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GREAT BRITAIN AND THE BRITISH NAVY.

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S T R I C T L Y C O N F I D E N T I A L

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GREAT BRITAIN AND THE BRITISH NAVY.

SOME REFLECTIONS OF A RETURNING NAVAL ATTACHE

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Great Britain and the British have much that appeals to Americans. Those of us with British ancestry view with pride Anglo-Saxon achievements making for civilization and world progress.

We who have been closely associated with the British, particularly during the World War, when there was such splendid cooperation, cherish many pleasant reflections of those eventful days, and are prone to give ready support to plans for further close cooperation. We could readily utilize all the time we have at our disposal today in considering the natural affinity of America and Great Britain and the numerous advantages that would accrue from such cooperation to both nations and in fact to the World in general. The result would be unquestioned dominance of English speaking people over world affairs. However, assuming that as naval officers we have a special responsibility for the general welfare and common defense of the American people, certain aspects of British affairs must be considered from a strong, perhaps selfish, pro-American viewpoint.

My observations during the past three years convince me, I regret to say, that this is a selfish world, with self interest predominating and that those charged with safeguarding a nation's interests have to deal with realities rather than ideals.

CONDITIONS SINCE THE WORLD WAR.

The general welfare and common defense of Great Britain and the British Empire are so linked with the sea power, that a proper survey of British naval **defense** involves consideration of a vast number of world-wide elements.

Cheap coal, cheap labor and cheap shipping have been the basis of British wealth. Strict adherence to a few recognized policies, superior world intelligence and wonderful organization, with a rugged common sense have given the British dominance in world affairs, and until the World War produced a satisfied and contented nation.

The end of the World War found Great Britain confronted with many grave problems. Changed conditions at home and overseas threatened her material prosperity and political ascendancy. Coal was no longer cheap; oil had replaced it to a large extent; labor was relatively dear; doles amounting to over a billion dollars a year had to be paid to the million and half unemployed. The national debt had risen to \$46,000,000,000. The very considerable gains in territory as the result of the war were more than off-set by the unrest in India and other dependencies. The Dominions clamoured for a political status of equality with Great Britain. Competition in world trade, industry, shipping and finance were both cause and result of important changes in world conditions.

London no longer had sufficient control over world affairs to enable the British to readily and satisfactorily meet the changed conditions in the Empire and the rest of the world.

The result has been popular dissatisfaction and unrest with frequent changes in the British Government and three elections within a period of two years. The discussions incident to the overthrowing of successive governments - Coalition, Conservative and Labor - and bringing new parties successively into power, have afforded opportunity to learn what policies the respective political parties and Great Britain, as a whole, stand for.

BRITISH IMPERIAL POLICY

The British have no written policy, nor even a written constitution. But there is a very clear and widespread understanding of both. The factors that have contributed most to British wealth and power are kept constantly in view through education and training, and particularly by tradition in an exceptionally able and efficient Civil Service. British Governments may change, but whatever the political party in office, the Civil Service seldom fails to produce a continuity of policy in matters affecting the outside world.

Back of the Government and the Civil Service, and always in close touch with affairs is the "City" - that small section of London in which are concentrated the minds dominating World finance, industry, commerce, and shipping. Generally speaking the British do not believe in the Government being in business, but Business controls the Government. The situation has been rather tersely presented by the editor of a colonial weekly as follows:

"Britain is the workshop of the world. It lives by foreign trade. Therefore, to secure and hold markets it must invest money abroad, acquire colonies and control the seas.

"Debts must be paid. The gold standard must be maintained. Forms of government do not matter. Law and order must be established and revolutions put down.

"The world must be made safe, not for democracy; for that is only a word - - but for trade and commerce.

"That is the national policy of the British people, of both Liberals and Conservatives. It forms the background of all British thinking. It is not openly stated, as there is a trace of Oriental secrecy and reticence in England. It is not considered good form to shout one's beliefs from the house-tops."

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Mr. Amery, late First Lord of the Admiralty, and now Secretary of State for the Colonies, in a recent magazine article stated that

"A complete Imperial policy, political, defensive, economic, was summed up in the historic watchwords 'Ships, Colonies, and Commerce'.

". . . Men, Money and Markets form an inseparable trio which have to go together to insure really successful development."

The same article contained the following interesting paragraph:

"Unless we deal with it on big lines the American debt is likely to involve us in an economic servitude to the United States far more oppressive than any we ever imposed on the American Colonies before they revolted against us. The development of the Empire is our economic War of Independence against American domination."

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The discussions of British policy have been enlivened by the frank statements of "Augur" in recent issues of the Fortnightly Review, two of which are as follows:

"The British Empire has been built up, developed and maintained, not out of an idea of justice, but for profit. It is composed of cells of two sorts: the power cells, which like the United Kingdom and the white Dominions, form the backbone of the Imperial body, and supply the governing brain; and the profit-giving cells which supply the blood-forming elements. That this conception of the Empire is correct is proved if one has the courage to think honestly."

"The ideal formula for a policy directed towards the establishment of real balance of power in Europe would be for us to do our utmost to create such a state of affairs in Europe that all danger of warlike conflicts should cease to exist. France would be under the moral obligation of disarming at last, and turning her attention to the economic competition in which we are well able to hold our own and even better than that."

Substitute "the World" for "Europe" and "other powers" for "France", and you have a British "ideal formula" for the establishment of balance of power in the World that would enable the British to give full effect to their various policies - political, territorial, economic, industrial, commercial and shipping.

Mr. Baldwin, now Prime Minister, has stated that the Conservative Party "will make the League of Nations the pivotal factor in our foreign policy". With the Secretary-General of the League of Nations and about twenty-five per cent of the Secretariat British, the League offers an excellent opportunity for British dominance in World affairs at least until the end of the 10 years of tranquillity. However all British are by no means believers in League of Nations owing to its tendency towards internationalism and pacifism.

NAVAL POLICY

Nearly every phase of British Naval Policy has been publicly discussed during the last three years in connection with the Washington Conference, the Imperial Conference in 1923, the controversy over Singapore and the Admiralty demand for control of Fleet Air Arm, and the recently proposed International Conference for the further limitation of armaments.

As indicated in the following quotations, the British have no intention of relinquishing the margin of supremacy in sea power, which they now possess, by virtue not only of superior naval strength in ships and personnel, but also of the stra-

tegral value of naval bases, fueling stations, Merchant Marine, and systems of world communication - both cable and radio.

Equality of sea power or even equality of strictly naval forces is rarely mentioned in Great Britain; the reverse very frequently. The following from an address of Admiral of the Fleet Sir Doveton Sturdee is typical:

"We ought to be very careful before we reduce our Navy to the level of any other country in the world, however friendly it might be."

There has been a suggestion that as a result of their naval reductions whether they will not have to reconsider the point of view that the enemy coast is their strategic frontier. Probably this was suggested by our situation in the Pacific.

The views of Mr. Amery expressed 30 March, 1924, in an article dealing with "Imperial Naval Defence, Oceanic Strategy, Capital Ships and Cruisers", are worthy of our careful study in view of his being First Lord of the Admiralty in the previous Conservative Government and Colonial Secretary in the present Cabinet.

"The problem of Singapore is only a part, though a vital and inseparable part, of the wider problem of the protection of our whole oceanic system.

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"Our dependence on the sea is not something accidental, but is intimately of the structure of each and every part of the Empire."

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"The object of the naval forces of the Empire is to keep open these vital communications, and their capacity to carry out this duty in the actual event of war enables them to fulfil what is really their primary and their continuous function, namely, to preserve our peace and to secure the safeguarding of our common interests by peaceful diplomacy."

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"The main defence, just as the main trade, of the Empire will continue to be carried on on the surface of the sea."

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"What should be the standard of our naval power? For us, depending as we do for our very existence upon the continuous maintenance of the freedom of the sea, it is essential that as against any Power or combination of Powers, whose armaments or policy might constitute a real and definite menace to our security, we should maintain a substantial margin of superiority."

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"In view of all we stand to lose by even a temporary loss of sea control, we can never afford to go below the standard of at least equality with any other nation. We cannot afford to be obviously and clearly at the mercy of any foreign Power, however friendly."

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"The One-Power Standard, however, is a standard which refers to the strength of fighting fleets as measured in

capital ships. There can be no similar rough and ready standard for cruisers and smaller craft, the requirements in respect of which - apart from the proper complement of the fighting fleets - must depend on the peculiar defence problem of each Power".

Evidently Mr. Amery's views are the views of the Conservative Government, as Mr. Baldwin, the Prime Minister, recently stated

"We cannot allow, and we will not allow, any weakening at present of the defensive forces of the Empire. We stand for a one-Power Navy sufficiently equipped with cruisers to protect our trade routes, and sufficiently equipped bases throughout the world to make our Fleet mobile and capable of action wherever the call may come from."

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"So long as the main line of communications in the Empire lies through the Suez Canal to India it is a cardinal feature of our policy, and I may say to the best of my belief it is the policy of all parties, that the security of that communication must be safeguarded and maintained."

A clear brief presentation of one important phase of British naval policy is contained in the following statement of Mr. Amery's in Parliament, 12 March 1923:

" - - - Our scheme is based, not on the contemplation of the menace, but only in keeping in existence a

Navy sufficiently efficient to deal with such a menace gradually coming into existence after a period of years."

BRITISH NAVAL OBJECTIVES.

As often stated by British statesmen and strategists, the control of trade routes and protection of trade is the primary objective. British trade extends to all frequented parts of the ocean. A naval force adequate for that purpose, will be able to afford all needed assistance in diplomatic negotiations and otherwise maintaining British prestige, so that the British point of view shall have due weight in the affairs of Europe and the World.

(British policy and British Naval Strategy to be properly understood requires constant reference to a globe of the largest size.)

The protection of the route to India and the Far East via Suez and the political situation in Southern Europe and the Far East are the major naval considerations at present. Accordingly the Fleet stationed in the Mediterranean has recently been greatly strengthened. From there the transfer of Naval Forces to Far Eastern waters may be readily effected.

The stationing of the latest cruisers in Asiatic Waters and the recent decision to provide full crews for all submarines on the China Station indicates due British interest and concern in the situation in the Western Pacific. Evidently the British Fleet will maintain a sphere of influence there. It may be noted

that Wei-hai-Wei is still in British possession, in spite of Lord Balfour's statement at the Washington Conference that the British would retrocede it to China.

(Bombay - Trincomali - Suez).

DRAFT OF WATER IN SUEZ CANAL AND FIRST CLASS PORTS.

"The programme of 1912 of the Suez Canal Company is expected to be completed during the present year. It provides for the passage of vessels with a draft of 33 feet. The programme of 1921 provides for a progressive increase in the depth of the Canal up to 42 feet 8 inches, which will allow the passage of vessels of 35 feet and possibly 36 feet draft. This scheme is due for completion at earliest in 1933 and at latest in 1935."

"Up to the present, progressive increases of depth at Colombo have been obtained at a relatively low cost by dredging, but to go deeper than 36 feet and provide an additional 2 feet of water to give accommodation to vessels drawing 35 feet would apparently involve the clearance of large rock areas and an expenditure on a scale much higher than the cost of dredging."

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"The effect of the 1921 programme at Suez will be to place the two great inter-oceanic Canals approximately on a par in the matter of effective depth. - - - - We feel, therefore, that after the lapse of a certain number of

years, it is not unlikely that a depth of 40 feet will become standardized for first-class ports.

"Although the Panama Canal has a fresh-water depth of 41 feet, we understand that it has not yet been utilised to the full."

BRITISH IMPERIAL NAVAL FORCES

The Royal Navy as regards both personnel and materiel is in a highly efficient condition. On the occasion of the Naval Review at Spithead, July, 1924, there was much comment on the diminished naval force as compared with Fleet assembled for the review just prior to the War, but there was a general consensus of opinion that the present smaller Fleet was relatively stronger especially as regards condition of personnel, which, through the gradual reductions since the War, had reached the highest standard of efficiency as to physical condition, education, training and discipline. However the new material for both officer and enlisted personnel is not up to the old standards and the conditions governing entry into the Service have been made less exacting.

(7) The British naval budget, and the number of personnel are approximately the same as ours. Their funds go further, and owing to the average term of service of their enlisted personnel being about three times as long as in our service, enormous advantages, both as regards economy and efficiency are obtained. The old saying that "Man for man our bluejackets have no superior" only holds when "of same length of service."

Since the war there has been a complete reorganization of the Admiralty Staff, and the naval education and training systems, which together with the reorganization of the Committee of Imperial Defence, with the Lord Chancellor as its head, is tending to higher standards of naval efficiency, and of naval defence being properly coordinated with the Army and Air Services and brought in close relation with other branches of the Government.

- As regards materiel - Ships, Dockyards, Bases and fuel stations, and reserve supplies in Great Britain and overseas - the British Imperial Navy is in much better condition than ours;
- (8) present provisions for upkeep is such as to maintain that superiority.

- Changes and improvements have been going on quietly since the War in the chain of British naval bases that extend around the world. The development of Singapore is the only one that has attracted attention. The transfer of the naval base from
- (9) Bombay to Trincomali almost passed unnoticed; likewise the big dry docks at St. Johns, N.S., and Esquimalt, which, while private enterprises will be available for docking the largest naval vessels; also the extensive increase of oil fuel storage provided for by the Naval Estimates for 1924-25 at

Pembroke

Aden

Ceylon (Trincomali)

Glasgow

Malta

Rangoon
Singapore
Falklands
Gibraltar
Plymouth
Sierra Leone
Port Sudan.

It is significant that the Naval estimates do not indicate the amount of expenditures at each place, and the total cost is left blank.

DOMINION NAVAL FORCES

The Dominion Naval Forces, particularly the Australian Navy, are becoming a factor that must be considered in any comparison of American and British naval forces. They augment the regular naval personnel by 5,402 and 6,244 reserves. Through interchange of ships, and officer personnel between the Dominion Forces and the Royal Navy, the British hope to have uniform naval training throughout the Empire and particularly that all the naval personnel should be inspired by the traditions upon which the morale of the Royal Navy is largely founded.

The projected two 10,000 ton cruisers, "patrol" submarines, drydocks, naval bases, and oil fuel storage by Australia are an important contribution to British Naval defense in the Western Pacific.

COMPARISON OF BUDGETS AND NAVAL PERSONNEL - 1924

(Slide 7)

	<u>U. S. A.</u>	<u>Great Britain</u>	<u>British Empire</u>
Total Appropriations	\$3,008,480,764	\$3,673,116,490#	\$5,242,609,560
Budget for Defense	611,761,113	621,241,475 ^x	961,046,890
Naval Budget	277,208,327	276,129,040	292,941,268

#Equivalent for exchange at par.

^xArmy Budget - \$255,408,921.20

Air Budget - \$89,703,513.60

<u>NAVAL PERSONNEL</u>	<u>U. S. A.</u>	<u>Great Britain</u>	<u>Dominions</u>	<u>British Empire</u>
Regular Navy	94,537	88,901 ^x	5,402	94,303 ^x
Naval Reserves	26,919	40,551	6,244	46,795
Marines	20,666	10,045	?	10,045
Marine Reserves	2,641	8,358	?	8,358

^xFor comparison, add: 4,113 civilian crews of British naval auxiliaries and 9,483 for Air Personnel corresponding to our Naval Aviation.

(3,550 Royal Air Force are now assigned to British Fleet Air Arm)

UPKEEP OF BRITISH SHIPS

(Slide 8)

The following expenditures for reconstruction, large repairs and alterations, 1924-25 indicate in a measure the high standard of upkeep of ships in the British Navy.

SHIPS UNDERGOING RECONSTRUCTION & LARGE REPAIRS

FURIOUS.	£ 1,319,864	(Total)
COURAGEOUS.	£ 149,330	(1924-5)
GLORIOUS	£ 117,441	(1924-5)
WARSPITE	£ 134,619	(1924-5)
RENOWN	£ 309,272	(1924-5)

SHIPS UNDERGOING LARGE REPAIRS & ALTERATION.

VINDICTIVE	£ 265,119	(Total)
LOWESTOFT.	£ 119,700	(Total)

Also 10 other cruisers.

- 1 Aircraft Carrier.
- 2 Monitors
- 4 Sloops
- 1 Drill Ship
- M-29) Conversion to
M-33) Minelayers
- 3 Destroyers
- 10 Submarines.

NEW CONSTRUCTION - 1924 - 25

The following new construction is provided for by the British Naval Estimates 1924-25:

2 Battleships (NELSON and RODNEY)

9 Cruisers

2 Flotilla Leaders

2 Destroyers

7 Submarines

1 Minelayer (ADVENTURE)

(10) Of this new construction the cruisers EFFINGHAM, FROBISHER and EMERALD, the flotilla leaders KEPPEL and BROKE and five submarines of L Class will be commissioned during the present fiscal year ending 31 March, 1925. This leaves under construction the NELSON and RODNEY, 6 cruisers, 2 destroyers, and the ADVENTURE.

In addition is the extensive reconstruction in Great Britain, and the projected Australia program including two 10,000 ton cruisers and a number of "patrol" submarines.

BRITISH NAVAL POINT OF VIEW ON NEW CONSTRUCTION

(The following statements by Mr. Amery as First Lord of the Admiralty, in Parliament, 21 January, 1924, may be accepted (as the probable views of the present Government:)

"From the naval point of view the situation is this: Practically the whole of our light cruisers will become obsolete and worn out in the course of the next twelve years. To replace them and to maintain our cruiser establishment in strength sufficient to meet the requirements of our Fleets, and the protection of our commerce, we shall have to lay down, in the course of the next ten years, the total of some fifty-two cruisers in all, in other words an average of five a year. There will, moreover, be a particularly heavy drop in the next six years, and to prevent a serious deficiency arising in 1929 and subsequent years, we ought to lay down as many above that average as reasonable in the immediate three years. Apart from strategical considerations, there are also very strong reasons of administration, and economy, in favour of expediting to some extent our cruiser programme. In 1927-8 and subsequent years we shall have to keep the yards well occupied with considerable replacements of destroyers which, by then, will have become obsolete. From 1931 onwards we shall, under the provisions of the Washington Treaty, be faced with heavy expenditure in connection with the replacement of capital ships. By getting out of the way a substantial part of the light cruiser replacement programme in the next few years, we

shall provide a much more even distribution of work, and expenditure, and secure better tenders, as well as meeting the immediate needs of the employment situation.

"What we have, therefore, proposed was to lay down immediately eight light cruisers of a type that, under the Washington Treaty, has become the standard type adopted by all great naval Powers, namely, vessels of 10,000 tons armed with eight-inch guns. Three of these we have proposed to lay down in the Royal Dockyards and the remaining five put out to tender. In addition to these, the special unemployment programme this year included three submarines and a submarine depot ship, two destroyers and a destroyer depot ship, and two gunboats of a special shape for the Persian Gulf, and aircraft carrier, and a mine-laying vessel. All these are necessary requirements most urgently needed for replacement."

Again in Parliament, 31 July, 1924, Mr. Amery expressed his views on new construction in an extended address of which the following are brief quotations:

"Taking into account the five cruisers now laid down, taking also into account the two cruisers which it seems reasonably probable the Australian Commonwealth will add to her young Navy, we ought to lay down at least another 10 cruisers in the next two years."

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"from 1929 onwards and until 1935, we shall have to replace 177 destroyers."

"I should say the argument rather is that the construction of these great fleets of submarines will necessitate a much larger construction of cruisers and destroyers on our part to deal with them."

BRITISH VIEWS ON ELEVATION OF GUNS

- (11) From usually well informed and reliable source information was to the effect that (May 1923) Admiralty officials
(12) concerned were about equally divided on the question of the right under the Washington Treaty to increase elevation of guns.

From the same source (27 November) that officers at the Admiralty did not consider the increasing the angle of elevation of guns contrary to the Provisions of the Treaty but that undoubtedly the Admiralty officially would place the contrary interpretation upon the provisions of the Treaty, as it was their policy to "oppose any measures which would enhance the military efficiency or margin of safety of any important Naval Power."

(Opinions appearing at about the same time in Naval & Military Record and Scientific American relative to gun elevation were probably from same source as above).

In the House of Commons, 7 May, 1923, in reply to inquiry of Commander Bellairs, M.P., addressed to the Prime Minister, asking whether in view of the fact that America and Japan have voted money for increased elevation of guns of capital ships, and that there is reason to believe that this is contrary to the spirit of the Washington Treaty, whether the Government

will make friendly representations to both Powers with a view to preventing wasteful rivalry, - the Parliamentary Secretary for Foreign Affairs replied "No action of the nature suggested is at present contemplated".

(Commander Bellairs asked a very similar question in House of Commons, 2 May 1923.)

The British Ambassador, Washington, addressed a long letter, 14 February 1924, to Secretary of State Hughes pointing out that the reconstruction of ships, and particularly increasing the elevation of guns in the opinion of the British Government was not in accordance with the spirit of the Washington Treaty.

"Viscount CURZON asked the Prime Minister, (House of Commons, 7 April, 1924) whether, in the view of His Majesty's Government, warships may be converted from coal to oil burning; and whether gun-mounting may be so modified as to allow additional elevation being given to the gunnery armament within the scope of repairs as contemplated by the Washington Agreement?

"The PRIME MINISTER: If the question refers to the capital ships that are retained under the provisions of the Washington Treaty, the reply is that, in the view of His Majesty's Government, such warships may not be converted from coal to oil burning. Also, if the elevation of the guns of the main armament of those retained capital ships is referred to, the view of His Majesty's Government is that such existing ships were intended to remain

unaltered in this respect."

Note that while the British Ambassador's letter was in the nature of a diplomatic protest, the other statements were in the nature of Government pronouncements in Parliament.

BRITISH NAVAL EDUCATION AND TRAINING.

Immediately after the Armistice, in the course of discussions relative to the direction of naval activities for preparing for the next war, there was great diversity of opinion as to what materiel and technical matter should be given this particular attention. There was unanimity to concentrate upon education and training which would prove profitable whatever change might take place in methods of warfare.

The advantage of long term of service of the enlisted personnel is evident in every activity involving personnel. While the British recruits number less than 6,000, ours number about 20,000 a year. As result with equal facilities at training stations, the British give all seamen recruits practically a year's training before sending them to sea, while our recruits must be limited to eight weeks' training on shore, followed by another eight weeks at sea.

The British have a most admirable course of training for their engine-room artificers, who undergo 4-1/2 years training before assignment to sea duty.

One of the distinctive features of British naval education is that it is placed under a highly paid civilian and is carried out largely through a Corps Naval Instructors, consisting

of commissioned and warrant instructors and school-masters. The supervision of the Adviser on Education extends even to the examination of officers, and the activities of the Naval Instructors Corps extend to all of the larger naval vessels and even to some of the destroyers.

Since the war the entire course of education in the Royal Navy has been revised both as regard to general and technical education. Advancement in rating of enlisted personnel depends largely upon the educational qualification of the individual men as indicated by the educational certificate, which forms a part of their record. As an evidence of the thoroughness with which this new system of education and training is carried out, petty officers not only have to qualify for their rating, but have to re-qualify periodically.

Generally speaking the system of British naval education and training aims to prepare all personnel, both commissioned and enlisted, to efficiently perform their respective ship duties before going on board the vessel. This also applies to the personnel maintained in readiness for manning all ships in reserve in event of an emergency.

The education and training of British naval personnel is much facilitated by the relatively short distances between the Admiralty and the various dockyards and training schools and stations in the United Kingdom. Each of the three principal naval commands - Plymouth, Portsmouth and Chatham, have in connection with the barracks, or as separate institutions, most complete facilities for the training of enlisted personnel,

warrant officers and the lower ranks of commissioned personnel. However, the greater part of the education of officers is carried on in special establishments in Greenwich and Portsmouth.

The British Navy List (Page 307) contains a list of the courses for officers. Thirty-six separate courses are listed with over 600 officers in attendance in October 1924. This does not include naval cadets and midshipmen undergoing training at Dartmouth or afloat.

The following are courses of special interest in view of their importance and the fact we have none corresponding to them:

Senior Officers Technical Course.
War Staff Course (including Trade Course).
Intelligence Course.
Navigation Course.
Anti-Submarine Course.
Physical and Recreational Training Course.
Secretaries Course.

BRITISH NAVAL WAR COLLEGE

The Senior Officers' War Course is limited to officers not below the rank of Captain, R.N., and Marine, Army and Royal Air Force officers of corresponding rank. At present time there are about 14 officers in the class. The syllabus of the course does not differ materially from ours.

"The Tactical Manoeuver Board is little used except for small forces, as it is found that the Officers lose interest after a time, but particular attention is paid to exercises that will simulate the work in plotting room and conning tower, showing the positions of vessels during an action. Evidently much time and attention are given to what corresponds to our "Estimate of the Situation" for strategic problems. Considerable time is spent in lectures, followed by discussions; and these discussions are regarded as rather more valuable than the lectures. International Law lectures are apparently carried on in much the same way as at our Naval War College.

"The function of the Naval War College in regard to the preparation of War Plans is entirely academic, the War Plans being prepared in the War Plans Division of the Admiralty."

"The number of Officers taking the War Staff Course is 26, and this is expected to be about the average number. The number of Officers taking the Intelligence Course is 14.

"At the War Staff College there are apparently a great number of different courses, including Intelligence Course, Trade Course, Anti-Submarine Course, and other technical courses, which cooperate closely with the practical courses held at Portsmouth, and the practical work carried out at Portland.

"The wide range in the ranks of Officers taking the

Intelligence Course may be noted from consulting page 1112, British Navy List.

"The Trade Course is closely associated with the functions of the Trade Division of the Admiralty, (whose work was indicated in Naval Attache's report Serial No. 414 of 11 March, 1924, showing the influence of Singapore upon British trade.")

BRITISH NAVAL AVIATION

At present the British Fleet Air Arm has 3,550 Royal Air Force, and strictly navy personnel of 84 officers and 117 men. Its organization is shown in the (monthly) British Navy List.

The present arrangement is regarded as most unsatisfactory and tends to continue the inefficient condition of Naval Aviation. Admiralty continues to actively press for control over the Naval Air Wing. The Naval personnel assigned to training or administration of naval air service has been largely increased recently, with a view to taking over control of the air forces actually operating with the Fleet.

The following extract from an address by Admiral Earl Beatty presents the Admiralty views as to the place of Naval Aviation in Naval Defence. It incidentally deals with the question of the vulnerability of capital ship to attack from the air.

"Then we come to the question of air attack on the capital ship, and the means for countering and defeating it. The improvement in armour protection against the gun

is effective against the bomb, and the under-water protection against the torpedo is equally effective against aircraft bombs bursting close alongside a ship. Anti-aircraft fire has made great strides, and we should be able to rely on our own Fleet aircraft for counter-attack. The decision that capital ships can be equipped to withstand all these forms of attack has not been reached without the most careful investigation, or without giving every consideration to the points which have been urged against it by those who hold that the day of the large surface ships is past. The decision is based upon experiment and exhaustive trial, fortified by the best naval opinion available, and the advice of all officers who have held important command with the last ten years, the period during which the new menaces have developed. Naval constructors corroborate the naval opinion, and their views are in turn confirmed by the decisions reached in the United States and Japan.

"The capital ship, that is to say, the most powerful ship afloat, is the basis of sea power; it is the unit upon the support of which depends the freedom of action of every less powerful type of craft; it is a match for any ship or weapon that can be brought against it. In the distant past the capital ship was the trireme; today it is the battleship; tomorrow it may be something different, something that can fly, dive or perform other evolutions which today seem impossible.

"To turn again to the air. Nowhere is the importance of this arm more fully recognized than in the Navy. It is not too much to say that in the future no fleet, no ship, will be fully equipped without aircraft. They are becoming an additional indispensable weapon of the fleet, as indispensable as guns or torpedoes, and as much a part of a ship's equipment. To command a fleet in the future, an officer's knowledge of the value and use of aircraft must be as intimate as his knowledge of the value and use of gun, torpedo, and submarine. The aeroplane has definite functions in the gunnery organization of each ship. It may well be that the Commander-in-Chief and his staff will be quartered on board an aircraft carrier. During operations Staff officers in aeroplanes, far in advance of the Fleet, should be able to give information enabling him to dispose his forces to the best strategic and tactical advantage. Victory may well depend upon this.

"It must be remembered that shore-based aircraft can function only in comparatively narrow waters. The great oceans which carry our trade and communications are as free from their influences as ever. As in the case of the submarine, it is only the Power which commands the sea that can secure the full use and freedom of action of aircraft borne in aircraft carriers and in other vessels of the fleet. It is therefore imperative that the air arm of the Navy should be developed, unhampered, side by side with the gunnery arm, the torpedo arm, and the other arms

which go to make up the efficiency of the fleet; and that a proper proportion of the personnel of the Navy should be devoted to its development, as is the case with the other arms."

The Committee of Imperial Defence recently inquired into the cooperation and correlation between the Navy, Army and Air Force from the point of view of national and Imperial Defence generally. They came to the decision that the capital ship must be retained as "the basis of naval power". While admitting that a considerable expansion of the Royal Air Force was vital, the Committee made the following observations which are of importance as bearing upon future naval policy:-

"So far as the protection of territory and communications in the wider oceans is concerned, the question of a readjustment of responsibilities between the Service Departments did not arise. Although certain types of 300-400 miles, neither the British nor any other Air Service is yet equipped with aeroplanes whose normal effective radius of action exceeds about 200 miles, and beyond that distance only sea-borne aircraft have for the present to be considered. But it may be remembered that the types of aeroplanes now in service use continue steadily to be replaced by machines of greater power and wider radius of action." (Hurd's deduction.)

OPERATIONS AND FLEET EXERCISES.

The present disposition of British naval forces is with a view to secure diplomatic influence and prestige generally. The recent world cruise of the HOOD and other cruisers is simply one, though a very important one, of the great number of cruises of British naval vessels visiting in groups or singly ports practically in every part of the world. The systematic way in which all the cruises to foreign ports have been carried out is a matter that merits more attention than it has received.

There are also 10 naval survey vessels engaged in hydrographic surveys - 4 being overseas. (M.I.D. Map of Mediterranean.)

The British Fleet yearly program covers about the same range of exercises and maneuvers as ours. Off coast of Scotland in the vicinity of Invergordon the Divisions exercise for several weeks twice yearly. The fleet is based upon Portland, with its anti-submarine operating base, for fleet exercises and certain forms of target practice every summer. Last winter, for the first time since the war combined Fleet Maneuvers were held. The Atlantic and Mediterranean Fleets were based in the Balearic Islands (Spanish) and the problem was the defence of the British route to the East via Suez.

Little information is obtainable as to British maneuvers, naval tactics or gunnery training. The "Defense of the Realm Act" is still in force and enforced. (Elaborate.)

(Target practice - aircraft bombing - tactical exercises - Anti-submarine - Mine-sweeping - Gas)

SINGAPORE NAVAL BASE

The return of the Conservative Party to power means the development of Singapore as a Fleet Base. In fact it is probable that the Labor Government if it had continued in office would have reversed its policy to abandon the Singapore scheme.

This is borne out by the fact that the Labor Government in disposing of equipment for construction work at Singapore, only sold such equipment as would rapidly deteriorate and which could be readily replaced from supplies on hand, elsewhere.

In presenting its decision to Parliament the Labor Government carefully stated that the Admiralty had convinced them of the strategic necessity of the proposed development of Singapore. The Government asked Parliament not to proceed with the scheme owing to its detrimental effect on British general foreign policy, especially with regard to international cooperation, through an enlarged League of Nations, for settling disputes by conciliation or judicial arbitration, and creating conditions for a comprehensive limitations of armaments.

In the course of a discussion in Parliament, Mr. Amery while First Lord of the Admiralty, stated:

(3) "The policy as to our fuel storage and Singapore is not aimed at Japan or any Power. The object is simply to restore to the Navy in the oil fuel days and the days of big bulged ships that mobility which it enjoyed in the days of coal. We have to create at Singapore a graving dock capable of holding the modern big bulged ships, and we have to have workshops, stores, and all the apparatus

which would make it an effective base if at any time we wished to restore the position such as existed before the German menace arose and a very large portion of our active fleet was in Far Eastern waters."

At another time Mr. Amery pointed out that "Singapore is only a part, though a vital and inseparable part of the wider problem of the protection of our whole oceanic system".

(13) At present Singapore has important naval base facilities and oil fuel storage, though its one large dry dock will not take the HOOD or battleships with bulges, or the aircraft carrier EAGLE.

While to Australia and New Zealand the development of Singapore appears to be an effective and essential reply to a very real present menace to their welfare, it is safe to say that the British understanding generally is that a fleet base at Singapore is not directed against a particular Power or to meet a present condition, but to maintain British supremacy on the seas with respect to any and all Powers for all time.

TRANQUILITY AND DISARMAMENT

Of the problems confronting Great Britain at the end of the World War apparently the condition of national finance gave her most concern. Burdened with a debt of about forty-six billion dollars it was evident that government expenditures must not only be reduced to a minimum, but the forty-four million people in Great Britain (excluding Southern Ireland) could not continue to meet the expenses of maintaining forces

hitherto considered necessary adequate to protect the Empire even with the financial assistance obtainable from the Dominions and Colonies. While it is frequently stated that the British Empire covers a quarter of the area of the world and includes (14) approximately five hundred million people, all of those people do not contribute to Empire, defence, at least directly or by their own free will, as is evident by the existing state of affairs in India, the Sudan and even in some of the Dominions, notably Canada and South Africa.

British post-war policy was a matter of close attention before the Armistice. It now appears that in 1919 the Coalition Government, of which Lloyd George was Prime Minister decided upon a policy of ten years' tranquility, that is that Great Britain would not engage in any major war during that period. This policy of ten years tranquility was reaffirmed in Parliament by the Conservative Government in 1923 and the Labor Government in 1924.

In accordance with that policy tremendous reductions were at once undertaken in the British Navy, Army and Air Forces. It is interesting to note that the First Lord of the Admiralty (Lord Long), on 17 March 1920 announced in the House of Commons that the naval policy of the Government was to maintain a "One-Power Standard" - i.e., that the British Navy should not be inferior in strength to that of any other Power. In March 1921, nearly a year before the signing of the treaty of Washington, in presenting the naval estimates to Parliament, Lord Lee, who had become First Lord of the Admiralty, called attention to this

- announcement of his predecessor and intimated further large reductions in the British naval forces, including transfer to the
- (15) "Disposal List" of eight battleships, all of which were included in the twenty-two ships to be scrapped under the Washington Treaty. More recent information from the British Admiralty was to the effect that four of these eight battleships and four others named to be scrapped had been actually
- (16) disposed of before the Treaty of Washington was signed.

The New Construction scrapped by the British - 4 ships - cost £533,124; our 11 capital ships \$98,632,653.39. A British Admiral referred to the scrapping under the Treaty as giving the British Government a breathing spell financially.

The British have scrupulously observed the provisions of the Washington Treaty, but America should understand that British reduction of Naval Armament and the adoption of the "One-Power Standard" for capital ships only was in accordance with British policy adopted two years or more before the Washington Conference. In this connection the following extract from the "London Morning Post" of 17 October 1924 under caption of "Illusions and Realities" is of interest:

"We shall, no doubt, be told that the Washington Conference, and not Mr. Lloyd George, was the cause of this disarmament; but we believe it to be true that the destruction of our ships and the suspension of shipbuilding was decided on before the Washington Conference even took place, and that the Conference was merely the means employed by the Wizard to shift the blame of his policy

on another pair of shoulders."

It may therefore be expected that in accordance with the British policies of retrenchment and tranquility they will be ready to enter into any arrangement for the further limitation of naval armaments that will enable the British to maintain the same margin of security that they have at present.

LORD LEE AND THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE.

In the course of an address before the Institute of Naval Architects, 5 April, 1924 (shortly after his return from the Washington Conference) Lord Lee stated:

"When he accepted the position of First Lord of the Admiralty, about a year ago, the outlook was very gloomy because two of the principal nations of the world, the United States and Japan, had laid down building programmes which were enormous, and if they had been carried out would have relegated Great Britain to the third position as a naval power, which would have been unbearable. This condition could not have been avoided except by public sacrifices which the country could not have afforded, and which would eventually have lead to financial ruin. He considered that the Washington Conference, while it had not stopped the building of powerful navies, had taken the very heart out of it in limiting battleships and other construction."

- - - -

"It was unthinkable that the Navy could be reduced

to a point that might endanger the Empire, and he was sure that every patriotic citizen of the Empire would prefer to have a Navy sufficient for its defence rather than a reduction in income-tax."

- - -

"He stated that no matter what other means of defence might be improvised hurriedly, it was an absolute necessity to keep a trained personnel to man the ships of the Navy, and that this training could not be done hurriedly but required time to make the personnel efficient. No matter how excellent the materiel might be, without a highly trained personnel the Navy would resemble "a painted ship upon a painted ocean."

FURTHER LIMITATION OF ARMAMENTS.

In view of the possibility of an International Conference for the further limitation of armaments being called by the League of Nations or by some Power, it is interesting to note to what extent Great Britain will be ready to disarm, as indicated by the following statements made in Parliament during February, 1924:

Earl of Birkenhead in the House of Lords, 26 February, 1924.

"I hear all this talk about disarmament, and the more I hear talk of disarmament the more I feel myself impelled to ask what are the realities of the situation. Who is disarming, except the people who have not any arms at all?"

Who is disarming in this world, except those who talk in terms of idealism?

- - -

"I will tell him how he and his Government might more profitably employ themselves. Let them think in terms of national safety."

- - -

"Nobody in this world at the present moment has the slightest intention of disarming himself.

- - -

"there are a number of people in this country, ---, who have not the slightest intention of giving up anything which they conceive to be necessary for the protection of the country."

- - -

"the greatness of this country has been preserved, not by silly talk but by action, and by capacity for action when the need for action arises."

Mr. Ramsay MacDonald, Prime Minister, in the House of Commons, 12 February 1924.

"The final aim of the Foreign Secretary must be to come to an agreement upon armaments. I am going to use all the energy I have got to increase the representative character and authority of the League of Nations."

Viscount Haldane (The Lord Chancellor) in the House of Lords.
12 February 1924.

"I have not suggested any breach in the continuity of policy by which we have for years been organising our defences upon an improved basis."

Viscount Cecil of Chelwood (Lord Robert Cecil). 13 February 1924

"Our forces have been reduced, and reduced, I believe, to the lowest possible extent. Many good judges think that we have, perhaps, gone even further than we ought to go, and that means that, at any rate for some purposes, our influence in Europe may not be as strong as it otherwise would be. Surely it is a matter which everyone ought to consider -- whether there is any means by which the proportionate strength of this country and other countries may be, I will not say equalised, but brought nearer together, and if, as I certainly think, it would be a grave mistake to increase our forces, whether it is not worth every effort that we can possibly make to induce other countries to reduce their forces to something like the standard that we have adopted."

(17) In the event of such a Conference it may be assumed that the British political, naval, and other objectives will be as follows:

PROBABLE BRITISH OBJECTIVES AT A FUTURE CONFERENCE
ON FURTHER LIMITATION OF ARMAMENTS.

(Slide 17)

Probable British Political Objectives.

- (a) Maintenance of British political and territorial status quo.
- (b) Recognition of superior British interest in British Mandates.
- (c) Recognition of British necessity of security of route via Suez to Far East and trade routes generally.
- (d) Draw her Dominions and Colonies closer.
- (e) Strengthen British influence among minor powers, including South American states.
- (f) Weaken outside influence of other strong powers.
- (g) British ownership of preferment in oil producing areas.

Probable British Naval Objectives.

- (a) Restricting operations of submarines, or eliminating them entirely.
- (b) Prohibiting use of poison gas.
- (c) Limitation of Air Force.
- (d) Recognition of British necessity of having larger cruiser and auxiliary combatant forces.
- (e) Continued arming of Merchant Marine ships in time of war.

Other Probable British Objectives.

- (a) British domination through a strengthened League of Nations.
- (b) Reduction or cancellation of War Debts including British debt to America.
- (c) Extending the principle of "Freedom of the Sea" to foreign ports to remove "flag discrimination" even in coastwise shipping.

DOMINANT SEA POWER.

There is a British point of view that has become instilled in American minds that requires our serious consideration.

It is a comparison of American resources, particularly natural resources, with those of the British Isles, with the deduction that self-sustaining America does not require seapower of equal strength to that required by the British owing to geographical considerations, and particularly to the fact that it is vital to existence of the British Isles to ensure food imports and safe-guard exports of British products.

The security that the British seek is desired by every maritime power. It is the primary objective of organized government. The other maritime powers not having the means to provide such security against interruption of their sea trade, have to accept the situation including British dominance in this respect, and shape their policy accordingly.

What are the external causes that may lead to the interruption of British overseas trade? To the isolation of the British Isles? They arise only from conflicting policies. The plea is made that Britain should enjoy a degree of security in such contingency which no other maritime power can aspire to. As is the case with other maritime powers Britain overseas commerce will be subject to interference only in case of conflicting interests, causing friction, which Britain, lacking dominating seapower, could undertake to remove in the same way as other maritime powers are forced to do at present.

Concession of British dominance on the sea carries with it not only the security of food supplies and trade routes, but it is a potential factor always present to "assist in negotiations", to "support diplomatic representations", as officially stated as a reason for stationing the strength of the British Fleet in the Mediterranean. (Manila) (Azores)

Why should Americans concede this British point in view of the following statistics for the year 1923: (Slides 18, 19, 20, 21)

American foreign trade and American world interests are rapidly expanding. We have ample means to provide for safe guarding these interests; why should we not do so?

Comparisons of naval forces and sea power, and particularly arguments for at least equality of strength are fraught with danger to friendly relations. (I speak feelingly after my several years experience in London following the Washington Conference and its aftermath of recrimination). It may be to our advantage to take the stand at least in our public utterances, that some British take, that adequate naval strength is not measured by that of any other power, but is determined by a nation's commitments, particularly overseas. At the same time perhaps it may be well to show a spirit of Anglo-American cooperation to the extent of letting the British understand that the American Fleet may be counted on to reciprocate the potential support that dominant British sea power so long afforded certain American policies, notably the Monroe Doctrine.

COMPARATIVE DATA TO INDICATE NAVAL DEFENSE NEEDED.

(Slide 18)

	<u>POPULATION</u>	<u>AREA</u>	<u>COAST LINE</u>
		Sq. Miles	Miles
U.S.A. (Continent)	107,833,284	3,026,789	12,877
U.S.A. (Overseas)	<u>12,615,433</u>	<u>747,266</u>	<u>27,329</u>
U.S.A. TOTAL	120,448,717	3,774,059	40,206
United Kingdom	47,506,466	121,633	3,400
British Empire - TOTAL	452,848,923	13,795,202	47,538
White population	60,000,000		

	<u>WEALTH-(1922)</u>	<u>INTERNATIONAL DEBT-(1923)</u>
U. S. A.	\$320,804,000,000	\$22,349,687,758
United Kingdom	\$80,500,000,000	\$38,166,624,842.90
British Empire	\$130,000,000,000	\$49,471,999,336.32 (1921)

	<u>FOREIGN TRADE-(1922)</u> (Value in dollars)	<u>SHIPPING-(1924)</u> (Tonnage)
U.S.A.	\$7,959,559,043	15,956,967
United Kingdom	\$9,068,051,000	19,105,838
British Empire	\$14,888,659,000	21,873,500

(Slides 19, 20, and 21 contain additional data.)

SEA POWER AND THE MERCHANT MARINE.

The merchant marine is an indispensable factor to sea power. International law and tradition permits arming such vessels, which may serve not only as auxiliaries to the Fleet, but may engage in important independent operations. The 34% of ocean-going shipping under the British flag has a very great potential value for naval defense that will become relatively greater as strictly naval vessels are reduced in numbers.

Mr. Archibald Hurd, a well recognized authority on naval matters, who maintains close contact with the Admiralty, has recently devoted much attention to this matter, and links the "Merchant Navy with the Imperial Navy as constituting British Sea Power". He points out that "Ships after all do not constitute sea power". - - - "In the long run it is the human element which counts at sea as well as in the shipping offices ashore, and in both those respects this island is supreme."

The number of American merchant vessels now operating do not give the British as much concern as the fact that we are gradually developing considerable groups of Americans to efficiently and economically conduct such overseas operations.

The British attitude towards the American Merchant Marine is shown by the concluding paragraph of an article in the London Daily News, 29 February, 1924, under the caption "Collapse of Great Enterprise - 1,335 Ships Which Cost £560,000,000".

"The enterprise has therefore proved one of the most disastrous in shipping history, and Britain's supremacy is now unchallenged."

The British shipping interests are actively engaged in a campaign against American shipping, begun before the Armistice. They not only term our policy of Government owned ships but our restriction of our Coastwise commerce to American ships as "flag discrimination". This is a matter that should receive our special attention, for there is a very clever British scheme to have

"all maritime nations declare that carriage by sea, whether in the foreign or in the coastwise trades, should be equally open to all; and if Scandinavia, Germany, Holland, Belgium and Japan could be persuaded to become parties to such an agreement, they would in his (Mr. Holt) view be in a position to compel every other nation to throw open its trade to every flag."

The matter has already been taken to the League of Nations, and we may find the U.S.A. haled before the League Council as an aggressor nation, for having a shipping policy which threatens the welfare and peace of the world.

The matter of "flag discrimination" was also considered by the Imperial Economic Conference, 1923, and the following resolution adopted:

"In view of the vital importance to the British Empire of safeguarding its overseas carrying trade against all forms of discrimination by foreign countries, whether open or disguised, the representatives of the Governments of the Empire declare -

"(1) That it is their established practice to make no discrimination between the flags of shipping

using their ports, and that they have no intention of departing from this practice as regards countries which treat ocean-going shipping under the British flag on a footing of equality with their own national shipping."

"(2) That in the event of danger arising in future to the overseas shipping of the Empire through an attempt by a foreign country to discriminate against the British flag, the Governments of the Empire will consult together as to the best means of meeting the situation."

Note that the term "consult together" is the one always used in the treaties of alliances, etc. when use of force may have to be anticipated. British, interested in shipping have stated that such "flag discrimination" and Government competition in shipping will result in retaliation that can only lead to war.

BRITISH IMPERIAL COMMUNICATIONS

CABLES AND RADIO

While the British are strongly adverse to Government owned, operated or subsidized shipping, so essential to American welfare and defense under present conditions they hold an opposite view relative to systems of world communications - telegraph, cable, and radio.

This matter of British Imperial Communications was considered at the Imperial Conference, 1923, which adopted, among

others, the following resolutions:

"That in view of the fact that the Dominions interested in the Pacific cable have for a long time pressed for the provision of a State-owned connecting link across the Atlantic, all possible support should be given by the Governments of the Empire to the State-owned Atlantic cable route which has now been provided."

"That in any concessions given in the British Empire to private enterprise in respect of cable or wireless services (including broadcasting stations), preference should be accorded to British Companies of any part of the Empire."

These charts show the extent that the British have achieved "All Red" cable communication around the world, so that messages are not subject to foreign supervision, control, or inspection of any sort.

The recent arrangement between the British Government and the Marconi Company will provide British radio systems covering practically the whole world.

CONCLUSION

The British are still supreme on the sea and are the dominating influence in world affairs. Their power and prestige were never greater. Changing conditions threaten that dominance.

Britain needs assistance in solving many of her problems. Many of their problems are our problems too. Their solution

and many other World problems is practicable and possible through cooperation of America and Britain. But these problems involve conflicting interests that are inherent to the general welfare and common defense of both countries. We cannot accept the slogan of "Britain first" in dealing with these matters. They will probably accept no other. They rightfully feel a superiority in world leadership - in the conduct of world affairs, that should prevail.

Under the circumstances our mission is clear. It is to develop American leadership commensurate with our numbers, our wealth, our interests and our ambitions and provide power, particularly sea power, to support it. Then we shall be ready to cooperate with the British and the World.

INDEX TO SLIDES

Captain Hussey's Lecture

Naval War College
Newport, R.I.
5 December, 1924.

1. Chart of World showing Trade Routes
2. Spheres of Influence Mediterranean
3. Geographic Data -- Pacific (Circular)
4. Geographic Data -- Atlantic (Circular)
5. Arctic Regions.
6. Antarctic Regions
7. Comparative Naval Data
8. British Ships, Upkeep of
9. Outline Chart of World (Mandates)
10. Nelson and Rodney
11. British Naval Guns
12. Gun Elevations, United States, British, Japan.
13. Singapore.
14. British Empire -- Area and Population.
15. Ships Scrapped under Washington Treaty.
16. 16 inch Guns scrapped under Washington Treaty.
17. British objectives at New Limitation Arms Conference.
18. Comparative Data -- Population - Area - Wealth - Trade -
Shipping.
19. Comparative Data - Industrial Capacities
20. Fuel Oil Production.
21. Cable Systems of the World.
22. American Cables.

1533
12-24

-49-

23. British Cables.
24. British Cables.
25. Marconi Radio World Plan.

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