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## WAR PLANS

Lecture delivered by Captain W. S. Pye, U. S. Navy

at the

Naval War College

7 January 1926

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Naval War College  
Newport, R. I.  
12 January 1926

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**Not to pass out of the hands of Officers  
of the U. S. Naval or Military Service.**

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Lecture by Captain W. S. Pye, U. S. N.

7 January, 1926

My object in appearing here today is to inform the War College Staff and student officers as to the steps which have been and are being taken by the Navy Department to insure the effectiveness of the Navy's war plans, especially the plans for the conduct of war in the Pacific.

Some of you are familiar with the Basic War Plans issued by the Department in 1924, but, on the other hand, probably there are many who have not even had an opportunity to read them, to say nothing of a chance to give them that profound study which is essential to their complete comprehension. It seems desirable, therefore, to give a short general description of these plans before entering upon a discussion of the changes now being made to increase their effectiveness.

For a general description of these war plans, I can do no better than to quote the Preface as written therein: (Slide 1).

"1. The War Plans, U. S. Navy, comprise:-

- (a) Basic War Plans
- (b) Contributory War Plans.

2. The Basic War Plans are those prepared by the Chief of Naval Operations under authority of law. They embody a concrete expression, governed by current conditions, of the 'U. S. Naval Policy', approved by the Secretary of the Navy. They conform to the approved decisions of the Army and Navy

Joint Board. They constitute the basis of all the Navy's activity in preparation for war.

3. The Contributory War Plans are those prepared by various offices, afloat and ashore, on matters under their cognizance, in support of the Basic War Plans.

4. The Basic War Plans are in two volumes:-

Volume I - Basic Readiness Plan

Volume II - Basic Operating Plans.

The Basic Readiness Plan is for the maintenance of the Navy in time of peace in a satisfactory state of readiness for war. This plan should be under execution at all times.

The Basic War Operating Plans are for the operation of the Navy in war. They are based on current conditions and most probably enemies. They should be executed only upon order of the President.

The Basic Readiness Plan.

The Basic Readiness Plan comprises:- (Slide 2)

(1) Standards of Readiness

(2) A Task Assignment for attaining and maintaining the Standards of Readiness.

The Standards of Readiness define the state of readiness which the Navy should attain during peace. They represent responsible professional judgment, based upon the requirements of national defense and on reasonable peace-time capabilities of the country. They are goals for attainment toward which the Navy should strive by all legal means.

The Task Assignment for maintaining the Standards of Readiness is an allocation of responsibility and commensurate authority among the officers having cognizance. In this task assignment the scheme of allocation of responsibility and commensurate authority as now in effect in the Navy has not been changed. This task assignment has been designed solely to guide existing administrative machinery toward a definite end. Each responsible officer is given such freedom, as regards means and methods, as now or may hereafter exist. However, those functions not heretofore definitely assigned are now given definite assignment.

The Basic Readiness Plan is an expression of our Peace Strategy. It contemplates a condition of readiness suitable for any probable war and acts as a guide toward the future attainment of such a condition. Peace strategy must, like war strategy, be based upon a study of our international relations and upon general estimates of the situation relative to probable or possible enemies. In its broad aspects our Peace Strategy changes slowly for it should change only with marked changes in our international relations.

The study of our International relations and the general estimates of the situation, indicate the nations with which war is possible; the possible theaters of war; and whether our war strategy in its initial stages in each case should be offensive or defensive.

The study of the international situation resulted in the

adoption of a fundamental Standard of Readiness, as follows:-  
(slide 3)

FUNDAMENTAL STANDARD

Standard 1: A Navy maintained in sufficient strength to engage successfully in a war with the British Empire in the Atlantic, or with Japan in the Western Pacific.

The general strategical estimates of the situation resulted in the general decision that, in its initial stages, our naval strategy in the Atlantic should be defensive and in the Pacific offensive. And, also, that our condition of readiness for the conduct of strategically defensive war in the Atlantic was in advance of our condition of readiness for a strategically offensive war in the Pacific, hence, so far as practicable, the requirements of a Pacific campaign should be given priority.

The other standards of readiness contained in the Basic Readiness Plan are :-

- (a) General Standards
- (b) Standards of Operating Readiness
- (c) Standards of Readiness of War Plans.

The General Standards (Slide 4) are :-

Standard 2: The highest attainable degree of readiness in all factors contributing to naval war strength, primarily strength for battle, secondarily strength for exercising oceanwide economic pressure.

Standard 3: A constant liaison between the Navy and the diplomatic agencies which will lead to a clear understanding

of our national policy and international relations, to an advanced recognition of strained relations, and which will make possible a far sighted disposition of naval forces for a timely concentration.

Standard 4: The attainment of the Standards of Readiness mentioned herein, by a systematic and progressive development and maintenance of the following units in the order named:

- (1) United States Fleet,
- (2) Those units of the Shore Establishment that serve and support the United States Fleet,
- (3) The Naval Transportation Service,
- (4) Those units of the Shore Establishment that serve and support the Naval Transportation Service,
- (5) The Local Defense Forces,
- (6) Those units of the Shore Establishment that serve and support the Local Defense Forces.

Standard 5: Continuous, progressive and exhaustive study, research and experiment in order to develop to the maximum the art and material of naval warfare.

It is not my intention to quote all the Standards of Readiness of the Basic Plan. Those I have quoted are general in their nature. The remaining standards are more specific. I shall merely indicate their nature.

The Standards of Operating Readiness comprise standards of:-

- (1) Organization Readiness,
- (2) Strategic Readiness,

(3) Tactical Readiness,

(4) Logistic Readiness,

The Standard of Readiness of War Plans outlines the Basic and Contributory Plans which should be prepared and indicates the standard of readiness which specifically appertain to each such contributory plan.

In the Basic Readiness Plan certain of the standards require little or no cooperation between various offices and Bureaus for their attainment but there are others which require more definite statements than are included in the wording of the standard. There are therefore certain appendices to the Readiness Plan, the principal ones of which are:-

- (1) Peace Building and Maintenance Policy and Building Program,
- (2) Shore Establishment Project,
- (3) Mobile Base Project.

The first two of these are self-explanatory. The third is a project to develop the elements of a mobile base capable of accompanying the fighting forces and of accommodating its movements to those of the fighting forces, with the least possible interruption in the continuity of its work.

These standards of readiness may be said to comprise three classes, although this distinction is not recognized in the plan. These are -

- (1) Standards which can be attained by the Fleet, shore establishments and Offices and Bureaus of the Navy Depart-



ment without exceeding normal appropriations, such as pay of the personnel, clerical force, etc.

In this class are standards of planning, organization, disposition of naval forces, and such standards of logistic readiness as the maintenance of high morale and the maintenance of stability in the assignment of personnel.

(2) Standards which are affected by the allocation of funds embraced in the budget, comprising such standards as the strength of enlisted personnel; the training of the fleet as affected by fuel and target practice allowances; the repair and alteration of vessels, etc.

(3) Standards which can be attained only by authorization of and special appropriations by Congress, comprising such standards as may require new ship construction, increase in shore establishments, etc.

The Standards of the first class are to serve as guides and aims toward which we should strive in the execution of routine duties.

The Standards of the second class are guides for estimates of requirements to be provided for in the budget. They should guide officers charged with the preparation of budget estimates, and the Budget Officer and Secretary's Council in the revision of estimates to meet the Bureau of the Budget's total fund allocated to the Navy.

The Standards of the third class are guides to those officers charged with the preparation of the building program, and plans

for naval shore establishment development where such require Congressional authorization or special appropriations.

The War Plans Division, by a few people, has been somewhat severely criticised for setting some standards which, in the opinion of many, can never be reached. There is, no doubt, some justification for this criticism unless it is thoroughly understood that these standards set a mark at which to aim. Progress is based upon imagination; even dreams. The Basic Readiness Plan represents an ideal and, as such, has proved most valuable in guiding the Department in its peace strategy. It aims to guide routine administration and planning; to secure legislation to advance the state of readiness; to govern the allocation of funds requested in the Budget, and to insure the wise expenditure of the funds appropriated.

It will readily be seen, from the above description of the classes of standards, that there will not be a uniform development toward their attainment. Certain standards approximately have been reached, whereas others may never be reached unless the appropriations in the future are more generous than in the recent past.

Each Naval District must have a Readiness Plan as well as operating plans for each war for which a Basic War Operating Plan is issued by the Department.

In this slide (slide 5) I show you an outline of the Readiness Plan of the 4th Naval District. By glancing down the left-hand column, you will see listed as appendices the many activities

of the District which must be provided for in this plan. You will notice in the other column the task assignment for preparation of the detailed plans and for their inspection and execution. I will make no attempt to discuss the District Plan. I desire merely to point out that the plans have reached a stage where the Naval Districts are actually engaged in the formulation of War Plans.

Now, let us for a moment consider what is meant by a Basic Operating Plan.

The Basic Operating Plans are for the use of the Navy in war. There should be a Basic Operating Plan for each probable war.

Each Basic Operating Plan should be such that it can be put into effect instantly upon order of the President. Thus it must be based upon current conditions. It differs from the Basic Readiness Plan in that whereas the Basic Readiness Plan is based upon current naval policy, a Basic Operating Plan deals with actual conditions, not ideals; and with specific strategical considerations rather than general strategical considerations.

When war comes the Basic Readiness Plan ceases to be effective, it is superseded by an Operating Plan for a particular war, which is based upon the conditions as they exist and deals with a specific enemy. It is true that the actual conditions represent the degree of effectiveness attained in the execution of the Basic Readiness Plan, but good or bad they must be accepted as the basis of the Operating Plan.

It is obvious, however, that we can not wait until war is

declared to formulate an operating plan, yet such plan must be based upon the existing situation. This can be accomplished only by determining the actual condition at a definite date and modifying the plan as the condition of readiness changes.

The Operating Plan then, is, or rather should be, based upon the existing condition of readiness; upon the state of effectiveness to which the standards of readiness have been accomplished. As at present many of these standards are far from being attained the formulation of an operating plan has a definite value in determining the priority which should be assigned to certain features of the Readiness Plan. Thus, if in the preparation of the Operating Plan there are found to be deficiencies in the actual state of readiness which seriously reduce the effectiveness of contemplated fleet operations, such deficiencies should be recognized and the attainment of a satisfactory condition in these respects given a high order of priority in the projects for the attainment of the desired state of readiness. But, until such deficiencies are corrected the operating plan must be based upon the unsatisfactory conditions. Unfortunately, this fact did not receive sufficient attention in the preparation of the original War Operating Plan - Orange, and the anticipated changes are primarily to correct this fault.

The Basic Operating Plan Orange was issued by the Department in February 1924. It consisted of three parts -

- (1) The Basic Strategic Plan
- (2) The Basic Plan to complete mobilization

(3) The Basic Logistic Plan.

The Basic Operating Plan Orange was the first attempt of the War Plans Division to prepare a definite operating plan in accordance with the previously mentioned policy of having an operating plan for each probable war.

During the year following its issue this plan was subjected to continuous study both in the Department and in the Fleet, with the inevitable conclusion that this first effort was susceptible of considerable improvement.

The Basic Strategic Plan is sound in its strategy but unsound in three features which are of the greatest importance. The first error was a failure to appreciate the distinction drawn above, between the desirable situation contemplated by the Basic Readiness Plan and the actual situation. In other words, the Basic Operating Plan intimated that the Department hoped to attain the standards of readiness given in the Basic Readiness Plan instead of informing subordinate agencies as to the actual state of readiness of the naval establishment.

The second error was an assumption that partial mobilization and preliminary movements could be executed at a period as great as forty days before a declaration of war.

The third error was the decision to concentrate the fleet at the Hawaiian Islands irrespective of the strategical situation and of the degree of safety of a fleet anchorage in the Hawaiian Islands and also without regarding the additional strain this would throw upon our transportation service.

The first of these faults was dimly recognized when the plan was issued but it was hoped that the formulation of Contributory plans by various agencies would crystalize opinion as to what could be done toward the mobilization of the entire fleet. This hope did not materialize and in order to make any progress with his contributory plans, the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, was forced to base his plans on the desirable theoretical conditions contained in the Basic Readiness Plan, which do not correspond to the actual conditions; also the Bureaus did not make much progress because they had insufficient data as to the vessels required in the event of mobilization and of their respective order of priority.

During the Spring of 1925, the War Plans Division became convinced that it would be necessary for the Department to provide the Commander-in-Chief and Bureaus and Offices of the Department and Naval Districts with more accurate data upon which to base properly coordinated contributory plans, and that the preparation of a detailed mobilization plan based on current conditions, was essential to meet this deficiency.

Superior authorities in organizing task commands are responsible for providing the commanders thereof with adequate and suitable means for the accomplishment of the assigned task. In this particular plan, however, the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, had been given the greatest possible amount of initiative and had been informed that all of the resources of the Navy would be eventually put at his disposal.

Power is the product of force and time. It is quite possible that there is a point of maximum relative power of the U. S. Fleet; a point after which delay to gain greater force actually decreases relative power because of the simultaneous increase in the strength of the enemy or the attainment by him of a more advantageous strategical situation.

In order that the mobilization plan to be prepared might, so far as practicable, meet the anticipated requirements of the Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet, the Chief of Naval Operations requested from him a statement indicating the minimum force with which he would be willing to proceed to the Western Pacific in the event of an Orange War.

The information requested was subsequently received by the Department as a paragraph of the Commander-in-Chief's Contributory Operating Plan for an Orange war. The force proposed is, of course, merely an estimate of the desirable strength and under war conditions would of course be subject to modifications due to the then existing strategical situation.

While this Contributory Plan of the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, is in many respects excellent, its main features are based upon an erroneous assumption that the actual condition of readiness of the Navy is that indicated by the Basic Readiness Plan as a theoretical desirable ideal. As a consequence its value lies largely in the discussion it contains rather than in the decisions made.

This condition can be remedied only after the Navy Department does its part by furnishing the Commander-in-Chief with a

mobilization plan indicating the vessels and aircraft to be mobilized at the outbreak of war with a statement of the date upon which mobilization will be completed and the time at which each vessel may be expected to reach a selected rendezvous.

With this in view the War Plans Division began the consideration of a tentative mobilization plan with the objective to provide the minimum force determined upon by the Commander-in-Chief, or its equivalent, in the minimum time.

A comprehensive study by the War Plans Division of the existing situation resulted in the conclusion that even this minimum force could not be assembled at the Hawaiian Islands in less than ninety days after mobilization was ordered. It also accentuated the opinion that an assumption that mobilization would proceed for many days before a declaration of war, was an error.

The first decision in the revision of the plan was to base everything upon M day, namely: the day upon which mobilization is ordered. There may, and probably will, be certain preparatory measures which can be undertaken before M day, but as the initiation of any of these might lead to a declaration of war, such initiation should be directed only by the Department. In this new plan the preparatory measures will be listed, but they will be executed only as directed by the Department.

The decision that the Commander-in-Chief's minimum force could not be assembled in less than ninety days led to a further consideration of the possibility of moving to the westward earlier with a smaller force if conditions were favorable or if the



strategical situation forced the Department to order such movement.

It was apparent that the major portion of the active fleet could, if desired, be concentrated in the Hawaiian Islands, by M plus 30; that this force could be considerably augmented by fighting ships and a moderate sized Expeditionary Force of Army and Marines by M plus 60; but that a large part of the total Army Expeditionary Force and much of the fleet's logistic support could not be provided until M plus 90.

This conclusion appeared to offer three options to the Commander-in-Chief, namely:

(1) To sail from the Hawaiian Islands at M plus 30 days with only the major portion of the active fleet;

(2) To sail at M plus 60 days with an augmented fleet and a moderate sized Expeditionary Force of about 50,000 Marines and Army troops;

(3) To sail at M plus 90 days with a naval force approximately equal to the Commander-in-Chief's estimated minimum force, plus the Marine Expeditionary Force and an Army Expeditionary Force, totaling about 90,000 troops.

It is apparent that any of these actions are possibilities and consequently it was decided that the force to be made available at each thirty day interval of time should be accompanied by the proper logistic elements to move the force to the Philippines and to maintain it there a reasonable time.

In view of the initiative allowed the Commander-in-Chief in

the initiation of the movement across the Pacific and of the actual unsatisfactory situation in the Hawaiian Islands with regard to a fleet base, it was decided to authorize the Commander-in-Chief to concentrate the fleet at his discretion, the dates given in the plan for the completion of mobilization of units to indicate the time at which the unit would be ready to sail from its mobilization base. So far as possible these dates were to be made such as to insure concentration of the elements of the fleet in increments at successive periods of thirty days.

In the previous plan a general order of priority for mobilizing had been stated:

- (1) U. S. Fleet
- (2) Naval Transportation Service.

The further study indicated that such priority was unsound, for many vessels which will join the U. S. Fleet cannot be mobilized within ninety days. To give such ships priority over merchant ships required for the logistic support of the Commander-in-Chief's minimum force was, therefore, an error.

The study of the practical conditions governing mobilization indicated the necessity for general priority groups and, for further classification, subdivision of these into priority sub-groups.

A decision was made to divide the naval forces and additional vessels to be obtained from other Government departments and the Merchant Marine into five general priority groups as follows:  
(slide 6)

Group 1 - Vessels to compose Asiatic Fleet upon mobilization, and vessels required to raise Panama Canal Defense to peace strength.

Group 2 - Vessels assigned to U.S. Fleet and Naval Transportation Service to be available for concentration at Hawaiian Islands by M plus 30.

Group 3 - Vessels assigned to U.S. Fleet and Naval Transportation Service to be available for concentration at Hawaiian Islands by M plus 60.

Group 4 - Vessels assigned to U.S. Fleet and Naval Transportation Service to be available for concentration at Hawaiian Islands by M plus 90.

Group 5 - Vessels allocated for later assignment to U.S. Fleet or Naval Transportation Service, or assigned to special service.

For the purpose of further classification, differentiation of personnel policy and assignment of detailed priority, it was found desirable to divide each of these priority groups into five parts as follows:-

A = Naval vessels in full commission.

B = Naval vessels not in full commission.

C = Vessels of other Government Departments to be used by Navy.

D = Vessels of the Merchant service to be manned by the Navy.

E = Vessels of the Merchant service to be chartered

by the Navy.

Having determined upon the classification to be employed, an examination of the existing situation was made to determine what fighting vessels could be expected to comprise sub-groups A2 and B2, and after such determination to decide upon the logistic requirements of such force to give it freedom of movement to the Far East should such action be determined upon by the Commander-in-Chief. A similar decision was required to determine the vessels to be assigned to Group 3 and Group 4.

The tentative decision as to the combatant units, auxiliaries and required logistic support which can be made available in the Hawaiian Islands by M plus 30, M plus 60, and M plus 90, respectively, is indicated in the diagram (Slide 7).

It will be noted that after M plus 30, the increase in the available combatant strength is small in comparison to the additional strength in troops and logistic support. As troop transports and additional auxiliaries are obtained mostly from the merchant marine, it will be seen that it will be difficult to reduce this period no matter to what state of readiness the Navy itself may attain.

The total number of vessels comprised in these three priority groups is eight hundred and nineteen. Is it strange that at least ninety days will be required before such a force can be concentrated at the Hawaiian Islands?

After the preliminary decision by the War Plans Division as to the composition of each of these priority groups was made,

the results were embodied in a tentative mobilization plan in which all the vessels are listed. This plan is really a tabulation (Slide 8) of which the diagram shows a sample sheet.

You will notice that it contains the following information -

- (1) The assignment (at top)
- (2) The identification number of the vessel, or for merchant vessels the International Signal Letters.
- (3) The type, organization unit and name of the vessel.
- (4) Priority sub-group.
- (5) Mobilization base.
- (6) Days after M day by which vessel is to be ready to sail from its mobilization base.

While the above described mobilization plan is adequate as an assignment of priority there are some vessels of the Merchant Marine to be converted to aircraft tenders, distilling ships, etc., which have such importance that the assignment to them of a high priority for conversion is essential. This conversion not only requires work after mobilization is ordered but it requires the preparation of conversion plans during peace.

It was considered necessary, therefore, in order to insure the concentration of planning effort, to issue an additional plan showing the priority for conversion of merchant ships. A sheet of this plan is indicated by the diagram (Slide 9).

It will be noted that for some ships dates of completion are given for both coasts. This is because the vessels in question are now engaged in operation between the east and west coast

and it is impossible to decide now on which coast such conversion should be accomplished. It may, however, be stated as a general rule that if practicable conversion should be accomplished on the east coast to avoid undue strain on the ship-building and industrial plants of the Pacific Coast.

In the tentative mobilization plan, as so far completed, only vessels and aircraft to be employed in the theater of war or on special service connected with the defense of our outlying possessions, have been considered.

In order to make the mobilization plans complete there must be similar plans for the mobilization of naval district craft and of shore activities.

The allocation of naval district craft has been made and some features of the shore establishment mobilization have been tentatively provided for. These plans, however, will require some time to complete. The War Plans Division feels, however, that the most important plan is the one now tentatively completed.

In speaking of the Basic Readiness Plan it was stated that it represented a theoretical desirable condition. The present tentative ship mobilization plan likewise represents a theoretical condition until the Bureau of Navigation and the Material Bureaus state that from their respective points of view, it is practicable of execution. In order to obtain the point of view of these Bureaus, the Director, Material Division, and the Director, Navy Yard Division, this tentative plan has been submitted to them for an expression of opinion as to the practicability of meeting the dates

assigned.

The Bureau of Navigation has expressed itself as of the opinion that the personnel requirements can be met, and has prepared a personnel plan with that in view. Tomorrow Lieutenant-Commander Frost will talk to you about this plan, which in the opinion of the War Plans Division is the greatest step in advance ever made from the personnel point of view.

The Material Bureaus have not yet made a report on the material features of the plan, but this report is expected before the end of this month.

Naturally the final plan will have to be such that it can be met by the Material Bureaus and Navy Yard Division. It is believed that the tentative plan can be carried out, but if not, the necessary changes will be made.

When the mobilization plan is issued the Commander-in-Chief and the Bureaus and Offices of the Navy Department will have something tangible upon which to base their respective Contributory plans.

The War Plans Division is convinced that this mobilization plan will insure more effective operating plans and a more efficient mobilization should we ever require it.

There is one feature in which the War College can be of material assistance to the Commander-in-Chief and War Plans Division; this is in playing a strategic maneuver with the forces limited to those provided by the mobilization plan. It is hoped that this may be done.

GENERAL STANDARDS.

Standard 2. The highest attainable degree of readiness in all factors contributing to naval war strength, primarily strength for battle, secondarily strength for exercising oceanwide economic pressure.

Standard 3. A constant liaison between the navy and the diplomatic agencies which will lead to a clear understanding of our national policy and international relations, to an advanced recognition of strained relations, and which will make possible a far-sighted disposition of naval forces for a timely concentration.

Standard 4. The attainment of the standards of Readiness mentioned herein, by a systematic and progressive development and maintenance of the following units in the order named -

- (1) United States Fleet.
- (2) Those units of the Shore Establishment that serve and support the United States Fleet.
- (3) The Naval Transportation Service.
- (4) Those units of the Shore Establishment that serve and support the Naval Transportation Service.
- (5) The Local Defense Forces.
- (6) Those units of the Shore Establishment that serve and support the Local Defense Forces.

Standard 5. Continuous, progressive and exhaustive study, research and experiment in order to develop to the maximum the art and material of naval warfare.



ASSIGNMENT OF SUB-GROUP PRIORITIES

A= Naval vessels in full commission.  
 E= Naval vessels not in full commission.  
 C= Vessels of other government departments, to be used by Navy.  
 D= Vessels of Merchant Marine to be manned by Navy.  
 E= Vessels of Merchant Marine to be chartered by Navy.

Vessels - includes aircraft.

M day = day mobilization is ordered.

II

A1 1	B1 2	C1 3	D1 4	E1 5	
A2 6	B2 7	C2 8	D2 9	E2 10	Vessels to compose Asiatic Fleet upon mobilization, and vessels required to raise Panama Canal defense to peace strength.
A3 11	B3 12	C3 13	D3 14	E3 15	Vessels assigned to U.S. Fleet and Naval Transportation Service to be available for concentration at Hawaiian Islands by M plus 30.
A4 16	B4 17	C4 18	D4 19	E4 20	Vessels assigned to U.S. Fleet and Naval Transportation Service to be available for concentration at Hawaiian Islands by M plus 60.
A5 21	B5 22	C5 23	D5 24	E5 25	Vessels assigned to U.S. Fleet and Naval Transportation Service to be available for concentration at Hawaiian Islands by M plus 90.
					Vessels allocated for later assignment to U.S. Fleet or Naval Transportation Service, or assigned to special service.

FOURTH NAVAL DISTRICT  
 CONTRIBUTORY READINESS PLANS  
 R-5. - R-6.

PORTIONS OF THIS PLAN	TASK ASSIGNMENT			
	PREPARATION	INSPECTION	EXECUTION	STATE OF EXECUTION
COMMANDANT	COMMANDANT	DIRECTOR NAVAL DISTRS. DIV.	COMMANDANT	DIRECTOR NAVAL DISTRS. DIV.
CHIEF OF STAFF	COMMANDANT	DIRECTOR NAVY YARD DIV.	CHIEF OF STAFF	COMMANDANT
CHIEF OF STAFF	COMMANDANT	CHIEF OF STAFF	CHIEF OF STAFF	COMMANDANT
AIDE OPERATIONS	CHIEF OF STAFF	AIDE OPERATIONS	AIDE OPERATIONS	CHIEF OF STAFF
DEPT. COM. SUPT.	AIDE OPERATIONS	AIDE OPERATIONS	AIDE OPERATIONS	CHIEF OF STAFF
DIR. INTEL. OFF.	AIDE OPERATIONS	AIDE OPERATIONS	AIDE OPERATIONS	CHIEF OF STAFF
PERSONNEL OFF.	AIDE ADMIN.	AIDE ADMIN.	AIDE ADMIN.	CHIEF OF STAFF
MATERIAL OFF.	AIDE ADMIN.	AIDE ADMIN.	AIDE ADMIN.	CHIEF OF STAFF
ENG. WORKS OFF.	AIDE ADMIN.	AIDE ADMIN.	AIDE ADMIN.	CHIEF OF STAFF
COMPLY OFFICER	AIDE ADMIN.	AIDE ADMIN.	AIDE ADMIN.	CHIEF OF STAFF
DEPT. OFFICER	AIDE ADMIN.	AIDE ADMIN.	AIDE ADMIN.	CHIEF OF STAFF
DEPT. OFFICER	AIDE ADMIN.	AIDE ADMIN.	AIDE ADMIN.	CHIEF OF STAFF
DEPT. DIRECTOR	CHIEF OF STAFF	CHIEF OF STAFF	PORT DIRECTOR	CHIEF OF STAFF
COM. DEMOS. OFF.	AIDE ADMIN.	AIDE ADMIN.	AIDE ADMIN.	CHIEF OF STAFF
CHIEF OF STAFF	COMMANDANT	COMMANDANT	CHIEF OF STAFF	COMMANDANT
COMDT. NAVY YARD	COMMANDANT	COMMANDANT	COMDT. NAVY YARD	COMMANDANT
GOVERNOR	COMMANDANT	COMMANDANT	GOVERNOR	COMMANDANT
INSPR. IN-CHARGE	COMMANDANT	COMMANDANT	INSPR. IN-CHARGE	COMMANDANT
COMDG. OFFICER	COMMANDANT	COMMANDANT	COMDG. OFFICER	COMMANDANT
COMDG. OFFICER	COMMANDANT	COMMANDANT	COMDG. OFFICER	COMMANDANT
COMDG. OFFICER	COMMANDANT	COMMANDANT	COMDG. OFFICER	COMMANDANT
COMDG. OFFICER	COMMANDANT	COMMANDANT	COMDG. OFFICER	COMMANDANT
COMDG. OFFICER	COMMANDANT	COMMANDANT	COMDG. OFFICER	COMMANDANT
COMDG. OFFICER	COMMANDANT	COMMANDANT	COMDG. OFFICER	COMMANDANT
COMDG. OFFICER	COMMANDANT	COMMANDANT	COMDG. OFFICER	COMMANDANT
CHIEF OF STAFF	COMMANDANT	COMMANDANT	COMDG. OFFICER	COMMANDANT
COMDG. OFFICER	CHIEF OF STAFF	CHIEF OF STAFF	COMDG. OFFICER	CHIEF OF STAFF

PRIORITY GROUP 2			PRIORITY GROUP 3			PRIORITY GROUP 4		
Combat-ant Ships	Tenders and Auxiliaries	Trans-ports	Combat-ant Ships	Tenders and Auxiliaries	Trans-ports	Combat-ant Ships	Tenders and Auxiliaries	Trans-ports
12-BB	4-AD		3-BB	4-AD	26-XAP	11-PE	1-AS	6-XAP
1-OCA	2-AS		2-OCM	2-AS	(Troop A)	63-VF	2-AF	(Marine) Troop
10-CL	1-AV		115-DD	2-AR	40-XAP	21-VS	3-AC	22-XAP
1-OCV	1-AR		4-DM	2-AF	(Animal-A)	90-VT	1-AO	(Army troop)
2-OCM	1-AF	None	24-SS	1-AC	15-XAP		1-AT	20-XAP
77-DD	5-AO		1-OSF	9-AO	(Troop M)		2-AG	(Army ani-)
8-DM	1-AE		16-VF	1-AE			60-XAO	
33-SS	2-AK		6-VO	3-AK			10-XAC	
10-OSS	1-AH		81-VS	15-AP			8-XAF	
67-VF	8-AT			1-AH			9-XAV	
44-VO	16-AM			12-AT			7-XAG	
18-VS	1-AG			22-AM			2-XAH	
IV 36-VT	20-XAO			1-AG			20-XAK	
	3-XAV			50-XAO			2-XAD	
				10-XAC			1-XAS	
				5-XAV			3-XAM	
				2-XAG			3-XAR	
				2-XAH			6-XAE	
				25-XAK				

PREFACE TO NAVY WAR PLANS.

1. The War Plans, U. S. Navy, comprise;-

(a) Basic War Plans.

(b) Contributory War Plans.

2. The Basic War Plans are those prepared by the Chief of Naval Operations under authority of law. They embody a concrete expression governed by current conditions, of the U. S. Naval policy, approved by the Secretary of the Navy. They conform to the approved decisions of the Army and Navy Joint Board. They constitute the basis of all the Navy's activity in preparation for war.

3. The Contributory War Plans are those prepared by various offices, afloat and ashore, on matters under their cognizance, in support of the Basic War Plans.

4. The Basic War Plans are in two volumes -

Volume I - Basic Readiness Plan.

Volume II - Basic War Operating Plans.

The Basic Readiness Plan is for the maintenance of the Navy in time of peace in a satisfactory state of readiness for war. This plan should be under execution at all times.

The Basic War Operating Plans are for the operation of the Navy in war. They are based on current conditions and most probable enemies. They should be executed only upon order of the President.

PREFACE TO VOLUME 1.

1. The Basic Readiness Plan is for the maintenance of the Navy in time of peace in a satisfactory state of readiness for war. It comprises;-

(a) Standards of Readiness.

(b) A Task Assignment for attaining and maintaining the Standards of Readiness.

2. The Standards of Readiness define the state of readiness which the Navy should attain in peace. They represent responsible professional judgment, based on the requirements of national defense and on reasonable peace time capabilities of the country. They are goals for attainment toward which the Navy should strive by all legal means.

3. The Task Assignment for attaining and maintaining the Standards of Readiness is an allocation of responsibility and commensurate authority among the offices having cognizance. In this task assignment the scheme of allocation of authority and responsibility, as now in effect in the Navy, has not been changed. This task assignment has been designed solely to guide existing administrative machinery toward a definite end. Each responsible officer is given such freedom of action, as regards means and methods, as now or may hereafter exist. However, those functions not heretofore definitely assigned are now given definite assignment.

FUNDAMENTAL STANDARD

Standard 1. A Navy maintained in sufficient strength to engage successfully in a war with the British Empire in the Atlantic, or with Japan in the Western Pacific.

UNITED STATES FLEET

BATTLE FLEET

MOBILIZATION PLAN SHEET

Identifica- tion number or Int. sig- nal letters	Type - Organiza- tion unit - Name	Priority Sub-group	Mobilization Base	Days af- ter M day to be ready to sail
BB 44	<u>BB</u> California (flag)	A-2	San Francisco	M plus 10
BB 48	<u>Div. Five</u> West Virginia (F)	"	"	"
45	Colorado	"	"	"
46	Maryland	"	"	"
BB 40	<u>Div. Four</u> New Mexico (F)	"	"	"
43	Tennessee	"	"	"
42	Idaho	"	"	"
41	Mississippi	"	"	"
BB 38	<u>Div. Three</u> Pennsylvania (F)	"	"	"
39	Arizona	"	"	"
36	Nevada	"	"	"
37	Oklahoma	"	"	"
CA 11	<u>OCA</u> <u>Fleet Flag</u> Seattle	"	"	"

Name and Type	Priority Group	Conversion to be completed days after M day Atlantic Coast.		Conversion to be completed days after M day Pacific Coast.	Minimum number to be converted on Atlantic Coast.	Minimum number to be converted on Pacific Coast.	Additional Classification.
XAV (10)	Group D				3	3	
Manulani	Sub-G.D2			15			
Manukai	Do.			15			
Edgar F. Luckenbach	1-Sub-G.D2			15			
Horace Luckenbach	3-Sub-G.D3	20					
Lena Luckenbach		20					
Robert Luckenbach		20					
Californian	1-Sub-G.D3	25	or	45			
Missourian	1-Sub-C.D4	55	or	75			
Mexican	1-Sub-G.D3	25	or	45			
Texan	1-Sub-C.D4	55	or	75			
XAG (E) (2)	D				2		
Agwihavre	Sub-G.D3	25					
Agwimex	Do.	25					
XAP (Marine) (15)	D				7	2	
Manoa	Sub-G.D3			45			
Mount Maunaivile	Do.			45			
Dorothy Luckenbach	Do.	25	or	45			
Harry Luckenbach	Do.	25	or	45			
J. L. Luckenbach	Do.	25	or	45			
Julia Luckenbach	Do.	25	or	45			
Lillian Luckenbach	Do.	25	or	45			
Mount Clay	1-Sub-G.D3	1-25					
Mount Clinton	2-Sub-G.D4	2-45					
Republic							
American Legion	1-Sub-G.D3	1-25					
Southern Cross	3-Sub-G.D4	3-45					
Western World							
Pan America							
Venezuela	Sub-G.D4	55	or	75			

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