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THE U. S. NAVY'S ROLE IN GENERAL WAR AND CONFLICT SHORT OF GENERAL WAR

A lecture delivered
at the Naval War College
on 10 December 1958

by

Admiral Arleigh A. Burke, United States Navy,
Chief of Naval Operations

(Including Question and Answer Period to Speech)

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Thank you very much, Admiral Lyman.

I am always just a little bit uneasy when Admiral Lyman introduces me because I never quite know what is going to happen (and this is the first time that it hasn't happened). When Charlie spoke about education, he referred back to the time when we were midshipmen and Charlie was a plebe. I am very proud that at that time I had sense enough to start educating him extremely well.

It is, of course, always a pleasure for me to come to speak to the Naval War College (it is a pleasure for any sailor). Not only is it a pleasure to speak but to take on your barrage of searching questions, which I am sure are going to follow.

Each officer here has been purposely selected to step aside from the daily main stream of immediately urgent problems. Your mission now, while you are here, is to think: to reassess

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and scrutinize established ideas; to size up new approaches to our problems; but, above all, to work on those problems. In the coming years you are going to carry some very heavy burdens, and certainly you will have grave responsibilities. This is the year which has been allotted to you to prepare yourselves for those demanding years ahead. For this reason, I am eager not so much to recount factual matter this morning (and I am not going to do so, because you can read about the facts in the papers which you have anyway; other people will tell you about the Navy, and so I am also not going to speak to you about the Navy this morning), but what I would like to do would be to present to you a challenge -- a challenge of a new outlook on some very serious problems that confront the United States. As a result, you are going to hear a lot more questions than answers from me this morning -- but they are serious questions with which all of us are now faced, and will be faced until we either get some answers or quit.

I would like to start now with a scrutiny of basic attitudes. It is obvious that our enemy is the Sino-Soviet Bloc. This is where the threat to us and to the entire Free World comes from. How do you look upon the Soviet Union? If you look upon this State as a traditional State, buttressed by great military strength, you are probably fairly optimistic that over the long haul we can contain it by military strength alone.

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But most of us, I think, would vigorously protest that we do not look upon the Soviet Union in exactly this way. Instead, we would say that the Soviet Union was in the hands of a dedicated revolutionary group who believe that they are destined, as a party, to turn the entire world communistic and to rule it from Moscow. But, regardless of our protests, many of us tend to slide into the error of judging the Soviet regime by traditional nation-state standards. We pride ourselves in liking to think in logical terms, for we thus feel more at ease in judging an otherwise puzzling situation. The danger here is (and you can see frequent evidence of it) that we tend to believe the Soviet objectives are limited; that skillful compromise can solve our problems; and that the Soviets can gradually be educated to believe that reason is the best guide of conduct. In short, some of us erroneously believe that if we sit and wait, the situation will evolve within the Soviet Union to our satisfaction.

What I am getting at is simply this: as a people, we have indeed been very clearly informed by those who are running the Communist Bloc that we are their enemy; that we will be their victim; and that they intend to eradicate our way of life. For them, a campaign of attrition against us is the order of the day -- and this has been going on for over forty years. For them, waging such a war of attrition is a virtue, for the world

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demands it (so they assert). Our people have not squarely faced up to this problem. It is not surprising that the Communists are encouraged by the successes they have had. In short, they have clear, simple objectives and the will to pursue those objectives. They feel that they have nothing to lose and the whole world to gain.

Why are we, as a people, so unwilling to face up to this fact? Why can't we realize that we cannot react violently to one provocation and then sink back into lethargy? Why do recurring efforts of Soviet peace stir a new, but vain, hope? Why do we tend to believe that the Soviets will give up their philosophy, perhaps even give up their religion, and watch their Communist edifice collapse?

One of the basic reasons why we want to believe that lies in our national character. We are optimistic if we are left to our own devices. We find compromise a desirable solution when we think that honor itself is not sacrificed. We find deliberate, sustained hatred and aggressiveness alien to our spirit. Therefore, when we are not faced with a dramatic Communist push we like to believe that, after all, things are not quite so bad. We tend to judge the Soviet leaders by the standards we use to judge a neighbor, an ally, or a traditional nation-state. I am stressing this simple, basic subject because confusion over the enemy threat can set off a whole chain of

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decisive, but disastrous, evaluations of that threat.

Let's look at this matter more closely. First, let me summarize what I believe is the Soviet approach toward reaching its objectives. We must, of course, allow for every contingency in Soviet actions. The action which is most talked about is the possibility of a Soviet sneak attack against the United States. Simple prudence on our part demands alertness for this type of attack, but certainly it does not demand hysteria or obsession. There is no real evidence that the Soviets have directed their energies toward such an attack. It is true that they have developed a long-range air force, but it has remained essentially a medium-bomber force. We have seen what the Soviets can do with a project when they get overriding priority to that project. I think it is obvious that a deliberate intention to cripple the United States as soon as feasible by a sneak attack has not had such priority in the Soviet Union.

What, then, is their way of achieving their aims? I think we have ample evidence, not very difficult to find, that their means to an objective are not primarily military (and that also includes navies as well as air forces and armies). The Soviets will never make the mistake of becoming militarily weak. They prefer to gain their objectives through the threat of force and, on the other side of the same coin, through the prestige of real military strength.

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I believe that we have consistently erred as a nation in attributing to the Soviets an intention to gain their objectives solely by the use of military force. This implies that their military men have been given a mission of conquest for the Soviet Union; the evidence, however, points the other way. It is a group of professional political conspirators who carry out the mission of the Communist World. Their design is to disintegrate the institutions of the Free World and to remake civilization. For them, military strength is an important instrument in political warfare and is one of the several different means by which to gain their objectives, step by step, in the cautious manner of conspirators.

They have shown -- and they now show -- a rare skill in the psychological use of good military strength. They have often gained their ends without having to commit their forces, and that is important! But, more important, they are schooled in the discipline of the prudent use of military force. Their cardinal rule is that the destiny of Communism must not be jeopardized by hair-brained risk. This has been so in the past and it seems likely to continue in the future. This helps to explain why we "miss the boat" so often in trying to deal with such an enemy.

He has a clear objective. He disposes all of his resources in all of his territory in one integrated campaign to gain that

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objective. He fights in the fields of politics, of economics, of psychology, and of culture. He fights hard all of the time on all fronts and in every area. He aids and abets trouble-makers throughout the Free World. He can increase or reduce pressure. He can talk gently, or he can bellow. Across the entire spectrum of this type of warfare he uses his resources to weaken the Free World, to confuse it, to frighten it, and, finally, to make it feel helpless. The main point is, of course, that he is committed to making this kind of Communist war against us, and he never doubts this. For him, it is normal. For him, he must carry out that kind of a battle or he, himself, becomes an enemy to the revolution. We in the Free World somehow or other refuse to take this very seriously. Theoretically, we recognize it, but we do not really act as though we took it seriously at all.

Let me offer an illustration of how we unconsciously adapt ourselves to the Soviet ground rule. If you face up to the facts, you will have to admit that the ground rule laid down by the Soviets is that the battleground of the cold war is on Free World territory; it is never within the Soviet Bloc. If you reflect upon this for a moment, I think you will also have to admit that most of our Free World has tacitly accepted that the Soviet Union will meddle or attack beyond its borders but that we, ourselves, may not make trouble within the territory under their control.

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When the Geneva Summit Meeting was in preparation, you probably remember that the Soviets stated flatly Eastern Europe was not acceptable as a subject of discussion. Their attitude during and following the Hungarian uprising also followed exactly the same pattern. However, when Great Britain and France attacked Egypt, the Soviets had a great deal to say -- including the threat to destroy France and Britain. We witnessed a similar situation when Syria falsely claimed that Turkey was about to attack her. And, recently, the Soviets declared themselves involved when we responded to Lebanon's request for aid. What they say in effect is this: that what happens in the non-Communist World is their business, but what happens in the Communist World is nobody else's business. Unfortunately, the Free World has let itself be conditioned to accepting that Soviet point of view.

The Free World shudders at the thought of any Western interference within the Communist orbit. It also shudders when the Communists threaten to interfere with a Free World situation. I am merely laying bare for you a tacit principle of the entire cold war. It is not very pleasant to contemplate that something very dangerous happens to the man who comes to accept that the "other fellow" will always carry the ball.

To what can a situation like this lead? It is simply this: you approach a situation where the enemy defines the issues; where the enemy makes the challenge; where the enemy selects the

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ground on which the conflict is to be waged; and where the enemy chooses the weapons. This is very well worth reflecting upon, because it points up the power of purpose contrasted with the weakness of drifting. Lest you misinterpret that remark, I mean that the people of the United States, as a people, are drifting -- not just the Administration, Truman or Eisenhower, not just Congress, not the Democrats, not the Republicans, but we, as citizens of the United States, are drifting. We cannot brush this off on somebody else's shoulders for the burden is on the shoulders of each of us.

I would now like to examine the role of military power today. Here, again, let's take a long look at some of the common working concepts which we have taken for granted.

In the first place, our nation has grown accustomed to thinking that the only problem of the United States lies in deterring an all-out Soviet surprise attack against us with nuclear weapons. This is a legitimate problem in itself, and all aspects of the threat to the United States must be examined, including that grave one. But to become totally preoccupied with this contingency alone can leave us helpless before the many other courses of action available to an imaginative enemy and, of all the things we should have learned by now, we should have learned that the Soviets are imaginative.

Once having decided that prevention of an all-out attack on

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the United States represented the military facts of life, there was a temptation for us to try to make our military strength for strategic retaliation do the job of preventing the Soviets from any type of aggression. I do not mean by this any type of military aggression, but I mean any type of aggression: political, economic, as well as small military aggressions. "Massive retaliation," which became a slogan, reigned for a time under the guise of a practical concept and a simple solution. What happened? The Communists continued the expansion of their influence and prestige -- regardless of our ability to destroy them, regardless of the strategic nuclear threat.

A strategic nuclear stalemate has now come about. The Soviets fully realize (we have told them, and they are convinced that we mean it) that a sneak attack against the United States is filled with the risk, or probably even the certainty, that we will destroy Russia. They know, we know, everybody knows if they attack the United States, Russia itself will be wiped out; it will be destroyed. Thus, just as long as we have sufficient strength to assure them of significant retaliation, the possibility of an all-out attack becomes very remote.

The possibility should become even more remote once POLARIS is functioning in sufficient numbers. POLARIS brings out more clearly a misconception that we have had about deterrence. To deter general nuclear war, we must have a real, demonstrable, and, preferably, an invulnerable capability to inflict

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wide-spread capabilities. A true deterrent has no gradations: it does not need a condition of "more deterrent" or "most deterrent." For these reasons, the Navy of the future may have only a relatively small percentage of its forces devoted to the all-out nuclear deterrent problem, but these forces will virtually be invulnerable. Regardless, however, of how much we think POLARIS can contribute, regardless of how much we realize that POLARIS can destroy Russia, it is not the only problem and it is not even the greatest problem; therefore, we have to have POLARIS, but not in large numbers. It is clear that if the Soviets had a consuming intention to build up as rapidly as possible to attack the United States, their long-range air force would have long since been a true intercontinental force. They have demonstrated their capability of building this equipment, but they have not built it.

I am not emphasizing these factors to challenge the necessity for preparedness against a sneak attack, although that is necessary, but that preparedness has been overaccomplished. We are overinsured for that one contingency. I simply stress that we must widen our sights to include the necessity for adequate preparedness against the more probable enemy courses of action. These enemy courses of action, which can be decisive in the long run, fall far below the flash point of general war.

Gentlemen, every American likes to bargain. We all prefer

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a quick and simple solution to our problems. This is fine, whether we are working among ourselves or with allies who share our way of thinking, but it will not work with the Communists. It certainly cannot be applied to the military facts of life today. We are not engaged in any tennis match where losing a set or so can be made up later. We are engaged in a power struggle in which the enemy is out for attrition. Through consolidated strength and rigid controls, he intends to make his day-by-day victories irreversible. By tradition and temperament, we Americans think of the "white" of peace or the "black" of war. We are not very much at ease with the dragging, nagging cold war that is neither peace nor general war but that vast "gray" area in between.

This gray area is the area of Communist warfare and the area of attrition. It is the avoidance of dramatic Soviet military attacks, but the constant nibbling all the way around the periphery of the world -- and those nibbles are going to come faster, and faster, and faster. Lebanon followed Suez, although there was quite a time in between; Taiwan followed closely on the heels of Lebanon; Berlin followed closely on the heels of Taiwan; and, several days ago, the Governments of Finland and Iceland fell.

The Government of Finland fell because of the economic pressure that was applied to it. The Soviets decided they did not like the leaders of Finland, so they broke the government.

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Finland did not want to break it, but the Soviets put direct economic pressure on her and said, "Either change your government or this pressure continues." And Finland changed her government. That will happen again. There are no Communists in the Finnish Government; they are anti-Communists, and that is why they were broken.

The Icelandic Government fell for a different reason and because of a different kind of Soviet pressure; Soviet political pressure from the Communist Party of Iceland. This is power demonstrated in the way they intend to use it. This is the power that we, as Americans, are going to have to combat. You cannot combat that kind of power with strictly military force. It is in this gray area of cold war that we have been living for the past thirteen years, an area in which we will go on living for a long, long while in the future. It is high time, therefore, for us as a people to face up to this and to coldly plan to operate on this basis for generations ahead.

Nations usually die not from being clobbered from without, or beyond their borders, but because of what happens to them from within. They die because they lose their stamina, their will, their willingness to work, and their character. Take Germany: she was clobbered twice, yet she is now a strong nation in Europe. Nations die because the people of the nation become so self-interested, perhaps even so selfish, that they

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allow that self-interest to interfere with their public interest. Their selfish interests become paramount, while their public interests take second place. They use public affairs to make private gains.

The history of the first democracy of the world, which fell, proves that this has been going on for a long time. Athens was the first city to have a democratic form of government. When it started out, it was one of the most powerful city-states in the world, and it lasted for a long, long time. It died not because of what Sparta could do, for Athens defeated Sparta over and over again; it died not because of what the Macedonians did to it externally. It died because the Athenians no longer would support their State; no longer would they give their services; no longer would they go out on the battlefield to fight; and no longer would they internally resist the pleasures that come from soft living. Philip of Macedonia made slaves of Athens. He made happy slaves of them, so that they were people who were perfectly happy and contented. All Philip asked was tribute, for them not to engage in any external affairs, and for them to be satisfied with living their lives out (which is a terrible thing to contemplate!)

What happened to Egypt and Rome? What is now happening to France?

France is a nation of great people, but no two Frenchmen

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can get along. They could not get a group of people who would work for the good of France; that is, exclusively for the good of France. Each political party in France was working primarily not for France but for the individuals or for their particular party. Why does de Gaulle have the strength that he has in France at the present time? De Gaulle has many faults, but he also has one virtue, and it is a virtue which Frenchmen now realize; he works for France. He does not work for de Gaulle; he does not work for a party. He works for France. Right or wrong, everything that he does in the international arena he does for the glory of France. He will bring France up -- and she will come up -- by doing many of the things which we will not like. But when de Gaulle dies, what happens to France? What can happen to France? There is no large group of Frenchmen who are willing to follow de Gaulle, and a man like de Gaulle never generates a successor of his own qualities. These things are serious things!

If we, as a nation, should ever come to convince ourselves that situations like Berlin, Greece, Lebanon, Korea, Quemoy and Taiwan are really little pieces of real estate of no decisive value, we shall then surely be on the road to disaster. It is quite true that any one of these situations, if taken by itself in terms of narrow logic, does not seem vital, and any one of them by itself is not vital. But if they are all taken together, and with the others that are certain to come along, they can be decisive.

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To what conclusion does all of this lead? Simply to this: the real aggression of Communism is on the day-to-day scene. It is not likely to be in an all-out nuclear attack against us so long as we maintain an adequate strategic nuclear deterrent. We have already witnessed how many people readily acquiesce our defense against local aggression as the first step in a chain reaction leading to all-out nuclear warfare. We know that the Soviets do not want the all-out nuclear exchange any more than do we. When they sponsor a local war, or when they shoulder us with a situation like Berlin, the Soviets are really in control of the situation. If they meet firm resistance in that situation, they talk; they have a conference. We attend the conference, but the action peters out. If they do not meet resistance, it is another addition to their power. The situation never again arises because that situation has then been included within the Soviet Bloc.

Here, then, is the area in which we must expect to take them on -- and where we will have to take them on. This is the area where the true imbalance of our preparedness now exists. If we buckle in this area through lots of talk and inadequate preparedness or inadequate willingness, we are submitting to defeat by attrition. Under those circumstances there will be no death agony, but there will be a prolonged, gradual, almost painless ending of the life and of the spirit of the Free World.

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Remember that the Communist aggression calls for a lot more than the proper type of military preparedness. Military preparedness in itself is vital, but Communist aggression calls for a lot more than that. The problem which we face is one for the entire nation, for every individual. Our country has always been dedicated to the "pursuit of happiness." But far too many of our people have narrowed this to the "pursuit of material happiness." The Soviets, on the other hand, are dedicated with a discipline to the "pursuit of power." This is what is involved in Berlin, in the Taiwan Straits, and all over the Middle East -- power.

Too many Americans are prone to react to these situations by extremes. One reaction is this: that a small area of the Free World is not worth fighting for. The other reaction, and one which is often coupled with the first, is this: that the Soviets will initiate general war if we contest Communist campaigns in any one of these local areas. Neither reaction is worthy of us. The first reaction throws overboard our principles and our honor; the second brings on the psychological paralysis in the face of every Soviet move.

In this power struggle of today, general war is remote because the Soviets do not want it and are not going to jeopardize their power base for any non-Soviet territory. This has been proved over and over again. Every time they have been

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faced with the possibility of a fight, they have walked back the cat. Berlin is a challenge, and the Soviets would like to see us fold -- a victim of our own fears. If we stand firm in this and all of the other day-to-day pressure areas, they will turn off the heat on Berlin and wait for another day and another place. We cannot give in to attrition, and this is where the decisiveness and the struggle will surely and eventually lie.

Gentlemen, the cold war in which we now are engaged will last just as long as we shall live. How we make out in this war will be largely dependent upon what we, as a nation, are willing to do: how hard we are willing to work; whether we have enough strong men to shoulder the public interest and let their private interests go.

The creed of service and action has been the creed of the Navy for a long time. As naval officers, you have great responsibilities for the future of your country: responsibilities of example, of advice, and, quite frequently, of action.

May you have the knowledge, the power and, above all, the willingness to carry those responsibilities!

Thank you, gentlemen!

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QUESTION AND ANSWER PERIOD TO
THE LECTURE BY ADMIRAL BURKE

Q: Under the classification which we have here, could you tell us a little bit about the plans (which I understand are in preparation) regarding what we, as naval officers or military men, can do to further the cold war effort?

A: That is another lecture, but there is a lot we can do. When we deal with foreigners, nearly all of them believe us to be a rich, carefree nation, with an unlimited amount of money and very little consideration of people. To them, we are a nice sort of people, but we don't have very much good commonsense. And we certainly don't realize what foreign people have to put up with. We don't have very much consideration. When we go abroad, we frequently live in American colonies. We skim the area. We have a hell of a good time. We see the Lido (I like it, too). When I was in Japan, where I went at the beginning of the Korean War, the Japanese then were trying to reconstruct their country. When I came down in the morning and would see General MacArthur go by with his big car, with his chauffeur, with his motorcycle escort, he was king (and I used to be proud of him because he was king); he was acting like a king. The Japanese bowed when he went by -- he was a king! But when

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you saw the average American also acting like a king, it wasn't so good. There was a little resentment when the Japanese got off the streets as we went by (and they did that in those days!). We were a little arrogant -- not the big people, but a lot of little people; not everybody by any means, and not even most of the people by any means, but there still were enough people who were. The Japanese thought that we were an arrogant race because we permitted our fellow Americans to be arrogant. When I returned from Korea, after having been there for quite a while, and I came into San Francisco, I was a little bit ashamed. I could not quite figure out then quite why, but I think I have it figured out now: it was because when I was in Korea the people did not have a damned thing but the clothes on their backs (and very little of them); they had very little food; they had very little anything. But they fought hard! They had faults, a lot of faults, but all in all they were pretty good people. They were fighting the same battle that we were fighting -- for a little bit different cause, of course, but we were on their side and they were on ours. They were happy, for they were accomplishing something; they had a sense of achievement; they were going places; they had a goal and an objective. When I landed in San Francisco, everything was soft. Nobody gave a damn for anything. We didn't have an objective; we weren't really willing to do

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things for our fellow men. That is why a lot of people in this country do things for charity, and that is why you can get volunteers for any charity, for any good-will mission or anything like that: because people need a sense of achievement, a sense of doing something beyond themselves, and they don't know what else to do. So the most important thing that anybody can do is to have an understanding heart. That is much more important than the physical things that you can do. The other thing is to understand foreign people. When you go to Indonesia, don't "cream" Indonesia, but learn about Indonesia. What makes Indonesians act the way they do, which is very funny from our viewpoint (it may be funny from their viewpoint, too, but I don't know). We don't understand it. We have got to understand Indonesia, if we are ever going to have any great influence there. We have got to understand the Arabs, hard as it is. We have got to understand the morals of the Arabs. I'll admit that I don't have the least idea what makes them tick in the way they tick, but we have got to have some Americans who do understand them as a nation. We have got to quit chiseling. We chisel on each other. Our youngsters chisel on each other in school. As a nation, we chisel. Here we are, the strongest and greatest nation and the leader of the world, and what do we do? We sell old military equipment at the price it cost us to a nation whom we are supposed to help. Why do we do it? To get money to buy new equipment.

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This great nation chisels on things like that. Temporarily, we got some advantages from that, but we chiseled and chiseled our honor away, and the foreigners know that by now. We aren't doing it any more, but we did it. We are apt to get the quick advantages, and we have got to stop that and stand for the same damned things our grandfathers stood for. They aren't 100% right, but they are 95% right and we have got to stand on that 95%. We have got to quit weasling in all of these statements that we write, so to make sure that all contingencies are taken care of. We write a policy (to make it interesting) on how you treat your wife (or something else). You can write that policy in one page and have everything nearly all in there. But if you want to get it exactly right, it will take 150 pages (and it won't mean a damned thing). What can naval officers do? We have got to work like hell ourselves, and we have got to cause other people to work. We do work hard -- the Navy has always worked hard. But it has got to; we have got to continue. We have got to work with people; we have got to understand them; we have got to have friends in foreign countries; we have got to understand foreign countries; and we have got to make sure that we, ourselves, are an example to our own citizens. If that sounds like a broad-brush treatment, it is. But, in general, I think it covers the question.

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Q: Admiral, do you believe that the services have an obligation to bring to the American public some indication of the severity of the Communist threat? If you so believe, do you think that the services are likely at any time in the future to be permitted to do so?

A: Yes, and yes! Of course it is our duty to do this, and we are permitted to do it. I blasted off on Quemoy and Matsu. Nobody else was going to do it. I found that out first, when I tried to sell the idea. Everybody thought that the idea was good, but they said: "Don't brush it off on me, Joe. It is not popular; it is tough. Nobody wants to do that. You will cause a hell of a lot of trouble!" Ex-Democrats and Republicans, well you couldn't get anybody to take that issue! Somebody has got to sound off (and there are a lot of military people who are sounding off now on this same line). This is not strictly my views and my speech. There are a hell of a lot of people in all of the military services that believe that sort of stuff -- and it is true! It is getting real dangerous. There are going to be more and more speeches on that, and more and more effort made to try to convince people. So I think that they will let us do it. You can't stop anything that is right -- you can't stop it! And I don't think people will really try.

Q: Admiral, I don't think any of us need to be convinced that

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we need to change our philosophy and approach in this country toward greater sacrifice, even if it means giving up our second Cadillac. But we, as military men preaching this doctrine, get the same accusing finger that you get, which generally is: "Yes, all you want is more money for the military." There is a minute minority of Americans that could sell the American public on this idea (and I have in mind the press), which leads to my question: Just how do we convince people like Walter Lippmann, David Lawrence, Joseph Alsop, Edgar Ansel Mowrer, and the rest of the writers whose material people read, that they should preach this approach, tell the people the facts, and sell the American public on it, instead of criticizing us? They are the ones who raise the human cry of which you just spoke.

A: Well, because we have been guilty of doing just what they accuse us of doing -- of going out on a platform just about this time of the year. This is a good time of the year for military people to get out on a platform, because it is just before the budget is put to bed, Congress is being influenced, and it is a wonderful time to get out and show how we in our particular service are doing. We are all guilty of it. We in the Navy are not as adept as we ought to be, but we are all guilty of just that sort of stuff. You can pick up any newspaper now and you will find the tremendous advances

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that have been made by any particular service. So we are guilty of doing just what they accuse us of doing. How do you get to the newspaper people? By talking to them. You don't convince anybody by one argument. I don't convince anybody by standing up here on this platform and making one speech. If you already believe what I have had to say, then you were convinced before I got here. All I can ever hope to do with one speech at one time is to reassure the people who already believe that way and to cause some doubts in the minds of the people who do not. That is all you can do with newspaper people. You can't do it with talking to a newspaper man or pounding the desk once. A lot of people have to talk to them. They have to hear it over and over again. They have to become convinced -- and they are cynical people! Essentially, most of them are good people. I made a speech out in San Diego to the Newspaper Fraternity. I didn't think it was a very bad speech, but the censor (not the censor, but the Public Information Officer) wanted to take out part of it. (This was the SecDef's Office, so I am not blasting our own Public Info people). I asked, "Why? Is it because of policy or is it securitywise?" They answered, "No, it is none of that. It is just that you are going to get into a lot of trouble with the newspaper people who are helping you." So I said, "Well, never mind. I'll get help

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afterwards." So they let me say it, and the newspaper people who were helping me took it pretty well. The speech was on their responsibility for finding out what is the truth. Instead of their just getting a superficial examination, in getting some catch phrases and things like that, and in trying to tear everybody to pieces, to find out what is the truth. Why do they repeat the Communist slogans? You can pick up a Peking broadcast, and in three days the damned thing, without credit, will be repeated in a good many papers of the United States. But they will have forgotten by that time that it has come from Peking. That is their responsibility. One or two people are not going to do it, but a lot of people can. So that means that you have got to talk to them over and over again. Every time you can corner one, preach to him!

Q: I think that your diagnosis of the present situation, in terms of the relation of military power to other forms of national power, is one that has appealed to us a lot in these last few months, but one which seems to be slow to realization and acceptance among the people and possibly within the Government. Do you have any idea of how much this line of diagnosis is being realized and acted upon within the hierarchy of the Government?

A: The Government is a big, amorphous organization. When you

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speak of the Government, you speak of a great many facets. When you speak of a movement, of a cause, of an objective, or something like that, and the views of the Government on it, it is very seldom that you can give a true analysis of what Government's views are. First, different people view the problem from different aspects. In other words, each group or activity takes the problem from its aspect. They look at the elephant from a different point of view. However, there are a lot of people in the Government -- in Congress, in the Administration, and people who are advising the Government (perhaps our "shadow government," if there is such a thing) -- who realize that we haven't been doing so well. Some of the people are concerned about our economic health; some of them are concerned about our political integrity; some of them are concerned about the situation which will permit Mr. Hoffa to run around this country with all of the charges which have been made against him (most of which are probably true) and still be honored, still be a leader among his Teamsters. There are a lot of people who are worried about that. I suspect, sometime or other, that something will be done about it. I am sure that this is going to come about sometime. If it doesn't, we, as a nation, are going to go down -- as we will deserve to have done. So I think we will come out of it, but it is going to take a lot of awakening.

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Q: Admiral, you very clearly stated the requirements for containing international Communism. I would like to hear your views on what you think will happen if we merely contain it for the next fifty years and don't do something more aggressive.

A: Like what?

Q: In the Berlin situation, for instance. Let's say that our basis of negotiation is to transfer all of Berlin to West Germany and a corridor leading into Berlin to West Germany.

A: If I were in the Army, I would say: "Never select an outpost that you cannot either hold from or retreat from." Berlin is something that we cannot give up, but it is too damned bad that we took it and got ourselves into that mess in the first place. There was a time when we could have done something about Hungary -- and we didn't! Poland may be the next place; or maybe it will be Iran or Iraq -- but we have got to move! Until we prove to outside the Iron Curtain that we are willing (and we are going to have to prove this over and over again) to stand by people who are willing to fight on the same side we are willing to fight on, we aren't going to be able to convince anybody inside the Iron Curtain that we mean business. The Hungarians revolted because some of them thought that we would help.

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Well, we didn't help, and those people are now dead. It is going to be a long time before anybody else under the Iron Curtain revolts, in the belief that we will help because we did not help. So we are going to have to demonstrate that over and over again. It is true that we cannot let Berlin go. But, what do we do about it? It is a very enticing thing that the Russians are offering. We cannot just go in with military force and say: "To hell with you! We will go in there with a couple of divisions, or ten divisions, or a hundred divisions and hold Berlin!" That doesn't get you a damned thing. What you are dealing with is men's minds. You are dealing with property, too, but mostly it is with men's minds. You have got to handle your property so that you convince people. We have got to hold Berlin not with a large number of troops, but with a few. And so that those few troops will stand there to the death, and bayonet anybody that comes in. We will not permit anybody else in Berlin -- not with large numbers of troops, however, but with a few troops. I think that perhaps demonstrates what I really mean: that is, that we cannot make major projects out of all of our troubles. Our troubles are going to be a series of little troubles. What we have to do is to have a few little people stand fast, and not make a major project out of each trouble. Does that avoid your question?

Q: Yes, except I wonder what is going to happen in the next

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fifty years if all we do is merely contain them?

A: Have you got any suggestions?

Q: No, I am looking for - - - --

A: So is everybody else. When you start going downhill, the first thing that you have got to do is to stop going downhill. Then, after you stop going downhill, you start finding out how to get back on top of the hill again. But, first, you have got to stop the slide.

Q: You have recently indicated publicly that you believe the Navy requires more than one nuclear-powered carrier. This morning, in your speech, you have indicated that you believe there will be many more of these small incidents around the world which will require a maximum of participation by the Navy. For the cost of one of these nuclear-powered carriers, we could get a great deal in the way of smaller ships -- nuclear-powered destroyers, and things of that sort -- which, it appears to me from where I sit, might be more advantageous for our purposes than what you have indicated in your speech.

A: General, you see that controversy about carriers is not only between the Air Force and the Navy, but we have it within the Navy. You have got half a dozen questions there. First, you aren't going to get any nuclear-powered destroyer -- not because of money, but because the God-damned thing cannot be

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built. The smallest power plant that we can build now is 110 pounds per horsepower. You are a destroyer sailor, so you know that the conventional power plant of a destroyer is about 30 pounds per horsepower. We could build a power plant which would fit into a destroyer of about 3,500 tons if we could get the rate of horsepower ratio down to about 50 pounds per horsepower. True, some day that will happen, but unless destroyer people want to be eaponized (which I don't think they do), it won't happen very soon. So the smallest ship that we could put a nuclear power plant in is a frigate -- that is, a frigate by a little stretching of the hull. That is the smallest ship that we can get now. So, money won't help you. To get back to the other problem -- why the hell do we want a new carrier now when we are so badly in need of other types of ships? Why don't we put more money into destroyers and submarines? (I can answer this question, because I get it daily either within the Navy or outside the Navy). Let's take the need for carriers at all. The first thing we have to determine is this: Do we need carriers? We, in the Navy, are not wedded to any weapons system; we are not wedded to any particular type of ship. We have gone through all of the types of ships that they have. We adapt things to our use; when they are no longer useful, we throw the damned things away and take the other pieces of equipment that will do the job

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that we have to do to control the sea. What could we have done in Lebanon without carriers? Where are our bases that we could support any possibility of an action without carriers? You have got Adana - and then you have got Adana -- and you are through, unless you get Turkey involved. So the only way that we can apply any airpower at all is to have carriers there. That doesn't mean that carriers did it all -- I don't mean that. But I mean that you have got to have carriers there to supply that quick reaction and heavy power at the beginning. Then, you can get other things with which to help. What would Taiwan have been if we hadn't had carriers? What would happen in Indonesia, if we have actions there, without carriers? And we have sent carriers off to Indonesia (it was not publicized, thank God, but they were there). So you need carriers now. But, do you need them in the future? Well, sometime in the future you perhaps will not need carriers or any other manned aircraft. Someday, there might be some way of handling by some other means the problems that are now handled with manned aircraft: either by missiles, or something else. But with anything that is on the books now, I don't see how, in the future, you can get the precision that is needed and the versatility that is needed -- that is, the handling of nuclear weapons down to a 20-caliber strafing attack -- by anything but manned aircraft. There is no way that we can solve the problem of search and attack except by manned

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aircraft. If you know the position of the target ahead of time, if you know what you want to hit before your launch, then you can do it with missiles sometime in the future. But you cannot go out and say: "Find out what is bothering those troops and clobber them!" You can't tell a missile that --or, if you can, it won't do any good as yet. You have got to have a man that can think. So as long as you need manned aircraft, we will have to have carriers, because there are a good many places where we have no bases. Then there are other places where we now have bases but where we are having a little trouble (like Morocco). So you are going to need carriers. Now, why in the devil do we need a big carrier? Why don't we get a little bit of a carrier and let that do? Why don't we get smaller carriers -- why do we have to build these tremendous things like the Forrestal and the Enterprise? When any of us go up against the enemy, we aren't going up against second-rate materiel. The wars may be limited, but the techniques will not be limited, particularly after the Chinese Communists made the stupid mistake of putting half-trained pilots against the ChiNats. The next time that thing occurs, they are going to be damned certain that they have good pilots and good aircraft; they are not going to take that rubbing, for that cost them! So we are going to have to go up against their best equipment that they can get. They can get the best equipment

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that Russia can devise, and the best equipment that Russia can devise is pretty good. So we are going to have aircraft that can compete with good Russian aircraft. That means that an F11F won't do it any more. This means that you are going to have to have all-weather aircraft. You have got to have F8U's, or F4H's, or F4D'S -- you have got to have really good aircraft. That means decks. The Enterprise has about a 750' landing area; the Essex has a 518' landing area -- or 200 feet difference. In World War II, land-based aircraft landed on a field of 5,500 feet, and that was plenty of area for all kinds of aircraft. Now, we are extending 10,000' runways, because our aircraft can't take off. The same thing has happened at sea: we have extended the landing runway 200'. The aircraft that we now have (not the ones we are going to have) are heavy; they land fast; and the kinetic energy that must be absorbed when the aircraft land is considerable (as you will find, to your surprise, when you come in on a short deck with an A3D, for your neck snaps). So you need that landing area. To get that landing area, you need a big ship. We would very much like to build a ship of something less than 1,000' long -- but you can't do it; at least, not to operate airplanes from it. There are a lot of technical reasons why a big aircraft carrier of the size of the Enterprise and the Forrestal is needed. But perhaps it

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be summed up in one statement: the accident rate per landing in the Essex-type carrier is about 44 per 10,000 landings (these are major accidents). Most of major accidents are now fatal accidents (that is not quite right, but there are many more now than there used to be because of speed and other things). In the Forrestal-type carrier, the ratio of accidents is 21 per 10,000 landings, or two to one. This is experience. This is not what we think it will be, but what has been. That is about the ratio of the effectiveness of the ship. There is another reason. (May I have until 3:00 o'clock?) You are a destroyer sailor, and if you are in an old destroyer you know what is happening to that destroyer. She is old; she is wearing out; the wiring is not so good; the pumps are a little bad; there are leaks around the piping that are commencing to trouble you; there is a little boiler trouble every now and then. The Essex-type are old ships. The merchant ship, or man-of-war, will last about twenty years -- but you can't stretch it much farther than that. When you ask an old ship to keep going at the same rate it did when it was new, it just won't do it. The Bennington lost her elevator over the side in a heavy storm - the whole damned thing fell off. Why? The cable stretched a little bit and tore away. It was a pretty rough storm! But I started to check to find out why they did not inspect the cables. Why didn't they

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know those cables had a little slack in them: They said: "Admiral, if she were true we could do that. But everything is getting stretchy and getting worn." The Essex contaminated her aviation fuel (that one really was troublesome) but, fortunately, not all of her tanks. What happened? It was rust from age. We had that examined by people outside, so as to make sure it was not a personnel error. The ships are getting old, so they have got to be replaced. If we have manned aircraft, they have got to be replaced with about a Forrestal type. So a new carrier is critical to us. If we are going to exert the power of the United States beyond our own borders, we are going to have to use manned aircraft; we are going to have to use carriers; and we are going to have big carriers. The final question is: Why do we need a nuclear carrier? A nuclear carrier has several advantages: (1) it will permit the use of a fixed-array radar, which will give you a 400-mile detection range (or a 500-mile one, if the airplanes get that high) instead of the short ranges which are now possible with the rotating antennae that we can put on ships; (2) there are no intakes or smokestacks to take in air or to get rid of gasses and, therefore, the ship is tighter; it is much easier to handle in an atomic cloud; fall-out doesn't bother you, as long as the oxygen holds out; you can move your island where it is most advantageous

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for you on the carrier, instead of having to put it where the stack is; there is greater flexibility in the handling of planes; it gives more volume for your aircraft fuel; and there are a lot of other things like that. Nuclear power in an aircraft carrier has the desirable military characteristics which a nonnuclear-powered ship does not have. The nuclear power is not essential, but the new aircraft carrier is essential -- and there comes your balance. You asked the question because you are a destroyer lad. What you have in the back of your mind is this: "Why, in God's name, aren't you building enough destroyers? You are a destroyer sailor yourself. But you get down there and you forget it! You aren't giving us what we need to do our job!" Then the submariners beat on me and say, "You've got to have more submarines! You remember what the Skate, the Sea Wolf, and the Nautilus did -- and we have got to have the submarines!" That is true all the way around. They are all correct for we do have to have them, but there is such a thing as balance. You have got to balance between all the various elements of the Navy, because no one element of the Navy can stand by itself. Carriers cannot stand by themselves; destroyers cannot stand by themselves; submarines cannot do the job by themselves. It takes the whole damned business, working together, each element proud of itself and proud of what it can do, each believing in his heart that he is

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in the best part of the best outfit in the world; having confidence enough in himself and confidence enough in his outfit that he can permit other people a little recognition, too; that he is good enough for that. With this balance, how many carriers do we need? Why do we not slip carriers a little bit and build other ships? We have -- we are now building carriers every other year; we are building a few destroyers, a few frigates; we are building an experimental research antisubmarine ship (I don't know what they are going to call it), which is some sort of an escort ship. It is a funny thing, with all sonar in the bow. The engines are not attached to the ship at all, but are in a cell. Maybe it will work. You need a few brand-new radical ideas (like the Albacore was); you need enough to carry on what you are doing; and you need to maintain the immediate readiness of the forces which you now have. Because if we go to war, we go to war with what we have -- not what we have got being built or what we have promised. So you have got to strike this balance -- there is no question. The Navy has many strengths. Probably the greatest strength which it has is the integrity of its officer corps: the willingness and the hard work which they must put into it. There are a lot of other strengths which the Navy has, but it has one very bad weakness (excuse me, General, I hate to give a lecture to our own people on the Navy): we spite each

other. It is good to have differences of opinion before decisions are made -- it is very good. When a problem comes up to me that has one answer only, I know damned well that it has been railroaded; it can't be that good; there must be some other reasons for it, so it goes back. To have the various answers come up, and let people argue, that is good. Nothing is ever absolutely right and nothing is ever fixed. But we do more harm in the Navy by tearing down other elements of the Navy than any other group. The Air Force get their arguments to use against the carrier from where? From naval officers. Some lunkhead builds up a lot of half-truths, because he believes his element is more important than aircraft carriers. The other day, I had to defend surface ships from this criticism: that no surface ship can possibly live; that the day of the surface ship is really over. I tried to run that down. Where did it come from? From naval officers. The lad who started that did not intend that to happen, but he knew better. In his enthusiasm for submarines, he forgot to stick to the truth; or, he forgot to tell the whole truth. This is very important. It is also important in interservice elements. There are a lot of things I don't like about the Army, including the Nike ZEUS; there are a lot of things I don't like about the Air Force, including the B-70 (which I think is going to be too fast, too late). But, still, there are

some good elements in both the Army and the Air Force. Every time we start tearing down the Army or the Air Force, we, ourselves, lose a little bit. True, we have suffered in the Navy in the past because we haven't fought back soon enough or hard enough -- and you can only take so much. But when we do get into an interservice squabble, we have got to realize that we hurt all services. We can't afford not to get into an interservice squabble, or to be nice and placid, if somebody starts unfairly attacking us; we fight. But when we do fight, we hurt all services; we hurt the United States. This is true in inter-Navy fights. I don't mean to give this lecture to you, you just gave me the opportunity. But it is important that we, as a Navy, owe our strength to what we, as a whole in the Navy, can do. Carriers cannot live by themselves; destroyers cannot live by themselves; nobody can live by themselves under certain special circumstances. Every element of the Navy has some job that it can do better than any other element, or it would not be there. There are times when you call on each particular element in turn to lay in there and do its stuff so the rest can operate; if each cannot do its stuff, the rest cannot operate -- and that goes from the minesweepers all the way up. The minute that we lose that ability to operate with with one another, we have lost the ability to maintain control of the sea. The minute that

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you cannot call on a destroyer, a cruiser, or a carrier to do the things beyond its strict line of work, to radically change its plans, to rush in -- in other words, if we get rigid -- we have lost. We cannot have rigidity. We cannot operate unless all of us work real hard in the Navy, together.

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