

THE RISE OF SOVIET POWER

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by

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Mr. President, Gentlemen:

As I understand it, my task this morning is to discuss The Rise of Soviet Power, but I am going to give it a rather different twist this morning than I have in the past. I understand that this recent book of mine has been assigned for reading and it seems to me unwise to traverse the same kind of ground that the book itself is concerned with. So, what I would like to do, today, is to talk about some developments which have taken place since the death of Stalin. But, before I do so, I would like to give you at least a brief characterization of the Soviet regime as it evolved over the last third of a century.

Despite some illusions which still persist in some quarters the Soviet Union, obviously, is not an egalitarian Workers' State in which class privileges and all forms of discrimination have been abolished. It is, instead, a fully-developed totalitarian system in which ultimate power resides in the hands of a small party elite, whose authority is all-embracing and without limits.

The formula of totalitarian rule, as it is crystallized in the Soviet system, and as it crystallized under Stalin, is not a simple formula. It is a fairly complex one, and I think its complexities are not always fully appreciated. I would say that it consists of a calculated mixture of terror, of bureaucratic, Party and administrative controls, of careful use of incentives, and of heavy reliance also on indoctrination.

First, the terror element. Through a system of institutionalized, mutual suspicion, constructed primarily around the Secret Police and its network of informers, Soviet society has been atomized and fragmentized; independent thought has been discouraged and suppressed; and the possibility of conspiratorial action against the regime has been reduced to a minimum.

Second, there is the administrative bureaucracy, which serves as the transmission belt by which the objectives of the ruling group are translated into actuality. There is also the Party bureaucracy, which parallels the administration, which infuses the police and the armed forces, which serves as an instrument of control to check the activities of the police and the administration, and which is also used as an instrument of indoctrination to mobilize popular support for the regime.

Third, there is a carefully graded incentive system-- a system which represents a far cry from the egalitarian

aspirations of 1917; a system which is directed toward two major objectives: first, by compensating industry and loyalty by penalizing indolence and apathy, this system is designed to contribute the efficiency of the Soviet productive mechanism. But it is also designed to do a little more than that. It rewards the elite elements in the society and in the Party, the police, industry, science, and the arts. It gives them special privileges and purposes, in that way seeking to cement their allegiance to the leadership. That is to say, emoluments compensate for the absence of freedom. And for the prevalence of surveillance, conformity is enforced by the positive sanction of material rewards, as well as the negative sanction which the police exercise.

Then there is the fourth element of indoctrination--unremitting indoctrination--which operates as a device in a one-party State to manufacture consent and which seeks to dissipate dissatisfaction. The effectiveness of indoctrination is based on the virtual sealing-off of the Soviet Union from outside contacts and on the assumed inability of most Soviet citizens to make meaningful comparisons with the outside world. So, counting on this kind of enforced isolation, the propaganda organs of the regime constantly reiterate the Soviet Union as the most progressive country in the world. They say that Western Capitalism is decadent and crumbling; that workers abroad are oppressed and exploited; and that the voice of the

future is the voice of Moscow.

Marxist themes are fused with native pride and national appeals through a new hybrid of Soviet patriotism, which seeks to tap the wellsprings of national sentiment while continuing to stress the superiority of the Soviet social order over all of its competitors. This, in brief, is the totalitarian brew which Stalin concocted and which is used to extract maximum effort from the people, while never surrendering the powers of discipline and control over them.

What are the sources of strength in this control system? First, it has enabled the Soviet leadership to concentrate a maximum of scarce resources on high-priority objectives, on heavy industries, on military strength, on nuclear power, while sacrificing consumer interest, mass welfare, and so on. Second, it has permitted a high order of tactical flexibility in foreign affairs. Since the leadership is largely free from the constraints of public opinion at home, it can pursue its power objectives abroad with great maneuverability and with an appearance of monolithic solidarity in the face of divided opponents.

The extent to which the Soviet ruling group has been able to capitalize these advantages is a matter of record in which, I think, there is no point in deprecating. It has given the country a strong, heavy industry base and it has built up

a powerful war potential. It has carried through a program of rapid industrialization, which has a very considerable appeal to some intellectuals in Asia and other underdeveloped areas. It has utilized its military power to consolidate its dominion over Eastern Europe. It is presently coordinating its efforts, with its Chinese ally, to nibble away at Indo-China and other overripe colonial morsels in Asia. Its outposts in France and Italy are massed parties which have won an ascendancy over the trade unions and which command the electoral support of from one-quarter to one-third of the population.

Contrary to the expectation of many observers, the death of Iosef Stalin registered no real deterioration in the Soviet power position. Indeed, I think one would have to say that his successors have pursued their objectives in the last year and a half with a subtlety and a sophistication of which Stalin toward the end of his life was incapable.

To understand the course which Soviet domestic policy has run since Stalin's death, it is essential to recapture the background out of which it emerged. At the end of World War II, the Soviet Union was a pretty battered and tired country. But, despite that, Stalin accorded top priority to the reconstruction and development of heavy industry and let the consumer goods' sector go. Achievements in the heavy industry area were impressive, but they were purchased at a price. Shortages of

consumer goods and housing continued to plague the mass of the Soviet population. Agricultural output lagged far behind their needs and their wants. Pressure on the peasant to increase production yielded unsatisfactory results. Indeed, what they had instead was the flight from the countryside to the industrial centers. The problem of supplying the urban areas remained acute and the strains of post-war reconstruction were evident on every side.

The death of Stalin posed a series of major problems for his heirs: (1) There was the issue of the succession and how it would be met; (2) there was the problem of determining the direction of the new regime and of stabilizing its authority; (3) there was the problem of priorities and economic development--whether capital resources should continue to be concentrated primarily on heavy industry and armaments or whether some effort should be made to gain popular support by expanding consumer goods production and housing; and (4) there was the crisis in agriculture--the urgent need to increase food output and to gear the delivery programs of the collective farms to the demands of industrial advance and urban mass welfare. These were among the major challenges which Stalin's successors confronted.

What I would like to do in the time that we have is to analyze the way in which they have been responding to these challenges.

The first important issue was the succession. The death of Stalin left a power vacuum which had to be filled. As we know, Stalin left no testament and he designated no heir. Yet, I think there is reason to believe that at the Nineteenth Party Congress, in the fall of 1952, Stalin inaugurated, or sanctioned, a series of maneuvers which were intended to strengthen the position of Georgi M. Malenkov and the Party apparatus in the race for power: the choice of Malenkov to deliver the main political report of the Central Committee, a report which before that Stalin had never surrendered to anyone, and the relegation of Vyacheslav M. Molotov and Lavrenti P. Beria at the Congress to subsidiary roles provided, I think, one index of Stalin's design. A reorganization of the Party High Command at the Congress also appeared to reinforce the position of Malenkov and the Party officials. There were no representatives of the armed forces and no representatives of the police (aside from Beria) in the Presidium. The composition of the Presidium suggested that Stalin was determined to subordinate both of those men to the top Party command.

During and after the Congress, evidence began to accumulate which pointed toward a deterioration of Beria's position in the hierarchy of leadership. The designation of a Party functionary, Semyon D. Ignatiev, as the new Minister of State Security was at least open to the interpretation that an

effort was being made to limit various controls of the political police.

Then, on January 13, 1953, came the announcement of the arrest of the Kremlin doctors. This was accompanied by a statement that "the agencies of State Security did not discover the doctors' wrecking terrorist organization in time." This was as close to a public rebuke to Beria as it was possible to conceive in the Soviet system of communications. It was particularly menacing because it was followed by a reminder that the security agencies should have been particularly vigilant in view of the earlier doctors' plot in the late 1930's, during the Great Purge--a plot in which H. G. Yagoda, the head of the N.K.V.D. was alleged to have been involved and for which he was executed. The grim overtone to this reference seemed to augur rather poorly for Beria's future health.

It is impossible at this distance to know whether the Kremlin doctors' plot was a provocation aimed at Beria. But weight is lent this interpretation, despite Mr. Harrison E. Salisbury (and on the basis of others), by various action after Stalin's death in dismissing the case against the Kremlin doctors as a crude M.G.B. fabrication and also in securing the dismissal of Ignatiev as Minister of State Security and as Party Secretary. If, as appears plausible, efforts were already underway prior to Stalin's death to limit various power, or even



to eliminate him from the leadership circle, it now looks as if Stalin's death brought this campaign to an abrupt halt at a point where Beria still represented a force with which to reckon and where it seemed necessary to present a united front to the outside world.

By the same token, the build-up of Malenkov's strength, which seemed to be gathering momentum in the post-Congress, pre-Stalin death period, still fell far short of undisputed ascendancy when Stalin died. The reconstitution of the Party Presidium, after the death of Stalin and the disposition of Government and Party officers, implied a negotiated settlement in which Malenkov, Beria, and the other members of the old Politburo were powerful enough, together, to determine the governing arrangements but in which no one was in a position to dictate completely to the others.

You remember that the appointment of Malenkov as Chairman of the Council of Ministries was soon followed by an announcement that the Party Central Committee had voted to grant his request to be released from the duties of Secretary of the Party Central Committee. The none too subtle efforts of the Party's journal, PRAVDA, during the first weeks of the new regime, to suggest by way of doctored photographs that Malenkov was the heir apparent suddenly ceased (you remember there were the photographs of Stalin, Malenkov and Mau, together, the last

one a "doctored" photograph. There was a new emphasis on collegial leadership, in which the triumvirate of Malenkov, Beria and Molotov emerged as the leading figures of the new regime. In other words, the maneuvers of the early days suggested a determined--ant at least temporarily successful--effort to circumscribe Malenkov's power to prevent him from donning Stalin's mantle and to distribute authority within the old Politburo group.

So far as we can unwind the story, the next stage in the struggle involved an effort by Beria to expand his jurisdiction and authority. That campaign opened with the announcement, in April, that the Kremlin doctors' plot had been a hoax and by the dismissal of Ignatiev as Secretary of the Party Central Committee.

Then, in mid-April, came the news of a dramatic thorough-going purge of the Georgian Party and governmental organization. Beria's directing role in the purge was frankly acknowledged and the purge was accompanied by the reinstatement of a number of various henchmen who had been removed in an earlier purge of the Georgian Party organization. In this case, one saw Beria sort of reaching out into the Party domain.

In June there came another very dramatic step. Melnikov, the Ukrainian Party boss, had continued to trumpet the virtues of Malenkov in the Ukrainian press after PRAVDA

had given the signal to end the campaign. So, in June, Melnikov was removed as first boss of the Ukrainian Party organization. It looked as if Beria was "on the march." As could be expected, the effort of Beria to expand his dominion from the police into the Party deeply alarmed his colleagues in the Presidium. We cannot, in the nature of things, know what the precise counter-measures were which they were able to take. But I think it can be surmised that they united together against him, that they rallied their support in the Party, that they took steps to ensure the loyalty of the armed forces, and it also looks as if they made an arrangement with Beria's deputy in the police, Sergei N. Kruglov (who later succeeded him), to subvert Beria's position in his own domain.

In any case, on the 10th of July the Soviet press carried the announcement that Beria had been removed from his governmental and party posts and expelled from the Party as an enemy of the people. Let me just read you the relevant paragraph from the PRAVDA announcement:

"Beria's evil scheming to seize power began with trying to set the Ministry of Internal Affairs above the Party and Government and to employ the agencies of the M.V.D.--both in the center and locally--against the Party,

its leadership, against the Government  
of the U.S.S.R."

A lot of other sins were piled on his shoulders. He was accused of undermining the collective farms, of creating difficulties in the country's food supply, of seeking to sow friction among the peoples of the U.S.S.R., and of illegality and highhandedness, and of having been an agent of the British Secret Service since the year 1917. Curiously enough, no specific reference was made to the failure of Beria in the M.V.D. to anticipate and prevent the uprising of June 17 in East Germany, although it was suspected that this may have been one of the handles which gave the other members of the group an opportunity to come to grips with him. I think that most of the charges against Beria can be dismissed as typical Communist hyperbole. But the one accusation which does carry conviction is that Beria sought to utilize his base in the police to move out and to attain a position of supremacy.

As a result of the frustration of this design, Malenkov, who spoke on behalf of the Party Presidium in the condemnation of Beria, emerged with greatly heightened prestige. The arrest of Beria was followed by a purge of his supporters; first, in the Georgian Party organization and then in the other republics of the Caucasus. Party organizations were instructed throughout the Soviet Union to reassert control over the M.V.D.

at all levels. What you got was a purge in the Secret Police which extended right down to the regional and district organizations, which also extended into the foreign organizations, and which, as a kind of incidental dividend, yielded us a few police defectors.

The last chapter in the Beria story unfolded just about Christmas Eve, 1953, when the Soviet press announced that Beria and six associates had been executed by a firing squad after a secret trial.

The downfall of Beria elevated Malenkov, chief rival for supremacy. But it did not necessarily guarantee that his leadership would henceforth go unchallenged because the purge of Beria was accompanied by two developments which I think are worth noting and which might conceivably provide some threat to Malenkov's future status as first among equals. The first development involves the rise of Nikita S. Khrushchev in the Party hierarchy, and the second grows out of the significant role which the Soviet armed forces played since the death of Stalin.

In September, 1953, PRAVDA revealed that Khrushchev had been elected First Secretary of the Party Central Committee. This is the position which Stalin always insisted on hanging onto. The significance of that announcement is not easily unraveled. Some assume that it may mean that Khrushchev functions

merely as Malenkov's deputy for Party affairs. But it is also possible, at least, that the new First Secretary will seek to use the very considerable patronage powers vested in his office to build a Party machine of his own and to assert his own claims to supreme authority.

Signs of activity on Khrushchev's part have not been lacking. There have been a number of quite important changes in regional and local Party leadership in the last year. We have also seen Khrushchev doing a great deal of traveling, both in the Soviet Union and in the satellite and allied areas. There is no hard evidence that the Party purge, which has been initiated under Khrushchev, will develop into a challenge to Malenkov. But I mention that because it remains a possibility which cannot be altogether foreclosed.

The second development--the prominent position assigned to the armed forces since Stalin's death--has been interpreted by some observers as raising the implicit threat that Bonapartism will be the next stage in the evolution of the Soviet regime. Indeed, Salisbury, in his recent series of articles in THE NEW YORK TIMES, even suggests that Marshal Zhukov is there sort of pulling the strings in the anteroom and that he represents the real power behind the throne. I think that this is a very, very dubious interpretation. But certainly there have been a number of developments which point

to an increased dependence of the new leadership on the army.

The recall of Marshal Zhukov from relative obscurity in the provinces and his elevation to the post of First Deputy Minister of Defense certainly provided an indication of the regime's felt need for army support. The role of the Beria purge is also worth noting. There was rivalry between the armed forces and the M.V.D., and it would appear as if Malenkov relied heavily on the counterweight of the armed forces to check these élite military groups at the disposal of the M.V.D. Weight is lent this interpretation by the important role which was assigned to the army marshals and generals in the condemnation of Beria by the designation of Marshal Konev as Chairman of the Tribunal which sentenced Beria to death and by reports which we have had of a substantial shift of functions on the military side from the M.V.D. to the Ministry of Defense. Undoubtedly these changes contribute toward a strengthening in the position of the armed forces. But it remains to be seen whether they are more than an accidental by-product of the Beria purge or whether they can really provide a springboard for an independent bid for power by the army marshals and generals.

I think that it can be taken for granted that the Party High Command has a pretty vivid awareness of the dangers of "Bonapartism." It is not unlikely that it will continue to

use its political generals and marshals; that it will use its Party organization in the army; that it will use a reorganized M.V.D. to nip any potential military conspiracy in the bud. There have been some interesting shifts in the regular army command which have taken place since the arrest of Beria which may indeed be prophylactic measures taken to discourage independent political activity by the military.

Since the Beria purge, Malenkov has emerged as the chief spokesman of the new regime with Khrushchev playing a very strong role--especially in the area of agricultural policy--and with Molotov appearing to exercise a new-found independence in the area of foreign policy. The official theory, which continues to be reiterated in the Soviet press, is that the leadership is collective (it is always in terms of the "group"), but I think it needs to be remembered, too, that it was under the guise of this theory that Stalin consolidated his own power. Five years passed before collective leadership under Stalin was transformed into the leadership of the vorsch (the chief).

There is much--too much--that we do not know about what is going on within the circle of this ruling group. It is certainly not clear yet whether the Beria purge was the last act in the resolution of the leadership crisis or whether it is merely the first act in a continuing drama. If, up to this point, the operations of collective leadership appear to be



proceeding with relative smoothness, I think it must always be borne in mind that the show of unity in a totalitarian system may conceal the most profound internal cleavages.

To sense the distance which the new Soviet regime has traveled since the death of Stalin, it is only necessary to recall the references to the necessity of preventing panic and disorder which accompanied the announcement of the new government. The first response of Stalin's lieutenants to the crisis was to submerge their differences, to rally the forces of national unity around the Party and Government. The old Politburo stalwarts moved into their agreed places at the head of the Party and governmental machine. Faced with the uncertainties of the transition period, faced with what they conceived to be the necessity of wooing popular support, they embarked on a policy of concession. "Peace" and the "advancement of popular welfare" became the new slogans of the new regime.

In March, they announced an amnesty decree. They followed that up, on the First of April, with a substantial cut in retail prices. On the 3rd of April, the Kremlin doctors were released and a PRAVDA editorial promised that all cases of official highhandedness and lawlessness would be rooted out. In May, for the first time in many years, wheat flour was placed on daily sale in government stores in Moscow and in other principal cities. In June, the state loan (which is

voluntary in form but actually compulsory in application) was cut in half.

Columns of all Soviet newspapers began to fill with articles promising more consumer goods, better housing, better restaurant facilities, closer attention to workers' grievances, and so on. This campaign culminated in Malenkov's speech to the Supreme Soviet in August, in which he elaborated government plans to expand the production of consumer goods, to improve the housing situation, to provide additional incentives, and to stimulate agricultural output.

As the domestic policy of the new regime unfolded, there was a marked effort to disassociate it from its Stalinist predecessor. It almost seemed as if the new leadership appraised Stalin as a liability rather than as an asset. While occasional laudatory reference to his achievements continued to appear in the press, there was a noticeable tendency to play down his role, to elevate Lenin to a more prominent position in the Communist Pantheon, and, indeed, by the very course of policy, to repudiate Stalin. By implication, if not expressly, the new course seemed to repudiate this Stalinist legacy of depravation and sacrifice. The attack on the cult of the leader, the denunciation of police lawlessness in the Kremlin doctors' case, and the constant expressions of concern for the welfare of the Soviet citizen carried overtones of anti-Stalinism which were

probably intended to free the new regime from the onus of Stalin's unpopularity. Tactical as these measures may prove to be, they probably served the new regime well by facilitating its acceptance and by giving it a breathing space to consolidate its authority.

This brings me to the consumer goods campaign. I would like to say a little about it because I think it is somewhat misunderstood. The new leaders undoubtedly sensed the dissatisfactions engendered by Stalin's failure to make adequate provisions for meeting consumer needs. Yet, the new regime also faced a dilemma. In determining priorities for economic development, they could continue the Stalinist drive from maximum industrial expansion at the cost of prolonging consumers' sacrifices, or they could shift the emphasis by putting more stress on the production of consumer goods at the cost of a possible cut-back in expenditures for heavy industry and armaments.

At the beginning--uncertain of their own support and perhaps persuaded that an increased flow of consumer goods would buttress their popularity and would also perhaps operate as an incentive to increased industrial efficiency--Malenkov and his colleagues determined to throw a sop to the consumer. Improvements in the standard of living became the new keynote of domestic propaganda. Targets for the production of consumer goods were revised substantially upward. In order to meet the

expectations which had been aroused by these promises, during the second half of last year the new regime did considerably step up its imports of consumer goods.

Although there has been a great deal of emphasis on this increased availability of consumer goods by increased production of consumer goods, I think it is important to emphasize that this is only a little thing and that the main emphasis is still on heavy industry. The rate of increase for the year 1953 for steel was 10% while the production for that year was 38 million metric tons of steel. The rate of increase on oil was 12%, with production of 52 million tons. Coal was a little less, with an increase of 6% and production of 320 million tons. The spectacular increases in the year 1953, so far as consumer goods' production is concerned, has been confined to what we call "consumer durables": 125% increase in the production of television sets; 59% increase in production of refrigerators; 100% increase in the production of vacuum cleaners, and so on. But those percentages are somewhat misleading, since the base of production for the year 1952 was a very, very small one indeed and, in terms of consumption of materials, this does not amount to very much. The quantities are small and, because of the high prices, most of the increased production will go to the elite categories of Soviet society.

So far as mass consumer goods (or goods in wide demand)

for the year 1953 were concerned, even if you take the official figures that have been released, the claimed percentage increases are far less impressive. For example:

Cotton fabrics	5%
Hosiery	4%
Leather footwear	4%
Butter	3%
Fish	3%

These are the articles of mass demands. Here, the percentage increases which the regime itself claims are not much more than enough to cope with the increase of population.

On the other hand, when you get into the area of heavy industrial equipment, the percentage increases are very much more substantial:

Steam turbines	40%
Turbo-generators	47%
Locomotives	163%

I give you these contrasts because I think that it is important not to be misled by this consumer goods campaign. Let us not forget that the main concern of the new leadership, as with Stalin before, is still with heavy industry. We must be careful to see this current consumer goods campaign in perspective. Some concessions have undoubtedly been made,

but the primary emphasis is still on heavy industry and armaments.

The most serious problem which the new rulers inherited was the crisis in agriculture. We had some pretty good notions about it even before they released their official figures, but it was very welcome for those of us who were trying to interpret it to get these official figures. What Khrushchev released, among other things, in the fall of 1953, were some figures which reflected very, very badly indeed on the agricultural achievements of a third of a century of Soviet rule. I will not bother you with the specific figures, but what he disclosed was that the number of cows in the Soviet Union, with a greatly increased population, was below the 1916 Czarist figure; horses were very much below the 1916 figure, also, and there was some increase in sheep, goats and pigs. He also indicated that the cattle population continued to fall during the year 1952. Then he went on to disclose a very bad situation so far as potatoes (and other vegetables) and even grain were concerned.

This was a prelude to the announcement of a grandiose plan to improve the productivity of Soviet agriculture. This is a many-sided plan. It represents a combination of increased reliance on incentives to stimulate output (the incentives are much better under this plan than they were before; it involves the opening-up of a great deal of new land; it involves a substantial rise in the projected capital investment in

agriculture, more machinery and more fertilizer. And it also involves an intensive effort to train needed agricultural skills and to redirect agricultural specialists from office jobs to production assignments.

One thing is worth noting about these agricultural plans. This has been greeted by some as a great retreat, and it is a retreat in the sense that the incentive for the peasant is somewhat improved. But no retreat to the economic policy of the 1920's is contemplated. The characteristic of this program is that it takes place within the framework of the collective farm system. Improved incentives, yes--to encourage increased output, both on the private plots as well as on the collective farms. But the Central Committee's resolution on agriculture makes clear that the communal economy is central and decisive.

The spearhead of this new effort to raise output is the machine tractor stations, which is to be greatly strengthened--both in equipment and in personnel. Tractor drivers who formerly served the machine tractor stations as seasonal employees, while retaining their membership in the collective farms, are now to be transformed into full-time machine tractor station employees and owing their livelihood exclusively to it.

Not very much featured, but a part of this agricultural program, is an increase in the number of compulsory workdays

which all collective farmers have to give to the collective farms. In other words, concessions to the collective farmers are counterbalanced by tighter, more rigorous Party and administrative control and a determined effort is to be made to broaden Party representation in rural areas.

The tactics of the new regime suggest a pattern which has been used before in Soviet agriculture. By temporarily relaxing its demands, by putting increased reliance on incentives, the government hopes to lure the peasant into increasing his output, as he was lured in other periods of crisis—such as in 1921 and in 1933. But at the same time, the government is taking no chances. Controls are greatly strengthened in order to enforce deliveries to the State and to ensure that the minimal food needs of the urban areas and the industrial centres are met.

It is too early to say how successful this new course will be. If the Malenkov regime seriously pursues its intention of providing a great deal more in the way of machinery and fertilizer to Soviet agriculture, if it equips the collective farms and the machine tractor stations with skilled agricultural specialists, an increase in agricultural output may well take place. But past experiments are a reminder that it is not going to be an easy task. The projected increase in the output of fertilizer and agricultural machinery is impressive, but there



are limits in terms of the reluctance of the regime to sanction any scale of expansion which would involve serious cut-backs in the rate of industrial growth.

The new incentive schemes represent an improvement over past practice, but it remains to be seen whether they are sufficiently enticing to overcome the peasants' resistance to the collective farm joke.

The style of an administration is revealed in its acts. The public image which the Malenkov regime has thought to project is that of an efficient administration determined to cut down on bureaucracy and red tape, determined to move closer to the people than its Stalinist predecessor. In the first days after Stalin's death they announced the whole series of measures designed to cut down on the number of ministries, designed to increase the authority of the ministers, and followed later by this hours-of-work decree--which was designed to rationalize office hours from 9:00 to 6:00 instead of the all-night work, and so on.

But there has been a relapse since. Within a year and a half the number of ministries has mounted from the twenty-five (25) that they were reduced to in March (after Stalin's death) to forty-seven (47) at the present time. The government has explained that the amalgamation process went too far and that these new ministries are proving top-heavy. It

looks as though the administrative economies were not proving as feasible as had been hoped.

At the same time, the Malenkov regime also undertook a series of measures to widen its popularity. The Kremlin was thrown open for pioneer visits, Komsomol balls, and all sorts of meetings. Members of the top leadership group, instead of being completely isolated from the rank and file, began to put in personal appearances at district conferences of the Party organization. The bitter totalitarian overtones of the Beria purge were counterbalanced by a promise of a freer dispensation in the arts and sciences. But I should add that as soon as some Soviet writers began to express independent opinions, the regime promptly cracked down on them.

Each generation of leadership has its own appointment with destiny, its own problems to resolve, and its own choices to make. In the year and a half since Stalin's death, his successors have sought to stabilize their new authority. On the international front they sought to preserve and extend the gains which Stalin achieved by mobilizing their full arsenal of propaganda, of diplomacy, of trade weapons, to accentuate cleavages in the non-Soviet world.

The "new look" in Soviet diplomacy gives a surface appearance of moderation and restraint. The new ruling group possesses a desire to negotiate its differences with the West.

It declares itself the advocate of peaceful coexistence and it never loses an opportunity to proclaim its pacific intentions. But beneath the verbal surface, when words are tested by deeds, there is a suspicious resemblance between the "new look" and the "old look."

Negotiations on the Austrian Treaty continue to drag out despite the fact that the Western Powers have conceded every point that the Soviet Union earlier demanded. On the German Treaty, the Soviet negotiators have thus far shown no real disposition to retreat from the positions which they took under Stalin. They have, from time to time, offered lures when it looked as if the Western Union was being consummated.

The Soviet Union still maintains the most formidable military establishment in the world. It continues to resist the requirements of thorough-going inspection, or control, which are essential to any form of nuclear disarmament on a basis of mutual confidence. There is very little evidence of any disposition by the new ruling group to abandon the main engines of totalitarian power.

The Party retains its monopoly of political control, despite the Beria purge. The Secret Police and the Forced Labor Camps continue to operate. The first efforts of Soviet writers, as I said, to air critical views under the new regime have been

met with suppression. A standard of rigid Party orthodoxy on questions of doctrine is just as sternly enforced now as it was enforced earlier. The concessions which have been made in agriculture have been accompanied by a tightening of Party controls and the collective farm system has been reinforced, rather than abandoned.

So, despite a good deal of wishful thinking in both East and West, in my view there is no hard evidence yet to indicate that the new course on which the Malenkov regime has embarked marks the opening of a new stage in the development of Soviet society--a stage of democratic regeneration--that it portends the abandonment of Stalin's industrial revolution, or that it signifies the renunciation of dreams of world power. The new rulers may rule temporarily with a softer hand, but, like Stalin before them, they remain committed to a program of industrialization and armed might; they remain committed to the projection of totalitarian controls over their subjects, and, I believe, they remain committed to the expansion of Communist power in the world.