



JUTLAND

MAY 1925






CRUISING FORMATION



APPROACH FORMATION

SCALE OF MILES




INCORRECT APPROACH

Orders of British Admiralty - 30 May

1. On 30 May, probably during the forenoon, the Admiralty received news which pointed to early activity on the part of the High Sea Fleet.
2. About noon the Admiralty ordered the Commander Dover Patrol to send the Harwich destroyers back to Harwich and to recall the Belgian coast patrol; the R.A. East Coast to recall minesweeping sloops; the 3rd. B. S. and 3rd. C. S. to have steam ready by daylight of the 31st; the submarines of the Harwich Force to be ready on short notice.
3. At 5:40 p.m. the following message was sent to C-in-C. G.F. at Scapa: "You should concentrate to Eastward of Long Forties, ready for eventualities."
4. At 5:40 S.O. 2nd. B. S. made "Preparatory signal for leaving Cromarty"
5. At 5:40 C-in-C. G.F. made "Preparatory signal for leaving Scapa."
6. At 5:45 S.O. B.C.F. made signal: "Raise steam for 22 knots."







BRITISH NOTES.

- A: Lion passes May Is. at 12:05 A.M.
- B: Commence zigzag at 2:30 A.M.
- C: Battle fleet forms anti-submarine screen at 4:00
- D: Cruising Disposition 1 ordered at 7:09 A.M.
- E: 1st C.S. joins cruiser screen at 9:00 A.M.
- F: 2nd B.S. joins battle fleet.
- G: 2:00 P.M. position assigned for battle fleet.
- H: 2:00 P.M. position for B.C.F.
- I: Submarines E-55, E-26 and D-1 proceed to take position off Vyl Lightship.
- J: 4 Submarines and 1 destroyer proceed toward assigned position.
- K: Assigned position of submarines

GERMAN NOTES

- Z: Radio station at Neumunster reports that 2 large ships or squadrons sailed at 8 A.M.
- Y: U-32 reports 2 battleships, 2 cruisers and several destroyers at 7:32 A.M.
- X: U-66 reports 8 battleships, light cruisers and destroyers at 8:48 A.M.
- W: German scouting fleet at 2:00 P.M.
- V: Battle fleet at 2:00 P.M.

ADVANCE OF BRITISH AND GERMAN FORCES
7:00 P.M. 30 MAY - 2:00 P.M. 31 MAY.

A -- Battle Fleet - Jellicoe

Battleships 24
 Battle Cruisers 3
 Light Cruisers 12
 Cruisers 8
 Destroyers 51

B -- Battle Cruiser Fleet - Beatty

Battleships 4
 Battle Cruisers 6
 Light Cruisers 14
 Destroyers 27
 Scaplane Carrier 1

Y -- Battle Fleet - Scheer

Battleships 1st line 16
 Battleships 2nd line 6
 Light Cruisers 6
 Destroyers 33

Z -- Scouting force - Hipper

Battle Cruisers 5
 Light Cruisers 5
 Destroyers 32



GRAND AND HIGH SEA FLEETS
 2 P.M. 31 MAY 1916.

Part of GRAND FLEET with ADMIRAL JELlicoe

1	⚓	KING GEORGE V	1st. Div. Jerram	2nd B.S. (8BB)	↑	CASTOR (CL)	8 BB	
2	●	AJAX				Hawksley		
3	●	CENTURION				KEMPENFELT (DL)		1 CL
4	●	ERIN				11th. FLOTILLA		15 DD
5	⚓	ORION	2nd Div. Leveson	4th. B.S. (8BB)	↑	TIPPERARY (DL)	8 BB	
6	●	MONARCH				BROKE (DL)		12 DD
7	●	CONQUEROR				4th. FLOTILLA		
8	●	THUNDERER						
9	⚓	IRON DUKE	3rd. Div. Duff	4th. B.S. (8BB)	↑	TIPPERARY (DL)	8 BB	
10	●	ROYAL OAK				BROKE (DL)		12 DD
11	⚓	SUPERB				4th. FLOTILLA		
12	●	CANADA						
13	⚓	BENBOW	4th. Div. Sturdee	1st. B.S. (8BB)	↑	FAULKNER (DL)	8 BB	
14	●	BELLEROPHON				MARKSMAN (DL)		15 DD
15	●	TEMERAIRE				12th. FLOTILLA		
16	●	VANGUARD						
17	⚓	COLUSSUS	5th. Div. Guant	1st. B.S. (8BB)	↑	FAULKNER (DL)	8 BB	
18	●	COLLINGWOOD				MARKSMAN (DL)		15 DD
19	●	NEPTUNE				12th. FLOTILLA		
20	●	ST. VINCENT						
21	⚓	MARLBOROUGH	6th. Div. Burney	1st. B.S. (8BB)	↑	FAULKNER (DL)	8 BB	
22	●	REVENGE				MARKSMAN (DL)		15 DD
23	●	HERCULES				12th. FLOTILLA		
24	●	AGINCOURT						
						Attached	4 CL	
							1 DD	
							1 DM	
	⚓	INVINCIBLE	3rd. B.C.S. Hood	↑	↑	CHESTER (CL)	3 CC	
	●	INFLEXIBLE				CANTERBURY (CL)	2 CL	
	●	INDOMITABLE				4 DD	4 DD	
	⚓	MINOTAUR	2nd. C.S. Heath	↑	↑	4 DD	4 CA	
	●	HAMPSHIRE				4 DD	4 DD	
	●	COCHRANE						
	●	SHANNON						
	⚓	DEFENCE	1st. C.S. Abuthnot				4 CA	
	●	WARRIOR						
	●	D. of EDINBURG						
	●	BLACK PRINCE						
	⚓	CALLIOPE	4th. L.C.S. Le Mesurier				5 CL	
	●	CONSTANCE						
	●	CAROLINE						
	●	ROYALIST						
	●	COMUS						

24 BB, 3 CC, 8 CA, 12 CL, 51 DD, 1 DM = 99 vessels

BATTLE CRUISER FLEET with VICE ADM. BEATTY.

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ♣ LION ♣ PRIN. ROYAL ♣ QUEEN MARY ♣ TIGER 	} 1st. B.C.S. Brock	← Beatty	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ♣ CHAMPION (CL) ↑ 13th FLOTILLA 	4CC 1CL 10DD
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ♣ N. ZEALAND ♣ INDEFATIGABLE 	} 2nd. B.C.S. Pakenham		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ↑ ½ 9th. FLOTILLA ↑ ½ 10th. FLOTILLA 	2CC 4DD 4DD
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ♣ BARHAM ♣ VALIANT ♣ WARSPITE ♣ MALAYA 	} 5th. B.S. Evan-Thomas		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ♣ FEARLESS (CL) ↑ 1st FLOTILLA 	4BB 1CL 9DD
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ♣ GALATEA ♣ PHAETON ♣ INCONSTANT ♣ CORDELIA 	} 1st. L.C.S. Alexander-Sinclair			4CL
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ♣ FALMOUTH ♣ YARMOUTH ♣ BIRKENHEAD ♣ GLOUCESTER 	} 3rd. L.C.S. Napier			4CL
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ♣ SOUTHAMPTON ♣ BIRMINGHAM ♣ NOTTINGHAM ♣ DUBLIN 	} 2nd. L.C.S. Goodenough			4CL
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ♣ ENGADINE 		OCV		1 OCV

6CC, 4BB, 14CL, 27DD, 1 OCV = 52 vessels

BATTLE CRUISER FORCE with VICE ADM. HIPPER

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 🚩 LUTZOW ● DERFFLINGER ● SEYDLITZ ● MOLTKE ● VON DERTANN 	}	Scouting Group 1. Hipper	↑	9th FLOTILLA	5 CC 11 DD
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 🚩 FRANKFURT ● WIESBADEN ● PILLAU ● ELBING 	}	Scouting Group 2. Boedicker	↑	2nd FLOTILLA	5 CL 11 DD
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 🚩 REGENSBURG 		Heinrich	↑	6th FLOTILLA	11 DD
					5 CC, 5 CL, 33 DD = 43 vessels

FORCES IN BATTLE CRUISER ENGAGEMENT

	British	German
Battleships	4	—
Battle Cruisers	6	5
Light Cruisers	14	5
Destroyers	27	33
Plane Carriers	1	—

TOTAL FORCES AT JUTLAND

	British	German
Battleships	28	22
Battle Cruiser	9	5
Armored Cruisers	8	—
Light Cruisers	26	11
Destroyers	78	72
Mine Layers	1	—
Plane Carriers	1	—
Total	151	110

B R I T I S H

	: Speed :	Main Bat. :	Armour	
			Side	Deck
K. GEORGE V	: 21.5 :	10-13"5	: 12" :	:
AJAX	: 21.5 :	10-13"5	: 12" :	:
CENTURION	: 21.5 :	10-13"5	: 12" :	:
ERIN	: 21 :	10-13"5	: 12" :	:
ORION	: 21 :	10-13"5	: 12" :	:
MONARCH	: 21 :	10-13"5	: 12" :	:
CONQUEROR	: 21 :	10-13"5	: 12" :	:
THUNDERER	: 21 :	10-13"5	: 12" :	:
IRON DUKE	: 21 :	10-13"5	: 12" :	:
ROYAL OAK	: 23 :	8-15"	: 13" :	:
SUPERB	: 20 $\frac{3}{4}$:	10-12"/45	: 11" :	:
CANADA	: 22 $\frac{1}{2}$:	10-14"/45	: 9" :	:
BEN BOW	: 21 :	10-13"5	: 12" :	:
BELLEROPHON	: 20 $\frac{3}{4}$:	10-12"/45	: 11" :	:
TEMERAIRE	: 20 $\frac{3}{4}$:	10-12"/45	: 11" :	:
VANGUARD	: 21 :	10-12"/50	: 9 $\frac{1}{2}$ " :	:
COLOSSUS	: 21 :	10-12"/50	: 10" :	2-3/4"
COLLINGWOOD	: 21 :	10-12"/50	: 9 $\frac{1}{2}$ " :	:
NEPTUNE	: 21 :	10-12"/50	: 10" :	2-3/4"
ST. VINCENT	: 21 :	10-12"/50	: 9 $\frac{1}{2}$ " :	:
MARLBOROUGH	: 21 :	10-13"5	: 12" :	:
REVENGE	: 23 :	8-15"	: 13" :	:
HERCULES	: 21 :	10-12"/50	: 10" :	2-3/4"
AGINCOURT	: 22 :	14-12"/50	: 9" :	:
LION	: 28 :	8-13"5	: 9" :	:
PRINCESS ROYAL	: 28 :	8-13"5	: 9" :	:
QUEEN MARY	: 29 :	8-13"5	: 9" :	:
TIGER	: 29 :	8-13"5	: 9" :	:
NEW ZEALAND	: 25 :	8-12"/50	: 6" :	:
INDEFATIGABLE	: 25 :	8-12"/50	: 6" :	:
INVINCIBLE	: 25 :	8-12"/50	: 6" :	:
INFLEXIBLE	: 25 :	8-12"/45	: 6" :	:
INDOMITABLE	: 25 :	8-12"/45	: 6" :	:
BARHAM	: 25 :	8-15"	: 13" :	:
VALIANT	: 25 :	8-15"	: 13" :	:
WARSPITE	: 25 :	8-15"	: 13" :	:
MALAYA	: 26 :	8-15"	: 13" :	:


G E R M A N

	Speed	Main Bat.	Armour	
			Side	Deck
KONIG	20.5	10-12"/45	14"	3"
GROSSER KURSFURST	20.5	10-12"/45	14"	3"
KRONPRINZ	20.5	10-12"/45	14"	3"
MARKGRAF	20.5	10-12"/45	14"	3"
KAYSER	20	10-12"/50	14"	
KAYSERIN	20	10-12"/50	14"	
PRINZREGENT LUITPOLD	20	10-12"/50	14"	
FRIEDRICH DER GROSSE	20	10-12"/50	14"	
OSTFRIESLAND	20.5	10-12"/50	11 $\frac{1}{2}$ "	3"
THURINGEN	20.5	12-12"/50	11 $\frac{1}{2}$ "	3"
HELGOLAND	20.5	12-12"/50	11 $\frac{1}{2}$ "	3"
OLDENBURG	20.5	12-12"/50	11 $\frac{1}{2}$ "	3"
POSEN	19.5	12-11"/45	11 $\frac{1}{2}$ "	
RHEINLAND	19.5	12-11"/45	11 $\frac{1}{2}$ "	
NASSAU	19.5	12-11"/45	11 $\frac{1}{2}$ "	
WESTFALEN	19.5	12-11"/45	11 $\frac{1}{2}$ "	
DEUTSCHLAND	18	4-11"/40	9 $\frac{3}{4}$ "	3"
HESSEN	18	4-11"/40	8 $\frac{3}{4}$ "	3"
POMMERN	18	4-11"/40	9 $\frac{3}{4}$ "	3"
HANOVER	18	4-11"/40	9 $\frac{3}{4}$ "	3"
SCHLESIM	18	4-11"/40	9 $\frac{3}{4}$ "	3"
SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN	18	4-11"/40	9 $\frac{3}{4}$ "	3"
LUTZOW	26.5	8-12"/50	12"	3"
DERFFLINGER	26.5	8-12"/50	12"	3"
SNYDLITZ	26.5	10-11"/50	11"	3"
MOLTKE	25	10-11"/50	11"	3"
VON DER TANN	25	8-11"/45	9"	


Total Force
 24 Battle ships.
 3 Battle Cruisers
 8 Armored Cruisers.
 12 Light Cruisers.
 51 Destroyers
 1 Des. Minelayer.
 Total 99 vessels.



BATTLE FLEET WITH ATTAGHED CRUISERS
 AT 2:00 P.M., 31 MAY.



GERMAN
BATTLE FLEET, 2 P.M., 31 MAY.





BATTLE CRUISER FLEET AT 2 P.M. 31 MAY.





PLATE 18








BEATTY, HOOD & DEFENSE IN ACTION
5:40 to 6:00 P.M.








FLEET TRACKS DURING THE NIGHT 10 P.M. 31 MAY to 3 A.M., 1 JUNE



10:04 P.M. positions
of 11th Flot, Castor, Seydlitz & S.D. II



British Notes
A. Castor damaged by gunfire of German vessels, probably Seydlitz and Scouting Div. II.
B. Southampton and Dublin severely damaged by gunfire.

German Notes.
Z. Frauenlob sunk by torpedo fired by Southampton.



~ LIGHT CRUISER ACTION ~
POSITIONS OF GRAND AND HIGH SEA FLEETS.
10:30 P.M. 31 MAY 1916.



A - Encounter between 4th Flotilla and High Sea Fleet.

~ 4th FLOTILLA IS ATTACKED ~
 POSITIONS OF GRAND AND HIGH SEA FLEETS.
 11:30 P.M., 31 MAY 1916.





British Notes

A. 13th Flotilla makes contact with 2nd div, 1st B.S.

German Notes

Z. Moltke makes contact with 6th Div, 1st B.S. escapes, due to failure of British to open fire.



~ 9th & 10 FLOTILLAS ~
 ~ SIGHT HEAD OF GERMAN COLUMN ~
 POSITIONS OF GRAND AND HIGH SEA FLEETS
 12:30 AM, 1 JUNE 1916.

In undertaking to tell you briefly the story of the BATTLE OF JUTLAND, I shall ask you to view this battle from the basis of the Fundamental Principles of War. This will place both Army and Navy upon common ground. Viewed in this manner, the tactics of a naval battle are as easy of comprehension by an army officer as by a naval officer. There is no reason why, unaided, you should not be able to arrive at a clear and just appreciation of the correct and incorrect employment of forces in the BATTLE OF JUTLAND or in any other naval engagement.

In the study of war, both on land and on sea, certain fundamental principles have been gradually recognized. These principles are recognized more or less definitely in all countries. In our country they are grouped under the following titles and are called the Nine Immutable Principles of War, or the Fundamental Principles of War. As you are familiar with these principles, I will mention merely the titles:

Principle of the Objective ✓
Principle of the Offensive ✓
Principle of Superiority ✓
Principle of Security ✓
Principle of Surprise ✓
Principle of Simplicity ✓
Principle of Movement ✓
Principle of Economy of Force ✓
Principle of Cooperation ✓

We can hardly conceive of war without a battle. If these principles are the principles of war they are the principles which apply to battles. By tactics we understand the employment of forces in battle. Therefore, These principles of war are of necessity the fundamental principles of tactics.

In all of the many tactical situations, large or small, arise before and during engagement, a commander has

~~4-25~~
4-25

two things to do: First, select that principle which is vital or of paramount importance in the special situation; Second, decide on the method of applying that principle.

Selection is necessary because it is evident that all of the principles are not of the same importance in any given situation. Some one of them is always vital and this one must be selected if correct tactics are to follow.

Decision as to the method of applying the principle is necessary, because it is evident that there are various methods by which any principle may be utilized; for example, if we conclude that the principle of offense is vital, there are many methods of conducting an offense. As another example: if our position is unfavorable and we decide to change it, the principle of movement is vital. It is then necessary to decide where to go and how to go, that is, to decide on the method of applying the principle of movement. Evidently mistakes may be made either in the selection of the principle which is really vital, or in the method of applying a principle which has been correctly selected.

A tactical study from the basis of Fundamental Principles becomes almost wholly impersonal. It is no longer an expression of personal opinion. It is not an advancement of individual ideas. Analysis, based upon this sound foundation, forces conclusions upon us impersonally by the test of the Fundamental Principles of War.

Now, just a word upon the Principle of Superiority. In the Army this principle is called, I think, the Principle of Mass. Formerly in the Navy it was called the Principle of Concentration. Concentration conveys the idea of a collection of many ships and guns. The Principle of Superiority, as used in the Navy, means more than mere superior numbers of troops, ships, or guns. It means more than a superiority of material strength or of fighting strength. It comprises every form of superiority which contributes to victory. Victory can be won only by superiority. Victory can never be won by superiority of material

strength alone.

At JUTLAND decided numerical superiority did not result in victory. In the battle cruiser phase of that engagement the British had superiority of material strength of more than 2 to 1. It was not used and in consequence they fought that phase of the battle with actual inferiority. The result was the loss of two battle cruisers. Superiority in battle is not superiority unless it is used. In his greatest victory Nelson did not have material superiority. He did have superiority or he would never have been victorious. The vital factor of superiority which Nelson possessed was superior knowledge and superior tactical skill. Superiority of material strength is given to a commander gratis. Superior knowledge and superior tactical skill he must himself acquire. Superior morale, superior cooperation, he must himself create.

It is in this sense that the Principle of Superiority is used in this discussion of the BATTLE OF JUTLAND.

At various important tactical situations throughout the battle it will be stated, for example, that one or more Fundamental Principles have been violated by one side or the other. By violation of a Fundamental Principle is meant either incorrect selection of the principle or incorrect application of the fundamental principle selected.

Plate 6.

Upon the outbreak of war the British Grand Fleet was based at Scapa Flow in order to remove it from submarine and destroyer menace and thus give it greater freedom of action. The concentration of most of the British forces at SCAPA left the East Coast of England open to raids. Several raids had been made by German forces. The last bombardment of a coast town was that of Lowestoft. The inability to deal properly with these German raids had led the British authorities to consider a re-distribution of the British Fleet. This redistribution had been practically decided upon and to a certain extent had been carried out, but the final redistribution had not been made.

The distribution of British forces on the eve of the Battle of Jutland was as follows:

Jellicoe with part of the Grand Fleet at Scapa.
Jerram with the Second Battle Squadron at Cromarty.
Beatty with the Battle Cruiser Force at Rosyth.

Plate 7.

For a long time Admiral Jellicoe had used every device in order to entice the German fleet to sea and to bring it to action. His latest plan, which was to be put in operation about June 2nd, was to send certain forces to the Skaw, where they would show themselves and then cruise down the Cattegat to the Great Belt. These forces were to be supported at some distance by the Grand Fleet. The idea was to entice German detachments to sea and then cut them off and destroy them.

Admiral Scheer, who had recently been placed in command of the German Fleet, had a plan of operations somewhat similar in idea to that of Admiral Jellicoe. He planned to bombard Sunderland, (Plate 6) the nearest port to Rosyth, where the British battle cruiser force was based. The bombardment was to be carried out by the First and Second Scouting Divisions, while 16 submarines were to be stationed off the British bases

to attack the British forces as they left port. The First and Second Scouting Divisions were to lead the British forces that escaped the submarines into contact with the German High Sea Fleet, which was to support the Scouting Forces and thus cut off and destroy British detachments. To guard against surprise, Admiral Scheer planned to use a number of air ships for scouting. The use of air ships depended upon good visibility.

Admiral Scheer had an alternative plan in case of bad weather or poor visibility. This consisted in sending a detachment to strike at British merchantmen in the Skagerrack. British detachments sent against this force were to be cut off and destroyed by the German Grand Fleet.

On May 15 the German submarines put to sea to carry out the first plan. They could remain at sea until about the first of June only because of their limited fuel capacity.

On May 28 Admiral Scheer issued orders for all units of the German Fleet to be ready for sea. On May 30, the visibility continuing poor, Admiral Scheer decided to follow Plan 2 and ordered Admiral Hipper with the German battle cruisers to proceed to the Skagerrack while he (Admiral Scheer) followed with the High Sea Fleet. The first moves which resulted in the Battle of Jutland were about to take place. This was May 30.

During the morning of May 30 the British Admiralty received news which pointed to early activity on the part of the German High Sea Fleet. At noon, May 30, the Admiralty informed Jellicoe and Beatty that the High Sea Fleet was assembling in the Jade, that it might go to sea the next morning, and that 16 German submarines were out. Shortly after 5:00 P.M. May 30, it became known to the Admiralty that all sections of the High Sea Fleet had received a seemingly important operation order. At 5:40 P.M. Admiralty telegram No. 434 was sent to Admiral Jellicoe, and a copy to Admiral Beatty, conveying to them this latest information. The telegram contained this order to Admiral Jellicoe:

"You should concentrate to Eastward of Long Forties ready for eventualities."

(NOTE: "Long Forties" is an area at sea 60 to 100 miles east of Kinnaird Head.)

The wording of this order is subject to criticism. Under the circumstances, however, it could have but one meaning, however vague its phraseology. In view of the fact that for many months Jellicoe had tried to entice the German Fleet to sea in order to destroy it, and in view of the information that the Admiralty believed the German Fleet might put to sea early the next morning, the order to Jellicoe could mean only this: You should concentrate to Eastward of Long Forties in order to destroy the German Fleet. It should have been quite clear both to Jellicoe and to Beatty why the British Fleet was ordered to sea and what it was to do when it got there. This point is emphasized not because of the outcome of the Battle of Jutland but because of certain decisions and certain tactics during the progress of that battle. It is emphasized also because Jellicoe in his book THE GRAND FLEET, on page 318, says: "The Grand Fleet put to sea on May 30th for the purpose of carrying out one of its periodical sweeps in the North Sea." The point is vital because it is evident that an Admiral's conduct must depend upon his conception of why his force is at sea.

Let us view the situation not from knowledge of subsequent events but from the information in possession of Jellicoe and Beatty on the evening of May 30. They both knew:

- (1) That 16 German submarines were in the North Sea.
- (2) That the whole German Fleet had shown signs of unusual activity and that it had assembled in the Jade.
- (3) That all sections of the German Fleet had received a seemingly important operation order.
- (4) That, based on information in its possession, the

British Admiralty believed that the German Fleet would put to sea the next morning.

(5) That, based on this information, the Admiralty had ordered the Grand Fleet to proceed to sea on the evening of May 30.

In view of this information it would seem that from the moment of sailing every move of every part of the Grand Fleet should have been made with only one thing in mind, namely, battle with the German High Sea Fleet.

Admiral Scheer sailed with the German High Sea Fleet in the early morning of May 31st, as the British Admiralty had anticipated. At the time of sailing, Admiral Scheer had no information of any movement of British forces.

Shortly after sailing, at 5:30 A.M., May 31, Admiral Scheer received from Submarine U-32, (Plate 7) 70 miles East of Rosyth, a report that 2 battleships, 2 cruisers, and several destroyers were taking a southeasterly course.

At 6:30 A.M., U-32 reported also that she had intercepted English radio messages to the effect that 2 battleships and groups of destroyers had left SCAPA FLOW.

At 6:48 A.M., U-66, 60 miles East of Kinnaird Head, reported that 8 battleships, light cruisers, and numerous destroyers had been sighted on northeasterly course.

Admiral Scheer in his book GERMAN HIGH SEA FLEET, page 141, comments: "These reports gave no enlightenment as to the enemy's purpose".

These reports, however, did give very significant and definite information to the effect that at least 12 British battleships, cruisers, light cruisers, and groups of destroyers, had evidently sailed simultaneously from various British bases and were at that moment at sea. This was important information for Admiral Scheer, and it would seem that from the moment of its receipt it should have had a decisive influence upon all his decisions and tactics.

While the tactics employed in a battle are directly affected by the information in possession of the two Commanders, they frequently are also affected by the strategical situation existing at the time. In the case of the World War, the British desired a decisive battle with the German High Sea Fleet. Due to the superiority of the Grand Fleet the British had every reason to believe that a decisive fleet engagement would result in the annihilation of the German Fleet. Whether or not the British were willing to pay the full price of such a victory, we must accept as a fact that they desired and sought a decisive fleet engagement.

Plate 8.

The British forces left port on the evening of May 30th with this object in view and with certain information in their possession. The inferior German fleet did not desire a fleet engagement with the Grand Fleet. The German forces left port during the early hours of 31 May, not with the object of meeting the Grand Fleet, but with the object of intercepting and defeating a detachment of that fleet.

The British forces sailing from Scapa, Cromarty and Rosyth were necessarily divided when they left port. The Cromarty forces joined the battle fleet toward noon of 31 May, but the Battle Cruiser Force remained separated under orders to arrive at a point 69 miles S.S.E. of the Commander-in-Chief at 2:00 P.M., 31 May, and then to join the Grand Fleet. The German forces were divided deliberately upon leaving port. The purpose of the division in each case was similar. Both the British and the Germans hoped to cut out and defeat some detachment of the enemy. Under the circumstances, the reason for the division in each case appears sufficient to have warranted such action. Due to

insufficient scouting and to lack of linking up ships between the advanced forces and the main forces, both the British and Germans violated the Principle of Security, and this entailed a serious risk of a further violation of the Principle of Superiority which later actually materialized. In each case the divided force should have been closely linked with the main body, in order to furnish information to the main body and in order to afford support to the divided force. During the progress of the battle cruiser engagement neither Admiral Scheer nor Admiral Jellicoe received the information which was of the most vital importance to them. The joining up with the main body of a detached force which at the time is hotly engaged is always a difficult maneuver. To accomplish it successfully and to take full advantage of all the possibilities which such a situation offers is one of the most difficult feats of tactics. There can be hope of its successful performance only when the Commander-in-Chief receives complete information of the progress of events as the forces approach each other.

Plate 9 shows the relative positions at 2 P.M. of the four forces involved in the BATTLE OF JUTLAND. Jellicoe with the Grand Fleet was about 73 miles N.N.W. from Beatty with the British Battle Cruiser Forces. Admiral Hipper with the German battle cruiser forces was about 53 miles East of Admiral Beatty and about 50 miles North of the German High Sea Fleet. Contact was first made between Beatty and Hipper and an engagement lasting nearly an hour was fought while these battle cruiser forces steamed to the Southward. Beatty upon sighting Admiral Scheer with the High Sea Fleet turned North pursued by the whole German fleet, and later contact was made with Admiral Jellicoe resulting in a spasmodic main fleet engagement. Following this engagement was a night of torpedo fighting.

CRUISING FORMATIONS

In order to understand the BATTLE OF JUTLAND, it will be necessary first to understand the ordinary disposition of naval forces when cruising and when deployed for action.

PLATE I shows two fleets deployed for action. It will be seen that the battle fleets are deployed opposing each other, while on the engaged van of the battle fleet are light cruisers and destroyers. On the engaged quarter are other light cruisers, destroyers and mine layers, while endeavoring to get upon the track of the enemy's fleet are numerous submarines. The destroyers and light forces in the van are in favorable position for torpedo attack, while those on the quarter are stationed there in case the enemy counter-marches.

PLATE 2 shows a number of tactical positions of equality, advantage and disadvantage. The second diagram represents what is called the T-position. Fleet A has crossed the T of Fleet B and its position of tactical advantage can be clearly recognized. It has superiority of gun fire and of gun range. It has superiority of numbers which can effectively engage. The other diagram shows a position approaching that of a T in which Fleet A holds a corresponding advantage over Fleet B. Diagram 4 shows Fleet B endeavoring to improve its position by turning head of column toward the right.

PLATE 3. While cruising, the forces of a fleet are disposed in such a manner as to provide security. Security means obtaining information of the enemy, denying information to the enemy, and deploying promptly to meet any threatened attack. When the direction of attack is unknown, a circular screening formation is adopted. In the outer screen are placed submarines. These boats can see frequently without themselves being seen. Their role in cruising is largely that of reporting

information. The next screen consists of a number of destroyers whose role is similar to that of the submarines. The third screen consists of groups of light forces, cruisers, light cruisers, and destroyers, and possibly battle cruisers. Their duty is to deny information and to repel any form of minor attack. It is thus seen that the two outer screens, which are usually 25 to 30 miles from the pivot, constitute the eyes of the fleet, whose primary role is to see and to report. The screens become stronger as the formation is penetrated and resistance to any attacking force grows correspondingly greater. This arrangement furnishes the Commander-in-Chief with the earliest possible information and affords the battle fleet time for deployment to meet any powerful attack.

If the general direction from which the enemy will appear is known, a fleet does not necessarily adopt a circular formation; at least, the complete circle is modified and only a portion of it is utilized in the direction of the enemy.

PLATE 4 is an intermediate formation between cruising formation and deployment. The bearing of the enemy is known with a fair degree of accuracy and the forces are more concentrated than while cruising. The battle fleet is cruising in short columns. This formation is called "Line of bearing". For deployment into battle formation, it is necessary for each short column to go column right or left and the fleet will then be in a long column formation ready to fight.

It will be readily seen that the division column line of bearing formation must approach the enemy with the line of bearing at 90° to the direction of the enemy if the column is to be at 90° upon deployment. This is important, for if the column is not bearing 90° to the enemy, one of the unfavorable positions shown in Plate 2 would result. Either a T-position or a position approaching a T would follow.

PLATE 5. In Plate 5 we see six divisions of 4 ships each approaching in division column on a line of bearing which is not at 90^o to the bearing of the enemy. When these six divisions went column left for deployment the resulting battle line was not normal to the bearing of the enemy, and to make it normal the head of the long column was obliged to go column right, as shown in Plate 5. This is a diagrammatic sketch of the deployment of the British Grand Fleet at Jutland as it actually occurred, and this deployment, instead of taking three minutes, took about forty minutes.

PLATE 10. JELlicOE'S CRUISING FORMATION.

We will now discuss the cruising formation adopted by Admiral Jellicoe for the Grand Fleet (Plate 10). The 24 battleships are disposed in six divisions of 4 ships each on a line of bearing like the teeth of a comb. Three flotillas of destroyers are immediately surrounding the battleships for the purpose of protecting the latter against submarines. Three miles ahead of the battleships are six light cruisers. About 6 miles ahead of the battleships is a screen consisting of armored cruisers, while 20 to 30 miles ahead of the battleships is a squadron of battle cruisers accompanied by destroyers and 2 light cruisers.

It will be seen that Admiral Jellicoe has placed his strongest fighting ships, the battle cruisers, in advance; while number 2 screen consists of armored cruisers; number 3 screen of light cruisers, and the last screen around his battleships consists of destroyers. There were no submarines present at Jutland.

It will be seen that Admiral Jellicoe proposed to use as the eyes of his fleet, first, battle cruisers, then armored cruisers, then light cruisers, and so on. In other words, his cruising formation is directly reversed from the usual order of a battle fleet screen.

A screen must afford security, first, by providing information, second by denying information to the enemy, third by ability for quick deployment. The screen of the Grand Fleet does not meet any of these requirements. The battle cruiser force alone is the only provision for reporting the approach of an enemy more than six miles in advance of the Grand Fleet. The destroyers, which should have been used as the eyes of the fleet, are placed in a purely defensive role of screening battleships against submarine attack. This use and disposition of destroyers violates the Principles of Offense, Objective, and Security. The disposition of the light cruisers only three miles from the battleships is subject to the same criticism.

With the exception of a small anti-submarine screen, the destroyers would have been more useful in an advanced screen supported by the light cruisers, then by the First and Second Cruiser Squadrons and finally the Battle Cruiser Squadron. Such a formation would have afforded greater security by better guarding against surprise and by furnishing earlier and more complete information.

It will be seen later that Jellicoe's disposition of his destroyers and light cruisers greatly hampered the deployment of his fleet for battle and also made it impossible for the light forces to promptly reach their battle stations. This disposition of light forces, therefore, in addition to violating the Principles of Offense, Objective, and Security, violates nearly all of the remaining Principles of War, namely, Superiority, Simplicity, Cooperation, and Economy of force.

From the violation or disregard of a tactical principle it does not necessarily follow that a mistake has been made. A Commander may deliberately disregard one tactical principle in order to take full advantage of another, which under the circumstances is of more vital importance. For example:

in the BATTLE OF TRAFALGAR, Nelson during his approach disregarded temporarily the Principle of Superiority in order to take full advantage for the moment of the Principles of Offense and Surprise, and a little later of the Principle of Superiority, in a crushing manner.

In the matter of the cruising formation of the Grand Fleet we do not find that disregard of Fundamental Principles is based upon any such sound judgment. The consequences later in the day were important. They will be mentioned as they occur in the progress of the battle.

PLATE 11. GERMAN HIGH SEA FLEET CRUISING FORMATION

The scouting division is well disposed in a sort of semi-circular formation advanced 10 miles or more ahead of the battle fleet. The scouting division consisted of destroyers and light cruisers. Surrounding the battleships, or accompanying them, were other flotillas of destroyers.

The column formation of the battle fleet for cruising is unusual. It violates the Principle of Security. If the enemy is met dead ahead, the battle fleet is disposed 90° from the position which it must eventually take. The formation would have been more mobile had the fleet been in division or squadron line of bearing formation, as in the case of Jellicoe's fleet. Moreover, the German fleet was cruising with 700 meters between ships and with 3500 meters between squadrons.

These distances are too great for battle and had to be closed before action was joined. In our service the distance between ships is 500 yards and between divisions 700 yards.

It will be noted later that the Germans adopted the column formation both in the approach and later in the night withdrawal from action. It possesses the advantage of simplicity.

The follow-the-leader idea eliminates necessity of signals and facilitates quickness of action. Under certain circumstances this is an advantage; under others it is a serious disadvantage.

PLATE 12. BRITISH BATTLE CRUISER CRUISING FORMATION:-
ADMIRAL BEATTY.

Admiral Beatty's main force consisted of six battle cruisers and four 25-knot battleships. The battle cruisers were divided into two squadrons: First Squadron, 4 ships; Second Squadron, 2 ships. The Fifth Battle Squadron consisted of 4 fast battleships. From the time of leaving port they cruised somewhat as shown in Plate 12. The screen for this battle force was 5 or 6 miles in front and at 2:00 P.M. was disposed on a line N.E.-S.W., while the advance was towards the East.

The screen consisted of light forces. The three flotillas of destroyers closely surrounded the capital ships, as was the case with Jellicoe. The cruiser screen is only 5 or 6 miles in front of the capital ships. This is insufficient distance to give timely warning of contact. It violates the Principle of Security. In advance of this cruiser screen should have been a screen of destroyers acting as the eyes of the fleet.

In regard to the disposition of the capital ships: There was no possible reason why they should have been separated a distance of 3 miles between the battle cruiser divisions and at least 5 miles between the battle cruisers and the battleships. As contact was expected from the Southeast, the battle cruisers and the Fifth Battle Squadron should all have been disposed on the same line of bearing as that of the light cruiser line, N.E.-S.W. They should have cruised at proper distance for deployment on this line of bearing in short division columns. In such a formation, even with sudden and

unexpected attack, they could by column right or left movement have turned into column deployed for fighting within 3 minutes. They would all have been concentrated, thus observing the Principle of Superiority. The disposition of these capital ships, as shown (L) in Plate 12, cannot be supported by any Principle of War, nor by any sound reasoning. It is difficult to imagine what influenced Admiral Beatty causing him to adopt such a peculiar formation. It exercised a most decisive influence on the Battle Cruiser action.

PLATE 13. GERMAN SCOUTING FLEET FORMATION - ADMIRAL HIPPER.

Here again we see the principles of a screen observed. Scouting Division One consisted of 5 battle cruisers. Accompanying them was one flotilla of 11 destroyers. Scouting Division Two consisted of 5 Light Cruisers and 22 Destroyers. It was stationed about 10 miles ahead of Scouting Division One, though this distance is uncertain. It guards against surprise from all directions forward of the beam. It is so disposed as to give prompt information.

In the case of all screens it is necessary that linking ships between the screen and the main force be provided. This serves a double purpose: (1) It enables visual signals to be transmitted between the screen and the main force; (2) It enables the vessels of the screen to keep accurate station by ranging on the linking ships. These linking ships should have been provided between the advanced force of Admiral Beatty and Jellicoe and also between the forces of Admiral Scheer and Hipper. This would have eliminated the serious error in position which developed in the British forces. Beatty appeared in sight of the Grand Fleet about 11 miles from the position in which Admiral Jellicoe expected to find him.

PLATE 14. BATTLE CRUISER ACTION

Plate 14 shows the movements of Beatty and Hipper from 2:15 to 2:30. At 2:15 Admiral Beatty turned North to join the Grand Fleet. At 2:10 the light cruiser GALATEA, in the northern part of the screen, had reported: "Two-funnelled ship has stopped a steamer bearing E.S.E. 8 miles, and closing." This signal in time of war could mean only one thing, that the two-funnelled ship which had interfered with the movements of a steamer and stopped her was some sort of a vessel of war and therefore must be an enemy vessel, so at 2:10 Beatty had information sufficient to warrant the conclusion that he was in the presence of the enemy. When Beatty turned north the GALATEA and PHAETON continued to the Eastward to investigate the steamer which had been stopped. At 2:20 the GALATEA reported: "Enemy in sight". At 2:28 the GALATEA opened fire on two destroyers, the first shots of the BATTLE OF JUTLAND. At 2:32 (Plate 15) Beatty turned Southeasterly with his battle cruisers. The 5th Battle Squadron was six miles away to the Northwest and did not see the signal; consequently they did not turn Southeasterly until 2:40, eight minutes later, and were thus left more than 10 miles behind Admiral Beatty's battle cruisers. Beatty with faster ships increased speed and Evan-Thomas in the 5th Battle Squadron was left farther and farther behind.

PLATE 15. 2:30 to 2:45 P.M.

This shows the German forces moving Southwest toward the point of contact. It shows the two British light cruisers turning Northwest and that they are being joined by 6 more light cruisers.

PLATE 16. 2:45 to 3:00 P.M.

This plate shows 8 British light cruisers steaming to the Northwest, followed by 3 German light cruisers and 2 destroyers. Admiral Beatty with the battle cruisers followed by the battleships is steaming S.E. at 22 knots.

The British light forces were superior at the point of contact. Their role was to act as the eyes of the fleet and to furnish information. These cruisers at 2:39 had sighted smoke to the East of the destroyers and light cruisers, but instead of making any effort to ascertain its nature they turned and withdrew N.W. As early as 2:39 the GALATEA had reported "large amount of smoke as though from a fleet". This was significant and important. The British light cruisers should have driven in the inferior forces in contact and should have developed the smoke which had been sighted. It was nearly one hour later before Beatty (and also Jellicoe who intercepted reports at this time) knew the character of the force which was making the smoke. Moreover, the light cruisers in withdrawing to the Northwest misled Beatty by reporting that the enemy was following them. Beatty, who had turned Southeast to cut off the enemy, whatever he might be, upon receiving these reports that the enemy was following to the Northwest turned his force to the Northeast (Plate 17). The result was that Beatty did not get between the enemy battle cruisers and their line of retreat but met them almost exactly dead ahead. This move of the light cruisers to the Northwest resulted in a third misfortune. None of the cruisers which had taken part in it succeeded in getting into the battle cruiser engagement where their services were urgently needed.

A glance at Plate 16 shows that all the British light cruisers are running at top speed toward the GALATEA, who had made contact with the enemy.

This is in violation of the Principles of the Objective and of Security. These cruisers in the screen, acting as the eyes of the battle cruiser fleet, left their stations without orders and rushed full speed, evidently to reinforce the cruiser that had made contact. Their objective was not this cruiser nor the enemy in front of it, but the possible enemy in front of their station in the screen. By leaving their stations they exposed the battle cruisers to surprise contact and this violated the Principle of Security. Their only reason for rushing to the aid of the GALATEA must have been based upon the Principle of Superiority, but the GALATEA and PHAETON were already superior to the enemy in front and when the other light cruisers arrived they merely joined the GALATEA in the run to the Northwest. It is difficult to explain adequately this action of the light cruisers.

Let us consider the action of Admiral Beatty in handling the battle cruisers and battleships. At 2:10 Beatty should at least have suspected the presence of the enemy. At 2:20 Beatty knew that the enemy was in sight. At 2:28 he knew his screen was in action. At 2:32 he turned his battle cruisers S.S.E. At 2:39 Beatty knew there was a large force in front of him. The GALATEA had reported "large amount of smoke as though from a fleet". When Beatty turned at 2:32 it was 22 minutes after he should have suspected the presence of the enemy, and 12 minutes after he actually knew the enemy was present. When he turned he left his battleships behind. They did not turn until 8 minutes later. Beatty practically ignored them at this time, as well as later in the action. At 2:20 when the GALATEA reported the enemy in sight, Beatty's first act should have been to concentrate his capital ships. (He might most wisely have done so at 2:10 when the GALATEA reported the suspicious action of the two funnel ship). If Beatty had

acted at 2:20 he could have concentrated all his capital ships and at 2:32, when he actually turned S.E. he could have been nearer to the enemy than he actually was. The battleships left behind at this time never took any effective part in the battle cruiser engagement. They were left behind without signals and without instructions and could only follow as best they might the battle cruiser force and the smoke of battle which later developed in front. This act on the part of Beatty had a direct and vital bearing on the result of the battle cruiser engagement.

PLATE 17. This plate shows the movement of forces from 3:00 to 3:15. At 3:00 o'clock the German battle cruisers were 29 miles from Beatty. At 3:15 they were 17 miles distant. 8 British light cruisers withdrawing North-west have reported to Beatty that the enemy is following them and Beatty has turned accordingly N.E. At 3:15 the NEW ZEALAND, leading the 2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron, sighted 5 German battle cruisers distant about 17 miles. ^{not reported.} In spite of this actual sight contact by ships of his own force, Admiral Beatty continued in the formation in which he had been cruising with his capital ships separated 3 to 10 miles.

PLATE 18. 3:15 to 3:30.

Beatty is still continuing with his capital ships separated. At 3:30 the leading battle cruiser, NEW ZEALAND, is 9 miles from Admiral Hipper. At 3:25 Admiral Beatty from the LION sighted the smoke of Admiral Hipper's 5 battle cruisers distant 15 miles, and at 3:31 - one minute after the time shown in Plate 18, Beatty saw Admiral Hipper's ships.

Special attention is invited to the positions of capital ships in Plate 18. This is the situation at the moment of actual sight contact between the battle cruiser forces. The distance between the leading British cruiser and the German

battle cruisers is 18,000 yards. It is now 3:31; 29 minutes later the INDEFATIGABLE was sunk at a range of 17,000 yards. The British formation is shown heading North-easterly; 2 battle cruisers in column 3 miles ahead of 4 battle cruisers also in column; to the West-North-West, distant about 8 miles, are the 4 battleships. The German column is almost directly ahead of the British column and has almost perfectly crossed its tee at a range of 18,000 yards. The British forces are divided into 3 groups. The two separated forces are distant from the point of contact 3 miles and 9 miles respectively. It is impossible to place a force on the maneuver board in a position of greater disadvantage than the position of the British battle cruiser force at 3:30. This is 18 minutes before the battle started. It is one hour and 10 minutes after Beatty received the first report of the presence of the enemy.

This is the direct result of Admiral Beatty's cruising formation and of his disregard of the information which he received in regard to the enemy forces.

Plate 4 is shown again at this time to illustrate a correct approach just previous to deployment for battle. There are two points to note: First, the disposition of capital ships. Their correct disposition is in a line at 90° from the bearing of the enemy. Beatty's force was disposed in column headed toward the enemy. Moreover, Beatty's force was separated into 3 groups. In Plate 4 light forces are disposed on the flanks of the capital ships. Beatty's light forces are 16 miles distant steaming North-west, with the exception of destroyers and several light cruisers immediately surrounding the capital ships.

PLATE 19 3:30 to 3:40

At 3:33 Admiral Hipper turned his column around and headed S.S.E. At 3:34 Admiral Beatty signalled to the 2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron to turn back and take station astern of him. At 3:37 these two battle cruisers turned, distant about 17,000 yards from Admiral Hipper. The 2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron had to make two

180° turns in column in order to come up in rear of Admiral Beatty. At high speed this is a very difficult maneuver and it is unlikely that these two cruisers turned into station accurately in the rear of Beatty's column.

PLATE 20. 3:40 to 4:00

This plate shows the two battle cruisers turning in behind Beatty's column. At 3:45 Beatty was still in column headed almost directly toward the enemy. At this time he made signal to form on a line bearing N.W. Three minutes after this signal was made and while the evolution was being carried out, Admiral Hipper opened fire at a range of 14,500 yards, and the battle between capital ships began. It is evident that the battle opened under conditions of great disadvantage to the British forces. Even the six battle cruisers are not deployed for battle.

PLATE 21. 3:31 to 3:51

This plate shows the movement of forces from 3:31, when Beatty sighted Hipper's ships from his flagship, up to 3:51, three minutes after fire was opened. Within three minutes after opening fire the LION was hit twice by heavy shell, and the TIGER was hit three times. Two hits on the TIGER were on turrets. One knocked off a turret sighting hood. During the first ten or twelve minutes of the fighting the Germans had everything their own way. They reported that during this period they suffered hardly at all, while the British within three minutes were being repeatedly hit and within twelve minutes the INDEFATIGABLE was sunk and the LION out of the battle line for a period of 20 to 25 minutes, while turrets were disabled on the TIGER and PRINCESS ROYAL.

It is certain that Admiral Beatty was not in a position to open the battle at the time it started. Corbett in his official history states that it was an intense relief to the Germans that the British did not open fire from a longer distance.

The British guns out-ranged the German guns and Beatty had a terrific advantage had he been in position and had he opened fire at a range at which the German guns were ineffective. Instead of that, the Germans opened fire first, and even then all Beatty's ships could not reply.

The five plates, 17 to 21, inclusive, are perhaps the most important of the plates illustrating the battle cruiser action. They show the disposition of forces during approach, deployment, and the opening of the engagement. It was really during this time that the result of the battle cruiser engagement was decided. It is remarkable that in the Narrative of the BATTLE OF JUTLAND, issued by the British Admiralty, no plates are shown illustrating the position of forces throughout this period, 3:00 p.m. to 3:50 p.m.

PLATE 22. 4:00 to 4:26.

At 4:00 o'clock the INDEFATIGABLE sank. At 4:26 the QUEEN MARY sank. At 4:00 o'clock the Q-turret on the LION was wrecked. The LION dropped out of column with fire raging in her turret and was out of column for probably 25 minutes. Therefore, from 4:00 o'clock until probable 4:26 the British had remaining in column only 4 battle cruisers fighting the German 5. At no time in the battle cruiser engagement did the British bring to bear the superior force which they possessed.

From reports, it seems probable that the VON DER TANN opened fire on the INDEFATIGABLE at 3:56. At 4:00 o'clock the INDEFATIGABLE was sunk; range 17,000 yards; time, 4 minutes, 6 hits. A salvo struck on the upper deck in line with the after-turret and evidently penetrated the interior; an explosion followed. She fell out of line, sinking by the stern. Another salvo struck her near the fore-turret; a second explosion followed and she turned over and disappeared. The fighting between the battle cruisers started at 3:48 and continued until 4:05, when it was

temporarily interrupted by both Admirals opening the range. At 4:17 fire was re-opened. The DERFFLINGER opened fire on the QUEEN MARY, the second ship in column as the LION was not at the head of the column at this time. At 4:22 the DERFFLINGER had the range of the QUEEN MARY. At 4:26 the QUEEN MARY was sunk; range 14,500; time, 4 minutes, 9 hits.

The QUEEN MARY was destroyed in the same manner as the INDEFATIGABLE. A plunging salvo pitched on her deck abreast the Q-turret; an explosion followed, and the QUEEN MARY disappeared.

From the beginning of the battle until about 4:10, six or seven destroyers were on the engaged side of the British battle cruisers interfering with their gun fire by volumes of smoke. This would never have happened had the British forces been properly deployed for battle.

It is evident that when battle starts serious damage follows almost immediately. No Admiral can be justified who enters engagement with his forces improperly disposed if there is information and time to properly deploy them for fighting. Within three minutes of opening fire the British ships received serious and repeated hits. Within twelve minutes of opening fire one battle cruiser was sunk; the LION'S Q-turret was wrecked and she was out of column. One turret on the PRINCESS ROYAL was damaged and out of action. One turret on the TIGER had a sighting-hood shot off. All this happened within a few minutes of opening fire and the Germans report that during this time they suffered hardly at all.

PLATE 23. 4:26 to 4:40 P.M.

This plate covers the time from the sinking of the QUEEN MARY until Admiral Beatty turned North upon sighting the German battle fleet. During this time the principal incident of inter-

est was a torpedo attack delivered by the British.

As early as 3:55 - seven minutes after the battle started - Beatty had signalled to the light cruiser CHAMPION leading the 13th Destroyer Flotilla: "Opportunity appears favorable for attacking." Evidently the CHAMPION did not interpret this as an order to attack, for at 4:05 Beatty signalled to the CHAMPION: "Attack with torpedoes." The CHAMPION with the 13th Flotilla was one mile on the starboard beam of the LION, that is, on the disengaged side. The battle station for destroyers and light cruisers is several miles in advance on the engaged bow of capital ships. This advanced station is necessary for making an effective torpedo attack. The distance in advance should be greater in the case of battle cruisers of high speed. It took the CHAMPION and the 13th Flotilla (12) minutes to get from the starboard beam of the LION across her bows about one mile ahead of her. (Plate 22). Just after this flotilla had crossed the bows of the LION and was standing to the Eastward to get into the attack position which they should originally have occupied, the light cruiser NOTTINGHAM which was on the engaged beam of the LION attempted to cross the bows of the LION to the disengaged side. In her haste she cut through the column of 10 destroyers and cut off the 4 rear destroyers. This was a bad start for the destroyer attack, both in time and in numbers which continued. No detailed description of the attack need be given.

The Germans sent out destroyers and light cruisers almost simultaneously either to repel the British attack or to deliver a torpedo attack of their own. The British destroyers instead of continuing with their torpedo attack, abandoned their objective, which was the enemy battle line, and turned to fight with the German destroyers. This violated the Principle of the Objective. The British destroyers were given a role at JUTLAND, which was almost wholly defensive. Their principal duty con-

sisted in safeguarding or protecting the British capital ships from submarines and torpedoes. As a result of the fighting between British and German destroyers and light cruisers, the British lost 2 destroyers and the Germans lost 2. The British had 11 destroyers in all in the attack. They fired 21 torpedoes and made one hit on the SEDYLITZ and one hit which sank one of the two German destroyers. The Germans had 16 destroyers and one light cruiser in the fighting. They fired 12 torpedoes at the British column with no effect. The British destroyers were greatly superior in gun power to the German destroyers. The two British destroyers which were lost were not actually sunk in the destroyer fighting, but were disabled and stopped in the path of the advancing German fleet and they were sunk later by gun fire from the German battleships. At 4:43 Beatty made the destroyer recall, just after he himself had turned North.

PLATE 23 shows Hipper's Scouting Division 1 turning away to the South-east. This was primarily due to the torpedo threat, but it was possibly due to a desire to lead the British forces farther to the East in order that they should run head on into the advancing German battle fleet now only a few miles away.

During the run to the South the 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron had taken station about 3 miles ahead of Admiral Beatty's battle cruisers. This distance was entirely too small. As they took no part in the battle, their presence in advance must have been for the purpose of scouting. They should have been much further ahead, perhaps 10 or 15 miles, considering the high speed at which forces were travelling. They violated the Principle of Security in remaining so near to Beatty's battle cruisers. Considering the absence of Beatty's light cruisers 16 miles to the N. W. when the battle opened, the 4 light cruisers of the 2nd Squadron violated the Principle of Cooperation and Economy of Force.

One cruiser in advance of Beatty could have performed all of the service rendered by the four. This would have released three light cruisers to support the British destroyer attack on Hipper and the result of that attack might then have been much more effective.

PLATE 24.

At 4:30 the SOUTHAMPTON reported to Jellicoe and to Beatty "One enemy cruiser bearing S.E. Course N." This was the first of a long series of remarkably efficient reports sent in by the SOUTHAMPTON. This report should have meant a great deal to Beatty. Beatty had been told by the Admiralty on the eve of sailing that the German High Seas Fleet would probably put to sea the next morning. He had actually encountered and was then engaged with a part of that fleet. There was every reason to believe that the rest of it was not far distant. In view of the information in his possession, this report of the SOUTHAMPTON should have meant that the advanced screen of the High Seas Fleet had been sighted at 4:30. At 4:30 another light cruiser, the NOTTINGHAM, reported "2 cruisers S.S.E." Apparently these reports did not impress Beatty with their full significance. At 4:33 the SOUTHAMPTON reported to Beatty: "Enemy battleships S.E." Even this third report was not accepted by Admiral Beatty as conclusive, because he immediately "turned at once to port, direct for the position where the apparition had been reported". This phrase is quoted verbatim from the official history written by Corbett, page 340. The following is quoted from the same source and page: "Wholly unexpected as Admiral Scheer's arrival was, all doubt was quickly at an end. Two minutes after the LION altered course she could see the leading German battleships less than 12 miles away".

It is to be remarked that Beatty was surprised and also that he felt obliged to confirm the reports which his cruisers had made. In heading for the German battle fleet with his inferior force, he

ran a serious and unnecessary risk. It was unnecessary that he should personally see the German battleships at this time. His act is best explained as a lack of appreciation of the situation revealed by the information which he had received both before and after sailing.

At 4:45 Beatty reported to Jellicoe: "Have sighted enemy's battle fleet bearing S.E.; my position....." This is the only report of the enemy battle fleet which Beatty voluntarily made to Jellicoe for 2-1/4 hours, or until 45 minutes after Jellicoe himself saw the German fleet.

At 4:40 Beatty made a general signal by flags to turn by column movement 180° and his battle cruisers turned at this time. Evan-Thomas with the 5th Battle Squadron of 4 battleships was 8 miles behind Beatty in the smoke of battle and did not see the signal. As in several previous cases Beatty took no steps to insure that the battleships received his signals. Eight minutes later Beatty repeated the signal to the battleships who were then approaching on an opposite course two miles away. As a result, the battleships were late in turning North. In consequence, they were separated about 4 miles from Beatty after turning and were subjected to terrific gun fire while making the turn and for half an hour afterward.

Thus on the run North, as on the run south, the British violated the Principle of Superiority by the separation of their forces.

The 5th Battle Squadron was exposed to the fire of both the German battle cruisers and battleships. The concentration of fire on the battleship MALAYA all but resulted in that vessel dropping behind and becoming a victim of the approaching enemy. This risk was unnecessary for the 5th Battle Squadron could and should have been turned before coming within gun range of the High Seas Fleet.

The Narrative of the BATTLE OF JUTLAND issued by the British Admiralty contains two pictures of the situation when the battleships turned North. On page 24 the Narrative states: "As the WARSPITE and MALAYA, the rear ships of the line, turned, they sighted it (German Battle Fleet) and the BARHAM saw it too"

On page 27 the Narrative states: "The BARHAM had hardly turned when she was hit by a heavy shell.....Three other hits were received.....The MALAYA, too, suffered heavily. She was firing at the KONIG, but the leading German division concentrated on her with the evident intention of disabling her and making her fall behind, and at one time salvos were falling round her at the rate of six a minute."

Corbett in his Official History, page 343, speaking of this turn of the battleships to the North, says:"...as MALAYA, the rear ship, turned, it was evident that she was the target of a whole division or more. Salvos were falling all around her at the rate of six a minute."

These quotations are given to illustrate the danger when reading any single authority on the BATTLE OF JUTLAND of accepting without investigation all statements at their face value.

It was most fortunate for Beatty that he sighted the German battle fleet on his port bow and not on his starboard. This was probably largely the fault of Admiral Hipper. It certainly was not due to any precaution on the part of Beatty. Had Hipper headed a little more to the Eastward, he would have led Beatty to the Eastward of the German fleet, and when Beatty turned to look at that battle fleet he would have found himself between the two German forces, - the battle cruisers on the East and the battle fleet on the West. To have extricated himself from such a position would have been well nigh impossible. That he did not find himself in such a position was due to Hipper's mis-

take and not to his own actions. He did not take even the ordinary precautions for providing security. The information which Beatty had received should have caused him to fight the whole battle cruiser action with the knowledge that the German battle fleet was possibly, if not probably, somewhere to the Southward. As a matter of fact, Admiral Scheer appears to have been the only one to recognize the tactical possibilities of the situation during the battle cruiser action. He headed his battle fleet to the Westward in an effort to bring Beatty between him and the German battle cruisers. He was obliged to turn back and hasten to the relief of Hipper upon hearing that the 5th Battle Squadron was also with Beatty's forces. Scheer did not know that this ^{5th} Battle squadron was exercising no practical effect on the action. *But they were. V. de T. was being hit*

Beatty was fortunate in a second respect at the moment of contact with the German Battle Fleet. This contact was made at the fortunate moment when the torpedo attack of the 13th Flotilla had caused Hipper to open the range and Beatty's battle cruisers were not under effective fire from Hipper at the moment of turning.

Second Phase - THE RUN TO THE NORTH

In the run to the north, the wind which had been N.W. at the time of first contact, had shifted until at this time it was W. by S., force 2 to 3. The British forces thus occupied a position to windward with inferior visibility. The 5th Battle Squadron was suffering from a heavy concentration of gun fire without the ability to fire effectively in return. The British position was admirably adapted to laying a smoke screen for the protection of the well nigh defenceless 5th Battle Squadron. Except for some extraordinary reason a force similarly situated should be withdrawn from action, protected by a smoke screen, relieved by a destroyer attack, by reinforcements, or by some other means. In this case it was undesirable to break contact as the enemy was being drawn toward the Grand Fleet. For the same reason it was undesirable to turn the enemy back, or to turn him away, by a destroyer attack. The quickest and most effective means of protection - the laying of a smoke screen - was therefore the course of action which was supported by various tactical considerations. There was, moreover, a particular tactical reason which demanded the protection of the 5th Battle Squadron at this time. At several critical instants during the BATTLE OF JUTLAND the British suffered because of their inability to decide correctly the important questions, when to fight and when not to fight. This is a case in point. This was no time for Admiral Beatty to fight. From the moment he sighted the German main fleet his tactical attitude should have been completely reversed. Up to that moment he was on the offensive seeking to destroy Admiral Hipper's force. After that moment he was on the defensive, and should have avoided engagement without losing contact. Upon sighting the German Battle Fleet Beatty immediately became a part of the Grand Fleet and

the affair in hand became the business of the Grand Fleet. His part in it ceased to be that of Admiral Beatty, Commander of the Battle Cruiser Force, and became that of Admiral Beatty, a unit of the Grand Fleet. Perhaps in the excitement of battle this distinction was overlooked. If so, it may explain why a number of other things were also overlooked by Beatty during the battle. With this point in mind, you will see that a greater tactical change was involved than that of mere reversal from offense to defense.

From the moment of sighting the German main fleet, Admiral Beatty had three vital things to do in the following order of importance.

First - to keep the Commander-in-Chief fully informed of the situation;

Second - to lead the German fleet into contact with the Grand Fleet to the tactical advantage of the latter;

Third - to preserve his own force for use in the main fleet engagement.

The 2d Light Cruiser Squadron having failed in its duty of cooperation with the battle cruisers during their run to the south, perhaps rendered at this time service most valuable in its bold development of the German Battle Fleet. At great risk it secured and reported information of the utmost value to Admiral Jellicoe.

This was the beginning of Commodore Goodenough's splendid conduct throughout the BATTLE OF JUTLAND.

During the run to the north, Admiral Beatty, of all persons in either fleet, was the one who possessed the most information in regard to the situation. He knew that in pursuit of him was the whole German High Seas Fleet and that probably in little more than an hour a major fleet engagement would be raging. It became his paramount duty to further in every possible way the British chances of success in the approaching main fleet

engagement. Affairs were no longer in his hands to direct as the Admiral on the scene. From the moment the German battle fleet was sighted the engagement of the Battle Cruiser Force with Admiral Hipper's battle cruisers ceased to be an independent action and became a part of a major fleet engagement. What Admiral Beatty did to the German forces on the run north was of slight importance in comparison with what he was in a position to enable Admiral Jellicoe to do to the High Seas Fleet when it came into contact with the Grand Fleet. Admiral Beatty should have bent every effort toward furnishing the Commander-in-Chief the information so essential to the latter before contact was made between the two main fleets. //

Beatty sent voluntarily only one signal, at 4:45, conveying information to Jellicoe of the German battle fleet. For 2-1/4 hours after this time, when Jellicoe depended wholly upon information furnished him by Beatty's forces in contact with the German fleet, Beatty sent voluntarily not one single message to his chief. Even the one message which Beatty sent at 4:45 was inadequate. It merely stated "Have sighted enemy's battle fleet bearing S.E. My position...." It should have given the strength of the enemy forces, their disposition, their course, and their speed. It was certainly possible at this time for Beatty to have given the enemy's course and approximate speed. It was very important for Jellicoe to know whether the German battle fleet was steaming North or steaming South. Twice during the hour and a half following Beatty's only report the Commander-in-Chief signalled by search-light to Admiral Beatty: "Where is the enemy's battle fleet?" In reply to the first of these messages Beatty replied: "Enemy's battle cruisers bearing S.E." When finally after moments of anxious delay the Commander-in-Chief received a reply to his second message, Beatty merely reported: "Have sighted the enemy's battle fleet bearing S.S.W." The meager in-

formation furnished the Commander-in-Chief between 4:45 and 6:15, the moment when he was forced to deploy, is remarkable. During this hour and a half the matter of furnishing the Commander-in-Chief with information was the thing of paramount tactical importance. It appears to have received practically no attention. During the battle cruiser engagement Jellicoe had to ask if the 5th Battle Squadron was in company with Beatty.

Jellicoe received six reports in regard to Hipper's battle cruisers between 3:40 P.M. and 3:59 P.M. After 3:59 P.M. there followed a period of silence of 39 minutes. Then followed a series of six reports of the German battleships - 4:38 to 5:00 P.M. Then followed a second interval of silence of 40 minutes. Jellicoe never knew where the German battle fleet was until one minute before he made the signal to deploy the Grand Fleet at 6:15.

When Beatty turned north the 1st and 3rd Light Cruiser Squadrons were about 20 miles to the northward from him. They had done nothing but make mistakes up to this time. Now was an opportunity to have turned their past mistakes to some good purpose because of their present position. Some of them should have been sent north at full speed to establish contact with the Grand Fleet and others should have been used as intermediate linking ships. This would have done much toward correcting the original mistake of providing no linking ships and also toward correcting the consequences of the faulty cruising formation of the Grand Fleet. These linking ships also would have immediately revealed the navigational errors of the two flagships.

There appear to be four tactical mistakes which together resulted in leaving the Commander-in-Chief in almost complete ignorance of the situation at the most critical time of the battle.

First - The faulty cruising formation of the Grand Fleet. With light forces well advanced it is impossible that Admiral Jellicoe should not have received information of the position of the German fleet long before he did.

Second - The failure to provide linking ships closed this means of obtaining information.

Third - The failure of Admiral Beatty to provide these linking ships when opportunity occurred.

Fourth - The failure of Admiral Beatty to report. The radio of the LION was shot down during the battle cruiser engagement, but it is impossible to believe that Admiral Beatty was unable to communicate to the Commander-in-Chief the important information in his possession. It is difficult to think of a satisfactory explanation of this failure. The lack of essential information in the dispatches quoted above from Admiral Beatty to the Commander-in-Chief is also difficult to understand.

The result was that the Grand Fleet crashed into contact with the High Seas Fleet at an unexpected time and on an unexpected bearing and the great advantage of the most stupendous tactical surprise in history was largely lost.

PLATE 25.

When Beatty turned north in view of the German battle fleet Jellicoe was 66 miles to the North and West of him. For a period of about half an hour, or until nearly 5:30, the 5th Battle Squadron, several miles in rear of Beatty, was left unsupported in hot engagement with battle cruisers of Hipper's force and battleships of the German fleet. The four battleships of the 5th Squadron suffered severely during this time. Every moment of the time they ran the risk of being crippled and falling a prey to the on-coming Germans. Beatty did nothing to relieve them or to support them. Admiral Evan-Thomas, with superior

speed, could have escaped the gun damage which he was suffering had he steamed to the Westward directly away from the German ships. He did not choose to do this because he interpreted his duty to follow Beatty. Beatty was heading too far to the North for two reasons: First - it kept his battleships in action; second, it was not the best course for him to take to make junction with the Grand Fleet. He headed directly for the Grand Fleet himself and, later, even turned the Germans farther to the East. This will be discussed later.

At 5:33 Beatty turned to the N.N.E. At 5:40 contact between Beatty's force and Jellicoe's force was made. (Plate 25). The BLACK PRINCE sighted one of Beatty's cruisers. Beatty turned to the Eastward and renewed the engagement with Hipper's ships. Hipper turned Eastward conforming with Beatty's movement. A little earlier the light cruiser CHESTER with Hood's battle cruisers made contact with German Scouting Division 2. The 2nd Scouting group chased the CHESTER N.E., came under fire of the DEFENCE and WARRIOR of Jellicoe's force, turned East, became engaged with Hood's battle cruisers and turned Southeast, leaving the WIESBADEN behind a cripple. (Plate 26). Admiral Hipper sees the engagement of the 2nd Scouting Division, thinks he is facing the British fleet, turns back Southwest to close the German battle fleet, and then resumes course N.E. at the head of the German Battle Fleet. (See PLATE 27).

PLATE 26.

This plate shows Jellicoe's battleships ready for quick deployment steaming toward the S.E. The German battle fleet, instead of being directly ahead, bears South from Jellicoe well on his starboard bow. Beatty's force is seen in contact with Jellicoe heading to the N.E. and crossing the bows of Jellicoe's fleet. Due to lack of accurate information Jellicoe expected to find the German fleet farther to the East than it actually was. This was due to errors in navigation, mainly on the part

of Beatty, but partly on the part of Jellicoe's forces. Had visual contact been maintained or established between Beatty and Jellicoe this error would have been discovered in ample time. Had Beatty furnished the Commander-in-Chief with a continuous stream of information, which it was his primary duty to do, Jellicoe would never have been in such an awkward position at the time of his deployment.

PLATE 27.

This plate shows the situation shortly before deployment, which was made at 6:15. At 5:56 Beatty sighted the battleships of the Grand Fleet. Up to this moment Jellicoe was ignorant not only regarding the whereabouts of the German fleet but regarding the position of Admiral Beatty himself. Jellicoe waited five minutes after Beatty came in sight and then signalled to Beatty by searchlight, at 6:01: "Where is the enemy's battle fleet?" After the lapse of five minutes, at 6:06, Beatty replied: "Enemy's battle cruisers bearing S.E." This was exceedingly meager information to furnish the Commander-in-Chief by an officer who had been in contact with enemy forces for nearly four hours, who had been in contact with the enemy battle fleet for 1-1/2 hours, and who had been in sight of the Commander-in-Chief for 10 minutes. It did not answer Jellicoe's question even in regard to enemy battle cruisers. It gave no range, no course, no speed. Jellicoe could see his own battle cruisers three miles ahead of him in hot engagement with an unseen enemy, and at his wits end to solve the situation repeated his signal to Beatty: "Where is the enemy's battle fleet?" Precious minutes passed and no reply came. Finally, at 6:14, Admiral Beatty signalled: "Have sighted the enemy's battle fleet bearing S.S.W." No range, no course, no speed of the enemy battleships was furnished.

It is difficult to believe that during the 18 minutes Beatty had been in sight of the Commander-in-Chief he could not have

given the latter some idea of the approximate whereabouts of the German battle fleet. It was under these circumstances that one minute later, at 6:15, Admiral Jellicoe ordered the deployment of the Grand Fleet. While in no way minimizing the earlier mistakes regarding the absence of linking ships and regarding the faulty formation of the Grand Fleet which contributed to this unfortunate situation, the main responsibility for the Commander-in-Chief's lack of information about the German battle fleet must rest upon the officer who since 4:38, a period of one hour and 36 minutes, had been in contact with that fleet.

PLATE 27-A.

This plate is an effort to show in one diagram the condition existing at 6:15 when the signal to deploy was made.

It should be noted that the German fleet is not directly ahead of Jellicoe's force, which is the position it should have occupied for a quick deployment at this time. The center of the German fleet is about 15 miles S.W. from this position of dead ahead. Jellicoe's deployment signal directed all columns to go column left, which brought his force into one long column heading North-easterly. The Easternmost column, instead of turning to the left, continued on the real deployment course, which was S.E. by E. The first part of the movement, all divisions column left, could be completed in about four minutes. The whole deployment, under the circumstances, could not be completed in less than 20 minutes to 1/2 an hour. When the Grand Fleet, at 6:15, started its deployment German shells were falling between its columns. Only a few of the German ships could be seen intermittently through the mist and smoke. The WIESBADEN, burning and in a smoke screen, could be seen ahead. Beatty's battle cruisers were only two or three miles ahead of the Grand Fleet steaming at full speed across the van of Jellicoe's force. Between Jellicoe and the Germans, battle cruisers, cruisers,

and destroyers were hurrying to their battle stations. The vessels steaming across his front were shutting out all beyond in an impenetrable pall of funnel smoke. To this smoke was added the smoke and roar of battle both ahead and to starboard.

In front of Jellicoe between him and the enemy were more than fifty destroyers steaming in all directions rushing for their battle stations. Part of them belonged to Jellicoe's forces and part of them to Beatty's forces. The 1st Flotilla belonged to Beatty; the 12th Flotilla to Jellicoe. Their stations were at opposite ends of the line, and as they attempted to reach their stations the columns of these two flotillas became confused. Destroyers had to stop and back and dodge one another to avoid collision. The DEFENCE and WARRIOR rushed to attack across the bows of Beatty's battle cruisers so closely that Beatty had to change course. They steamed down Beatty's engaged side, blocking his gun fire with smoke. Beatty was steaming N.E. pouring out volumes of smoke from funnels and from fires on the vessels all of which was added to the smoke of gun fire. The DUKE OF EDINBURGH, which could not follow the DEFENCE and WARRIOR across Beatty's bows, joined the procession to the N.E. in front of Jellicoe's fleet and for twenty minutes added a volume of smoke to that of other vessels. The 1st Light Cruiser Squadron which belonged to Beatty became confused between the columns of Jellicoe's fleet and finally turned back around the disengaged side. The 5th Battle Squadron which was following Beatty, at first tried to follow Beatty across Jellicoe's front and then, wisely, decided to deploy in the rear of Jellicoe's column. In all there were more than seventy vessels, large and small, steaming in all directions, all making smoke, between Jellicoe and the German battle fleet at 6:15, when Jellicoe was called upon to make his decision in regard to deployment. His chief subordinate previous to this time had utterly failed to furnish him with any definite

information upon which he could act. Jellicoe waited five minutes after Beatty came within sight and then asked "Where is the enemy's battle fleet?" The reply after five minutes told him nothing of value. He repeated his question and waited for the reply until 6:14, and the reply then was merely "Have sighted enemy's Battle Fleet bearing S.S.W." It did not tell whether the enemy were going North, South, East or West.

This is a very abbreviated picture of the conditions under which Jellicoe decided his deployment. Imagination must furnish the details. In one minute Jellicoe decided and made his deployment signal. In this moment Jellicoe was truly great. He was great, not so much in his decision and in his action as in his self-restraint and self-control. Jellicoe has been severely criticized because he deployed on the left flank division away from the enemy instead of deploying on the right flank division toward the enemy. This criticism first appeared when information was lacking. It has persisted with many even after full information became available. It is believed that no competent or sincere naval tactician has the slightest ground for advocating a deployment on the right flank division in this situation. Jellicoe reached the only possible decision under the circumstances. It was a poor deployment, poorly executed, but under the circumstances, due to lack of information, it was the best that could have been done. As a matter of fact, the deployment adopted had nothing to do with the fact that the British did not obtain victory. This deployment, in fact, combined with the German movements, resulted in giving the British forces later a position of maximum tactical advantage. Therefore, right or wrong, the deployment adopted led to a situation to the greatest advantage of the British forces. If the British did not obtain victory at JUTLAND it was not due to the deployment adopted but to something else.

Before leaving this subject of junction of the British forces and deployment of the Grand Fleet, Beatty's three duties on the run North will be repeated.

First: To furnish the Commander-in-Chief full information.

Second: To lead the German Fleet into contact with the Grand Fleet to the tactical advantage of the latter.

Third: To preserve his own force for use in the main fleet engagement.

In regard to the first and second duties of Beatty during this phase of the action, the full consequences of his failure in this particular can now be seen. Having failed to keep the Commander-in-Chief informed, it was of course only by chance that Admiral Beatty could succeed with his second important duty. This diagram shows that this did not occur.

It will be recalled that Admiral Beatty believed his position to be about seven miles farther East than it actually was, that is, about seven miles farther East than is shown in this plate. That being the case, it is not clear why Admiral Beatty took advantage of his superior speed to force the head of the German column still farther to the East. Had Admiral Beatty been where he thought he was, and had his efforts to turn the German fleet been only a little more advanced, he would have succeeded in bringing about the following general situation: the German fleet would have been headed East and several miles to the Eastward of the Grand Fleet and the Grand Fleet upon deployment would thus have been confronted with a stern chase. Perhaps Admiral Beatty's tactics in turning the head of the enemy column were concerned only with his own forces and had no reference to the Grand Fleet.

Admiral Beatty's tactics in forcing the head of the German column to the Eastward should have indicated to Admiral Scheer the proximity of strong British reinforcements. It was an adver-

tisement of the presence of the Grand Fleet. Had Admiral Beatty's forces been quite alone, it would have been a very astonishing thing for him to engage the whole German fleet and apparently attempt to turn it around and force it to go home.

It is useless to speculate upon what might have happened in this battle, but as a tactical problem it might be of interest to determine whether the Grand Fleet could have deployed with less confusion had the German Fleet been led to the N.W. and the Grand Fleet in line of bearing approximately N.W.-S.E. made contact from the Northward or Northeastward. The German Fleet would then have been caught between Jellicoe and Beatty.

From the contact as made the British had little reason to hope for a tactical advantage. Fortunately for them the low visibility assisted them by keeping the German Commander in ignorance of the real situation.

The cause of this critical situation at and during deployment may be summed up very completely as LACK OF INFORMATION. The four tactical mistakes resulting in this lack of information have been mentioned. It is evident that there is no adequate excuse for failure to furnish the Commander-in-Chief with important information when it is possible to do so.

PLATE 28 shows the British deployment after 11 minutes have elapsed. The British column is bent almost at a right angle in order to deploy in a column which is 90° to the bearing of the enemy. In this situation there is nothing which resembles a correct approach or deployment formation.

When the DEFENCE and WARRIOR crossed the head of Beatty's column just before the deployment of Jellicoe's force they fiercely attacked the WIESBADEN about 5,000 yards away. This brought them almost immediately under the fire of the German Fleet. They attempted to escape around the rear of Beatty's column. The DEFENCE was hit by two salvos in quick succession,

blew up and sank at 6:19:- range 8,000, time about one minute, hits 4. The WARRIOR, badly damaged, escaped around the rear of Beatty's column and was saved from immediate destruction by the WARSPITE of the 5th Battle Squadron. As the 5th Battle Squadron was turning into station in rear of the Grand Fleet the rudder of the WARSPITE jammed and she turned a complete circle which brought her between the WARRIOR and the enemy. The WARRIOR was thus saved for the time being but she sank later on her way home.

PLATE 29.

Admiral Hood with the 3d Battle Cruiser Squadron had turned and taken station ahead of Beatty, thus placing his force at the head of the column of the Grand Fleet. At 6:20 he turned Southeastward and at 6:23 opened fire on the German Fleet. The advantage of visibility was with the British who for about six minutes fired effectively while the Germans were unable even to see the British ships. Suddenly at 6:29 the veil of mist lifted for a few moments. The DERFFLINGER saw the INVINCIBLE, Admiral Hood's flagship. The DERFFLINGER immediately opened fire, range 9,900 yards. The first salvo went over, the second, third and fourth salvos hit, the INVINCIBLE blew up, broke in two in the middle and at 6:31 sank:- range 9,300, time 2 minutes, hits 8.

In considering the position of the German forces as shown in this plate, we see for the second time in this battle a force in column formation running head on into contact with the enemy and in a position of an almost perfect "T". The first case was that of Beatty. Beatty did have full information by reports and sight contact of the enemy. Admiral Scheer did not. He was as much in the dark as was Jellicoe. This is the third occasion of sudden and unexpected contact in which the force on one side found itself in an embarrassing and critical situation.

Consider the information in possession of Jellicoe and of Scheer. The British knew upon leaving port that there was every probability that the High Seas Fleet would put to sea the next morning. They knew it had received an important operation order. This was the reason why the Grand Fleet was ordered to sea. At 6:00 o'clock in the morning of May 31st, Admiral Scheer knew that there were numerous British battleships, cruisers and destroyers at sea. Did the various commanders forget or did they ignore this information? As contact was made with one enemy force after another, did the Commander think that each force encountered was the last? Admiral Beatty who chased Hipper's battle cruisers toward their stronghold with no provision for learning what might be ahead of them had the tables turned on him an hour later by the Germans, who in their turn chased him to the North with no adequate provision for discovering what lay ahead of them.

Although Admiral Scheer had run his fleet into a dangerous situation he possessed the ability to extricate it. Up to this point through/^{out}the day the Germans had held superiority of gun fire over the British. While Admiral Scheer could not have known the full gravity of the situation, he evidently realized that superiority now rested with the British. The head of his column had been bent to the Southward and with a second bend in the column and while under gun fire of the Grand Fleet Admiral Scheer at 6:35 ordered a reversal of the battle course by ship movement. This maneuver consisted simply in each ship turning 180° simultaneously.

PLATE 30.

In the maneuver branch of Tactics this ability of the Germans to reverse battle course is the conspicuous feature of the Battle of Jutland. As an evolution, it is extremely simple. In the execution of this evolution there is great difficulty and danger. Even in peace-time under favorable conditions an Admiral attempts

it always with mis-giving. The turn away was covered by a destroyer smoke screen and almost instantly the German battle fleet disappeared from view. Admiral Jellicoe could hardly have known what had happened, but, had he known, he was in no position at this time to follow the retiring Germans. His column is still bent and his deployment still incomplete. Ships are over-lapping, and due to the necessity of slowing his speed during deployment ships in the rear of the column were bunched together. He is still trying to straighten out the Grand Fleet into an orderly column ready and fit to fight. ^{His mind is not prepared to follow, either "I refuse to be} Jellicoe after 20 ^{no} minutes is not yet in any position to fight a battle. Almost at ^{drawn} the moment when he expected to crush the German High Seas Fleet it disappeared and Jellicoe was obliged to content himself with heading to the Southward with the object of placing his fleet between the Germans and their base. But he was to be offered another and a better opportunity to destroy the German fleet a few minutes later. Admiral Scheer (Plate 30) steamed to the westward with his column in reverse order until at 6:55 he again ordered a simultaneous reversal of course by ship movement. This brought his fleet into column formation again heading to the Eastward in natural order. At the same moment Jellicoe had turned by division movement to the South.

PLATE 31.

It is thus seen at 6:56 that the British and German fleets are rapidly approaching each other. This move of Admiral Scheer was the boldest maneuver in the battle. Exactly why Admiral Scheer ordered this turn may never be known. Admiral Scheer states that his turn to the Westward partook of the nature of a retreat, that a pursuing enemy might destroy his rear ships (this is quite evident), and that it was too early in the evening to try to detach himself. He decided that a turn back to the Eastward would force the enemy into another engagement, would force

the enemy's destroyers to attack, would surprise the enemy, and that all this would facilitate the later withdrawal of the German fleet during the night. If these were Admiral Scheer's real reasons, his turn back brought about everything he anticipated except one thing - it did not force the enemy destroyers to attack.

Certainly the Germans gave the British a second opportunity, and as it happened a last opportunity, to annihilate the High Seas Fleet at a time when the British should have been fully prepared.

At 7:05 Jellicoe headed to the Southwest, but almost immediately, at 7:09, he received reports of an enemy submarine and of several destroyers approaching. At 7:09 he turned to the left three points and resumed his course South.

At 7:17 Admiral Scheer realized that he was headed directly into the flank of the British fleet, and for the third time signalled a reversal of course by simultaneous ship movement, and for a third time successfully carried it out. (Plate 32).

It will be remembered that at 7:09 the British ships upon sighting a submarine and several destroyers, turned three points (about 34^o) to the left and headed South. Admiral Jellicoe states the destroyers influenced him in making this turn. When Scheer reversed course he ordered his battle cruisers and his destroyers to attack, and when the German destroyers were sighted Admiral Jellicoe, at 7:22, ordered his ships to turn to the left two points away from the torpedo menace. (Plate 32)

At 7:25 Jellicoe turned away another two points. The turn away at this time was four points, and at 7:09 it had been three points. In all, the British ships turned seven points, or practically 80^o to the left. There were 12 German destroyers which made the attack at this time. They fired a total of 21 torpedoes. The British report they sighted the tracks of 19 torpedoes.

Probably 13 or 14 torpedoes passed through the line of British ships. There are two ways of meeting a torpedo attack by a column of battleships: First, turn toward and parallel to the track of the approaching torpedoes; second, turn away and parallel. The only advantage in turning away is to withdraw the battleships beyond the range of the torpedoes. Otherwise, the risk in either case is practically the same. The chance of a torpedo hit when ships are turned toward or away from approaching torpedoes running on parallel tracks is about one hit for every 20 torpedoes fired. Therefore, the risk from the number of torpedoes fired by the Germans at this time was one torpedo hit.

A turn toward or a turn away from torpedo attack is one method of meeting it, but it does not follow that this is the only method. It will be remembered that the British light forces, light cruisers, and destroyers, had been assigned the primary duty of defending the British battleships against destroyer and submarine attacks.

It is believed that the light forces should have been left to attend to their assigned role, while the battleships continued to attend to their own. For many months the Grand Fleet had sought an opportunity to engage the High Seas Fleet. At this critical moment the Grand Fleet had, not only the opportunity to engage, but had this opportunity when occupying the most powerful position ever obtained by one fleet for destroying another. All the British had to do in order to destroy the enemy was to drive home the gun attack of their heavy ships, many of which were firing on the enemy without themselves receiving any damage in return. But apparently Admiral Jellicoe either failed to grasp the situation or was unwilling to pay even a small price for the victory which at that moment was within his grasp. Receiving no serious injury from gun fire and unwilling to risk even slight injury from torpedo fire, he turned away from the enemy and from the chance

of victory in the same moment. Here was the time and place to exercise the Principle of the Offensive. The British had superiority - of material, of position, of visibility. It was the moment to strike. If ever the time was opportune for the employment of the tactical offensive it was at this moment. But the British appear to have lacked a full appreciation of the value of this fundamental Principle of Offense. On the other hand, we have in the conduct of Admiral Scheer an illustration of the value of offensive tactics. Although tactically inferior in all respects, by the mere assumption of offensive tactics, Admiral Scheer drove off the vastly superior British Fleet, extricated his own fleet from an impossible situation, and eventually conducted it safely home. In his turn back to the Eastward, and in his bold attack on the British fleet, Admiral Scheer illustrated the Principles of Offensive, of Surprise, of Movement, and of Cooperation. (12)

In the ending of this main engagement we see a fleet of inferior material strength in what is conceded to be the most dangerous of all tactical positions, where one would expect a considerable amount of demoralization, we see this fleet rise above the great tactical surprise which it had experienced in running into the Grand Fleet and by the assumption of offensive tactics actually drive its numerically superior enemy away and escape with less total damage than it succeeded in inflicting on the enemy.

Why was this result possible? What did the Germans have, or what did the British lack, that made possible such an outcome in this battle?

In general, the answer is that the Germans knew, understood and followed the Fundamental Principles of War which are of necessity the Fundamental Principles of Tactics.

They gave a magnificent example of the Principle of Offense in a situation, where it perhaps was the only thing that would have saved them.

They understood the Principle of the Objective. Each of the German units knew and followed its proper objective.

They exhibited an almost perfect example of the Principle of Cooperation. By their cooperation between types in attacking, covering and maneuvering, they showed their ability to take advantage of time, surprise, smoke, attack and maneuver.

They observed the Principle of Simplicity.

They exhibited a knowledge of the value of Surprise.

They observed the Principle of Superiority. Throughout the Battle Cruiser engagement the Germans had superiority at all times. When they met greatly superior numbers in the Grand Fleet they broke off the engagement.

They exhibited Economy of Force by launching light forces which held the whole British fleet at bay and thus covered the turn away of their main fleet.

They showed more than a mere knowledge of the Principle of Movement by their masterly maneuver of the battle line in three times reversing its course.

They showed a conception of the Principle of Security in the formation of their screens.

The Germans made tactical mistakes, but they were of less consequence than the mistakes made by the British.

The British showed a lack of appreciation of the tremendous value of the Principle of Offense.

The tactical objective of types, especially of light forces, was incorrect.

Too great a value was placed on material superiority.

They violated the Principle of Security in their screens and in failure to furnish information.

They did not appreciate the Principle of Cooperation.

They failed to take advantage of the Principle of Surprise.
They did not observe the Principle of Economy of Force.

PLATE 33.

Admiral Jellicoe continued his withdrawal from torpedo menace until 7:35, when he turned to the South, and at 7:42 turned South-westerly. In the meantime the German Fleet had withdrawn to the West and had then headed Southerly. The situation shown in Plate 53 at 8:00 o'clock is the situation at sunset. Sunset was at 8:07.

When the German Fleet turned away at 7:17 they disappeared instantly from sight. Between then and 8:00 o'clock various British forces had glimpses of them at different times. At 7:40 Beatty made one of his rare voluntary reports. He reported that the enemy bore from him N.W. by W. At 7:47 Beatty sent to Jellicoe a much discussed signal. It was: "Urgent. Submit van of battleships follow battle cruisers. We can then cut off whole of enemy's battle fleet." This signal was received by Jellicoe shortly before 8:00 o'clock. The relative position of Beatty and Jellicoe and the German Fleet is shown on Plate 53. Jellicoe has been criticized because he ignored this suggestion of Beatty's. This criticism, like the criticism of Jellicoe upon his deployment, was probably originally based upon lack of information. Jellicoe received the signal a few minutes before 8:00 o'clock. In Plate 54 will be seen Jellicoe's reaction probably to this signal.

PLATE 34.

At 8:00 o'clock Jellicoe turned West directly toward the reported position of the German Fleet. Jellicoe has been criticized and it has been stated that had he followed Beatty the enemy would have been cut off, would not have escaped. Considering Beatty's signal as it is worded, it is difficult to under-

stand what Beatty had in mind, or whether he had in mind at all any real conception of the situation. The German Fleet had been cut off when Beatty sent his signal, had been cut off from anything which was possible to cut them off from. The British forces had cut them off from their base.

In addition to turning West with the battle fleet Jellicoe immediately or at 8:10 ordered the van division to "follow our battle cruisers". This signal is logged as having been received in the KING GEORGE V at 8:07. Jellicoe continued Westerly until about 8:30 when he turned S.W. At 9:00 o'clock the British and German Fleets were about six miles apart, and were steering converging courses. There had been contact and fighting between light forces and also between certain British forces and some of the ships of the German Fleet itself during the period from 8:00 to 9:00 o'clock. The position and course of the German Fleet should have been known approximately to Jellicoe. It was still light in this Northern latitude up to this time. Had Jellicoe continued rapidly closing the German Fleet at 8:30 it is practically certain that the engagement would have been renewed before daylight failed. Possibly Jellicoe did not wish a renewal of the fleet action with darkness so near at hand. In any case, at 9:00 o'clock he altered course to the South and the British fleet assumed its night formation. (PLATE 35)

When one of two engaged fleets finds itself threatened with defeat it endeavors to withdraw from action. If the successful or superior fleet would turn such advantages as it may have into decisive victory it must follow and destroy the fleet attempting to withdraw.

At dark on the day of Jutland, the German Fleet, opposed by a greatly superior force, decided to avoid engagement and to retire during the night to the security of its bases. The mission of the British fleet was to destroy the German fleet before it

could escape. Apparently the British had two courses of action open to them. One was to destroy the German fleet during the night; the other was to maintain touch and prevent its escape during the night and to destroy it the next morning.

From the point of view of Tactics no one will criticise Jellicoe for not seeking a fleet engagement at night. Having the one alternative left - a fleet engagement at daylight - Jellicoe had two things to do during the night. First, to maintain contact with the German Fleet in order to ensure its attendance in the morning; second, to protect his own fleet in the meantime in order to ensure its existence in the morning. Admiral Jellicoe attended only to the second matter. It is true that he placed the Grand Fleet between the enemy and the direct route to his base through the mine fields to the Southward. But the route via Horn Reefs was not covered, nor the route to the Westward of Heligoland. (Plate 36). No effort was made to keep contact with the enemy battle fleet during the few hours of darkness. All the British destroyers, except the 1st Flotilla were ordered to take station five miles behind the Grand Fleet. (Plate 35). This was for the purpose of protecting the battleships from the attacks which the enemy light forces were expected to make. *To prevent mistaken identity, night* The British though superior in light forces made no attempt to attack during the night when conditions are most favorable for destroyer attack. This was not essential to the mission of the British fleet. It was essential, however, that the light forces maintain touch during the night. No attempt was made to do so.

It so happened, however, that in spite of their purely defensive disposition and attitude, the mass of light forces astern of the battleships were destined to get in touch with the German Fleet, due to the fact that Admiral Scheer decided to cross astern of the British fleet and head for the Horn Reef Channel.

This movement of Admiral Scheer resulted in various contacts and in fighting at intervals from about 10:00 o'clock until after midnight. This fighting started on the starboard quarter of the Grand Fleet and moved slowly across its stern to its port quarter. At 10:41 the Admiralty informed Admiral Jellicoe that the enemy battle fleet had been ordered home, that its course was S.S.E. $3/4$ E., speed 16 knots. This message, and especially the knowledge of fighting across his rear, should have at least suggested to Admiral Jellicoe the possibility that the High Seas Fleet was doing exactly what it was doing. But Admiral Jellicoe disregarded the message and misinterpreted the fighting, believing it indicated destroyer attacks on his main fleet. No destroyer attacks approached the fleet, however, and that should have caused him to doubt the correctness of that inference. The thought of destroyer attack caused him to turn away from the German Fleet at 7:09; the thought of destroyer attack between 10:00 and 1:00 prevented him from using his destroyers to keep touch with the German fleet, thus enabling him to intercept it, which possibility existed up until about 1:00 o'clock.

We have here an illustration of failure to estimate a situation correctly, even with fairly good information at hand, and of the resultant failure to reach a sound decision. Obsessed always with the idea of defending his own fleet, we can find Admiral Jellicoe at no time after the first deployment seeking aggressively to locate or to destroy the enemy.

At 2:39 in the morning of the first of June, Admiral Jellicoe turned the Grand Fleet to the Northward seeking his own cruisers and destroyers, not the German High Sea Fleet.

PLATE 35.

We will return to the tactics of the British Light Forces during the night and give only a brief outline of their activities. Formed astern of the Grand Fleet (PLATE 35) were six groups of

light forces; one group consisted of four light cruisers; the other five groups consisted of destroyer flotillas. In all there was a total of six light cruisers and 57 destroyers. It was into and through these groups that the German Fleet ran in its course to Horn Reefs, suffering no loss of capital ships except the old battleship POMMERN. As the British light forces were on the bows of the Germans in a favorable position for attack, the result or lack of result, is extraordinary.

NIGHT ENGAGEMENT. 10:15 P.M.

CASTOR and 11th FLOTILLA versus 2nd SCOUTING DIVISION

(1 CL and 15 DD)

PLATE 37.

At about 10:15 P.M. the CASTOR heading the 11th Flotilla on the Western flank of the British Light Forces sighted suspicious vessels in the dark. These vessels were part of the German 2d Scouting Division. These vessels immediately opened fire. The CASTOR replied. Two British destroyers joined in the engagement and fired torpedoes without effect. The remaining 13 destroyers of the 11th Flotilla did nothing. Some Commanders said they were blinded by the gun flashes; others stated they thought that the 2nd Scouting Division might be British ships. Half an hour later this Flotilla made a second contact with the German Scouting Division. A few rounds were fired on each side and the enemy vanished. The 11th Flotilla took no further part in the night engagement and rejoined the Battle Fleet at 8:40 A.M. the next day. It is not clear where it spent the night.

10:30 P.M. 2nd LIGHT CRUISER SQUADRON (4 CL) versus
4th SCOUTING DIVISION (5 CL)

PLATE 37.

About 10:30 P.M., when seven miles on the starboard quarter of KING GEORGE V leading the 2nd Battle Squadron, five ships of the 4th Scouting Division were sighted. The enemy promptly turned on searchlights and opened fire. The SOUTHAMPTON and DUBLIN were badly damaged. On the German side, the FRAUENLOB was sunk by torpedoes. After this brief engagement the 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron took station astern of the battle fleet with the idea of securing the fleet against torpedo attack. Commodore Goodenough made prompt report of this engagement which reached the Commander-in-Chief at 11:38 P.M. The gun flashes and searchlights were visible to the whole battle fleet. Commodore Goodenough reported that he had been engaged with German destroyers. This was literally true and was all the information which he had. Thus Commodore Goodenough in the SOUTHAMPTON continued to the end his series of splendid reports. In his capacity as a leader of Light Cruisers he performed his duty in a most efficient manner, showing at all times sound judgment and a proper conception of the situation. This was in marked contrast to the conduct of some of the other leaders.

10:30 to 11:30 4th FLOTILLA (12 DD) versus GERMAN FLEET.

PLATE 38.

At 10:35 the 4th Flotilla consisting of 12 destroyers was in column, course South, speed 17, when one of the destroyers reported to the Flotilla leader "A Cruiser bearing West on a parallel course making speed of 17 knots." At 10:50 destroyers in the rear of the column of the 4th Flotilla reported three enemy destroyers approaching from the starboard quarter. At 11:00 o'clock, and at later times, other suspicious vessels were sighted, but the 4th

Flotilla continued steaming South on a parallel course and with-
in sight of these enemy vessels and took no action. At 11:30
searchlights suddenly blazed forth from the German ships and a
terrific gun fire was concentrated on the head of the column of
the 4th Flotilla, disabling the TIPPERARY. She eventually sank
about two hours later.

It can not be assumed that the 4th Flotilla were taken by
surprise, for they had been looking at these suspicious vessels
for nearly an hour. However, they were thrown into the greatest
confusion. Of the 12 destroyers in the Flotilla the TIPPERARY
was sunk, one destroyer ran West, believing British forces were
in that direction and collided bows on with a German battleship.
The destroyer lived through this collision and eventually car-
ried home twenty feet of the forecastle plating of the German
battleship. Three other British destroyers were in collision,
two of them ramming the third, the SPARROW HAWK, which they sank.
Two other British destroyers were disabled in the engagement.
The Germans lost two light cruisers, the ROSTOCK and ELBING,
one from torpedo fire and the other from collision.

Only six destroyers of the 4th Flotilla remained together.
Half an hour later they again ran into the German High Sea
Fleet. From this encounter one lone destroyer made off to the
East and later, for a third time, ran into the German Fleet,
and on this occasion was sunk.

All told, the 4th Flotilla lost 4 destroyers sunk and 3
disabled. The remaining five destroyers were scattered and took
no further part in the night engagement as a flotilla.

11:30 P.M. 13th. FLOTILLA (1 CL and 9 DD)

PLATE 38.

At 10:30 P.M. (Plate 38) the order of Flotillas from West to East was as follows:

4th, 13th, 9th, 10th and 12th Flotillas.

The strength of these Flotillas was as follows:

4th Flotilla	12	destroyers
13th	"	1 CL 9 destroyers
9th and 10th Flotillas	6	destroyers
12th Flotilla	15	"

(The 11th Flotilla originally contained 1 Light Cruiser, the CASTOR, and 15 destroyers. This flotilla was scattered by its action at 10:15.)

• At 11:30 P.M., when the enemy so suddenly opened fire on the 4th Flotilla, many shots fell among the 13th and the 9th and 10th Flotillas. The CHAMPION leading the 13th Flotilla made off at high speed to the Eastward without signal. Only two of her 9 destroyers succeeded in keeping touch with her. The seven lost destroyers attached themselves to the 9th and 10th Flotillas without the Senior Officer of these Flotillas being aware of this addition to his force. As the CHAMPION with its two destroyers continued running to the East she forced the 12th Flotilla off its course and also forced it to reduce speed in order to let the CHAMPION pass. After proceeding about six miles to the Eastward the CHAMPION turned South. She had lost 7 of her own destroyers but had detached in passing two destroyers from the 12th Flotilla, so she now had with her four destroyers.

At 2:34 A.M., as it was getting light, the CHAMPION and her four accompanying destroyers sighted enemy battleships, and fired one torpedo, sinking a German destroyer. They then proceeded North to join the Commander-in-Chief, and at 5:30 sighted four enemy destroyers, who were probably the four

destroyers returning from the wrecked LUTZOW with 1500 survivors on board. This concluded the night activities of the CHAMPION and the 13th Flotilla. The CHAMPION had succeeded in largely demoralizing the 9th, 10th, and 12th Flotillas thus opening a wide path for the passage of the German Fleet on its way to Horn Reef.

11:30 P.M. 9th and 10th Flotillas.

PLATE 38.

Originally the 9th and 10th Flotillas consisted of four destroyers each. During the night there were only six destroyers in this group. When the CHAMPION passed the bows of the 9th and 10th Flotillas as she proceeded N.E. to escape the enemy gun fire, the leader of the 9th and 10th Flotillas turned S.E. and ran S.E. for half an hour, then turned S.W.

The Admiralty Narrative states: "the object in view was to work round to the other side of the enemy ships." The other side of the enemy ships was the side upon which the enemy was not firing. The 9th and 10th Flotillas eventually got on the other side of the enemy ships, but they crossed the head of the column of German battleships at 12:25 A.M. so closely that four rear destroyers were obliged to change course to avoid collision, while the last British destroyer was rammed and sunk. Apparently the Flotillas made no attack and they certainly made no report of this contact. The 9th and 10th Flotillas proceeded Westward, and as they were short of fuel, at 5:35 A.M. they returned to their base.

When these destroyers crossed the van of the German Battle Fleet column they saw several German battleships headed S.E. This was at 12:25.

Had they reported this information to Jellicoe, he would have had ample time to intercept the Germans before they escaped South of Horn Reef. Jellicoe could have intercepted the Grand Fleet at any time up until 1:00 o'clock.

High Sea

12th FLOTILLA (15 DD) FAULKNER, Destroyer leader:

Captain A.J.B. Stirling, Flotilla Commander.

PLATES 38, 39, 40.

At 11:45 P.M. the FAULKNER leading the 12th Flotilla was crowded off her course by the CHAMPION as the latter passed running N.E. The 12th Flotilla steamed East, then North-east, reducing speed to let the CHAMPION pass. After about half an hour the Flotilla resumed its course to the South.

At 1:45 A.M. they sighted strange ships steering S.E. At 1:52 the FAULKNER reported to Jellicoe: "Enemy battleships in sight." At 2:07 A.M. the FAULKNER reported to Jellicoe: "Am attacking." Neither message was received by Jellicoe. The result of the attack delivered by Stirling and the FAULKNER was one hit on the German battleship POMMERN, and she blew up and sank at 2:10 A.M.

This was the only Flotilla that made an attack throughout the night. This was the one and only act of offense throughout the night by any British light force. This was the only force engaged with the enemy throughout the night, except Commodore Goodenough at 10:30, who made any report to the Commander-in-Chief. The two reports from this flotilla did not get through.

Why did the British light forces in such a favorable position fail to secure any result worth mentioning during the night?

The cause appears to be a simple one - the British light forces did not attack. They did not act on the offensive. They acted solely on the defense and, furthermore, defense of themselves only. They were placed behind the battleships to protect the battleships from destroyer attacks. To carry out such a mission required them to attack and to fight off any destroyers approaching. The British Light Forces failed to do this. They acted entirely on the defensive, fought only when it was necessary in protection of themselves and made no attempt to follow and

head off what appeared to them to be destroyer attacks aimed at the battleships. When one group was seen in action an adjacent group never went to its assistance. Only a few torpedoes were fired and those were usually single shots fired apparently at light cruisers. No attempt was made to get behind the enemy cruisers to ascertain what they were screening. In accepting the defensive role which was assigned to them there appears to have been an exaggerated defensive attitude in carrying out that role on the part of the British Light Forces. They passively occupied defensive positions waiting for approaching vessels to open an attack on them. In several instances light forces permitted unidentified vessels to cruise in company and to pass them without challenge or attack.

Corbett, whose book "Naval Operations" is the official history of the British Navy during the World War, gives a full account of what happened during this period, and in speaking of the failure of the British destroyers to prevent the escape of the German fleet says: "It was the power of the weapon itself that had been overrated" (meaning the torpedo).

As all basic lessons of tactics are drawn from actual battles, should we accept as the lesson to be learned from these night actions the statement of Corbett that the torpedo was overrated?

Before doing so, let us recall its effect during daylight when operating under less favorable conditions than those which the British enjoyed in their night actions. Twelve German destroyers advancing to attack in daylight fired a single salvo of 21 torpedoes at about 7:10 in the main fleet engagement. Although none of these torpedoes hit, the mere fear of them not only broke up a terrific gun attack by the whole British Battle Fleet but actually made that fleet retire from action at a time when it had the most powerful position possible for destroying an enemy fleet.

In this brief study of the Battle of Jutland we have paused only at a few of the vital tactical situations in order to consider them from the standpoint of the Principles of War. Your knowledge of the Principles of War will have indicated to you the correct and the incorrect tactics in the various important situations. While this is sufficient to answer the question why a victory at Jutland did not rest with the superior force, I will, in addition, invite your attention to two significant things which undoubtedly had an important influence on the tactics of the British forces.

First - Lack of a clear appreciation on the part of Jellicoe and Beatty of why the Grand Fleet was ordered to sea on the evening of May 30.

Second - A mis-conception on the part of Jellicoe that the Principle of Security meant Safety.

In regard to the first point, Jellicoe, after the battle, stated in his book that the Grand Fleet put to sea to carry out one of its periodic sweeps in the North Sea. The records distinctly show that it did not put to sea for this purpose. It was suddenly ordered to sea by the Admiralty in an emergency to meet and to deal with a special situation. This special situation was the belief, based on information received, that the whole German High Sea Fleet would put to sea the following morning - and it did. Both Jellicoe and Beatty were told this in their orders. Up to the moment that Beatty personally sighted the German Battle Fleet at 4:40, neither he nor Jellicoe had made a single move which indicated that either had given any consideration to the possibility of its presence at sea.

In regard to the second point, every tactical move of Jellicoe throughout the battle is stamped with the Doctrine of Safety - safety of the Battle Fleet.

More than a year and a half before the Battle, in his letter to the Admiralty (Letter No. 339/HF 0034) dated 30 October 1914, Jellicoe sets forth his Doctrine of Safety. I quote only two extracts.

"If, for instance, the enemy Battle Fleet were to turn away from an advancing fleet, I should assume that the intention was to lead us over mines and submarines, and should decline to be so drawn....."

"It is quite within the bounds of possibility that half of our Battle Fleet might be disabled by under-water attack before the guns opened fire at all."

The following is quoted from Jellicoe's book, "The Grand Fleet", page 400, and are some of his reflections on the Battle of Jutland:

"The last consideration present to my mind was the danger involved in leaving too much to chance in a fleet action, because our fleet was the one and only factor that was vital to the existence of the Empire, as indeed to the Allied cause. We had no reserve outside the Battle Fleet which could in any way take its place, should disaster befall it....."

The following extract is from the same book, page 401:

"Therein lies the whole necessity for the exercise of the greatest care when dealing with the under-water weapon."

Jellicoe's doctrine of safety for the Battle Fleet is emphasized by:

1. His written views on the subject;
2. His training of the Grand Fleet before the battle in turn-away tactics from torpedo menace;
3. His massing all destroyers closely around the battleships;
4. His assigning to destroyers a defensive role, that of protecting the battleships from torpedo attack.
5. His turn-away from the first torpedo attack which threatened;

6. His formation of the battle fleet during the night following the day action;

7. His massing destroyers astern to protect the battle fleet from torpedo attack during the night;

8. His decision at daylight, 1 June, to first seek his scattered destroyers before seeking the German fleet.

If a Commander misinterprets the Principle of Security as meaning a Doctrine of Safety, no degree of superiority in material strength can obtain victory.

BATTLE OF JUTLAND CHRONOLOGY.

Note. Abbreviations used.

- C - Corbett Official History Vol. III.
- N - British Admiralty Narrative of Jutland.
- J.P. - Jutland Papers. Official Despatches.
- S - Scheer. German High Sea Fleet in the World War.
- V.H. - Von Hase. Ziel and Jutland.
- J - Jellicoe
- B - Beatty
- BB - Battleship
- CC - Battle cruiser
- CA - Armored cruiser
- CL - Light cruiser
- DD - Destroyer

Note. There is no reference to Admiral Bacon's book, The Jutland Scandal, as this paper was written prior to the publication of that book.

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May 10	SS put to sea.	C-322
" 26	Scheer issued orders for all units to be ready.	
	C 323	
May 30	Scheer ordered Hipper to proceed to SKAGERRACK	
	while he followed with the High Sea Fleet. C323	
12 noon	Admiralty telegraphed Jellicoe and Beatty that the	
	High Sea Fleet was assembling in the JADE, that	
	it might go to sea the following morning, and	
	that 16 German SS were out. C 323: N. 6: J.P. 398	

1586
4-25

-2-

May 30

5:40 PM Admiralty sent J. and B. telegram No. 434 conveying this latest information and the following order:-
"You should concentrate to Eastward of Long Forties ready for eventualities." C 324: N. 6:
JP 398

9:30 PM Jellicoe sailed.

9:50 PM Beatty sailed.

May 31

2:00 AM Hipper sailed. N 10

2:30 AM Scheer sailed. N 10

5:30 " U 32, 70 miles east of ROSYTH, reported 2 BB, 2 CC, several DD, course South-Easterly (BCF) S 141, N 11.

6:30 " U 32 reported intercepted British raids to the effect that 2 BB and groups of DD had left SCAPA. S 141, N. 11.

6:48 " U 66, 60 miles East of KINNAIRD HEAD, reported 8 BB, CLs and DDs, course N.E. (2d/BS) S 141, N. 11.

2:10 PM GALATEA reported: "Two-funnelled ship has stopped a steamer bearing E.S.E. 8 miles, am closing."
J.P. 443. N. 10. C. 329

2:15 " Beatty changed course to N. by E. (PLATE 14)

2:20 " GALATEA reported: "Enemy in sight." J.P. 443, N. 10,
C 329

2:28 " GALATEA opened fire on 2 DD. N. 10, 11: C. 329

2:32 " Beatty turned S.S.E. J.P. 444: N. 10, 12: C. 329

2:33 " Beatty speed 22 knots. Raise steam for full speed.
J.P. 444, N. 10, C. 329

2:37 " GALATEA and PHAETON turn N.W. 2d S.D. 7 miles
astern. N 12

2:39 " GALATEA reported large amount of smoke as though from a fleet bearing E.N.E. J.P. 444, C. 331, N. 12

May 31

- 2:40 AM Evan-Thomas, 5th BS, turns S.S.E. Speed 22. He was
left over 10 miles astern. C.P. 331 J.P. 444
N. 12
- 3:00 " Beatty turns East. J.P. 445, C. 332
- 3:12 " Beatty speed 23. J.P. 446
- 3:13 " Beatty turns N.E. J.P. 446, N. 13
- 3:15 " NEW ZEALAND sights 5 CC (d. 17 miles) J.P. 446, N. 13
- 3:20 " Beatty speed 24. J.P. 447
- 3:25 " Beatty sights smoke of 5 vessels (d. 5 miles)
J.P. 447, C 332
- 3:30 " Beatty turns East. Speed 25. J.P. 447, N. 13
- 3:31 " Beatty sights Hipper distant 14 miles. N. 13, C 332
- 3:33 " Hipper turns to S.S.E. N. 14, C. 332
- 3:34 " Beatty to 2 B.C.S. Take station astern. J.P. 448,
N. 13, C. 332
- 3:36 " S.O. 2 B.C.S. C.C. 16 points to st. J.P. 449
- 3:40 " Beatty to Jellicoe: 5 CC, DD bearing N.E. course
unknown. J.P. 449
- 3:42 " 13th Flotilla 2 points before S, beam 2 miles.
J.P. 449, N. 13
- 3:45 " 9th Flotilla Take station ahead. JP 449, N.13, C 333
Beatty signals: "Form on line of bearing N.W." JP 450, N.14, C 333
- 3:45 " Beatty to Jellicoe: "Course of enemy S. 55 E" JP 450
- 3:46 " LION and PRINCESS ROYAL concentrate on leading ship.
(JP 450: N. 15)
- 3:48 " Open fire. Hipper first, then Beatty. Range was
14,500. Intense relief to Germans. C 334 & 333.
- 3:50 " Remarks: LION frequently hit by enemy. Turret
wrecked at 4:00. J.P. 450: N. 15.
- 3:51 " TIGER hit 3 times - two turrets hit. Central sight-
ing hood knocked off. N. 15.
- 3:55 " Beatty to Jellicoe: "Am engaging enemy, my position."
J.P. 450

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- 3:56 PM VON DER TANN opens on INDEFATIGABLE. N. 15.
- 4:00 " INDEFATIGABLE sank in 4 minutes. 6 hits Range 17,000.
N. 15, 16: C 336
- 4:00 " LION Q-turret wrecked. Out of column and action
about 25 minutes. N. 16; V.H. 154; C. 335.
- 4:00 " Argo turret on PRINCESS ROYAL put out till 4:16.
N. 16
- 4:00 " 5th B.S. 8 miles astern. N. 17.
Germans report they suffered hardly at all. C. 335.
- 3:55 " Beatty to CHAMPION: "Opportunity appears favorable
for attacking." J.P. 450
- 4:09 " Beatty to CHAMPION: "Attack with torpedoes."
JP 451, N. 17.
- 4:05 " Cease fire. Range 20,000.
- 4:10 " 5th B.S. opens on Hipper at 20,000 yards. Germans
reply and straddle BARHAM. N. 24 (see N. 17).
- 4:17 " Re-open fire. V H 154.
- 4:22 " DERFFLINGER opens on QUEEN MARY. VH 160
- 4:26 " QUEEN MARY sank in 4 minutes. 9 hits Range 14,500.
N. 17, VH 160, C 337
- 3:48) " 6 or 7 DD fouls range with smoke. N. 18
4:10) "
- 4:15 " CHAMPION orders 13th Flotilla, 1 mile on st. beam of
LION to attack. N. 18, C. 338-340.
- 4:21 " NOTTINGHAM passes through column of DD and cuts off
4 DD. (N. 18) 2 DD turn back, 3 continue. Result:
NESTOR and NOMAD lost. V 27 and V 29 lost. One
hit on SEYDLITZ. N. 20.
British 11 DD attack and fire 21 torpedoes. German
16 DD and 1 CL attack and fire 12 torpedoes.
- 4:43 " DD recall. J.P. 453, N. 22.
- 4:33 " LUTZOW hit and turns away. N. 20.

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4:30 FM SOUTHAMPTON to Jellicoe and Beatty: "One enemy
cruiser bearing S.E. Course N.E." J.P. 452

4:30 " NOTTINGHAM to J. and B: "2 cruisers S.S.E." J.P.452

4:33 " SOUTHAMPTON to B: "Enemy BBs S.E." J.P. 452 N. 22

4:38 " SOUTHAMPTON to J. and B: "Have sighted enemy battle
fleet bearing S.E. Course N." J.P. 452

4:38 " Beatty turns and heads for High Sea Fleet ("appari-
tion") C 340

4:40 " Beatty sees High Sea Fleet. N. 22, C 340.

4:40 " Beatty turns N. (Evan-Thomas 8 miles astern)
Signal was general. J.P. 453, N. 22, C 340

4:43 " DD recall. J.P. 453

4:45 " B. to J: "Have sighted enemy's battle fleet bearing
S.E. my position, etc." J.P. 453
Jellicoe was 66 miles N.N.W. from LION.

4:48 " B. to Evan-Thomas to turn North. LION and BARHAM
approaching within 2 miles. JP 453, C. 340.

4:05 " Scheer heads N.W. N. 23.

4:20 " " " W. N. 23.

4:35 " " " N. 15 knots

4:45 " " speed 17. Divs. Col. left to N.N.W. N. 23.

4:55 " " full speed. N. 23.

4:53 " Hipper turns North. N. 19.

4:45 " SOUTHAMPTON turns N. 13,000 yards from High Sea Fleet.
Sends 3 reports between 4:38 and 5:00. N. 23, 24.

4:53 ") BARHAM turns North. N. 24, 27. C. 343.
to) " abreast KONIG

4:57 ") " Hit 4 times shortly after turn.

4:57 " MALAYA on turn was target of whole division. Salvos
6 a min. Germans concentrate on turning point.
C. 343.

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5:05 PM) MALAYA straddled. 2 hits below water line. C. 348
to)
5:25 ") WARSPITE hit 5 or 6 times.

5th B.S. course converged with German.
5:30 " Range increased and firing broken off. C. 344, N. 344
5:30 " J. 23 miles to North. C. 345

Hood 21 m. ahead.

J. thought cruisers were being chased North C. 348

The following is a summary of Beatty's signals to Jellicoe reporting first contact and Battle Cruiser action. These comprise all Beatty's signals between 2.20 and 4.45. See J.P. & N 103.

3:40 PM 1. B. to J. Enemy CC sighted. J.P. 449
3:45 " 2. B. to J. Course of enemy S.55E J.P. 450. C. 348
3:55 " 3. B. to J. Am engaging enemy. J.P. 450
4:05 " J. ordered Hood to reinforce B. C. 348, J.P. 451.

silence for 1/2 hour.

Nothing heard of 5th B.S.
4:17 PM J. to 5th B.S. "Are you in company with SO BCF."

J.P. 451

5th B.S. to J: "Yes I am engaging enemy." J.P. 451
4:50 " J. to Admty: "Fleet action imminent." C. 349
5:33 " B. turns N.N.E. C. 350
5:40 " B. renews fire. C. 351
5:33 " BLACK PRINCE sighted by FALMOUTH. C. 351.
5:40 " " " reports enemy CC. C. 351.
5:27 " CHESTER hears guns (2d SD) C. 352.

In 5 minutes 3 guns disabled. C. 352.
5:37 " Hood turns N.W. C. 353

WIESBADEN wrecked.

Torpedo attack on HOOD. C. 353.

SHARK and ACOSPA attack CLs. C. 353.

SHARK stopped and sunk. C. 354.

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5:56 PM Beatty sights Gd Fleet 4 miles to Northward. C. 355.
B. altered course to East. C. 355.

6:01 " J. to B. "Where is the enemy battle fleet?" C. 355

6:02 " J. turns S. C. 355.

6:06 " J. sig. Course S.E.

6:06 " B. to J. "Enemy CC bearing S.E." C. 356

6:10 " J. to B. "Where is enemy battle fleet?" C. 356

6:14 " B. to J. "Have sighted enemy battle fleet bearing
S.S.W." (C. 361)

6:14 " Hipper after circling again bears N.E. C. 356
DEFENCE and WARRIOR attack WIESBADEN. C. 358, 359.

6:20 " DEFENCE sunk 4 mits 8000 yards (4 min.) C. 359
WARRIOR saved by WARSPITE. C. 359.

6:08 " J. ordered DDs (3 Flos) to take station. C. 360.

6:14 " B. "Have sighted BBs bearing S.S.W." C. 361
BARHAM saw them. C. 361.

6:15 " Condition at deployment. C. 361, N. 47

6:15 " Deployment on left flank div. Course S.E. by E.
Right or rear div. under fire. 14,000 yards. C.362
Evan-Thomas thought fleet deployed and followed B.
Then realized situation and made wide turn and
formed in rear.

6:15 " WARSPITE steering gear jammed. C. 363

6:00 " Hood sees Beatty, joins and turns up ahead.
"maze of crossing ships" C. 364

6:27 " Scheer turned E. C. 364.

6:22 " Hipper turned S'ly, C. 364.
J. slows to let B. get by. C. 365.
J. sig. turn S.S.E. by Divs. C. 365.
B. still masked van. C. 365.
Jerram circling to port to get sea room. C. 365.

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6:33 PM J. increases to 17 kts. C. 365.
6:30 " IRON DUKE got in action.
Duty CCs in orders C. 365
6:32 " B. reached station.
6:29 " INVINCIBLE sighted by DERFFLINGER. V.H. 183, C. 360
6:31 " INVINCIBLE sunk. (2 min.) 8 hits Range 9,300.
6 saved. V.H. 183, C. 366. C. 367.
6:35 " First German turn away. N. 50 C. 370
6:44 " J. changes course by Divs to S.E. J.P. 460, N 52,
C. 372
6:55 " J. changes course to South. J.P. 461, N. 52 C. 372
6:55 " Scheer turns Easterly N. 53, C: 374
6:57 " MARLBOROUGH hit by torpedo J.P. 462, N. 52, C. 373
7:00 ")
or) SOUTHAMPTON reports position and course of enemy.
7:04 ") J.P. 462, N. 52.
7:05 " J. heads S.W. by S. J.P. 462 N. 54
7:09 " SS and DD reported. J. turns away 34° to South.
N. 54, J.P. 463, C. 376
7:22 " J. turns away 22 1/2° to S.S.E. N. 58, J.P. 464,
C. 381
7:25 " J. turns away 22 1/2° to S.E. (a total turn away
of 78 3/4°) N. 58, J.P. 464, C. 381
7:17 " Second German turn away. N. 56, C: 380
7:35 " J. turns toward enemy to S. by W. J.P. 464, N. 59,
C. 382
7:42 " J. turns to S.W.
7:40 " B. to J. "Enemy bears from me N.W. by W. distant
10 to 11 miles" J.P. 465
7:45 " SOUTHAMPTON reports position enemy to C in C. JP 466
7:47 " B. to J. "Submit van of Battleships follow Battle
Cruisers. We can then cut off whole of enemy's
Battlefleet." Rec'd by J 7:54. JP 466, N. 60, C. 385

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8:00 PM J. heads West. J.P. 467

8:14 " J. to 2d B.S. (van) "2d B.S. follow our battle
cruisers". J.P. 468, (N. does not mention it)
C.383 (Logged by K.G.V as rec'd at 8:07)

8:07 " Sunset.

8:30 " J. turns S.W. J.P. 469

9:01 " J. heads South. J.P. 471, N. 70

9:14 " Scheer signals course S.S.E 1/4 E (for Horn Reef) C.391

9:17 " J. assumes night formation (Columns of Divs 1 mile
apart). J.P. 472, C. 389

9:27 " J. orders DDs to take station astern of BBs five
miles. J.P. 472, N. 70.

9:58 " Admiralty to J. "At 9 P.M. rear ship of enemy B.F.
in Lat. 56°-33 N. Long. 50°-30'E on southerly
course." Received by J. at 10:23 P.M. JP 474, N.72.

10:41 " Admiralty informed J. that the enemy was believed to
be returning to its base as its course was S.S.E
3/4 E. and speed 16 knots. JP 475, N.72, C. 402

10:15 " CASTOR and 11th Flotilla vs. 2d Scouting Group.
N. 71, N. 78, C. 391.

10:30 " 2d L.C. Squadron vs. 4th Scouting Div. N. 72, C. 392

10:40 " Commodore Goodenough (2d L.C.S.) reported engagement
to J. Received by J. at 11:38. JP 476, N. 72, C. 394

10:30 ") 4th Flotilla vs. German Fleet. N. 72, N. 73, N. 78,
to)
11:30 ") C. 394 to 400.

11:30 " 13th Flotilla and CHAMPION activities. N. 82,
C. 404, C. 410.

11:30 " 9th and 10th Flotillas N. 83, C. 404, C. 405.

June 1st

12:25 AM 9th and 10th Flotillas cross bows of German battle-
ships. One British DD rammed. No report.

N. 73, N. 83, C. 405

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31st-1st

11:45 PM) 12th Flotilla. FAULKNOR. Captain Stirling.
to)
2:10 AM) N. 84, C. 404, C. 408

June 1st

1:52 AM Stirling reports to J: "Enemy battleships in sight."
No record of receipt in log of IRON DUKE.
J.P. 478, N. 74, N. 84, C. 408

2:07 " Stirling to J: "Am attacking." No record of receipt
by any vessel. J.P. 478

2:13 " Stirling to J: "Course of enemy S.S.W." No record
of receipt except by MARKSMAN. J.P. 478

2:10 " POMMERN sunk by Stirling with 4 DD. N. 74, N. 85,
C. 409

2:39 " J. turns Battle Fleet North in column. N. 75.