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GALLERY, Daniel B.
15 April 1953
"Command Leadership"

Gentlemen, the subject of our lecture this morning is "Command Leadership." You've been involved in the study of Human Relations and it is apparent, that in an officer's life there is hardly anything more important than Command and Command Leadership. I'm sure you'll agree with me that we're most fortunate in having RADM Daniel B. Gallery to give us this talk this morning on "Command and Command Leadership." I can think of no one with a better background and who had demonstrated his abilities along this line more than ADM. Gallery. He has written several books and many articles and in every one of them, you will find that in many many instances in which he expresses Command and the value of Command Leadership that sometimes in a rather light vein but it all comes back to the fact that Leadership is the biggest part of our life. I take great pleasure in welcoming RADM Gallery back to this platform.

I consider it a great honor, as any officer would, to be asked to come here to Newport and address the class of the War College. I must admit I would have preferred an easier subject than this one that I have, "Command Leadership." This subject is, of course, one of the most important things that we have to think about in our profession, but I take the platform this morning with some because you people of course are making Command Leadership your life's work and you've been successful at it, otherwise you wouldn't be here this morning, so that puts me in a rather difficult situation of lecturing to a group of experts on their speciality.

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Now don't think I come here before you as an expert, this morning, except in the sense that they define an expert around the Pentagon; namely, an SOP with a briefcase from out of town. However, if there is anything in my own experience that can be useful to you, gentlemen, I'm certainly glad to share it with you.

Now, the subject of Command Leadership covers a wide field ranging all the way from that of a Petty Officer 3rd Class to that of a Commander-in-Chief. I will restrict myself, this morning, mostly to that of the level of the captain of a ship.

To talk about Command Leadership in a high command level is a little bit beyond my own experience. I'm sort of groping my way through that field myself right now. And besides it seems almost impossible to lay down anything except a few broad general principles about the upper echelons of command. The methods of exercising top command seem to vary with each individual. For example, what similarities can you find among our top leaders during the war - Admiral King, Halsey, Nimitz, Mac Arthur, Eisenhower, Bradley, and Patten. There are several different men who, so far as I can see, are totally different and that the methods which work for one would not necessarily work for the others. In fact, I think the only general principle that you can lay down about command on that level is to surround yourself with good people, delegate authority to them, and, as long as they have your confidence, to back them up to the limit. And when you get right down to brass tacks, I guess that formula applies to

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the top management in any field of endeavor, whether it's military, political, or industrial; the higher you go, the more you have to depend on your subordinates.

Actually I think it takes more leadership to be a good captain than it does to be an admiral. In fact, I think that the captain of a big ship occupies the top spot in this world, so far as personal leadership is concerned. The flag officer has a large staff helping him and his personality isn't often felt as directly as that of a skipper. He doesn't personally make as many decisions which directly affect the performance of his forces as a ship's captain does. I think an outstanding captain is practically sure to be a good admiral, and that a mediocre one has little chance of being one. So I'll stick mostly to the captain's level in this talk. On that level you can look at the thing from several points of view.

For example: How do you qualify for command leadership in the first place. How do you prepare to assume that leadership.

Well, you do it by experience, by training, and by what you gentlemen are doing here now--by professional study. You prepare for command by going to sea and rubbing elbows with ships, seamen, and with the problems that arise at sea.

I can readily imagine a captain of industry, such as the president of the United States Steel Company stepping directly from his office into a flag officer's billet and doing a fairly good job of it, even at sea, if he has a good staff,

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but I cannot conceive of him stepping into the shoes of the captain of a big ship; the skipper has to make too many split second decisions based on his own knowledge and experience.

We all know that the performance and proficiency of a ship depends to a very great extent on the ability and performance of one man--the captain. I would say that the captain supplies something over 50 per cent of the ship's total performance.

You can change a ship from an efficient fighting unit overnight into a weak sister just by changing skippers. An efficient and well-trained ship with a skipper who can't make up his mind or who can't handle the ship can be practically useless in a task group. And on the other hand, a ragtime sloppy ship will straighten out pretty fast if she gets the right kind of a skipper. I think we all agree that hot-shot skipper with a crew of recruits will get much better results than a veteran crew with a clumsy skipper.

Now at the risk of saying some things that are pretty obvious, I want to begin with some generalities. First of all the purpose of command leadership is to accomplish whatever mission is given to your command and to get the maximum possible results from your ship. Let's get that straight right at the beginning because it is very easy in discussing command leadership to get bogged down on side issues and to confuse means with the end. The end that we're after is success in battle. There are a great many things that

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analytic that such as the kind of weapons and equipment that you're given to fight with, the kind of orders and information that you get, your own professional confidence, the luck of the battle, and last, but perhaps most important, the morale of your command. Of all these things the only one over which a skipper can exercise much control by the time he gets to be skipper is morale. And in that I include the state of training of your ship. Now that word morale is a highfalutin word and everybody is in favor of it. But there has been a lot of sloppy thinking about it and many people don't know what it really means - so let's take a look at the dictionary. It says, "Morale--prevailing mood and spirit conducive to willing and dependable performance; steady self-control and courageous conduct despite dangers and privations based upon a conviction of being in the right and on the weight of success and upon faith in the program and in leadership." That is the definition you'd find in the dictionary and I think it's a very fine one. I'm glad I looked it up because it puts things very much better than I could improvise myself. It gives the real criterion by which morale should be judged, "dependable performance and courageous conduct despite dangers." It tells a lot about how to achieve high morale, "conviction of being in the right and faith in the program and in the leadership." Note that there is nothing whatever in that definition about

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"all night in and beans for breakfast, or about USO Shows and canned beer." To have high morale, it is not absolutely necessary to have a carefree happy ship, although that usually is the means to achieve the end. But we're after is an efficient fighting ship that can and will accomplish any job she is given despite great odds.

I think all of us will agree that high morale is the most important and vital thing in any military organization. Napoleon said, "In war, morale is to the physical as three to one." But a lot of people think morale is high just because everyone likes one another and never a cross word is spoken. They confuse morale with health and comfort of the crew, which again is merely a means to an end. I've seen some outfits that were fat, dumb and happy, but they would throw away their guns and head for the bushes if you hollered "boo" at them. And I've also seen disgruntled outfits where no one spoke to each other that would fight to the last ditch if the enemy showed up. I don't think the First Marine Division was very happy during the retreat from the Chosan Reservoir, or rather I think the marines call it "that advance to the rear." Isn't that the correct way of phrasing it? But anyway those marines came out in good order bringing their equipment and their wounded with them, covering the retreat of other friendly forces, and doing a job in the customary grand marine style. Those marines must have felt that they were pretty badly used. They were thoroughly disgusted but the morale was very high indeed. Now just what is it, that creates this

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kind of morale, in the correct sense of the word. Let me say right here, that there is no one great secret, no universal high road to success, and no magic formula that will work for everybody. Your methods have to be suited to your own personality and what works for one man may not work for another. Subject to that qualification, there are, I think, two things that are most important:

- a. Confidence in the leadership
- b. Loyalty to the organization

Those two things are closely related and to some extent, but not entirely, each depends on the other. The way to win the confidence of your men is simply by demonstrating your own professional confidence. You must, of course, have confidence in yourself, based on previous experience and training giving you accurate knowledge on how to operate and your ship to the best possible advantage. In addition, you've got to have the initiative and force to put your knowledge into practice. It's a trite old saying that "nothing succeeds like success." But that is certainly true as far as winning the confidence of a ship's company is concerned. Success breeds more success by increasing confidence and catering to the natural desire of a ship's company to be proud of their ship and to brag about their accomplishments. The more things a captain can do himself, and do well, the better. A snappy

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approach to a tanker gives the boys something to talk about, so does going alongside a dock without a pilot (if you don't knock the dock down, doing it).

There is such a thing though, as overdoing personal leadership and becoming a prima donna instead of a team man. I've known captains who have the intense loyalty and confidence of their crew and who would be ideal men to send off on a lone wolf job that took a lot of initiative and guts, but whom I wouldn't want to have in a task group under my command. Personal loyalty is a fine thing but it can be carried too far. Loyalty to the organization is what we want. In my opinion, the outstanding example of the best kind of loyalty is that of the marines to their corps. I don't know what it is that the marines do, but they do something to everybody who puts on that marine uniform long enough to get through boot-camp that makes the kid feel he belongs to the greatest fighting organization in the world. As a result, the marines are just that. Personal loyalty to company officers, no doubt, plays a part in this; but loyalty to the corps is the big thing because that can be passed along from one leader to the next.

Now, coming back to leadership for a couple of other examples of a sort, I refer you to the Caine Mutiny. If you haven't read this book, you should. It has caused a lot of controversy in the navy, but whether you approve of it or not, it presents two very interesting studies in leadership.

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The first skipper of the Caine, Debrese, ran a very ragtime ship, disgracefully dirty, and non-regulation. I doubt if his men had, what we would call, proper respect for Debrese or for anything else. But Debrese was a competent seaman and whether he had the respect of his men or not, he had their confidence. His ship was an efficient one which could do any job that was given, and do it well, except it couldn't possibly pass an admiral's inspection.

Now when you come right down to brass tacks, what's wrong with running a ship this way in time of war. Well, one thing wrong about it is that a ragtime undisciplined outfit blows up under pressure; another one is, that it throws an unfair load on the good men who have to carry the loafers on their back. The ship may succeed for a little while in this condition but certainly not because of it. In a taught regulation ship, the loafers have to produce and they're the only ones who really suffer by the change. The final thing wrong about a ragtime ship is that it ruins the men for service in any other ship. If they were transferred from the Caine, it would take a long time to delouse them of the sloppy ideas they had gotten there, even though the Caine could do a job. In other words, Debrese's failure was in his duty to the rest of the navy. Debrese was a successful skipper but a poor naval officer. He thought only of his own ship. Sometimes pride in their own ship makes the people from that ship obnoxious characters to those from other ships. There is

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really very little harm in that, but there is a lot of harm in ruining people for service in any other ship by letting them get to slipshod and non-regulation as Debrese did in the Caine.

The second skipper of the Caine, Quiege, was a horse of another color (in fact I wouldn't even say he was a whole horse). Debrese was slack and ragtime but he got results. Quiege was strict, utterly selfish and incompetent. He tried to cover up his deficiencies by being a martinet and he had neither the confidence nor the respect of his men. The ship under him was much worse than under Debrese and could do nothing right. Now while on the subject of the Caine mutiny I would like to say that I disagree with those naval officers who take a dim view of this book because they think it's bad navy publicity. I think that the book tells both sides of the story, even though the emphasis may be on the bad side. But anyone who reads the book with reasonable care and an open mind, I think will wind up with the impression that the navy is an efficient, fair, and good outfit to belong to. I think Admiral [redacted] summed it up very well when he said that he found it an interesting book and that he found characters in the book, all of which he had met during his forty years of service in the navy. But he said that the one thing he couldn't understand was how in the world the author was able to meet all of those guys in two short years and on one ship.

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Now going on to examples of other kinds of leadership, we have an example, let's say in General Patton, of the inspirational, swashbuckling type. Some of his contemporaries, in their mean words, tend to poke fun at him, but I think deep down they envy him because his outfit certainly did a job. However, I don't recommend taking him as a model because we are not all Patton's, and there is no use trying to be. Many of us can neither swash nor buckle and we just make ourselves ridiculous if we tried to. A ship's company are very quick to detect any false pose which you can't back up. I don't recommend slavishly imitating anybody no matter how outstandingly successful he may have been, because each one of us must use his own method adapted to his own personality and limitations. For two totally different, but equally successful ship captains, I give you Admiral King and Admiral Halsey. They were great admirals too, but I'm talking about them now as ship captains. They had the Lexington and Saratoga respectively about twenty years ago and both ran fine ships, but by totally different methods.

When Admiral King took command of the Lexington, she was a very ragtime ship indeed (in fact if you read about some of the things that use to go on in the Lexington, in the book, you'd say that's impossible, it never happened, but, anyway, let's just say she was a very ragtime ship when he took her over). The very day he took over right after he had gotten his orders and had command of the ship, he called

a conference of his heads of the departments in his cabin. When they were all assembled there, and had been waiting a few minutes, Admiral King emerged from his innersanctum with the navy regulation book in his hand and he just tossed that out on the table and announced, "Gentlemen, this is my platform." Then he stood there, glared at the assembled crowd around the table for a minute without saying a word, and then said, "That's all gentlemen, thank you." That was the way he started off. And when Uncle Ernie said something like that, everybody knew that he meant it for sure. He was tough but he was fair. He could hand out 500 hours of extra duty at the mess without batting an eye, but he was a very competent skipper. Now of course this was before the days that we had this alleged Code of Military Justice thrust on us. Anyway his people had confidence in him and he ran a good ship.

Admiral Halsey, on the other hand, was the paternal type, known to all hands as the old man. He had the affection of his men which Admiral King did not. He was a fine seaman and he also ran a good ship.

So here we have two totally different types of men getting equally good results by entirely different methods. Maybe the Lexington would have been a better ship, if Admiral King had had more genial personality; on the other hand, maybe it took a stern task master to straighten her out. All I can say is that the methods were suited to the personalities of the men using them and to the different circumstances prevailing on the

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Lexington and Saratoga at the time.

Command leadership is judged on a performance basis and the payoff is in results not in methods. The methods will often influence the results but about the only broad statement that it is safe to make on leadership is that leadership is whatever it takes to put life and soul into your ship and it varies with different men and different situations. Different ships, different .

I said that nothing matters except results and in war time that is certainly true, but methods can influence the results. I said the ship depends mostly on the skipper's performance. If the skipper delivers his part, a big chunk of the crew's loyalty necessarily go along with it and it will be a fairly good ship, no matter what methods he uses.

Now there are various tricks of the trade I have found useful in doing this. I'll give them to you for whatever they're worth.

One of them is to get up in front of your crew periodically and talk to them. Give them a chance to see and hear you and find out how you think. When you do this, you don't have to deliver a flowery oration on a global subject, but you always must find something to say that is worth listening to. Find out about some gripe which the crew may have and if you don't see fit to change things, explain why they've got to be that way. It's not a sign of weakness to get up and explain

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a standing order or a policy. When you tell a man to get a haircut or to sound general quarters or to back both engines, you don't explain. Those are orders which are executed immediately and that's the end of it. But a standing order or a policy is different. The people will always perform better or more intelligently, if they know the reason for things. So if you got a good reason, get up in front of your people and explain it. If it's just one of those policies that has no reason, then change it. Some of the talks that I gave to my crew were on the subject of first, getting back from liberty on time; one was the facts of life talk to a very young crew about keeping away from the fairies that hung out around Norfolk; and one was about security when we were towing the U505 home. One subject that is always good (the crew is always interested in) is the future movements and operations, as far as security permits. The toughest talk that I ever gave the crew was on the Hancock right after the Japs surrendered. Everybody on the Hancock figured that because of the long time in the forward area and the combat record, etc., that the Hancock would be one of first ships sent home. I had just taken over the command before the end of the war and didn't know the crew very well, in fact this was the first time I ever talked to them. It was my job to get up one night, right early in the game, and explain why the Hancock, instead

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of being one of the first ships to come home was going to be one of the last ones. Well that was a tough bill of goods to sell and when I got through I was ready for anything down there on the hangar deck from boos to vegetables. I'm not going to claim I got an ovation at the end of this talk, but I did get a round of applause which I still look back on as meaning more than any other one I ever got. Now the reason the crew applauded, I think, was because they appreciated getting the straight dope from the head man, instead of getting it by scuttlebut. As I say, I was brand new on the ship at the time and looking back on it, I am sure that making that talk and breaking the bad news to the boys myself did me a great deal more good in their eyes than harm.

Now, what I've been talking about here is not a daily broadcast over the public announcing system on current events or operations. That's done on a lot of ships as a routine matter and it's a very good thing too. But it's not the same as the old man himself getting up every now and then and having a heart to heart talk with his crew.

Another very valuable faculty is that of remembering names, at which, I'm sorry to say, I'm not very good. The quickest and easiest way to make a very small cog in your ship feel that he is important and that you are a very great man, is for the skipper to call him by name when he speaks to him. It's just human nature that there

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is nothing anyone likes better than to hear his own name correctly pronounced. It pays off out of all proportion to the effort involved. It's an absolute must, of course, for the skipper to know every officer by name and for the division officers to know every man in his division. Whenever I inspect a ship, nowadays, I require the division officer, as he goes down the ranks, to announce the name of each man in his division as he goes by. That's something which I suggest to you, gentlemen, when you get command of a ship. Require your division officers to do that and you'll find that it makes them sweat for a while, but they very soon get so that they can announce the names as they go along. You can do that at your weekly captain's inspection.

Another thing that we did on the ships I commanded and which I think contributed importantly to the morale of the crew was the daily morning prayer. Every morning at sunrise when at sea, and at colors when in port, word would be passed on the loud speaker, "Attention to morning prayer." All hands would stop whatever they were doing, uncover and face the bridge while the chaplain said a brief, non-sectarian prayer. I'm convinced that this was a beneficial thing and I don't see why we should be bashful about doing it. After all, we all profess to believe in God and the motto of our country is, "In God We Trust." Why shouldn't we take time out at the beginning of each day for a half minute to put our affairs in his hands.

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At any rate, this daily prayer idea seems to me to be one of those things in which you can't possibly lose and you have quite a bit to gain, especially with a young and inexperienced crew a long way from home.

Another thing I find is worth doing is to inject a little salt and humor into the way that you run the ship's routine. Now a little bit of that stuff goes a long way and it's easy to overdo it. Again it has to be suited to the particular circumstances and personalities involved and there are plenty of subjects and situations on which the skipper can't afford to be .

Now, all through this talk, I have been emphasizing that there is no one great magic formula of leadership and there are few general principles which will apply equally well to all situations and all personalities.

I've been saving for last one of the few principles that which I think does apply universally. It is this; that the best way to win the full loyalty of your crew is to make the welfare and success of your ship your major mission in life as long as you are in the ship. Now perhaps at first glance that sounds like a statement of the obvious, but there is more to it than meets the eye. Note that I say the "welfare and success of the ship" not of yourself. That is the key to getting your crew into the frame of mind which makes them do things that may seem impossible. It makes the difference between a mediocre ship and a good one and between a good ship and an outstanding one. The present American sailor is a pretty smart unbree and

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it doesn't take him very long to find out whether the Captain is in there pitching for himself first or for his people. As soon as your crew knows you are pitching for them, you're in. You can spend most of your time in your bunk, if you want to and the boys will heave around and make you look good on everything that comes up. I said that the Captain's performance is over half of the ship's total. Some captains who haven't got the professional ability to supply their full share, make up for it by getting the complete loyalty and support of their crew. Now of course, the ideal situation is when you find the captain who does both, and then you got a Nelson or a John Paul Jones. Nelson and Jones had crews who were the riffraff of the waterfront, and it was much harder to win their loyalty than it is to working with the high type men that we have in the navy, today. But they did it. It should be much easier for us to do this now than it was for them.

Now you have got to be willing to go all the way on this deal and sacrifice your own welfare to that of the ship. And it's a lot easier to fool yourself on a thing of this kind than it is to fool your crew. You've got to back up your subordinates and when the occasion demands step up and take the rap for them. That isn't easy to do, because naturally we're all anxious for promotion and would eventually like to be flag officers. It sometimes comes hard to do something which you know is for the best interest of the ship, but which may look like it's against your own personal interests. It may seem to be a paradox but

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your own personal interest will nearly always be best served by refusing to cater to them. So if you know that something is good for the ship, but think that maybe something else might be better for you, I would follow Omar Khayyam's advice "take the cash and let the credit go; nor heed the rumble of a distant drum." Luck plays a very large part in success on this earth in any line of human endeavor, and this is certainly true of the navy today where, let's say, only one out of twenty captains who have already gone through selections several times can get to be a flag officer. I don't think that anyone who gets there will claim even to himself that he made it on sheer ability to his own undivided efforts. Too many things happen over which we have no control, even though we often like to kid ourselves that we earned all the good breaks by our own personal efforts and that the bad ones came only when luck took charge. So my theory is that when you put the interest of your ship above your own, you're rigging the odds in your own favor. You get a lot of people helping you to roll the right number and maybe even dice for you to prevent them from coming up the wrong way.

Finally, there's no greater feeling in this world than to command a good ship on which you know that you've got the whole ship's company behind you. After you have done that, you can say that you have had a successful naval career, whether you ever get to be a flag officer or not. In fact you can go a lot further than that, you can say that you have had a successful and useful life on this earth.

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Well, now I'm told that now comes the tough part here where you gentlemen can pitch me straight balls and curves and _____ and I'm suppose to knock them back. I'll do my best.

Q. LCdr Smith: Admiral, my question concerns the new inexperienced captain during peace time. Now he has nothing to judge the morale of his ship as he would in war. For example, if he's officer of the gig. Now the fact that he has a few mast cases and he hears no grumbles about the chow and the seamanship exercises satisfactorily, are those criteria to judge the morale of the ship?

A. Yes, I think so.

Q. Or just how does he judge the morale of the ship.

A. On their performance. So I'd say that the criteria which you named are among the important ones.

Q. Cdr Hathaway: Adm. Gallery, remembering the impact of the fitness report on an officer, do you recommend showing the fitness reports to the officer? In connection with that on leadership and _____.

A. Well, that's a tough one. I don't know. I would say that that depends very largely on the captain's ----it varies with individual captains. There are some captains who can do it, and others can't. My experience has been that on most ships that I have served in, the captain doesn't show it. Well, of course on the system that we have in the navy now, I don't know whether I would recommend it or not. As a matter of fact, in general I have not followed that practice of showing. Of course, in general, we mark all fitness reports _____ and high. If you take say a couple of hundred fitness reports, just take a group

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like this, and average up all of the fitness reports you would expect that you would wind up with an average report, or maybe, from a group like this which is especially selected to come to the War College, a little above average. I think, in general, the average officer gets marked much higher than that. So if you are going to mark, you might say, real honestly and conscientiously, give everybody exactly what you think, it might be pretty tough showing those reports. I don't know, that's a problem that each individual has to figure out for himself.

Q. For your information, we had a lecture by R. N. Smoot on "Career Planning" and this is one of the subjects which he brought up, and Adm. Smoot gave some good examples why as a general practice or as a regulation, it shouldn't be done. He felt that we would get, as a result of that, a better grading of the officer in the fitness report than we get today, and I think that your experience is the same as mine, that if an officer is good, you look him over and you want him to be sure to get a good mark all the other officers in the navy and consequently you lean on the high side and you don't actually go into his little idiosyncrasies, that although are high here, as you would in a report that you didn't show him or didn't seriously endeavor to give him, what you consider, his grade in every category. Adm. Smoot also brought out that the reports are available to you after they are in Washington and (this is my first appearance down here, I'll take a minute if you don't mind). But one of the things that I would impress on all of you is to not fail to go to Washington

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and look your fitness reports over, and this is particularly true before your coming up for a selection. There have been several instances in which officers' reports were fouled up by similar names or by letters that had gotten into their jacket by mistake but were brought to the fitness report board, and in several cases had succeed^{ed} in going to Congress to have the pass over rectified on that _____ but we've had several cases in which they have not succeeded but actually were victims of material in their selected jackets not pertaining to them or were erroneously in there, and you owe it to yourselves to visit Washington whenever the opportunity offers to go to your record and look at it. You should not let many years go by without a survey of your record.

Q. LCdr Riordan: Admiral, in the practical point of view, I guess we all have to make out fitness reports, the two _____
loyalty to the
proposition is the/system and your loyalty to your own people. Now, personally my average is a little high, higher than the average. My average I would say in the old form will come toward the top 20 per cent and I was just wondering how you thought of a practical way to _____.

A. Well, it's a tough decision that you just have to work out to your own satisfaction. You are torn between two loyalties loyalty to the system, and the navy as a whole, you might say, and the other is the loyalty to the people who are doing the best they can for you. I think most of us are inclined to lean too far toward the second one and not enough toward the first.

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Q. Cdr. Kinsella: Admiral, on this same subject of showing the fitness reports to your officers, I feel that if you do not show them to the officers, particularly in the cases where officers aren't measuring up to your standards, that practice is diametrically opposed to your theory,^{tc} which I agree wholeheartedly, that your interest in the ship should come first because frequently by being forced to show the officer the unpleasant facts of life, you, not only as a commanding officer will more thoroughly examine that report and feel more justified in the report, but you will also be taking steps to raise the standard of performance in that officer by acquainting with the fact that he is not doing his job and tying that in with the fact that that is reflected in his records as it goes to Washington. Do you care to comment on that, sir?

A. Well, that's perfectly true and of course you are required to show a report which has any unfavorable matter in it, that is if you mark an officer unsatisfactory in any respect, you are required to show that to him and let him comment on it.

Q. I understand that sir, I was referring to one that might not be as good by comparison to another officer. In other words, the old form where we had the 10 per cent bracket most everybody thought they were doing a good job should be in the 10 per cent bracket and get down the the middle 40 per cent not constitute an unsatisfactory fitness report, there weren't many officers that were proud to get one like that

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A. That's right. Again, that depends on the particular circumstances. If you think that showing a report is going to improve his performance, then I would say by all means show it to him. But of course there are some people who just belong, say, in the middle bracket and they're never going to get out of it. So I don't know whether you do him any good by showing it to him or not.

Q. Admiral, my question is one of the--your opinion is is restricted _____ gimmic to solve the problem. The problem is, you're commanding officer of a ship which has several divisions on it and you are interested in improving the appearance at Saturday inspection and maintaining a high level of that appearance and the gimmic is that as you inspect each division, you assign it a relative standing and the division with the highest standing is excused from the succeeding inspection. The question is, do you consider that an honest gimmic or is it a dishonest gimmic, or is it a good one?

A. I see nothing wrong with it at all. I think it's good.

Q. Admiral, I'd like to get back to "morale". You gave a definition which is the best I've ever heard up until the definition.

A. It's not original. I picked that out of the dictionary.

Q. Up until I heard it, the word morale meant so many different things to me, and it really means ~~so many~~ different things to people in the service, especially since the _____ during the last war which contributed to morale, like USO Shows, etc. It has gotten so that I felt that

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I felt that commanding officers of units thought that the goal for their unit was and every unit was good morale. And morale is so difficult to measure, sometimes you don't know when it's bad or it may be good and you'll never know it. I recommend substituting for the goal of the unit effectiveness in place of morale because morale is so hard to know when you have it, and effectiveness you know when you have it, and effectiveness you know when you're effective by your more competent means of measuring it. And I think the factors which lead to morale can be defines as liberty, recreation, a strong athletic program and things like that, down to a certain _____ which you can give wholehearted attention to instead of looking around in the dark, wondering if you have it and maybe not knowing if you do have it; whereas a ship that is effective has to have good morale and a ship with good morale necessarily is not a good ship but one that is effective must have good morale. Would you comment on that please?

A. Well, I would say that effectiveness is the measure of your morale. If the ship can and does do everything that she is suppose to do, well that's the proof of the pudding, the morale is high. I don't mean by that, that everybody goes around happy as a lark and they all love each other and that sort of thing, but it's just that when you come right down to it, the proof of morale is the performance of the ship.

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Q. Admiral I have a couple of questions I would like to ask you about. One is, your comments on the use of the request mast ~~mas~~ aboard ship. My thoughts are organizational for all types of ships. The second is this uniform problem; tailor makes ~~vv~~ regulation blues.

A. Well, what is it you want to---

Q. First, request mast. The second, is the problem of tailor makes uniforms for the sailors as against the regulation blues.

A. All right, now what about request mast?

Q. I want to know your thoughts on having it at all, and _____ to effect the leadership and morale aboard ship?

A. Well, request mast is something--a custom that goes way back and still followed so far as I know and it should be followed. A man should be allowed to come up and make reasonable requests. On the business of tailor makes ~~vv~~ issue uniforms, well, I can't tell the difference between them, myself. I mean as long as the thing is reasonable and looks well, I've always figured that if a man was interested enough in his personal appearance to go out and spend his own money on a tailoredmade uniform, which met the regulations, that's all right. Of course, if he comes up with some ~~sootsuit~~, that's something else.

Q. Admiral Gallery, I recently read an article in one of your _____ Saturday Evening Post by Captain Gallery who had one of the large carriers off Korea. Did you happen to read that?

A. Yes, I did.

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Q. I wanted to ask your opinion about his method of achieving discipline on his criteria _____ along with the war.

A. All right

Q. In your personal opinion was this good for the navy as a whole, for the war effort due to the fact perhaps _____

A. Well, I think it was good judging it by results, only. The Princeton certainly did achieve results and she could do anything that she was called upon to do, which was the reason why the ship was out there. So I'd say that the methods used there were successful and were good.

Q. (Pertaining to the above)

A. Well, that is a problem of course, but after all I think you have to think of first things first, and when you have command of the ship run it so that you will accomplish best results during your time there. You can't be thinking too far ahead and trying to do the next man's job too.

Q. Admiral, I think in the last few years, it has been generally recognized that the military _____ hand salute becoming more and more laxed both among enlisted men and junior officers. My question is do you attach any significance to this, do you think in the modern navy it's anything to be concerned with?

A. Well, I'm in favor of people saluting when they're suppose to and the decline that you speak of, is just an indication of sort of general laxness in growing up, which I deplore. I

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think that people should salute when military curtesy calls for a salute.

Q. Admiral, granting that this is a command problem _____ human relation problem and that morale and effectiveness are extremely important, granting too that the commanding officer should work for the good of his ship, what happens when a commanding officer takes over a ship in which the morale is low and which the effectiveness is low and coincidental with that, his crew is sloppy and getting in trouble all the time; he wants to put the pressure on. Obviously the first thing he has to do is straighten them out. Then he is faced with the problem, if I straighten these boys the way I should, the captains mast or what you referred to as the new code of justice, even that can be a little bit tough. If he makes the punishment fit the crime in all cases, is he going to have the respect and the admiration of the crew?

A. Well, I think he is, yes, he may be unpopular for a while but you mustn't confuse personal popularity with high morale. That's one of the things I've been trying to say here, that's wrong. He can be personally unpopular but as long as he makes clear to his people that there is a legitimate reason for these things and that the efficiency of the ship is going to benefit in the long run, I think that after a preliminary period of unpopularity, he will get the respect and confidence of his crew. That's one of the penalties he has to pay for having command, that he has got to go through that period

and work it out.

Q. Admiral sir, what is your opinion of the book "The Cruel Sea" in connection with the subject at hand?

A. Well, I found it a very interesting book. I didn't like the way _____ brushed the U.S. war effort under the rug. I thought he disfigured his book by that. There was one thing in the book that I just couldn't swallow and that was where they sent a little corvette back to rescue survivors from a ship that has been sunk and when they get back there ^{they get a ping on their} /sonar and cut lose with a salvo depth charges that kills everybody in the water. I just couldn't go for that at all. But I thought it was well worth reading.

Q. Admiral, this is the small ship problem again, on a ship without a chaplain, would you recommend that the commanding officer say daily prayer?

A. I think so, yes. Of course in my situation, I have big ships and always have a chaplain but sometimes he was on leave when we were in port and we just had the officer-of-the-deck do it. For many of them, it was the first prayer they had said in years and years.

Q. Admiral, there has been a lot of sniping by Congress and newspapers against all the armed forces. How do you think that affects the morale and leadership problem?

A. I think it's hurting the morale of the officers, and I think this alleged Code of Military Justice was a sad blow at the morale but I see it's five minutes after twelve if I ever get going on that, we'll be here until five minutes

after one, so I'd better pipe down on that. I take a dim view of it though. You can count on that.

Q. Admiral _____ talk recently in a discussion including an article by Baldwin to the effect that present ships' operating schedule, take the Atlantic particularly because there is no war over there, are getting so stiff that they're more or less undermining best efforts to send a commanding officer to maintain the morale of their ships. Do you have any comments on that?

A. Well, I think I saw this article of Baldwin, it was four or five months back, wasn't it? And it seemed to me that he went overboard and became a sort of a sob-sister in that article, I didn't agree with him.

Q. My question ties in with the one that was just asked. It seems to me that there is a growing conflict and demand, you might say, on the officers aboard ship, particularly say the division officers, in the sense that real morale requires a certain amount of personal leadership and personal guidance. You mentioned the division officer knowing the names of all his men and so forth, while on the other hand there is a technological advantage that the navy has to deal with increased the demands on those--same officers to study their own fire control gear and ordnance equipment and whatever specialized equipment they may have there in the department increases and the problem of training their men to handle the complex gear increases and the secondary associated problem of the increase in paperwork, the reports required on the particular gear, it seems to me, sir that well, say in a destroyer the division officer level or even the head of the department level,

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The problem is getting so that when enforced there is so much paper work and study to do there isn't time for what the naval officer recognizes as the more important part of the thing, the development of morale and knowing the man personally. It seems to me this problem is going to increase rather than decrease as the years go on.

A. The only comment I can make on that is you say it's getting so there isn't time for the most important thing which is the personal leadership. I don't think I'd put it that way. I'd say there isn't time perhaps for both things and you have to make a choice between which one you are going to do. In that case I would say the choice is pretty plain. You neglect your paper work rather than your interest in your crew. Of course somebody is going to crack down on you if you neglect enough of the paper work, but the way you put it was that there was not time for the most important thing. Well, I can't agree with you on that. There's always time for the most important thing, and you give whatever time is left to the things which are not most important. It all depends what you yourself determine is the most important for you.

Q. I just wanted to comment on Capt Gallery's article in the Saturday Evening Post. I was aboard the ship. It wasn't a non-regulation ship by any manner of means. What I think he meant was the pressure that was put on the ship was so heavy that it didn't leave time for everything. We did the most important things first and then iron out the details. The crew is not so different that another skipper would have any

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inking that the article had been written.

Ada Gallery, I want to thank you for coming down here and sharing your experiences, giving us something to think about. We certainly appreciate your frank and direct answers to the questions.