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U.S. Foreign Policy

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IAW DOD MEMO OF HISTORICAL RECORDS

U. S. Foreign policy, namely the assurance of the national security, has two main sides. The first is the assurance of the security of the United States and of the possibility for the United States people to go on with the development of their life without interference from outside. The second and the more constructive, the happier side of United States Foreign policy, is the one that we can pursue only when and as security is restored. That is the task of trying to bring about conditions in the world under which this country can make the maximum contribution to advance of civilization everywhere and derive the maximum contribution to other countries.

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In this discussion I intend to talk to you solely about the first of those two objectives and to put forward for your consideration a concept of the security problem that faces this country today. I say a concept because it is nothing that has been thrashed out and approved by the government down in Washington. It's something which I am thinking out here personally and putting before you as a pattern of thought that you can be thinking about during the remainder of this course and that perhaps you can make your judgment about, when the course is at its end.

I often think of the days before World War I, when I suppose a lot of us here present were boys, and of the problem of United Security as it looked to us in 1912 or 1914. At

that time I don't think there was a country in the world, and there had not been any country probably for one or two thousand years, that ever had the consciousness, the sense, the assurance of security that this country had. There had been almost a solid century during which there had been absolutely no serious outside threat to our security. During that century our own power, with relation to our power to potential enemies, had been growing steadily. I think anyone looking at the situation in 1910-1912 would almost have scoffed at the possibility that the development of the United States society would be seriously threatened within our lifetime by outside forces.

Now it's clear that, during those thirty some years that have elapsed since that period, there has been some enormous change in the framework of world power relationships in which this country lives which has given to us, today, the very high sense of insecurity which many of us feel, and I think we ought to do some serious thinking about what that change has actually been, what it is that has crept up on us in this curious way during our own lifetime and changed us from an unusually secure nation to one which no longer considers itself very secure at all.

My own answer as to what that has been, would be that it has been a change in the possibilities of land power, especially in the Eurasian land mass, a change brought about by the development of modern weapons in certain very important

and decisive ways. That development of weapons has, of course, brought about an alteration from a purely military standpoint, which all of you would understand, and I think that it has made it possible for single governments, single groups of people, to attempt the military conquest of larger areas than they could have attempted with any prospect of success of 100 or 200 years ago, although Napoleon did pretty well. But I think that even more important than that has been the effect of the development of modern weapons from the police standpoint, from the standpoint of governing great areas once you have conquered them. That is something that is very little thought about here in this country and it's important and shouldn't be ignored.

Two or three hundred years ago it was possible for people, if they were fed-up with a dictatorial or a despotic regime, to revolt with cudgels and pitchforks, if there were enough people to do it. There was always a possibility of internal dissention because weapons were primitive and the weapons of government were very little more advanced than those of people themselves.

Today that relationship has changed. The first premonition perhaps of what was coming was Napoleon's use of artillery to clear away the crowds when he seized power in France. In the hundred years that have passed since then, that development has carried us very far. Today any group of people, any political regime or governing group, which has and holds the monopoly of modern weapons, modern means of transportation

and modern means of communication, can hold any people in subjection as long as it retains its internal unity and its complete ruthlessness and readiness to use those weapons. We saw that illustrated during the last war when the Germans, despite all their defeats, despite all their difficulties, really were able to hold all of their occupied areas with the possible exception of Italy. They were able to hold the ones that were very important to them such as Norway and Holland, France, up to the moment when they were forced out by military measures. They did not really have to fear popular revolt; they had a technique worked out whereby it was simply technically impossible for people to revolt against them. Now that is something which has been made possible by the development of modern weapons and which has a very great significance for us and for our security.

What is that significance? (I'll ask you to keep in mind the Eurasian map). There are only four centers of power in the world which are of vital significance to our national security. By centers of power I mean combinations of natural resources, industrial skills, vigor and numbers of population, a combination sufficient to produce military power, particularly amphibious power, in dimensions large enough to cause us any concern. Those four centers of power all lie within or near the Eurasian continent. Two of them lie along its sides; those are the British Isles and Japan and those two today need cause us relatively little worry. About the British Isles I have no basic concern because the people of England are perhaps the only people across the ocean from this continent who have

a real consciousness of their stake in the power and prosperity of this country and vice versa. I think we can depend on that to carry us through in the past. As for Japan, that might be a problem again in the future; we have to watch it closely. But today we have it in our hands and unless we do something very stupid, it cannot be used against us. We are reduced, therefore, to the two great power centers which are on the Eurasian land mass. One of those is that of Europe and the other is that of Russia. Our problem lies in the relationships between those two power centers and in the question of who controls them.

Let us go back and look at what has happened since the outbreak of World War I in that respect. Once the Germans got into World War I, they fought what was in reality a holding action against Russia while they tried to achieve their main war aims. I think those war aims related primarily to the West, but not actually to the destruction of the West. I think the Germans wanted to set themselves up, at that time, as successful competitors and rivals to Great Britain on the seas, and they wanted to make it absolutely evident to the French that they, the Germans, were the dominant power in central Europe and would have to be recognized as such. For that reason, World War I was not really an attempt by one group of people to command both of those power centers, that of Europe and that of Russia.

We intervened, as you know, in that war for reasons which are not so easy to find today, partly I think because we instinctively felt that we could not afford to let Britain be threatened,- partly because we didn't like German methods, the invasion of the low countries and the tactics used in the submarine warfare. But in any case, when the war was over and we were faced with the questions of peace, I think we have to recognize that we Americans failed to contribute anything of any particular value or to think out our problems in terms of power relationships at all.

As far as Russia was concerned we settled down to a seventeen year period during which we had no relations with Russia at all and in those days in 1919-1920, the immediate post-hostilities period, we paid very little attention to the Russian problem. As far as Germany was concerned, we ourselves made a completely non-political peace treaty which pursued no political aims in Europe, and we permitted the others to conclude the treaty of Versailles which really did some of the stupidest things that a peace treaty could have done. Above all it smashed the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and in doing so it smashed the only great power aggregation in central Europe which could have competed with Germany. In that way it definitely ruined the balance of power in Europe itself. It left Germany the only great state in central Europe, surrounded by nothing on the east and south but relatively new, relatively unstable little democracies. If any of you want a clear revelation of the connotations of what was done at that time, I would suggest that you get out the books

of the Old French Bourbon historian Jacque Van Ville. I don't know whether all of them are translated into English, but I think one or two of them are. They were written in 1918 and 1920 and they were absolutely astoundingly prophetic. He was an old French reactionary, an old monarchist sourpuss, but he thought this thing out and he predicted with amazing accuracy what was going to happen. He said "This thing won't last, you watch, there will arise a Germany, a powerful Nationalist movement. These new, little countries which have been set up there in the east and in the south will not yet have found themselves. None of them will be powerful enough to stand up to Germany. They will not be loyal to each other. The Germans will play them all against each other and eventually they will be picked off, one by one and the first three to go will be Austria, Czechoslovakia and Poland."

Now that was, I think, the great mistake of the peace-making after World War 1. And it left an unsound situation in Europe in which it was perfectly evident that the Germans would some day take over. Yet, at the same time, it provided enough pin-pricks on the Germans themselves to put them in an ugly, resentful, revengeful frame of mind and to give them a special edge of sentiment and irritation against the West.

During those two and one half decades between the two wars, two main things were happening which were vital to the security of this country. The Russian power center was being developed, for military purposes, by a group of people in Moscow who were, by every drop of their blood and every last

element of their philosophy, the implacable enemies of the Western world. Many of us were reluctant to take them at their word and believe what they said and it didn't cause great perturbation in this country that that should be perceived. In Europe a process was going on by which these very chauvinistic, bitter, desperate Nationalists groups in Germany were gathering their strength, seizing German society and preparing themselves to take over the power center of Western Europe.

In the combination of those two trends we had a double process which was extremely dangerous to the security of this country. I don't need to recount to you the events of the outbreak and the early course of the last World War. The Germans got themselves into a war with both East and West and were afraid to finish that war in the West by the invasion of England until they had liquidated the second power center in the East. They undertook this ill-conceived, politically ill-executed, action against Russia. If they had been politically more astute; if they had thought through their strategic concept, if they had thought through the realities of what they were doing, I think they would have succeeded in the East. I think they would have had the Russians where they wanted them. They could easily have done it; it was only their own mistakes that lost it for them. If they had done that, it would also have been an outcome of the war, certainly no less dangerous to our security than the situation we have today. Possibly it would have been more so, because you would then have had the thing that we must avoid, which is both of those

power centers falling under a single control and especially a control hostile and bitter towards the world of which we form a part here on the shores of the North Atlantic. Actually, of course, they failed, but we can't take great comfort in that fact because the tragedy of this recent war is that the Atlantic nations. (I'm thinking, above all, of ourselves and the British) actually were not strong enough to deal with both of these Eurasian power centers at once. Both of them were, from our standpoint, dangerous, hostile, committed to our destruction. But we were strong enough to deal only with one, and we had to make a pact, a dicker with the other in order to defeat that one. We had to collaborate, in other words, with one enemy in order to destroy the second and out of that collaboration, out of that dicker, has grown the tremendous problem of the post-war era, because the outcome of the war, as we all know, left the power center of Russia moved a thousand miles further to the west. It left it astride of central Europe, left it in physical possession of a portion of the European center of power. It left it in a position where the men in the Kremlin felt that any revival of western Europe, without their permission and except along their lines, would be impossible. It left it in a position where they felt they could over-shadow and intimidate and eventually conquer by political means the remainder of western Europe. I don't think they ever felt that they were going to have to do that by military means. I think they felt that their position on that line from Lübeck down to Trieste made

any revival of the strength of Europe impossible without them. After all the armies of Germany and the armies of Italy were gone, there were no other great armies on the continent. A power vacuum had arisen and they had part of that power vacuum in their own hands. Out of that situation has emerged, perforce, the tasks of our foreign policy from the standpoint of national security in this post-war era.

We have had to do three things. We have had to try, first of all, to stop the Russian political attack on Western Europe and to prevent the seizure of Western Europe by political means, which the Russians firmly expected, as little as one or two years ago, to be able to achieve. Secondly, having done that, (and we have substantially done that now) we have the task of trying to maneuver Russian power back by means short of war, to its natural boundaries, to a place where it can no longer threaten to seize and command the power of Europe as well as of Russia. That is a task on which we are only starting today. It's a tremendously difficult one, a very uncertain one. We cannot be sure that we can do it without war, but we believe that there is a possibility.

These things are not in a time-progression; they all have to be done simultaneously. We have before us also the third task which is then to see that the power of Europe, as Europe revives, does not again fall into the hands of people like the German Nazis, who did not know how to use it, who would do stupid things with it, who would turn it against ourselves and who would eventually probably destroy it.

We have been concentrating, in the last year and a half, primarily on the first of those tasks, which is to rescue Western Europe from Russian political aggression, to stiffen the morale of people there, to cause them to oppose communists efforts, to seize power in their countries. We are pretty well satisfied with the success we have had. After all, during the past year there has been a tremendous change both in France and in Italy. A good portion of the labor movement has been wrested out of the hands of the Communists. Italy has been saved politically through an election which was a tremendous test of strength between the communist and the non-communist elements, and which few people would have ever thought could have been won by the non-communist elements a year ago. Greece, which as little as a year ago still looked hopeless, is today at least not threatened in anyway near the same degree by communist pressures as it was then. You have had elections all over Europe in which the smaller countries have gone very strongly against the communists, in Holland, in Finland and recently in Switzerland. In addition to that, opinion in Germany has turned so strongly anti-communist, by and large, that I think the Russians have given up any hope of trying to seize the power of Germany through the German Communist Party and are working today on other lines. So that altogether we regard the first of these three actions, which I described to you, as having been thus far successfully conducted. In

fact our first objective has been achieved and what we have to do today politically in western Europe is basically a holding operation, namely not to lose ground over what we have already gained. That holding operation is not so simple. We have been faced with something which, to most of us who have worked in the policy planning field in Washington, was unexpected, and that was that within a few months after we basically relieved the causes of economic insecurity and fear in western Europe, these same Western Europeans would turn with almost hysterical emotionalism to a sense of military insecurity. You know that is a very interesting thing. A year and a half ago when we began to talk about the Marshall plan, and examined what could be done about helping Europe, nobody talked about military insecurity and the howl with which we were faced on the part of the western Europeans was "How can you expect us to stand up to Communism when we can't see how we can work ourselves out of our economic difficulties. You can never expect us to be strong anti-communists when we don't know how we are going to eat tomorrow. Give us food and you'll see that we will deliver?" And I notice that as soon as that food was given, as soon as their economic future had some elements of security, they turn around with equal vehemence and declare that obviously it is impossible to ask them to face up to the task of a firm policy toward Russia unless we satisfy their demands for complete military security. The fact that those two waves of sentiment have come in the way they did, leads me to suspect that the basic cause of insecurity

in the minds of the western Europeans is neither the one nor the other, it is really a lack of confidence in themselves. For that reason there is a demand that we come over and do something for them in order to make them secure. I dare say that even if we could, (and we can't) satisfy them on the military security end, they would still find some grounds to come to us and ask us to take over basic responsibility. They are scared, tired people today and they don't really want to face the realities. This demand of theirs for the military guarantee on the part of ourselves is a very unfortunate thing, I believe, and one which is going to present a real poser for us. It is really nonsense and it is too bad that they think along those lines. Their security problem cannot, within the course of the next few months, be materially solved by anything either we or they can conceivably do. For that reason, they would do better, I think, not to dwell upon it so much and to recognize that if that sort of an attack should come that's just too bad. Meanwhile, though, they had better keep their eyes on the ball, which is economic recovery and political firmness and not keep looking backward over their shoulders but go firmly and stoutly ahead along the only line they can go, because they have no alternative. They think they have but they haven't. When the French say to us today "Oh don't stand up this way to the Russians about Berlin the Russians might get mad and attack us." They are inclined to think that we have an alternative. But they have no alternative, none of us have. If we don't stand up to the Russians the

Russians are going to be right back there with that political threat to western Europe. If the French could only see it, they are endangered no less by a communist seizure of France through political means than they are through an invasion of the Red army. Therefore, they really have no choice but to stand up, and if they would do it they would be a lot better off. But we have to recognize that we are dealing here, not with rational fears, but for the most part with irrational sentiments and we have got to be patient, do what we can to reassure them and go ahead with what we are doing.

As far as the second of the tasks is concerned, maneuvering the Russians back then from the center of Europe to their own pre-war quarters or perhaps a little farther back, I don't know. We have made a start on that, more auspicious than anything that any of us had hoped. I am referring here to the Tito affair which is the first real and serious rift in the structure of power which the Russians have set up in Eastern and Central Europe. I can't say to you today whether Titoism is going to spread in Europe. I am almost certain that it is going to spread in Asia, because the prerequisites for it are there. I hope it will spread in Europe. In any case I think that it has given us opportunities for shaping our moves in such a way as to increase the strain on the relations between the Russians and their own satellites in Eastern Europe and to fan the flames of Titoism there, to increase the centrifugal forces which must inevitably work on so wide and far flung a

structure of power as the Russians had. And if we conduct ourselves properly, if we wage effective political warfare, I think we have a good fighting chance of placing such strains on that structure that other countries, in addition to Yugoslavia, will cease to be effective satellites of the Russians. Possibly internal developments in Russia may help us in that respect but we cannot count on them. There is not much we can do to promote internal differences there, but there is a possibility, and only a possibility, that they will occur and that they will take some of the burden off our hands.

Now as for the third task of assuring that the European power center, once free, is in the hands of reliable people. That is one at which we have to work today. We cannot wait for the complete freedom of Europe to do it. We must do something about all these differences which we today have with the French and with other peoples in Europe over policy with regard to Germany - the differences over the western German arrangements - over reparations - the arguments about whether we should use the Germans as an armed force. All those things revolve around this question as to who eventually, among the Europeans, is to control the power of Europe.

We haven't forgotten the lessons of the last war. We know what the Nazis were. And I think its incumbent on all of us today to bear that carefully in mind and not to be led, by whatever we may feel about the Russians, into forgetting what sort of a thing we faced in Berlin in 1941

and 42. We also must recognize that, psychologically, the Allied occupation of Germany has not been successful and that today, three years after the war, the Germans, insofar as they are not utterly apathetic, are by and large embittered, cynical, unregenerate and so far are almost completely untouched by any Western ideas of democracy or moderation. I don't think we can permit ourselves to hope that if we were to turn Europe back to the Germans it would be run in any way that would be satisfactory to our security as things stand today. We don't know; that is still a debatable point. Perhaps this military effort that the Germans conducted, as a second great military effort within the lives of one generation in Germany, has taken the final steam out of them the way the Napoleonic wars took the steam out of France and perhaps they are now ready, as France was ready in the 19th century, to recognize that they are not the people to conquer Europe. Possibly that is so. After all, Bonapartism lingered on in one form or another for fifty years in France and in Europe after Napoleon's death. Perhaps that would be the same way with Germany. Perhaps we will see a sort of a pseudo-Nazism linger on for many years there, but never with quite the same steam that Hitler had. I think that is likely. In that case, we would have to reckon that the Germans couldn't do quite as much damage as they were capable of doing before, but they still wouldn't be much better people to control Europe. In any case, I think we must recognize that that would be an undesirable outcome of things for us if

we were compelled to admit that we had fought the last war for a completely false objective and end up several years after by turning Europe back to the very people we fought the war to keep from controlling it.

A far more preferable alternative from our standpoint would be a federation of some sort in Western Europe in which the cumulative initiative and strength and hopes of the European peoples could be assembled to govern the whole place in one great federated state. That is, in fact, the only alternative that we can seek, because there is clearly no single European power today who has either the will or the ability to take leadership in Europe in the sense of really providing the political push to animate the life and the military power of the entire continent. That being the case, we must be for European Union. We must promote a federal Europe but at the same time we must be realistic and recognize something which the European Allies themselves are unwilling to recognize but which in my opinion is absolutely vital and inescapable. That is that no federated Europe is going to be worth the name unless it finds means to bring the Germans into a whole-hearted and enthusiastic cooperation with the other countries of Europe and utilize their skills, their vigor and their ability, which nobody questions, for the purposes of building European strength.

Now if the French and the others think that they can have a European federation and leave Germany out of it as a sort of a dark corner into which you sweep everything that is unpleasant in the international life of the continent, and

the Germans are going to sit there and accept that status year after year, and that Europe is going to have any strength without them, they are laboring under a great delusion and they put us over the barrel when they take that attitude and say those things. Because if they continue to do that, and they insist on facing the future without the Germans, or take a completely negative attitude toward the Germans, eventually they may leave us no choice in the last analysis but to say "Better a Europe stiffened and united by Germany than a Europe perpetually at the mercy of Russia." I hope that it will not work out that way and I believe that we should be very patient and should never jump to premature conclusions along those lines. It would be only with the greatest of reluctance that, after everything else that could possibly be tried has been tried, that we should ever let ourselves be impelled to that conclusion. I merely point to that as the danger that lies in the line of thought which the French and some of the other Western Allies, sometimes pursue.




Now I can hear the questions in the minds of some of you who would say "Well, now you have talked about the power centers of Europe and of Russia, but how about Asia?" And that question is so important, so legitimate, that I thought I would speak about that especially and try to tell you where I think it fits in. I would hazard the statement that nowhere in Asia outside of Russia, would it be possible to develop a center of power which could really threaten the security of

this country. Now that is a very debatable point and one which you could talk about for the rest of the term but it is a very vital one and we may as well make up our minds about it. Of course the first thing to which people find to turn in this connection is China. And I would just like to point out to you here certain of the realities that we face with respect to China. It is true of course that China has these hundreds of millions of people. We don't know within 50 million, I guess, how many it actually has. It has this tremendous manpower, it has tremendous expansion territory but I merely want to point out here something about its resources in relation to those of the other great power centers of the world.




Chart I shows the potentials, not what exists today. Notice that China is very weak in coal reserves. She is stronger in iron ore but nothing like the others. In petroleum reserves she is almost insignificant. The same is true on hydro-installed capacity almost insignificant, as is thermal installed capacity. These, of course, are all actually existing potentials. Cultivated land per capita is important for reasons which I don't want to go into here, but which have a deep significance with respect to the ability of China to overcome her backwardness and assemble capital, to accumulate capital, and build anything like a modern industry. And the influence that that has on industrial potential is an unfavorable one.

CHART I

INDICES OF INDUSTRIAL POTENTIAL FOR SELECTED AREAS












ELECTRIC POWER ...



C.H.A.R.T. II

INDICES OF PEAK INDUSTRIAL OUTPUT FOR SELECTED AREAS



*YEARS IN WHICH PEAK OUTPUT WAS ACHIEVED VARY BY COUNTRIES AND COMMODITIES. DATA ARE NOT GENERALLY INDICATIVE OF PRESENT PRODUCTION
 **TOTAL ORE MINED WITHOUT REGARD FOR FE CONTENT

849-520

If you will look at Chart II you get a similar picture as things stand today. Coal production is very small, iron ore output is very small, pig iron still less. In none of those respects does China even compare. Petroleum is almost infinitesimal. In every respect what you get is the picture of a country in which it would simply not be possible in present terms, and hardly likely in terms even of fifty or one hundred years, that there could even be developed that combination that I spoke of at the beginning of this lecture, of resources - of capital, - investment - of technical skills - of human vigor-organizational power - which could go to make up major military naval and air power as we know it today. And I do urge you to bear in mind that unless overt groups can develop that sort of power, power on the grand scale, the power to build bombers, the power to build battleships, the power to arm divisions in a modern way, they cannot of course really count in the power relationships of today.

What I am driving at is that whatever else you may say about China, whatever you may think are the prospects of the Communists control of China, I do not see that China can be used itself as a major factor to threaten the United States of America. Even if the Communists controlled it entirely, (and I think is a very dubious possibility that they could) and even if they retained their fidelity to Moscow, once they did control China, (which I think is an even more dangerous assumption) I do not see that once they had it in their hands, they could do

much with it which could threaten the United States from the strict standpoint of national security. We must remember that China and Russia are not complimentary in the economic sense, in the sense of the demands they make for economic development; they are competitive. I can remember Stalin one time during the war, when some American asked him whether the Soviet Union was going to give a lot to China when the war was over, telling that American in effect, "What the hell do you think, we haven't got anything to give China. We have got 100 cities of our own to build in Soviet Far East. If anybody is going to give anything to China it's going to be you Americans." And he was right.

Now you may ask about Southeast Asia. Again I ask you to go over the countries of southeast Asia, look at their resources, look at the stage of their development, look at the stage of their civilization, look at the factors and climate and geography that you have there and see whether you can discover anywhere in Southeast Asia the germs of the development of military and industrial potential along the lines of that of Germany or Russia. Personally, I have not been able to, and I think that when you get south of China and into those areas you come up against realities, which perhaps we may not like to speak of it sometimes because it involves a certain international tactlessness, but which I think we have to face when we deal in strategic problems. Those are the realities of climate and its effect on human beings. I think we have to face the fact that it is only the temperate climates of this earth which have been able to produce a really vigorous hard-hitting civilization capable of developing the resources of the earth in a formidable way. Perhaps you may

find someday that it is only the challenge of having to house and clothe themselves before the demands of winter and of the cold and rigors of climate that have really brought things out of men, things that have enabled them to develop industry. I think we may as well recognize that in most of the tropical areas of the earth there is no great likelihood of a vigorous civilization springing up within our time. Perhaps someday if somebody there can solve the problems of birth rate, the democratic problems, then the problems of public health perhaps you could develop there something resembling the spiritual and physical vigor that has existed in the temperate zones. But up to today we haven't done it and nobody has made any serious beginning at it; for that reason I think you can cancel out a large portion of southeast Asia as a source for the development of power in Russia.

Now you may say that we cannot ignore the possibility that amphibious power, even if it could not be produced in eastern and southeastern Asia, could be assembled there and launched against our country. That is theoretically true but today I do not think that logistics would permit it. Those logistics can of course be changed, of course in time but even if you solved that problem I would submit for your contemplation that from our position today in Okinawa (and providing that we make sure that Japan and the Phillipines as flanking bastions are at least demilitarized or do not fall into the hands of any harmful covert) we should be able to neutralize and prevent the assembling and launching of any amphibious power in the Pacific area capable of threatening our national security.

If I am right in that (and I would suggest you examine that very carefully) important conclusions flow from that for United States security policy in the Asiatic areas. If that is true, you do not need to hold land positions on the Eurasian land mass to protect our national security. If that is true, you can theoretically content yourself with permitting most of these land areas to be in the hands of people who are hostile to ourselves as long as you exercise that power of inhibiting the assembling and the launching of amphibious forces from many Asiatic ports. And I believe that the only ports which come into the question are in the northern regions and are accessible to Okinawa air power. I merely tell you that in order to explain to you why I exclude those areas of the world, just as I do Africa and South America as areas from which military power could be developed today in sufficiently serious dimensions to be a vital factor in the security of our country.

In summary therefore, gentlemen, I would submit the following: The basic problems of United States security is bound up with the two power centers of Russia and of Europe. The former, that of Russia, will probably always be in the hands of people who cannot be trusted to feel any real sense of responsibility for the security and prosperity of the Western world and for this reason we have to regard it as one of our national objectives to see to it that its possibilities for mischief remain limited and particularly that it does not gain sufficient relative strength to encroach upon or eclipse or take over the power of Europe.

The other power center, the European one, is, and will remain for a long time to come I think, the object of a tug of war between two competing elements in Europe. On the one hand there are those who set some store by Western civilization, who still feel themselves to be the bearers of the Roman traditions of law and of order and of moderation, who have some attachment to the mercantile trading world of the north Atlantic area. On the other hand are those, like the Nazis, who represent a deep illness in European society, who are unwilling to accept the restraints and the self discipline which would be necessary for an orderly development of Europe along western lines and who would be willing, if they were to get control of Europe's power again, to repeat the desperate and suicidal efforts already once undertaken by Hitler, to develop that power for purposes of aggression both toward the East and toward the West. We have no choice but to intervene where and when we can in that contest in Europe for the control of Europe's power and to see, if we can, that those desperate elements do not win out. Because they are poor allies for us, their very desperation is the guarantee of their eventual failure. The Russians are sure, as they were in 1939, that if people like that get hold of Europe they will eventually destroy it and the Russians know very well that a destroyed Europe is Russia's prey.

Now there you have the guts of the security problem which I think is the base of this country. It is essential to see to it that the Russian power center is kept weak and that the European power center does not fall into irresponsible hands,

but above all to preserve a certain balance of power between the two and to see that one does not control the other, because as long as that balance exists between those two great centers of power, and as long as each of them has to look over its shoulder at the other one constantly, like a pitcher with a fast man on base, neither will ever be able to risk the diversionary effort of an attack on this continent or on the North Atlantic with which we stand. And in my opinion, we would do well to keep our eyes pretty strictly on this central problem and to remember that in it lies the only major outside threat to our security today. We must concentrate our effort on it and guard against any dissipation of our national effort on secondary objectives which are not of vital significance. We are a strong nation but we are by no means as strong in relation to the trials and tasks that stand before us as a great many Americans are inclined to think and in order to enable us to withstand these trials, it is going to take the greatest possible concentration of our national efforts for the foreseeable future.