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NATIONAL ENLISTMENT;
VOLUNTEERING REGULATED AND INSURED.

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NATIONAL ENLISTMENT - VOLUNTEERING REGULATED AND INSURED.

The principle that the State has the perfect right to demand military service of all individuals able to bear arms is as old as the idea of organized government. In fact, any government so weak as to fail to announce and enforce this right would be too feeble to avail itself of protection under the first law of nature, - self-preservation.

Strength is as much a necessary attribute of government as justice and wisdom, for without strength neither justice nor wisdom can avail. The mandate "Be strong, quit ourselves like men" is written of nations as well as of individuals.

Our government has placed itself on record, both in the Constitution and acts of Congress, announcing in most positive terms the right to universal military service, but has failed to specify and fix the manner in which the individual shall be enlisted into the military service and become a soldier.

In our fundamental law, the Constitution, we find: "Congress shall have power to raise and support armies." This is a general, unlimited and far-reaching power. It covers every able-bodied man, and every dollar coined by the authority of the United States.

It is a fact that all grants of power made by the Constitution to be effective must first be occupied by appropriate legislation by Congress.

The military arm of a nation is an indispensable force for maintaining

order at home and respect abroad, when local statutes and the dicta of international law fall short of their appointed uses.

The army, the navy, and the militia are the muscles of the military arm. The power of this arm depends on the strength and quickness with which these muscles obey the will of their master, the general government.

The two prime necessities in creating and maintaining a military establishment are men and money.

In regard to Money.

Our fundamental law, the Constitution, provides for these necessities as follows: "Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises x x x". This is the general grant of power, one of the seventeen with which the people empowered the general government when they "ordained and established this Constitution for the United States of America". Further, Congress has occupied this general grant of power by the enactment of extensive and minute legislation fixing and regulating taxation, viz: our laws imposing duties on foreign imports and those regulating internal revenue taxes.

Thus the financial duties and obligations of the government to take the necessary steps to insure the possession of sufficient funds by the treasury to defray the expenses of the various branches of the government, including the military establishment, are fully met.

In regard to Men.

The Constitution reads: "Congress shall have power to provide for the

common defense x x".

"To raise and support armies x x".

"To provide and maintain a navy".

By what specific legislation to insure the services of the necessary men in the military establishment have these general powers been occupied by Congress? Strange as it may seem, the answer to this question is "None".

The grant of these powers by the Constitution places upon Congress the manifest duty and obligation to enact an Enlistment Statute that will insure and regulate the presence of the necessary number of men for duty with the military establishment, according to the varying needs of the nation. Some form of statute which will insure the supply of the soldier element in the military establishment with the same degree of certainty with which the money question has been solved. Without a competent Enlistment Act, it is impossible for us to have an army in the real, modern sense of that word, for men are the brawn and muscle of war, while money is its sinews - each useless without the other. Without an adequate Enlistment Act, we must look forward to the certainty of sending into the field to fight our battles mobs of varying and uncertain numbers, lacking in organization, instruction and discipline.

When it is asked who serves in our army, we must answer, "Anybody from anywhere, if fancy or misfortune happen to suggest enlistment". We characterize this system of neglect by the pleasing and flattering conceit that we rely entirely for our soldiers and sailors upon the voluntary enlistment of our citizens. As a matter of fact, we are dependent on the caprice of the unemployed to fill our ranks. As a result of this condition, the government has

been obliged to go into the labor market and attempt to buy with money military service, as corporations and individuals hire labor for railroads, mills and breweries. This has degraded the conception of military duty in the eyes of the nation to a level with purely commercial and mercenary occupations. As a result of this situation, the soldier is generally considered simply as a fellow with a job, and his pay is contrasted, without any modifying or qualifying considerations, with the wages of civil laborers.

This is the principal cause of that blind and almost universal inability of our people to appreciate the enormity of the disgraceful crime of desertion. If the railroad or mill workman can quit his job without disgrace or ignomy, why shall not the soldier enjoy the same right?

You cannot buy honest and faithful military service with money--you cannot pay a man for his life, you cannot even compensate him for the dangers, sufferings and hardships of war, with dollars and cents. The government must dignify the position of the soldier in the nation by recognizing his importance. The government must ennoble military service by demanding it of all able-bodied citizens as a matter of duty and honor. Of course, the soldier must be cared for while in service, for he is the most important part of the machinery of war and cannot do his work unless he is properly cared for, fed and clothed. And after leaving the ranks he should be compensated as far as possible with all reasonable material comforts for any loss of limb or health which he may have actually suffered in the service. Our government has always been most generous to its soldiers in regard to money, pensions and splendid cemeteries; it is only in the matter of moral encouragement and recognition that it has been negligent and niggardly.

Now, in peace and prosperity, is the time for us to study our most serious military weakness, recognize fully its cause, and prescribe the remedy.

By allowing ourselves to drift into the position of attempting to buy military service in the labor market, instead of demanding it as a matter of duty and honor, we have degraded the position of the soldier, made our army mercenary and alien to the sympathies of the people.

Were our army not alien, would any man dare discriminate against or insult the uniform? This outrageous condition has gone so far that several states have enacted remedial legislation to protect the soldier in uniform from insult in public places. This welcome legislation is in the nature of a rebuke to the general government. The soldier is the servant of the nation. National legislation should protect him and his uniform from insult, without waiting for the matter to become so outrageous as to cause the individual states to interpose in his behalf.

Let us look back in our history and see how our peculiar methods of enlistment have worked in peace and war.

In Peace.

At no time in our history have our enlistment measures, in peace, ever contained anything more positive and businesslike than a vague and feeble invitation to citizens in general to enlist in the military establishment, provided that such act was entirely in accordance with their convenience and inclinations. No direct appeal to the people to enlist for motives of honor or duty has ever been made. It has been the practice of our government to content

itself, in regard to enlistments, by simply appropriating a certain sum of money as pay for the military establishment and then to publish pay-tables giving the monthly and yearly wages of the various grades and ratings. As a result of this method, commercial prosperity and the condition of the labor market have regulated our enlistments, and determined whether our ranks should be full or vacant according to the caprice of the mob, and in sovereign disregard to the exigencies and necessities of the military establishment and the prestige and honor of the nation.

Resultant Methods.

As a result of this condition, to get men at all the government has been forced to advertise and beg for them in the most undignified and humiliating manner. In all our cities we find pasted on dead walls, numbers of gaudy bill-posters, showing soldiers--generally depicted as enjoying themselves in the shade of the tropics and wearing the most attractive uniforms which the tastelessness and color-blindness of our military tailors can devise--and these mural decorations are accompanied by the legend "Men Wanted for the Army or Navy". This is certainly a discreditable note of distress to come from our government, when we consider that to fill the ranks of our entire military establishment, land and sea forces, it is necessary to have with the colors, under arms, only one man to every 700 of our population.

What must our neighbors, the great powers, think of us, a nation that has to advertise and beg for soldiers and sailors to do their duty under the flag in peace, a nation that competes in the bill-posting business with patent

medicines, circuses and breakfast foods for its recruits--and even then frequently fails to get the necessary recruits?

In addition to the bill-poster efforts, the Army maintains more than a hundred recruiting officers, stations and parties in all parts of the country, and at all important centers of population, and the Navy and Marine Corps also keep recruiting offices, all competing with each other in their efforts to get recruits.

What it actually costs us in money to land a recruit with his organization, when we consider desertions and the various kinds of discharges, would be difficult, if not impossible, to compute.

Undoubtedly our recruiting methods are not only the most extravagant and wasteful, but they are also the most ineffectual, undignified, and humiliating to which any great nation has ever deliberately, voluntarily, and persistently resorted.

In view of this well known and fully advertised weakness and rottenness at the very foundation of our military establishment, can we expect our alliance to be sought, our policies heeded, or our displeasure feared by any power which has taken the first step in military preparation--the enactment of adequate enlistment laws?

Throughout our history, the supply of recruits has never been uniform or steady. Frequently the ranks have been full and all original enlistments have been suspended, and only the best men allowed to reenlist. This condition has only occurred in times of unusual commercial and financial depression. At other times, when business has been good and wages high, it has been found

impracticable to get enough recruits to fill our ranks even to the authorized peace skeleton strength.

Before the Spanish war, when our army was practically an Indian police, it was not so serious a matter if the organizations were sometimes temporarily short of their authorized strength.

But now the situation is entirely changed. We have assumed several grave responsibilities which may require the prompt use of force far beyond the continental limits of our territory. Among these are the maintenance of order in Cuba, and the providing for stable governments in, and the protection of, the Panama Canal Zone and of our numerous insular possessions. At any moment the flames of disorder and anarchy may break out in all or any of these places. In addition to these, we still have the Monroe Doctrine from which we cannot recede without serious loss of prestige, and we have lately been toying with the "Open Door" in the East as one of our foreign policies.

Yet, in the face of all these obligations and responsibilities, which, however lightly we may take them, are nevertheless regarded seriously by the rest of the world, the years 1907 and 1908 witnessed the utter failure of our recruiting methods. In these years the strength of our Army was frequently more than 40 per cent short of that authorized by law, and the peace strength is only that of skeleton organizations, about half that expected in war.

To incur serious obligations and announce foreign policies while conspicuously and notoriously lacking the force to meet them, is playing at a transparent game of bluff, certainly undignified if not immoral on the part of a great nation upon whom the drift of circumstances has forced an important

role in the affairs of the world.

Let us reform our methods by the enactment of an adequate Enlistment Statute, or else give notice to our people and the world that we will cease to assume duties and responsibilities while neglecting to take the most necessary and primary steps to meet them with credit, success and honor.

In War.

During the Revolution our armies in the field constantly suffered from the want of men in the ranks, due entirely to the fact that we had no laws to regulate or insure the enlistment of soldiers. Washington's dispatches and letters to the Continental Congress and the governors of colonies are full of complaints and warnings on this score. This gives no cause for wonder, for at that time we were in the nebulous period of our national development.

In our first war we grafted upon our institutions and into the national mind the fatal error that we can depend on voluntary enlistments to fill our ranks in war. Our experiences then should have taught us that this theory is an utter fallacy and that to attempt to depend upon it practically is a bid for certain defeat.

Any man who reads the history of that war cannot fail to appreciate the fact that with our recruiting methods, we could never have attained our independence but for the fortuitous combination of favorable conditions in European politics, and the material assistance of the French.

Since then we have learned to put money in the treasury, but we have not advanced one step towards devising a practicable system of insuring the presence

of soldiers in our ranks on the battlefield.

The experiences of the War of 1812, the first which we undertook as a nation, were a perfect demonstration of the results of a failure to enact in peace something in the nature of an enlistment law.

On the vital question of putting soldiers in the ranks during war, the Government contented itself with issuing invitations to enlist, while leaving their acceptance entirely to the convenience and caprice of the individual.

In February, 1812, war being then imminent, Congress passed an act increasing the Regular Army to 25 regiments of infantry, 4 of artillery, 2 of dragoons, 1 of riflemen, with engineers and artificers. The paper strength of this force aggregated 36,700 men. Again in March, 1813, Congress increased the number of regular regiments of infantry to 44. The paper strength of this force aggregated 57,351.

But as we had no law compelling enlistments, few citizens enrolled themselves in these organizations. The highest number of men in ranks at any one time was 19,036. Thus the Army was 38,315 short of its authorized strength, this in time of war when the Government was offering as an inducement to enlist \$85 as bounty and advance pay and 160 acres of land. This was certainly a favorable situation in which to enact an enlistment law, but such an expedient does not seem to have occurred to any of the statesmen of that period. This situation also shows that the offer of money and land to induce enlistments in war has little or no effect.

No subterfuge or evasion can reach the desired end. The Government must demand military service as the right of the State and as the bounden duty of

the individual.

None of the organizations authorized by law were ever recruited to full strength, and some of them were never recruited at all. Some of the so-called regular regiments went into battle on the New York frontier with two and three hundred men in ranks--and they were raw recruits--when their authorized strength was more than a thousand men.

At Bladensburg, although we had ample notice of the intended attack on Washington, we could only muster for the defense of the capital 4500 militia, and regular organizations composed of raw recruits, to oppose 4000 British soldiers. No page of any nation's history furnishes a more disgraceful picture of mismanagement, incompetence and cowardice than is found in the story of the rout at Bladensburg, as a result of which the Capitol and White House were captured and burned.

Throughout the War of 1812 the British never had in one place at a time more than 6000 troops on our Northern border. Had we possessed on our statute books an enlistment law that would have enabled us to fill our paper cadres with live men and hold them in service long enough to learn their business, we could undoubtedly have invaded and captured Canada and had it today.

In 1846 the Mexican War found us without having advanced one step towards appropriate military legislation in regard to enlistments. We find the same invitations to volunteer, unsupported by any law insuring or regulating enlistments. In this war, it must be said, our people showed a commendable amount of military enthusiasm, and volunteered in numbers even greater than the Government could use. Still, it must be remembered that at that time we had

a large population and needed relatively few soldiers.

The great lesson which we might have learned from this war was the folly of short enlistments. Pursuant to acts of Congress, men were mustered into the service for three months, for six months, and for twelve months. Finally, at the close of the war, in 1847, Congress learned its lesson, the last regi-
authorized
ments/being mustered into the service for "The period of the war".

The failure to learn this lesson earlier came perilously near resulting in the capture or destruction of General Scott's entire invading army.

On May 4, 1847, General Scott was at Pueblo, three marches from the City of Mexico, with an army of 9,800 men, 4,000 of whom were volunteers mustered in for twelve months. They demanded their discharges and General Scott was forced to let them go. This left him with only 5,800 men, in the middle of the enemy's country and surrounded by a Mexican army of 36,000 men and 100 guns.

General Scott was forced to remain at Pueblo until August 7, when, by the arrival of new regiments from home, his army was raised to a strength of 14,000. He then resumed the advance and captured the City of Mexico on the 14th of September.

Had the Mexican army of 36,000 men possessed even mediocre efficiency and enterprise, it certainly should have captured or destroyed General Scott's command during the three months it held Pueblo with but 5,800 men, and this would probably have closed the campaign and ended the war.

The great War in 1861 found us where we were in 1846 as regards military legislation. In fact, we had forgotten the lesson regarding short terms of enlistment learned at the end of the Mexican War, for the first 75,000 militia

called out were mustered into the service for only three months.

The events of this war, the greatest and most important in our history, showed more positively than ever the need of some kind of law to regulate and control enlistments. At certain periods of great excitement and enthusiasm more men volunteered than the government could possibly use, and the War Department was forced to decline apologetically their services. This had the effect of discouraging subsequent volunteering. Many men felt that once having made the offer to enlist, and having been refused the privilege of fighting, they had done their entire duty by the war and the government. At other times when the very existence of the nation was threatened, it was found most difficult to induce enlistments at any price or on any terms.

Throughout this war, service in the regular organizations was never popular with the people. The number of men in ranks in these organizations was always very low and frequently organizations disappeared entirely. Had it been possible to keep the regular organizations filled to their authorized strength, the 20 regiments of infantry then in the service would have supplied infantry for two army corps, whereas the largest organization in the regular army which we heard mentioned during the war was the regular division, and this was generally composed of skeleton organizations.

In 1861, when the President called for 42,000 volunteers, 208 regiments, numbering 225,000 men, offered their services and were accepted, and the services of a large number of additional volunteers were declined. Again in 1862, just before McClellan's advance to the Peninsula, the army was full, and the War Department formally suspended all enlistments of volunteers by General Orders No.

33, May 3, 1862, and the Secretary ordered the furniture of all recruiting offices sold.

In the autumn of 1862, after the disastrous Peninsula Campaign, the army lost an immense number of men, by discharge, desertion, sickness and death; and then, too, the true proportions of the problem of coercing the South began to be fully realized. The War Department then made vigorous efforts to enlist more volunteers, but the psychological moment had passed; the volunteers failed to respond. The situation then became desperate. The government, with a depleted army and voluntary enlistments at a standstill, found itself confronting a victorious enemy, whose ranks were full, with old organizations maintained intact by the operation of an enlistment law so drastic that it has been described as robbing the cradle and the grave to furnish soldiers.

In this situation the government resorted to novel expedients to get soldiers. Among them the "Galvanized Yankees" are of interest in showing to what desperate straits the want of an enlistment law had reduced us. At this time the Sioux in Minnesota had gone on the warpath and killed a number of whites and devastated a large area. Prior to this a large number of Confederate military prisoners had been assembled on Johnson's Island in Lake Erie and other points along the lakes. An appeal was made to these men to enlist for the purpose of fighting the Sioux, the common enemy of civilization, and with the express stipulation that they would not be used to fight the Confederacy. A sufficient number volunteered to form several regiments. These regiments were called "Galvanized Yankees". Later several loyal states attempted to have these men accredited to their quotas at the War Department, so great was the

difficulty in obtaining men to volunteer to save the country.

The navy was also having its troubles in those days. Gideon Welles, then Secretary of the Navy, states in his diary, lately published, that in the autumn of 1863 he had from 30 to 40 ships laid up in navy yards for the lack of crews to man them.

The Navy Department heard of the "Galvanized Yankee" expedient and enlisted 400 with the stipulation that they would not have to fight the Confederacy. These men were put aboard the Niagara, a new ship then being put in commission for foreign service. This ship was manned by the usual complement of commissioned officers, 11 warrant and petty officers, and the 400 "Galvanized Yankees".

The Niagara put to sea from New York on June 1, 1864, under sealed orders to look for and capture Confederate cruisers. In March, 1865, the Niagara, under command of Commodore T. T. Craven, and accompanied by the Sacramento, encountered the Confederate ironclad ram Stonewall in the Mediterranean, off the coast of Spain. Commodore Craven did not attack the Stonewall, claiming that she was too formidable a vessel for him to encounter with wooden ships.

In December, 1865, Commodore Craven was tried by a court martial, with Admiral Farragut as president, for neglect of duty in failing to fight the Stonewall. Commodore Craven was found "guilty of the charge in a less degree than charged" and sentenced to suspension for two years on leave pay.

The enlistment of the military prisoners of an enemy is certainly a questionable act on the part of any government. Had these men fallen into the hands of the Confederate authorities, the latter would undoubtedly have been justified in putting them to death under the laws of war.

The Draft Act, passed March 3, 1863, ten months after we had suspended enlistments because we had more men, at the moment, than we could use, is the most convincing argument possible for an enlistment law insuring and regulating enlistments according to the needs of the government, and not as prompted by the convenience and caprice of individuals.

In the wake of the Draft Act, we had substitutes, bounties and bounty-jumpers, all discreditable and disgraceful. And worst of all, the New York draft rioters were shedding blood and burning houses while the battle of Gettysburg was in progress. It is doubtful if New York riots would have occurred had not the act allowed the rich man to buy a substitute if drafted for service. This was certainly a pernicious feature of the law, and one which the New York mob resented with violence and bloodshed. The cry went up, "The rich man's money against the poor man's blood".

That was a dark period for the United States, when its army was in a death grapple with a powerful enemy on the field of battle, while disloyalty, arson and anarchy threatened the existence of the national metropolis, and all because the government had neglected to put the military house in order by the enactment of obviously necessary laws before the hurricane of war swept the land.

In regard to practical, sound and sane enlistment laws, is the military establishment--Army, Navy, volunteers, and militia,- in any better condition today than it was in 1863? No. Are we then to go on in the future as in the past, wasting the blood and treasure of the nation through mismanagement and legislative neglect, whenever we are forced to draw the sword in the maintenance of our just and righteous policies? I think not. I believe that we have

diagnosed the disease and that we can find the remedy. In all the long years of our unnecessarily protracted wars it is doubtful if one American in a thousand really knew what was the matter with the military machine, why it had so much lost motion, why frequently it would not work, why sometimes it stood still, and even went backwards. Now we know that the principal trouble all along has been at the foundation, that it was the want of an adequate enlistment statute. Every nation in the world that has an army, except the United States, has enlistment laws on its statute books.

When the general staffs of the world begin to estimate the probable efficiency of their neighbors' armies, one of the first things that they study is the enlistment and recruiting laws of that nation. If these laws are found to be faulty, defective, or entirely lacking, as in our unique case, then the army of that nation is not considered as a serious factor in a probable war. This condition encourages aggression, provokes war, and weakens our position in every diplomatic contention.

Without an adequate enlistment law, suited to our people and institutions, it is useless to educate staffs, work out war plans, and elaborate organizations on paper, for when war comes we will not have the men behind the guns to put them into execution. Until we have the enlistment statute all other military work is like carrying water in a sieve,- it wastes away as fast as you put it in.

As a practical solution of this important question, it is proposed that the Army War College and Naval War College work out together what they believe to be an adequate and satisfactory enlistment statute, for the entire military establishment of the nation, including the army, navy, and volunteer forces to be raised

in war.

When this statute is completed by the War Colleges, it will be submitted to the Joint Board, the highest and most influential military authority in our country; after approval by the board it will be submitted to the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy, who will, in turn, submit it to the President, requesting that he transmit it to Congress with a message recommending its passage.

It is not to be expected that this law would find itself on the statute books in a year or even two or three, but it is a matter of such vast importance to the nation in general, and to the entire military establishment in particular, that the two War Colleges and the Joint Board might well make it their principal permanent work for a term of years until it shall be successfully accomplished. It would be well if we could point to this important act on our statute books as the first great work accomplished through the united efforts of the two War Colleges and the Joint Board.

Let us now pass to a brief outline of what should be the most important features of our Enlistment Act.

1. It is suggested that the title be, "An Act to regulate voluntary enlistments in the military establishment, including the army, navy, and volunteers".

The militia is omitted for two reasons: first, states are not required to maintain a militia at all if they do not elect to do so; second, it is believed that the true construction of the "Dick Law", requiring the militia to conform to the organization and general administrative methods of the regular army, would

force them to follow substantially the same recruiting methods.

2. The most important feature of this act is a definitive, specific and authoritative announcement from the highest source, the Executive or Congress, that military service is a general direct tax which the people owe to the nation, and will be levied according to population, as the Constitution provides in the case of direct taxes, that the nation expects and will demand military service of the necessary number of suitable men as a matter of duty and honor, according to its needs, and not according to the desires and interests of individuals.

Something must be done to free the idea of military service from the murrain of personal exploitation and selfseeking individualism. The theory of military service with our people has been wrong; it has been the interests of the individual first, and the needs of, and duty to, the nation last. It has been the pyramid on its apex.

3. Recruiting Districts. In order to ascertain if the inhabitants of the various sections are furnishing their proper quotas, it is necessary to have definite and well defined recruiting districts. It is suggested to have these districts follow the lines of the districts of United States Marshals. The names of the states will be omitted, though as a matter of convenience we will follow state lines. We are going to levy a United States tax, and we want to avoid in every way the idea that the states have any part in the transaction. We have had many experiences in trying to transact military business with the states, and they have been uniformly ineffective, expensive and disastrous, as they should have been, for all such expedients were in violation of the manifest spirit of the Constitution, which makes the United States the sole war-making

power in the government.

The 1st Recruiting District will be Maine, simply because it is marked on the map and has a name, and so on through the list of states and territories.

4. Publication. At stated intervals, say semi-annually in peace and when necessary in war, the government will publish a list of all recruiting districts, giving the population of each according to the last census, its assessed quota of men for the entire military establishment, and the number of men then actually in service.

It is believed that the mere publication of such a list would have a pronounced effect in stimulating enlistments in those districts conspicuously short of their quotas. It is doubtful if it would be advisable to advocate any more stringent methods to induce enlistments in time of peace, and in face of the present general apathy on the part of the people on this subject. Yet the government could in various ways, stimulate enlistment in a district, even in peace, and without further legislation. For instance, the government might say, "Until the quota of the 1st district shall be full, all troops stationed there will be withdrawn and no more government contracts let in that locality". This would be the other side of the picture from pleading and begging for recruits to come, while they come not.

In war, an entirely new departure from our past methods is proposed.

All United States Marshals have in their hands the machinery for impaneling jurors, - jury wheels for drawing names by lot, and lists of all citizens in the district liable for jury duty. It would require but little work to change these lists to those showing all men liable for military duty.

Our Enlistment Act will contain a clause providing for the impaneling of recruits, as follows: When a district is short of its quota, due notice will be given, and the fact published in all local papers. If in seven days after the publication of this notice the required number of men is not duly enlisted, then the United States Marshal will proceed to impanel them as in the case of jurors. Any man duly impaneled and notified, who fails to report to a recruiting officer and enlist, will be tried before a United States Court for contempt and will be liable to the punishment prescribed by law for the crime of desertion.

During the Civil War the Draft Act was enforced by deputy provost marshals. We could use retired officers of the army and navy for this purpose. The necessary number could be sent to work with the United States Marshals. The provost marshals, would do the real work, but under color of, and by authority of, the United States civil courts. This is believed to be an important feature, as it will free military officers from the unpopular and unpleasant duty of rounding the citizen up and cutting him out of the herd, which act is, after all, a civil rather than a military duty.

This law must under no circumstances permit the man with money to buy a substitute. A man once impaneled must serve, or stand trial and suffer the penalties of desertion. This law should also empower the President to put the impaneling clause into operation under the same circumstances as he is now authorized to call out the militia.

It is believed that if this legislation was printed on our statute book, that the cases would be very rare in which we would have to resort to the actual

impaneling of recruits. The mere fact that the government had finally taken a firm stand on this point, and that the recruiting machine was loaded and cleared for action, would be enough.

Let us assume a case in which notice has been served on a district that its quota was a hundred men short. In seven days the wheel will go around and roll out a hundred names. Who in that community will suddenly become enthusiastic recruiting officers? First, all the cowards, and there are plenty of them in war times, though we have an overwhelming majority of courageous and bloodthirsty citizens in peace; second, a large number of good men whose business is in such shape that they could not leave home for any length of time without serious financial loss; third, many women who happen to have a husband, son or sweetheart whose name the impartial wheel might grind out. All these persons would use every possible means to produce the necessary number of volunteers. This is why this method of recruiting is called "Volunteering insured". It has many advantages. It allows us to continue to glory in our ancient methods of "voluntary enlistments", while the presence of the necessary number of men in ranks, under the colors, is insured with almost the same certainty as is accomplished by the so-called conscription laws of Europe. It allows us to have the same system of recruiting in peace and war, and have that system thoroughly understood by the people in peace, a most important feature. With it we will have no more surprises and sudden shocks, as we had in the matter of recruiting in 1863, when in the short period of ten months, we ran through the gamut from repletion to despair, from the suspension of all enlistments to the Draft Act, a rough and awkward expedient, stamped with the unmistakable marks of hurry and hysteria.

Another absolutely essential feature is a reserve, if we are to have a really modern military establishment. Our Enlistment Act must provide for a trained and disciplined reserve in peace. We must have it because it confers an incalculable advantage. We must have it because every other army which we may be called on to oppose has it. For example, let us consider the infantry, the backbone of armies. The peace strength of an infantry company is 65 men, the war strength 128; for a regiment 800 in peace and 1600 in war. The war strength of the regiments of all our formidable neighbors is much greater. When we go to war we must immediately call to the colors 63 raw, untrained, undisciplined recruits per company, and 800 per regiment. This number of recruits called in at one time reduces greatly the efficiency of our organizations for at least six months. Meanwhile our enemy will fill his ranks with trained and disciplined reserves to the full war strength, and have still more on hand to supply the inevitable waste of war.

In regard to our fancied isolation, the barrier of the Atlantic is not worth more than ten days to us, and the Pacific more than twenty. The sea is the best and cheapest of all roads to a nation with ships.

The reserve is easily provided by having our men enlist for so many years with the colors and so many with the reserves, say 3 and 4, respectively. Until we have provided for the reserve, peace strength, war strength, and mobilization mean nothing for us. We had better strike them from our military vocabulary and cease to deceive ourselves by their use. An army that embarks on a serious war today without a trained reserve, had as well take the field armed with bows and arrows, for its defeat is a foregone conclusion.

I am optimistic enough to believe that the head and heart of the American people will fully approve and accept these basic features of a national Enlistment Act, if we do our duty by thoroughly bringing it to their attention and comprehension by a persistent campaign of education.

But if an unreasoning majority of our heterogeneous population, drunk with material prosperity and insane with groundless vanity, persist in opposing such legislation, then we must reconcile ourselves to looking forward to crushing defeats, followed by war indemnities, with probable partitions and annexations of territory.

November 3, 1918.