

The United States NAVAL WAR COLLEGE

The Functions of the NATO Standing Group
Address by Captain James E. Cohn, USN,
Naval War College

NWC, 25 Jan 55

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ADDRESS

By

Captain James E. Cohn, USN

on

The Functions of the NATO Standing Group

at the

Naval War College

25 January 1955

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SECRETINTRODUCTORY REMARKS

Admiral McCormick, Gentlemen:

The President of the Naval War College requested General J. Lawton Collins, United States Representative to the Standing Group and Military Representatives Committee of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, to speak to you on the functions of the NATO Standing Group. General Collins, my boss, is now, as you all know, representing the President of the United States on a Special Mission to Vietnam. He has spoken to classes of the Naval War College in years past which is evidence of his sincere interest in the importance of the work being done here. General Collins asked me to address you in his behalf on this subject, and I sincerely appreciate the opportunity of being here today.

I was struck some months ago when reading, in the Naval War College Review, a transcript of Admiral Carney's lecture delivered to last year's class. Three short quotations from it seem to me to be close to the crux of the problems which confront the United States as a NATO member. I quote:

1. "American strength is but one element - albeit a powerful one - of Allied power."
2. "I cannot conceive of a major military campaign for the future that would not involve full participation of all the Services, and all of the capabilities of each, all closely interwoven in the fabric of total national power."
3. "The Navy (all three Services in fact) must be ready to operate in conjunction with our NATO partners and in the forces of other associated nations."

These statements represent cardinal principles which are recognized throughout NATO and which are taken into account by

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the North Atlantic Council, the Military Committee, the Supreme Commanders and the staffs who are continually working on the complex military and political problems and plans of the Atlantic Alliance. The United States is its principal motivating influence.

General Gruenther also has stated very clearly the tasks before the West, in event of a war initiated by the Soviets involving NATO, as requiring that the "forces of all services must work together from the outset in furtherance of the common mission, exploiting to the full our atomic capability." By this is meant that NATO Commanders henceforth must be authorized to plan and make preparations on the assumption that atomic and thermonuclear weapons will be used in defense from the outset, and that steps should now be taken to integrate* these weapons into NATO strategy and tactics. This is a step forward in developing better, even though imperfect, plans for the collective security and common defense of the North Atlantic Treaty area.

DEFENSE PACTS

The contrasts and conflicts of the fundamental objectives of the U.S. and the USSR, and the persistent nature of each, have caused the United States to join in seven defense pacts since 1947 in order to restore balance of national power and prevent most of the free world falling to communism. Our global commitments have steadily increased and have become a determining factor in United States foreign, defense and economic policies. Our country is most heavily committed, of course,

* The ability to integrate the delivery of atomic weapons with the delivery of present type weapons. This involves the integration of intelligence and communications systems, and a common tactical doctrine.

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to NATO since it is a military alliance - the first one which the United States has ever joined during peacetime. For the first time, also, we have entered an alliance which guarantees the territorial integrity of European nations. This has come about because of the main threat and of our tremendous and traditional stake in Europe which is based on blood ties, culture, trade, the heritage of freedom and Western civilization, and stark knowledge that it is hopeless to try to go it alone against the USSR. Thus, our combined defense preparations in the North Atlantic Treaty area have come to aim at providing:

- a. A major deterrent to aggression.
- b. A successful forward defense in Europe.
- c. A high measure of confidence and security during the cold war period.

These may be said to be the very ideals of the Alliance and for them to be fulfilled NATO must be ever able to withstand a sudden and surprise Soviet onslaught, to deliver decisive counter attacks against the war making capacity of the enemy, to defend North America and to prevent the rapid overrunning of Europe, and to gain rapidly control of the seas and exploit it.

From the military point of view Article 5 of the Treaty is of utmost significance. It reads: "The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all; and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including

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the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area." ✓✓

Thus, fourteen nations - and soon a fifteenth it is hoped -- have made two great commitments. One is to build up progressively and sustain their individual and collective defenses. The other, within their resources and capabilities, following their several constitutional processes, is to take action, including the use of armed force possessed of atomic and thermonuclear weapons, in event of Soviet aggression against one or more members of NATO. All NATO strategic plans must be based on these commitments and recognize the limitations stemming from them.

All of this has been reaffirmed in the December Ministerial Sessions of the North Atlantic Council in dealing with the question of "The Most Effective Pattern of NATO Military Strength For The Next Few Years." The nations must now study the means by which and in what circumstances immediate resort to atomic counterattack will be made in event of sudden Soviet aggression. As a first step, there is under consideration by the Council a proposed agreement for cooperation regarding atomic information to give effect to recent changes in U.S. atomic energy legislation.

The future development and improvement of this military alliance are recognized in U.S. policy as being of great importance to the country and to its three military services in particular. All of us in the Services should recognize this and should not take NATO for granted. We must recognize also that the United States has large commitments outside of NATO. Allied military planning, command organization, and operations are limited at the present time to the NATO area. Likewise, our discussion today is limited to the same area.

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SECRETTHE ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF NATO

A brief review of the organizational structure, both civil and military, of NATO is desirable for an understanding of the evolution and development of NATO plans.

These charts (2 and 3) outline the broad organization following the guiding principle of the peoples of the West that our political leaders must formulate policies and hand them down to the military authorities. ✓

At the top, or "at the summit" as Lord Ismay, Secretary General of NATO and Vice Chairman of the Council, prefers to say, there is the North Atlantic Council. "It is a Council of fourteen governments, and not of fourteen individuals, and governments may be represented at the Council table by anyone they depute for the purpose." (Quote of Lord Ismay).

There is much day to day business for the Council and its work must be continuous. Owing to this and the fact that the top ministers could not all be available in Paris except on infrequent occasions, there is in continuous session a body known as the Permanent Representatives to the Council. These representatives reside in Paris, have ambassadorial rank, are always available to meet on short notice, and ensure continuity in NATO. The Council is served by civilian experts and an International Staff or Secretariat working on a committee system. The committees have membership composed of representatives of each country and are frequently chairmanned by some one of the Permanent Representatives who is an expert in the particular field. There is under the Council a permanent Military Budget Committee which controls the budgeting, allocation and expenditure of international funds in consultation with the Standing Group.

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Its function is similar to that of our own Bureau of the Budget. The work of the North Atlantic Council, the Council Committees and the International Staff is sparked by Lord Ismay and coordinated by a Deputy Secretary General.

Our permanent representative to the Council is Ambassador Hughes who is responsible to the President. He receives his day-to-day guidance from the Secretaries of State and Defense, and sometimes the Secretary of the Treasury and the Foreign Operations Administrator.

To summarize, there are several points about the Council. Firstly, it has effective powers of decision on a continuing basis. Secondly, it exercises civilian control over NATO. Thirdly, it has not supranational authority but must take its decisions unanimously. Lastly, there is a large volume of work performed, and this work is closely and continuously coordinated with military planning. The Council, then, represents the member nations on the highest political level, coordinating the activities and giving guidance to NATO military authorities, making recommendations to governments as required, and registering the approval of governments on matters before it for consideration. ~~AK~~

So much for the civil side of NATO. On the military side the supreme body is the Military Committee, composed of the Chiefs of Staff, or their representatives, of the member nations. It, like the North Atlantic Council, meets periodically, and annually in December in joint session with the Ministers. The Military Committee is served by the Military Representatives Committee (MRC) and the Standing Group, both located in Washington. The MRC is a fully representative military body in continuous session with power to take action in the name of the Military Committee. It, therefore, has a function comparable to that of the ^{Permanent} Council. Iceland possesses no military forces and has no representative on

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the Military Representatives Committee. Belgium also represents Luxembourg. The French, United Kingdom, and United States Military Representatives compose the Standing Group. The other military representatives ensure that the Standing Group is kept informed of the military views and problems of their nations. The Standing Group is the executive agency of the Military Committee and the MRC. It has a Secretariat and a staff of officers of the three services from each member nation -- that is from France, United Kingdom, and the United States. The entire staff of the Standing Group is less than 175 persons, of which there are some 35 U.S. officers located either in Paris or Washington. Since the U.S. is host country, our element is the largest.

Broadly speaking, the Standing Group is responsible for overall strategy and the day-to-day business of the Military Committee. It frequently holds sessions in Paris, and makes periodic visits to the field commands. In addition, the Standing Group has several agencies including the Military Agency for Standardization located either in London or Paris. The Standing Group, as the top military agency in full time operation, receives political guidance from the Council and military guidance from the Military Committee and MRC, and in turn guides the Supreme Commanders who direct NATO forces in the field.

The link between the Standing Group and the Council is the Standing Group Liaison Officer whose offices in Paris are in the same building as the International Staff, that is in the Palais de Chaillot.

There are three major commands - SACEUR's in the NATO area of Europe, SACLANT's in the North Atlantic Ocean area, and the Allied Commanders-in-Chief's in the Channel (CINCHAN and CINCMAIRCHAN) area between the United Kingdom and the Low Countries.

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There is on our side of the ocean a Canada-U.S. Regional Planning Group charged with planning for the continental defense of North America. The powers and responsibilities of these major commanders in peace and war, their areas of responsibility, and the like are laid down in charters or "Terms of Reference" for each developed by the Standing Group and approved by the Military Committee and noted by the Council. In turn these major commanders issue "Terms of Reference" for their subordinate commanders consonant with the basic charters. The definition of these responsibilities and powers has been an important accomplishment of the Standing Group since its establishment in the fall of 1949.

There are three subordinate commands in Europe. CINCNORTH, a British General, is responsible for Norway, Denmark and the Baltic Exits; CINCENTER, Marshal Juin of France, takes over in Schleswig-Holstein with the heart of Western Europe down to the Alps; CINCSOUTH, presently Admiral Fechteler with Headquarters in Naples, is responsible for Italy, Greece and Turkey. The Sixth Fleet is directly under CINCSOUTH. Other naval forces in the Mediterranean are under a Naval Commander, so far a British Admiral, directly subordinate to SACEUR but working in close coordination with CINCSOUTH.

There are two major area commands in the Atlantic - CINCEASTLANT, CINCEASTLANT. A third area command, CINCLANT, has not been activated and is temporarily under CINCEASTLANT. Admiral Wright is also CINCEASTLANT and a British Admiral is CINCEASTLANT. It should be noted that Portugal is within SACLANT's area. ✓✓

Command relationships are a difficult problem for negotiation due to delicate political considerations and differing national practices. The command organization is ponderous, to say the least, owing to the very nature of the Alliance and

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division of responsibility between NATO Commands and commands retained under national control. It is working and is constantly being refined and improved. For example, studies are being commenced to attune SACEUR's command organization to the very complex problem of the air defense of Europe. As you know, time and necessity only can resolve fully such fundamental questions as Allied command organizations.

This, then, represents the broad organizational structure of NATO. Both the Council and the Military Committee have continuity, harmony in their thinking, and the ability to take decisions unanimously.

HOW THE STANDING GROUP WORKS ✓✓

The functions of the Standing Group may be briefly summarized as follows:

Conduct the day-to-day business of the Military Committee.

Develop Military Policy and Terms of Reference for NATO Military Agencies and NATO Major Commanders.

Prepare Military Guidance for and Military Advice on the Annual Review conducted by the Annual Review Committee of the Council.

Prepare annual reports for the North Atlantic Council on NATO Military Progress and NATO Exercises.

Develop strategic and logistic guidance and give direction and support to NATO Commanders.

Review and coordinate the Emergency Defense Plans and other War Plans of the Major NATO Commanders and the Canada-U.S. Regional Planning Group (USRPG).

Undertake or coordinate special studies requested by the North Atlantic Council relating to security of the area or other subjects.

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Prepare an annual Intelligence Estimate.

Maintain Liaison with the Permanent Council.

Conduct planning and establish policy for military standardization.

Needless to say, the three Standing Group principals are not free wheelers. Each must seek the advice, recommendations or guidance of his Chiefs of Staff on all major matters that arise. Also they must seek before submission to the Military Committee guidance on or concurrence in the principal annual reports, changes in Terms of Reference, and special reports. It is General Collins' practice to make a recommendation on each request for guidance from our Joint Chiefs.

Briefly, the working procedure is about as follows. A problem is received by the Standing Group. Each national element endeavors, in consultation with its principal as necessary, to work out a position. Then, an International Planning Team (called I.P.T.) consisting of one staff representative of each of the three nations, is assigned by a directive of the Secretary of the Standing Group to study the problem and produce a draft team report. Such report is then taken by the Steering Committee preliminary to consideration by the Standing Group principals who approve or directly assist in developing a tentative or proposed solution for forwarding to the three national Chiefs of Staff. The process of drafting and redrafting the IPT report -- the staff call it nit picking -- is repeated as often as required to produce an acceptable solution or Standing Group report.

Following consideration of a proposal or Standing Group draft report, our Joint Chiefs of Staff send back comments, recommendations or specific guidance as deemed appropriate. General Collins, or in his absence the Deputy U.S. Representative, attends

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all sessions of the JCS dealing with NATO affairs. This is in the Terms of Reference of the U.S. Representative approved by the President. Frequently, the draft reports must receive the approval of the Secretary of Defense and Secretary of State.

When each principal receives his national guidance, the IPT meets to resolve any divergent views and to incorporate into the paper the guidance and recommendations of his nation. A revision of the draft report is prepared and taken by the Standing Group for production of a formal paper. The formal paper, if the subject requires, is sent to the Military Representatives Committee for study preliminary to considering the paper for final approval at a formal meeting of the MRC or for forwarding on to a special session of the Military Committee itself. Each military representative sends the Standing Group report or draft to his home country for comment or guidance in the same way that the Standing Group principals had previously done. Meanwhile, there are staff consultations with the staffs of the various Military Representatives. Guidance eventually comes back from each country and the individual views are sent to the Standing Group. Usually the changes are not of a controversial nature and frequently can readily be incorporated into the paper by the IPT charged with the paper. Any changes are cleared by each of the team members with his respective Standing Group principal. The paper, either a Standing Group (S.G.), Military Representatives Committee (M.R.C.), or Military Committee (M.C) paper, is produced and placed on the agenda of a formal MRC or MC meeting. Each paper is discussed and last minute amendments included. The papers are then distributed in final form by the Secretariat.

This is a long roundabout process but it has the advantage of unanimity and the mature judgment of the top military

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authorities of each nation involved. The processing procedure and format of the papers is similar to those used in papers produced by our Joint Staff, except that NATO military papers have both service and international aspects along with national conflicts to be resolved.

The U.S. Element, of course, consults with and depends on assistance of the three Services and of the Joint Staff. Its job is to express and represent the views of our government. The Joint Chiefs, however, have given the U.S. Representative to the Standing Group, General Collins, generally broad leeway and usually their guidance is broad and general in character rather than being in minute detail. Occasionally it is advisable or necessary to request modification of JCS guidance. Of course, throughout all negotiations each principal is bound by his national guidance and instructions until modified by his Chiefs of Staff. The Standing Group endeavors to avoid split views in its final papers and, of course, it would be undesirable to produce a final M.C. paper with split views. ✓✓

NATO STRATEGIC AND MILITARY PLANNING

The scope of the lecture calls for the Standing Group program for strategic planning. The development of Allied military policy and the coordination of military planning comprise the big job of the Standing Group.

There is nearing approval a proposed NATO planning cycle ✓ which I will undertake to outline to you. This revision became ✓ necessary in view of the fact that NATO now has an agreed general strategy and concept of operations for war and the further fact

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that the force build-up approved at Lisbon in 1952 is beginning to level off. You know about the levelling off of force build-ups since our Department of Defense is engaged upon one at the moment. However, U.S. forces assigned or earmarked for NATO are not affected in the plan. Allied forces in being and those to be called up in the first month of a war are to be sustained at a level for the long pull under the limitation of the resources that can be anticipated will be made available. That means no material increase in national defense budgets or in force goals, either assigned or earmarked for NATO, above the *force* goals established by the Council during the 1953 Annual Review.

Some systematic planning cycle is required to coordinate and synchronize the various elements of NATO military and strategic planning. Also, the cycle must meet civil planning requirements of the Council. The Chart shows the cycle and the principal military plans.

a. Strategic Concept and Strategic Guidance

These are M.C. documents which are broad in scope and permit considerable flexibility in operational planning. The papers include assumptions, defense policy, estimate of the threat, overall strategic aims, basic undertakings in the early stages of a war involving NATO, and so on. These documents are revised in case of a significant change in the international political situation and provide strategic guidance for the Council and the NATO Commanders.

b. Intelligence Estimate

The Standing Group has an International Intelligence Team produce in the early part of the year an annual intelligence estimate. It is approved by the Standing Group in April, forwarded to NATO Commands for information and guidance, and simultaneously forwarded to each member

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nation via its Military Representative for national comment. National comments, when received, are embodied in the estimate as enclosures. The estimate is revised by the Standing Group Intelligence Committee about October so that there will be available an up-to-date and comprehensive estimate at all times.

c. Planning Guidance

This document will be prepared annually for approval by the Military Committee in November of each year and will contain detailed instructions for the next year's Annual Review and for preparation of plans and studies for the forthcoming year or subsequent period. It will contain guidance for the revision of Emergency Defense Plans as required. The guidance for the Annual Review will contain a statement of any change in military policy and will include planning factors such as standards of readiness, rates of attrition, and levels of war reserves.

d. Annual Review Force Goals and Assignment of Forces

Force goals are established in the Annual Review process to be described later. The Standing Group is endeavoring to approve the assignment of forces in May for the subsequent year. This assignment of forces will be based on firm force goals. An assumed breakdown of the provisional and planning force goals will be included in the planning guidance.

e. NATO Force Program

In the past the Standing Group has had Capabilities and Requirements Studies and Plans prepared by the Supreme Commanders and the Allied Commanders-in-Chief Channel. A requirements plan is liable to become so comprehensive and ambitious as to render it of questionable value in view of the political and economic factors and limitations involved.

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Likewise, a conventional Capabilities Plan is likely to show that the Commander is totally incapable of carrying out the tasks required by his mission in view of the enemy threat against his area of responsibility, and it is possible for a Commander to conceive most of the enemy threat toward his Command. However, the JCS have not yet agreed that the Requirements Plan can be dispensed with entirely.

In the future a comprehensive study known as the NATO Force Program will replace the Capabilities and Requirements plans heretofore required. It will serve to analyse the following:

- (1) Opposed capabilities of NATO and the Soviets.
- (2) Effects of new developments and weapons, changes in organization and technique, and new equipment on Allied operations.
- (3) The military risk and weakness involved.
- (4) The most effective pattern of NATO military for the next few years based on estimate of available resources and force goals established.

A given Force Program would be evaluated by the Standing Group commencing in July of the year the studies are made by NATO Commanders. A report would then be prepared on the most effective pattern of NATO military strength for the consideration of the Military Committee about November. Once approved this report would be sent to the North Atlantic Council for its action at a ministerial session in December. Thus, there would be evolved a series of measures and program recommendations which would have to be taken for the study to retain validity over the period covered by it.

The Force Program would be made once in three years to cover a three year period and it will be the medium by which the NATO Military Authorities will project their strategic planning in the future. The cycle works this way. The 1954 Capabilities Studies which were reviewed by the Standing Group and the Military

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Committee during the past July to November, and on which a report (M.C. 48) was made to the North Atlantic Council, in December, will cover the years 1957-1959. If German rearmament takes place in some form as assumed in SACEUR's Capabilities Plan 1957, and if a German contribution of 12 divisions becomes available in mid-1957, then in November 1956 the Military Committee will issue guidance and planning factors for the NATO Force Program Study to be prepared during 1957 -- to cover the years 1960-62. Then, in 1960, a third such Study would be prepared to cover the years 1963-65. Once an effective pattern paper becomes available the Military Committee would report annually of any revisions required because of changes in the international situation or in NATO force goals until the succeeding paper is produced. In this way NATO's military strength is to take a defense posture which will ensure that NATO's aims are fulfilled and that the Soviets could not achieve victory if war should be thrust by them upon the Allies.

f. Emergency Defense Plans

Emergency Defense Plans are capabilities plans which cover a one year period and are based on the allocation of forces for the current year. They are submitted to the Standing Group about October by the major NATO Commanders (SACLANT, SACEUR, CINCHAN) and the Canada-United States Regional Planning Group. The plans serve as the basis for the supporting plans of the various subordinate commanders which are approved by major commanders only.

These plans are submitted to the Defense Ministries for comment and in the review process the comments of the nations concerned are taken into account in the Standing Group's comments on each plan. These plans are being changed continuously and are kept consistent with long range plans and the annual intelligence estimate.

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The purpose of these plans is as follows, quoted from SACLANT's EDP 1-55:

"This plan is designed to meet a situation in which war has been forced upon the North Atlantic Treaty Organization nations by acts of aggression against NATO by the Soviets. This plan provides primarily for the initial deployment of Allied Command Atlantic forces and prescribes tasks for the approximate period of D Day to D + 3 months. It also provides a broad outline of operations and estimated force deployment for the first six months of the war." There are 25 Annexes to this plan. Included among the annexes are the standard subjects such as "Concept of Operations" and "Logistics", and special subjects as "Command Relationships", "Measures to Avoid Mutual Interference", "Preparation Prior to D-Day", "Protection of Air Lines of Communication", etc.

Thus, the Emergency Defense Plans are approved plans available for use in the early stages of a war. The system of review and exchange is such that these plans are coordinated as between NATO Commanders and National Commanders.

g. Infrastructure

This is an annual report of the Military Committee to the North Atlantic Council in November or December on the next year's Infrastructure Program. It is based on requests submitted by NATO Commanders to the Standing Group in July. The report serves as the overall military document for obtaining Council approval of each slice of infrastructure and the fiscal support required to construct common military facilities and installations which support the military forces and which are essential to implementation of the NATO general strategy in event of war. Included are such "military real estate" as airfields, signals, POL pipelines, Naval ammunition storage dumps.

Over 2 billion dollars have been allocated so far for infrastructure. The recommended program for 1955, the so-called sixth slice, was for 260 million dollars. The seventh slice is now under preparation.

In addition to the above, there is emergency planning in civil fields related to military operations which is accomplished by the International Staff in conjunction with the Standing Group. Examples are Civil Defense, Surface Transport in Europe, Ocean Shipping Requirements, Trends and Implications of Soviet Policy, Treatment of War Casualties.

I should like to remind you at this point that all our international planning represents a synthesis of conflicting factors. As finally approved at all levels any major plan represents a compromise forced by consideration of the basic elements of military requirements, economic stability, and political necessity. NATO plans are not usually the "ideal" solution to the problem. However, there are few impasses or solutions so vague or watered down as to fail to serve the purpose.

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THE ANNUAL REVIEW

At the Lisbon meeting of the North Atlantic Council in February 1952, the Ministers decided that there must be a continuing means to reconcile NATO force goals and defense requirements with the political and economic limitations. General Gruenther has said that military planning is "the act of convincing the Chancellors of the Exchequers to be generous, which had been a rather difficult process."

The Annual Review was created to perform this reconciliation, in order to build an effective military machine without bankruptcy. It is essentially a civilian exercise and the responsibility of the Council. It is performed by the Annual Review Committee,

with the advice and assistance of the Military Authorities through the Standing Group Liaison Officer (SGLO). The internal organization of the Annual Review Committee is as follows:

Chairman - Deputy Secretary General

Members - One from each National Delegation

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Representatives of the International Staff.

The Annual Review process starts with the questionnaires sent out in February and culminates with submission of the following five documents to the Council in December:

The Final Report of the Annual Review.

The Military Comments on the Final Report.

The Military Guidance for the Annual Review of the Next Year.

The Council Resolution on the Annual Review.

The Council Resolution or directive for the Next Year's Review.

Throughout the process of the Annual Review and the drafting of the above documents there is the closest cooperation with the military authorities. Two of these documents are purely military in nature without political or economic compromise. They are approved by the Military Committee and forwarded to the North Atlantic Council without alteration by the Civilian Annual Review Committee.

The Final Report is the main document and is in three parts:

Part I - General or a summary of the Principal Issues of the Report.

Part II - Special Subjects

Military Considerations

National Military Service

Equipment and Production

End-Item Aid and Offshore Procurement

Economic Considerations

Annual Recurring Costs and Long Term Maintenance and Equipment of NATO Forces

Recommendations

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Part III - Country Chapters

The Chapter on "Military Considerations" is prepared by the SGLO and covers important military improvements, results of NATO exercises, weaknesses of defense, and a list of problems to be resolved.

The answer to the questionnaire represents the nation's capability to support force goals and objectives laid out by the Military Committee for each nation.

Each final Country Chapter in turn represents a detailed analysis of the situation of the country concerned having regard to the military and politico-economic problems with which it is faced. Following the analysis there is a series of principal military recommendations selected from a longer list submitted by the Standing Group in conjunction with the NATO commanders. Theoretically, this is the way balance between military and politico-economic questions is achieved in the process. Usually in the Government's reply on its Chapter, a number of the recommendations are accepted and future action on or rejection of the remainder indicated. Usually the problems arise from lack of money, equipment, infrastructure.

The Annual Review corresponds somewhat to the procedure involved on the national level in the preparations of the annual budget -- the preparation of a military program based on guidance of the executive; computation of the cost of this program; discussions and reconciliation inside the government; and finally, vote of the parliament. You can visualize that its process is arduous, year-long, and the source of ruffled feelings frequently.

The Annual Review then is the means which the Council has to establish force goals and other objectives for the defense build up for the next three years in order to implement NATO

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strategy. It also serves to exercise follow-up so that there is no dangerous slackening off in defense efforts. The major task of the Annual Review is to urge or press nations to reach established force goals and to increase the effectiveness of forces so raised. This is a new type of international undertaking, wholly frank and forthright, serving each year to confirm broad and confident relations which bring the nations of NATO closer together, despite the indecision and hesitation which sometimes occur, and to add to a growing sense of national coordination not heretofore possible.

The Annual Review Process at present is an exceedingly laborious and complicated exercise. Civilian and military planners are meeting in Paris at this time on a simplification of the Annual Review to make it more effective, to focus attention of the Ministers primarily on the major issues, and to enhance the follow-up features of the process. The immediate problem is to strengthen the AR process to cope with three basic problems during the 1955 process (1) dealing with the trend toward slackening defense efforts, (2) initiation of the implementing actions under M.C. 48 and (3) integration of Germany in NATO defense planning.

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SECRETNATO PLANNING DURING 1955

In addition to the military contribution to the 1955 Annual Review, there are many planning tasks to be undertaken by NATO Commanders and the Standing Group in the coming months. Chief among these are the following:

- a. Accession of Western Germany to NATO following the separate ratifications by 14 nations and the rapid implementation of plans to rearm Germany, provide equipment for and train 12 divisions, 1300 tactical aircraft and a navy of over 200 small vessels. This is indeed a delicate and formidable task and one which must be placed at the top in priority. This entire problem remains in the crisis stage and will remain so for some time. Ambassador Dillon in Paris has said German rearmament is "a basically unpopular pill" hard for the French nation to swallow.
- b. Inclusion of Germany into Western European Union (WEU), further definition of the relationships of WEU and NATO, and assistance in the development of the Union.
- c. Continuation of Capabilities Studies by SACEUR, SACLANT and the Allied Commanders-in-Chief Channel in the light of findings of Ports Damage Studies and a reassessment of ocean shipping requirements both for the initial phase of a war and for the subsequent period of sustained operations. A way must be found around the escort shortage, one of the most critical NATO naval deficiencies.
- d. A first report to the Council on the conclusions of the studies for the Air Defense of the NATO Area of Europe and a general hastening of such studies which will be continuous for a period of several years.
- e. The establishment and activation of the SHAPE Air Defense Technical Centre which is being financed

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initially under MDAP funds. This Centre will be provided the funds, facilities, international scientific personnel to carry out research, studies, investigations, development work in connection with the air defense of NATO as required by SHAPE. According to General Gruenther, "its success must rest upon the Centre's ability to marshal the best scientific and technical people in our Countries. The Centre will pool to the greatest extent possible the fund of knowledge on air defense now existing."

f. Improvement of defensive posture of SACEUR's command, especially air units, and the formulation of his action on the various program recommendations which were a part of his Capabilities Study. The implementation in full of his comprehensive program would take years. Hence, each measure which SACEUR recommends must be considered on its merits and bear the approval of appropriate NATO and national authorities concerned.

g. Development of the Seventh Slice infrastructure program which will be attuned to requirements under the most effective pattern of future NATO military strength, especially as to the deployment and dispersal of NATO air units in Europe.

h. Continuation of negotiations between Supreme Commanders and the nations on Alerts. The effectiveness of the NATO alert system will be a major factor in the initial phase of a war.

i. Revised intelligence estimates.

The year 1955 will be a full year, indeed -- possibly one of the most important in the history of the Alliance. The groundwork for the above program is well laid, including completion of the review of 1955 Emergency Defense Plans which have begun to reflect the findings and conclusions of the series of reports based on the Capabilities Studies.

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In presenting very briefly the subject of logistic support of NATO forces there are two points. One is that it is established NATO policy that the logistic support of national component forces is a national responsibility. The other point is that Supreme Commanders are active in this field and are developing logistic plans, in cooperation with national authorities, which will ensure from the logistic standpoint the feasibility of their operational plans in event of emergency.

By his terms of reference, SACLANT is responsible for informing national authorities of his logistic requirements for forces which will be made available to him in war and also for coordinating the arrangements and plans made by the national authorities to provide logistic support to those forces. Further, SACLANT is negotiating bilateral arrangements for cross-servicing NATO naval forces operating in or from the territory of another nation.

In February 1954, SACEUR forwarded a proposed plan to the Standing Group for improving the logistic system of Allied Command Europe. His plan has been approved in principle and provides the basis for the future development of a logistic system for the NATO area of Europe, ensuring the most effective use of Allied resources available in Europe under established policy. You can imagine that such a plan has many political, economical and financial implications which had to be discussed between SACEUR and the nations concerned at length. There is a plan, nevertheless, and all nations are aware of the problems involved.

In its action on the Paris accords on German accession to NATO, the North Atlantic Council requested that the machinery

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for the collective defense of Europe be reenforced. A proposed revision of SACEUR's Terms of Reference has been completed by the Military Committee and forwarded to the Council to become effective on the date of German accession to NATO. In so far as logistics is concerned, SACEUR's terms of reference will provide:

a. Responsibilities and Powers in Peacetime.

"1. Informing national authorities of his personnel requirements for forces.

"2. The establishment, in consultation with the national authorities concerned, of requirements for the provision of logistic resources. Logistic resources are defined as being materiel, supplies, installations and parts thereof which are necessary for the prolonged conduct of combat operations.

"3. The coordination and the supervision of the use, for logistic purposes, of NATO common infrastructure facilities and of those national facilities made available to him by national authority.

"4. The maintenance of an efficient organization, including the subordinate planning and command organizations, with staff elements charged with logistic support planning, which will be the nucleus for expansion in war."

b. To fulfill the above responsibilities SACEUR will have:

"1. The authority to establish, in consultation with the national authorities concerned, requirements for the provision of logistic resources for their national contingents.

"2. The authority to determine, in agreement with the national authorities concerned, the geographic distribution of these resources.

"3. The authority to establish, in consultation with the national authorities concerned, logistic priorities in connection with the building-up, equipping and maintaining of units.

"4. The authority to direct the utilization, for meeting his requirements, of those portions of logistic support systems made available to him by appropriate authorities.

"5. The authority to coordinate and supervise the use, for logistical purposes, of NATO common infrastructure facilities and of those national facilities made available to him by the national authorities.

"6. The authority to call for reports regarding the level and effectiveness of forces, including reserve formations, their logistic support and their armaments, equipment and supplies, as well as the organization and location of their logistic arrangements.

"7. Authority to make field inspections, as necessary, within the area of Allied Command Europe of the forces, including reserve formations, placed under him, and of those portions of logistic support systems made available to him by appropriate authorities."

You can see that SACEUR has broad responsibilities and some authority. His logistic plan and his authority in the field of logistics seem adequate and most assuredly about as far as the nations can go at this time under the basic NATO policy on logistic support. General Gruenther, in discussing his function relative to German accession, recently reminded the Council that

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the Paris resolutions on Western European Union do not materially increase his powers, adding that the philosophy at SHAPE has not been to seek additional powers.

COORDINATION

A few words on the coordination of NATO strategic planning may be desirable.

The December 1953 resolution of the Council invited the Military Committee "to recommend measures required to achieve maximum coordination among NATO Commands, and between NATO command forces and forces retained under national control."

A report was submitted in November 1954 by the Military Committee outlining what had been done and what needs to be done. Needless to say, considerable remains to be done since close and continuous coordination is absolutely essential at all times in any form of international planning.

There is the close coordination between Supreme Commanders and between their Major Subordinate Commanders. This is achieved:

a. Through regular liaison channels, allied elements in staffs, visits, briefings, interstaff consultations, exchange and review of commanders' war plans, and a sizable number of NATO exercises. There is considerable difficulty, however, in coordinating NATO and national exercises due to financial aspects.

b. By the review of Emergency Defense Plans previously explained which not only enables each commander to know what others are expecting of him, but also generates a valuable flow of comment both from other commanders and

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national authorities on questions such as mutual support, division of responsibility, and command relationships.

c. By the day-to-day resolution of problems relating to other types of operational planning such as operation of striking fleets, anti-submarine warfare, naval control of shipping, amphibious operations in support of SACEUR, submarine warfare, and correlation of mining plans.

d. By early coordination of communications matters through the various Standing Group and Council Communication Agencies. Subjects include adoption and provision of publications, cryptographic systems, security of NATO communications, provision of circuits and equipment.

e. By Semi-annual Planning Coordination Conferences at Headquarters of one of the Supreme Commanders.

A continuous process of coordination is taking place between NATO Commands and national authorities of which the following are typical: military operating requirements, planning and conduct of NATO exercises, exchange of intelligence, standardization of nomenclature and operating procedures, development of tactical publications and doctrines, shipping requirements, naval control of shipping matters, search and rescue, defense of ports, emergency port planning, and fighter defense of shipping in coastal waters.

The plans of NATO offensive air forces must be very closely coordinated with the plans of strategic air forces retained under national command. This is necessary in order that agreement is reached on targets to be attacked, that over-all NATO war plans reflect the total Allied strategic air effort which will be applied against the enemy, and that consideration is given to the requirements of commanders having insufficient air forces under their command to carry out their urgent tasks. The Air Deputy to SACEUR has been charged since July 1953 with the responsibility for coordination of external air assistance to

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Allied Command Europe. There is close liaison with the U.S. Strategic Air Command and the U.K. Bomber Command and solution of problems is progressing satisfactorily. SACLANT is doing the same thing, and in addition maintains the closest coordination with SACEUR on this and related problems. Thus, the strategy and concept of operations of NATO Commands will take into account the effects of strategic air operations of other commands.

The possibility, indeed the very probability, that a war may be initiated by a sudden and surprise atomic attack is one of the greatest threats against the Alliance. The destruction which could be wrought under such a circumstance and its influence on the outcome of the initial phase of the war combine to make the Air Defense of NATO the most critical and complex problem facing NATO at this time. You are aware of all of the technical difficulties of air defense. You also recognize that air defense is not an utterly hopeless military endeavor and that progress is being made in the continental air defense of North America. Also, much remains to be done on the fighter defense of shipping and naval forces in the approaches to the U.K. and Northwest Europe and in the Mediterranean Sea and other restricted sea areas around Europe. The present division of responsibilities between NATO Commanders and national authorities for the air defense of Europe makes evident that some type of centralized or closely coordinated system of command will have to be established. This latter statement is contained in the report which has been made to the Council.

Now, what is being done to correct this most critical deficiency in NATO defenses? I have mentioned the establishment of SHAPE Air Defense Technical Centre. SACEUR's first study of the Air Defense problem has been submitted to the Standing Group and is under consideration. SACEUR is setting up an

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Air Defense Group of recognized experts at SHAPE to speed the continuing studies. He has asked that approval in principle be given now to the concept that "any successful development of an acceptable air defense capability for continental Europe requires as a first step the early creation within SACEUR's area of a system of unified command responsibility under SACEUR." The Standing Group is also studying the revision of the basic Military Committee document (M.C. 36) which establishes the division of responsibilities in wartime as between National Territorial Commanders and the Supreme NATO Commanders and Subordinate Allied Commanders.

THE ROLE OF NATO NAVAL FORCES

In preparing M.C. 48, there was much discussion about sea communications and the report is inconclusive in that respect stating that further studies of naval problems would be required in order to determine how naval forces expected to be available in the next few years can be used to the greatest advantage in performing essential naval tasks. This has come about due to shortage of escorts and maritime aircraft, the problem of protecting and controlling merchant shipping in Europe and the Eastern Atlantic during the first few days of atomic war, and the whole question of effects of new weapons on ports and the development of secondary ports and over the beach unloading operations.

The reaction of NATO Naval Commanders who have expressed themselves in recent meetings where the Military Committee reports on the Capabilities were discussed is that possibly the problems of sea communications had received secondary consideration.

One British Admiral has summed up the naval reaction, and I shall paraphrase his remarks. This Admiral pointed out that

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there had been an inclination to assume exactly what the enemy would do and that the paper on the most effective pattern of NATO military strength had been discussed around the most difficult case - that is surprise attack with atomic and thermo-nuclear weapons at the outset. He pointed out further that wars had never taken exactly the form that had been expected, enjoining that NATO plans should be flexible. He concluded by saying that, as in the past so in the future, it must be "the duty of Allied naval forces to gain command of the sea from the very outset."

In past wars, the emphasis and priority has been on a general mobilization and build-up of forces to win the war after the initial blitz. The emphasis in M.C. 48 is on priority on forces in being and the peacetime build-up of forces which would ensure that the war would not be lost in the initial phase of intensive atomic exchange. The build-up of other forces would receive a lesser priority.

British naval thinking stresses the defensive naval role since, in their view, if the maritime effort fails in the early stages the war is lost. The U.S. thinking seeks a balance between the offensive and defensive naval tasks. At any rate, M.C. 48 states that, in order to participate most effectively in a future war involving NATO, "Naval forces in being must be capable during the initial phase of carrying out powerful offensive operations against such targets as enemy naval bases and confined areas and of establishing Allied supremacy at sea." To do the latter, NATO naval forces "must protect and maintain the flow of Allied shipping in the Atlantic, Channel and Mediterranean, ensure the support and reinforcement of NATO forces in Europe, control and exploit vital sea areas, and deny to the enemy the use of sea areas essential to his operations." Thus, the traditional role of navies is recognized,

and divergent views seem to have been recognized and reconciled, at least for the purposes of the report. M.C. 48 as written received the approval of the JCS even though at staff level in OPNAV there remain a few misgivings. It is hard for me to see that M.C. 48 makes any drastic changes in the naval policy and thinking of our country.

This much can be said. The Capabilities Studies, all three including SACEUR's, show that there are more naval tasks than NATO naval capability. Admiral Carney's view cited at the beginning is completely valid so far as M.C. 48 is concerned.

The operations which will be conducted at sea in the NATO area will be varied and most assuredly along the lines stated in Admiral Carney's lecture last year. These operations both during the initial phase and for the subsequent period of sustained operations should not be forgotten or minimized.

CONCLUSION

You have heard briefly of the strategic and civil planning performed by the Standing Group and the Council for NATO, and of the means for the periodic reappraisal and continuous review of this planning. You are aware of the problems attendant to attainment of military force goals at the national level, the development of an effective air defense of a continent, and the further improvement and maintenance of the effectiveness of national forces so highly skilled and effective as those of the United States. You may have wondered this morning or at other times as to the efficacy in peacetime of a military alliance such as NATO where these complexities are compounded on the international level. There is not much that one can do but to look back upon past achievements and watch the future of NATO with a clear perspective.

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There have been achievements -- thanks to a spirit of partnership and joint sacrifice. And, despite the fact that solutions of complex military issues always open up a whole array of newer problems, the amount of planning and other things to be done is not insurmountable. Some of the most noteworthy achievements of NATO may be cited as follows:

The North Atlantic Treaty, signed in Washington on 4 April 1949, having become a basic element in the foreign policies of all member nations.

The astonishing degree of political and military unity which has been achieved and the existence of a climate of partnership, achievement, and expectancy, despite the divisive nature of the critical issue of German rearmament.

A Council and Military Representatives Committee in continuous session.

An International Civilian Staff on which all member nations are represented, continuously engaged on the financial, political, and civil problems of NATO.

A military body, the Standing Group, charged with higher strategic direction, formulation of military policy and review of over-all strategic plans.

An Allied Military Organization with a vast network of commands covering Europe, the Mediterranean Sea, and the North Atlantic Ocean.

A shield of armed forces whose strength to resist attack is considerable and is being increased gradually, there having been a threefold increase since January 1951.

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An agreed and approved General Strategy for the defense of NATO along with the essential plans in the hands of NATO Commanders.

Over 2 billion dollars so far allocated for infrastructure and an increase of operable airfields from approximately 15 to 130 in the NATO area of Europe.

The machinery in the form of the Annual Review to ensure progress on meeting military goals which the military and political authorities approve.

The period ahead is a difficult one and many complex problems await solution. There has been no reason to believe that the long term aim of Soviet policy has changed during the past year. The Soviet military threat persists without diminution and there will always be communist efforts to divide NATO. The West is also faced constantly with the human failing wherein the longer a man carries a load the heavier it becomes. We must be prepared to expect shortfalls in goals, complacency, and crisis at times. If, however, NATO remains true to itself, remains united above its transient divisions no matter how serious, and continues toward the goal of achieving its full strength, the military tasks before it in event of war do not seem hopeless and, according to General Gruenther, NATO will be able to resist successfully an all out act of military aggression.

The first stage, largely a pioneering stage, is at an end and NATO is settling down in a more clearly defined form.

I suppose that, in dealing with the Soviets, the advice given by Saint Sergius to the Russians on the eve of the Battle of Kalikovo against the Mongols in the year 1380 is as good as any which NATO might receive: "Go against the godless boldly,

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without wavering, and thou shalt conquer." This seems to me to be close to the philosophy behind the object of NATO defense preparations which is not merely to win a war against the Soviets but to prevent one.

Thank you kindly for your attention. I appreciate the opportunity presented to me to pinch hit for General Collins.