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THE CIVIL WAR.

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1. INTRODUCTION

In attempting to review in the short period available so comprehensive a subject as the Civil War, many details must be omitted and the more important operations must be presented from the broad viewpoint of their effect on the objectives of the opposing forces and governments as a whole. Bearing this in mind, we will endeavor to present as concisely as practicable the principal strategic plans and operations and their effect on the final outcome of the war; prefaced by a brief consideration of the causes of the war, a comparative study of such vital factors as political objectives and economic and military resources, and a short description of the theater of war.

2. CAUSES

The principal causes of the Civil War fall under two general heads; namely, political and economic.

The most important political factor was based on a conflict in interpretation of the Constitution of the United States which conflict had existed almost from the very date of its adoption. In the South, it was contended that the Union was a collection of small nations, each having the right to secede at any time if it chose to do so. This belief had not always been confined to the South, but, at the time of the Civil War, generally speaking, in the North, the Union was considered as sovereign; each State being a part thereof and without the right to secede.

It is unnecessary to enlarge on this subject in this review other than to give one illustration of the differences in belief. Ropes, in "The Story of the Civil War", illustrates what he means in his discussion of this subject by calling attention to the fact that the State held a totally different place in the political thought of the South from that which occupied in the North. Quoting: "Mr. Trescot, Assistant Secretary of State in Mr. Buchanan's administration, in his account of the discussions in the Cabinet in the autumn of 1860, gives a forcible picture of the fundamental difference when he is describing the position of his immediate chief, General Cass, Secretary of State: 'Not recognizing any right in a State to secede except as a revolutionary measure, he would have resisted the attempt at the commencement, and, as the sworn officer of the United States, he would have done his utmost to preserve its integrity! I speak to Cobb, 'he would say', and he tells me he is a Georgian; to Floyd, and he tells me he is a Virginian; to you, and you tell me you are a Carolinian. I am not a Michigander; I am a citizen of the United States' '.

The economic factors which contributed to the causes of the war were too numerous and too complicated to be considered in detail in this presentation. Perhaps, the principal ones can best be summed up by quoting from Henderson's "Stonewall Jackson": "The South was purely agricultural; the most prosperous part of the North was purely industrial. x x x Divergent interests demanded different fiscal treatment. The cotton and tobacco of the South, monopolising the markets of the world, asked

for free trade. The manufacturers of New England, struggling against foreign competition, were strong protectionists, and they were powerful enough to enforce their will in the shape of an oppressive tariff. Thus the planters of Virginia paid high prices in order that mills might flourish in Connecticut; and the sovereign states of the South, to their own detriment, were compelled to contribute to the abundance of the wealthier North. The interests of labor were not less conflicting. The competition between free and forced labor, side by side on the same continent, was bound in itself, sooner or later, to breed dissention; and if it had not yet reached an acute stage it had at least created a certain degree of bitter feeling."

Then, too, the question of slavery bore an important part in the controversy. In the North, the Abolitionists were clamoring to free the slaves. In the South, it was the belief of many that the victory of the Republican Party and the election of Lincoln in 1860 meant the eventual freeing of the slaves, with its resultant damaging effect on the economic and social life of the South, as well as abrogation of States' Rights so jealously regarded at that time by all Southerners. With respect to this, Wilson, in his "Division and Reunion", states: "The South had avowedly staked everything, even her allegiance to the Union, upon this election. The triumph of Mr. Lincoln, was, in her eyes, nothing less than the establishment in power of a party bent upon the destruction of the southern system and

the defeat of southern interests, even to the point of countenancing and assisting servile insurrection." On the other hand, quoting from the same source: "The Republicans wished, and meant, to check the extension of slavery; but no one of influence in their counsels dreamed of interfering with its existence in the States."

3. SECESSION

South Carolina, whose statesmen had for a long time been threatening secession, was the first State to pass an ordinance of secession. This happened on December 20, 1860. President Buchanan did not believe that a State had the right to secede; nor yet did he believe that the Government had the right to coerce a State; therefore, South Carolina was not opposed. By February 1, 1861, Mississippi, Florida, Alabama, Georgia and Louisiana had seceded without opposition. The seceded States took possession of the public property within their borders, such as mints, arsenals, and forts, with the exception of three or four forts along the seacoast, among which was Fort Sumter, in the harbor of Charleston, South Carolina.

In February, 1861, representatives of the seceded states met at Montgomery, Alabama, and organized a provisional government - "The Confederate States of America" - and elected Jefferson Davis as President. Texas seceded in February.

On March 4, 1861, Lincoln was inaugurated President of the United States. The new administration took no immediate steps

to reduce the seceded states. The Government had no means at hand with which to coerce them. United States marshals and other civil officers refused and were powerless to act. The Army numbered only about 16,000 and was, for the most part, in the Far West. The Navy was small. In the States remaining in the Union public opinion concerning the right of a State to secede and the right of the Government to coerce a seceding State had not as yet crystalized into such shape as to warrant the President taking the extreme step of calling out the militia.

4. FORT SUMTER

In the meantime, the small garrison at Fort Sumter was besieged by an armed Confederate force under General Beauregard and its provisions were running low. Confederate commissioners spent several weeks at Washington negotiating for the delivery of the fort to the Confederate States and, about April 1st, they received from the President an agreement "that he would not change the military status at Charleston without giving notice". A week later, Mr. Lincoln notified the Confederate authorities at Charleston that an attempt would be made "to supply Fort Sumter with provisions only". Thereupon, "Beauregard was instructed to demand the evacuation of Sumter, and in case of refusal, to reduce it."

This demand was made on April 11th and was promptly refused. At 4.30 a.m., April 12th, the first shot was fired by the Confederates -- the first shot of the Civil War. At noon, April

14th, the fort surrendered and was evacuated.

5. CALL FOR TROOPS

The next day President Lincoln issued a proclamation calling out 75,000 militia, and stating that their first service would "probably be to repossess the forts, places, and property which have been seized from the Union". The term of service was for three months only. All of the Free States responded enthusiastically but the governors of the Slave States which were still in the Union refused. These States immediately took up the question of secession, with the result that Virginia, Tennessee, North Carolina and Arkansas joined the Confederacy. In the other border States, desperate struggles later took place between Secession and Union. Eventually, however, Kentucky, Missouri, and Maryland remained in the Union, and the western part of Virginia separated from that State and formed a new State -- West Virginia -- a Union State. Portions of Kentucky and Missouri, however, were for some time represented in the Confederate Congress and large contingents from Maryland, Kentucky and Missouri joined the Confederate Army.

During April, 1861, the Confederate States called into their service 35,000 militia whose term of service was one year.

6. COMPARISON OF OPPOSING STRENGTHS

Although from a political viewpoint, the war which was now to begin was a civil war, from a purely military point of view it was a war between two hostile nations; and that fact must

be borne in mind in order to arrive at a proper appreciation of the conflict. With that point of view in mind, let us now compare the strength of these two warring nations.

(a) Political Factors.

The Federal Government was an organized, going concern. But, the Confederacy had to set up the machinery of government. It was a loose federation with the independence and sovereignty of its States recognized and slavery permitted and protected.

The South believed that the struggle would be a short one. It based this belief on two premises: first, that in the North public opinion relative to the right of secession was divided and that war cannot be successfully waged by a democratic government in the absence of popular support; second, that a cotton famine in Europe would cause France and Great Britain to intervene. This conviction regarding foreign intervention had a marked influence on Confederate strategy.

That the North also believed that the war would be short is indicated by the fact that Lincoln first called for troops for only three months service as well as by other evidence. The political aim of the North was the preservation of the Union, by peaceful methods if possible; by force, if necessary. In his inaugural address in 1861, Lincoln said: "To the extent of my ability I shall take care x x x that the laws of the Union be faithfully executed in all the States. x x x I trust this will not be regarded as a menace, but only as the declared purpose of the Union that it will constitutionally defend and

maintain itself x x x The power confided to me will be used to hold, occupy, and possess the property and places belonging to the Government, and to collect the duties and imposts. x x x there needs to be no bloodshed or violence; and there shall be none unless it be forced upon the national authority. x x x In your hands my dissatisfied/fellow-countrymen and not in mine, is the momentous issue of the Civil War. The government will not assail you; you have no conflict without being yourselves aggressive."

From a military viewpoint, this statement of policy was a sound one. It was addressed primarily to the Northern and border States and was a very temperate statement. While it prepared the North to view the impending conflict as inevitable, it placed the blame for beginning it squarely upon the seceding States, and, it strengthened the Union cause in the border States which as yet had not seceded.

The political objectives may be summed up as follows: The Federal Government, to preserve the Union; the Confederate Government, to break away from the Union and form a separate nation.

(b) Economic Factors

The population of the twenty-two States in the North was about 22,000,000; that of the eleven States forming the Confederacy, about 9,000,000 of whom about 3,500,000 were slaves. The slaves were an economic asset as they were used to raise the crops on which the South subsisted during the war.

On the other hand, they were a political source of weakness because of the growing world opinion against slavery.

In material prosperity, manufacturing, and accumulated capital, the North had a great advantage; also, its railroad systems were greatly superior to those of the South.

In agriculture, the South was the producer of cotton and tobacco, but was largely dependent upon a foreign market which, when closed, was bound to bring about grave financial consequences.

In shipping, merchant marine, and ship-building, the North had a great advantage.

Whereas the North had an established financial system, the Confederate States had to establish one.

The South had plenty of unskilled labor but lacked skilled labor, while the North had ample skilled labor with which to operate its factories.

(c) Psychologic Factors

Morale was high and may be said to have been practically equal. The capture of Fort Sumter had solidified opinion in the North to preserve the Union. Lincoln's call for volunteers had been met with enthusiasm and the Northern people as a whole were ready for war and for war to the bitter end. In the South, enthusiasm was equally great and the Southern people as a whole were equally ready for war to protect their rights. Military training and experience were very limited in both the North and the South, there being a comparatively small number of officers

and men who were in the Regular Army or the Navy or who had seen war service in those forces or in the volunteers in the Mexican War. Racial characteristics in the North and in the South were very similar; there being some differences due to the fact that the proportion of native-born white persons was greater in the South than in the North to which section immigrants from several European countries had come for labor in the industrial areas.

(d) Armed Forces

At the beginning of the war, the United States Army was small and greatly scattered, and the Navy was small. However, those forces were capable of expansion. The Army, especially, was greatly handicapped by the resignation of so many able officers who joined the Confederate forces, thus requiring the placing of untried commanders in important positions. This was further aggravated by the appointment of political leaders, such as Banks, Butler and Fremont, as general officers.

On the other hand, the Confederacy had to form an army and a Navy. Former officers of the United States Army and Navy made an excellent nucleus for the development of these forces. This is particularly true when we consider such leaders as Lee, Jackson, Johnston and others of similar character, experience, and training.

The North had all the advantage when considering the reserves of man-power which might be made available for military service. This is forcibly brought out by the fact that the Federal Government employed during the war 2,375,000 men, whereas

the total white male population of all ages in the South numbered less than 2,800,000 of whom probably about 900,000 were enrolled during the war. Although the South had available some 3,500,000 slaves, they were not used as troops, but were extensively used in building fortifications and for other similar labor.

The disparity in available man-power was offset in some degree by the fact that the South possessed a more military population than the North. There were several excellent military academies in the South and the people, almost wholly occupied in agricultural pursuits, were accustomed to life in the open, to horses, to hunting and fishing, to exposure, and to unusual physical exertion. Such conditions of life naturally foster a military spirit.

At the outset of the war the United States had over 300,000 muskets and rifles, but one-third of these were in arsenals in the South and were captured by the Confederates. The North had a great advantage in manufacturing facilities; hence, was less dependent than the South on importations of war-making supplies, although both the North and the South were largely dependent on Europe for arms and ammunition. In some instances, the Confederates were dependent on such arms, ammunition, uniforms, equipment and food as they were able to capture from the Federal forces.

7. THE THEATER OF OPERATIONS

The theater of operations largely coincided with the terri-

tory of the Confederacy except for operations which were undertaken in Maryland, Pennsylvania, West Virginia, Kentucky, and Missouri. The outstanding characteristics of the theater were as follows:

(a) The long coast line from the Chesapeake to the Mexican border, some 3,500 miles, was an element of weakness to the Confederacy as the South had no fleet at the beginning of the war and could not spare sufficient army forces to protect it. The South was dependent on sea-borne traffic for supplies, and its ports were available for receipt of such supplies, but the sea afforded numerous avenues of approach for invading forces.

(b) Practically parallel to the eastern coastline and rising gradually from it to their crests many miles inland, the Alleghany Mountains divided the Confederacy into two theaters - the Eastern and the Western Theaters.

(c) In the Eastern Theater, the Alleghanies, particularly that part contained in the Shenandoah Valley, with numerous passes traversed by mountain roads and by a few railroads, were destined to play an important part in the strategy of the operations. The Potomac River likewise was destined to be of great importance, forming an obstacle to invasion of the North or of the South and providing means of movement for the numerous war-craft and transports of the Federal forces.

(d) In the Eastern Theater were the two most important cities, in many respects, of the contending nations. Washington, the capital of the Federal Government, is on the Potomac and, thus,

was on the boundary between the hostile nations. Richmond, the capital of the Confederacy, is on the James. It was afforded some protection from attack from the north and the east by rivers, small streams, and swamps, but was open to attack from the south by water. Between these two cities which are about one hundred miles apart, there is a succession of rivers and small streams, flowing generally in an easterly direction, many of which are fordable at but few points. These streams afforded obstacles to operations in the area between the two capitals, but most of them were too shallow for navigation.

(e) In the Western Theater, the border was entirely open and, thus afforded and facilitated offensive action on the part of whichever side might take the offensive. Within this theater, the Mississippi River formed a considerable obstacle to movement eastward or westward, and separated three states from the rest of the Confederacy. In general, the land bordering the river is low and flat, except at Columbus, Kentucky; Memphis, Tennessee; Vicksburg, and Natchez, Mississippi, where there are high bluffs close to the river. These bluffs were of importance because, if occupied by armed forces, control of traffic on the river was practically assured.

The Mississippi and its great tributaries, the Missouri and the Ohio, and the Alleghany, the Monongahela, the Cumberland and the Tennessee, afforded important means of traffic, particularly during high water. Other rivers within the Confederacy which carried considerable traffic were the White, the Yazoo and the

Red. In the area of military operations, all these rivers formed obstacles to military movements. At the outbreak of the war a large fleet of river boats was thrown out of employment and as most of these vessels were in Northern cities, they became available for moving Federal troops and were effectively used for this purpose.

(f) Paved highways, as known today, in both the Eastern and the Western Theaters were few and far between. Roads, as a general rule, were very poor, particularly over those areas of Virginia, Georgia, and other States where there is much sticky, clay soil. Movement over them in wet weather was always particularly difficult; sometimes impossible.

(g) Between 1850 and 1860, there had been a great impulse given to railroad building in the North, the mileage having increased from 9,000 to over 50,000. There were three routes across the Alleghanies in the North, namely; the Erie, the Pennsylvania, and the Baltimore and Ohio. Still farther north, was the New York Central.

Although the Confederacy covered a large area, it being about 800 miles from the Potomac at Harper's Ferry to the Gulf of Mexico, and about 1,700 miles from Charleston, South Carolina, to the western border of Texas, there were but six continuous railway lines: two connecting Richmond with the Mississippi; three connecting the Ohio with ports on the Gulf of Mexico; and one connecting Richmond with ports on the Atlantic.

The advantage insofar as concerned railway communication lay

with the North, and as telegraph lines followed the railways, this advantage was materially enhanced. There were, however, two disadvantages with respect to all railways which do not exist at this day, namely; many different gauges of railroads, and a lack of connection between railroads. In some points in the South, such as Lynchburg, Augusta, Charlotte, Raleigh, and Wilmington, freight had to be unloaded at one depot and hauled through the towns for reloading at another depot.

When Hooker's Corps was moved from Virginia to Northern Alabama in the fall of 1863, the troops moved by rail (4'-8½" gauge) to the Ohio River, detrained, crossed the river by barge and bridge, entrained and proceeded by rail to Indianapolis (4'-10" gauge), changed cars and went to Jeffersonville, Indiana by rail (4'-8½" gauge), crossed to Louisville by boat, then entrained on a five foot gauge railway and proceeded to their destination.

The engineering talent and factories for motive power, the rolling stock, and railway supplies were practically all in the North. As the war progressed, the efficiency of the Southern railways steadily declined, while that of the North just as steadily increased. This was the first great war in which waterborne and animal drawn transportation were supplemented by railroads in supplying field forces. All the essential problems connected with the effective use of rail transportation were solved successfully.

The outstanding development from a strategic viewpoint was the practicability of conducting operations at a much greater distance from a base than ever before had been possible.

(h) In connection with sea-borne traffic, the ports of New Orleans, Charleston, and Wilmington were of almost vital importance to the continued life of the Confederacy.

3. ORGANIZATION OF OPPOSING ARMIES

In the same proclamation in which President Lincoln had called for 75,000 men, he also called an extra session of Congress to meet July 4th. Without waiting for this session, on May 3rd, he called for 22,000 volunteers for the Regular Army and 13,000 for the Navy, for three years' service. When Congress met, he asked for authority to increase the Federal forces to 400,000.

In the meantime, the Confederacy had been raising forces. Although the Confederate Congress had authorized the establishment of a Regular Army, very little was done in this respect and a "provisional army" was organized for the conduct of the war. This army was organized so rapidly that there were over 30,000 men in service before the North had made a call for a single volunteer. In this hasty mobilization and organization of raw troops the Confederate government exhibited a better military system than did the Federal Government.

With reference to commanders for these forces, Mr. Lincoln showed but little judgment in the appointment of some of his of-

fficers to high command, whereas Mr. Davis, who was himself a military man by education and experience, made excellent selections of officers with military experience for high command in the Confederate forces. General Scott, an officer of long experience and distinguished service, was in command of the Federal forces at the beginning of the war, but was too old for active service in the field. McDowell, whose highest command had been that of a lieutenant, was made brigadier general and given command of the first field forces which engaged the Confederates in a major battle. In the South, Mr. Davis had selected as his senior commanders such men as Cooper, Albert Sidney Johnston, Lee, Joseph E. Johnston, and Beauregard.

9. BLOCKADE

On April 17, 1861, President Davis invited applications for letters of marque and reprisal, thereby extending the conflict to the seas. Two days later, Lincoln proclaimed a blockade of Southern ports. This probably was the most effective single strategic measure of the war. Although there were not sufficient vessels available at first to establish the blockade strictly as required by International Law, it later became most effective in isolating the Confederacy from foreign trade.

10. JOINT PLAN

On May 3, 1861, General Scott in a letter to General McClellan set forth what was in effect a joint plan of operations. Its

salient features were as follows:

"1. It is the design of the government to raise 25,000 additional regular troops and 60,000 volunteers for three years.

"2. We rely greatly on the sure operation of a complete blockade of the Atlantic and Gulf ports soon to commence. In connection with the blockade we propose a powerful movement down the Mississippi to the Ocean with a cordon of posts at the proper points and the capture of Ports Jackson and St. Philip, the object being to clear out and keep open this great line of communication in connection with the strict blockade of the seaboard, so as to envelop the insurgent States and bring them to terms with less bloodshed than any other plan.

"3. A word now as to the greatest obstacle in the way of this plan x x x the impatience of our patriotic and loyal Union friends. They will urge instant and vigorous action x x x unwilling to wait for the slow instruction of say twelve to fifteen camps". x x x

We thus see early in the war two major strategic objectives, namely: blockade of the coast, and the opening and control of the Mississippi. We also note that General Scott foresaw the insistence for immediate action by the Northern public which resulted so disastrously to the Federals at the First Battle of Bull Run.

11. CONFEDERATE STRATEGY

The strategy of the Confederates was, from the first, the strategic defensive. In his first message to the Confederate

Congress on April 29, 1861, President Davis said: "All we ask is to be let alone -- that those who never held power over us shall not now attempt our subjugation by arms". The Confederacy considered Maryland, Tennessee, Kentucky, and Missouri and the mountainous part of West^{ern} Virginia as southern territory and attempted to occupy them and draw them into the Confederacy. As previously stated, however, only one of these states, Tennessee, eventually became a Confederate State, although every effort was made to gain them all.

That part of Western Virginia lying in and beyond the Alleghanies was strategically particularly important to the South and was open to Federal invasion. Its rivers flowed into the Ohio or into major tributaries of that stream. A Federal force commanding the line of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad could work up the river valleys whereas troops from Eastern Virginia would have to cross the watersheds. Harper's Ferry could easily be turned from Western Virginia. Federal troops operating from Grafton could advance southeastward and by a shorter march than that from Harper's Ferry could reach Staunton and the upper valley of the Shenandoah. Also, in the larger strategic phases of the war, railway communications in Kentucky and in Tennessee might be interrupted by forces based on the westernmost part of what was at that time Virginia.

Mr. Davis based his hope of ultimate success on the intervention of foreign powers. Great Britain and France both had issued proclamations of neutrality, thus giving to the Confederate

States international standing as belligerents. Perhaps an early and decisive victory by the Confederates might even have brought about intervention on their side. In fact, at one time Great Britain was on the verge of declaring war on the United States because of the removal by a Federal man-of-war of Mason and Slidell -- commissioners from the Confederate States to England and France -- from the English steamer "Trent".

Although Mr. Davis was advised by some of his military commanders to invade Northern territory, he refused to do so; as a result, the Confederate forces were placed on the strategic defensive.

12. OBJECTIVES IN THE EASTERN THEATER

In discussing the campaigns, it must be remembered that as the war developed, each of the belligerents in the Eastern Theatre had in mind at most times three objectives: first, the protection of the capital of its own country; second, the capture of the enemy's capital; and, third, and lastly, the defeat of the opposing army. These objectives could not always be pursued at the same time but there may be noted in considering the various campaigns the effect upon the strategy of the opposing commanders produced by the attempt to gain them all, though they may not have been compatible in the same campaign.

13. FIRST BATTLE OF BULL RUN

On May 24, 1861, the day after Virginia ratified the ordinance of Secession, Federal troops crossed the Potomac at Wash-

ington and occupied Alexandria and Arlington Heights. Steps were taken immediately to put Washington in a state of defense. This having been accomplished, the Northern newspapers and public began to cry out for a movement against Confederate forces which were at Manassas, so close to Washington as to constitute a threat against that city. General Scott did not believe that the troops called into service for but three months could be relied upon for an offensive campaign. He wanted to wait until the three-year volunteers, who had been called for early in May, could be trained and made ready for service. "But the Northern public, as the violent language of the newspapers clearly showed, was determined not to lose the services of the three-months men before proving how much they could do; and x x x the Administration was finally induced to overrule the judgment of the lieutenant-general, and to order him to make the necessary arrangements for an advance."

The situation on July 17, 1861, was as follows: General Beauregard, with a force of about 22,000 Confederates, was stationed on the Orange and Alexandria Railroad, and protected Manassas Junction, where the Manassas Gap Railroad, coming from Front Royal in the Shenandoah Valley, connected with the main line to Richmond. General Joseph E. Johnston, with about 11,000 men, was at Winchester. "So long as Manassas Junction was held, troops could easily and speedily be transferred from the Valley to the vicinity of Washington, and vice versa. It was, therefore, clearly of great importance to hold this position if the

two Confederate armies were to be united either for an advance on Washington or to resist an advance from Washington. This location had the further strategic importance of lying directly between the two main roads between Washington and Richmond: namely, the one by way of Alexandria and Fredericksburg; and the other through Warrenton and thence by way of Culpepper or Fredericksburg. General McDowell, with some 35,000 men, had left Alexandria on the preceding afternoon and on July 17th, was at Fairfax Court House. General Patterson, with a force of about 14,000 Federals was at Charlestown, about twenty miles north-east of Winchester. He had previously followed Johnston from Harper's Ferry to the vicinity of Winchester, but on July 17th had withdrawn to Charlestown because he believed Johnston to have 35,000 men.

McDowell's plan was "to turn the enemy's position and force him out of it by seizing or threatening his communications". This plan counted on the ability of Patterson, in the Valley, and Butler, who was threatening Richmond from the southeast, to "contain" the Confederates in their respective fronts.

On learning that McDowell's army had started, Mr. Davis wired Johnston, on July 17th, to reinforce Beauregard. He also sent other troops to Manassas Junction. The failure of Patterson to hold Johnston in the Valley, permitted Johnston, on July 18th, to start toward Manassas with 9,000 men by way of Ashby's Gap to Piedmont, where he loaded his infantry on railway cars. By the afternoon of July 20th, he had joined Beauregard with the

bulk of his army.

In the meantime, McDowell had resumed his advance, but had halted at Centerville with most of his army over the 19th and 20th, in order to complete the concentration of his "loosely organized" force. The next day, July 21 -- the day after Johnston had reinforced Beauregard and had taken command - McDowell attacked Johnston and was defeated at the First Battle of Bull Run (or Manassas). After the battle, panic struck the retreating Federals, except for a small force of Regulars which covered the retreat, and the beaten troops never stopped until they reached the Potomac that night.

"The result of the battle" says Ropes "induced in the minds of the people of the South a very unwarranted opinion as to the superiority of their troops in fighting qualities". On the other hand, it aroused the North to the magnitude of its task, spurred Congress to make the necessary provisions for the development of the armed forces, and created such fear for the safety of Washington that the defense of the capital became the dominant consideration in the Eastern Theater practically throughout the remainder of the war.

14. LINCOLN'S PLANS

Immediately following the First Battle of Bull Run, Lincoln drew up two memoranda.

The first prescribed that an effective blockade should be pushed forward with all despatch.

The second stated that when the blockade had been inaugu-

ated: "1st. That Manassas Junction (or some point on one or other of the railroads near it) and Strasburg be seized and permanently held with an open line from Washington to Manassas and an open line from Harper's Ferry to Strasburg -- the military men to find the way of doing these. 2nd. This done, a joint movement from Cairo on Memphis, and from Cincinnati on East Tennessee".

These memoranda reaffirm the two original strategic ideas: namely, the blockade, and the opening and control of the Mississippi. It added two others, namely: the defense of Washington, and the occupation of East Tennessee. They furnish a fine example of the role of the statesman and of the soldier in war. Lincoln stated the national objective -- the prerogative of the statesman -- but left to the soldier the decision as to "how" to attain this objective.

15. PLANS AND PREPARATIONS

On the day after First Bull Run, Lincoln summoned Major General George B. McClellan to Washington. He had recently concluded successful operations in Western Virginia, had a very high reputation in the army, and was known to be one of the most accomplished officers in the service. He was immediately assigned to the command, under General Scott, of all troops near Washington. He at once began to reorganize and to train the Federal Army. He had a genius for organization and was a thorough soldier. Between August 4th and October 15, 1861, at

least 100,000 men were added to the forces near Washington and there appeared to be no limit to the resources and patriotism of the North. Moreover, the Federal troops were so well provided for in all respects, owing to the immense resources at the disposal of the Government, that there was every reason to expect in the spring of 1862 a decidedly improved condition in health and vigor, in self-confidence, and in all soldierly qualities, on the part of the soldiers.

On the other hand, the force at Manassas, owing to the straitened means of the Confederate Government, was barely kept comfortable in the matter of clothing and shelter, and its chief officers looked forward with undisguised apprehension to the coming winter, as certain to reduce perceptibly the health and spirits of the men, and even to relax discipline, and to render the army in every way less efficient. General Johnston, and his corps commanders, Beauregard and G. W. Smith, appreciated the relative conditions of the opposing forces and saw that something must be done to break up the constantly increasing Federal army while it was still in process of formation. At their expressed wish for a conference, Mr. Davis went to Manassas on September 1, 1861. The generals strongly advised him to reinforce the army at Manassas so they might cross the Potomac, cut the communications of Washington with the North, and carry the war into the enemy's country. But President Davis decided that he could not furnish the required reinforcement with^{out} a total disregard of the

safety of other threatened positions". Ropes, after discussing in some detail the possible effect of such an operation, states: "Therefore, we may say that Mr. Davis made a serious, and probably a very serious, error, when he refused to adopt the advice of his generals, and allowed this opportunity of striking such a telling blow for the cause which he represented to pass by unimproved".

It was practically impossible for McClellan to exercise the direct and unquestioned control which it was absolutely necessary for him to exercise, and at the same time to refer all matters of importance to the decision of General Scott. In October, the latter insisted on being allowed to retire from active service. On November 1, 1861, McClellan was appointed Commander-in-Chief.

In the Eastern Theater, no operations of any importance were undertaken and the fall and winter were spent in preparing for the next spring campaign.

In the Western Theater during the summer and fall of 1861, operations were undertaken by the Federals in Missouri to keep that State in the Union, but it was not until March, 1862, that the issue was definitely decided in favor of the Federals. Kentucky had at first attempted to remain neutral and, for a time, this neutrality was respected by both sides, but in September, 1861, General Polk with a Confederate force occupied Columbus, Kentucky, and, thereupon General Grant occupied Paducah. General Albert Sidney Johnston was assigned by the Confederate Govern-

men to command troops in the West with the task of holding Kentucky, Tennessee, and the Mississippi River. In November and December, the Federal forces in the West were reorganized; General Halleck being assigned to command the Department of the Missouri, comprising Missouri, Arkansas, and that part of Kentucky west of the Cumberland River; General Buell to command the Department of the Ohio, comprising Tennessee and that part of Kentucky east of the Cumberland River. These two departments were independent of each other and the commander of each reported direct to General McClellan.

16. LINCOLN'S GENERAL ORDER NO. 1.

During the fall of 1861 and the winter of 1861-1862, the apparent inactivity of the forces near Washington was the cause of great dissatisfaction throughout the North. McClellan, far from showing indecision, had definitely decided to get his army into effective condition to take the field in the spring of 1862. However, he did make the mistake of maintaining a studied and absolute reticence as to his plan which resulted in a loss of public confidence and caused some antagonism on the part of the President and his cabinet. Had McClellan taken the President into his confidence, it seems most probable that he would have had Mr. Lincoln's support and that the latter would have withstood the popular pressure and clamor. To add to this complication, McClellan was ill during December and January; hence, was in no condition to direct affairs during much of that period.

Finally, President Lincoln issued on January 27, 1862, without the knowledge of McClellan, the first of his famous "war orders", which we will quote simply as a matter of interest in order to show to what extremes public clamor may sometimes drive one in a position of authority. This order was never put into effect.

PRESIDENT'S GENERAL WAR ORDER NO. 1.

Executive Mansion,
Washington, January 27, 1862.

"ORDERED, That the 22nd day of February, 1862, be the day for a general movement of the land and naval forces of the United States against the insurgent forces. That, especially, the army at and about Fortress Monroe; the Army of the Potomac; the Army of Western Virginia; the army near Humfordsville, Kentucky; the army and flotilla at Cairo, and a naval force in the Gulf of Mexico, be ready to move on that day.

"That all other forces, both land and naval, with their respective commanders, obey existing orders for the time, and be ready to obey additional orders when duly given.

"That the heads of Departments, and especially the Secretaries of War and of the Navy, with all their subordinates, and the General-in-Chief, with all other commanders and subordinates of land and naval forces, will severally be held to their strict and full responsibilities for the proper execution of this order.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN".

17. OPERATIONS IN EAST RI. THEATER, 1862.

Early in 1862, the main Confederate army, under General Joseph E. Johnston, was at Manassas Junction. His total force, including troops on the lower Potomac, was about 47,000, though estimated by the Federals to be 102,000. In the Valley, Jackson had about 10,000 men.

The Federal Army, under McClellan, at this time numbered about 170,000. McClellan originally had expected to move against Johnston at Manassas, but in November, 1861, had selected Richmond as his objective. His plan was to transport his army as secretly as possible by water to Urbana on the lower Rappahannock; from there to make an advance rapidly overland about fifty miles and capture Richmond before Johnston could march there. The President did not favor this plan or any other that proposed removing the Army of the Potomac from between the main Confederate army and Washington. Finally, after much correspondence between the President and McClellan and many conferences and councils of war, on March 8, 1862, the movement by way of Urbana was decided upon by a council of war.

In the meantime, President Davis had decided on February 20th to direct Johnston to withdraw from his position which was too close to McClellan's strong army. Mr. Davis was influenced/^{also} by the capture of Forts Henry and Donelson in Tennessee by Grant, February 6th and 16th. The very next day after the Federal authorities had decided to move the Army to Urbana, Johnston withdrew his army to the line of the Rapidan.

About this time, according to McClellan's "Memoirs", McClellan decided to move his army to Fortress Monroe, instead of to Urbana, and then to advance up the Peninsula between the York and the James Rivers, the Navy supporting him on either flank, to the immediate vicinity of Richmond where the decisive battle of the war would be fought. He states that the Administration: "gave me the choice between the direct overland route via Manassas, and the route with Fort Monroe as a base. Of course I selected the latter."

18. PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN.

The embarkation for Fort Monroe began at Alexandria on March 17, 1862. McClellan was relieved from duty as Commander-in-Chief of all the armies and given command of the Army of the Potomac only. On account of Stonewall Jackson's activity in the Shenandoah Valley, Lincoln decided to hold back McDowell's First Corps for the safety of Washington but did not so inform McClellan until after his departure; he also withdrew one division from the second corps and sent it to reinforce Fremont in West Virginia, and withheld other troops which McClellan had expected to have. As a result, McClellan's force number^{ed} only 92,000 instead of the 155,000 which he had planned to use. Later, however, he was reinforced, raising his command to 102,000.

In his contemplated advance up the Peninsula from Fort Monroe, active cooperation from the Navy was, for a time, prevented by the Confederate batteries at Yorktown and at Gloucester Point,

and by Confederate forces at Norfolk, supported by the "Merrimac" which, although damaged by its fight with the "Monitor" was still able to close the James from use by Federal vessels.

Magruder, with about 13,000 Confederate troops, held Yorktown and vicinity. Without waiting for his whole army, McClellan decided to move up the Peninsula to a point between Yorktown and Williamsburg and cut off the retreat of the Yorktown garrison. This movement began April 4th. It was stopped by Magruder's forces which held strong intrenchments extending from Yorktown to the unfordable Warwick River. McClellan concluded the line was too strong to be taken by assault, so he determined to lay siege to it. He was about to direct the First Corps (McDowell), 30,000 strong, to move on Gloucester, as soon as it should arrive, when he was informed that the President, in view of the defenceless state of Washington, had decided to detain that corps near the capital. McClellan, in spite of orders from the President to leave sufficient forces near Washington, had, in the opinion of the President, failed to do so. McClellan was surprised by this reduction in his forces and protested to the President, but to no avail.

In the meantime, Johnston had been ordered by Mr. Davis to march his army to the Peninsula. He joined Magruder a few days after the Federals arrived in front of the position, and took command of the combined Confederate forces. The Federals were ready to make an assault after a month's preparation but Johnston had no intention of awaiting the attack, and, on the

night of May 3rd, he withdrew his forces and started for Richmond. McClellan advanced and, as the "Merrimac" could not ascend the James, she was destroyed, thus opening that river to the Federal Navy. McClellan and Johnston continued their respective advance and retirement with some fighting until they were in front of Richmond and McClellan was astride the Chickahominy. On May 31, Johnston attacked McClellan seeking to take advantage of the latter's faulty position. This battle known as Fair Oaks (or Seven Pines), continued on the next day, and resulted in failure for the Confederates. On May 31st, Johnston was wounded, and on June 1st, Lee, who since March 13th had been entrusted with the conduct of all military operations, under President Davis, assumed command of the Confederate Army by direction of the President. Lee withdrew his forces to their former positions close to Richmond and immediately set them to work strengthening the defenses. No offensive action of any consequence was undertaken by either side for nearly a month, except Stuart's raid around the entire Federal Army.

19. SHENANDOAH VALLEY CAMPAIGN

We will now consider briefly the happenings in another part of the Eastern Theater during the month of May, 1862. It was during this month that Jackson began his famous campaign in the Shenandoah Valley. As that campaign is the subject of special study later in the course, Jackson's strategy will not be discussed, but the general effect of his operations on those else-

where in this theater will be considered.

After Johnston had moved to Richmond from the Rappahannock, McDowell's First Corps advanced to that river opposite Fredericksburg. Stonewall Jackson, having withdrawn his small force up the Valley in April, Shield's division of Banks' Corps, on May 1st, was ordered to leave the Valley and join McDowell at Fredericksburg. McDowell was at this time awaiting the arrival of this division after which he planned to march his command to join McClellan and assist in capturing Richmond. Only 9,000 Confederates under General Anderson were in front of McDowell at Hanover Junction.

Lee had been in correspondence with Jackson in order to arrange a plan to draw McDowell's and Washington's attention towards the Valley, and thus to remove the threat of McDowell's force against the flank of the Confederate forces which were then confronting McClellan east of Richmond. As a result, Jackson was reinforced by Ewell's division, and about May 1st he began a series of rapid operations in the Valley that caused President Lincoln, on May 24th, to order McDowell, "laying aside for the present the movement on Richmond, to put 20,000 men in motion at once for the Shenandoah"; and to order Fremont, who was at Franklin "to move against Jackson at Harrisonburg". Thus the threat against Richmond from the north was removed for a time. Not only that, but the authorities at Washington were so in fear that a general advance was being made on that city, that McClellan

lan was warned that he might have to bring his army back to protect it. Later the division of McDowell's Corps which had remained at Fredericksburg, was sent to join McClellan by water, and, on the day of the Battle of Cross Keys (in the Valley, 9 June), McDowell's remaining forces were ordered to join McClellan as rapidly as possible. Before this order reached its destination, Fremont and Shields had both been defeated. Thereupon, McDowell's order was revoked and he was directed to leave Shields' Division at Luray and his other division at Front Royal.

20. PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN (continued)

Meanwhile Lee, at Richmond, had been planning an offensive against McClellan. He had received some reinforcements but needed more, so he decided to bring Jackson from the Valley. This movement was accomplished with great skill and secrecy and by the night of June 25, 1862, Jackson was at Ashland, fifteen miles north of Richmond. Then began, on June 26th, the battles east of Richmond, now known as the Seven Days' Battles, which resulted in McClellan's retirement to Harrison's Landing on the James River where it was in too strong a position to be attacked with any chance of success.

21. LEE'S STRATEGY

From this time forward Lee was to be the dominating personality in the Confederacy and was to command the Army of Northern Virginia throughout the remainder of the war.

His strategy was based on three promises:

- 1st. The Confederacy, due to disparity of man-power, could not successfully wage a war of attrition;
- 2nd. The security of Richmond was necessary for the success of the Southern cause; and,
- 3rd. The proximity of the Confederate forces to the enemy's country, particularly that portion of Virginia near Washington, would give the most effective strength to the Confederate forces.

In keeping with this strategy, Lee decided to maneuver as far as possible from Richmond and to accept battle only under conditions of his own choosing, hoping thereby to make the task of the Northern armies so difficult that the Federal government would realize the futility of the struggle and end the conflict.

22. COMMAND OF FEDERAL FORCES

It is of interest to note that while Mr Davis was availing himself of the advice of Lee and the latter was controlling all military operations for the South, the war was being conducted by the North in an entirely different manner. For some time after McClellan was given command of the Army of the Potomac only, the control of the other Federal Forces in Virginia was vested in the commanders of three separate departments. Each of these commanders reported direct to Mr. Stanton, Secretary of War, and Mr. Lincoln and he, with no military experience, undertook to direct all operations in these departments and elsewhere and

often refused the advice of the commanding generals of the field forces.

23. OPERATIONS IN THE WESTERN THEATER, WINTER & SPRING, 1862.

There now occurred a short lull in operations in the Eastern Theater. Let us see what had been happening in the Western Theater in the winter months and spring of 1862.

In January, 1862, General Albert Sidney Johnston, at Bowling Green, Kentucky, had troops at that place, at Columbus, Kentucky under Polk, and at Forts Henry and Donelson under Tipton. Opposed to him were Generals Buell and Halleck, the latter in command of the territory west of the Cumberland River. As previously stated, the commands of these two generals were independent of each other, and both reported direct to McClellan, at that date Commander-in-Chief of all Federal armies.

Buell proposed that Halleck should move up the Cumberland and Tennessee Rivers with 20,000 men, supported by the ironclad fleet, while he moved southward on Bowling Green and Nashville. Halleck did not favor this plan but wanted Buell's army placed under his command so that he might leave a containing force in front of Bowling Green and combine the bulk of Buell's force with his own and move up the Cumberland River. McClellan would not approve either plan, but kept urging Buell to move into East Tennessee in order to get possession of the East Tennessee and Georgia Railway and to encourage and support the inhabitants of the mountain regions who were strongly loyal in sentiment. Lincoln had proposed to Buell still another and different plan

which was, briefly to menace the enemy: "with superior forces at different points at the same time, so that we can safely attack one or both, if he makes no change; and if he weakens one to strengthen the other, forbear to attack the strengthened one, but seize and hold the weakened one, gaining so much."

Thus we see the confusion that may result from lack of unity of command in a given theater of war and from attempts to control field operations from the seat of Government many miles distant from the theater.

24. HENRY AND DONELSON CAMPAIGNS

On January 29, 1862, Halleck received word from McClellan that he had learned that Beauregard was under orders to leave Manassas for the west with reinforcements. On February 1st, Halleck, without awaiting further instructions from Washington, or arranging any cooperation with Buell, ordered Grant and Foote's ironclads to ascend the Tennessee and attack Fort Henry in order to "anticipate the arrival of Beauregard's forces." On February 2nd, Grant and Foote started on this expedition. Four days later Fort Henry was evacuated by the Confederates, and, on February 16th, Fort Donelson was captured.

Ropes says: "The effect of the capture of Fort Henry on the people of the whole country, North and South, was electrical. It was the first great success won by the Union arms within the limits of the Confederacy" x x x "The capture of Fort Donelson was not a great affair judged by the number slain; but judged by its

moral and strategical results it was one of the turning points of the war. Following so soon as it did after the loss of Fort Henry, the news of the surrender of Fort Donelson threw the Southwest into a state of excitement, not to say of panic, hardly to be described." He further states: "Chattanooga, the key of East Tennessee, apparently lay open to the invading Federal armies on one flank, and Vicksburg, the only strong post on the lower Mississippi, lay seemingly unprotected on the other."

When Johnston learned that Fort Henry had been captured, he evacuated Bowling Green and withdrew to Nashville. McClellan ordered Halleck to move against Nashville, but Halleck feared the Confederate forces at Columbus, Kentucky, recalled Foote's fleet to the Ohio, and held Grant at Donelson for ten days doing nothing. In the meantime, Johnston had withdrawn from Nashville to Murfreesboro and Buell had followed him as far as Nashville.

25. SILOH CAMPAIGN

Johnston's forces were widely scattered; his own army was at Murfreesboro, and Beauregard, with detachments at Corinth, Jackson, and other points, had the bulk of his force at Columbus, under Polk. Federal gunboats controlled the Tennessee as far up as Muscle Shoals. Thus, Johnston's command was cut in two and his two wings could unite only somewhere south of the Tennessee River. He decided to concentrate at Corinth and ordered the

evacuation of Columbus, Kentucky, as part of this operation.

Halleck seems to have given no thought to Johnston's main army at first, and picked Memphis as his objective, planning first to cut its railway connections toward the east. Accordingly, he ordered Grant to operate via the Tennessee River against the Memphis and Charlestown Railway. Grant's army moved by boat to Savannah, Tennessee, which was to be the base for operations.

On March 11th, President Lincoln placed all the territory from Knoxville as far west as the Missouri River under Halleck's command. Thereupon, Halleck ordered Buell to march from Nashville to Savannah.

Grant's army, about 33,000 strong, awaiting the arrival of Buell, was encamped at Pittsburg Landing in a very poor location, both strategically and tactically. Johnston, in the meantime, had concentrated 40,000 men at Corinth, only twenty-two miles from Pittsburg Landing. Realizing the faultiness of Grant's position, Johnston decided to attack before Buell could reinforce Grant.

There resulted the Battle of Shiloh (April 6-7, 1862). At first, Johnston had some success, but the arrival of Buell turned the scales and the Confederates were defeated. General Albert Sidney Johnston was killed and Beauregard succeeded to the command.

26 MOVEMENT AGAINST CORINTH

On April 11, 1862, Halleck took command in person of the forces near Pittsburg Landing. He ordered Pope, who, with the assistance of Commodore Foote, just previously had captured Island No. 10, to join him. In late April he began to move on Corinth, eighteen miles distant. He moved very slowly and, late in May, Beauregard, with his army intact, withdrew to Tupelo about fifty miles south of Corinth. Halleck did not pursue Beauregard. Lincoln demanded that East Tennessee be occupied. Halleck ordered Buell to Chattanooga and made him responsible for the Memphis and Charlestown Railroad. He sent one division to Arkansas, and scattered the remainder of his forces over a front of about two hundred miles from Memphis to Decatur, Alabama. On July 11, 1862, Lincoln appointed Halleck Commander-in-Chief of all land forces and ordered him to Washington.

27. OTHER OPERATIONS IN WESTERN THEATER, 1862.

New Orleans fell to Farragut in April, 1862, and by June, the Federals had captured Memphis and had gained control of the Mississippi River except for the two hundred miles stretch between Vicksburg and Port Hudson.

Buell began his movement on Chattanooga about June 10th. He had been ordered by Halleck to rebuild and repair the Memphis and Charlestown Railroad as he advanced. This task so hindered his march, that Bragg, who had succeeded Beauregard in command of the Confederates, reached Chattanooga ahead of him. Buell

then gave up his effort to keep open the railroad in his rear and adopted the Nashville and Chattanooga Railway as his line of communications, with Nashville as his secondary base of supplies and Louisville as the primary base. Raids on this line of communications stopped his advance on Chattanooga.

From Chattanooga, Bragg, in conjunction with Kirby Smith operating from Knoxville, threatened Louisville and Cincinnati. These operations drew Buell from Tennessee into Kentucky. The Confederate movements were successful but Bragg failed to exploit his advantage and after a fight at Perryville, Kentucky (October 8, 1862) retired into East Tennessee. Buell, after a short pursuit, moved closer to Nashville. On October 24th, Buell was relieved from command and Rosecrans succeeded him. The latter had concentrated his forces at Nashville by late November. In the meantime, Bragg transferred his Army, by way of Knoxville and Chattanooga, to Murfreesboro. On December 26th, Rosecrans moved on that place, and on December 31, 1862, there was fought near Murfreesboro the indecisive battle of Stones River.

When Halleck had left for Washington, Grant had succeeded to the command of the troops about Memphis and Corinth and "as far back as Columbus, Kentucky". His command, Buell's and later Rosecran's, were independent of one another. As Grant was required by Halleck to guard the railway from Memphis to Decatur, he was constrained to maintain a passive defensive attitude for a time. Later, he was authorized to operate against

Vicksburg. He advanced along the railroad in conjunction with Sherman who was moving from Memphis via the river. However, raids by Forrest and Van Dorn (December, 1862) interrupted the railways and destroyed Grant's advanced base at Holly Springs, causing Grant to withdraw. Grant abandoned the overland route and moved to Memphis to reorganize and advance on Vicksburg via the river. Sherman reached the vicinity of Vicksburg late in December, made an unsuccessful assault, reembarked and returned to the mouth of the Yazoo.

28. LEE TAKES THE OFFENSIVE IN THE EAST.

We will now return to the Eastern Theater and consider the operations which took place there in the summer and fall of 1862.

The failure of Fremont, Banks, and McDowell in their operations against Jackson in the Valley had convinced Lincoln that their three armies should be under a single commander. Accordingly, on June 26, 1862, he issued orders consolidating these armies and appointing Pope, whom he had recalled from the West, to command the new "Army of Virginia". Pope was ordered "to cover the city of Washington from any attack from the direction of Richmond; to make such dispositions as were necessary to assure the safety of the Valley of the Shenandah; and at the same time so to operate on the enemy's lines of communications in the direction of Gordonsville and Charlottesville as to draw off, if possible, a considerable force of the enemy from Richmond, and thus relieve the operations against that city of the Army of the Potomac".

Pope assembled most of his widely separated forces in the vicinity of Sperryville and Jarretton where he could cover the approaches to the Valley and to Washington and threaten Gordonsville and Charlottesville.

In the meantime, on July 13th, Lee had started Jackson for Gordonsville. Thus, one of Pope's objectives had been achieved--he had induced Lee to send away one of his best generals and a large force. The capture of Richmond was to be made much easier for McClellan. But McClellan was not to be allowed to make another effort to take that city, for, after Halleck's assumption of command of all the land forces, he ordered (August 3, 1862) McClellan to withdraw the Army of the Potomac from the Peninsula and to unite it with the Army of Virginia. Halleck wanted to unite the two armies at Fredericksburg, nearer to Richmond than Yorktown and between Washington and Richmond.

29. CAMPAIGN OF SECOND BULL RUN

Early in August, Pope's army was concentrating near Culpepper. Jackson, reinforced by A.P. Hill from Richmond, started for Culpepper from Gordonsville on August 7th. Banks, who had been sent forward by Pope, attacked Jackson at Cedar Mountain on August 9th, and was defeated. In the meantime, while McClellan was embarking at Harrison's Landing, Lee started for Gordonsville, for the purpose of attacking Pope's army before it could be joined by McClellan. Pope, learning from a captured order that Lee intended to turn his flank, attack him in force, and cut off his retreat towards Washington, then withdrew behind the Rappahannock. Then followed in succession Jackson's

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brilliant movement (August 25-26, 1862) entirely around Pope's west flank and his capture and destruction of Pope's supply depots at Manassas Junction; Lee's movement, with Longstreet's Corps, following Jackson; Pope's withdrawal towards Manassas Junction and Centreville; and the Second Battle of Bull Run (Manassas), August 29-30, 1862, in which Lee defeated Pope.

30. A TILTAL CAMPAIGN

Lee next decided to take the initiative and cross the Potomac. This was done for both political and military reasons. A Confederate army in Maryland might cause that State to secede from the Union; the invasion would have a deep effect on the Northern peace sentiment; and the chances of foreign intervention might be greatly enhanced. From the military viewpoint, it was probable that Lee would never again find the Federal forces with a lower morale. He had been successful against both Pope and McClellan; he was confident that the Northern armies would remain under the command of one or the other of these officers; and he fully believed in his ability to best either of them.

On September 2, 1862, the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia was concentrated at Chantilly. Pope's Army was enroute to the defenses of Washington where it arrived the next day. On September 5th, Pope was relieved from command. The two Union Armies were merged into one -- the Army of the Potomac; and McClellan was placed in command of the combined forces.

On September 4th, 5th, and 6th, Lee's Army crossed the Potomac near Leesburg, and on the 7th it concentrated at Freder-

ick, Maryland. His next objective was to be Harrisburg, but before entering Pennsylvania, he had to change his line of communications toward the West, farther from the Federal Forces. Accordingly, he decided to use the Shenandoah Valley for this purpose, but, as Federal garrisons still held Harper's Ferry and Martinsburg, he detached Jackson to capture or drive out these forces. Lee, with the remainder of his forces, moved west from Frederick across South Mountain. Jackson was to rejoin him upon the completion of his tasks.

In the meantime, McClellan had been moving northwestward from Washington. His movement was very slow because both he and Halleck - the Commander-in-Chief - were uneasy for the safety of the capital, and Lee's purpose was, as yet, unknown to them. Finally learning that Lee had fallen back west of the Monocacy, McClellan moved more rapidly and on September 12th - 13th entered Frederick. Here by good fortune there came into his possession on September 13th a copy of the order issued by Lee giving full information of his plans from which he should have been able to judge Lee's dispositions on that very day. But McClellan failed to grasp the fact that a prompt advance might enable him to place his superior forces between those of Lee and Jackson, and he halted his troops for the night instead of pushing on. After overcoming some opposition at Crampton's and Turner's Gaps on South Mountain on September 14th, McClellan's army reached Keedysville, about three miles from Sharpsburg on the evening of September 15th.

The Confederate troops engaged at the Battle of South Mountain had fallen back to Sharpsburg. Lee was anxious to concentrate his divided forces and, as he did not know how Jackson had fared at Harper's Ferry, he decided to cross the Potomac near Sharpsburg. Learning at about noon on September 15th that Jackson had captured Harper's Ferry that morning and was on the way to rejoin him at Sharpsburg, Lee at once ordered his troops into position on the heights overlooking Antietam Creek.

Here on September 17, 1862, McClellan attacked Lee but was unable to drive him from his position. Kopes says that the Battle of Antietam: "was one of the bloodiest battles of the war, and it is likely that more men were killed and wounded on the 17th of September than on any single day in the whole war".

The hostile armies bivouacked on the battlefield and remained there watching each other on the 18th. That evening Lee withdrew, undiscovered by the Federals, and had recrossed the Potomac into Virginia by the morning of September 19th.

The Southern invasion had been repelled. Lincoln proclaimed that all slaves in States or parts of States in rebellion on January 1, 1863, should then be free.

31. FREDERICKSBURG CAMPAIGN

Lee's army went into camp northeast of Winchester to rest while it watched the Federal Army. McClellan did not consider his army in fit condition to follow Lee across the Potomac, so he contented himself with having expelled the enemy from Maryland and with negative measures, such as the garrisoning of

Harper's Ferry, to prevent Lee's return, while he refitted and reorganized his army. But the authorities at Washington and the people of the North were impatient and, on October 6, 1862, Halleck by direction of the President, sent McClellan an order "to cross the Potomac and give battle to the enemy, or drive him south"; and stated that Lincoln preferred that McClellan should move east of the Blue Ridge so as to cover Washington, rather than up the Shenandoah Valley. McClellan replied that he preferred operations in the Shenandoah Valley. He was not ready to advance until late in October, but, as by that time the Potomac had risen and McClellan felt sure that the North was no longer in danger of invasion, he crossed the river at Berlin (east of Harper's Ferry), October 26th - November 2, 1862, for operations east of the Blue Ridge.

Lee at once started Longstreet's Corps towards Culpepper Court House, which was reached November 7th, but retained Jackson's Corps near Winchester to hold the Valley and threaten McClellan's flank until the enemy's plans could be determined. By this date, McClellan's army was in the area about Warrenton. McClellan was now in a position to separate the two wings of the Confederates and beat them in detail or else to force them to concentrate near Gordonsville when he received an order from the President relieving him from command of the Army of the Potomac and assigning Burnside to that command.

Burnside's plan was to give up the Orange and Alexandria Railway as his line of communications, to establish a base at

Acquia Creek, to "impress upon the enemy the belief that he was to attack Culpepper or Gordonsville", and then to "make a rapid movement of the whole force to Fredericksburg, with a view to a movement upon Richmond from that point".

His army began to reach Falmouth on November 17th. He did not cross the Rappahannock because he decided that it was impracticable to cross large bodies by the fords and he was afraid to cross small forces, although the Confederate garrison at Fredericksburg was very weak. His pontoon trains did not arrive until November 25th.

On November 18th, Lee learned of Burnside's movement, and by the 21st had concentrated Longstreet's Corps at Fredericksburg, where Jackson's Corps joined him on the 30th.

After making some preparations for a turning movement by way of Skinker's Neck, several miles, southeastward of Fredericksburg, Burnside decided to force a crossing against the Confederate front. This was attempted on December 13 - 15, 1862 (Battle of Fredericksburg) and Burnside was repulsed with heavy losses.

32. STRATEGY OF 1863

As 1863 opened, the strategic measures necessary to win the war had not been changed. Insofar as concerned the North, an increasingly effective blockade, the uninterrupted control of

the Mississippi River, and the denial of the use of waterways and railroads to the Confederates continued to be the guiding motives. These measures were most obvious, but there was apparently no military commander in a position of authority and with sufficient vision and ability to formulate a plan for their execution nor was any such plan to be developed during the year 1863.

The Confederate strategy in the Eastern Theater was dominated by Lee who held to a policy of open maneuver, keeping the enemy as far as possible from Richmond and never abandoning the line of the Rappahannock so long as he could hold it. In the Western Theater, the strategic defensive continued.

33. BATTLE OF CHANCELLORSVILLE

On January 26, 1863, Hooker relieved Burnside in command of the Army of the Potomac. By the end of April, Hooker's army encamped on the northern bank of the Rappahannock opposite Fredericksburg, numbered 133,000 men and was well organized and equipped.

Lee's army, poorly equipped, wretchedly clad, and living upon short rations, occupied camps on the southern bank of the river from Bank's Ford to Port Royal. Lee had only 60,000 men, for Longstreet with two divisions had been sent to the neighborhood of Suffolk to gather provisions. However, Lee's army was so disposed that he could concentrate it promptly at any point along his front.

Hooker saw that the position must be turned, but to turn its right was practically impossible owing to the width of the river toward its mouth, the swampy character of the country, and the difficulties of concealing the movement in the open country below Fredericksburg. Therefore, he decided to turn Lee's left.

After demonstrating beyond both ends of the position in order to confuse the Confederates, Hooker began his main operations on April 27th. There followed, on May 1 - 3, 1863, the Battle of Chancellorsville, in which Hooker was defeated and from which battlefield he retreated across the Rappahannock on the night of May 5 - 6.

The deciding factor in Lee's victory was Jackson's march around Hooker's right flank and his attack on that flank on May 2nd. Unfortunately for the Confederates, Jackson was mortally wounded on that evening and died on May 10th.

With reference to Hooker, Steele, in his "American Campaigns" says: "Up to the time when the right wing of the Federal Army reached Chancellorsville on April 30th, Hooker's plan, in its conception and its execution has been characterized by the critics as 'masterly', but from that moment to the end every item of it was so faulty that no one has arisen bold enough to venture a word in Hooker's defense."

34. GETTYSBURG CAMPAIGN.

After Chancellorsville, the opposing armies resumed their

positions on opposite banks of the Rappahannock. Both armies were in need of rest, recuperation, and reorganization. The morale of the Federal Army had suffered another defeat, while that of the Confederate Army had reached the highest point it attained in the course of the war.

The Confederates decided to invade the North. In making this decision, the Confederate government was influenced by political and military reasons. It believed it might gain foreign recognition if victorious in the North, and that an invasion would strengthen the influence of the anti-war party in the north and increase the disaffection that existed there because of heavy taxation and the draft law. In addition, the financial condition of the Confederacy was steadily getting worse.

Lee needed supplies of clothing and subsistence and expected to get them in Pennsylvania; and, of more consequence than anything, was the serious condition of affairs at Vicksburg. There, Pemberton was being besieged by Grant and could not hold out much longer. Also, Bragg was having difficulty in keeping Rosecrans from advancing farther in East Tennessee. Lee felt sure that his movement northward would cause the Army of the Potomac to cover Washington and he hoped that it might also cause some of the Federal forces in the Western Theater to be brought east.

Longstreet urged another plan which, however, was not adopted, namely; that the troops which had defeated Hooker be left to "contain" Hooker's army; that Lee himself go to the

Western Theater and take command of Bragg's army; and that Bragg's army be reinforced hurriedly by rail by Longstreet with his two divisions which had been absent from the Battle of Chancellorsville, by Johnston with his command, then at Jackson, Mississippi, by Buckner, then at Knoxville with a small force, and by all other available troops. Thus Lee would have had nearly 90,000 men as opposed to Rosecrans' 84,000 and, according to General Alexander: "Rosecrans might have been defeated and an advance made into Kentucky, threatening Louisville and Cincinnati. If anything could have caused Grant's recall from Vicksburg, it would have been this."

Late in May, Hooker heard of Lee's contemplated advance and proposed that if Lee moved via Culpepper with his main force, leaving a corps at Fredericksburg, he be allowed to attack that corps. Later, he proposed that he be allowed to move against Richmond. Each proposal in turn, was disapproved by Lincoln who insisted that Hooker should always keep his army between Lee and Washington.

Early in June, Lee began his advance, moving via Culpepper, the lower Shenandoah Valley, and the Cumberland Valley. Hooker soon conformed to the movement, marching via Warrenton, and crossing the Potomac near Leesburg. Soon after crossing the river, by direction of the President Meade relieved Hooker in command of the Army of the Potomac.

It was Lee's intention to accept battle only on terms of his own choosing, but due to the absence of Stuart on a raid

around Meade's army, he lacked vital information and found himself, on July 1, 2, and 3, 1863, committed to the offensive in battle at Gettysburg on a position chosen by the enemy.

Lee was defeated in what has been termed "the decisive battle of the Civil War". This was, indeed, a sad period for the Confederacy for the day following the Third Day at Gettysburg, Vicksburg surrendered to Grant, and, five days later, Port Hudson surrendered to Banks, thus opening the Mississippi and cutting the Confederacy in two.

Lee retreated soon after the battle and by July 14th was again in Virginia. Meade has been severely criticized by some historians for not launching a counter-attack or pursuing Lee vigorously.

Lee's offensive campaign had failed and in the Eastern Theater the rest of the year 1863 was characterized by watchful waiting with much maneuvering and but little fighting.

35. OPERATIONS IN WESTERN THEATER, 1863

We will now return to the Western Theater and consider the operations which had been taking place there during 1863.

It will be recalled that at the end of 1862, Grant's and Rosecrans's commands were still entirely independent of each other; that Rosecrans had fought an indecisive battle with Bragg near Murfreesboro; and that Grant, after making an unsuccessful attempt to move overland to Vicksburg in conjunction with Sherman's advance by water, had withdrawn to Memphis to

prepare for an advance on Vicksburg via the river.

On the Confederate side, General Joseph E. Johnston had reached Chattanooga on December 4, 1862, where by direction of Mr. Davis, he had taken command of all Confederate forces west of the Alleghanies.

36. VICKSBURG CAMPAIGN

Early in 1863, Grant resumed operations to gain his strategic objective, namely; the opening of the Mississippi. The boldness of his strategy has ever since been a marvel to military students.

On January 29th, he joined his army near Vicksburg and took command in person. After several months of discouraging and unsuccessful attempts to get the army south of Vicksburg, on the east side of the river, where it could operate against that city on favorable terrain, he finally succeeded in moving down the west bank of the Mississippi to a point suitable for crossing several miles below Vicksburg. Here, on April 30, 1863, with the aid of Porter's gunboats and the transports which had run by the batteries at Vicksburg, he began to transfer his troops to the east bank.

After defeating a small Confederate force at Port Gibson on May 1st, he cut loose from his base, relying for supplies on what the men could carry and what could be foraged off the country and struck out toward the northeast.

The forces of General Pemberton, who commanded the Confederates in Mississippi, were badly scattered throughout that

state. Pemberton, himself, had gone to Vicksburg and was telegraphing to assemble his forces. Grant anticipated that they would be assembled from every available place to save Vicksburg, and learned that there were Confederates at Jackson. He, therefore, decided to advance towards Jackson and the railway west of that place which connected it with Vicksburg, with a view to defeating the enemy in detail. First, he would drive back the Confederates at Jackson; then, turning west, he would attack Pemberton. His plan was successful. On May 14th, he defeated General Johnston at Jackson. He then turned west and defeated Pemberton at Champion's Hill on May 16th. The next day Pemberton retired within the defenses of Vicksburg. Grant assaulted the defenses on May 19th, but failed. He then invested the place and began siege operations with the result that, on July 4, 1863, Vicksburg capitulated. Port Hudson surrendered to Banks on July 9, 1863, thus opening the Mississippi to the Federals for its full length, separating the Confederacy into two parts, and permitting the tightening of the blockade.

37. CHICKALAUGA CAMPAIGN.

Rosecrans' army remained at Murfreesboro until late in June, 1863, confronted by Bragg at Tullahoma, whose army covered Chattanooga. For several months there were no large scale operations by the armies. Confederate cavalry interfered seriously with Rosecrans' lines of communications. The War Department and, also, Grant kept urging him to drive Bragg out of East

Tennessee, but he believed that such action would simply result in Bragg's reinforcing the troops opposing Grant at Vicksburg; therefore, he remained at Murfreesboro, doing his best to put his army in condition for the coming campaign.

Finally, on June 23, 1863, he issued orders for the movement against Bragg's forces at Tullahoma. At this time, Burnside, who had come to Kentucky to take command after the Battle of Fredericksburg, was moving toward Cumberland Gap against Buell whose corps was in the Valley of East Tennessee; Grant was investing Vicksburg; and Lee was on his way to Gettysburg.

By brilliant maneuvering, Rosecrans forced Bragg to retire from successive positions until, about July 3rd, Bragg's army was in Chattanooga.

Rosecrans's army remained about fifty miles north of Chattanooga for several weeks. His next task was to take that city - the important railway center and the key not only to East Tennessee, but also to north Alabama, north Georgia, and middle Tennessee. Halleck urged his advance at once but for various good reasons Rosecrans did not begin his movement until August 16, 1863.

Meanwhile Bragg had been fortifying Chattanooga and making other preparations to oppose a river crossing. He had recalled Buell from Knoxville, which place had been occupied at once by Burnside, and had been reinforced by some of Johnston's troops from Mississippi. Also, Longstreet was enroute from Virginia to join him.

Rosecrans made a feint at crossing the Tennessee with part

of his army northeast of Chattanooga but crossed with the bulk of it several miles west of the city, completing the movement on September 4th. Bragg's lines of communications being threatened, he evacuated Chattanooga two days later and retired several miles to the south. Rosecrans occupied the city with a small force and attempted to cut off the retreat with part of his forces while pursuing with the rest. Bragg attacked and defeated Rosecrans at the Battle of Chickamauga, September 19 - 20, 1863, whereupon, Rosecrans retired to Chattanooga and occupied and strengthened the field works southeast of the city which the Confederates had previously begun. Bragg followed Rosecrans and, before the end of September, was in position confronting the Federals' defenses. He contented himself with investing Rosecrans' army from the southeast, leaving to the Confederate cavalry the task of cutting off its communications with the Federal depot at Bridgeport on the northern side of the river and the destruction of the railway beyond that point.

33. BATTLES AROUND CHATTANOOGA.

Because of lack of supplies, the condition of Rosecrans' army steadily became worse. Vigorous efforts were made by the War Department to bring relief:- Grant was ordered to send troops from Vicksburg; Burnside, at Knoxville, was directed to go to Rosecrans' aid; and, Hooker was started for Chattanooga with two corps from the Army of the Potomac, but, on orders from Rosecrans, went to Bridgeport to protect that base and the railway back to Nashville.

The authorities at Washington at last awakened to the poor policy of having several armies in the field operating independently of each other and with no common head except General Halleck at the Capital. There was created the Military Division of the Mississippi, consisting of the Departments of the Ohio, the Cumberland, and the Tennessee, and all the area from the Alleghenies to the Mississippi north of General Banks' command (in Louisiana); and, about October 16, 1863, General Grant was assigned to command this division. By the same order, General Thomas relieved Rosecrans of his command on October 19th.

Grant reached Chattanooga on October 23rd. A project, which Rosecrans had begun, for shortening the line of communications with the base at Bridgeport was put into effect, by October 29th after overcoming some opposition and, thereafter, was guarded by Hooker; thus, solving the problem of supply.

Early in November Bragg sent Longstreet to drive Burnside from Knoxville. The authorities at Washington urged Grant to send relief to Burnside, but Grant knew that an attack on Bragg would be the best way to bring about such relief. Grant was unable to attack until the arrival of Sherman who was on his way from Vicksburg. After his arrival, Grant, on November 24-25, 1863, attacked Bragg and defeated him decisively at the Battles of Lookout Mountain and Missionary Ridge, south and east, respectively of Chattanooga.

Grant's next tasks were to pursue Bragg and to send troops to relieve Burnside at Knoxville.

Bragg retreated southward to Dalton, Georgia, where on December 2nd, at his own request, he was relieved from command; Hardee succeeding him. Pursuit by Federal forces was suspended near Ringgold on November 28th.

When Longstreet reached the vicinity of Knoxville, Burnside opposed him south of that city but, in accordance with instructions, offered little resistance, thus drawing Longstreet as far as possible from Chattanooga. After ten days of preparations, Longstreet assaulted Burnside's defenses on November 29th, but was repulsed. In the meantime, Grant had started Sherman to Burnside's aid. Longstreet, learning of Bragg's defeat at Chattanooga, started to return to Virginia on December 4th. Sherman reached Knoxville two days later; then returned to Chattanooga.

Thus we find, at the close of the year 1863, for the first time since the war had begun the whole of East Tennessee was under the control of the Federal Army and President Lincoln's devoutly cherished wish for the relief and protection of the loyal inhabitants was at least achieved.

39. GRANT'S PLANS FOR SPRING CAMPAIGN, 1864.

In February, 1864, Congress revived the grade of lieutenant general. On March 12th, President Lincoln appointed Grant to that office, made him commander-in-chief of all Federal armies; and personally gave him assurance that he would be allowed to exercise the real functions of the office. On the same date, Sherman was appointed to succeed Grant in command of the Divi-

sion of the Mississippi.

Then for the first time since the war had begun, a definite plan of action was laid out for the Federal armies - a plan that contemplated the simultaneous and concerted movement of all the armies toward a single ultimate objective; namely, the destruction of the only two organized armed bodies of any considerable strength that the South had in the field. These bodies were Lee's army in Virginia and the force under General Joseph B. Johnston at Dalton, Georgia, composed of the Army of the Tennessee, lately under Bragg, consolidated with the Army of Mississippi.

Grant's basic plan of operations is stated most concisely in three sentences extracted from his confidential letter to Sherman dated April 4, 1864: "It is my design, if the enemy keep quiet and allow me to take the initiative in the spring campaign, to work all parts of the army together, and somewhat towards a common center. x x x x x I will stay with the Army of the Potomac, increased by Burnside's corps x x x x x and operate directly against Lee's army, wherever it may be found. x x x x x You I propose to move against Johnston's army, to break it up and to get into the interior of the enemy's country as far as you can, inflicting all the damage you can against their war resources."

In addition to these operations the Army of the James, under Butler, was to operate against Richmond from the south side of the James River; General Sigel's command in West Virginia was to operate in the Shenandoah and Kanawha Valleys against the

Virginia and Tennessee Railroad; and, in the West, Canby was to seize Mobile and then advance northeastward. All operations were to begin about May 4, 1864.

40. OPERATIONS IN EASTERN THEATER, SPRING, 1864.

During the winter of 1863-1864, the Army of the Potomac and the Army of Northern Virginia confronted each other on opposite sides of the Rapidan River.

On March 26, 1864, Grant established his headquarters at Culpepper Court House. Lee retained command of the Army of the Potomac and all orders to it were given through him. Burnside's Fifth Corps, which had rejoined from the Western Theater, was not incorporated with that Army until later; however, it went through the spring campaign with it. At this date, it was guarding the railway from the Manassas back to Bull Run. The total Federal strength was about 105,000.

Lee's headquarters was at Orange Court House. His army had been rejoined by Longstreet's corps from the Western Theater, and numbered at this time about 62,000.

As already stated, Grant's main objective was to beat Lee's army. Behind its intrenchments and the Rapidan this army was unassailable in front. Grant must turn one or the other of its flanks and, thus, force it to come out of its intrenchments and fight, or suffer itself to be attacked in reverse. He resolved to turn its right flank and hoped, by concealment and rapidity, to cross the Rapidan and get out of the Wilderness on its south side before Lee should discover his movement; or, at least,

before Lee could take effectual means to oppose it.

Grant began his movement at midnight May 3, 1864, and, by night of May 4th, his troops were on the south side of the Rapidan and in the heart of the Wilderness and, as yet, had met no opposition. Lee had anticipated the movement and had not been deceived by feints that had been made against his left. He took no steps to prevent the river crossing, but, as soon as he learned that the Federals were on the march, he started his corps forward to strike them in flank before they could get out of the Wilderness.

Lee attacked early on May 5, 1864, hoping to take Grant at a disadvantage in the narrow roads and jungle without bringing on a general engagement before his (Lee's) rear corps could get into action. The Battle lasted two days (May 5th - 6th). The fighting was desperate, but was indecisive, although the Federal losses were about twice those of the Confederates. Grant resumed his efforts to turn Lee's right flank on the evening of May 7th.

With reference to the Battle of the Wilderness, Steele says: "Strategically Grant had failed to make Lee come out into the open; but Lee had failed to stop Grant's army. It was the first time, so far, that the Union Army had fought a great battle on the soil of Virginia and advanced immediately afterwards. It was the first step gained in General Grant's policy of 'continuous hammering'; the Confederacy could not stand many more such battles, call it victory or defeat."

For the next few weeks, Grant repeatedly attempted to turn Lee's right flank in successive positions and cut his communications. Grant's successive strategic turning movements all failed to get his army between Lee and Richmond. In each attempt, Grant found Lee's army intrenched across his road and desperate battles were fought at Spottsylvania Court House, the North Anna, the Totopotomoy, and Cold Harbor (June 3, 1864). With each movement, the Federal Army got closer to Richmond, but that was not the objective. As stated by Grant in his instructions to Meade: "Lee's army will be your objective point. Wherever Lee goes, there you will go also."

The main result of Grant's operations from the Rapidan to the James was to wear out Lee's army to a greater or less degree; but Grant's own army had suffered nearly three times as great a loss in men as had Lee's. Nevertheless, Grant's campaign had not been a failure. His army had kept advancing and fighting, which was something the Federal Army had not done in Virginia under any other commander.

41. SIEGE OF PETERSBURG.

For a few days after the Battle of Cold Harbor, Grant's army remained behind its earthworks confronting Lee's army at Cold Harbor, a few miles northeast of Richmond. That city was defended on the north side of the James by a line of works extending from the river above the town to Chapin's Bluff on the river below it. South of the James, Beauregard occupied a line

of works from the James to the Appomattox, confronting and holding Butler's Army of the James within its intrenchments at Bermuda Hundred. Still farther to the south, a circle of strong works extended about two miles outside of Petersburg.

Halleck proposed to Grant that he invest Richmond on the north side of the river, as such action would give greater security to Washington. However, it would never have accomplished the fall of Richmond nor the surrender of Lee's army because it would not have cut Lee's lines of supply from the south and the west - The Richmond and Danville, the Southside, and theeldon railroads. Grant, therefore, decided to move south of the James, unite with Butler, and by a rapid advance, cut Lee's communications.

Beginning after nightfall, June 12, 1864, Grant's army began its withdrawal from in front of Cold Harbor. By noon, June 14th, it was at Wilcox' Landing, and, two days later was south of the James River. This very difficult maneuver was executed skillfully and without arousing Lee's suspicions. Although Lee learned on June 13th that Grant's army had withdrawn from his front, Grant's movements were so well screened by covering forces that Lee believed Grant was not crossing the James but was simply moving closer to Butler in order that these two forces might act jointly against Richmond. Taken as a whole, Grant's movement must be considered one of the finest achievements of strategy in military history.

In spite of Grant's skill, he was destined not to be able to

accomplish his task of cutting Lee's lines of supply for many months to come. Due to lack of initiative and misunderstanding of orders on the part of his leading corps commanders, the advance on Petersburg after crossing the river was delayed so long that the movement was discovered and Confederate reinforcements reached that town in sufficient force and in time to prevent its capture.

After several vain attempts to take Petersburg, Grant concluded that its works could not be carried by assault and decided to invest the place as far as practicable, to intercept the railways leading into it, and to watch for opportunities to "attack Lee's army in unexpected quarters south, or even north, of the James". Pursuant to this decision siege operations were begun and, during the next several months the operations were characterized by mining and counter-mining, including the famous "Petersburg mine" explosion and the unsuccessful Federal assault into the mine crater; raids against the Confederate's lines of supply; and a gradual extension of Federal and Confederate field works toward the west.

42. OTHER OPERATIONS IN EASTERN THEATER, SUMMER & FALL, 1864.

Elsewhere in the Eastern Theater there had been other operations during this period. Sigel, who had been unsuccessful in the Shenandoah Valley, had been relieved by Hunter. The latter drove the Confederates back to Lynchburg. On June 13th, Early started toward the Valley to strike Hunter in rear. Hunter re-

treated across the mountains into West Virginia and Early, pursuant to Lee's orders, pushed on down the Shenandoah, crossed into Maryland, and reached the edge of the city of Washington on July 11th. In the meantime, Grant without relieving the pressure on Richmond, had sent reinforcements to Washington. These troops and others reached that city July 12th; hence, Early decided not to attack and withdrew into Virginia via Leesburg.

The sequel to this raid was that Grant sent Sheridan to command the Federal forces in the Valley. He not only expelled Early, but so thoroughly devastated that granary of the Confederacy that, as Sheridan expressed it: "A crow would have to carry its rations if it had flown across the valley."

43. OPERATIONS IN THE WESTERN THEATER, 1864.

It will be recalled that after his defeat at the battles around Chattanooga, Bragg had retreated to Dalton, Georgia, where Hardee succeeded him in command. The latter was, in turn, succeeded by Joseph E. Johnston on December 27, 1863.

The army remained at Dalton during the winter of 1863 - 1864, Johnston doing all that he could to improve its condition. The authorities at Richmond wanted him to take the offensive and recover Tennessee, but he did not believe that the condition of his army warranted such action.

During this winter, the Federals likewise did little in the Western Theater. Grant remained in command until appointed Commander-in-Chief of all the armies in March, when Sherman suc-

ceeded him in command in Tennessee. Because of bad roads, the difficulty of transporting supplies by the single railway from Nashville, and the temporary depletion of his forces, it was impracticable for Sherman to take the offensive until May.

It will be recalled that Sherman's part in the general plan of combined operations directed him "to move against Johnston's army, to break it up, and to get into the interior of the enemy's country as far as you can, inflicting all the damage you can against their war resources".

44. THE CAMPAIGN OF ATLANTA.

At the beginning of the Campaign of Atlanta, Sherman's army, numbered about 99,000 men. Johnston's army, after Hood joined it early in the campaign, numbered about 62,000.

Johnston's base was Atlanta, eighty-five miles from Dalton. Atlanta was full of foundries, arsenals, and machine-shops, and was the junction of several railways of strategic importance; one through Dalton to Chattanooga; another to Virginia, furnishing a line of communications between Johnston and Lee; a third through the heart of Georgia to the coast; and a fourth to Montgomery, Alabama. After Johnston's army, Atlanta was Sherman's next most important objective; also it was the most important place for Johnston to guard. Sherman said, concerning Atlanta: "I knew that its capture would be the death-knell of the Southern Confederacy".

Sherman began his advance on May 5, 1864. By a series of

very skilful maneuvers around Johnston's flank (usually the left flank) and with very few attacks against positions, he forced Johnston's army to withdraw successively from one position to another until by about the middle of July it took up a position in rear of Peachtree Creek, close to Atlanta. Here on July 17th, Johnston received a telegram directing him to turn over his command to Hood because he had failed to arrest the advance of the Federals to the vicinity of Atlanta.

Three days later, Hood attacked but was repulsed. (Battle of Peachtree Creek). He then withdrew into the intrenchments close about Atlanta, but on July 22nd again attacked (Battle of Atlanta), only to be repulsed again. Sherman then drew his lines in closer about Atlanta. After failing in several attempts to cut the railways from Atlanta toward the South, Sherman finally succeeded and on September 1, 1864, Hood evacuated Atlanta. Sherman's army at once occupied that city and vicinity to rest and prepare for further operations.

In commenting on the Campaign of Atlanta, Hamley says:-
"Except in attacking the Kenesaw Mountain on the 27th of June, the character of Sherman's operations was, throughout, the same. To protect his main line from a counter-attack, he left a force intrenched across it. He then reinforced his flanking wing to a strength sufficient to cope with the whole army of the enemy, and directed it by a circuit off the main line, upon the Confederate rear. In every case the operation was successful, obliging Johnston forthwith to abandon his strongest positions, and to retreat

Concerning Johnston's operations, Steele says: "While Johnston's retreat was carried out with the greatest skill, and with the least loss of men and material; while with any army of 60,000 he kept an army of 100,000 two months and a half (May 5th to July 18th) making eighty-five miles, hardly more than a mile a day; his operations, nevertheless amounted merely to a passive defense. And the great length of time taken by Sherman in gaining the distance from Dalton to the works about Atlanta was due more to the difficulty of the weather and roads and transport than to the direct resistance made by Johnston".

45. CAMPAIGN OF FRANKLIN AND NASHVILLE.

After evacuating Atlanta, Hood remained unmolested at Lovejoy Station, thirty miles to the south, for three weeks.

On September 20th, he moved to Palmetto, twenty-five miles southwest of Atlanta. Here President Davis met him and it was planned that Hood should begin an active campaign against Sherman's lines of communication to compel him to abandon Atlanta. Sherman at once made additional preparations for the protection of the railways leading back some four hundred miles to his base at Louisville.

Early in October, Hood took the offensive against Sherman's lines of communication with the result that Sherman moved all of his forces, except one corps, toward the north, and by the 15th was back at Snake Creek Gap where he had begun his campaign in May. Hood believing that he had drawn Sherman as far north as he

could, meant to select a position and give battle, but his corps commanders advised against **it**, so he withdrew towards Gadsden, Alabama, where he concentrated on October 22nd. Sherman followed as far as Gaylesville, where he halted to watch Hood's movements.

From this time forward, these two commanders marched their armies in opposite directions - Sherman's marched to the Atlantic Ocean and Hood's toward the Ohio River. For several weeks Sherman had been trying to persuade Grant to let him march through the heart of Georgia to the seacoast; thence, ultimately northward through the Carolina's to join Grant in Virginia. He had not been able to persuade Grant that it was not necessary to destroy Hood's army before undertaking the march to the sea. But now Sherman was convinced that he could not catch Hood's army and that if he allowed it to decoy him out of Georgia into Tennessee he would be doing precisely what the Confederates wanted and would be giving up all that he had gained by his Atlanta Campaign. Soon after reaching Gadsden, Hood moved to Decatur, Alabama, seventy-five miles to the northwest; thereupon Grant gave his consent to Sherman's proposals and, on November 2nd, 1864, telegraphed to Sherman to go ahead with his march.

Hood moved northward to Franklin, Tennessee, where on November 30th he attacked Schofield and in the desperate battle which followed, as stated by Alexander, the Confederates "went down to defeat in a blaze of glory".

Schofield retreated to Nashville where he joined Thomas. Hood followed. Thomas attacked Hood, December 15 - 16, 1864 (Battle of Nashville), and decisively defeated him. Hood retreated, being pursued for a time, and finally by January 10, 1865, the remnants of his army were at Tupelo, Mississippi. Three days later, Hood asked to be relieved from his command.

At Nashville, the Confederate army in the Western Theater had been virtually annihilated. It was the most decisive victory gained by either side during the Civil War and one of the most brilliant.

46. SHERMAN'S MARCH TO THE SEA.

On November 13, 1864, Sherman, with about 62,000 men started from Atlanta on his march to the sea. By December 10th, he was in front of the defenses of Savannah. On December 20th, the Confederates evacuated the city, and three days later Sherman occupied it. On his march, he had encountered virtually no opposition. His march is notable mainly as an example of an army's cutting loose from its base and communications. Its main purpose was to destroy the resources of the Confederacy, which it did effectually over a wide area. "There is no question," says General Alexander, "that the moral effect of this march upon the country at large, both at the North and at the South, and also upon foreign nations, was greater than would have been the most decided victory".

47. THE WAR GOES ON.

During the winter of 1864-65, it became increasingly difficult for Lee's army to obtain supplies. There were no longer sufficient food supplies in Virginia. These had to be obtained in North Georgia and the Carolinas and transported by rail to Richmond.

Grant had been unable during the fall and winter to cut the railways leading into Richmond and Petersburg from the west but he was determined to keep on trying to do so. In connection with these efforts, Sherman was to advance from Savannah to join Grant; Schofield, who had been brought from the Western Theater to Wilmington, was to advance along Lee's lines of communication near the seaboard and eventually was to join Sherman; and Stoneman, starting from Chattanooga, was to make a raid through southern Tennessee, Georgia, and the Carolinas. In addition there were to be other operations, minor in comparison, in Alabama, Mississippi and Georgia.

Early in March, 1865, Sherman advanced into North Carolina where he was opposed by Joseph E. Johnston who had been sent to the Carolinas to gather the scattered Confederate forces in an effort to stop him. Sherman defeated Johnston at Averysboro on March 16th, and, again, at Bentonville, on March 19th - 21st. He then continued his advance to Raleigh, where he arrived on April 13th.

At Richmond, Lee realized that eventually Grant would break through his extended line of defenses - now some thirty-five miles in length - or would succeed in turning his position; and,

that his only chance then would be to attempt to escape with his army and unite it with Johnston's. This was exactly what Grant was determined to prevent. Sheridan had rejoined him from the Shenandoah Valley and the Sixth Corps, which had been sent to Washington to repel Early's raid, had also returned. Grant's forces numbered about 125,000 whereas Lee had but about 57,000 men.

On March 29th, Grant's last movement to the left began. Sheridan with a force of cavalry and infantry set out for Burkesville, the junction of the Southside and the Richmond and Danville Railways. After meeting with a reverse on March 31st, Sheridan defeated Pickett and Fitzhugh Lee at Five Forks on April 1st. The next day, Grant renewed his attacks against the Confederate right, broke the line and forced it back, and gained possession of the Southside Railway.

That night, Lee's army left Richmond and Petersburg, hurrying toward the Danville Railway with the hope of reaching either Danville or Lynchburg ahead of the Federals so as to permit its uniting with Johnston's Army. Grant's army followed along the south side of the Appomattox.

Sheridan with his cavalry and the Second and Sixth Corps led in the pursuit and reached Burkesville before the Confederates. Lee now had Federal columns upon his flank and in his rear, while Sheridan's cavalry was riding far ahead to cut off his retreat. On April 6th, Ewell's corps, forming the rear guard, was captured. When Appomattox Court House was reached, Sheridan's cavalry stood

across Lee's path. Lee's situation now was hopeless; accordingly on April 9, 1865, he surrendered the Army of Northern Virginia to Grant.

In North Carolina, Johnston also realized the hopelessness of further resistance and learning that Lee had surrendered, sent a message to Sherman near Raleigh on April 14th requesting a cessation of hostilities with a view to negotiating terms of surrender. Arrangements finally were made and, on April 26th, 1865, Johnston surrendered to Sherman.

48. CONCLUSION

Thus the Civil War came to a close. Grant's plan of coordinated operations, having as their principal objectives the destruction of the Confederate armies had, at last, brought the war to a successful conclusion for the North.

Its campaigns and the outstanding commanders of the opposing armies have ever since been the subjects of close scrutiny by students of military history. Although overshadowed in many respects by the immensity of the more recent World War and by the development of new weapons and the improvement of the old ones, there still remains much to be learned from an analysis of the strategy of its campaigns, the tactics of its battles, the characters of its leaders, and the methods of exercise of command and leadership by its commanders.

In summing up the management of the war, Geer, in his "Campaigns of the Civil War", very aptly says, with reference to the North: "The first year of the war was one of unpreparedness; the second, of mismanagement; the third, of alternate success and failure. The fourth year marked the end of the political mismanagement of the forces: a trained soldier, for the first time, took full control of military operations. It had required three years of war to teach the Union authorities that trained professional soldiers should run armies."