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THE NAVAL OFFICER IN DIPLOMACY

LECTURE

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by

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Thanks to Kipling the characterization of the seaman as "The Handy Man" has become permanent in literature. Whether or not Kipling intended to restrict the appellation to men below decks, I claim that it applies equally to men who hold commissions, in which I am sure that your President will agree. As his successor in the European command I take pleasure in saying now, as I always do take pleasure when opportunity occurs to say it in good taste, that no task arose in the trying days of demobilization that was beyond the capacity of naval officers to perform, and to perform well, however far removed from an officer's experience and usual activities. Some of these tasks were inheritances and some arose as time went on. It is a matter of great service pride to me to recall how naval officers all over the southern and western parts of Europe did things that really pertained to civil administration; and, as I have said, did them well - in some cases with distinguished ability.

What has just been said may appear to be rather wide of the subject; but that would be a mistaken notion. There is something in the training and experience of naval officers that makes for flexibility of mind and the application of hard common-sense to the task in hand, which it was the intention to illustrate by reference to personal observation during my last months of duty before retirement. When an unusual task arises these qualities are immensely valuable. My belief in their existence among naval officers was no new thing but it was greatly strengthened during my last eighteen months of active service.

Now diplomacy is not ordinarily the mission of the naval officer. But if it comes in an officer's way to engage in diplomacy, why should we doubt that his flexibility of mind and common-sense, combined with his experience, will enable him to do it successfully? John Bassett Moore, in his Principles of American Diplomacy, speaking of American statesmen at the time of the French Revolution, says that they "were not mere doctrinaires. Their aims were practical." It is generally true of naval officers that they are not doctrinaires and that they have practical aims. Diplomacy is statesmanship applied to foreign relations. If practicality be a good thing in the equipment of a statesman or diplomat, the practical qualifications of naval officers to which I have referred should be a good foundation for diplomatic work in case of necessity.

It can scarcely be claimed that the life experience of the naval officer is a broadening one in the way of general culture in literary and intellectual pursuits. But it is broadening in the practical matter of international affairs and a knowledge of foreign peoples. As a class naval officers, and especially senior naval officers, are as widely traveled as, and have more contact with foreign officials than, any other class of our citizens; and a somewhat discriminating knowledge of relations with foreign nations is a necessity for the officer who has to justify his reason for existence. Can it be believed that the average senior experienced senior officer - and only to such would the opportunity be apt to come - is any less fitted for diplomatic action than some citizen (in many instances chosen largely because his fortune is sufficient to bear the expense of representing the Government abroad).

whose previous experience in diplomatic life has been no whit greater than the officer's own? It has not been so in the past, it is not so at this moment and we may confidently assert that it never will be so. While the exercise of diplomatic functions will be a rare experience for naval officers, we who have an abiding faith in our profession shall confidently expect that the work will be well done by them if occasion arises.

It will be of interest to note some of the instances in which American naval officers have acted in a diplomatic capacity. You will recall that the United States was the first nation to put an end to the exactions of the Barbary pirates. Operations went on for about 15 years. In 1801 the Pasha of Tripoli, not content with the \$30,000 tribute - blackmail - then being paid for immunity, cut down the flagstaff of the American consulate, and in addition held Americans for ransom. With the consequent naval operations we are not especially concerned here. A treaty was negotiated with him in 1805 by which the prisoners held for ransom were released, tribute thereafter was waived and respect for American commerce was agreed to for the future. But this did not clear up the situation for the Algerine pirates continued their depredations. Commodore Decatur brought the Dey of Algiers to terms and, in 1815, was co-signer with Mr. William Shaler of a treaty which insured, in the words of Willis Fletcher Johnson (America's Foreign Relations, Vol.I), "the abolition of the hateful and humiliating tribute which we had regularly paid down to that time." John Bassett Moore (op.cit.) says of this: "Decatur.....compelled the Dey on June 30th to agree to a treaty by which it was declared that no

tribute, under any name or form whatsoever, should again be required from the United States. No other nation had ever obtained such terms." The treaty was renewed in the following year, one of the signers being Commodore Isaac Chauncey in his capacity as Commander in Chief of the Naval Forces of the United States in the Mediterranean.

At the beginning of the nineteenth century, in 1826, Captain ap Catesby Jones of the Navy negotiated a treaty with the Hawaiian Government, on his own initiative and without special instructions. It was an excellent treaty, but the Senate was not as wise as the naval officer and failed to ratify it. Thus the distinction and advantage of being the first nation to enter into treaty relations with Hawaii passed from the United States. Ten years later, in 1836, Great Britain made and ratified a treaty with Hawaii, followed three years later still by France. Both of these treaties, like that of ap Catesby Jones, were negotiated by naval officers.

In 1839 Commodore Wilkes, during his famous expedition, entered into an "agreement with Samoan chiefs by which the interests of the natives and the whalers and traders visiting the islands from time to time were provided for. He appointed a consul to represent the United States and took measures to insure amicable relations in the future between the islands and the United States." (Encyc. Americana) No regular treaty seems, however, to have made until 1878. Moore says (op.cit.) that in 1872 "the great chief of the bay of Pago Pago, in the island of Tutuila, desirous of obtaining the protection of the United States, granted to the government the exclusive privilege of establishing a naval station in that

harbor." From another source I have learned that it was Commander Meade of the Navy who obtained this grant (Cath. Encyc.), which was the basis of our claim to the islands east of  $170^{\circ}$  E. long., in the tripartite treaty with Great Britain and Germany later on.

Our first treaties with an Asiatic power can hardly be claimed to be to the credit of the Navy, although the stamp of the sea was on their negotiator, Edmund Roberts, a sea captain of Portsmouth, New Hampshire, and he was rated as "captain's clerk" on board the naval vessel that took him out, so that we may perhaps claim him as a naval officer "once removed". He certainly did not go in great state, for we read (Moore, op. cit.) that "If we were to judge by the provision made for his comfort and remuneration, we should infer that little importance was attached to his mission...His pay was barely sufficient to defray the cost of an insurance on his life for the benefit of his numerous children; and for three months he was obliged to lie on the sea-washed gun-deck with the crew, all the available space in the cabin being occupied by a charge d'affaires to Buenos Ayres whose name is now forgotten." Roberts was only partially successful, but he did bring back treaties with Siam and Muscat.

We now come to an incident of great interest in connection with our subject. At the time of the "Opium War" between Great Britain and China the United States kept a squadron in the Far East for observation and the protection of American interest. It was under the command of Commodore Kearny, who obtained a heavy indemnity for illegal acts against the persons and property of Americans; but, far more important, he achieved a notable diplo-

matic coup at the end of the war. Quoting Johnson (op.cit.):

"Learning that in the peace treaty new tariff and trade regulations were to be made between China and Great Britain, he resolutely demanded that American citizens should be included, to enjoy the same advantages; in brief, that the 'most favored nation' principle should be established in their behalf. The Governor of Canton agreed that this should be done, testifying that American merchants in China had not been guilty of smuggling or other illicit practices but had confined themselves to honorable trade. On receiving this assurance Kearny would have taken his departure, but the American consul urged him to stay, as the presence of his vessels would have a salutary effect upon the Chinese commissioners who were coming thither to make the treaty. Kearny accordingly remained, and secured from the commissioners the formal and explicit assurance that whatever trade concessions were made to Great Britain should be fully and equally extended also to the United States. This was done, and as a result an 'open door' was first secured in China, for all nations on equal terms; a result which, according to one of the British commissioners who negotiated the treaty, was due to Commodore Kearny's wise and resolute action."

This is a bit of our diplomatic history in which naval officers may take justifiable pride. Mr. Hay gave the phrase "Open Door in China" to the world; but it is seen that the principle was established in 1840 by a wise American naval officer, ably advised by an American consul.

Matthew Calbraith Perry is our most distinguished exemplar of the naval officer in diplomacy. For over two centuries before his expedition to Japan that country had been maintained in a remarkable state of seclusion. In 1636 the Shogun Iyemitsu caused all deep-sea shipping to be destroyed and forbade the building of more. Thereafter the Japanese lived strictly to themselves. Toward the end of the eighteenth century the Dutch were permitted the very limited intercourse of not more than one ship a year, and Nagasaki was the only port open to that extent. The first American vessel to visit Japan was the Eliza, under charter to the Dutch, who were

at that time, 1797, at war with Great Britain and feared capture of their own vessels on the long voyage to Japan. The Japanese permitted the *Eliza* to fulfill her mission, as they did other American vessels on a similar mission during the Napoleonic wars. It was forty years later, in 1837, that the first serious American attempt was made to establish relations with Japan. It was a private venture and it failed. Eight years later an American shipmaster who had picked up some shipwrecked Japanese thought he might make their return the occasion of a more successful attempt, but he likewise failed. He was told not to do it again, and informed that the Emperor preferred to have castaways abandoned rather than have strangers enter Japan. In 1846 Commodore Biddle went to Japan with credentials to make a treaty, but made rather a lamentable failure of his mission. In 1849 Commander Glynn was sent to Japan to demand redress for the ill-treatment of some American seamen who had been shipwrecked and were being held as prisoners. He got the prisoners, who told such dire stories of their treatment as to arouse great indignation here. This was a contributing cause to the determination to bring relations with Japan to an issue, which resulted in the choice of Perry, who went out clothed with full credentials from the President and the Secretary of State. His diplomatic quality was thus deliberately conferred and was not the result of accident of service, as had been that of Kearny.

Perry's success in negotiating a treaty was a great feat, of which Johnson says (op.cit.): "Throughout the Western world the treaty was hailed as an unsurpassed triumph, and the highest credit was everywhere given to Perry for the diplomatic genius which he



had exercised. Nor was the achievement appreciated in Japan less than elsewhere." Moore's account gives an insight into the methods of Perry, which is interesting as an example of the adaptation of means to the end. He says: "His (Perry's) proceedings were characterized by energy and decision. He had, as he said, determined to demand as a right and not to solicit as a favor those acts of courtesy which are due from one civilized nation to another, and to allow none of the petty annoyances that had been unsparingly visited on those who had preceded him. He declined to deliver his credentials to any but an officer of the highest rank. When he was asked to go to Nagasaki, he refused; when ordered to leave the bay, he moved higher up; and he found that the nearer he approached the imperial city 'the more polite and friendly they became'."

Two princes were finally detailed to receive Perry's credentials. After delivering them he left Japan for a time in order to give the Japanese an opportunity to consider the treaty arrangements he proposed. Moore continues: "He returned with redoubled forces in February, 1854, and, passing by the city of Uraga, anchored not far below Yedo. The Emperor had appointed commissioners to treat with him, four of whom were princes of the Empire. They desired him to return to Uraga, but he declined to do so. The commissioners then consented to treat at a place opposite the ships. Here the Japanese erected a pavilion, and on March 8th Perry landed in state, with an escort of five hundred officers, seamen and marines, embarked in twenty-seven barges. 'With people of forms,' said Perry, 'it is necessary either to set all ceremony aside, or to out-Herod Herod in assumed personal consequence and ostentation.'

.....A treaty was signed on March 31, 1854. American ships were allowed to obtain provisions and coal and other necessary supplies at Simoda and Hakodate, and aid and protection in case of shipwreck were promised. No provision for commercial intercourse was secured, but the privilege was obtained of appointing a consul to reside at Simoda. Such was the first opening of Japan, after two centuries of seclusion."

Perry's achievement was of far more than national significance; it was an epochal event of world-wide importance. If in later days it has brought anxious moments to his country as well as self-satisfaction, it was at the time an unadulterated triumph that shed luster on his own name and on the service to which he belonged.

It was more than a quarter century after China and Japan had emerged from their isolation before Korea entered into treaty relations with the Western world. Again the United States led the way, and again a naval officer was the diplomatic agent. Quoting Moore (op.cit.): "Korea, the Land of the Morning Calm, continued, long after the opening of China and Japan, to maintain a rigorous seclusion. Efforts to secure access had invariably ended in disaster. On May 20, 1882, however, Commodore Shufeldt, U.S.N., invested with diplomatic powers, succeeded, with the friendly good offices of Li Hung Chang, in concluding with the Hermit Kingdom the first treaty made by it with a Western power. The last great barrier of national non-intercourse was broken down."

The examples thus far instanced have been drawn from days somewhat remote from our own times - days when wind was the motive power or when steam power was in its infancy in the Navy; when the world

was not encircled with cables; when radio was still to be discovered; days, in short, when world communications were primitive as compared with those so familiar now. The marvelous change in the facilities of communication that has taken place in a period of time insignificant in comparison with that covering the history of civilization, even modern civilization, has profoundly modified human relationships, international as well as intranational and personal. As diplomacy is concerned with international relationships, this change is one to be taken into account in considering the subject in hand. It undoubtedly tends toward a centralization of authority, in the State Department as well as in the Navy Department; which is only another way of saying that its tendency is to diminish initiative, and to impose a handicap upon the independence of action of officials. The ease of modern communication makes the most resolute and self-confident man think twice before adopting a course of action that he would adopt without hesitation if so situated that weeks or months instead of hours would be necessary for consultation with the home government; while the irresolute or self-distrustful man, or one who fears to accept responsibility, has under modern conditions a ready reason for doing nothing until he can be told what to do. It might, therefore, be thought that modern communications stand in the way of an opportunity for present-day naval officers to engage in diplomatic work. That this is not so a few instances may suffice to show. It is not to be expected that the opportunity of a Kearny or a Perry will arise under modern conditions, but there are other ways in which naval officers may still have an opportunity to do useful diplomatic work.

Thus, some years ago, affairs in China were in a critical stage. The Commander-in-Chief was Rear Admiral Murdock, now retired. We heard it said that he was the commanding figure of American influence out there, if not indeed of the entire foreign influence. In Washington, where I was at the time, his reports were the standards of information.

In 1905, Captain (now Rear Admiral) Dillingham was intimately connected with the arrangements made with the Dominican Government whereby the collection of customs revenues was done under the direction of an American and the service of the foreign debt was assured. The treaty concluded was not ratified by the Senate, but the President put the arrangement into effect as an interim measure after Congress adjourned, and it proved a great step towards the stabilization of that turbulent little country, and a relief to both it and the United States from the danger of foreign intervention. It served as a model for the treaty of two years later, which was ratified; and that treaty in turn was a model upon which a still later treaty with Haiti was largely based. It is not too much to say that the action of 1905 marked the beginnings of a policy that has been continuously followed since.

Two officers, each sometime President of this College, have within recent years done distinguished diplomatic duty for the country. Rear Admiral Sperry was a delegate to the Conference at Geneva for the adaptation of the principles of the Geneva Convention to maritime warfare, and later was a delegate to the second Hague Conference; while Rear Admiral Stockton was a delegate to the London Conference. In affairs of this sort the Navy seems to

be under an eclipse just now, as was shown by the astonishing action of the Administration during the recent conference at Washington in making the civilian Assistant Secretary of the Navy, an official quite wanting in technical experience, the technical representative of our Government to meet with the technical advisers of the other governments, all themselves naval officers, and as such to preside over their deliberations. That he did his duties with distinguished ability in no way detracts from the slight put upon the Navy by our own Government, and upon the very able officer of whose entire competence we who know him have no doubt, and who, as Chief of Operations, should have been the technician and not the nominal technician's adviser. One can not help speculating upon the sentiments of the distinguished foreign naval officers who were members of that committee, as regards both their own personal feelings in the association and their opinion of the estimate in which the United States Navy is held by its own Government. One can only judge by imagining one's own feelings had the same thing happened in Paris or London - which it never did. There is balm in the thought that human affairs go in waves, and that, while administrations come and administrations go, the Navy goes on forever.

Fortunately the present is not altogether dark. At this moment two officers are holding diplomatic positions as High Commissioners, of both of whom I am happy to be able to speak from personal observation. At Constantinople Rear Admiral Bristol as High Commissioner is doing service of which the nation no less than the Navy has occasion to be proud. Rear Admiral Bristol first went to Constantinople in a strictly naval capacity as Detachment Commander,

the State Department being apparently disinclined to give him any diplomatic functions. Without adventitious aids he soon established for himself such an influential position by sheer force of character, by his intelligent grasp of the situation (which was and is very complicated), and by his alert and careful guarding of the interests of his country and his countrymen that his appointment as High Commissioner followed. Since then his conduct of affairs has been so successful that it is now understood that the State Department is unwilling to have him replaced, and given the relief from his harassing duties which he naturally seeks. It is a proud record.

Quite recently Brigadier General J.H. Russell of the Marine Corps was appointed High Commissioner to Haiti, and it is a matter of some personal satisfaction to believe that the seed of the idea was sown by me over a year ago. The Navy has a double interest in this latest essay of an officer in the paths of diplomacy. General Russell is of the Navy because the Marine Corps is a part of the Navy, and for the further reason that he is a graduate of the Naval Academy and of the War College. I have personal knowledge of the difficulties with which he must contend, and of his high qualifications for his task. It is too early yet to speak of actual accomplishments, but that he will do everything possible in his difficult situation may confidently be expected.

Another recent case of the employment of a naval officer in diplomatic duty was that of Rear Admiral McCully in southern Russia. The Force Commander was urgently requested by the State Department to spare Admiral McCully's services from the European command in

order that he might be able to undertake the duty. While engaged upon it he reported directly to the State Department as an official under its jurisdiction. It is a source of service satisfaction that Admiral McCully was chosen for his responsible position near Generals Denikin and Wrangel because of his acknowledged unusual acquaintance and sympathy with the Russian people.

Mention must be made of the opportunity that is ever present to a naval attache to have an influence in diplomatic affairs. From my own limited experience in this kind of duty it is my impression that the weight of an attache's influence will depend in large measure upon himself, and upon his conception of the range of his duties. If he is alert, and if his interest is not confined to technical matters but extends to the currents of national thought and effort of the people with whom his lot is temporarily cast, he may have a very considerable weight in the diplomacy of his embassy or legation. Your President has a much wider experience in this particular than I can pretend to have. As his successor in London in 1919, like him I combined the offices of Attache and Force Commander, an unusual condition born of the war, under which all attaches in Europe were in a measure subordinate to the Attache in Great Britain. I personally found that Naval Headquarters in London often had earlier and better information than the Embassy, especially from Constantinople and the Adriatic. I was told by General Summerall, the American representative on the Inter-Allied Military Commission that went to Fiume to report upon the unfortunate incident of July, 1919, that he had learned more in his preliminary investigation in Paris from Admiral Andrews' dispatches to me than

from all other sources combined, including the French Foreign Office. This was high praise. It will not probably often happen that a naval attache will have acknowledged credit for diplomatic influence, but I firmly believe that he is in a position to have the reality. In published correspondence dating just before the war I have read dispatches from military and naval attaches of noteworthy diplomatic importance, aside from their military and naval information value.

My reference to Admiral Andrews leads me to speak of the exercise of diplomatic ability in the course of a purely naval command, because that point was so well illustrated by him while in command of the Adriatic Detachment. I say no more here than I have repeatedly said elsewhere in expressing my conviction that he kept the peace - averted open hostilities - between the Italians and the Jugo-Slavs, who were like leashed animals ready to fly at one another's throats for more than a year after the Armistice. This was not a part of this prescribed duty. But, like every officer worth his salt, he scorned the conception of the performance of duty that is content with exact fulfillment of orders when more remains to be done, and went beyond his prescribed limitations when he saw an opportunity to act for the general good. By tact and persuasion, combined with firmness and exact justice, through weary months he prevented the tension between the Italians and the Jugo-Slavs in his vicinity from breaking out into open conflict. Surely this was a display of diplomatic qualities of a high order, to which I am the more glad to testify here because they do not seem to have had elsewhere the recognition that they deserve.



Sufficient examples have been instanced to show how naval officers have been, and now are, of diplomatic service to the Government. I shall now permit myself some reflections more or less closely connected with the subject under consideration.

It may seem a strange assertion to make in the light of all the post-war conflicts of interest that are so apparent, but I believe that there is a distinct advance in the general attitude of nations as regards foreign relations - one toward the Golden Rule as a governing condition of international conduct. That goal is still far distant, but there has been progress toward it. Let me give you one instance. In September, 1899, when Mr. Secretary Hay approached the governments of Germany, Great Britain and Russia with a view to their making "formal declaration of an 'open-door' policy in the territories held by them in China" - to quote Mr. Hay's own words - and later approached the governments of France, Italy and Japan in the same sense, and essential feature of his instructions to our ambassadors and ministers was a recognition of "spheres of influence" on a parity with leased territories. There was no hint that spheres of influence per se were undesirable; they were accepted as an existing condition. In the intervening twenty-two years between then and the Washington Conference the conscience of the world had been awakened, and Art. III of the Nine-power Treaty, Relating to Principles and Policies to Be Followed in Matters Relating to China, puts an end to "spheres of influence," a fact that has had surprisingly little notice. The following is quoted from the report of Mr. Balfour's remarks in committee while this subject was under consideration:-

"The British Empire delegation understood that there was no representative of any power around the table who thought that the old practice of "spheres of influence" was either advocated by any Government or would be tolerable to this conference. So far as the British Government was concerned, they had, in the most formal manner, publicly announced that they regarded this practice as utterly inappropriate to the existing situation.....The words 'general superiority of rights with respect to commercial or economic development in any designated region' were words happily designed, as he thought, to describe the system of spheres of influence; and the repudiation of that system was as clear and unmistakable as could possibly be desired."

This Nine-Power Treaty is a new bill of rights for China as well as a formal engagement of the contracting powers among themselves. It marks a great advance over the attitude of only twenty-two years before, and a still greater advance over that of Commodore Kearny, who sought only for his own country equality of rights with Great Britain in China, with no apparent solicitude for any rights of China herself. A similar advance in international ethics may be seen in other directions, often disguised and perhaps with its inspiration in enlightened self-interest as well as in moral principle; but I believe that the latter motive is increasingly operative, following the enlightenment of the group conscience of civilized peoples.

My own faith in this matter would not, however, lead me to relax one iota of vigilance if diplomatic duty came my way; for there are still plenty of statesmen and diplomats whose interpretation of the Golden Rule in international dealings is more in accord with David Harum's statement of it than with that of the Scriptures. But if my faith is justified as a general conclusion, then that conclusion must be reckoned with in statesmanship and diplomacy.

This is especially true for Americans, and for naval officers as representative Americans, because the United States has been throughout all its history a torch-bearer in international ethics.

The last remark suggests another thought; naval officers should have a thorough knowledge of our own history and traditions, and keep themselves informed to the minute of the evolution of our national policies. It was remarked at the beginning that diplomacy is not the mission of a naval officer; but it may become a mission, and a vitally important one. In the light of that possibility officers should have some thought of preparing themselves for the eventuality, should it come, and especially officers who have attained the higher ranks. Surely there can be no more fundamental preparation than a knowledge of our own history and traditions, our institutions, our outlook upon the world, our time-honored policies, and any evolution leading to a modification of the national viewpoint. The statement needs no elaboration to prove its truth.

Another preparation, important to a less degree only, is a knowledge of foreign nations. The ignorance of and indifference to international affairs of the generality of Americans is as lamentable as it is noteworthy. As a people we have looked in and not out; our attitude toward the world has been parochial. Too many of our people think we can deal with Latins as we do with Anglo-Saxons, with Turks as with Slavs, with Asiatics as with Europeans, or with any of these as we deal among ourselves. Too few appreciate how the people of all nations are becoming more and more citizens of the world, fellow-citizens, and that the United States can not, if she would, continue to live the life of a snail. The late war has done

much to correct this fault, and it is a happy sign that agencies like the Institute of Politics at Williamstown, and courses in international relations in many colleges, have been established in our country. But much virgin ground remains to be broken yet in the intellectual soil of the United States before there can be any expectation of broad general comprehension of our relationship to the rest of the world.

Mr. Elmer Davis, one of the Editorial Staff of the New York Times, a man well qualified to speak, has something to say in this connection in a paper on American Influences in Eastern Europe, read before the last annual meeting of the American Academy of Political and Social Science and published in the July (1922) Annals. He says:

"Any active, prolonged and effective influence of America on European politics or rather on the complicated political - economic international relations of today, postulates an American public opinion informed on, and interested in, world affairs. Such an opinion does not exist outside of very limited circles. No doubt it is growing, but very slowly. Even when it flashes up unexpectedly under the pressure of immediate economic need, as in the resolution of last winter's Agricultural Conference in favor of participation in the Genoa meeting, it is apt to be poorly informed and misdirected. For nearly a quarter of a century America has had territorial interests in the Far East; war in the Philippines, in China and Manchuria, have attracted American interest; our diplomacy has in that field, as in hardly any other, had a continuing and consistent policy. Since 1898, in other words, we have had materials for the formation of a public opinion on Asiatic problems such as we have had for European questions only since 1918. Yet the Washington Conference, and the discussion of the treaties which followed it, showed that even on Asiatic affairs our public opinion was comparatively feeble and uneducated. To expect any general intelligent interest in European affairs for many years to come is rather visionary."

Ignorance of foreign affairs may seem to be a straw man raised to be knocked down when I say that I do not believe that this re-

proach may be laid at the door of naval officers. My point is that they should shine in this respect by comparison with the great majority of their countrymen on the same plane of education and social station; and specifically that they must keep abreast of our foreign relations and have a knowledge of foreign nations, - of their institutions, their policies, and as far as may be of their psychology, - to fit themselves for diplomatic duty (the example of Perry in Japan is an instance of adapting method of psychology). Naval officers have unusual opportunities so to fit themselves, and have little excuse for failure to do so.

I take occasion here to say that opportunity is not synonymous with experience in the sense in which the latter word has been used heretofore in this lecture. In that sense experience is the stored-up knowledge that comes from reflection upon the conditions and events that opportunity has brought to our notice. Reflection upon what we have seen or had a part in is a necessary factor of experience that is to be of value in the future. A much respected brother officer said to me many years ago: "Most people hate to think." The statement may be exaggerated but the underlying idea is true enough. Thinking, reflection, about the matters that opportunity brings to our notice transmutes our observations into real experience that fits us for future occasions. This is as true in the international field as in the naval; in diplomacy as in fleet evolutions.

The place of knowledge of international law in preparation for diplomacy is so obvious that it need only be mentioned. There is one phase of international law that has, however, so much importance

in connection with our subject as to be worthy of a few words. I refer to treaties, which do not, perhaps, have all the attention from officers that they deserve. A reference to the instructions for the guidance of officers in maritime warfare will show how necessary it is to be familiar with treaties in the pursuit of strictly naval duties. In a wider sense our treaties are an epitome of our history and of the evolution of our policies. They show what diplomacy has had in mind in the past. They cover the widest range of subjects that are of interest to us as a nation. They do not cover all, as witness the "Gentlemen's Agreement" with Japan; but generally speaking they are crystallized diplomacy. Our immediate concern as naval officers is naturally with treaties now operative, to be found in Treaties in Force and its supplements. As a historical and diplomatic study, however, treaties to which we have been parties but which are not now in force have also a value, and Malloy's two volumes are well worth an occasional hour. Nor need interest be confined to our own treaties. In the past few months I have spent considerable time to my advantage in browsing through MacMurray's two thick volumes entitled Treaties and Agreements with and Concerning China.

Every treaty is an international contract whose negotiators perform an act of high diplomatic significance. It is natural to expect that naval officers will rarely be plenipotentiaries for the negotiation of treaties; but they have been in the past and they may be in the future. In ordinary service their observations and reports may well serve to keep the Government informed about matters that are likely to become the groundwork of treaties. One

such matter is trade, which, in the broad meaning of the word, more than any other one thing forms the subject matter of treaties. By the word trade I mean to include broadly all the agencies for world exchanges, such as banking, transportation and communications, as well as the material things exchanged. We are here in the domain of finance and economics. Now trade in this broad sense, including finance and economics, is a matter into which our professional education does not enter. Yet it lies at the very root of international relations; it is the constant preoccupation of diplomats and governments; perhaps it is not too much to say that on no other one thing does the balance between peace and war so vitally depend. Economic disputes soon become political, and in my opinion no greater nonsense has been uttered of late than the attempt to differentiate between economic and political predominance, of which we have heard not a little within the past few months.

It would be going far to advise officers to make a deep study of finance, economics and the laws of trade in order to prepare for a very improbable chance to employ such knowledge in diplomatic duty. But every intelligent citizen should have some knowledge of these subjects, and we hold ourselves as being in the intelligent class. The knowledge can do no harm, even if it only serves to give a broader and more understanding outlook on the world.

Although somewhat removed from the immediate subject of the lecture, you will perhaps pardon reference to a personal experience that opened my eyes to the advantages of knowledge not confined to strictly naval limitations. When it fell to me to become Military Governor of Santo Domingo, events so shaped themselves that the

entire executive and legislative functions of government rested in my hands. My problems were principally those of civil administration and civil policy. If I had known more about finance and economics I should have been spared many anxious hours. Often and often I wished that my leisure hours in previous years had been less filled with novels and more with what would have been of inestimable value in fitting me for my responsibilities for the welfare of a nation of nearly a million people.

It may seem to you that undue stress has been laid upon a phase of the work of naval officers that is not usual - one that may never come to any of you; that there has been a lack of proportion in its presentation. That may, indeed, be true, for the temptation is great to let one's subject loom large in the preparation of a lecture. But, if true it is not by intention; for I think that the naval mission in the life of the naval officer is his all-important mission - that, however successful in endeavor outside of strictly naval lines, if he fails of complete success within them he falls short of the professional goal. I hope you will agree with me, upon reflection, that, with the exception of trade, the other high points mentioned in self-preparation for diplomatic work are all more or less essential features of a naval officer's mental and intellectual equipment - a knowledge of our own history, traditions and policies, and of those of other nations; the necessity to apply thought to opportunity and observation in order to crystallize them into useful experience; and a knowledge of international law and treaties. That these are useful and requisite in diplomatic work simply adds to them another interest; it



does not mean that naval officers must go into broad and unknown fields of attainment in order to prepare for a possible chance of usefulness that probably never will arise. Of trade, even, I am sure none in this audience would take pride in asserting entire ignorance.

During the preparation of this lecture the thought has arisen time and again that the officers and men of the Navy are in a very real sense doing diplomatic work daily in so far as they meet foreigners - doing it well or ill as they represent well or ill American standards. Any American abroad is representative in a sense; naval officers, and enlisted men too, are official representatives in a way they can not escape if they would. The diplomacy they exercise in routine daily life will be unconscious. It will not be in the way of outstanding incidents, nor recorded in international archives, but each act touching a foreigner will be an infinitesimal element of the sum total of our foreign relations, as the individual drops of water make the ocean. In all probability it will be given to none of us to be a Foch of diplomacy, but we may all give daily and worthy service as privates. Perhaps this may seem a trivial conclusion to a subject of some weight; my excuse is the persistent recurrence of the thought in my mind.