interpretation this clique used their opportunity to pay off many old scores and to improve their own positions. One of this party was prominently mentioned as likely to be the next ruler and there was reason for this report.

The refugees moreover, of 1884 were brought back and given the highest positions in the government where of course they were not at all trusted by the natives.

The palace was ^{naturally} of course in the hands of the Japanese and their Korean friends and though Japan had engaged in the China war for the sake of asserting the independence of Korea, the position of the foreign representatives in Seoul was about as anomalous as it was after the war with Russia. All matters were referred to the Japanese, but this very fact made the Koreans more anxious to interest other foreigners in their country and it was at this time that I secured for an American the first mining concession granted by Korea, one which has been exceedingly successful since.

An amusing part of the proceedings at this time was the treatment of China by her erst-while vassals.

The Japanese promptly secured the abrogation of all treaties and agreements with the Chinese Government but the Koreans did not stop here, they literally danced in joy over the prostrate form of their former friend, in revenge for the indignities put upon them by Yuan; indignities that had changed devoted admirers into a people jubilant over the fall of the giant.

Not content with merely abrogating the treaties, the Koreans willingly pulled down the marks of their subjugation by the Manchus and actually passed Chinese exclusion laws similar to those in force in our own country, and when later, it was thought necessary to introduce Chinese laborers, it was proposed if not enacted, that these should be limited as to their stay in Korea and in order to be sure of their departure on time, each Chinaman entering was to be photographed on arrival.

When the Chinese finally decided to renew treaty relations with Korea and sent a Minister with a large staff ~~expecting to put through~~ in February 1899 expecting to have the Koreans promptly conclude the kind of treaty decided upon in Peking, they found it impossible to get anything not already granted in the foreign treaties and even then were obliged to wait for nearly a year before concluding the treaty.

The Chinese Legation in Seoul, for a long time so powerful, has exerted no more influence since the war of 1894 than an ordinary Chinese merchant, and in fact some of these merchants have exerted more influence than their minister, while in case anything important really had to be attended to, the British Minister usually took up the case for ~~the~~ his Chinese colleague.

Thus was China eliminated from her ancient stamping ground which was supposed to become a sort of independent buffer state under the tutelage of Japan as a wedge driven in to prevent the long feared pressure from the north, a pressure soon to become intolerable to Japan as the result of her own mistakes.

The monumental blunder of this time however was one so great as to obscure all the lesser ones. I refer to the assassination of the Queen of Korea with some of her ladies in waiting and several high officials, by the Japanese and their Korean sympathizers.

up to the China war,

The old Tai Won Khun had of course been called into prominence by the Japanese, and his influence was sufficient to persuade the latter that all would go well but for the obstructions made by the Queen, whom he hated so bitterly, as has already been explained.

Finding things did not go along very well the Japanese Government had sent over one of the Elder Statesmen, Count Imouye, in October 1894 and he remained until the next July as Minister Plenipotentiary. He impressed one as a really great man and he did me the honor, though I was but secretary of legation, of calling me in to conference with him after he had been there through an unsuccessful winter. I urged him to drop the crowd of Koreans that had gathered about his legation and cultivate the King and Queen through whom he might work successfully. He adopted this course and I was the means of securing an audience for him with the Queen, who had never received any foreigner but myself previously. This plan worked admirably and the Count returned to Japan elated over his success, seeming to feel that he had put things in such shape that they would now run on smoothly.

He was succeeded by Viscount Miura, who announced in the Japan papers that he was but a blunt soldier and cared nothing for this new-fangled diplomacy and cared not to see Imouye as he had his own ideas of what was necessary for Korea.

He certainly had some original ideas. He promptly offended the royal family by coming to a great banquet given by the Queen on the anniversary of the day of her escape from the mob of 1882, *by* in ordinary every day dress while the others were in full uniform. He allowed collisions to take place between the Japanese and Korean troops or ~~soldiers~~, and finally on the early morning of October 8th 1895 the Queen was murdered according to a plan which the Imperial Court sitting at Hiroshima, found had been arranged by Miura who saw to its execution by the assistance of disaffected Korean *aided by* and Japanese adventurers.

On the approach of this mob to the palace I was sent for and on the way I stopped and got the Russian Minister to accompany me, as I was then simply Charge d'Affaires. As we entered the palace we saw the Japanese with their bloody swords leaving, and our telegrams to our governments, repeated to Tokio, gave the Japanese Government the first intimation of the conduct of their representative.

I may add that I felt somewhat responsible for the loss of the Queen, since I had calmed her fears after the strange actions of the newly arrived Japanese Minister by assuring her that with Japanese army officials in charge of the city and the palace, whatever happened, there could certainly be no bodily harm inflicted upon the occupants of the palace. Had it not been for this advice I have reason to believe she would have secreted herself when her father-in-law and Miura became so active in plotting.

The American drill officers before mentioned, were in the palace at the time of this murder, together with a Russian similarly employed, I mean as a sort of guard, and they saw much of the disorder though they were not in the part of the house where the murders actually occurred.

It is not necessary to go into the details of this outrage, all of which have been published in full. No one credited the Japanese Government with any connection with this act. It was simply a recurrence to barbarism of one of its agents acting on his own responsibility.

Returning to my house after witnessing the sad results of the morning's tragedy at the palace, I found eight of the highest Korean officials, not affiliated with the Japanese, as had taken refuge in my bedroom, one being wounded in the affair at the palace, and being dressed by my wife.

We kept these men at the Legation until the changes that took place the following February when Russia supplanted Japan in Korea.

After the murder of the Queen, for four months, the King was kept a prisoner in his palace and in constant fear for his life. We foreigners used to visit him daily to see that he was safe and to give him assurance, while an American missionary sent him food in a locked case each day lest he be killed by poison.

Miura had been promptly recalled and Mr. (Now Baron) Komura was sent as the Japanese Minister to Seoul. Count Inouye had returned for a few days but left suddenly telling me that his Government would not adopt his plans. He seemed disgusted with the turn of affairs and probably cared not to be held responsible for the outcome.

In addition to the refugees at our Legation there were two important ones in hiding at the Russian Legation, through whom the very able and suave Russian Minister at that time, DeWaeber, got into communication with the King and finally induced the latter to despatch a telegram to the Czar asking for Russian protection. I knew of this at the time from our own refugees and told it to my chief who had then returned, but Washington seems to have taken no notice of it.

On February 9th 1895 the guard at the Russian Legation was increased to 160 marines without apparent cause, until it was known that at dawn of February 11th, the King and Crown Prince, disguised in and in the chair of a court lady, escaped from the palace and took refuge in the Russian Legation.

Immediately after this sudden turn in affairs, the usual excitement took place. The pro-Japanese officials were hunted up and murdered in the streets or in their homes and their bodies were dragged about the town. The refugees at our Legation ^{together with} as well as those at the Russian Legation became the cabinet and my old friend with whom I had gone to Washington, was made Prime Minister. Japanese influence was henceforth a negligible quantity for the next ten years during the following decade. The ancient fear of Russian aggression; the failure of their plans in Korea, which had resulted in the Russians becoming the masters there, together with the forcible retrocession of the Liautung peninsula, ^{seems to have} convinced Japan that she must have with Russia a settlement similar to that she had forced upon China. The failure of Russia to carry out her pledges regarding Manchuria made a good pretext but after all, to the Japanese, the real point at issue was the control of Korea. Had Russia complied with the terms she had made regarding the evacuation of Manchuria and had still remained capable of thwarting Japan's every move in Korea, the war would have taken place just the same, and the Yalu timber concession would have furnished ample excuse as will be seen later on.

We Americans never failed to profit by fishing in the waters muddied by Japan in Korea. I have mentioned getting the mining concession as one of the results of the war with China, or rather of the after conduct of the Japanese in Seoul, and now on the escape of the King to the Russian Legation and the promotion of my refugees to be the cabinet, I was able to secure for an American the concession for

the railway connecting Seoul and Chemulpo. This man James R. Morse, had long been interested in Korea and had come from New York in 1892 upon the telegraphing request of the King to contract for the erection of this road. All had gone on well in the negotiations until the night when the document was to be signed. Yuan Shi Kai chanced to hear of it then and he promptly put a stop to further consideration of any such project. The treatment of this American in this instance was abominable but there seemed to be no redress as the Koreans could not help themselves and Washington cared nothing about such matters except to regard them as a disturbance and likely to cause work and worry.

When chance therefore placed me in a position of such influence with the cabinet I asked that this concession be granted and it was promptly acquiesced in though the Japanese had actually run a survey for the road but had neglected to get any documents covering it; seeing to think documents were unnecessary since they were in such complete control.

I noticed with much amusement that after the Russian war opened up the Japanese, profiting by their experience of ten years before, went to the opposite extreme of caution in asking the Korean Government, which was then absolutely under their control, for permission for all sorts of things and then taking sealed documents for covering any possible future contingency such as that presented by my getting the railway concession.

While the Koreans were entirely willing and anxious that we should have this railway, they had to inform me that it would be necessary for me to get the consent of the Russian Minister, which I agreed to do. (I should explain here that while I was simply secretary of legation, the kindly old gentleman who was my chief cared little for these matters and allowed me to go ahead about as I pleased even to writing despatches which he signed without reading.) On speaking to M. de Waerber, he shrugged his shoulders and told me that so far as he was personally concerned he would be glad to see us get that concession, but he would have to think it over. He thought it over for two weeks which was long enough for a message to be carried to Vladivostock and be telegraphed to St. Petersburg and the answer brought to Seoul. He then came and said it would be allright but (like a good diplomat) he wished to ask a favor also. He said his Government would be glad if Mr. Morse, who was to get the railway concession, would waive his rights to the timber on Dagelet island off the N.E. Coast of Korea, which Morse had held for ten years, in favor of a Russian who had secured a timber concession along the banks of the Yalu and Tiumen rivers. I telegraphed Mr. Morse in New York advising him to comply with this request, knowing that his Dagelet concession had long since proved to be useless to him. He assented by telegraph and thus was started the Russian claim to the border land of Korea, though I am perfectly certain that at the time, the concession was gotten with the full intention that it should be a purely commercial enterprise in connection with the construction of the railways of that region.

I will dismiss this railway matter by saying that the financial backers of the American concessionaire failed him at the last owing to the reports of uncertain conditions in Korea. He was therefore obliged to mortgage the concession to the Japan Specie Bank from whom he got funds to carry on the work almost to completion, when the Japanese willingly took it over on settlement of the mortgage and thus we got out of railway business in Korea, except that the firm who were constructing the road for the concessionaire took a contract for

building an electric road in the city of Seoul, which grew and enlarged until it included a lighting plant, water works and mines. With these railway, electric, construction, and mining enterprises, together with our large imports of kerosene and other manufactures, we were easily the foremost people in Korea in commercial matters up to the advent of the Russian war. All these advantages we threw away for nothing by recalling our legation from Seoul within ten days of the announcement of the Japanese protectorate and without obtaining any advantage for so doing.

If you will allow a slight digression I would like right here to state that we ^{321 13 7} follow an ^{imperial} ~~very foolish policy or rather stumble ahead~~ ~~without any policy~~ in much of our foreign dealings.

I have noticed that other powers, as in the case of the action of the Russians regarding the Seoul-Chemulpo Railway, usually get something in return for each and every favor they may grant, be it ever so small. In fact if it is small they will try to magnify it. This is notoriously the case with England. She will make a mountain off a molehill simply that she may have more of an asset for a possible trade.

I ~~firmly~~ believe that Japan would have allowed us a naval base in Korea had we played our part properly and desired such a thing. She wanted above all things to have her power fully recognized in Korea by the withdrawal of the legations and the transference of all dealings with foreign powers to Tokio. To secure our lead in this matter she would have made a great sacrifice. Although England was her ally I have reason for thinking the latter would have gone slowly, as in fact she did, in withdrawing her legation. Without apparent consideration therefore we promptly acquiesced in the Japanese rule without hearing a word from Korea and in spite of the fact that the first article of our treaty with Korea contains the following clause:-

"There shall be perpetual peace and friendship between the President of the United States and the King of (Korea) (Chosen) and the citizens and subjects of their respective governments.

"If other Powers deal unjustly or oppressively with either Government, the other will exert their good offices, on being informed of the case, to bring about an amicable arrangement, thus showing their friendly feelings". Treaty of May 22, 1882, Art. I.

I may add that Korea had an American, sent especially from Korea, in Washington at the time trying to get a hearing on this subject, but he was refused a hearing until after the action was taken, and I ~~can~~ ^{can} give good reason for believing that action was taken in recognizing the Japanese rule in Korea and withdrawing our legation because Mr. Root, our Secretary of State did not know of the existence of this clause in the treaty until after he had committed himself. Had he waited to get some advantage to America, he would not have made this mistake, and he might have taken the same action without seeming to be untrue to Korea, - a country opened up by us really against their will, and one that has trusted us most implicitly and granted us every advantage.

I might ^{mention} add another case in illustration. After the King of Korea had made himself an Emperor he greatly desired that the Powers should raise the rank of their representatives in Seoul to ^{Plenipotentiary} Plenipotentiary. I discouraged ^{such} such action on the part of America, supposing it would cause annoyance at Washington, but to my surprise President McKinley decided to promote me and told the Korean Minister so before advising me. Had I only been informed in advance by a cheap telegram and the matter held over till the time was ripe, I could have easily put through some business with which I was having great difficulty because of the action of the other representatives, my rivals. I would have had something to trade.

But I should have dissuaded such a treaty stipulation too

My attention has called to it.

resume.

Although a Russo-Japanese convention was concluded between Messrs Waeber and Komura, after wards ratified in St. Petersburg as the Lobanoff-Yamagata agreement, Russian influence grew apace as a result of the events following the war of 1894 and the murder of the Queen ^{in 1895.}

Following the example of the Americans, the French sought and obtained a concession for a railway to connect Seoul and Wiju. This was to be a Russian project in fact as it was intended that this road should connect with the projected Russian railways in Manchuria. I was urged by the Russian Minister to induce the Americans to lay down the broad of Russian gauge of 5 feet, or at least to make the bridge over the Han river of that width so that it could be used when the property fell into the hands of Russia, as it surely would according to his theory. I may add that while the concession for this northern railway lapsed because of failure to take up the work in time, it was not relinquished until the Korean Government agreed to build the road itself, using French materials and French engineers. Desultory work was still being done on the road by the Frenchmen when, in 1904 the Japanese military engineers took hold of it and pressed it to its recent completion, thus giving them with the Seoul Fusan line, (completed after the war began, though begun before,) direct rail connection from Fusan to Wiju where they will make connections by means of a branch line ~~to~~ with the Manchurian railway. Of course it must be borne in mind that French operations in Korea were synonymous with Russian and were so regarded by the Japanese. In fact much of later Russian action was taken under guise of a French project, but the Japanese seem not to have been at all misled.

Soon after Russia had become paramount in Korea a Russian Colonel came quietly to Seoul, Sterbitsky by name, and settled down in a house purchased by him in a retired part of ^{the city} Seoul. I suppose I know as much about this man as any one other than the Russians themselves and the French, though the Japanese probably knew everything they cared to since he had Japanese people in his house who were probably spies. The Colonel lived quietly in Korea from 1896 until the advent of the war of 1904. He traveled through all parts of ^{the land} Korea; made the most careful maps, in which he was assisted from time to time by other Russian minor officials and soldiers sent to him. He gave me a photograph he had taken of the lake at the top of the Ever-White mountains, which forms the source of the three rivers, Sungari, Yalu and Tiumen. There is no doubt that Russia was well prepared as to topographical knowledge of Korea when the war broke out. The Japanese were as well prepared however and made better use of thier knowledge.

I may add that Major Pariera of the British Army, attached to the British Legation at the time of the war, made journeys through the whole of Korea during 1904-5 in which he seems to have had the full assistance of the Japanese. He will have provided the British Government with a fine set of topographical maps and charts. *I take it that the matter of maps will be of future interest to you.*

During the spring following the murder of the Queen, of Korea, ¹⁸⁹⁶ 43 Japanese were murdered in the interior of Korea by the natives. The Japanese Government made a demand of Yen 5000 for each of these deaths. The Korean Government safely discomfised in the Russian Legation replied "If a Japanese peddler is worth Yen 5000 how much is a Queen worth". The matter was not pressed but when Japan began to take everything she wanted in Korea after the war of 1904 ^{she began to go her way}, she entered and allowed this claim as an offset for any future claim Korea might make if things became less favorable. *Having charge of the treasury she could pass on her own claims ~~was not~~ this time.*

Russian Admirals and high officials began to visit Seoul ~~Now~~ quite frequently, and soon a military commission arrived under Col. Potiata to take charge of the drilling of the Korean troops. Only three officers with ten non-commissioned officers came at first, but they were soon followed by thirteen additional officers, and a year later a grand scheme for placing the whole Korean army under the control of a new staff of 158 officers came very near completion but for the obstinacy of the then Korean Minister for Foreign Affairs, who utterly refused to obey the ~~imperial~~ mandate and sign the order. This man had been first secretary of the legation I took to America in 1887 and he came as near being a patriot as any Korean I have known. As a result of his refusal to do as ordered he was removed from office at Russian instigation and did not get back until the establishment of the recent Japanese protectorate. Naturally he favors Japan, though he desires Korea for the Koreans first.

After having lived over a year at the Russian Legation the King and Crown prince removed to a newly erected palace which practically surrounded the American Legation on three sides. The Russian officers had charge of the Korean-- palace guard. The removal took place on February 20th 1897.

The year 1897 was an eventful one in Russo-Korean relations. In addition to the frequent arrival of Russian officers for employment under the Korean Government, the wise and able Russian Minister de Waeber, who really loved the Koreans and had a way of getting all there was to be had in a very conciliatory manner, was replaced by a man de Speyer, after the style of Yuan Shi Kai. This man was most arrogant and seemed to regard Korea as an actual part of Russia. He was most offensive to his colleagues except the French Minister of course, and by his summary methods he soon brought Russian matters in Korea to a crisis.

A branch of the Russo-Chinese Bank had been established in Seoul by Mr. Pokotilloff ~~and~~ under the name of the Russo-Korean Bank, and branches were to have been started in the ports of Korea.

An official of the Russian Finance Department, Kir Alexeiff, came from St. Petersburg with assistants to take charge of the Korean treasury, which was done in spite of the remonstrances of Great Britain, because of the necessary ejection of an Englishman, McLeavy Brown, from that post.

The King took upon himself the title of Emperor in that year, and he changed the name of the country from Chosen to Tai Han (Great or exalted Han). The Russian seemed to encourage his vanity in all ways and he probably never had a happier time in his life. He was free from personal danger, was made much of by his new friends and busied himself with listening to and executing schemes proposed for his personal gratification.

The Russians seem to have a very pretty way of absorbing subject races. The victims are so well smeared with sweetness that they slip down the gorge with ecstasy rather than woe. The woe may come later on.

The Queen of Korea murdered in October 1895 was buried in November of this year 1897. That is, a supposed fragment of one of her bones was buried. The Japanese had wrapped her in mattresses saturated with kerosene and burned her body, but a finger bone was found and after having posthumous titles conferred upon her, the Queen now an Empress, had a costly burial which occupied two days and a night and the foreign representatives were entertained at the cemetery in new houses erected for them. A number of naval officers accompanied me,

on this occasion. Unfortunately I have not their names with me now.

The conduct of the brutal Russian Minister at this funeral ceremony was most insulting to his Japanese colleague who had been given the rank of Special Envoy to represent the Emperor of Japan on the occasion. The latter bore the insult quietly though rather to the disgust of some of us. He probably thought best to bide his time.

On March 1, 1898 this Russian Minister foolishly delivered an ultimatum to the Korean Government regarding the employment of Russian military officers, financial advisers, assistants, etc. The Koreans had wearied of his bullying ways so different from the soothing conduct of his predecessor, and to his great surprise and astonishment they accepted his ultimatum and he had nothing to do but withdraw all his officials as well as his bank.

He was replaced within a month by a man who erred on the side of doing too little.

The withdrawal of Russia from Korea at this time however was in reality as much ~~due~~ to the large operations she had just embarked upon on the Liautung Peninsula and in Manchuria, as because of actual conditions in Korea. They needed to devote all their energies to the greater enterprise, while Korea would keep nicely for future development.

I think, ^{some of} and the best informed Japanese have agreed with me, that had Russia left de Waeber in Korea, she might have gotten everything she desired and still have done it so smoothly as to have made war well nigh impossible. These Japanese expressed themselves as most thankful to Russia for having removed Waeber, and sent Pavloff after ~~one removed~~. (Matunine served between Waeber and Pavloff).

~~De Speyer~~ ~~De Speyer~~

In December 1898 the Japanese finally succeeded in getting a concession for a railway to connect Seoul and Fusan. I assisted in this very materially on the understanding that the materials would be purchased in America, an understanding that received not the slightest consideration until the war broke out and in the rush Japan bought heavily of us for all her railways, *because she was obliged to.*

From the date of the withdrawal of the Russians to the beginning of the Russian war the Koreans were absolutely independent. It was the only time they had been entirely without an overlord. Under the then Russian Minister, Matunine, the Russians kept hands absolutely off Korea even to the extent of allowing the murder, or execution, of the naturalized Russian of Korean birth who had been their trusted interpreter and who had made himself most obnoxious to the Koreans by his overbearing ways under de Speyer.

~~Suddenly~~ ~~left~~ ~~it~~ to stand alone their poor legs were too wobbly. Instead of getting up and cleaning house and making the best of their opportunity as they were strongly advised to do, they sat down to enjoy ~~th~~ themselves, and the official who could contrive a new dance for the hundreds of dancing girls of the palace, was more acceptable than he who could propose a tiresome reform. The ruler had been kept in close check by the late Queen but now that she was ~~gone~~ and buried and he was given full swing, he made the most of his opportunities.

In January of 1899 came the new Russian Minister Pavloff, who had been chiefly instrumental in getting for Russia the Cassini conventions, secret and otherwise, which gave Russia her great hold on Manchuria. ~~The~~ storm was so great that Cassini was removed to Washington while Pavloff went to the fertile field of Korean intrigue. He was soon in his element and he had much to do with bringing on the war.

Mr. Pavloff had been a naval officer and appreciated well the needs of the navy. One of the first things attempted by de Speyer was to secure a naval station on the large island in the harbor of Fusan known as Deer Island, which commands that town and harbor. This was in October 1897 and I promptly protested against any such grant as violating the ~~agree~~ treaty agreement between Korea^X and America covering a settlement at Fusan. Others took a similar course and the scheme was not put through though as the navy had spent much money in buying up land from individual owners they were allowed to retain it as a coaling station subject to future settlement regulations.

This did not satisfy at all, and furthermore, the near by port of Masampo offered much better facilities and was more attractive as a naval base. The Russian navy began to be reported as present at frequent intervals in this harbor, while as a counter move the British fleet began to be reported as at Port Hamilton though as nothing came of the latter action it will be dismissed.

Fearing future trouble in connection with these southern ports, the Korean Government upon friendly foreign suggestion and with the assistance of the British commissioner of customs, in June of 1898 set aside 900,000 square metres of land on Deer Island at Fusan for a foreign settlement. No settlement has yet been made there but the reservation of about all the available low-lying land accomplished its purpose. This action was made easier by the sudden withdrawal of de Speyer and the arrival of a new minister.

To make ~~ag~~ surance doubly sure however it was decided to open the port of Masampo to foreign trade, together with several new ports including one well up on the N.E. coast near to Vladivostock, -Sunchin. In about one year, namely in October 1899, these settlement plans were duly signed by the foreign representatives and the Korean Government, and immediately the Japanese government despatched a consul to reside at this townless port. *Masampo.*

In the spring the Russians had a consul at Masampo and both nationalities were busy in buying up land.

The Russian Admiral Hildebrandt, visited Seoul with a band of music and there were great festivities. This was in March 1900 and on the 20 th of April next it was announced that Russia had been allotted a special settlement at ~~Fu~~ Masampo.

This was the public ^{ANNOUNCEMENT} part but later it became known that at the time of the visit of Admiral Hildebrandt or within a few days thereafter, namely on March 30th 1900, the redoubtable Pavloff^{had} secured a private treaty granting to Russia the island of Kojai Do in Masampo harbor and gaveo controlling the place entirely.

The Masampo question soon became so acute that had it not been for the boxer disturbance in China, that year, matters might have come to a crisis over this question. As it was the Japanese secured for themselves a special settlement at that port as an offset to the Russian one and apparently waited to see if the secret Kojai agreement would ever be brought forth. Collisions between the two consuls at that lonely port, and between the two police forces, were amusing to the on-lookers and such questions had to be referred on occasion to the foreign representatives since the consuls could not settle them.

The years 1900 and 1901 were marked by a steady growth of Russian influence under Pavloff's ministrations. The secret agreement relating

Kojei remained a secret and the status quo was maintained at Masampo. For some reason the Russians began to keep somewhat more in the background and the French were advanced, presumably by the advice and consent of their allies.

Frenchmen were engaged in the post-office, in charge of the arsenal; to develop the mines; to conduct various manufacturing enterprises, and in the capacity of legal adviser.

On April 11 1901 the Russian timber concession began to loom up as something more than the negligible commercial enterprise it had formerly seemed to be, and was extended for a period of 20 years on ^{that date} April 11th.

On the 16-19th however the Korean Ministers for Finance and Foreign Affairs, with the consent of the Council of State, or at least with the seal of the latter body, executed a contract with a French firm for the loan of Yen 5,000,000 to be secured by pledging the maritime customs.

This fully explained an attempt that had been made on March 21st previous to oust McLeavy Brown, the Englishman in charge of the Customs and hand the same over to a French subject, which attempt caused the British to become exceedingly active and in which I was compelled to take an active part since such disturbance of Korea's financial affairs would have worked injury to American interests. The British and Japanese representatives for some reason, were not able to speak ~~right~~ out officially but tried to induce the Emperor to desist from the attempt to get rid of Brown and turn over the customs to the French in security for this loan. I did not feel so limited however and wrote an official despatch of protest, having first talked the matter over frankly with my French Colleague who did me the justice to admit that were he in my place with a prior lien on the Customs, he would do the same. Washington did not reprove me for this action so perhaps it was not disapproved. Had the protest not succeeded I might have been approved. The scheme failed however. Brown remained and the French loan was not accepted, though it brought a British fleet to Chemulpo and caused the expenditure of a small fortune in telegrams between Seoul and London.

I should add that while these negotiations were on but not yet made public, Admiral Skrydloff arrived with the Russian ships "Admiral Nakimoff" and "Rossia". The Admiral came to Seoul in great state and his presence helped the negotiations greatly. He was promptly followed by Rear Admiral Sir James Bruce on the "Barleaur" and on May 5th my notes show there were twelve foreign war vessels at Chemulpo: Four Austrian; Four British, Three Japanese and one Russian.

About this time there was a revolution on the island of Quelpart, which called two French gunboats to that region since French priests were endangered. This had nothing to do with the political situation, though it resulted in the arrival of Vice Admiral Pottier on June 17th at Chemulpo.

Captin Sperry also visited Chemulpo from June 11th to 17th but his visit was without significance. On the "New Orleans",

In May of 1902, the Japanese Government took an action that met with the bitter opposition of the Russians.

Having no banks and no proper currency, the Koreans had gradually gotten to using the Japanese money put in circulation through the agency of the branches of the Japanese banks in Korea.

So much of this currency was demanded for use in Korea that the First Bank, Dai Ichi Ginko, decided to issue notes for Korea with the assent and support of the Japanese Government. From the fact that these notes bore the image of Baron Shibusawa, President of the bank, they were known as "Shibusawa Notes".

Backed by Russian objections the Korean Government issued violent edicts against the use of these notes and for a year the subject was one of acute agitation, until on February 12, 1903 the Korean Government removed its objections upon the Japanese Charge d'Affaires issuing an ultimatum to the effect that if further opposition was persisted in the Japanese Government would make reprisals, accompanied with a private intimation that Japanese troops would occupy the palace. In support of this threat tracks were laid across the Chemulpo General Foreign Settlement roads for the landing of what was called "Heavy material", no permission was obtained for thus violating the Foreign Settlement and it looked as though war might be contemplated. The Koreans yielded and the incident closed.

Foreign fleets were frequent visitors to Chemulpo during 1902, including two American fleets under Admirals Evans and Rogers: Two British under Admirals Grenfell and Bridge, the French, Italian and German fleets. Admiral Sir Cyprian Bridge moreover visited Port Hamilton on leaving Chemulpo as though the British were still keeping their eyes upon this port.

During all this time of suppressed anxiety the Koreans were playing with their coronation ceremonies, before mentioned, and similar silly demonstrations of greatness.

Probably the most important event of this year however, was the arrival in Seoul of Baron Gabriel de Gunzburg, the Russian agent for the yalu timber concession, mines, etc.

Active operations were begun forthwith in the preparations for the development of this timber concession and in attempting to extort from the Koreans, concessions for mining rights. The Grand Dukes were supposed to be the financial backers of this enterprise which also had a sinister appearance to Japan from the fact that it would mean, if successful, more or less territorial acquisition on the part of Russia.

The Japanese met these moves by more rapid work on the Seoul-Fusan Railway for which they secured a reservation of a large tract of ground outside the south gate of Seoul.

I must make a little digression here to mention a rather amusing incident of the winter of 1902-3.

The various governments of the Treaty Powers had met the Korean request for the despatch of special envoys to the coronation celebration by appointing their local ministers, envoys for this purpose. Russia however sent a real special envoy in the person of its former able minister C. de Waeber. Pavloff took his ^{temporary} departure, presumable that he might not be outranked. The Russian Charge d'Affaires could not get

along well with the Envoy who was most cordially received by all, for his own excellencē and amiability. He brought with him the great decoration of St. Andreas ^{in diamonds} and all the lesser decorations that went with this, to be presented to the Emperor in return for a Korean decoration conferred upon the Czar.

The British had made the mistake of returning the Korean compliment by sending the Emperor the British decoration prepared for the Indian service, - Honorary Knight Grand Commander of the Most Eminent Order of the Indian Empire, - and this Russian decoration was to come in very acceptably after the indignity felt by the Koreans to have been put upon their Emperor by the British.

The coronation celebration did not come off ^{for} upon the ostensible excuse that there was small-pox in the palace, but really because the Powers had not taken it up as the Koreans desired.

The Russian decoration was withheld therefore pending the receipt of the desired Russian concessions. As there was opposition enough in Seoul to hold these back, Mr de Waeber went away in May 1903 taking the beautiful decoration in diamonds with him, ^{and closing this incident}

Yi Yong Ik

The Russians had as a potegée and palace intermediary, the most hated and most corrupt of Korean officials! The oppressions of this man grew so severe that in November 1902 he was about to be haled before the court, which meant that he would be killed. He was rescued almost from the hands of the police, by the Russian and French Ministers and taken to Port Arthur on a Russian gunboat. From whence he was brought back after he had been forgiven and reinstated. He was the Russian agent in objecting to all the proposed reforms or moves that might have mitigated the danger of the approaching war.

On April 23rd 1903 occurred the formal opening of the Russian Timber Company's operations. They seized upon the only available Yalu port, Yongampo for their depot though the Japanese, British and Americans had been trying to have this port or the near by one, Wiju, opened to general trade.

The Mr. Pavloff who had now returned, confided to me that there would be no objection to our having special priviledges at this port but that they simply could not and would not have Japanese there.

The Japanese had been conducting large timber operations on the Yalu, and the Russian Timber Agent informed me that he intended to seize all Japanese timber coming down the river. I informed our Government therefore in May 1903 that there would probably be bloodshed in that region as a consequence.

In the autumn of 1903 the Russians brought over from Port Arthur a large guard of Chinese to assist their Russian frontier guard.

These operations taken in connection with the failure of Russia to carry out her agreements regarding the evacuation of Manchuria, put the Japanese in a very bad temper, and still I felt that if the Koreans would only yeild to the request of the Japanese, British, and Americans, to open Yongampo and Wiju to trade, it might relieve the situation, by showing that they were not entirely under Russian domination. This they agreed to do, or rather the Emperor promised me, ^{in Dec 1902,} he would do so and so instructed the Minister for Foreign Affairs in my presence, but the Russian agent, the man they had rescued and taken to Port Arthur, was able to cause the Emperor to change his mind and as the Minister for Foreign Affairs was a man whom I had practically raised, ^{this way} it was thought he would carry out the Imperial order in my favor, therefore he was dismissed that same night and the Japanese saw that no one could prevail against the Russians with the Korean Emperor in a diplomatic manner.

On discussing this failure of our efforts to win the Koreans away from the Pavloff influence, with my Japanese and British colleagues, and upon considering private telegraphic advices from our well posted minister at Tokio, I decided that war was but a question of weeks, and as there was already considerable disorder in Seoul where we had considerable interests to protect, notably an electric railway that occupied the chief streets of the city, I telegraphed Washington that it would be advisable to station a ship at Chemulpo prepared to land a marine guard when necessary. My British colleague took the same course.

Washington however suddenly sent me a guard of 100 marines from the Phillipines on the transport "Zaphiro", with Commander Marshall of the "Vicksburg" as senior officer. These men were brought to Seoul in two detachments as they could not remain on the transport in that cold weather of the early days of January.

The Korean before mentioned as the Russian agent persuaded the Emperor that this action was an insult to Korea. It was amusing for ever before and very soon thereafter, the Emperor was most fond of having an American guard present. Realizing this to be but one of Pavloff's moves, though I had received a despatch from the Foreign Office which I learned later was suggested by Pavloff, to the effect that no guard was necessary and asking me not to bring one, I conveniently failed to receive this communication until the guard had arrived, the it being a fact that I did not receive it until after they had left their ship. I sent the secretary of legation to meet the men outside the walls of the city and when, in entering the gate a sentry stepped out to stop them, the secretary quietly brushed him aside and the incident was ended.

The hea Korean.

This may seem to you a shocking thing to do, but twenty one years of contact with Korean soldiers does not confirm one in a high estimate of the sacredness of the man on post. These Korean troops were mere coolies, trained to little else than to salute the Korean military officials as they passed in uniform, and forever committing the most unmilitary ^{they will} depredations.

As an instance of their standing with Seoul residents, I may tell one little incident that recently occurred while war was on. The only Russian remaining in Seoul was a strapping big woman who was married to a German merchant. These people had once kept a sort of saloon, much frequented by the cossack guards. I have seen her take these big fellows by the scruff of her ~~n~~ neck and kick them out of her front door as I was passing. She was a regular amazon. One day in passing through the city gate a Korean sentry made the mistake of insulting her. She promptly seized his gun, tucked him under her arm and took him off to her place, where she locked him up and refused to deliver him on demand of his officers. Whereupon the Minister of War had to appeal to the German Minister to get back his army. It took a regular trial in the German court where the officers were so cowed by this woman that they were glad to compromise with her on her agreeing to deliver up the prisoner. ~~Strange to say this woman was most friendly to me and as polite as a kitten, the reason being that when I once had her husband in my employ as a jailer at a good salary, I obliged him to marry her for decency's sake. She probably desired to maintain with me the re high-position I seemed to entertain of her.~~

Legend

The other legation promptly followed suit and secured legation guards, the Russian guards being marched overland to Seoul since the Japanese railway was just then too busy in transporting military stores to accept them as passengers, though they found no such difficulty in bringing the others to Seoul, including the French guard.

The Eastern newspapers made much fun of the "fly-speck" armies we had in Seoul, but I learned from reading one newspaper that a Russian fleet that had started for the China station was recalled on learning of the general advent of guards at ~~the~~ Seoul. This may have been a good hint to St. Petersburg as to what was the actual opinion on the spot.

Whatever St. Petersburg may have thought however, they seemed to leave matters pretty much to Alexieff in Port Arthur and Pavloff in Seoul. The latter was most indifferent. I had spoken with him in December about the opening of ports and had tried to show him that he was pursuing a most unwise policy, claiming that if insisted upon war would be the inevitable result. He treated with the greatest contempt the idea that Japan would dare think of going to war with Russia. When I pointed out that the temper of the Japanese people was so wrought up that the Government might be forced, even against its will, to go to war, he exclaimed that in that case they would soon get full satisfaction since it would be short and sharp and Japan's navy would be promptly done for for all time.

In further illustration of the false sense of security held by this man it is a fact that on the night of February 8th after 1500 Japanese troops had landed at Chemulpo, he dined out in company with some other Russians, and an American who was at the dinner asked him if he did not consider the situation critical, whereupon he replied that he did not at all, that if the Japanese wished to land soldiers let them do so since Russia would promptly land many more. The next day his three ships at Chemulpo were wrecks, his people prisoners or refugees, and he was confined to his own Legation.

1904

To go back a little at this interesting period I must explain that during December and particularly during January 1904, the Japanese had been very busy in erecting great stables for the accommodation of thousands of horses; immense stores of forage was being landed; we had reports of the landing of mysterious cargoes at out of the way places; as early as December 22nd Major General Iditti had arrived in Seoul as military attache though there was already such an official there. It was supposed this General Iditti was to look after the preliminary military preparations then known to be going on in Korea.

On February 5th Japanese subjects in the north of Korea were called to Peking for safety. On the 5th relations between Japan and Russia were practically severed by the withdrawal of the Japanese Minister at St. Petersburg.

On February 6th Japanese vessels arrived at Fusan and Masampo and landed troops, the original intention having been to march across Korea to Wiju. At Fusan the fine Russian steamer "Moukden" was seized.

On the 7th the Japanese cruiser "Chiyoda" shifted her anchorage at Chemulpo where she was near the Russians and left in the night for the near by anchorage, Asan, where the Japanese fleet was stationed in waiting under Admiral Uriu. The Japanese Minister informed me of this action but asked me not to telegraph it to my Government for a day or two.

On February 8th a fleet of Japanese transports entered Chemulpo harbor in the presence of the Russian vessel and landed 1500 troops, and the same night the Russian Minister in Seoul was enjoying himself at a social function. He complained afterwards that the Japanese had imposed upon him by cutting off his telegraphic communication. Of course they had. He, however, knew what the rest of us did of the

extensive preparations so long being made by Japan, and of the rumored landing of Japanese troops in the South. He had the fine cruiser "Variag" at Chemulpo together with the gunboat "Koriertz" and the good fast passenger steamer "Sungari". It would seem to have been his duty, if he could get no communication with Port Arthur, to send one of these vessels over as a despatch boat, or still better to send them all away out of danger. This may have occurred to him when it was too late, for on the 8th he started the slow "Koriertz" across, but she was turned back by the Japanese fleet outside. This news came to him at the close of the before mentioned dinner and seems to have been the first cause of agitation brought home to him.

On the next day, February 9th 1904 occurred the memorable battle of Chemulpo when, instead of sinking the obsolete and valueless little "Koreitz" and the passenger vessel "Sungari" and making a good running fight with the American built cruiser "Variag", the two first named went out together, having made no particular preparation for battle; met the Japanese fleet near Round Island and were driven back to anchorage with the "Variag" who had alone been in the fight, with a bad list and with her sides full of holes, as one observer said, looking like a pepper box.

In the afternoon of the same day these three vessels were sunk by their own officers in the Chemulpo harbor. The "Sungari" was soon raised and commissioned and the "Variag" was finally raised after much difficult work, the Japanese seeming to take a pride in restoring these vessels. The "Koreitz" was blown out of shape and remained a hopeless mass of tangled iron.

The crews of these vessels found refuge on the British ship "Talbot" the French "Pascal" and the Italian "Elba", and the wounded were cared for at the Japanese red-cross hospital at Chemulpo.

The presence of these refugee crews caused great difficulty to my British, French and Italian colleagues, and it was a long time before they could get rid of them.

Pavloff had asked me to come to see him and had then requested that I allow the "Zaphiro" to take all these men on board. I replied that I could do nothing without first asking Washington and that I would not telegraph unless he gave me permission first to secure the assent of my Japanese colleague. This he agreed to and I saw Mr. Hayashi, who consulted his Government and secured their assent providing the men were not landed north of Shanghai. This I telegraphed to Washington all within a few hours of receiving the request, but I never received a reply.

On Friday the 12th Minister Pavloff and his family and staff together with the ~~remains of his~~ guard and all other Russian subjects, were escorted to Chemulpo by a Japanese guard under Major General Iditti, and placed on board the French cruiser "Pascall", already crowded by so many Russians.

Seeming to feel that some sort of explanation was due from him for allowing his vessels to be caught in this trap, Pavloff used the leisure of his somewhat protracted stay in cramped quarters in Chemulpo harbor to write various statements, one of which concerning Commander Marshall of our gunboat "Vicksburg" you are doubtless familiar with.

It would seem to me that if there was any cause for complaint in this matter it was the Commander of the "Vicksburg" that had the cause since the Russians blew up their gunboat "Koreitz" within 300 yards of the "Vicksburg" to the great peril of the latter.

* without warning Capt Marshall

When it was learned that Admiral Uiu intended to enter the harbor of Chemulpo if necessary and attack the Russian ships, the commanders of the British, French and Italian vessels united in a protest against such "violation of a neutral harbor". This protest was sent out to the Japanese admiral by the steamboat belonging to the ^{But Ish Shahr} "Talbot" [?] Commander Marshall was not asked to join in this protest, the why and wherefore not being necessary since the fact remains that he was not asked. When the vessels were sunk, the Commander of the "Vicksburg" was the first to send his surgeon and tender assistance. -The Russians sent to him however and asked that he allow the crews of the ~~des-cred~~ ^{des-cred} ~~troyed~~ ^{des-cred} vessels to go on board the little "Vicksburg" he was obliged to ~~decide~~ ^{decide} as he had no room. He did offer the comfortable "Zaphiro" however, which offer would have been accepted had he yielded to the Russian request that he put her in commission. He said he could not do this without permission from the Admiral, with whom it would be very difficult to communicate at that time. The offer was then declined and we escaped the awkward position in which the other three nationalities were placed with their refugees, who it would seem should have been taken by the Japanese as prisoners. However, the Japanese were not yet sure of themselves and were inclined to go very carefully.

My failure to accede to Pavloff's request for the use of the "Zaphiro" following by Commander Marshall's necessary refusal, taken with the fact that Japan's ally as represented by the Commander of the "Talbot", had come to Russia's aid in heading a protest which the American had not signed, seemed to give the discredited Russian Minister a chance to attempt to call attention away from his own failures by directing comment unfavorably against us. His reports doubtless had an effect in Russia for only so late as August of 1905 I chanced to meet the (then) Russian naval attache of Washington who asked me about this incident, expressing his surprise that the American commander should have acted in such an ungracious manner. I was able to give him the facts almost first hand and he seemed greatly interested, and I fancy he made my remarks the subject of a report.

The details of the war are of course familiar to you and I need not dwell upon them.

On February 23rd, before the Japanese fully realized how easy it was to be to absorb Korea, they concluded a treaty with the Koreans virtually establishing a benign protectorate and agreeing to preserve the independence of Korea and "the peace and integrity of the Imperial House." This agreement allowed the Japanese to use Korean territory for military purposes, and under this clause they have gone on taking lands until every Japanese adventurer, of ^{whom} ~~which~~ there are thousands in Korea, seems to have been able to seize something on the ground of military necessity.

Dealings with the Japanese Government are usually very amicable and agreeable, while dealings with the individual Japanese official and especially the people on the spot, is quite a different thing. Our people in Korea are feeling the pressure of the Japanese on all sides, for the peninsula where we but a short time ago were in the lead, is now suddenly become too small for us. ^(can) The Japanese want it for themselves and look with particular disfavor upon the large American interests there, since our Government may be expected to stand up for the vested rights of its citizens. Contract obligations, therefore, of the most legal and binding nature, which were obtained before the protocol of Feb. 23rd gave Japan the control of Korean affairs, are being interfered with with a view of nullifying them entirely.

ahhantla

After succeeding so well with the war and finding that there was to be little opposition on the part of the treaty powers, chiefly America, to the actual absorption of Korea, the Japanese disregarded the protocol of February 23rd 1904 and in November 1906 they forced upon the feeble Koreans an outright governorship. While there is no doubt that Korean misrule had brought this condition of affairs upon themselves, and that in the long run the common people may profit by the change, providing the Japanese can and will restrain the greed of their own people, still it is sad to see a people lose their independence after having maintained it for so many centuries. It is worse humiliating to see the haste with which we recognized this rape of an empire where we were so implicitly trusted by the people and government and where it was so much to our own commercial interest to meet the new issue with decency and due deliberation.

As to the present condition of Korea and the Koreans I may quote from one of the most intelligent Korean's, - a man educated in America and France, whose letter reached me while I was writing this passage. He says:- "On the 1st instant (February 1, 1906) the flag of the Japanese Legation was finally and formally hauled down. (To make room for the flag of Marquis Ito, Resident or Governor General) The events of the past few months have been as sad as they have been humiliating. For your sake personal consideration I am glad you had to leave before the final scenes of Korea's degradation were enacted. They would have pained your sympathetic heart beyond description.

"Yet what else could have been expected from such a reign of corruption, imbecility and vanity as you and I have known during the past twenty years.

"Are we as individual Koreans any better off under the new regime? Not a whit bit. We are suffering from a double tyranny and a dual anarchy, as ---- (Min Sang Ho) said to me 'This is a hell'. We are countryless, friendless and lawless. Our new ministers (of State) Ye Kun Taik, Ye Che Yong, Ye Wan Yong, Pak Chai Soon, and Kwan Chung Hyen go about with ^{the} pomp and circumstance of Japanese power. Their sole ambition and efforts are directed to securing their position under their new masters. Japanese coolies go about all over the country grabbing everything, pretext or no pretext and terrorizing the simple Koreans who hate them like vipers. Highway robbery and blackmail are the most paying businesses in Korea. It is sickening to see the people oppressed and wronged by our protectors and protected criminals, without power to help themselves.

"The Foreign Office was taken over by the Japanese as the office of the Resident General on January 19th. All signs -and wonders- of the Korean independence are gone. But those who did most to bring the country to this deplorable condition of shame and misery are still in full power, sucking the last drop of blood there is left in the people". (Yun Chi Ho, Seoul Korea February 4th 1906.)

From an American who is at the head of large interests in Korea I learn at the same time that the Japanese are trying all possible efforts to compel his people to dispose of their interests at very greatly depreciated values. This is not the work of individuals but of the government officials. So far have they gone in this direction that a Korean concession covering American rights has been produced which is undoubtedly of recent draft but dated back so as to claim priority over the Americans.

Milling

It looks as though we had been the ~~mill~~ assistants in the opening of a regular pandoras box, the output of which will destroy our commercial life in Korea, while the effect upon our commerce in that small peninsula will be infinitesimal as compared with what we may expect to be the results in China and Manchuria. And while good authorities inform us that the Japanese are persistently promoting the Chinese boycott on American goods, and while Japan is negotiating for the purchase of our trans-Pacific steamers, and is fast getting control of the Asiatic coast trade, we ~~are~~ sending money to feed the Japanese reported to be starving, though I have searched my Japanese papers to find some account of any such assistance on the part of the Japanese Government. I have found complaints at the neglect of the Government, and some account of private subscriptions of less than a thousand yen from the Imperial family, but the Government that was able to borrow hundreds of millions for war seems not to think of borrowing for the succor of its reported starving people. *They all condemned military stores to the Japanese, thus leaving to the Government the American contributions.*

In June 1903 I made a most interesting trip through Manchuria, Siberia and Russia from Port Arthur, on the fine express train then newly installed. I saw ships unloading American goods at Port Arthur and saw evidences of the sale of these goods along the line. Even our bear was flowing freely along the railway line in Manchuria. Our train was drawn by American engines and our bread, in that wheat country, was made from American flour. I saw the Mujik as he was being brought in train load lots to settle the plains of Siberia. I had good opportunities to meet and talk with intelligent Russians who knew conditions. I was surprised to find that the French were not favored in Russia as I had expected they would be. The Germans I found were disliked and distrusted because the German agents in Russia were so commonly of the hated Jew class. The English were suspected naturally while the Americans were apparently looked upon with the greatest favor. As one man expressed it to me "The Americans are sympathetic". It struck me that it would be generations in time before Russia could become a manufacturing nation since it would take till the grand children of the present Mujik should be educated before that vast class could make intelligent artisans. In the meantime we would be able to supply the wants in the line of manufactures if we went about it right. It seemed to me too that if Russia were willing to spend the hundreds of millions of roubles necessary to pacify and open up that vast Manchurian country, we should sit quietly and take the benefits of this pioneering work, which was obviously to our very great benefit. By encouraging Japan as we seemed to do it looked very much as though we were liable to cast a friendly and people who could not well become our rivals and put in their place a tricky and clever manufacturing people who would see to it that we got none of the benefits of trade in the countries that would fall under their sway.

Of course there was the disadvantage of the Russian propensity to violate agreements, I mean the tendency of the Russian Government to such acts, the individual seems not to be so affected. But, the Russians I have known best are men of character who keep their word and I am satisfied there are plenty more of the same stamp in that country and that their counsels must in time prevail. In view of all these things therefore and the bearing in mind the traditions of the past I went to Washington on my return from this trip much impressed with the view that we were backing the wrong cause.



In the absence of the Secretary and Assistant Secretary of State, I explained my views to the President and Mr. Rockhill, the latter being virtually the director of our Asiatic policy at that time - October 1903. I did not seem to make much of an impression except to give the erroneous one that I was anti-japanese and pro-Russian.

To sum up the chief events leading to the recent war.

It may be said that the trouble really dated from the sixties when Russia became active in the Amur region.

When Vladivostock proved to be an ice-locked port and not so useful as it was expected to be, and especially when the Liautung peninsula had been obtained and operations were begun at Port Arthur, it became evident that Russia would try to obtain at least a portion of the desirably located Korean peninsula, which to them seemed like a wedge driven in between these two important fortresses, while to Japan the simile was that of an arrow pointed at the heart of their country.

On the Japanese side, ancient claims seemed to give them a particular interest in Korea, toward which land they had long directed their gaze. But for the Satsuma rebellion the China-Japan war might have been brought on in the seventies by the proposed conquest of Korea by Japan, but when this war did take place and the weakness of China was demonstrated, Japan took a new position in the eyes of the world, and what was perhaps of more importance, the Japanese people realized that their supreme confidence in themselves was not misplaced and that they were as efficient in modern warfare as they had long prided themselves on being in their own ancient system, and the essentially warlike and belligerent character of the Japanese must not be forgotten.

The China-Japan war was brought on by the arrogant claims of China under Li Hung Chang, and the brutal and insulting method of enforcing these claims by his agent - Yuan Shi Kai.

Smarting under the loss of the Liautung peninsula which was granted them by their treaty of Shiminoseki, only to be taken from them at the instigation of Russia, who promptly secured the same for herself and promptly obtained a paramount influence in Korea, Japan set steadily to work to prepare for the great contest of her history. While as has been said, the "Boxer" Masampo matter might have precipitated this contest with Russia but for the "Boxer" trouble, there was still the Yalu timber concession and all it stood for, as a cause of war, even had not Russian failure to keep to her pledges regarding Manchuria, furnished a better pretext since it put Japan in the position of righting the wrongs of the other treaty powers. Japan however seemed determined to have control of Korea, and had she been allowed to hold the Liautung peninsula as a result of her war with China, she might have been content with controlling it as an independent state under a Japanese protectorate.

In conclusion I may add that my Japan papers show that the Japanese are meeting with much difficulty in Korea where a feeble but general insurrection covering pretty much the whole country, is compelling the Japanese military to be more or less active, while over a hundred high officials are reported as being under

arrest in connection with the organization of this opposition, which is supposed to have the full sanction of the Korean Emperor. It is also stated that Mr. Pavloff in Vladivostock, is in communication with these leaders.

This movement may be taken as merely the dying gasp of a conquered people, but it shows the spirit in which the new position of Japan in Korea is taken by the people and that the commercial development of the land must be delayed by the existence of such a spirit. It is also an indication of what may be expected from Korean intrigue and Russian activity if such activity ever becomes a serious matter by virtue of the reorganization of the internal disorders of Russia.

It would not be surprising if this recent war should prove to be but the fore-runner of another great conflict.

Horace N. Allen.

Horace N. Allen
