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The Navy's reasons for being - an abortive effort to evaluate.

Joseph C. Wylie, NavWarCollege, November 1951.

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Note: (1) This document was prepared in sections and due to the press of time there may be some slight repetition of major arguments. There is also some roughness in the transition from one section to another, which can be taken out in any subsequent draft.

(2) These sections are not assembled in alphabetical order. The order in which they are assembled is:

- A
- H
- C
- B**
- F
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- D
- E

I (included throughout paper)(no section I)

J (included in K) (no section J)

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BY *DF* DNDT. DATE *26 Aug 82*

A In the past few years the Communists, with their power centered in the U.S.S.R., have become increasingly intransigent in their political methods and have also made it obvious that they are willing to undertake military ventures. As the intent and power of the Communist bloc became more obvious the non-Communist world began to draw together in self-defense.

Gradually two power systems have emerged, each with a definite character and each occupying a fairly well defined geographic area.

Geographically, the Russian Soviet bloc consists of contiguous nations, reaching from the Eurasian littoral on the west and southwest, to Asia Minor and the Indian sub-continent on the south, to off-lying islands of the Pacific on the east, and to the Arctic on the north. The Communist Bloc forms a huge land-mass, which relies largely on internal land lines of communication. Politically, this land-mass is bound together by a set of beliefs which are not only utterly opposed to those which the Western Allies profess, but which commit them to the solution of political problems by violence, revolution and war.

The non-Communist world surrounds the Soviet land-mass. These non-Communist lands rely chiefly upon the world's sea-lanes for commerce, LOG's and military requirements. Although these non-Communist countries do not share a common political system they are gradually achieving a degree of unity in the face of the threat which the Communist bloc presents. In this coalition the U.S. and the United Kingdom constitute the chief sources of strength.

The United States can count upon the military and political support of the following countries in the event of war with the Communist bloc:

(Reproduce from current war plans)

The following countries will either remain neutral or will not render effective support to either side:

(Reproduce from current war plans)

There is a possibility that some situation short of total war may develop between the two systems. It would, however, be foolhardy and improvident for the U.S. to count on anything less than total war when confronted with an enemy such as the Communist bloc. The enormous size of this bloc, the nature of its conspiracy against the West, and the experience of two World Wars indicate that there will be almost no possibility of limiting any outright war between the Communist bloc and the West short of a total and all-enveloping war.

In a war of this nature, the United States, because of its *location and capacity* distance from the main theaters of action, will undoubtedly become the industrial center which will supply the main military supplies to the Western world in its struggle. There will thus be an enormous demand upon the U.S. to supply the skilled technicians to operate the complicated mechanisms and logistical systems of modern war. At the same time a greatly increased productivity will be required of the industrial system of the U. S. Such a situation will call

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for the most skillful and intensive use of all the man-power,  
material and technological resources which the U.S. possesses.  
*+ its allies*

Such a war would be "total" in a sense that no previous  
war has ever been.

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H. Strategy is basically not predictable.

Historically, it has been well proven that the moment a strategy becomes excessively rigid it enters a period of decline. By the very nature of strategy, which involves the consideration of literally thousands of different factors, it is not a predictable science. What is successful in one time and place and against one enemy may be fatally inadequate against another.

The range of possible courses of action to be selected by an enemy is theoretically without limit. While in reality our actions or capabilities may serve in part to narrow the extent of his range of choices, we cannot, <sup>because of his great initial potential + political set-up</sup> until the final stages of war are reached, enforce on him a single course of action chosen by us. The aim of our basic strategic plans should be to settle on certain initial courses of action for ourselves sufficient to counter the most damaging enemy initial capabilities, and sufficient to place us in such a military and political position after this first phase of war that we may select a series of supporting strategies which exploit developed enemy weaknesses and bring us in each phase closer to the attainment of the general aims of the war.

For this reason the United States must study each major situation and alternative with a view to all of the possible implications which the situation may contain. <sup>In our military set-up</sup> We must constantly and objectively balance the lessons of the past against the claims of new weapons, the emergence of new situations, and the formations of new alliances and political balances.

This unpredictability of strategy is especially true when considering the unique situation grown from the merging of Marx's communism with Russia's imperialism which, for the first time, has put a single organic political and military machine astride the Eurasian land-mass. The nature of communist aggression, using domestic conspiracy and sabotage as weapons of a stature equal to military force, brings us face to face with a series of novel and unorthodox situations.

As will be enlarged upon in later pages, the Communist bloc has the capability of striking in a number of different directions with decisive effect. Beyond the purely military level, their control of international communism makes them capable of instigating subversion and sabotage against Allied interests throughout the world.

If, for example, the Communists initiate a general war by expansion of a local conflict, such as Korea, they may elect to assume a defensive attitude in areas other than that of actual conflict. From their point of view their strategy might be considered local and limited. Allied strategy, unless it is always to relinquish the potential for offensive to the communists, must be aimed at containment of these local attacks by a strategy which is global in scope and is global in capability.

Since by its internal structure our democracy is incapable of initiating a war, it must thus surrender to the communists the choice of where, when, and under what conditions the war will start. This unavoidable handicap introduces an even larger than normal

element of unpredictability into the formulation of our strategy.

All of these elements of indeterminacy and unpredictability do not mean, however, that the United States and her allies <sup>are</sup> ~~TOP SECRET~~ without great strategic strength and latent capabilities. Paradoxically, the very number of alternatives offered to the aggressive action of the Communist bloc is one of their chief sources of weakness.

Before these weaknesses can be indicated with accuracy and precision, however, we must first investigate the major strategic military alternatives open to both the Communists and the Allies at the present time and in the reasonably near future.



C Strategy and capabilities of USSR and Allies

In considering enemy capabilities it is apparent that the USSR and its satellites will, on the outbreak of war, be capable of half a dozen major moves. All of these moves will be well within their military strength. All of them pose a threat of sufficient strength to warrant our preparing plans for countering them at the earliest possible stage. As our strength develops certain of these alternatives may be compromised or, in certain cases, made impossible. On the other hand by shifting emphasis the Soviet bloc may be able to accomplish any one of them in a much quicker period than now seems feasible. These alterations of strategy we cannot predict, but at the present time there seems little doubt that the Soviet bloc can accomplish the following minimum objectives.

1. The extent of Soviet penetration in Western Europe is dependent on many factors, chief among which are the subsidiary decisions made by the Soviet high command (i.e., whether they divert forces to attempt to secure the northern shores of the Mediterranean, or give greater weight to the drive for the channel ports and the early invasion of the British Isles), the will-to-survive of the non-Communist European nations, and the strength and disposition of the NATO land, sea, and air forces.
2. Campaigns in strength against our sea lanes of communications, especially in the North Atlantic, may be expected to attain initial success, since the USSR, with the initiative, can deploy her submarines to their patrol stations prior to the act which provokes all-out war. The chances of initial success in a surprise mining campaign of ports in the British Isles, especially if undertaken in coordination with atomic bombing attacks, may be considerable.

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3. An atomic bombing campaign against the cities and military installations of the British Isles is certain to inflict heavy damage. Whether or not it can be so successful as to make possible an invasion of the British Isles will be determined by whether or not such a campaign can, in conjunction with the submarine and mining campaigns, succeed in isolating the British Isles from the U. S., and in destroying the British air-sea defense organization.

4. The campaign in the Middle East will face barriers of terrain, mountains and deserts. Establishment of the USSR in Iran prior to the outbreak of full-scale hostilities would greatly simplify the Soviet problems in this region. Seizure of control of the Dardanelles and the Eastern Mediterranean, to deny this area to our forces and to permit sea transport and supply of Soviet forces, would be tantamount to victory in this campaign.

5. The success of atomic bombing of the United States and Canada will be proportional to the emphasis placed by the USSR on the efficacy of this type of attack. The Soviet disregard for human life, as exemplified in current analyses of Russian character, would tend to indicate that the USSR would regard it as a distinct advantage to be able to trade destruction of Russian cities for U. S. cities on a one for one basis. If only one-way flights are now possible for Soviet long-range bombers, it is clearly seen that each such bomber is completely expended, along with its bomb, although the crew may save itself. Such one-way flights are militarily acceptable if either of two conditions holds:

- (1) that the war will be decided at such an early date that no further need for the bombers exists; or
- (2) that there are sufficient bombers available that they can be expended so lavishly.

6. Land campaigns in strength in Eastern Asia, Southeastern Asia, and in India, either by Soviet troops, or by Chinese Communist troops, whether or not directed by the USSR, or by both, will probably be successful in most areas, in view of the tense political situations existing throughout Asia. Successes against the Asiatic islands, Japan, Formosa, the Philippines, and Indonesia, will be dependent on Communist forces gaining control of the sea and air, unless internal revolutions succeed in setting up pro-Communist governments in these islands.

*only name*

The ultimate capabilities of the United States and her Allies, as compared to those of the Soviet bloc, are very large. They stem basically from the industrial and political development of the countries of the Western bloc, as well as certain geographic advantages which the West possesses.

The military capabilities of the United States and her Allies are at this time, however, quite inadequate when compared to the USSR. Further, it will take from two to three years in peacetime for the United States to produce any significant change in her relative military power.

It was officially estimated in N.S.C. 68 that in 1950 we could:

1. Reasonably protect the Western Hemisphere.
2. Protect our bases in the Pacific.
3. Establish and protect necessary lines of communications throughout the world.
4. Conduct a powerful air offensive, including heavy atomic attacks against the USSR. This will not necessarily cause the Soviets to sue for peace, nor will it prevent the occupation of Western Europe. It would, however, reduce the overall capabilities of the USSR and her satellites.

The military power of the United States and her Allies, in 1950, was inadequate to:

1. Protect the United Kingdom.
2. Protect Western Europe

3. Protect the Middle East.

4. Protect the Near East.

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Our military power has been substantially increased in the past year, but not sufficiently to make a significant change in the overall situation.

To sum up: The enemy is Russia and her satellites. This enemy is a land-based power, operating in huge spaces, backed with enormous man-power resources, a self-sustaining economy, based on minimal industrial requirements, interior land lines of communication and military power that is concentrated in her land army. This army now contains  $2\frac{1}{2}$  million men plus 400,000 Security Troops. \_\_\_\_\_ million additional men are trained and are available, on call, in her reserve. Her Air Force is capable of supporting her ground effort, or defending her home-land, and of a newly generated offensive bombing capability built around 700 bombers of the B-29 type. This air force is authorized 20,000 aircraft. Soviet military aviation personnel, including Civil Air Fleet, is 600,000 men. Her naval forces are essentially defensive in character being concentrated largely in submarines. The Soviet Naval personnel strength exceeds the personnel strength of its Air Force, containing 680,000 of which 80,000 are the Naval Air Arm; 275,000 men are involved in coastal defense and naval infantry missions; and 325,000 men are utilized in the operating forces and shore establishment. Inland seas, the Artic ice barrier, and the vastness of Russian territory make it impossible for Russia to concentrate her dispersed naval forces and use them as a vehicle for projecting her military and political aims.

From these facts we can derive what is almost a military axiom: Russia will impose her will, if at all, through the use of her ground forces, with other military elements in supporting roles.

This capability of Russia also suggests what her major vulnerabilities are, and what our major tasks must be.

We must first be prepared to strike reprisal and preventive blows against the vulnerable land-mass of Russia. These must come from many directions, with all our strength, in all combinations and with overpowering effect. Orthodox weapons must be brought to bear as well as atomic weapons; all means of delivery must be utilized. The immediate objective is to present Russia with a widely separated variety of assaults, ranging from atomic attack on her air bases and her more vulnerable industrial and transport targets to swift amphibious attacks by Marines on valuable areas and the immediate support of our allies. The sheer land-mass of Russia, at present a source of her power, must be skillfully and fully utilized to bleed her from as many arteries as possible.

Strong effort must be exerted ~~to save~~ to save the industrial heart of Western Europe. Not only will such a move preserve and increase the morale of our allies there, but it will give prompt evidence to India, the Near East, Africa and the Eurasian fringe that we will not willingly see them go under. Such a move is firmly based on military precedent and principle. Admiral Ofstie in a brilliant piece of testimony has indicated that in precisely such

operations the strategic strength of Germany was most drastically sapped.

At the same time, a sound tactical offensive will reap vast political benefits. Our allies will be reassured that we will not return to atom-bomb them; a number of countries such as Spain, India, Arabia and Yugoslavia, will be induced to align themselves with us.

What must be avoided at all costs is the initial use of any weapon or strategy in such a way as to alienate our potential allies or to sacrifice needlessly to the Soviet land armies valuable industrial targets. Admiral Conolly, while serving as CTMGNELM, and after long and intimate contact with the military leaders of our Western European Allies, commented in 1949 that "...we can (not) afford to concentrate our productive effort on provision for any single mission if that reduces our ready naval combatant strength, our tactical Air Force strength, or our United States Army strength below the levels required for effective action at the start of hostilities."

Most certainly we cannot hope that by the exclusive concentration upon the atom bombing of Russian industrial targets that we can halt the Russian occupation of Western Europe and the Near East. If no strong and feasible plan for stopping Russia at once and by many means exists we may find that her land armies will have achieved their strategic objectives using only "pipeline" and "ready" stockpiles. In such an eventuality we would be faced either with the alternative of bombing friendly populations or *and*

fighting without allies. and either alternative would be a serious defeat.

In brief, our war plans must be based on a strategy which is capable of securing the basic and minimum conditions of strategic success measured in terms of our political goals. They must be further based upon an intelligent and imaginative use of all of our present weapons. Such a strategy must be based upon the fact that while great physical mass may be a source of strength it may also present a "soft underbelly" of global proportions which we have the ability to gut and destroy. But above all we must keep in mind that we must gain certain minimum political goals and that we must not hazard the attainment of these political goals by <sup>depending on</sup> employment of any single weapon or types of weapons <sup>which does not assure</sup> precluding the reaching of our ultimate ends.

Such a strategy, which allows us the maximum flexibility in meeting potential enemy thrusts and is in consonance with our political aims, goes far towards meeting the two basic functions which the NSC and the Executive Branch of the U. S. Government have laid upon the Armed Forces: These are, 1) the support of our foreign policy and, 2) the prevention of disaster.

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B Necessity for balanced forces to meet any contingency.

The training and doctrine of the Communist movement makes it obligatory for its executive group to view war between the Capitalist and Communist worlds as inevitable and unavoidable. The political and military reality make it quite likely that the Communists will present us with an entire range of situations in which we are faced with a threat that is a blending of political conspiracy (as in the case of Malaya and Iran) and outright military adventurism (as in the case of Korea and Greece).

In the event of total war we must be prepared to conduct operations of many different sorts, exploiting our unique strengths to uncover the enemy weaknesses. We must use his gigantic mass to unbalance and unhinge him. All of this must be done with a high regard for our economic limitations, the needs of our allies, and our military capabilities.

For the military strategist this means a clear recognition that modern war is fought in four media: on land, on sea, under the sea and in the air. Offensive and defensive capabilities in each category are needed by this nation and our allies if we are to survive (in a global war). Failure to have ready both offensive and defensive strengths in any of these four fields will cost us dearly.

One of the clearest lessons of military history is the fact that reliance upon a single weapon, regardless of its apparent superiority, is the surest means of eventual defeat. This is all

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the more true when we recognize that such claims for decisiveness today are not based upon modern experience and analysis. There is, for example, no evidence in either our World War II experience or in contemporary fact to assure us that the atom bomb will, in and of itself, assure us a decisive victory.

In addition to avoiding the tempting illusion of "victory through a single weapon", we must also avoid falling into a blind repetition of older techniques. We must not, for example, be trapped into matching manpower with the masses of soldiers which the Communist bloc can throw into battle.

Both history and modern experience then, seem to indicate that our surest chance for victory against the Communist menace lies in the formation of a striking force which is highly flexible, designed to meet threats of all kinds, capable of taking offensive action of many kinds and, most importantly, utilizing our sources of strength while denying the Communist bloc the fullest use of theirs.

This means that we must, first of all, fully utilize our great mobility and fight in areas advantageous to us. Russia's land-mass is actually an island and an island surrounded by water which we can dominate. Our mobility over, under, and on the water gives us an advantage which, when coupled with our strategic air potential, should be indomitable.

Our mobility and Russia's immobility, once the war has started, means that we can seize the initiative to select the areas in which

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we will engage in decisive combat. This same mobility gives us the flexibility to concentrate the necessary superior forces at the point which we will select. This gives us the ability to meet, at our time and place, the Communist hordes and to destroy them piecemeal. When we have selected an area of decision we also possess the means to interdict such an area.

In such battles every media will be used---land, sea, air and under-sea weapons. Every weapon will be used and every manner of delivery will be used. Lack of ability to fight in any media, lack of capacity to deliver any weapon by any media, will take from us the flexibility and mobility which is our greatest strength. Balance, a proper and deliberate balance, in manpower, equipment, training and morale throughout each service and with each of our allies is fundamental to the success of this venture.

The possession of such a flexible and balanced force by the Allies presents the Communist bloc with such a variety of threats and menaces that they will be strained to the utmost in merely defending against them; in maintaining that balance which is so essential to a proper military campaign. The knowledge that they must defend against not one but a multiplicity of weapons and threats will be not only a powerful deterrent against war, but will present the most perplexing type of war for which to prepare and anticipate.

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While the theatres themselves might have quite different characteristics, it is pertinent to illustrate the strategic results of such flexible mobility by actions in the last war. The allied invasion of Normandy was a classic of strategic surprise made possible by a complete domination of the sea access to the continent. There is a greater length of accessible littoral under Russian control than was available for allied attack on the Germans. In the Pacific, the isolation or individual reduction of island strongholds leads to the belief that similar action might be taken in and around the periphery of the vast land-mass of Russia.

Utilizing the mobility of the sea, military strength need not be tied to the narrow confines of an overland route nor to the base limitations of land-based air forces. The rapid altering of plans in the Pacific to exploit developed enemy weakness indicates the potential in the full utility of the sea access to the surrounded Eurasian land-mass.

Let us now examine the role of the U. S. Navy in such a strategy.

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F The use of carrier-air against the "vulnerable zones".

Nowhere is the principle of a balanced, flexible and mobile application of forces better revealed than in the modern methods by which violence can be delivered from the air. While it is assumed that the Air Force will attack the enemy's industry and his communications system associated with it, there is a zone or series of zones behind the various fronts that can be attacked by both Air Force and the air power of the Navy and its seaborne assault forces.

These zones, of varying depths, contain vital communication centers, dumps and storehouses of essential supplies and troop concentrations necessary for the support of the forces fighting in the combat zones. The mobility of the Navy permits quick concentration of offensive effort against the critically sensitive foci in the enemy's support system. The Navy's capabilities to provide close air support to troops and to participate in the tactical support of armies is evident and has been recently demonstrated.

In the early stages of the war, and most later stages, our strategic air forces will be occupied with large targets well in the interior of the Eurasian land mass. It would be neither likely nor profitable to expect the SAC to direct its energies to tactical support missions having a more rapid and direct effect on the course of battle. However, the complete strategic mobility of the Navy would make it possible for carrier-based air to strike not only at the immediate tactical objectives in a battle-area, but also at

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those strategic targets which are in the battle-support area of the enemy.

At present our strategic bombing forces operate either from the continental U.S. or from a series of bases which are being built in the most probable areas of future usefulness. But in the event of the outbreak of a general war these bombers would be severely hampered for a long period until new and more advanced bases could be built for them. This weakness would occur at precisely the time when our maximum strength would be needed in defense against Soviet attack. In a situation such as this the air component of sea power is peculiarly suited to fill and contribute a timely reinforcement until the air-base construction can catch up with requirements and the additional air strength mustered within the expanded complex of bases. The inherent mobility of the Navy's floating bases permits rapid reinforcement in air strength without any additional load on the airbase logistics of a theater. In this field naval air power is complementary to that of the Air Force and constitutes a quick and economical way of augmenting the total military striking power at precisely the time when it is needed most.

Within a flexible strategy, which employs the utmost capability of air power, regardless of its sources, there are many other functions which naval air could perform. For example, although a series of strong bases surrounding the Communist land-mass would be a great advantage to us, at the present time such bases are quite beyond our economic ability to maintain. Short of a total war

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it is also doubtful that we could supply sufficient personnel to maintain such bases. Such bases inadequately manned become a tempting objective for initial thrusts and therefore are probably strategic liabilities instead of assets.

The base problem can only be realistically solved by the exploitation of allied peacetime control of the medium that surrounds the Eurasian land-mass---water and air. This water and air medium offers an avenue of approach to all of the area in which Soviet action is possible. If the establishment of permanent bases on the periphery is not practical then mobile bases, strategically available in the seas surrounding the Soviets, provide a suitable substitute for permanent base sites. Because of their greater mobility they are in many ways superior. Such bases would be supported by fewer and more economically located major bases, while, in turn, they would be capable of establishing and supporting land operations wherever necessary. The high mobility of such bases would be especially important in the early months of a war when fixed-land-bases would become subject to capture in event of tactical defeats.

The use of carrier-based air is not limited, however, to the strategic interdiction of various zones around battle areas and the throwing up of a chain of "floating bases" around the Eurasian land-mass. At a moment's notice such forces could also become the spear-head of forces which could strike at any one of hundreds of targets around the shores of the Russian land-mass. When used with

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*Manuscript for the book "The Navy" by A. J. A. J.*

Marine amphibious troops such raids could range from mere "spoiling" raids to throw the enemy off balance to full-scale operations against large industrial and urban targets.

The combinations in which the composite elements of a modern navy can be used are almost endless; for the moment, however, it is important to note that these forces are today the only forces "in being" which are capable of launching the whole range of violence, from the delivery of atomic bombs to the landing of Marine forces and the tactical air-support of troops, at once and with increasing vigour against the Communists.

When used in such a flexible and imaginative way, the modern navy becomes a tool which can be adapted to an almost infinite number of military jobs, can move rapidly from one ocean to another, can change the entire direction and type of its operation without detracting from the logistic or military support it affords to the other Armed Services.

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G New weapons and the ability of the navy to use them.

Since the end of World War II a number of powerful new weapons have been produced as well as a variety of new ways in which to deliver these weapons. These weapons range from Hiroshima type atom bombs through the new "tactical" atomic weapons and include various guided missiles. As these powerful and expensive new weapons have been developed the method of delivery has come to be of increasing importance. Since so large a proportion of our industrial productivity is bound up in these weapons, it is vital that as high a percentage as possible of such weapons be successfully delivered; the destruction of any sizable percentage of them involves the Allies in a considerable wastage of economic effort.

The new weapons of the present, and the still newer ones of the future can be ideally conveyed and launched from seaborne platforms aboard carrier-based planes. Atom weapons when carried aboard a carrier have the additional advantage of being carried aboard ship to the very fringe of the enemy country with complete air cover in the process. The bomb-carrying planes can then be launched with fresh crews, full fuel tanks and under a fighter-cover that will protect them over most of the flight. Indeed, when the new size and capabilities of atomic weapons are considered it can be seen that naval air is one of the most economical and precise ways of delivering them against a land-mass.



The P2V, with a combat radius of 2000 miles, can be launched from carriers of the MIDWAY class. The AJ with a combat radius of about a thousand miles, can operate from CVB and from CV carriers of the ESSEX class on which the 27A Conversion program has been completed. Both of these planes are capable of delivering the presently available atomic bomb. In the <sup>near</sup> future planes of much higher performance will be utilized to carry the smaller and lighter atomic weapons which will then be available.

Experience during World War II clearly showed that the losses from unescorted bomber missions over enemy territory in which we do not have air superiority are unacceptably high. The British were forced to abandon daylight bombing for this reason. Our Air Force learned the same lesson in Germany, and relearned the same lesson in Korea. The costly assault on Iwo Jima was undertaken to provide a base for fighters found necessary to escort Air Force bombers attacking the cities of Japan.

Navy policy in air attack will continue to provide fighter escort on all bombing missions. As our present capabilities permit, this is contemplated today. However, the present fighter has a speed differential so much greater than the attack plane that true escort of the attack plane cannot be accomplished. Instead, the slower attack plane must be escorted by relays of fighters who reach their support positions independently and at high speed, remaining as escort until fuel shortage dictates that they return to base after relief by another relay of fighters.

Within the next year and a half, and possibly sooner, however, this lack of homogeneity between fighter and bomber will have been rectified by the introduction into service by the Navy of the jet attack plane. When this substitution is made, the attack plane will cruise out and back at best speed for its escorts and the same aircraft will be able to participate in all phases of a mission. Costly relays of escorts, with attendant possibility of missing rendezvous, or, worse yet, missing base on return, will be eliminated. The high speed attackformation of the near future will permit atomic attack to be made by a self-sufficient, mutually-supporting group of homogeneous aircraft, designed to reach the target with attack capabilities unimpaired, and designed to fight the air battle on the way out and back in such fashion that the group can return again and again with equal precision and despatch.

Jet attack bombers in service use will greatly increase the potential of our combat carriers. High speed attack groups will have the capability of striking heavily defended enemy targets with atomic weapons to a distance of 700 miles from the carrier force. The excess of fighters over those now required will be used to provide additional protection to the carrier force, and to make fighters sweeps against enemy defenses, thereby clearing the way for the attack groups. The longer range of the new jet attack aircraft may be utilized by launching them without escort from well outside enemy fighter radius, picking up their escort from carriers operating close in with air groups composed entirely of fighters. Under these conditions, jet aircraft attack with atomic weapons is possible to a distance of 1200 miles from the carrier launching the attack aircraft.

Accuracy of aircraft bombing decreases rapidly with increase of altitude of the bombing aircraft. A study of World War II and Korea bombing accuracy shows that the smaller, more maneuverable carrier bombers are inherently far more accurate than the high altitude bomber. The atomic bomb, especially in its tactical applications, requires accuracy of drop very nearly comparable to that of conventional explosives if the full potentialities of the atomic weapon are to be exploited.

A full appreciation of the potentialities of the carrier task force and its embarked aircraft, potentialities which enable the launching of attacks close to the edge of the Soviet land-mass, attacks in force, with fighter-escort, and from varying directions, makes it apparent that the Navy has available one of the most efficient, precise, and flexible means of delivering atomic weapons.

Results of the guided missile program have been somewhat disappointing to date. A comparison of the present status of guided missiles with the planned development program set up several years ago clearly indicates that we have consistently underestimated the technical difficulties, in both guidance systems and in propulsion, which must be overcome before the long-range inter-continental guided missile of acceptable accuracy becomes a reality.

These difficulties underline the importance, within the next four or five years at least, and probably for much longer, of maintaining our ability for launching guided missiles from bases relatively close to the target, and with terminal guidance from locations similarly close to the target.

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Experiments conducted during the past few years on various types of ships have demonstrated the feasibility of utilizing such mobile bases as guided missile launching platforms. Perhaps the most important navy guided missile for offensive missions is the submarine-launched REGULUS, a turbojet missile which carries an atomic warhead, and which is scheduled for service tests late in 1953.

The fact that the Navy has in being now a mobile and flexible force which can mount accurate and precisely controlled attacks against seacoast targets throughout the world is of marked importance in these times of international tension and imminence of all-out war. The capabilities of this force, augmented by the guided-missile launching submarine, will, in the next three years, be enormously increased, and will enable the Navy to mount attacks of even greater precision, accuracy, and destruction.

D The Classic Theory of Control of the Sea

The preceding pages have indicated several ways in which the flexibility of a modern navy allows it to apply force in widely separated areas and with great precision. This increased capability of the Navy should not, however, allow us to ignore that this flexibility as well as the ability of the Navy to supply over-seas Allied armies is based upon one basic fact: control of the seas.

Because the U.S. and its British ally have been able to maintain control of the sea in two World Wars there has been a tendency to ignore it as a factor in modern war. It is only when that control is threatened as it was by the two submarine campaigns in the World Wars, that it is driven home to us that all of our over-seas strategy is contingent upon maintaining control of the seas. It is significant that the losers of the two World Wars were most vividly aware of how <sup>essential</sup> ~~central~~ to their strategy was control of the sea. The memoirs and interrogations of almost all high ranking officers in the German and Japanese forces revealed that by losing control of the seas the powers were either exposed to economic strangulation or to an overwhelming sea-borne attack, or both.

Although control of the seas has always been a basic, but undramatic, foundation of our military victories, its importance in the present situation is becoming more and more obvious. The Soviet bloc is surrounded by the seas. The dominating access to any

critical area of the world, including the Eurasian littoral, is an access by sea. Any offensive which we can launch against this land-mass must come over the seas. Any attack which it wishes to launch outside of its mass must come over the seas. No contemporary development has been able to dissipate or diminish<sup>in</sup> the fact that control of the sea is still an absolutely essential prerequisite to survival of the Western World.

This control of the sea will be seriously contested by the USSR in the advent of war. Its present submarine striking force far exceeds that with which the Germans entered World War II. In terms of fighting efficiency and technical advancement Russian submarines are greatly superior to the World War II submarines used by the Germans. The Russian Navy, with its considerable air arm, will also contest our control of the seas. Especially will they contest our control of those vital narrow seas which reach in towards the Russian heartland. Our task will be to force the entry as we choose.

The Navy's role will not be ended, however, with merely assuring to us and to our Allies a continued control of the oceans of the world. The nature of a modern overwhelming navy also gives it the power to extend its strength in from the sea. Possessing its own artillery, air and troops, all capable of being supplied by mobile bases and capable of striking at world wide objectives, the Navy can accomplish any one of a number of missions.

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For example, the immediate readiness of the Fleet Marine Forces, trained with the naval elements which give it gunfire and air support, and the availability of the vessels which will transport it under single-service control, give it an effectiveness which is out of all proportion to the numbers of men involved. The speed, mobility and readiness with which this force can be applied is a root source of its strength. It is a classic adaptation of the concept of "force in being" to the mobility of the modern navy.

This mobility, this readiness, was recently given dramatic emphasis in the Korean war. On 5 July 1950, the JCS directed the Commandant of the Marine Corps to send 1 RCT, with appropriate supporting air to Korea; four days later the ships had been assembled and spotted. On 14 July the FMF had been moved 50 miles to a port of embarkation, completed their combat loading, and sailed for Japan. Enroute they were diverted from Japan to Korea. They landed at Pusan on 2 August and entered combat at once.

This high degree of mobility was underlined in the Inchon landing. On 5 July 1950 there were a total of 27,000 Marines in the 2 FMF's. These men were scattered from the Mediterranean to Pearl Harbor. On 15 September, 70 days later, 30,000 Marines were in the Far East and made the assault landing at Inchon.

National war plans contemplate a strategically defensive position in the Far East. Forces, other than naval, allocated to the Pacific-Far East-Alaskan theater are largely static and defensive

in nature. The major emphasis in this area will be naval operations. A strong amphibious striking force, employed in its entirety or by its functional parts, could be a strong deterrent to likely enemy offensive action by means of raids, reconnaissance in force, limited offensive operations, counter-landings and operations in defense of the Alaskan area. Naval Forces in the form of the SEVENTH Fleet have already shown that they could, by a show of force, prevent seizure of Formosa by the Chinese Communists. The threat of offensive action by a balanced striking force in the Far East and limited-objective attacks by this force can be the direct cause of containment of large Russian forces in the Far East, can bleed industrial potential from Russia by requiring continual repair to the Trans-Siberian railway, and can offer tangible evidence of the interest of the Allies in freeing the people of the Orient from Russian domination. The objective would be to bleed Russia at every point possible, to strain her economic potential to the utmost without ever freeing her of the burden or responsibility of administering the areas. The operations would parallel those of Lawrence in Arabia in World War I.

In any offensive phase of naval warfare, the Fleet Marine Force, as a part of the balanced Navy team, offers a new method of applying their force against the enemy. The new method is the landing by transport helicopters of the assault elements of a Marine Division. This will give new freedom in selecting the point



of attack, will reduce the hazards of weather in a landing and will vastly increase the problem of defense against this manner of projection of sea power. While practical for the assault by large forces this method of operation will <sup>also</sup> have countless applications for minor operations, raids, and demonstrations. It has the advantage of vertical envelopment but the entirely new feature of being able to withdraw a force upon the completion of its limited-objective mission by the same manner in which it was landed. It eliminates the normal requirement of committing other ground elements to fight to a junction with the troops landed from the air by providing a reliable method for the withdrawal by air of the raiding forces. Again it will freeze in position many thousands of Russian troops from the threat it presents to their rear areas, thus robbing them from front line missions. Again it is the projection of the power of a maritime nation exploiting by the sea its mobility and its flexibility.

A force such as this need never be limited to the engagement of any one set of specified targets around which the enemy can pre-arrange his defenses. He will have to prepare to meet us at many more places because this force can do any mission which the security of the United States or the interest of the United Nations require.

On 30 June 1952, 3 Marine Divisions and 3 Marine Air Wings will be available for employment as part of the maritime forces of

Size?

this nation. It is believed that a total of 4 Marine Divisions and 4 Marine Air Wings should be available so that up to 2 Divisions and 2 Wings may be under constant employment as United Nations Forces. This will leave a minimum of 1 Division and 1 Wing with each of the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets, thus insuring that balanced striking forces are always available in the national interest. A second land army is not contemplated. Sufficient forces to provide the flexibility and retain the balanced fleet concept is needed. This size is a function of the rapidity of commitment to missions in support of the fleet and the United Nations. Sufficient forces must always be available to permit the flexibility of our maritime power to be retained.

It can be seen that such a naval force, completely integral with its component air, artillery, air protection, mobile logistics, and Fleet Marine Forces would present a threat of the greatest magnitude to the Communist bloc. The Communists would either have to keep their entire perimeter garrisoned, which might well exhaust them, or allow us to launch and carry out penetrations of the most serious character in her flanks. If adequately planned for, such task forces could make the entire land-mass of Eurasia a "soft under-belly."

From the foregoing, it is obvious that the old definition of "control of the seas" has been greatly expanded. Not only is the Navy capable of exercising its most basic task of controlling the seas, but it is also capable of mounting an offensive of the most diverse and powerful sort which can strike at almost any point in the world.

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E. Sea Transport and Its Defense.

In any conceivable future situation, whether it be "cold war" or total war, it will be essential that we maintain our lines of communication and supply with our allies and with our own overseas bases. No development either in existence or contemplated invalidates this basic principle. We must be able to supply our forces abroad and to bring to the continental U.S. those raw materials necessary for the continued operation of our economy.

We must rely on our sea transport for this. Although air transport has made great strides since World War II it is still so expensive, limited and special a means of transport that it can not be considered except in the most extraordinary circumstances. It should be noted, for example, that if the Berlin Air Lift had been supported entirely by air from bases in the United States it would consume practically the entire gasoline output of the United States. Even in Korea where air transport has been employed on a larger scale than in any previous operation only 2% of the total supplies arrived by this method. Although air transport is necessary in some special and limited cases, in any future war we must anticipate moving the vast bulk of our supplies by sea.

In two world wars Germany correctly anticipated that the vulnerability of the sea-lanes of the Allies would be their weakest link. It was in this area that we came closest to losing both of these wars. From what has been mentioned previously it is quite obvious that Russia is fully aware of the importance of overseas LOC's. We can expect her to launch an aggressive submarine campaign

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against our surface commerce. The Navy at this time believes that its ASW development has reached and, perhaps, surpassed the offensive capability of the submarine. At the same time it should be recognized that the ability to supply by sea will involve a long, continuing and vigorous campaign.

Such a campaign will involve a full use of all of the means available to the U.S. Navy. It will be necessary to fight on the sea, under the sea, and in the air to assure that this menace is met. ASW surface craft, submarines, hunter-killer groups and lighter-than-air craft will all be used. In addition, carrier-based air will be used to strike the enemy submarines before they are able to leave their berths and shoal water areas and venture into the open seas. Experience has shown that this is the most efficient method of meeting the submarine menace.

There will be many needs for using the Fleet Marine Forces in this campaign. For part of the pattern of defeating the Soviet submarine effort will lie in holding those land areas which limit the access of the USSR submarine fleet to the open seas and particularly in maintaining control of those land areas which in the hands of the USSR, would deny essential sea communications. The Danish (Jutland) Peninsula area, for example, would be a most critical area not only to limit the staying power of Russian submarines in the Atlantic by forcing them to operate from the Archangel-Murmansk area. Such a mission, which is well within the capability of our modern navy, would have several secondary effects of the greatest importance. It would force a diversion of the

Soviet forces and throw the Soviet time-schedule off balance. It would increase the strike range of allied aircraft operating from fields in this area. It would also bolster the morale of the indigenous populations of the surrounding area.

Other areas which offer maximum opportunities to exploit the navy landing-force mobility and to capitalize on Russian weaknesses are the Bosphorus-Dardanelles area; the Mediterranean lines of communication, including the Sardinia, Sicily-Crete-Cyprus complex; and the Italian peninsula. TOP SECRET

The recent development of means of vertical envelopment by the Fleet Marine Forces in transport helicopters greatly diminishes the vulnerability of concentrations of shipping to atomic attack during amphibious assault operations.

From the foregoing it can be seen that the navy's obligation to exercise the conventional control of the sea and to guard our lines of sea transport, are by no means passive in nature. Indeed, they offer a unique opportunity to accomplish the basic missions and at the same time take advantage of the navy's mobility and striking force to inflict substantial damage upon the Russian armed forces.

[ Let us now turn to our more contemporary battle experience to see if it illuminates any of the problems which the navy will face in the future. ]

K Modern U. S. Navy, its capabilities, nature and future.

Conclusion:

The strategic aims which have been indicated in this discussion assume there will be a navy of sufficient size and strength not only to effectively maintain control of the sea, but also to insure that the mobile striking strength of the navy will be constantly available to meet our total strategic requirements. Although such a navy can be built and maintained as a force "in being" without serious injury to the economic fabric of the United States, the skills and materials necessary for the construction and manning of such a navy cannot be found outside of our continental limits except in the British Commonwealth. A modern navy is an extremely complex organization calling for skills and mechanisms which almost guarantee that the U.S. will have to supply the dominant part of the navy which will be used by the Allies.

This does not mean that other navies, such as the British, will not play important roles. Rather it underlines the fact that in the last generation the experience and materials involved in maintaining a global navy have been gradually concentrated in the hands of the English-speaking world.

This tendency places tremendous responsibilities upon the U.S. Navy, both present and future. It means that the Navy must be prepared to not only meet direct and indirect threats in the immediate

future, but that it must also possess the potential for expanding to meet the tasks which will flow from our support of our Allies and over-seas bases in the case of a global war.

The strategy indicated in this discussion is uniquely equipped to meet the primary obligations which the National Security Council has laid upon the Armed Forces. These are, as we have indicated, 1) the support of our foreign policy and, 2) the defense against disaster. These represent not only the settled and legal opinion of the Executive Branch of the United States Government, but they are objectives which are well within the capability of the United States Navy to attain.

As we have indicated throughout the bulk of this paper the Navy, by nature of its extreme mobility, its "force in being" and its comparative economy, is ideally suited to the needs of the United States in a situation short of war. In the period of the "cold war" it is now our established policy to support our Allies throughout the world whenever they are threatened by Communist aggression. There is a strong possibility that the Politburo may choose to implement its aggression by such covert means that Russia itself is not involved in a general war; it may choose to impose its wishes by a series of "Koreas" throughout the fringes of its present power. Our foreign policy is clearly committed to a containment of such aggression.

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In support of this containment policy the Navy is uniquely equipped quickly to bring to bear not only the advantages of control of the sea, but also to launch offensives utilizing air-power (up to and including atomic weapons delivered by air), sea-borne artillery and strong amphibious forces. In the present stage of our relations with the Soviet bloc it would seem that no other branch of the Armed Forces is capable of so quickly bringing effective force to bear at such widely scattered points. At the same time such force can be maintained for long periods of time without undue cost to the U. S. economy. The forces already exist, they are independent of expensive over-seas bases, they are highly mobile, and they can, in most cases, be quite decisive.

In the interim period of "cold war" the use of sea-borne forces will also have distinct political advantages. The unrest and discontent both within Russia proper and its satellites can be inflamed to the point of open rebellion if, in the initial stages, our force is applied with a scrupulous regard for military targets. If in the small-scale aggressions, which we must contain, we are forced to rely on atomic attacks on industrial and urban areas we can only alienate those peoples who would, in normal circumstances, be hospitable to our cause and welcome the opportunity of overthrowing the Communist apparatus that is now fastened upon them. As we have indicated earlier, the people of Western Europe, Asia and the Middle East would much rather be supported by forces which

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are capable of striking quick, powerful and decisive blows without ruining the economic and social fabric of their life, than by weapons which indiscriminately disrupt and destroy their entire society.

In that unpredictable period short of total war the Navy, with its integral air and Marine forces, is a tool uniquely adapted to these ever-changing situations. Indeed, at the present time we have no other form of force which has so high a degree of "political utility" as the Navy.

The Navy also possesses the potential effectively to implement the second obligation imposed on the Armed Forces by the National Security Council, namely, to "defend against disaster." In the event of total war this would mean that our Armed Forces must be prepared to fend off blows which would have a disastrous effect upon our national life and which would isolate us from effective contact with our allies.

In the event of a total and global war the Navy could, in addition to assuring control of the seas, undertake strong "spoiling" attacks against the Soviet aggressor. These attacks could take the form of air strikes against the tactical advances of the Soviet armies; they could take the form of strategic delivery of atom bombs against the industrial heartland of USSR. Navy forces could also be used to mount a sea-borne attack by ground forces around the entire periphery of the Eurasian land-mass. In the event that the war occurs sufficiently far in the future the Navy will be a primary source of guided missiles, delivered at the minimum range and with the maximum precision. In all of these offensive

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actions the Navy would have it's integral logistic support and would constitute the most flexible means of bringing pressure to bear against the vast extent of targets which Russia would present.

It is an undisputable fact of history that world power without sea power is impossible. Developments of the last decade have also made it obvious that the sea is much more than an infinitely variable system of LOC's and commerce routes. It has become the medium through which the most flexible, mobile and powerful elements of American strength can be delivered at all points around the globe. Sea Power has passed from a passive, denying role to that of offensive power of the greatest strength.