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1. Thanks &
stay of war.

2. not read
paper -

China and the Sea Powers

When I received the invitation to address you on the geographic factors of Chinese power, I naturally gave some thought as to what in particular I should say to such an audience as you represent. After turning the matter over in my mind for some time, I suddenly realized that I was in effect trying to change the topic by giving it a distinctive form which I felt would be appropriate to the occasion. Therefore, by your leave, I shall be talking on a topic which might better be entitled "China and the Sea Powers."

It seems to me that in all the discussion of the revolutionary developments of the last few years in Asia little attention has been given to the revolutionary change in the influence of sea power in developments in continental Asia.

If we were to view the history of American relations with China from the turn of the century in terms of sea power we would find a paradoxical development: on the one hand, our power in the Pacific has steadily increased, while on the other hand our influence over

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events on the Chinese mainland has declined.

After we acquired the Philippines, Guam and the Hawaiian Islands, the constant concern of our strategists was whether we had adequate strength to secure this line across the mid-Pacific. However, in spite of this concern we still had adequate power, in the form of the Yangtze Patrol and the Asiatic Fleet to be directly involved in developments on the Asian continent. The Washington Conference of 1921-1922, in checking the naval race, "froze" the Pacific. Although our naval power was prevented from increasing, sea power in the form of Japan continued to have great influence on China. I do not wish to go into the question of whether the Washington Conference, by limiting our naval power with respect to Japan, provided a situation whereby Japan could carry out her aggression against China without fear of the United States. What is significant for our purposes is that with the end of the Second World War the Pacific was in naval terms an American lake. No other navy could challenge ours.

Never has our sea power been greater, and yet at no time in modern

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history have we had less direct influence on the China mainland.

This situation is even more striking when it is viewed in terms of the history of China's relations with sea powers.

The first contacts China had with the West came through Central Asia. Western traders such as Marco Polo, and the early missionaries had to make the heroic trip across the mountains and deserts of Central Asia. When they arrived in the Middle Kingdom they did not represent a threat. Rather they were the ones to be impressed with Chinese civilization and power.

First slide

Later on Russian power expanded eastward and came in contact with Chinese power. The early bands of Cossacks found that when they were so far removed from their home bases they were no match for the Chinese. Even as late as the mid-19th century when Russia was a major European power she could not transport enough power across the waste of Siberia to be a serious threat to China.

The real impact of the West on China came only through Western sea power. By means of sea power the West could bring its superior military technology half way around the world to Asia without seriously

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impairing its effectiveness. When the British men-of-war entered the approaches to Canton they were as effective fighting forces as when they left the Thames. This was particularly the case during the days of the sailing vessels. The transformation over to steam power placed limits upon the range of sea power. But by this time the essential coaling stations had been secured.

The Opium Wars of the 1840's demonstrated clearly the dominance of sea power over Chinese land power. For the next hundred years there seemed to be no question as to the relative superiority of sea power over continental power. This remained the case even after Russia had reached the Pacific with the construction of the Trans-Siberian Railroad. Although the struggle intensified and Manchuria became a key area, sea power in the form of Japan and Britain seemed adequate to counter this rising threat.

Now the balance seems to have been dramatically altered. Possibly the most striking single incident that illustrates this change is the

China/Pye cont'd.

story of the withdrawal of the last British frigate from the Yangtze River. I am sure you will all remember the daring escape of the Amasitt as it pulled off a mud bank on the Yangtze and ran through a gauntlet of Chinese communist field pieces to escape to the high seas. The British suffered more casualties in this withdrawal than they did in the initial Opium War which established the pattern of relations for one hundred years.

Obviously a fundamental change has occurred in the relationship of land to sea power in Eastern Asia. This is a conclusion we are reluctant to accept since the U. S. is now the major sea power in the area. Indeed, I suspect a certain hankering over the old days is to be found in our tendency to hope for the possibility of "emaculate wars" with respect to Asia. It is largely in terms of this part of the world that we still feel that there should be the possibility of sea and air power doing the job without the need for troops. And this seems to be the case in spite of Korea and Dienbienphu.

The important question is what has changed in East Asia. And the immediate answer we are inclined to give is that China is now under

Communist control. The change seems to have coincided with the victories of the Chinese Communist armies. This suggests that we should analyze the implications for Chinese power in this victory of Communism.

We have always thought of the geographical factors as being the fundamental ones in international politics in the sense that they are the most stable. They provide a key to the potential physical basis of power of any state. Is it possible that the Communist successes in China make it necessary for us to revise our estimates of the elements of power of China?

In analyzing this problem the first important factor to note is that the Communist victory in China brought about a new alignment of power in the eastern end of the Eurasian land mass. For the first time Russia, Manchuria and China are united in a single bloc.

2nd
slide.

Western policy-makers have for a long time recognized the potential dangers of such an alignment. However, in modern times it has always seemed that the more likely threat would be from a uniting of Manchuria, Japan and China. Indeed, in one respect we fought the Pacific war in order to pre-

vent such an alignment of power from becoming permanent. Even at the end of the last war we felt that the stability of the Pacific required a strong China capable of checking any future rise of Japan. The assumption was that such a sea power as Japan would still constitute a danger to the mainland of China. There are, of course, many other considerations which entered into the Yalta decision. However, it is clear that at the time, we were more concerned with the danger from Japanese sea power than the danger of a united land mass of Russia, Manchuria and China.

Historically, the Manchurian-Korean area has been almost a classical example of the balance of power involving sea and land forces. In the nineteenth century Britain assumed the lead in trying to check any Russian expansion into the Pacific ocean area. This ^{culminated} ~~terminated~~ in the Anglo-Japanese alliance at the turn of the century. You will also remember the role that Teddy Roosevelt played in terminating the Russo-Japanese war in 1905[?] at a time when Japan had the advantage.

Throughout this early period the Western sea powers fully recognized the danger of Russian control over Manchuria and North China.

But as a consequence of the years of concern over Japanese aggression
 the dangers from Russia became less conspicuous. Thus, at the end of
 the last war we were not fully prepared for the implications of
 removing Japan from the balance and permitting Russia to return
 to South Manchuria and Port Arthur and Dairen. In one sense, our
 occupation of South Korea and the entry of Marines into Peking and
 Shantung represented an effort to fill the void left by the defeat
 of Japan. However, it was also clear at the time that we were not
 committed to a serious policy of playing the balancing role.

Some of you may have had the experience during the Korean war
 of having Japanese friends point out to you that "now that America
 is trying to do what we refused to let Japan do we can appreciate
 what was at the basis of Japanese policy." Although the similarity
 exists, it is annoying that these Japanese refuse to recognize that
 difference in the spirit in which the Japanese war lords followed
 their policies of aggression and the spirit in which we fought the
 Korean war.

Returning to China, the important question is: What has the

reorientation of power in Eastern Asia meant as far as Chinese
power (is concerned?)

Added

First of all, it is essential to remember that in spite of all the industrial activities in China during the last few years, China without Russia would be a third rate power. The ability of the Chinese to fight in Korea as they did was almost entirely a consequence of the arms and supplies they received from Russia.

Traditionally we always believed that a state's power was largely limited by the resources it had at its direct command and were available in the territory of the state. The added advantages of alliances were largely limited to the possibility of obtaining a direct commitment of friendly states to enter any conflict as a participant. The case of Korea stands as an example of how one state can export power to an ally without becoming an open belligerent.

It should be noted here that in Communism the Russian were able to devise a method of exporting power that is not limited by logistical considerations. This can be seen in the history of how Russia assisted the Chinese Communist Party come to power without providing much material assistance. And, of course, at present we

have the same situation with respect to the activities of local Communists in Southeast Asia and the other underdeveloped areas.

I would also like to digress for a moment to point out that it is not always possible for an industrial state to export power as the Russians did. In particular it would be dangerous for us to believe that we can do this for all the small states along the border of the Communist Bloc. There are many reasons why there are only limited conditions which make this (power exporting?) possible. Also, developments in the field of military technology make it necessary for us to view such exporting of power as primarily a policy of deterrence in the form of a "plate glass window" and not one of providing adequate autonomous power to meet total aggression. It should not be forgotten that even in Korea Russia was a major deterrent against us with respect to expanding the conflict against China.

The greatest immediate advantage that China has received from the new alignment of power in Eastern Asia is a psychological and political one. The simple fact that China is united under a powerful

Alignment
of powers
administration related

administration represents a great change.

We are well aware that historically whenever China has been united its influence has always spread over into the mainland of Asia.

In addition of course there is the fact that it was Communist power that united China. This has been a particularly disturbing political problem because of the widespread feeling in the underdeveloped regions that Communism is the wave of the future. The very existence of Communist China is a factor that influences the reckoning about the future of the peoples of Asia.

We must now ask the question as to whether China has been able to build up its physical strength to match its psychological and political power. Is there still a great gap between China's physical power and her psychological impact? If there is we may expect that in time events may make this apparent and China will seem less of a threat to the rest of Asia.

I do not want to burden you with a detailed analysis of China's five-year plans, and her prospects of success in the various sectors of her economy. I want to mention only a few key problems for your

*N.B.
Psychological
impact
exceeds
physical
capability.*

consideration.

First and foremost it must be emphasized that the Communists have not been able to alter the land-mass ratio of China. Indeed, we have been presented with the phenomenon of the Chinese Communists apparently trying to impress the world with amazing new figures as to China's population. The (recent?) announcement that China has a population of nearly 600,000,000 people at home, and over this figure if the Over-seas Chinese are included, suggests that the problem of over-population is greater than we expected. However, it is clear that the Peking rulers hoped to impress the world with the myth of China's "unlimited manpower." The announcement was made during the Korean conflict at a time when the West was wondering whether China might not have unlimited manpower.

The Communists have claimed until last year that the idea of over-population is purely a "bourgeois-reactionary" theory. However, it is inescapable that China has less than a half acre of arable land per person. This is hardly adequate for raising the standard of living of the country unless it is willing to turn to

foreign trade.

It is a particularly serious problem when China hopes to squeeze out of agriculture the surplus necessary for creating an industrial economy.

It is of course one of the well-recognized ironies of history that Marxism focused on industrial societies and yet the greatest successes of Communism have come in pre-industrial societies. However, of possibly greater significance is the fact that Communism has not been able to solve the problems of agricultural production and yet in Russia and China the problems of agriculture are immense. Although Russia has been able to survive the failures of her agricultural policies, it is questionable whether China can.

7 years
1/2 mark
2/3 mark

It is true that during the first years of the Communist take-over Chinese agricultural production rose. This was part of the consequence of normal rehabilitation after seven years of war and Japanese occupation. Also, it is true that by their control over the countryside, the Communists were able to increase the efficiency of distribution and reduce losses in storage. Also, with very little capital investment

the Communists were able to increase the per acre yield of some crops by introducing more modern techniques and chemical fertilizers.

The major problem Peking still faces is whether it will be possible to control consumption and increase production enough to gain the capital necessary for its industrial plans. The fact that Peking is pushing collectivization suggests that it is not discouraged by the failures of Soviet agriculture. It also demonstrates the extent to which the Chinese leaders are bound by their dogma.

According to the 5 year plan report

Let us turn now to the industrial sector which is the one that the Chinese are most proud of and which will be most critical

in providing autonomous physical power which can influence the political

relations of East Asia. I would like to cite some figures to give

you a general impression of the prospects of Chinese economic

development:

*in some
agriculture
by
30% -
David del.*

Industrial Development:

1) Pre-Meiji Japan -

2) G.N.P.

| | | |
|-------|---------------|-----------------|
| China | \$ 30 billion | \$ 50 per head |
| India | 22 billion | \$ 60 per head. |

3) Can develop later in terms of projects -

a) dams, roads, railroads.

b) This is important because transport has been a major bottleneck.

4) Five Year Plan -

a) not a systematic plan.

b) We do not know all details.

c) Steel Production:

a) can be done with Soviet aid.

d) Return Manchuria to Japanese period and then some.

e) Not going to be easy to make

beyond this —

- a) Can have spectacular projects, but not complex industrial development.
- b) Hard to see a rise in standards of living.
- c) Also quite possible as to whether in next few years will add to Chinese military power.
- d) In more distant future should not discount possibility of development —
 - a) Japan did it

You will note that I have given comparative figures for India and Japan. This is because we are primarily concerned with the position of China within the Asian context. Clearly there is no prospect of China in the foreseeable future becoming an industrial power comparable to Western Europe and the U. S. The important question is whether in the next few years China can raise her industrial power to the point that it will reinforce and provide a substantive basis for the psychological advantages she has gained in the last few years.

Thus in thinking of the balance in Asia it is now necessary to include not only a new Japan but also an independent India. During the last years China, as we have observed, has been able to create the impression of great power. In time, however, if China does not continue to expand its industries at a spectacular rate it would be in ^{is threatened} with the possibility of the position of losing more prestige than India.

1. In the past the balance of power in Asia was limited to East Asia; now competition between India and China.

2. China's development is still dependent upon Russia.

Comparison
with
Asia
&
N. & W.
West.

New
balance
of
power
in
Asia.

3. Possible strain in alliance (Russia-China).

7
care

- a. Care of Eastern Europe
- b. China in Stalinist period at time when Russia moved out.
- c. Competition in underdeveloped areas.

Should not be over-emphasized.

4. Must calculate future trends without Soviet-China split.

5. Probable that if ring can be held in Southeast Asia then the

inflated estimates of Chinese power will be punctured.

- a. Problem of estimating Asian power.

6. Return to Sea-land power theme.

- a. Sea power not through
- b. The real key is the rimland..
- c. Sea power can still be of influence here.

7. To hold rimland need more than hope for immaculate war.

- a. development program.

8. Conclusion: although far more difficult for sea power than in past, not hopeless. Time may be on our side.

Need for total foreign policy commitment.