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THE
NEED FOR ECONOMY AND COORDINATION
IN THE NAVY.

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By

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In order properly to treat a disease, it is required first of all that a correct diagnosis be made, in order that proper remedies may be applied. In endeavoring therefore to point out the necessity for the exercise of economy in the administration of the navy, and in making an appeal for coordination on the part of all who are concerned with that administration, it might be wise at the beginning to give a few pertinent illustrations as to existing conditions. All of us know that much money has been uselessly expended, because those charged with the expenditures have not been imbued with proper ideas as to economy. That there is lack of coordination needs little illustration. The fact is flaunted in our faces by any newspaper writer who may lack material with which to fill his editorial page. He complacently indites an article upon the Line and Staff fight in the navy.

The following are a few from the many instances of want of economy which are presented by Pay Inspector Mudd in his paper entitled "The Money for the Navy":

1. "A number of years ago at one of the navy yards, an old structure was converted into a combination office and stores building, containing the offices of three of the yard departments. There was no central heating plant in the yard. Two of the departments erected expensive steam heating plants in opposite ends of the first floor, and the third led in steam for itself from one of its adjoining buildings. This situation continued for years without an indication from anyone that he appreciated there was a joke living right in that building day and night, so set were our minds along the lines of the inviolability of bureau appropriation rights. Finally, one night, there was a difference of opinion among some electric wires in the building, and the three heating plants passed away, never to be replaced.

2. Today, at each of three of the navy yards, there are two mighty testing machines of one hundred thousand pounds capacity, alike, being from the same maker, and having been purchased under two different appropriations, and costing a mint of money. The largest ship-building plant in the world, were it ten times its present size, would have but one large testing machine; and yet these yards, of not nearly the same importance, have two each, the situation being due to the sharp line of division drawn by the fact of the separate bureau appropriations.

3. When one of the double turreted monitors was about to be placed in commission some years ago, it was discovered that the furniture for the vessel bore ridiculously excessive prices. The manufacture of this furniture, made at a navy yard, had extended, at least on paper, over a number of years, and the job orders covering, being left around loose, must have had tossed into them all sorts of stray expenditures for labor and material. For when the accounts were closed, the furniture was invoiced into store from the yard department that made it, at a total price of \$16,129.00, although a board of experts immediately appraised it at the value of \$3,249.00, the difference, \$12,880 being charged to 'waste'.

4. The boats for the battleships are built, as to kind in the same model and the same material. Recently, at one yard, it cost \$1890.63 to make a 30-foot steam cutter, while at another, not many miles away, it cost \$2684.62 to build exactly the same kind of boat, to put on board the same kind of battleship. *****

In the articles of output for the boats there was found even a greater variation of prices. For the standard 30-foot cutters, one of the yards had made boathooks for fifty cents apiece, while another yard had made exactly the same article at a cost of \$3.00 each. Awning stanchions were \$1.50 at one yard and \$3.50 at another. Rudders were \$6.00 at one yard, and \$10.00 at another. A tiller was \$1.00 at one yard and \$3.00 at another. Imagine an ordinary boat tiller costing three dollars! Why, a landlubber could buy a lawn mower for that money; and think of the gears, knives, rollers and other things in the mower. Only the other day, the writer bought, over the retail counter, for his own use, a pick handle. It is a handsome piece of finished work of its kind, made of hickory; it cost twenty cents. Cut in half, and with a little whittling, it would make two fine tillers.

And it should be kept in mind that the prices quoted are not the selling prices, as in the cases of the pick handles and the lawn mowers; they are not even cost prices. Numerous expenses, such as those connected with the general administration of the yards, purchase of material and yard storehouse handling, which are never added to these navy yard invoice prices, would, were our plant in the hands of the makers of the pick handles or the lawn mowers, go into the price of the boat tillers, etc. We sometimes forget this point."

Very earnest endeavor has been made by the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts to reduce the expenditures coming under its cognizance, and to clear away, so far as is possible, the complex methods enveloping the entire business of the navy.

In his annual report for the year 1907, the Paymaster General stated:

"During the year effort has been made to simplify the routine of the Bureau's work; to bring it, so far as Government methods and the requirements of law would permit, in consonance with the business world; to remove the complaints of creditors as to delays in payments, which still existed in spite of the improvements of later years; to supply early information to merchants as to intended purchases, and to meet, so far as an inadequate clerical force would permit, the demand for a more detailed account of expenditures under subheads of naval appropriations.

It did not take long to determine that the cornerstone of any system of bookkeeping that would give the expenditures under the subheads of appropriations must be some form of suspension account into which all stores purchased would go and from which all stores used must come. In the naval supply fund the Navy Department had such an account already in existence. If it could be extended so as to become a clearing house for stores, the problem was solved; the answer could be given. This Bureau, therefore, with the concurrence of all the other bureaus -

particular emphasis attaches to that phrase "with the concurrence of all the other bureaus", for without that concurrence this plan would undoubtedly have fallen to the ground,-

This Bureau, therefore, with the concurrence of all the other bureaus, laid before the Department a plan to consolidate under the naval supply fund all that stock technically known as "common general stock".

This plan was approved by the Department, and thus was placed under one account all the reserve stock of the Navy, with some exceptions, these being special stores peculiar to each bureau, such as fuel, ordnance material, boats, and some other purely technical supplies, and these will, in all probability, eventually pass through this account. In no other way is the keeping of accounts under subheads of appropriations possible.

In submitting this proposition to the Department the Bureau stated as follows:

"The Bureau will say, however, and without any wish to exaggerate, that the saving which will be made by this plan will be incalculable- so great that the Bureau hesitates to define it for fear of perhaps overstating its importance.

It must be said, however, that, in the opinion of the Bureau it will reduce the work of stock keeping in the navy yards, at a moderate estimate, 25 per cent; that it will so consolidate and strengthen the books of the Naval Establishment under the direction of the Bureau itself as to very largely increase their clearness and reduce their volume; that it is believed that it will, by the elimination of obsolete stores, consequent to the proper appraisal of material and condemnation of useless articles increase the available space in store-houses and probably influence the annual demands for augmenting

storage space in the navy yards and the erection of expensive and numerous buildings; that it will enable the Bureau, as the result of the proper consolidation and supervision of stores, to carry so large a stock as to settle the innumerable questions that are now arising as to setting aside supplies for specific work and job orders; that it will very largely reduce the number of open-purchase requisitions and resulting orders for small quantities of stock at uneconomical prices; that it will remove all temptations to accumulate undue reservations of stock at the end of the fiscal year; that it will permit the introduction of a system by which annual appropriations shall be specifically charged with all supplies used by them, either for issue or for manufacturing departments. Indeed, the Bureau might go on almost indefinitely multiplying examples of the increased efficiency and good administration that may be gained by this very simple change. It regards the proposed step as the most important and far-reaching in its effects of any that have been taken by the Bureau since the initiation of the naval supply fund itself."

This plan was approved by the Department and is now in successful operation with all the beneficial results predicted by the Paymaster General.

Again in 1908 he writes:

"The effort of the bureau has been continued during the year past to accomplish a further material shortening of official processes, a consolidation of duplicated accounts, the abolition of unessential reports, and, above all, the elimination, so far as possible, of objectionable outgrowths of the provisions imposed by law upon purchases; and though the bureau is, by reason of these very provisions, prevented from conducting its affairs as a great mercantile house would, it has at least endeavored to carry on its transactions in as businesslike way as its limitations would permit, and it believes it has, in a measure, succeeded.

It has been brought into closer contact with the commercial world and has established new connections therewith. A large number of firms which have never before tendered for naval work or supplies are now regular bidders. The result of its plan of going after business instead of waiting for it to come, as described a year ago, has brought about wider and keener competition, as the following comparative table will show:

	1907.	1908.
Number of firms bidding.....	11,057	13,243
Number of bids received.....	39,631	45,533
Average bids per class.....	4.07	5.58
Number of schedules issued.....	958	1,341
Number of copies of schedules distributed.....	742,900	1,075,900

Earnest endeavor has been made during the year toward the simplification of the navy yard accounts and the abolition of duplicate processes".

The Bureau of Supplies and Accounts strives to conduct the business of the Navy in the most economical manner possible without losing

sight of efficiency. It endeavors to carry on its work in the same manner as though it were the business management of a corporation whose aim is to produce results with the smallest possible expenditure. There is a belief in the pay corps that the Paymaster General exercises a miser's care over his official spending money. Allotments of funds from appropriations under control of the Bureau must be rigidly accounted for, and it is the feeling of many a pay officer that he is expected to get about \$200. worth of return from \$100. allotted. One paymaster recently told me that although his current allotment has been somewhat less than that of the two preceding years, and although additional work involving considerable expenditure has been performed without any increase in the allotment - instead of receiving a word of praise for his economical administration - he was informed that the Bureau noticed with regret the large expenditures that had been made from this allotment, and trusted that in the future he would endeavor to reduce them.

This policy of retrenchment was adopted before the beginning of the recent crusade against lavish expenditures on the part of the Navy. Indeed when a recent magazine writer undertook to inform the country as to how the millions of dollars which have been appropriated for the navy within the last ten years had been expended, he found nothing to criticise in the business methods of the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts. I do not mean to assert that our methods cannot be improved, but I do state most positively that we are bending every energy toward conducting our work after the most approved modern economical business methods.

During the last year, many reputable business men have congratulated us upon the modernizing of our practices, commenting upon the consequent ease with which firms may now transact business with the Navy Department. So far as we are able, we are checking useless expenditures and extravagances and are endeavoring to impress upon the other bureaus and their representatives both ashore and

afloat the necessity for economy. The time has come when the people of the country are demanding a rigid accounting for the funds which they appropriate for the Navy, and it will not be sufficient to appease them, to state that the work is of so highly technical, confidential and important a character that questions may not even be asked as to how the money has been spent.

To our great credit - be it said, ~~that~~ the integrity of officers of the Navy is never questioned, but so many glaring instances of incapacity in conducting business, which have resulted in wasteful expenditures, could be instanced, that the necessity for enforcing economy is immediate and imperative. While probably the greatest misuse - or perhaps I should say lack of intelligent use - of appropriations, has occurred at navy yards, there has been a direful waste also in expenditures on board ship. One need only have knowledge of the results of the Department's recent order to the Fleet to turn in all the supplies in ships' storerooms and to refit, to be convinced of the truth of the above assertion. We trust that the remedy for this evil has been discovered by carrying all stores for all the ship's departments in one general store, under the custody of a general storekeeper, and that a similar condition of affairs will not prevail hereafter. The reorganization and consolidation at navy yards is of so recent a date - being indeed still in process - that it is not necessary to dwell upon the undertaking or upon its results. That it came to pass none too soon is evidenced by the fact that a bill has been introduced in Congress, which if passed would take the entire management of all navy yards from the hands of naval officers and place it under the control of civilians, the idea of its author - presumably being that if private shipyards can be conducted without a loss, or indeed with a considerable gain, there would appear to be no reason why the government shipyards, if properly managed, should not also be run upon a similar economical scale.

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Now I beg you to believe, gentlemen, that the poor administration of navy yards will not be permitted to continue. Naval officers occupy in the yards, positions similar to those of president, managers and chiefs of divisions of large corporations, such as railroads and manufacturing plants. The people are the stockholders; Congress is the board of directors. When the stockholders are convinced that the business is mismanaged; acting through their board of directors, they simply dismiss the failures and secure competents to fill their places, that means, for the navy, the turning over of navy yards to civilian experts. A number of officers have informed me, that in their respective opinions, ships can be repaired at outside establishments, such as Cramps or the Newport News Shipbuilding Co., more satisfactorily, more expeditiously and more cheaply than at any navy yard. If Congress becomes convinced that this is a fact, it will not be long before it determines to remove naval officers from navy yards, and it would be a poor consolation to either the Line or the Staff to know that the other fellow has been turned out also.

There are none so blind as those who will not see, and it is this unwillingness to read the signs of the times which prevents us from seeing that a crisis is imminent. I do not desire to pose as a prophet, but even now I think I can see the hand writing on the wall. It is not too late however to mend matters. The remedy is in our own hands. While it seems inevitable that, if we do not get together and put navy yards upon a proper basis, they will be taken from us, it is equally clear that if we exercise judgment and common sense, by training officers and putting only competent ones at the work, we can produce results equal to those of any private ship yard. We certainly cannot do it though, so long as we devote our energies to fighting each other about who shall boss the work. Congress has been patient and long suffering with us, but some day, growing tired of our family quarrels it may cry "A plague o' both your houses" and tumble us incontinently out of navy yards. Thereafter, our viewpoint of those same yards will be only that of the man in the street.

~~managed, should not also be run upon a similar economical scale.~~

Pay Inspector Mudd writes:

"The main purposes of the navy yard are to build and repair ships, and to supply, manufacture, and repair fittings and equipage for the same, to furnish general supplies for the fleet, and to conduct experiments and tests relating to such work".

And again - relative to the subject of the management of the great shops and yard departments of our shore plant -

"If the flag-officers and battleship commanders are ever selected from the grade below, with the move should go the selection of the 'managers' in our shore plant, from the grade below. Even with a directive system established with which no one man can meddle, success will still depend on the human units- the managers and the bosses. The writer has often seen the efficiency of a yard department go up or down, with change of managers, no other bit of the machinery being touched."

Now it ought not to need a great deal of demonstration to prove that economy in navy yards can only be secured when officers who are trained in industrial work have the active management of the shops. It is not my desire to debate the relative merits of any class of officers for this work, but I do desire to emphasize the fact that it is just as necessary to have trained officers in navy yard shops, as on the bridges of battleships. When I say it is necessary I mean, necessary if it is to be the policy and aim of the Navy Department, to carry on its shipbuilding and ship repairing in the most advantageous and economical manner possible. A poor manager might build or repair a battleship and make the government pay twice the necessary cost, just as a poor navigator might run a battleship ashore and compel the government to build another one to replace it. Of course if we cut out the idea of accounting for expenditures, and are satisfied to produce results, on the theory that the country has plenty of money and it does not make any difference how much the work at navy yards costs, then my position is not tenable, since one can procure almost any material thing in this world if he is willing to pay any price for it.

"Any unit of an organization should be able to state definitely what is accomplished by it. In business, one must be able to state along with what he 'wants' to do, what it is

likely to cost to do it. No man is fit to be an active worker at any kind of a job, where the interests of others are involved, unless he has some idea of the cost. The man who says 'I know exactly what to do in this case but I have no idea of what the cost will be' is about as desirable a citizen in this age as he who loves to say that he knows exactly what he wants to say but that he cannot put it into words".

In an article in the "Saturday Evening Post" of June 26, 1909, entitled "Educating the Employer", Mr. George Frederic Stratton writes as follows:

"What is often estimated as success is, in reality, rank failure when the opportunities are taken into consideration.

It is in manufacturing, rather than in distribution that wasteful, inefficient methods cause a loss to the whole country, as well as to the owner of the factory. The man who is burning five tons of coal where four tons would do the work is wasting a natural resource. The employer who secures only seventy or eighty per cent of the possible productivity of his employees is causing as great a loss to the nation as the farmer who raises only fifteen bushels of wheat to the acre on land which could yield twenty-five bushels. Intensive farming is attracting the widest attention and the most urgent encouragement; but intensive manufacturing is a term which the writer has never yet seen in print, nor heard, except from professional business systematizers.

Still, it is being practiced in many of the larger plants, and the directors of others are being constantly aroused to the possibilities of far greater output from expensive equipment than they are now obtaining. To secure this an expert mechanical engineer is sometimes called in. He will probably rearrange the entire plant, so as to facilitate the handling of material. He may also regulate the speed of machines, and thus effect large savings in the amount of power used. Sometimes, again, an expert accountant is engaged, who devises a system of detailed shop-accounting which will indicate, infallibly, leakages as well as profits. And again, a factory systematizer may be secured who will introduce methods of paying hands by piecework, or bonus systems which will encourage stronger, steadier and more intelligent effort. In fact, it is on labor that by far the greatest gain has been made in large plants, a twenty to forty per cent increase in output, without any increase of labor cost, being no uncommon result of the introduction of scientific and broad-minded wage systems.

The introduction of these specialists or educators into a manufacturing organization means nothing more nor less than the education of the executives in new and advanced methods - in intensive manufacturing. But very often the efforts in this direction are nullified by the antagonistic attitudes of the pupils. An engineer of high reputation, but whose practice for some years has consisted almost entirely of developing higher efficiency in equipment and men, makes a statement regarding his experience which is here presented in his own words:

'The modern shop or industrial organization is an evolution from the primitive shop of one hundred years ago, in which the master was supreme. Similar organization existed in the armies and navies, all of these being line organizations.

Pilotage first, and later steam, forced the staff as an adjunct of the line upon seagoing vessels. It was Von Moltke's greatest claim to fame that he forced staff skill on the Prussian line and demonstrated that it would work'."

I am not unmindful of course, that in the Navy, Line officers are frequently detailed for Staff work, and that there are Staff-Line officers, as well as the regularly designated Staff officers.

Continuing from Mr. Stratton's article:-

"American and other industrial enterprises are, as yet deficient in staff. While real staff does not displace line it knows, momentarily, more than the line; the pilot being an example. No pilot can force a captain to enter any given port, but when the captain decides to enter that port he must, for the time, defer to the staff skill of the pilot as to what channel he shall follow.

Most managers in shops and other industrial undertakings have not grasped this idea of staff limitations, staff scope and staff authority. They resent the assumption that any staff member can know more than they do about their own business. They object to his exercising any authority, and even when this authority is exercised, as it often can be through the line officials, the latter reserve to themselves the right to pass on the value and practicability of staff requests.

Line managers, as a rule, owing to their misunderstanding of staff methods and staff conventions, cannot get over the idea that there is personal disgrace to themselves in admitting that any one else can produce better results; personal disgrace in allowing better results to follow the application of these plans."

I think Mr. Stratton has illustrated a misunderstanding that exists in the Navy.

As an example that honest endeavor to improve evil conditions is not always appreciated, the following might be instanced: In 1908 the President issued an order to pay navy yard workmen every week instead of semi-monthly as before. The work of all yard pay offices was thereby almost doubled and requests came from all quarters for additional assistance. The Paymaster General refused all such requests and informed officers that they must carry on the work with the clerical force at hand. Practically no increases have been made. It became evident immediately also, that very material loss would ensue to the government as a result of this order, due to the time lost from work on account of the order requiring that men be paid in government time. The Bureau directed its officers to devise, each

one for himself, a system of payment which would decrease the time lost. This was done in various ways at different navy yards and, by informing each pay officer of the methods carried on in other yards, competition was obtained, and it is estimated that \$100,000 or more is being saved the government annually. We had rather flattered ourselves that we had accomplished something really worthwhile until we read the following editorial in the New York Sun of June 15, 1909, headed "Navy Reform": It is common knowledge of course, that the "New York Sun" is at present conducting a campaign against the Staff corps of the Navy.

"We see it asserted in the papers, from some very high Navy Department authority, that 'the improved system of paying navy yard employees will save the Government \$125,000 a year! It is quite possible that an even greater economy could be effected, say at Kittery Point, Me., by arresting the manufacture of tubs, buckets, squeegees, etc., and buying those articles in the open market at one-third the price. Nevertheless this saving in the pay service is worthy of consideration. It amounts as we understand to \$125,000 a year - a good round sum which would make the eyeballs of the average farmer bulge.

We trust, however, that this tremendous retrenchment has not been achieved at the cost of any diminution of the pay corps. When we heard last from the New York Navy Yard there were nine or ten - or was it really eleven? - assorted paymasters stationed there, most of them with no apparent duty save that of joining in the general staff cry for more help, more politics and necessarily more influence. Maybe the saving in question has been accomplished by a lopping off in New York and elsewhere of these beautiful and bright adornments. We really do not know.

In a general way, however, this announcement of a considerable economy in the pay system of the navy yards is welcome if not altogether intelligible. We have long believed that these same navy yards are costing the country at least eight times as much as they ought to on even the most easy going scheme of expenditure, but in the hurrah of clashing ambitions and conspiracies we have never been able to identify the special and peculiar leak. It has seemed to us in fact that the paymasters, the doctors, the constructors and the civil engineers have been engaged in an affectionate rivalry as to which chief can get the most out of the Government, assemble the largest number of 'subs' and assistants, obtain the biggest possible appropriations and otherwise intrench himself most securely in the interests and expectations of our frugal Congressmen. As Mr. Joseph Jefferson used to say, 'We may be wrong, doubtless are; if so, pray correct us.' From this distance the proclamation of a great saving in the navy yards through the medium of the pay corps neither enlightens nor disenchants us.

It is our fancy, meretricious no doubt, that the entire administrative system of the United States Navy is in dire need of reorganization. We do not think, however, that anything serious can be achieved by isolated and empirical action. Our opinion is that reform should begin in the Department itself, with its bureaus and the false atmosphere that has followed their establishment. An economy here or there amounts to nothing. No wholesome structure can be erected upon such a foundation. Let us assume that \$125,000 a year has been cut off through the pay corps of the navy yards. The system remains, and ten times \$125,000 a year may easily be squandered under its regime.

If there be any officer present whose ship fitted out at the New York yard prior to the recent cruise around the world, perhaps he might have a kindly word to say about those nine or ten ornamental paymasters.

There would seem to be little doubt that the wasteful methods heretofore prevailing in navy yard business methods are due primarily to the lack of harmony among the various corps of officers, which has prevented that coordination and cooperation so necessary to the successful conducting of any work.

Pay Inspector Mudd writes in regard to this:

"What an acceptable, inspiring word coordination is. The mention of it brings one's thoughts to peaceful achievement, to modern triumph over that business demon, WASTE. In the navy it means something like the general peace in Europe, where the dusty boundary stone is not needed to mark division between neighboring mighty states, the demarkation being more clearly shown by unbroken lines of waiting bayonets. Such is coordination today among the Bureaus."

For an example he cites the following case:

"Some years ago, an ambitious general storekeeper at a busy yard, determined it would be a good thing to have a motor truck for delivering supplies to ships at the water front. The Bureau of Supplies and Accounts approved the idea, and the Bureau of Yards and Docks was asked to authorize the purchase. This was refused. Then Supplies and Accounts sat up for several nights reading law, and decided that it would be perfectly legal to buy the truck from the appropriation 'Contingent, Supplies and Accounts'. When the purchase had almost been made, Yards and Docks heard of the move. A call to arms was sounded in that camp, and in short order Supplies and Accounts was politely but firmly notified that if the truck was bought it would be seized at once, carried off to the yard stables, and there locked up with the oxen and timber-wheels.

As the regulations gave the civil engineers charge of everything on wheels or hoofs, including the devil wagons, the truck was not bought. Maybe the general storekeeper still requisitions the yard railway train - a locomotive and flat car - to carry a hatful of supplies to a ship, or, in case the train be away hauling a monkey wrench or so for some other department, takes the bull by the horns, and sends the stuff down to the ship in a handcar, pushed by a dozen or so husky voters at a pace that would make a snail blush and hurry out of sight".

This want of cooperation and coordination cannot help impressing itself upon anyone who seriously and honestly considers the subject. During my seventeen years service, it has been a matter of continuous wonderment to me. I have found that officers almost without exception have been willing to work assiduously and without complaint for the improvement of that branch of the service which they represent. It cannot be doubted that all of them in time of war would undertake any hazardous employment, - with the expectation of loss of life, - cheerfully and willingly; that in time of peace they will go to any part of the earth and do anything which their country demands. They will make personal sacrifices without complaint, provided it increases the credit of that particular branch which they represent; but so settled is the determination to proceed on those narrow lines only, that it appears almost beyond power to effect intelligent cooperation. The whole difficulty of course is explained in the long and bitter fight between the Line and the Staff. Instead of all working together for a common end, the various corps insist upon misdirecting their energy by proceeding - each along its own line; and rather than swerve a hair's breadth from that line, or, admit the possibility of a better course, each one rejoices in pointing out the mistakes of the other. What would seem to be needed under present conditions is a reconciling committee, which should decide all questions arising. The common head is frequently incapable of doing this by reason of lack of knowledge. He must necessarily be completely at sea when he has been advised by one officer of high rank that a certain thing must be done, and immediately afterward another officer of

equally high rank, but of another corps, recommends a directly opposite course. Either one might be correct, but it is more than probable that an intermediate route is the right one.

The chief difficulty seems to be that each separate corps is a stiff necked generation. Why this should be the case is difficult to explain. While one perhaps is willing to admit that the points of view of officers graduated from the Naval Academy and those appointed from civil life might in some cases be different, it is not conceivable to me, for example, how the Line of the Navy and the Construction Corps do not find it easy to perform their work in absolute harmony. All of the members of each have received the same education, and presumably up to the point of entering different corps, have the same sentiments and the same ideas. It is remarkable therefore, that in every question at issue, every naval constructor should be confident that Construction's contention is absolutely correct, and every Line officer be equally sure that it is wrong. Isn't it rather probable that both may be a little wrong, and that if a real desire for harmony and coordination prevailed, differences could be settled out of court- that is, out of the Secretary's office?

The various corps expend much of their energy in finding fault with and gleefully criticising the errors, mistakes and omissions of their brother officers. If anything goes wrong it is instanced as an illustration of how incapable that particular corps is. No one objects to honest and sincere criticism provided the critic is striving to accomplish the same end as the one criticised, but if the criticism be accompanied by slighting comment or sneer, no possible good can be accomplished.

One could hardly conceive that the various members of a board of directors of any large railroad or other corporation would rejoice over the mistakes made by other members which would result in direct loss to the corporation itself, but one doubts that many tears would be shed by any corps of the navy upon hearing of serious mistakes that had been made by another corps, even if those mistakes cost the government many dollars.

Esprit de Corps is a fine thing and much to be desired, but it has reached too fine a degree of cultivation, when every member of each corps thinks that his own corps is omniscient and infallible. And yet I ask you is not that the blind faith which most of us now have? Did any of you ever know the son of a Staff officer living his boyhood amid Staff surroundings and with Staff beliefs who has gone to the Naval Academy and thence into the Line who has not become an ardent Line man? And is not every son of a Line officer who has come into a staff corps equally as strong a Staff man? And there are many instances of both transitions. Ought not this to teach us that, since it is a certainty that both cannot be right, there is probably between the two blind beliefs a rational and practicable course of procedure?

I am thoroughly convinced that the desired goal of united effort can never be attained until the different corps have merged their opposing ideas into a common cause. When we have reached that stage where Line organizations and Staff organizations are abolished and a strong harmonious united navy organization is built up, we may hope. That the members of Congress who hold the fate of the navy in their hands cannot legislate intelligently at present, is not surprising, when one has knowledge of the diverse opinions and antagonistic statements that are presented for their consideration. They must be so veered and hauled about by these honest and

intelligent, but fanatical gentlemen- and I don't think fanatical too strong a word - as at the end of "hearings" from Line and Staff representatives to be veritably at sea. It seems to me that in all questions involving the welfare of the navy in general, and by that I mean personnel, navy yard administration, increases- in fact I can think of practically no general exceptions - all differences should be settled by the navy itself; that there should be no secret committees, conferences or boards, and that before any subject is presented to Congress for action, every trace of opposition in the navy itself should be eliminated before such presentment. The existing status might truly be said to represent two hostile camps, between which messages are sent only under a flag of truce. The Line and Staff are suspicious of every action of each other; propositions from one to the other are searched for possible "jokers". Efforts to work in harmony are attempted but are treated as suspects. The motto for each appears to be "Timeo Danaos et Dona Ferentes".

A suggestion has been made, apparently with seriousness, that possibly the difficulties might be solved by amalgamating the paymasters and the constructors with the Line. Such a proposition ought not to be seriously considered by the Line, the Pay Corps or the Construction Corps, for while perhaps such action might serve to overcome our personal grievances, it is hardly to be believed that the efficiency of the navy as a whole would thereby be increased. In these days where everything runs to specialties, the jack of all trades is ordinarily good at none, and I have no hesitation in stating that our best work can be done only so long as our corps is preserved as a separate organization.

I doubt if many other officers are aware of the feeling of pride which possesses us on account of the work which we have accomplished during the last two years. The success of this work, is, in no small measure, due to perfectly legitimate corps pride. We honestly try to make the spirit which actuates us an endeavor to serve the navy rather than to serve the Pay Corps, although perhaps it has not yet reached the stage where, when we are smitten upon one cheek, we turn the other. We have earnestly striven of recent years to obtain the very best material possible for our personnel. The importance of the work devolving upon us has demanded this. Our entrance examinations have been made as rigid as possible, and last year, the Bureau endeavored by correspondence with various colleges to have promising representatives of those colleges designated. In 1901 the Paymaster General, in his annual report, recommended that appointments to the Pay Corps be made from Naval Academy graduates, and I for one paymaster, would be very glad to see our corps recruited from the Academy, provided that only midshipmen who were desirous of transferring to the Pay Corps, and who had indicated during their six years course an aptitude for business and for the kind of work devolving upon us, would be selected. We should naturally be unwilling to accept only the "tail enders".

It is of course, desirable that every officer acquire the navy spirit at an early age. But by that I mean a new and enlightened navy spirit, not the old antagonistic corps spirit which prevails at present. After transferring to the Pay Corps, the assistant paymaster would be expected to sever all connection with the Line, since it must be manifest that all his interests and expectations should be bound up in pay department work solely. His training at the Naval Academy would

undoubtedly enable him to render better service in time of actual battle than had he not had such training, but during the time of preparation for war, the importance of the work at hand would demand all his energy and time.

It can hardly be denied by any fair-minded Line officer that the prevailing spirit in the Line heretofore, has been that the Line is the navy; that the Staff members are in the navy, but not of it; and even yet, there appears to be a great deal of the feeling "I am better than thou". It would be an easy matter for the Line, acting as a body, to eradicate this feeling in short order, and its eradication would remove the worst disease with which the navy has ever suffered. That the disease does exist is instanced in articles which are constantly occurring in newspapers. This particularly annoying boil cropped out in the May "Bluejacket", which is published almost within the shadow of this building and whose editor, I am informed, is an enlisted man:

"Now that we have surgeon-admirals, pay-admirals and and constructor-admirals, would it not clarify the situation somewhat if they were allowed distinctive flags to fly over places under their exclusive control. As enlisted men, our art information and knowledge of color combination is not of a very high order, but we do humbly offer the following tentative suggestion for suitable flags: For the doctor - two pills on an Epsom salt background. The paymaster - two crossed pickles on a flat bean soup color. As to the constructors (we beg pardon, we meant Heads of Manufacturing Departments) we are somewhat in doubt, but as a temporary expedient for the H.M.D. we suggest a clinched fist toward which jagged rays of lightening converge, with a picture of J. Paul Jones in the starboard topside corner suffering from nausea. Of course we hardly expect that these crude suggestions will meet with favorable consideration - the wife-admirals, even could get up some jig-saw designs from the Ladies' Home Journal patterns that would have our poor attempts beaten a mile".

In writing that article the man must have felt that its publication would not be frowned upon by a large portion of the strongest body of officers in the navy.

Notwithstanding all this, the germ of the spirit of toleration has been planted, and is now growing, and perhaps an optimist may

hope that before long beneficial results may be produced.

Evidences that the necessity for coordination is impressing itself upon the commissioned personnel of the navy appear from time to time. In an article entitled "Some Remarks called forth by the Able Essay of Pay Inspector Mudd - and a Plea", Commander Hood, in the Naval Institute for June writes as follows:

"With the fundamental principle enunciated at the beginning of the essay, 'The industrial and commercial part of the naval establishment is the auxiliary of nothing; it is a main part', I am entirely in accord" x x x x x

and farther along -

"To meet this thorough organization, definite policy, and ceaseless planning of our possible enemies in war, what have we in our naval organization? We have a general board of insufficient membership and precarious tenure, a war college without practical staff, an insufficient office of naval intelligence supported by four attaches scattered over the face of the earth, and the over-worked chief of bureau of navigation. Do you think, my brothers, such archaic means are sufficient to meet the thorough organization of our prospective adversaries? I do not. And yet whenever there is a whisper of a general staff, so loudly called for by the teachings of the times, to advise the Secretary in matters of military need, naval policy, correction of proven faults in material, and bear with him the responsibilities of having the 'fleet in being' prepared and planned for war at all times - which is now everybody's business and therefore nobody's - we hear the wail of Chinese walls, desires to own the earth, the trampling of rights, and what not!

Believe me, some of us would-be reformers are looking for nothing personal, and expect nothing from the reforms we advocate but the general good that would accrue to the service and the country. We see - or think we see - a grave danger to the country should a serious war occur under existing conditions; and we see - or think we see - the remedy from our study of war and history. This remedy we believe to be the institution of a proper general staff in the personnel branch of the departmental organization, a remedy that has so signally proved itself in every leading military and naval organization of modern times. We are not looking to smite the other branches of the service, which are in fact just as important and necessary in their way. So why should our friends of the staff cry out in alarm when they are not hurt, and raise the flag of opposition when any mention even is made of any proposal to increase the military efficiency of the fleet? In fact, any properly organized general staff should have on it representations from all the corps who have to do with the building and maintenance of the fleet, - surgeons, paymasters, constructors and marines. So why the eternal wail? Is it that the general non-military duties of the offices performed overcome the military associations of the

professions of the officers of all corps in the navy to such an extent that it blinds them to vital military necessities? Let us hope not, and forget for a while that we belong to this corps or that; but are all officers of the navy, necessary in our several capacities. You, the essayist, forget for a while that you may be Pay Director Smith, let him forget for a while that he may be Naval Constructor Jones, and I will forget for a while that I am Commander Robinson; and then let us be plain Smith, Jones and Robinson, three officers of the navy, who owe to it and the country our best efforts; and then get down to brass tacks and work together for the 'best' good of the whole service, whether we think our slice of reward from the national pie counter is of the largest or not."

If it were understood that the scope of the proposed general staff is to be limited to the purpose outlined by Commander Hood, viz: "To advise the Secretary in matters of military need, naval policy, etc"., and that the general staff is not to dominate either the Secretary or the Bureaus, it is probable that there would be no more "walls of Chinese walls, desires to own the earth, the trampling of rights, and what not". In this connection however, I should like to offer the following extract from a statement of the Secretary of the Navy before the Committee on Naval Affairs, United States Senate, Monday, February 1, 1909, the General Board being under discussion:

The Chairman. This board, which is a matter of regulation and not of statute, is not in any way either above the Secretary or standing between him and the President.

Secretary Newberry. No, sir: not at all. It is an advisory board, just what it is called.

The Chairman. It is simply an advisory board to be called upon by the Secretary to furnish him with information on which he will act.

Secretary Newberry. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. Are any reports of this board in its conduct here made directly either to Congress over the head of the Secretary or to the President over the head of the Secretary, or are the reports and suggestions and advice made to you, when you call upon them, and do you purpose anything that will change that?

Secretary Newberry. No, sir. The reports of the board are made to the secretary and the references come from the secretary. They are a branch of his administration and a very important and desirable branch, too.

I think I can say that so far as I know in no part of the reorganization which I have heard or read of is there included a desire ostensibly to make a general board or a general staff, or something of that character which will appear to be an advisory board, but as I questioned the gentlemen who have spoken to me about it I find that the

advisory board must have executive authority with which the secretary can not interfere, and in the last analysis of any reorganization plan which you may read about in the papers you will find it claimed that the advisory board must have executive authority. I give that to the committee because I will not be here again before you and I wish you to act in the light of that remark when drawing any plan.

The Chairman. You are not in favor of that?

Secretary Newberry. No, sir; or anybody else who has the welfare of the navy at heart.

Senator Tillman. You are not in favor of having the Secretary of the Navy a mere dummy, with the advisory board running the department.

Secretary Newberry. No self-respecting man will act as Secretary of the Navy and be a rubber stamp for any board.

Senator Tillman. Of course not."

If anyone thinks that the Staff Corps have not cause to doubt as to whether that which they deem is due them will be given, let him hark back to the days of Admiral Porter and remember what happened to the Staff corps in those days when the Line officer was the supreme power in the navy. Let him look today at the composition of the General Board of the navy. Will he not wonder why if, to quote Commander Hood, "Any properly organized general staff should have on it representations from all the corps who have to do with the building and maintenance of the fleet,- surgeons, paymasters, constructors and marines",- the General Board, which, as I understand it, acts in the capacity of advisor to the Department, does not have representatives of these staff corps. Would that not be a step in the direction of harmony, coordination and consequent efficiency?

It would be in line with the idea that all general policies of the navy should have the benefit of the experience and ability of the various kinds of officers which compose the personnel. For example, the question of supplies is frequently given consideration by the General Board, and I believe that an experienced pay officer with a knowledge of business, such as cannot on account of his training be possessed by any Line officer, would be of great value as a member of the General Board.

We are all familiar with the celebrated comment that an army travels upon its belly. The navy's belly is complex. The sailors require food; the ships' furnaces eat up coal; the engines drink oil; the guns devour ammunition. The entire ship demands such a variety of food that the proverbial digestive apparatus of the ostrich is simple in comparison. The food for this complex organ is designated as supplies, which are furnished by that industrial and commercial part of the naval establishment which - as Commander Food and I agree - is the auxiliary of nothing, but a main part.

"The supply business touches the front line of war. It reaches from the mill and the shop, from the storehouse and the factory, to that advanced spot many miles away where the battle is waged. Do not forget that if there is no coal at hand for the furnaces, no oil for the engines, no powder and ammunition for the guns, and no food for the sailors, all strategy and tactics are worthless. The supply business, no matter how commercial in character it may be at times, is a leading military consideration."

To be sure the information relative to supplies can be and is obtained from the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts which is near at hand, but the same might be said to be equally true of other information which could be obtained from the Bureau of Navigation, or the Bureau of Ordnance, or the Bureau of Construction, all of which are equally near the Department. The point is that if all matters of general policy were threshed out in a General Board, which was really general and not solely Line, having representatives from all branches of the service, the likelihood of subsequent opposition and bitter contests might be avoided.

omitted
If there be a real desire to give due recognition to staff officers it might also be suggested that in the composition of the staff of any flag officer afloat as set down in the annual navy register, the fleet surgeon, the fleet paymaster and the fleet

omitted
marine officer,- whose identities are only ascertained now by searching through the list of officers on the flagship and found with the word "fleet" in parenthesis after their names, just below the midshipmen,- might be raised to association with the fleet ordnance officer and the fleet engineer officer whose duties might not be regarded as dissimilar.

I have not the slightest desire to question Commander Hood's sincerity - my friendship with him and respect for his opinions antedates my entry into the service. The major part of his remarks is pleasant reading even to a staff officer, but I wish that he might have omitted this paragraph:

"So why should our friends of the staff cry out in alarm when they are not hurt, and raise the flag of opposition when any mention even is made of any proposal to increase the military efficiency of the fleet?"

Our cry of alarm is not because we think we are hurt, though it might be because we are dreadfully afraid that we are going to be hurt. We have been burnt children several times. And we have fancied at times, that we had even helped to increase the military efficiency of the fleet instead of raising the flag of opposition.

And again just after referring to surgeons, paymasters, constructors and marines he says:

"So why the eternal wail? Is it that the general non-military duties of the offices performed overcome the military associations of the professions of the officers of all corps in the navy to such an extent that it blinds them to vital military necessities?"

In passing one might state that ordinarily marine duty at least might be considered military. An incidentally we paymasters do not think that our duties are non-military. I would go even further than the writer when he asks me to forget for a while that I am "Pay Director Smith". I would be willing to forget every time that I am "Pay Director Smith" when the business under consideration is "to get down to brass tacks and work together

for the 'best' good of the whole service."

Until the last year or so when Staff officers were ordered to the Naval War College, there appeared to be a distinct objection to having Staff officers serve with Line officers in any work involving broad questions. The Staff officer's opinion might be asked, and he might write a paper embodying this opinion, which paper however must be submitted to and passed upon by Line officers. The entire commissioned personnel of the navy is zealous, energetic, and patriotic. The outsider might find it difficult to understand why the different members of the various corps who are theoretically working for the same end,- namely, the welfare of the navy, cannot get together and haul away in unison. Instead, each corps mans a different line, and has a few skirmishers on the outside lying in wait ready to lay a stumbling block in the way of the other fellow. The resultant course which the "Ship of State"- or rather navy- pursues, instead of being short and direct, resembles that of the beginner on the golf course.

I agree with Commander Hood that if we could only reach the point where everyone of us had as his goal the success of the navy rather than the success of the corps of which he is a member, it could not be doubted that our duties would be many times more efficiently performed than they are now. So far as I can remember the entire navy has been united only once. This was in the endeavor to obtain the passage of the pay bill last year. While undoubtedly all of us believed that the increase would indirectly promote the efficiency of the navy, it is hardly to be doubted that our keenest interest was aroused by the personal benefits which would accrue to us as individuals. As it has been shown that we can unite for our own individual interest, should not every one of us endeavor to cultivate the spirit of uniting for

the interests of the government? Isn't it a much more worthy aim to strive to further the navy's interests even though it be at the expense of corps and individuals, rather than to look out for, first the individual, second the corps and last of all the navy?

Professor Wilson showed us in his interesting lectures upon the work of the International Naval Conference in London how much can be accomplished when men who differ not only in ideas, but also in nationalities get together in a spirit of accord and with a desire to accomplish a general good - respecting the details of which general good however, there are very diversified opinions. By each one giving a little here and there, and receiving a little here and there in return, a result was obtained of which all the participants may be justly proud. In finishing its work the Conference stated:

"The conference has thus taken up the work of codification begun by the declaration of Paris in 1856. It has worked in the same spirit as the second peace conference and taken advantage of the labors accomplished at the Hague. It has been able to solve some of the problems which, owing to lack of time, that conference was compelled to leave unsolved. Let us hope that it may be possible to say that those who have drawn up the Declaration of London of 1909, are not altogether unworthy of their predecessors of 1856 and 1907".

It is doubtless due to the wise selection of their representatives, by the different nations at this conference, that so much was accomplished. Probably most of the representatives were careful, patient and tolerant, and probably the predominant factor was the spirit of toleration, - the willingness to try to look at every question from the other man's point of view. If this much could be accomplished by men so different in training, life time habits, language and nationality, it would seem that a conference of representatives from all the corps of the navy carefully selected, particularly with a view to qualities of patience, recognized ability and toleration, and particularly possessed of that rare attribute - common sense, might meet

together and solve ^{some} at least, of the vexed questions, which, due to the radically opposite ideas of the different corps, have perplexed the navy for so many years. And I would select only those men who have indicated, either by action or argument, that they are willing to forget, at least during the session of this conference, that they are "Pay Director Smith, Naval Constructor Jones and Commander Robinson," respectively, and to remember only, that they are "officers of the navy who owe to it and the country their best efforts", and to their country, when in its service, they should give only their best efforts, and all of them.

I was much impressed a few ^{weeks} ~~days~~ ago at reading in "Collier's Weekly", relative to a tariff discussion the following:

"The independent oil producers of Oklahoma, men opposed to the Standard Oil Company, constitute one of the most important industries of that State, probably the most important next to farming. They are extremely eager to have a duty on oil. They form the backbone of the group which has been pleading with Congress to give them this duty. They are good men, much more entitled to consideration than most of the interests clamoring for protection. Senator Gore comes from Oklahoma. By every law of politics he would be expected to obey the wishes of these powerful men in his State. In an analogous situation, a Senator from any State would count it his highest duty to work for what a powerful industry in his State demanded. That is what is done in ninety-nine cases out of a hundred - it is the very method by which the tariff has been made. But Senator Gore did not vote for a duty on oil. In casting his ballot to put that commodity on the free list, he delivered a speech no less high in its literary form than sound in political morality. That speech closed thus:

'I confess there is a good deal of human nature in me. I wish that this cup might pass from my lips. Many of the independent producers in the State of Oklahoma are my personal and my political friends. They would render me any possible service and I would reciprocate. I would render them any possible service that I could without violence to my conscience and my convictions. Perhaps my attitude on this occasion is attributable rather to verdure than to virtue. Perhaps when I have grown older in statecraft and in political finesse I may revise both my views and my policies. Mr. President,

I am not unaware that I may now be making a serious, a fatal political mistake. I am not unaware that I may be ordering a political casket. I am not unaware that I may be like the ancient queen lighting my own funeral pyre. But sir, I shall never demand a protective duty in behalf of a product or an industry in my own State until I am willing to concede protection to every other industry in every other State of the American Union'.

These are patriotic words. The disappointed oil producers of Oklahoma must respect Senator Gore for them. If the governing motive of fifty Senators were the same as Mr. Gore's, what a tariff we should have!"

If the patriotic spirit which moved the senator to utter those words could germinate and grow in the heart of every officer of the navy; if every one of us could be convinced of the necessity for abandoning our old battle lines and all uniting to work together, then might the navy receive benefit by every pound of energy that every officer possesses, and we might in this time of peace, - our civil war ended - intelligently and zealously prepare for foreign war.